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THE

POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

*WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TWO PREFATORY ESSAYS
AND NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY*

BY

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the Ninth he overthrows the exclusive claims of the rich and the *δαΐδεραι*.

41. καὶ τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν. See above on 1275 b 34.

42. κἀν. 'Ipsum κἀν non sequente et ita usurpatur ut a simplice καὶ vix distinguatur' (Bon. Ind. 41 a 36, where instances of this are given).

τοὺς γὰρ πολλοὺς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here probably remembers Hom. Il. 13. 237,

ξυμφορὴ δ' ἀρετὴ πᾶσι ἀνδράων καὶ μάλα λυγρῆν.

1281 b. 1. σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ. See vol. i. p. 293.

δμως stands in opposition to *ὡς ἑκαστός ἐστιν οὐ σπουδαῖος ἀνὴρ*. Compare its use in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιουμένοις κοινῇ ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς εἰσὶν δμως τινὲς οἱ εὐδοκίμοιυτες καὶ δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἐπιεικεῖς, and in De Part. An. 1. 5. 645 a 7 sqq., in both which passages the opposition is of a similarly indirect character.

2. ἐκείνων, 'the Few Best.'

οὐχ ὅς ἑκαστον. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 12.

οἷον τὰ συμφορητὰ δεῖπνα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 15. 1286 a 29, ὥστε ἐστίασι συμφορητὰ καλλίων μᾶς καὶ ἀπλῆς: Hesiod, Op. et Dies 722 sq.: St. Jerome, Epist. 26, c. 4.

4. πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων κ.τ.λ., 'for each of them, numerous as they are, may have a share of virtue and prudence, and the Many, when they have come together, just as they become one man with many feet and many hands and many senses, may likewise become one man with many excellences of character and intelligence.' Supply *ἐνδέχεται* from 1 with *ἔχειν*, 4. 'Αρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως is taken up by τὰ ἄβη καὶ τὴν δαΐνοιαν, 7. For *συνελθόντων*, where *συνελθόντας* might have been used (it is the reading of some of the less good MSS.), see notes on 13 and 1335 b 19, and cp. De Gen. An. 2. 6. 744 a 15 sqq. and De Gen. et Corr. 1. 4. 319 b 10 sqq. As to the gain of having many eyes, ears, hands, and feet, see c. 16. 1287 b 26 sqq. The Lacedaemonians dedicated a statue of Apollo with four hands and four ears, as he had appeared to the combatants in a battle near Amyclae (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 22: 2. 264); the Erinnys is conceived by Sophocles (Electr. 488) as having many hands and feet; we read of beings like Geryon (see vol. i. p. 256, note 5, and Stallbaum's note on Plato, Laws 795 C); and Aristotle imagines the same multiplicity extended to moral and intellectual gifts. He perhaps remembers in the passage before us Aristoph. Ran. 675 Didot,

Μοῦσα, χορῶν ἱερῶν ἐπιβῆθι καὶ ἴλθ' ἐπὶ τέρψην δοιδᾶς ἡμῶν,
τὸν πολλὸν ὀψομένη λαῶν ὄχλον, οὐ σοφίαι
μυρία κάθηται.

Compare also Eurip. Bacch. 359 Bothe (427 Dindorf),
σοφῶν δ' ἀπέχων πραπίδα φρένα τε περισσῶν παρὰ φωτῶν
τὸ πλῆθος δ' τι τὸ φαυλότερον
ἐνόμισε χρῆται τε, τόδε τοι λέγοιμ' ἄν,

and Xen. Cyrop. 4. 3. 21, where Chrysantas says that the mounted horseman gets the advantage of his horse's ears and eyes as well as his own, and thus comes to be something better than a centaur, for a centaur has only two eyes and two ears. The thought that the Many gathered in an assembly become, as it were, one man recurs in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 11 sqq. Plato had already (Rep. 493 A sqq.) compared the Many under these circumstances to a *θρέμμα μέγα καὶ ἰσχυρόν*, but had regarded the opinions of this great creature, whether on questions of drawing, or music, or politics (493 D), as the reverse of wise, and the Sausage-seller in the Equites of Aristophanes (752 sqq. Didot) finds the Athenian Demos far cleverer at home than in the Pnyx (cp. Demosth. Prooem. 14. p. 1437). On the other hand, bodies of men acting as a whole have sometimes been credited by good observers with a superiority to the individuals composing them taken singly. Thus 'Canning used to say that the House of Commons as a body had better taste than the man of best taste in it, and I am very much inclined to think that Canning was right' (Letter of Lord Macaulay, Feb. 1831: Life and Letters, 1. 174). 'The quick and correct feeling of the House of Commons as a body is very striking' (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in 1820: Life by S. Lane-Poole, 1. 294). The House of Commons, it is true, is a more or less picked assembly. Compare, however, also Plin. Epist. 7. 17. 10, opinor, quia in numero ipso est quoddam magnum conlatumque consilium, quibusque singulis iudicii parum, omnibus plurimum.

7. τὰ ᾗθῃ καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. For the distinction between τὰ ᾗθῃ and ἡ διάνοια, which evidently repeats ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, 4, Bonitz (Ind. 185 b 61) compares 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 38 sq.

διὸ καὶ κρίνουσιν ἄμεινον κ.τ.λ., 'hence' (i. e. because they possess as a Whole these manifold excellences of character and intelligence) 'the Many [not only are better than the Few, but] also judge better both works of music and works of the poets.' Socrates was of a different opinion (Diog. Laert. 2. 42: 3. 5), and Plato also (Rep.

493 A sqq.: Laws 670 B, γελοῖος γὰρ δ γε πολλὸς ὄχλος ἡγούμενος ἱκανῶς γινώσκων τὸ τε εὐάρμοστον καὶ εὐρυθμον καὶ μὴ, and 700 A-701 B). Aristotle here (speaking to some extent aporetically) echoes the compliments which it was the fashion for comic poets to shower on their audiences (Cratin. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 51: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 192),

χαῖρ', ὃ μὲν' ἀχρεὺς γέλωτος ὀμίλει, ταῖς ἐπιβδαῖς,
τῆς ἡμετέρας σοφίας κριτὴς ἔρισται πάντων.

10. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ., 'but it is just in this that men of complete excellence differ from each individual of the Many.' I follow Vict. Giph. Bern. and Sus. in my rendering of διαφέρουσιν. Sepulv. Lamb. and Welldon render it 'are superior to,' but the former rendering suits 16 sq. and 19 sq. better. Plato had claimed (Rep. 484 sqq.: compare the picture drawn of Theaetetus in Theaet. 144 A sq.) that there was an union of many great qualities in the philosophic nature, and Aristotle says the same thing of the σπουδαῖος. For οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν cp. Isocr. De Antid. § 316, τοῖς καλοῖς καγαθοῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

11. ὅσπερ κ.τ.λ., 'as indeed men say that beautiful persons differ from those who are not beautiful and pictures done by art from the original objects.' For other instances of the chiasmus which we note in ὅσπερ, 11—ἀληθινῶν, 12, see note on 1277 a 31. For τῶν ἀληθινῶν, cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 19, τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις. Sus.³ (Note 566: Sus.⁴, 1. p. 399) has already referred to the remark addressed by Socrates to Parrhasius in Xen. Mem. 3. 10. 2, and Vict. and Giph., followed by many others, to the mode in which Zeuxis obtained the ideal of womanly beauty which he depicted in his Helen. See Brunn, Geschichte der griech. Künstler 2. 80, 88 (referred to by Vahlen and Sus.), and Overbeck, Antiken Schriftquellen Nos. 1667-9, where Cic. De Invent. 2. 1. 3 is quoted, tum Crotoniatæ publico de consilio virgines unum in locum conduxerunt et pictori, quam vellet, eligendi potestatem dederunt. Ille autem quinque delegit . . . Neque enim putavit omnia quae quaereret ad venustatem in corpore uno se reperire posse ideo quod nihil simplici in genere omnibus ex partibus perfectum natura expolivit.

13. ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε, 'since if we conceive them' (i. e. τὰ συνηγμένα εἰς ἓν) 'to be separated from each other.' Here, as often elsewhere (see above on 1254 b 34), ἐπεὶ . . . γε 'justifies what precedes by pointing out what would result if the contrary were

the case.' As to the genitive absolute *κεχωρισμένων*, see Bonitz on Metaph. A. 9. 990 b 14, *νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος*. 'Omissi in genitivis absolutis subiecti exempla ex Aristotele conguessit Waitz ad Hermen. 10. 19 b 37, ex aliis scriptoribus Krüger, Gr. Gr. § 47. 4. 3. Usurpantur autem genitivi absoluti, cum per leges grammaticas videatur participium ad nomen quoddam ipsius enunciati primarii referendum fuisse (*νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος* idem quod *νοεῖν τι φθαρέν*), quo maiore vi participium, seiunctum illud ab enunciatione primaria, pronuntiatur, cf. Matthiae, Gr. Gr. § 561, Krüger l. l. § 47. 4. 2. Exempla Aristotelica contulit Waitz ad An. Pr. 2. 4. 57 a 33.' Thus in the passage before us *κεχωρισμένων* might well have taken the place of *κεχωρισμένων*, and this reading is actually given by *r* and in a blundered form by *M*^s, but *κεχωρισμένων* is certainly right. Waitz on De Interp. 10. 19 b 37 compares among other passages Probl. 35. 4. 965 a 1, *τὰ σώματα θεγγανόντων ψυχαιότερά ἐστι τοῦ θέρους ἢ τοῦ χειμῶνος*: see also Bon. Ind. 149 b 37 sqq.

15. *εἰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* *Μὲν οὖν* here introduces a slight qualification of what has been said (see above on 1252 b 27 sqq. and 1253 a 10): it is answered by *ἀλλά*, 20. For *περὶ πάντα δῆμον καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος*, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12, *ἐκ τοῦ δῆμον καὶ τοῦ πλῆθους*, and other passages in which the two words are used in much the same sense, e. g. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 24 sq. and 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 19 sq. The almost tautological repetition is for the sake of emphasis (see notes on 1323 b 29 and 1325 b 10). Aristotle probably remembers a remark of Socrates recorded in Diog. Laert. 2. 34, *πρὸς τὸ οὐκ ἐξιδίλογον πλῆθος ἔφασκε (Σωκράτης) ὁμοίον εἶ τις τετραδραχμον ἐν ἀποδοκιμάζων τὸν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων ὑπαρὸν ὡς δάκιμον ἀποδέχοιτο*, and see vol. I. p. 256, note 1.

18. For *τῇ Δία* see above on 1281 a 14.

ἐνίων, sc. *δήμων*, and so *ἐνιοι*, 20.

ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κ.τ.λ., 'for [if we claimed that every kind of demos possesses this superiority over the Few Good,] the same argument would hold in the case of brutes also, [which is absurd:] and yet what difference is there, so to speak, between some kinds of demos and brutes?' Aristotle refers in *ἐνιοι* especially to cases in which the demos is composed of *βάνανσοι ἀγοραῖοι* and *θῆρες*, and is therefore of a servile type (cp. 1282 a 15, *ἀν ἧ τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες*, and 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 24 sqq.). The *βάνανσοι* and the *θῆρες* have been ranked with slaves in c. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq., and the slave comes very near to the brute (1. 5. 1254 b 24 sqq.). The Many had been compared to brutes by Heraclitus (Fragm. 111, quoted above on

1281 a 40), by Plato (Rep. 496 C sq.), and by Aristotle himself (Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1095 b 19 sq.).

21. διὰ καὶ τὴν πρότερον εἰρημένην ἀπορίαν λύσειεν ἂν τις διὰ τούτων κ.τ.λ. The question referred to is that raised in c. 10. 1281 a 11, τί δὲ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. Isocrates had already declared for a similar solution of the question (Areopag. § 26, ὥς δι' συντόμως εἰπεῖν, δεικνύει διεγερτικῶς ἥσαν οἱ δὲ τὸν μὲν ὄμιον ὥσπερ τύραννον καθιστάναι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ κολλάειν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας καὶ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητούμενων, τοὺς δὲ σχολῶν ἔργον δυναμένους καὶ βίαν ἱκανὸν κατηγμένους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν κοινῶν, ὥσπερ εἰκότως . . . καίτοι πῶς ἂν τις εὖροι ταύτης βεβαιότεραν ἢ δικαιότεραν δημοκρατίαν, τῆς τοῦ μὲν δυνατωτάτους ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις καθιστάσης, αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὸν ὄμιον κύριον ποιούσης;). Half the interest of the chapter before us lies in this, that in it Aristotle supports the views of Isocrates against those of his master Plato. There are no doubt some expressions in the passage just quoted of which Aristotle would not approve; he would also, it would seem, wish the magistracies to be in the hands of the Few Best rather than of οἱ σχολῶν ἔργον δυναμένοι καὶ βίαν ἱκανὸν κατηγμένοι, though this is not quite clear, for in 1282 a 31 sq. he connects the ἐπιμελεία of 1282 a 26 with the possession of high property-qualifications.

24. ὅσοι μῆτε πλοῦσιοι κ.τ.λ. For the omission of εἰς see Vahlen on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7, where Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 5, καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρείοι καὶ τὰλλα ἔχουσιν εἰδότες ἐκ γενετῆς, is compared among other passages. For ἀξίωμα ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς μὲν, 'possess no ground of claim in respect of virtue,' cp. 2. 5. 1264 b 8 sqq. and Plut. De Adulatore et Amico, c. 33, μὲν δὲ ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς ἐμολογούμενον ἀξίωμα καὶ δόξαν.

25. τὸ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. If we supply φήσιν ὡς τις εἶναι with οὐκ ἀσφαλές from λύσειεν ὡς τις, 22, we shall thus be able to explain the infinitives ἀδικεῖν ὡς (which Sus., following Rassow, would alter into ἀδικεῖν ἀνάγκη) and ἀμαρτάνειν. Aristotle is still expressing the views which the imaginary τις of 22 might entertain. See notes on 1259 a 39 and 1280 a 27. Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristot. Poet. 1. 51, explains these infinitives as 'dependent on the thought contained in what precedes,' and refers to Waitz on Hermen. 19 a 23. The strong language here used as to the ἀφροσύνη and ἀδικία of the Many as individuals recalls the language of the Persian Megabyzus in Hdt. 3. 81, ὁμίλου γὰρ ἀχρηῖον οὐδὲν ἴσθι ἀξυνετότερον οὐδὲ ἰβριστότερον, and that of Plato in Rep. 496 C sq., where μανία and ἀδικία are ascribed

to them ; Aristotle himself, if he were expressing his own views, would perhaps use milder terms.

28. τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι μὴδὲ μετέχειν φοβερόν. Supply ἀρχῆς with μεταδιδόναι and μετέχειν, and εἶναι with φοβερόν. For the risks attending the presence in a Greek State of many ἄνθρωποι see [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 3. 12 sq. and Plut. Ages. c. 30. Cp. also 2. 12. 1274 a 17, μὴδὲ γὰρ τοῦτον (i. e. τοῦ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ εἰδέναι) κύριος ἐν ὁ δῆμος δοῦλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος, and 3. 15. 1286 b 18 sqq.

31. λείπεται δὴ κ.τ.λ. For τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ κρίναι, cp. c. 1. 1275 b 18, ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς, where κριτικῆς = δικαστικῆς, as appears from 1275 b 16, τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ διακρίναι. Hence τὸ κρίναι in the passage before us probably means 'judging,' but as Aristotle is speaking of functions exercised by the whole demos gathered in one assembly, and not broken up into a number of dicasteries, he must refer to the judicial functions which fell to the popular assembly (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 3 sqq.). When the holders of magistracies are said in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 25 sqq. βουλευέσθαι περὶ τῶν καὶ κρίναι καὶ ἐπιτάττειν, the word κρίναι is used in a different sense. In saying that, if the *δευτέροι* are excluded from the greatest offices, the only remaining course is to give them rights of deliberating and judging, Aristotle forgets that it would be possible to admit them to minor offices, a course suggested by him under certain circumstances in 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 27 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq.

32. Ἰδὼν. Cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 15—21, 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 7, and Plut. Solon, c. 18. As Solon gave the assembly no more power than this, it is difficult to understand why he took the trouble to institute a Boulê of 400 to aid it in the performance of these light duties. Aristotle points out in 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq. the risks besetting oligarchies in which οἱχ οὔτοι αἰρεῖνται τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ ἑν ὁ ἀρχοντίς εἰσιν. Was not the Solonian constitution exposed to similar risks? Contrast with Solon's policy that of the founder or founders of the Lacedaemonian Ephorate; this great office was made accessible to all the citizens. It is possible that Solon legislated on this subject in intentional opposition to them. The passage before us reads as if Solon was the first to give the right of electing magistrates to τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν at Athens. If this is Aristotle's meaning, we must suppose that in 2. 12. 1273 b 41 sqq., where he says that Solon found the magistrates already appointed by election, he means that, though they were thus appointed before Solon's time,

they were not elected by the people. On the question whether Aristotle's statements as to Solon here and in 1282 a 25 sqq. and 2. 12. 1274 a 15 sqq. are reconcilable with 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 8, τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐποίησε (sc. ὁ Σόλων) κληρωτὰς ἐκ προκρίτων, [ο]ὗς [ἐκείν]ῃ προκρίνει τῶν φυλῶν προδερκεν δ' εἰς τοὺς ἐνεία ἀρχοντας ἐκάστη δέκα, καὶ τοῖς [τοῖς] ἐ[πεκ]λήρου (or καὶ [ἐκ] τοῖς [των ἐκλ]ήρου), Gilbert (Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 136. 1) and Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 275. 1) take opposite views, the former thinking that they are and the latter that they are not. To me the latter view seems to be the true one.

τῶν ἄλλων τιτὲς νομοθετῶν. Hippodamus allowed the demos in his ideal State the right of electing the magistrates (2. 8. 1268 a 11), but (so Aristotle thinks) excluded the cultivators and artisans from the most important offices (1268 a 20 sqq.). In some oligarchies the demos, though excluded from office, had the right of electing the magistrates (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq.).

τάττουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας κ.τ.λ. Cp. Isocr. Philip. § 151, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς πράξεις σὲ τάττουσι, νομίζοντες τούτων μὲν σὲ καλλιστ' εὖ ἐπισταῆσαι κ.τ.λ. (Liddell and Scott s. v. τάσσω ii. 1). Aristotle speaks here as if to give the Many the right of electing the magistrates was equivalent to giving them deliberative authority; he distinguishes the two things, however, in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23 sqq. As to ἐπὶ τὰ κ.τ.λ. see note on 1284 a 35.

34. κατὰ μόνους. See vol. i. p. 257, note 2, and cp. Plato, Polit. 292 B, κατὰ πρώτας. The expression probably includes magistracies administered by Boards in addition to those held by single individuals.

35. For the order of the words in ἱκανὴν αἰσθησθαι see note on 1275 a 32.

μιγνύμενοι τοῖς βελτίοις, cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20, βουλευόμενοι γὰρ βέλτιον κοινῇ βουλευόμενοι πάντες, ὁ μὲν δῆμος μετὰ τῶν γυναικῶν, οὗτοι δὲ μετὰ τοῦ πλείονος. Dr. Arnold has already compared the passage before us with Thuc. 6. 18. 6, where Alcibiades says, καὶ νομίζουσι νεώτητα μὲν καὶ ἡῆρας ἀνὲν ἀλλήλων μηδὲν δύνασθαι, ἡμῶς δὲ τό τε φαῖλον καὶ τό μίσην καὶ τό πᾶν ἀκριβὲς εὖ ἐνγκερὰν μέλιστα εὖ λοχεύειν. See also above on 1276 b 37.

36. ἢ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφή. Food in a more or less raw state, standing in need of some further working-up to fit it for consumption, is termed 'impure food' in De Gen. An. 1. 20. 728 a 26, ἔστι γὰρ τὰ κατομήρια σπέρμα οὐ καθαρὸν ἀλλὰ δεόμενον ἐργασίας, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ

περὶ τοὺς καρποὺς γενίσει, όταν ᾗ μένῃ διατημένη (διατημένη Z, followed by Aubert and Wimmer, 'sifted through,' from διατῖω), ἔρεσσι μὲν ἢ τροφῇ, δείται δ' ἐργασίας πρὸς τὴν κάθαρσιν διὰ καὶ μεγνυμένη ἐκείνη μὲν τῇ γονῇ, αὕτη δὲ καθαρᾷ τροφῇ, ἢ μὲν γενῇ, ἢ δὲ τρέφει. Cp. De Gen. An. I. 18. 725 a 14, τῆς μὲν οὖν πρώτης τροφῆς περίττωμα φλέγμα καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον καὶ γὰρ τὸ φλέγμα τῆς χρησίμου τροφῆς περίττωμά ἐστιν σημεῖον δ' ὅτι μεγνύμενον τροφῇ καθαρᾷ τρέφει καὶ ποιοῦσι καταναλίσκεται. In Athen. Deipn. 109 c a καθαρὸς ἄρτος, or 'loaf of pure meal,' is opposed to a συγκομιστὸς ἄρτος, or 'loaf of unbolted' (i.e. 'unsifted') 'meal,' and in Hippocr. De Victus Ratione (vol. i. p. 673 Kühn) καθαρὰ ἄλευρα are opposed to συγκομιστὰ ἄλευρα. Aristotle evidently thinks that a large quantity of pure and impure food together is more nutritious than a smaller quantity of pure food. He was much interested in questions about diet (Plut. Alex. c. 8, δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ τὸ φιλιατρῆν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ προστρίψασθαι μᾶλλον ἐτέρων Ἀριστοτέλει, οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὴν θεωρίαν ἠγάπησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοσοῦσιν ἐβοήθει τοῖς φίλοις καὶ συνέταττε θεραπείας τινας καὶ διαίτας, ὥς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν λαβεῖν ἔστιν).

39. πρώτην μὲν is taken up by ταύτην μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 1282 a 23, and answered by ἄλλη δ' ἐστὶν ἐχομένη ταύτης, 24. Compare with this ἀπορία the remark ascribed to Anacharsis in Plut. Solon, c. 5 *sub fin.*, ἔφη δὲ κἀκείνῳ θαυμάζειν δ' Ἀνάχαρσις ἐκελευσὶ παραγενόμενος, ὅτι λέγουσι μὲν οἱ σοφοὶ παρ' Ἑλλήσι, κρίνουσι δὲ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς, and the argument ascribed to him in Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. 7. 55-59.

41. I have not traced elsewhere the construction ποιῆσαι ὄγιά τῆς νόσου τῆς παρουσίας, though Liddell and Scott give ὀγισθεῖς τοῦ τραύματος from Anon. ap. Suid. s.v. ὀγισθεῖς.

42. οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ἱατρός. M^s Pⁱ and possibly Γ add δ before ἱατρός, but probably wrongly: see above on 1253 b 11 and cp. c. 4. 1277 b 15, αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου, and 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32. See also Bon. Ind. 546 a 51 sqq.

ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. We must apparently supply ἔχει. For similar omissions of ἔχει see Bon. Ind. 306 a 16 sqq.

1. τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας. See note on 1297 b 20. 1282 a. The two words are conjoined also in 1. 9. 1257 a 4 and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 21.

3. ἱατρός δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and we give the name of physician to the executant, and to the man of directing skill, and thirdly to the man who is merely cultivated in the science.' For the contrast of δημιουργός and ἀρχιτεκτονικός, cp. Polyb. 8. 9. 2, 'ἴρωνος μὲν χορηγοῦ

γεγονότος, ἀρχιτέκτονος δὲ καὶ δημιουργοῦ τῶν ἐκπονημάτων Ἀρχιμήδους. In 1. 3. 1253 b 38 the ἀρχιτέκτων is contrasted with the ὑπεργέρτης and in Metaph. A. 1. 981 a 30 sqq. and b 31 sq. with the χειροτέχνης. As 10 ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην, Coray compares Plato, Protag. 312 B, οἷα περ ἡ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ καθαριστοῦ καὶ παιδοτρίβου· τοῦτων γὰρ οὐ ἐκείνην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἔμαθε, ὥς δημιουργοὺς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείῃ, ὥς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν εὐαίθετον πρέπει, and Bonitz (Ind. 558 a 4), De Part. An. 1. 1. 639 a 1, περὶ πάντων θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινοτέρων τε καὶ τιμωτέρων, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἐξέως εἶναι, ὡς τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσεγγερίαν, τὴν δ' οἷον παιδείαν τῷ πεπαιδευμένῳ γὰρ ἐστὶ κατὰ τρέπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρίναι εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων.

4. εἰσὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See critical note on 1282 a 5.

7. τὴν αἵρεσιν, 'the election' of magistrates and other masters of an art, as well as the review of their conduct.

8. καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίδασθαι ὀρθῶς κ.τ.λ., 'for choosing rightly also [no less than judging rightly] is the work of those who know the particular science or art.' The force of καὶ is here retained in καὶ γάρ. Compare the remarks of Cicero in Pro Plancio 3. 7 and 4. 9.

10. εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for if in the case of some kinds of work and some arts some non-scientific persons also do share in the ability to make a good choice, they do not do so in a higher degree than the scientific.' Supply τοῦ δίδασθαι ὀρθῶς with μετέχουσιν. Coray, followed by Bekk.², would read οὐ τοι in place of οὐ τι, but οὐ τι seems to be right here: see Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 70, who remarks, 'hoc videtur praemittendum esse, οὐτοι ita distare ab οὐτι, ut illud sententiam restringi significet, cum τι ad οὐ addito nihil aliud nisi particulae negantis vis prematur.' See also Bon. Ind. 539 b 18 sqq. The passage before us was perhaps present to the memory of Dionysius of Halicarnassus in De Thucyd. iud. 4, οἷδ' ἂν γὰρ τὰς Ἀπελλοῦ καὶ Ζεύξιδος καὶ Πρωταγόρου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γραφῶν τῶν διανομασμένων τέχνας οἱ μὴ τὰς αἰτὰς ἔχοντες ἐκείνοις ἀρεταῖς κρίναι κεκάλυπται· οἷδ' ἂν τὰ Φειδίου καὶ Πολυκλείτου καὶ Μύρωνος ἔργα οἱ μὴ τηλικούτοις δημιουργοί· εἴ γὰρ λέγειν, ὅτι πολλῶν ἔργων οὐχ ἦν τὸ τοῦ τεχνίτου κριτῆς ὁ ἰδιώτης.

15. ὅς ἢ τὸ πλεῖθος μὴ λίαν ἀνδραποδῶδες. In a passage of the Laws (701 A) which Aristotle probably has before him here Plato had said that the *θεατοκρατία* which sprang up at Athens after the Persian War would have mattered less if the demos had consisted of *εὐαίθετοι ἄνδρες*.

18. *περὶ ἐνίων*, sc. *τεχνῶν*. Aristotle would not say this of geometry, for instance.

μόνον ὁ ποιήσας. See critical note.

20. *ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Plato, Rep. 601 D, *οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὀρθότης ἐκάστου σκεύους καὶ ζῴου καὶ πράξεως οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν χρεῖαν ἐστὶ πρὸς ἣν ἂν ἕκαστον ᾖ πεποιημένον ἢ πεφυκός; Οὐτά.* Πολλὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τὸν χράμενον ἐκάστῳ ἐμπειρότατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀγγελοῦ γίγνεσθαι τῷ ποιητῇ ὅλα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ χρεΐᾳ ᾗ χρηταί· ὅλον αὐλητῆς που αὐλοποιῶ ἐξαγγελεῖ περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν οἱ ἂν ὑπηρετῶσιν ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖν, καὶ ἐπιτάξει οἷους δεῖ ποιεῖν ὁ δ' ὑπηρετήσῃ, and Cratyl. 390. Yet if the user is a better judge of the excellence of some articles than the maker, it does not follow that some users are not better judges than others.

22. *καὶ θοὴν ὁ δαιτυμὸν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ μάγειρος*. For the thought see vol. i p. 258, note 1. Cp. also Alexis, Fragm. *Λύκος* (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 444),

*καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑποκριτῶν πολλὸ
κράτιστός ἐστιν ὀψοποιός, ὥς δοκεῖ
τοῖς χραμένοις, τῶν δ' ὀψοποιῶν ὑποκριτής.*

25. *δοκεῖ γάρ κ.τ.λ.* This probably refers to Plato, Laws 945 B sqq.: see vol. i p. 258.

26. *αἱ δ' εὐθυναὶ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 25, *τὸ διακρίνει πάντας καὶ ἐκ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων, ὅλον περὶ εὐθυῶν κ.τ.λ.*

27. *ὥσπερ εἴρηται*, in 1281 b 32.

28. As to *τοῖς δῆμοις* and *ἡ ἐκκλησία*, see above on 1275 b 7.

29. *καίτοι κ.τ.λ.* introduces a proof that members of the assembly, etc., are *φαιλοί* (26). So much mixed up is the conception of *φαιλότης* and *ἐπιείκεια* with wealth and poverty. It is here implied that the Boulê is not one of *αἱ μέγισται ἀρχαί*, whereas in 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 30-b 17 it is grouped with the offices of *stratêgus* and *euthynus* and *logistês* and counted among the most important magistracies. Notwithstanding what is said here, a high property-qualification was sometimes required for membership of the assembly, and sometimes none at all (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sq.). At Athens no one could be a member of the Boulê or the Heliaea till he was thirty years of age (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., pp. 265, 392), but Aristotle would perhaps regard this as *ἡ τυχεύουσα ἡλικία*. We read of Solon in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 7, *τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς ἀπένειμεν ἀρχὴν ἐκ πεντακοσιομέδιμνων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν καὶ ἐνγυγίσω, τοῖς*

ἐνεία ἀρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ταμίαις . . . τοῖς δὲ τὸ θηρικὸν τολοῦσιν ἐκκλησίας καὶ δικαστηρίων μετέδωκε μόνον. Solon, in fact, required the ταμίαι τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς to be Pentacosiomedimni, and the law was the same in Aristotle's day, but it was no longer observed ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 47 *init.*: c. 7 *sub fin.*: c. 8. l. 7). It does not appear that there was any property-qualification for the office of stratēgus at Athens, for the stratēgi are said to be elected 'from all' (Gilbert, *ibid.* p. 230).

33. καὶ ταῦτ', i. e. the giving of greater powers to men possessed of a small property-qualification only and youthful in years than to men possessed of a high property-qualification, no less than the giving to unskilled persons of the right to elect magistrates and to review their conduct in office.

36. μόνον ἐστι τούτων, 'is only a part of these.' For the suppression of 'only' cp. c. 9. 1281 a 9, c. 11. 1282 b 4, and c. 15. 1286 b 8, and see notes on 1336 b 26, 1340 a 34, and 1292 a 32.

λέγω δὲ μόνον κ.τ.λ. This explanation seems unnecessary, but see above on 1277 b 37 and below on 1282 b 39. See also Vahlen on Poet. 13. 1453 a 4.

40. πάντων τούτων, i. e. the members of the demos, the Boulē, and the dicastery.

τὸ τῶν καθ' ἕνα καὶ κατ' ἀλλήλους κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 5. 1278 b 4, κύριος ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν ἢ μετ' ἄλλων τῆς τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελείας.

1282 b. 1. ἡ δὲ πρώτη λαχθεῖσα ἀπορία, i. e. the discussion on the ἀπορία raised in c. 10. 1281 a 11, τί δέ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. This discussion has made it clear that the check of law is necessary to prevent the Many or the Few committing injustice, and that law must be just law if it is to do this.

4. περὶ τούτων, 'only about those things' (see above on 1282 a 36). ἐξαδυνατοῦσιν, 'are wholly unable.'

7. τὸ πάλαι διαπορηθέν, i. e. τί δέ τὸ κύριον εἶναι τῆς πόλεως.

8. ἀλλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'but it must needs be also that as the constitutions [to which laws belong] are bad or good and just or unjust, so the laws also are the same—this, however, is clear that the laws must be adjusted to the constitution, [not the constitution to the laws]—but if this is so, it is evident that laws in accordance with the normal constitutions must necessarily be just and laws in accordance with the deviation-forms not just.' For the view that laws vary with constitutions, cp. Plato, *Laws* 714 B sq. Cp. also 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 13, πρὸς γὰρ τὰς πολιτείας τοὺς νόμους δεῖ τίθεσθαι καὶ τίθενται πάντες, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς πολιτείας πρὸς τοὺς

νόμους. Demosthenes insists on this also: see Hug, *Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum*, p. 79, where Demosth. c. Androt. c. 30 is referred to, *ἄξιον τοίνυν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ τὸν θέντα τὸν νόμον ἐξετάσαι Σόλωνα, καὶ θεάσασθαι ὅσῃ πρόνοιαν ἐποιεῖτο ἐν ἀπασιν οἷς ἐτίθει νόμοις τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ ὅσῃ περὶ τούτου μᾶλλον ἐσπούδαζεν ἢ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αὐτοῦ οἷς τίθει τὸν νόμον*, and also Demosth. in *Lept.* cc. 105–109, where the variation of the laws respecting rewards under different constitutions is traced. Sus. has already referred to Isocr. *Areopag.* § 14, *ταύτῃ* (i. e. *τῇ πολιτείᾳ*) *καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὁμοιοῦσθαι, καὶ πράττειν οὕτως ἐκάστους ὡς ἂν ταύτην ἔχωσιν*. *Εἰ τοῦτο (11), sc. φανερόν ἐστι*.

14 sqq. Aristotle's inquiries have so far led him to the conclu- C. 12.
sion that the true supreme authority is to be found in 'laws in accordance with the normal constitutions,' and we expect him (see vol. i. p. 259) to go on and ask what laws are in accordance with the normal constitutions, but perhaps he feels that he has not yet sufficiently studied how normal or just constitutions should be organized, and that till he has done this he cannot decide what laws are in accordance with them. At all events, instead of asking this question, he makes a new start in the Twelfth Chapter and learns from a renewed inquiry into the nature of Political Justice, (1) that a just or normal constitution will recognize in its distribution of power all attributes which contribute to the being and well-being of the State, and not one of them only, and (2) that under given circumstances the conclusion at which he has arrived in favour of the supremacy of law does not hold good, and that Justice may require that the State shall be ruled not by law, but by the will of an Absolute King supreme over all law. To this extent then the conclusion reached at the end of c. 11 needs to be modified. In teaching that account ought to be taken of other things besides virtue in the award of political power, and that superiority in virtue alone, unless it is transcendent, gives no just claim to exclusive political supremacy, Aristotle differs from the language held by Plato in *Laws* 756 E–758 A, and especially 757 C, where we read of the nobler of the two kinds of *ισότης* (*ἡ ἀληθεσιμότης καὶ ἀρίστη ἰσότης*), *τῇ μὲν γὰρ μείζονι πλείον, τῇ δ' ἑλάττωσι σμικρότερα νέμει, μέτρια διδούσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρῃ, καὶ δὴ καὶ τιμὰς μείζονι μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν δεῖ μείζον, τοῖς δὲ τοῦτωνίων ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς τε καὶ παιδείας τὸ πρέπον ἑκατέρῃς ἀπονέμει κατὰ λόγον ἵστί γὰρ δὴ πον καὶ τὸ πολιτικὸν ἡμῖν δεῖ τοῦτ' αἰτέ, τὸ δίκαιον*. He probably has

also before him Rep. 540 D, *ὅταν οἱ ὡς ἀληθῆς φιλόσοφοι δυνατόν, ἢ πλείους ἢ εἷς, ἐν πόλει γενόμενοι, τῶν μὲν τῶν τιμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν . . . τὸ ἔρθῃν περὶ πλείστον ποιησάμενοι καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων τιμὰς, μέγιστον δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαϊότατον τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ ὑπαρτυούσιν τε καὶ αἰξάντες αὐτὸ διασκευαρήσονται τὴν ἐαυτῶν πόλιν.* Cp. Isocr. Archid. § 35.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here begins a long string of protases introduced by *ἐπεὶ*, which lack an expressed apodosis to take them up: compare I. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq. The virtual apodosis perhaps comes in 21, *ποιῶν δ' ἰσότης κ.τ.λ.*, unless we supply after τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον 'we shall do well to inquire what the just is.' Compare Magn. Mor. I. 1. 1182 b 1, *ἀλλὰ μὴν ἢ γε πολιτικὴ βελτίστη δύναμις, ὥστε τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν.* For *ἀγαθόν* (not τὸ ἀγαθόν) see Stallbaum on Plato, Hipp. Maj. 293 E. For *μάλιστα* see note on 1252 a 4. That τὸ πολιτικὸν ἀγαθόν is τὸ δίκαιον might be guessed from Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 30, *διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιστεπρόθεός ἐστι τὰς πόλεις*, taken with 1261 b 9, *καίτοι τὸ γε ἑκάστου ἀγαθόν ἐστὶν ἑκάστου.* As to ἢ πολιτικὴ δύναμις, 'ai μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις idem fere sunt ac τέχναι et ἐπιστήμαι, itaque saepe δύναμις vel coniungitur cum verbis τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη vel pro synonymo usurpatur' (Bon. Ind. 207 b 4 sqq.). The three terms are already used in conjunction by Isocrates in Panath. § 30, *ἐπειδὴ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδοκιμάζει.*

17. *τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῇ συμφέρον*, 'and by the just I mean that which is for the common advantage.' Cp. I. 9. 1257 a 19, *ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωσίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία).* Aristotle adds this remark because he has already explained in c. 6 that the common advantage is the end for which the State originally comes into being and the end of all normal constitutions: cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 11 sqq. and Rhet. I. 6. 1362 b 27 sq.

18. *δοκεῖ δὲ πᾶσιν ἴσον τι τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι.* Cp. c. 9. 1280 a 11 (where see note). By *ἴσον τι* is probably meant *ἴσον κατ' ἀναλογίαν*: cp. 7 (5). I. 1301 a 26, *πάντων μὲν ὁμολογούστων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον.*

19. *τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγοις, ἐν οἷς διέρισται περὶ τῶν ἠθικῶν.* The reference appears to be to Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 9 sqq. Popular opinion is distinguished from 'philosophical inquiries' very much as in Eth. Eud. I. 8. 1217 b 22, *ἐπίσκεπται δὲ πολλοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ τρόποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἑξωτερικοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν*: cp. De Part. An. I. 1. 642 a 4, *τῶν μὲν γὰρ δύο τρόπων οὐδέτερον οἶόν τε ὑπάρχει, τῶν διωρισμένων ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν.* See Bon. Ind. 821 a 18 sqq., and cp. Plato, Symp. 218 A, *τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων.*

20. τὸ γὰρ καὶ τισὶ τὸ δίκαιον, 'for that which is just is a thing and has to do with persons,' or, in other words, justice involves an assignment of a thing to persons.

22. ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτ' ἀπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικὴν, 'for this inquiry is productive of questions and of philosophical speculation on politics.' For ἔχει see above on 1268 b 24. It is a merit in inquiries to give rise to aporetic discussion: see above on 1275 b 34. Bonitz (Ind. 820 b 58 sqq.) compares Phys. 1. 2. 185 a 17, οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ περὶ φύσεως μὲν οὐ, φυσικὰς δὲ ἀπορίας συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς, ὥστε ἔχει καλῶς ἐπὶ μικρὸν διαλεχθῆναι περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχει γὰρ φιλοσοφίαν ἢ σκέψιν, and Eth. Eud. 1. 1. 1214 a 12, ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἔχει φιλοσοφίαν μόνον θεωρητικὴν, λεκτίον κατὰ τὸν ἐπιβάλλοντα καιρὸν, ὃ τι περ οἰκίον ἦν τῇ μεθόδῳ. Cp. also 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 30.

23. ὥστε γὰρ ἂν φαίη τις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps has before him the discussion in Plato, Gorg. 490 B sqq. He may possibly have thought that Plato lent some countenance to the view criticized by him when he said of true Justice in Laws 757 C, τῷ μὲν γὰρ μίζοντι πλεῖον, τῷ δ' ἐλάττωσι συμμέτρον ἐπέμει, μέτρια διδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἑκατέρω, yet it is likely that Plato's language in Rep. 454 C (esp. ἐκείνο τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἀλλοιώσεώς τε καὶ ὁμοιώσεως μόνον ἐφυλάττομεν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὰ τεῖνον τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα) suggested to Aristotle the distinction between attributes contributing to the work to be done and others. See also below on 27.

24. νεμεσῆσθαι, not νέμεσθαι: cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 16: 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 13: 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 16: 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 10. Compare also 1. 13. 1260 a 4, ἰφίγηται, and 3. 9. 1280 a 16, δέχεται (see note). 'Saepe quidem in physicis maxime metaphysicisque libris cum aliorum verborum tum huius ipsius ἀκολουθεῖν formae praeteriti ponuntur vix ut praeteriti temporis notionem persentias, velut ut huius quidem verbi exempla pauca ponam, ταύτῃ δ' ἠκολούθηται (τῇ καρδίᾳ) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν καλουμένων σπλάγχχνων ἑκαστον ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς γὰρ ὥλης συνεστῶσιν, De Part. An. 2. 1. 647 a 34' (Vahlen on Poet. 5. 1449 b 9).

25. μὴδὲν διαφέρειεν ἄλλ' ὅμοιοι τυγχάνοιεν ὄντες. For this 'abundantia contraria copulandi,' see Vahlen on Poet. 1. 1447 a 17, who refers among other passages to Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 41, ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον.

26. τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν. Καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν is added in explanation of τὸ δίκαιον (see note on 1257 b 7) and to show that the kind of τὸ δίκαιον referred to is that which rests on ἀξία, for

there is another kind of τὸ δίκαιον (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3, καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικὸν τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἐστὶ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν). That this kind alone is truly just we see from 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 16, οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νικητῆσθαι συμφέρι καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν.

27. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. In correcting this error (cp. 1283 a 11-14) Aristotle probably has before him a saying of Solon (Diod. 9. 2. 5, ὁ Σόλων ἡγήσατο τοὺς μὲν πύκτας καὶ σταδαιεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀδελφὰς μηδὲν ἀξιώλογον συμβάλλεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς σωτηρίαν, τοῖς δὲ φρονήσας καὶ ἀρετῇ διαφέροντας μόνους δύνασθαι τὰς πατρίδας ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις διαφυλάττειν), a saying which Xenophanes virtually repeats in the well-known lines (Fragm. 2. Bergk),

οὐτε γὰρ εἰ πύκτης ἀγαθὸς λαοῖσι μετείη
οὐτ' εἰ πενταθλείν, οὐτε παλαισμοσύνην,
οὐδὲ μὲν εἰ ταχυτήτι ποδῶν, τέ πῆρ ἐστι πρότιμος
ῥώμῃς δ' οὐδ' ἀνδρῶν ἔργ' ἐν ἀγῶνι πέλει,
τοῦνεκεν ἂν δὴ μᾶλλον ἐν εἰσομίῃ πόλις εἴη·
σμερὸν δ' ἂν τι πόλις χάρμα γένοιτ' ἐπὶ τῇ,
εἴ τις ἀεθλεύων νικᾷ Πίσσας παρ' ἔχθρας
οὐ γὰρ πιαίνει ταῦτα μυχὸς πόλιος

(cp. Isocr. Paneg. § 1 sq.). Plato had lent some momentary countenance to the opposite view in Laws 744 B (see vol. i. p. 260, note 1), but he anticipates Aristotle in Laws 696 B, ὁ γὰρ δὴ δεῖ κατὰ πόλιν γε εἶναι τὰς τιμὰς ὑπερεχούσας, ὅτι τις ἐστὶ πλούτιος διαφέρων, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ὅτι ταχὺς ἢ καλὸς ἢ ἰσχυρὸς ἀνευ τινὸς ἀρετῆς οὐδ' ἀρετῆς ἢς ἂν σωφροσύνη ἀπῇ (where he perhaps remembers the saying of Solon and the lines of Xenophanes), except that Aristotle thinks that the rich man has a better claim to office than the swift or handsome or strong man. The Ethiopians were said to make the biggest and strongest man among them their king (Hdt. 3. 20: Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 4 sqq.) or else the handsomest (Athen. Deipn. 566 c: Nic. Damasc. Fraggm. 142 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 463), other barbarians honoured swiftness of foot in the same way (Nic. Damasc. Fraggm. 138: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. ibid.), and Euripides had put in the mouth of one of his characters the lines (Fragm. 1035),

δοῖσι κατ' ἰσχύιν πρῶτος ἀνομέζετο
ἢ τόξῳ πᾶλλον ἢ μάχῃ δορὶ σθένει,
τοῦτον τυραννεῖν τῶν κακίωνων ἔχρησεν.

Indeed, Aristotle himself speaks in 1. 5. 1254 b 34 sqq. and 4 (7).

14. 1332 b 16 sqq. as if a great physical superiority conferred a title to rule.

30. φανερόν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμειν. Cp. c. 13. 1284 b 7, δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν.

31. τῶν γὰρ ὁμοίων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle first takes the case in which the essential attribute (skill in flute-playing, in the illustrative parallel which he has chosen) is shared by several individuals in an equal degree, and he says that these individuals must be awarded flutes of equal excellence; extraneous qualifications like that of high birth must not be allowed to turn the scale in favour of any one of them (cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 8, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἴσον τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ τὸ μὴ ὅμοιον τοῖς ὁμοίοις παρὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καλόν). He next passes on (34 sqq.) to the case in which one individual possesses the essential attribute in a far higher degree than the rest, and as to this case he tells us that no inferiority of this individual in respect of higher but non-essential things must lead us to deny him the superior award of flutes which is his due.

35. ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ προαγαγοῦσιν, 'if we push it still further.' Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 22, δόξειε δ' ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ: Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 a 8, μικρὸν προαγαγόντες τὸν λόγον.

38. εἰ καὶ μείζων κ.τ.λ. How little respect was felt for the art of flute-playing, we see from 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 18 sqq.

ἑκάστον here takes the place of ἐκάτερον, as in Poet. 6. 1449 b 25 (see Vahlen's note on this passage: he says 'ἐκάστον hic ut alibi est pro ἐκατέρου' and refers to his Aristot. Aufsätze, 2. 50).

39. λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ. For this really needless explanation see above on 1277 b 37 and 1282 a 36.

κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν, 'if we compare the two ratios,' i.e. the ratio in which noble birth and beauty excel the art of flute-playing and the ratio in which the surpassing flute-player excels his fellows. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 31, ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν διαχρίσταις.

2. In place of τοῦ πλούτου we expect τοῦ κάλλους, but see below 1288 a. on 1323 b 35.

3. ἔτι κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον κ.τ.λ., i.e. the λόγος of the imagined opponent in 1282 b 23 sqq. Things that differ very much are not commensurable (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 b 18, τῇ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ ἀδύνατον τὰ τοιοῦτον διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γινέσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἐνδέχεται ἱκανῶς, and 1133 a 19, διὰ πάντα συμβλητὰ δεῖ πῶς

ἔσσι, ἐν ἑστὶν ἀλλαγῇ, where πος = πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν: Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 3 sqq.).

4. εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τί μέγεθος. Montecatino (vol. iii. p. 191) translates, 'si magis imperiorum et principatus civitatis esse particeps debet,' etc., and so Sus., 'for if a given bodily stature [confers political privileges] more [than a certain amount of wealth or good birth].' These interpreters apparently supply δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν, or something similar, with μᾶλλον (cp. 1282 b 23 sqq.). Stahr, on the other hand, translates, 'denn wenn eine bestimmte Körpergrösse für irgend etwas höheren Werth verleihe (confers a higher value for anything whatever),' and Bernays, 'denn wenn z. B. einem gewissen Maass von Körpergrösse im Vergleich zu Reichthum und freier Geburt irgend etwas in höherem Grade zukommt.' Prof. Ridgeway brackets μᾶλλον, and another critic would read ἐν μᾶλλον in place of it, and Sus. mentions these suggestions, though he still retains μᾶλλον in his text. I am myself inclined to supply ἀγαθόν with μᾶλλον from the preceding sentence ('more a good'), and to translate, 'for if a given amount of size is more a good than [a given amount of some other good, such as wealth or free birth].'

καὶ ὅσος ἂν κ.τ.λ., 'size would also generally' (i.e. apart from its amount) 'be capable of being matched against wealth and free birth.'

6. δὲ εἰ κ.τ.λ., 'and so, if this man excels in size more than this man in virtue' (or in other words, if this man's amount of size is superior to this man's amount of virtue), 'and size generally' (i.e. apart from questions of amount) 'is superior in a higher degree than virtue, everything would be comparable [whatever its amount], for if such an amount is better than such an amount, such an amount will evidently be equal.' I have followed Sus. in bracketing μέγεθος, 8, which may have been repeated by mistake from the preceding line, though it is possible that instead of bracketing μέγεθος we should read ἀγαθόν in place of it. The difficulty of retaining μέγεθος arises from this, that, if we do so, we have to translate, 'for if such an amount of size is better than such an amount [of something else], such an amount will evidently be equal,' and it is doubtful whether we have any right to supply 'of something else.' Aristotle probably means by εἰ ἂν συγκρίναι πάντα, 8, that all *goods* would be comparable, not everything, for this is all that his argument proves. For τοιοῦτοι γὰρ κ.τ.λ., cp. Phys. 7.

4. 248 a 11, εἰ δὲ ἔστι πᾶσα (sc. κίνησις) συμβαλλή καὶ δημοκρατὶς τὸ ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ ἴσον κινούμενον, ἔσται περιφερές τις ἴση εὐθείᾳ, καὶ μείζων δὲ καὶ ἐλάττω. Κρίττον in 9 must mean 'better.'

9. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον. See above on 3.

10. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, 'in the case of things political also,' no less than ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων (1282 b 30). For τὰ πολιτικά, cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 11.

11. εἰ γὰρ . . . 14. τὴν τιμὴν. Here the fragment of Xenophanes quoted in part above on 1282 b 27 is especially present to Aristotle's mind. Οὐδέν is to be taken with δέ, as in Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 27, οὐδέν οὖν δέ αὐτῶν. Τὴν τιμὴν, 'the honour which falls to them.'

13. ἡ τοῦτων διαφορὰ, 'the superiority possessed by these men.'

14. ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν κ.τ.λ. 'Ἐν τοῖς is 'in respect of these things': cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 b 1, ἐπειδὴν γὰρ σφόδρα οἴονται ὑπάρχειν (sc. αὐτοῖς) ἐν τοῖς ἐν οἷς σκάνονται, οὐ φροντίζουσιν, and Poet. 2. 1448 a 16, ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ ἡ τραγωδία πρὸς τὴν κωμῶδιαν δίσταται. See also Stallbaum on Plato, Gorg. 452 E, καίτοι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ δυνάμει δοῦλον μὲν ἔχεις τὸν λατῶν, δοῦλον δὲ τὸν παιδοτρίβην. The πῶλις is regarded by Aristotle as composed of wealth, free birth, nobility, culture, etc.: cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 17, ἔστι δὲ πᾶσα πῶλις ἐκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ· λέγω δὲ ποῖον μὲν ἐλευθερίαν πλοῦτος παιδείαν εὐγένειαν, ποσὸν δὲ τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχήν.

16. τῆς τιμῆς, cp. τὴν τιμὴν, 14, which answers to τῶν ἀρχῶν, 11.

17. δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., '[for free birth and wealth are things of which the πῶλις is composed,] for' etc. Cp. Eurip. Fragm. 21 (quoted above on 1276 b 37). In 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 33 Aristotle mentions τὸ τοῖς οὐσίαις λειτουργεῖν, ὃ καλοῦμεν εὐπόρους, as a necessary part of a State. It is true that in Crete the State defrayed the liturgies which were elsewhere borne by rich men (see above on 1272 a 17), and that this might have been made the general rule, but even then rich men would be needed to contribute to the *cisphora*. Aristotle says nothing about οἱ εὐγενεῖς, though he has mentioned them in 16, probably because he includes them under οἱ ἐλεύθεροι (cp. 33 sqq.).

τίμημα φέροντας, i.e. contributing to the State a rateable quota of property. Cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 20, τοῖς ἔχουσι τίμημα, and for φέρειν, 2. 5. 1263 a 3, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φέροντας ἀναλίσκειν. For the contrast implied here between οἱ ἄποροι and οἱ τίμημα φέροντες, see note on 1279 b 19.

18. οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴη κ.τ.λ. See above on 1276 b 37 and 1280 a 32. Is there a tacit reference here to the latter passage, in which it was

shown that there could not be a *polis* wholly composed of slaves? If so, we have something to add to the other evidence (see vol. i. Appendix C) that cc. 12 and 13 were placed where they stand by Aristotle.

19. ἀλλὰ μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq. (where military prowess and judicial virtue are again mentioned together) and 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 18 sqq. Tyrtaeus had long ago said (Fragm. 12. 15),

ἔπειτα δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς πόλεσι τε καὶ ἐνὶ τοῖς δήμοις,
ὅστις ἀνὴρ δικαίᾳ ἐκ προμήχειται μάχῃ
καλεῖται κ.τ.λ.,

and as to justice Protagoras had gone further than Aristotle, for he makes it essential to the very existence of a State (Plato, Protag. 324 D sq., and 326 E, τοῖς τοῦ πρίγκειτος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἢ μάλ' αὖ πόλις εἶναι, οἰόμενοι δὲ ἄνθρωποι).

21. πλὴν κ.τ.λ. For the contrast here drawn between *εὖναι πόλιν* and *οὐκ εἶναι πόλιν*, cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 6 sqq.

- C. 12. 24. πρὸς μέντοι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ ἢ ἀρετῆς μέγιστα δικαίως ἐν ἀμφισβητοῦσιν. *Τὸ ἀγαθόν* is taken as the standard in 1. 8. 1256 b 32, and said to be the end which the lawgiver should set before him in 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 7 sqq. *Παδεία* and *ἀρετή* are here conjoined as in Plato, Laws 757 C, and in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 29 and 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 26 sqq. *Παδεία*, 'culture,' is connected with aristocracy in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 24 sq., where the offices in an aristocracy, which are usually said to be filled *ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων* (3. 7. 1279 a 35), are said to be filled *ἐκ πενταδεκαμίων*. In 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sqq. it is opposed to *βασίλειαν* and treated as a note of oligarchy (cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 37). Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s.v. *ἀμφισβητέω*, notes the rare occurrence of *ἀμφισβητοῦσιν*, adding however that *ἀμφισβητοῦσιν* occurs in Plato; Euthyd. 296 E, and *ἀμφισβητοῦσιν* in Menex. 242 E (see also Demosth. Prooem. 46. p. 1453 for *ἀμφισβητοῦσιν*). *Ἀμφισβητοῦσιν* is used in Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 24 and 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 12.

26. καθάπερ εἰρηται καὶ πρότερον, in c. 9. 1281 a 4 sqq.

ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. This has been already said in substance in c. 9. 1280 a 21 sqq., and it is repeated in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq. For *πάντων ἴσων ἔχειν*, 'to have an equal share with others of everything,' cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 10. 1242 b 30, *ἴσα ἴσων ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ τῆς λειτουργίας*, and Eurip. Phoeniss. 513 Bothe, 547 Dindorf,

οὐ δ' οἷα δίκην δαίμωνος ἔχουσιν ἴσων;

Τὰς τοιαύτας πολιτείας, i. e. constitutions which give an equal amount of everything to those who are equal in one thing only, or which give an unequal amount of everything to those who are unequal in one thing only. The reason why such constitutions must necessarily be *παρεκβάσεις* is that they contravene τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον (cp. c. 6. 1279 a 17 sqq.).

29. εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερον κ.τ.λ. This was said in c. 9. 1280 a 9 sqq. Μὲν οὖν has nothing to answer to it. Aristotle's original intention probably was, after interposing an explanation of the grounds on which the different claimants base their claims, to continue, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἤδη σκεπτόν, εἰ πάντες εἴεν ἐν μῇ πόλει, τίνας ἀρchein δεῖ. In adding this explanation, however, he allows his attention to be diverted and the strict sequence of the passage to be broken (just as in 1. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq.), and thus it happens that μὲν οὖν has nothing to answer to it. Μὲν οὖν here, as elsewhere, introduces a more particular and detailed treatment of the subject.

30. ὅτι διαμφισβητοῦσι τρόπον τινα δικάως πάντες, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ πάντες δικάως. For the repetition of πάντες, cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 1, φανερόν ἐστι χρηστότερον μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἀρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστότερον.

31. οἱ πλοῦσοι μὲν κ.τ.λ. In the passage 31-42 Aristotle bears in mind the rule which he has laid down in c. 12. 1283 a 14 sq. that claimants for political power must rest their claims on attributes entering into the composition of a State. The different claimants are represented as doing so. This is indicated by κοινόν (32), πρὸς τὰ συμβόλαια πιστοὶ μᾶλλον (32), πολῖται μᾶλλον (34), οἴκοι τίμιος (36), βελτίους (36), and κοινωνικὴν ἀρετὴν (38). Κοινόν, 32, 'a public thing,' or in other words, one of the things which are essential to the State: cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 5 sqq. Compare also *Ēth. Nic.* 8. 16. 1163 b 5, οὕτω δ' ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῇ κοινῇ παρίστων· τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδεται τῇ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, ἢ τιμῇ δὲ κοινόν. It is implied in the passage before us that the rich will be owners of land, and this may have commonly been the case in Greece; still there were other forms of wealth besides wealth in land (2. 7. 1267 b 10 sqq.), and most of Nicias' wealth was in silver (*Plut. Nic.* c. 4).

32. ἔτι κ.τ.λ. So the Syracusan Athenagoras, though he was the leader of the demos, admits that the rich are the best custodians of money (*Thuc.* 6. 39): that this was a common view we see from such passages as *Rhet. ad Alex.* 9. 1429 a 34, τοῖς γὰρ πλείστοις

ἔστιν ἰδίῳ νομίζοντας τοὺς πλουτοῦντας δικαιοτέρους εἶναι τῶν πεπομένων, and Pol. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 38 sqq. and 2. 11. 1273 a 21 sqq. (cp. also Fragm. Trag. Adesp. 92 Nauck). Aristotle does not agree with this view; he requires virtue in a custodian of money (7 (5). 9. 1309 b 6 sqq.).

33. οἱ δ' εὐγενεῖς καὶ εὐγενεῖς κ.τ.λ., 'and the free-born and noble claim as not being far from each other, inasmuch as [if the free-born claim on the strength of their citizenship,] those who are better born are citizens in a higher degree than the low-born, and nobility is in every State locally prized; and again because it is likely that those descended from better ancestors will be better, seeing that nobility is excellence of race.' The εὐγενεῖς and the εὐγενεῖς are classed together in 1283 b 16 as οἱ κατὰ γένος ἀξιούστες ἀρχεῖν: the εὐγενεῖς are in a superlative degree what the εὐγενεῖς are in a positive degree (cp. 1283 b 19 sq.). In some places the word εὐγενεῖς appears to have been used to designate the noble (6 (4). 4. 1290 b 9 sqq.), none but οἱ διαφέροντες κατ' εὐγένειαν καὶ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας being accounted εὐγενεῖς. The well-born were citizens in a higher degree than the low-born, for they could reckon more generations of citizen descent, and this was with many a test of citizenship (c. 2. 1275 b 21 sqq.). The fact that nobility is παρ' ἐκάστοις οἰκῇ τίμιος is insisted on, because this shows it to be of importance to the πολιτικὴ κοινωνία, and therefore a just ground of claim. Its champions might have gone further and urged that Greek nobility is recognized everywhere (1. 6. 1255 a 32 sqq.), but this would not have been equally to the point. The sophist Lycophron would not admit that nobility belonged to the class of τίμια καὶ σπουδαῖα (Aristot. Fragm. 82. 1490 a 9 sqq.). The fem. form τίμιος is used in the passage before us (possibly because it is followed by ἔτι: see note on 1277 b 25): in De Part. An. 1. 5. 644 b 24 we have περὶ μὲν ἐκείνας (sc. τὰς οὐσίας) τιμίας οὐσας καὶ θείας. For ἔτι διότι βελτίους εἰσὶ τοῖς ἐκ βελτιώσεων, cp. Rhet. 1. 9. 1367 b 29, οἷον εὐγένεια καὶ παιδεία: εἰσὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸν οὗτω τροφέντα τοιοῦτον εἶναι. For the definition of εὐγένεια as ἀρετὴ γένους cp. Rhet. 2. 15. 1390 b 22, ἔστι δὲ εὐγενεῖς μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀρετὴν, γενναῖον δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως: ὅπερ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολλὸν οὐ συμβαίνει τοῖς εὐγενέσιν, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εὐτελεῖς: φορὰ γὰρ τίς ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς γένεσιν ἀνδρῶν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς χώρας γεγεμένοις, καὶ ἐνίοτε οὐδ' ἀγαθὸν τὸ γένος, ἐγγίνονται διὰ τινος χρόνου ἄνδρες περιττοί, καί τετα πάλιν ἀναδίδωσιν ('deficit,' Bon. Ind. s.v. ἀναδίδωμι): Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 b

18 sqq.: Aristot. *Fragm.* 85. 1490 b 43, ἡ μὲν εὐγένειά ἐστιν ἀρετὴ γένους, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ σπουδαίων· σπουδαῖον δ' ἐστὶ γένος ἐν ᾧ πολλοὶ σπουδαῖοι πεφύκασι ἐγγίεσθαι. These passages show that ἀρετὴ γένους means 'excellence of race' in the sense that the race to which the εὐγενής belongs has produced in the past a number of virtuous men (cp. *Pol.* 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 33, ἡ κατ' ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν ἢ κατὰ γένους), so that the εὐγενής stands at any rate a better chance of being virtuous than one who is not εὐγενής. We must bear in mind that this definition of εὐγένεια is here placed in the mouth of οἱ εὐδαίμονες καὶ εὐγενεῖς, who would be likely to take the most favourable view of εὐγένεια. We see from *Rhet.* 1. 5. 1360 b 34 that εὐγένεια did not, in the ordinary acceptation of the word, necessarily imply descent from ancestors remarkable for virtue; it might imply only descent from ancestors remarkable for wealth or other social advantages; nor did it necessarily imply a frequent occurrence in the family of virtuous individuals, but only of individuals distinguished in some way or other (ἐπιφανεῖς). Cp. *Diog. Laert.* 3. 88. Still the view that εὐγένεια is ἀρετὴ γένους is not far from that of Aristotle. In the *Rhetoric* (2. 15. 1390 b 22 sqq.), as we have seen, it is distinctly adopted by him, though he holds that, owing to the occurrence from time to time of degeneracy in families, most εὐγενεῖς are men of little worth. Compare the view taken in the fragments of the possibly genuine *Περὶ εὐγενείας* (Aristot. *Fragm.* 82—85. 1490 a 1 sqq.). Here, however, we find (1490 a 31 sqq.) a reference to the contention that οἱ ἐκ πάλαι πλουσίων may be εὐγενεῖς no less than οἱ ἐκ πάλαι ἀγαθῶν (cp. *Julian, Or.* 2. p. 81 B, φασὶ γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς ἐκ πάλαι πλουσίων εὐγενεῖς), and in the *Politics* Aristotle seems to adopt as his own the doctrine that εὐγένεια implies descent from ancestors not only virtuous but rich (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 21, ἡ γὰρ εὐγένειά ἐστιν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετὴ: 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 3).

37. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'we shall say then that in a similar way virtue also prefers a just claim, for we say that justice, which is necessarily accompanied by all the other virtues, is virtue operative in social relations [and therefore essential to the State: so that virtue as a whole has as good a claim to recognition as justice].' I take the antecedent to ἡ to be τὴν δικαιοσύνην, not κοινωνικὴν ἀρετήν. For the omission of ἀρετῆς after τὰς ἄλλας, cp. 1. 13. 1260 a 24: 3. 5. 1278 a 40. Aristotle introduces his own view with δὲ, just as he introduces it with οὖν in c. 3. 1276 a 13 sqq. For ὁμοίως, cp.

1283 b 16, 19, 31: it is not to be taken with *δικαίως*. That justice is virtue operative in social relations we see from Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 25-1130 a 5, and from the definition of virtue ascribed with whatever truth to Plato in Diog. Laert. 3. 91, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη (αἰτία) τοῦ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις καὶ τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δικαιοπραγεῖν: cp. also Plut. De Defect. Orac. c. 24, εἰσὶν οὖν ἐκτὸς ἴτεροι θεοὶ καὶ κόσμοι, πρὸς οὓς χρῆται (ὁ θεὸς) ταῖς κοινωνικαῖς ἀρεταῖς· οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸς αὐτὸν οὐδὲ μέρος αὐτοῦ χρῆσις ἐστι δικαιοσύνης ἢ χάριτος ἢ χρηστότητος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλους. That there is a close connexion between justice and the other virtues, we see from Aristot. Fragm. 75. 1488 b 5, ap. Plut. De Stoic. Repugn. c. 15, (ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ γ' περὶ δικαιοσύνης . . .) 'Αριστοτέλει περὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀντιγράφῳ οὐ φησιν αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς λέγειν εἶναι, τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐσης τέλους, ἀναιρείται μὲν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, συναναιρείται δὲ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἐκείνη, and from Plato, Laws 631 C, ἐκ δὲ τούτων (i. e. φρονήσεως καὶ σωφροσύνης) μετ' ἀνδρείας κραδίητων τρίτον ἂν εἴη δικαιοσύνη.

40. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Here, as Eaton points out, Aristotle has before him Plato, Gorg. 488 D.

42. λαμβανομένων. Cp. c. 10. 1281 a 17, πάντων ληφθέντων.

ἀρ' οὖν εἰ πάντες εἰεν ἐν μιᾷ πόλει κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle perhaps has before him Plato, Gorg. 490 B, εἴαν ἐν τῇ εἰσιᾷ ἄμεν, ὥσπερ νῦν, πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι ἀνθρώποι κ.τ.λ. 'Αρ' οὖν is repeated in πέρας for the sake of clearness, the parenthetic sentence λέγω δὲ . . . πολιτικῶν having intervened: compare the way in which ὅλως εἶναι takes up ὅλως ὥς in 1283 b 17 sqq. after an intervening hypothetical sentence.

1288 b. 2. οἱ πλοῦστοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς. The article is omitted before εὐγενεῖς because the rich and noble are classed together in contradistinction to the good: cp. 1283 a 33, οἱ δευτέρου καὶ εὐγενεῖς.

εἶτι δὲ πλῆθος ἄλλο τι πολιτικόν, 'and further outside their ranks a mass composed of citizens.' Πολιτικόν is added because there is such a thing as a non-citizen πλῆθος (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 18, ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἵσως ὑπάρχειν καὶ δούλων ἀριθμὸν πολλῶν καὶ μετοίκων καὶ ξένων).

4. καθ' ἑκάστην πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων. Cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 27, καθ' ἑκάστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων: 2. 6. 1265 b 29, κοινοτάτην τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείαν: 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 5, τὸ μῖσον ἐκπέρους τιμήματος τούτων: Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. 19. 7, pleraque ex Punicis oppida, and 30. 4, unam ex tam multis orationem eius.

5. τοῖς γὰρ κυρίοις διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, 'for it is just in respect of the supreme authority they constitute that they differ from each other' (Bernays).

6. τῇ διὰ πλουσίων. For the omission of the article, cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 24, *ὅσον ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀλγεαρχίαις ἐκ τῶν πλουσίων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκ τῶν ἐλευθέρων*, and see note on 1310 a 6.

8. ἀλλ' ὁμῶς σκοποῦμεν, ὅταν περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ταῦθ' ἐπέρχῃ χρόνος. These constitutions settle the matter in their own way, but still we persist in asking how it ought to be settled. Ταῦτα refers to αἱ ε' ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενεῖς, ἔτι δὲ πλῆθος ἄλλο τι πολιτικόν: for the gender, see above on 1263 a 1.

9. εἰ δὲ . . . 13. ἐξ αὐτῶν. 'Well, if those who possess virtue are quite few in number, in what way should we determine the question? Or perhaps we should [not trouble about their number in itself, but] consider the expression "few" in relation to the work they have to do, [and ask] whether they are able to govern the State, or whether they are numerous enough to constitute a State?' Thurōt (*Études sur Aristote*, p. 47) and Susemihl think that this paragraph should be transposed so as to precede εἰ δὲ τίς ἴσται, 1284 a 3, but it seems to me to be in its right place. The discussion of the question just raised is introduced by δὲ, as often elsewhere (e.g. in c. 4. 1277 a 14-16 and c. 15. 1286 a 7 sqq.). Τίνα δὲ διελεῖν τρόπον, 10, takes up πᾶς διορισμὸς,

9. Aristotle's first impulse is to challenge the claims of the good to rule on the score of the smallness of their number, as he has already done in c. 10. 1281 a 28 sqq. But he drops this ground of attack, probably because he feels that paucity is no bar to a claim to rule. Even a single individual may have a just claim to rule, if his virtue is transcendent. Hence he passes on in 13 sqq. to deal with another objection, the discussion of which brings out this fact. The claims of the good have a weak point which they share with those of the rich and noble. Just as the claims of the rich and noble to rule may be defeated by those of one man who is richer or nobler than all the rest, so the claims of the good may be defeated by those of one man who is better than all the rest. And the claims of the Many may be defeated in a similar way. If this superiority of One Man or of a Few not numerous enough to constitute a State is overwhelming, the fact that they are not numerous enough for

this must not stand in the way of our giving him or them supreme authority.

16. οἱ κατὰ γένος, i.e. οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ εὐγενεῖς.

ἄλλον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'Aliquoties enunciatio per ὅς introducta per δὲ continuatur, e.g. in Phys. 6. 2. 233 a 13 sq.: 1. 7. 190 b 17 sqq.: 8. 7. 260 a 23 sqq.' (Bon. Ind. 872 a 1). For the repetition of ἄλλων, see vol. ii. p. li, note 6. For the thought, cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 22 sqq. Εἰς πλουσιώτερος πάντων seems to have been almost a proverbial expression: see Plut. Solon, c. 14, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν δὲ μέσων πολυτέρων, τὴν ὑπὸ λόγον καὶ νόμον μεταβολὴν ὁρῶντες ἐργασίῃ καὶ χαλεπῇ οὖσαν, οὐκ ἔφευγον ἕνα τὸν δικαιοτάτων καὶ φρονιμώτατον ἐπιστήσαν τοῖς πράγμασιν: Plut. De Cupid. Divit. c. 7, 4, καθίστερ λέγουσιν, εἰς ὃ πονηρότατος ἐν τῇ γένει γενόμενος καταφέρει τὰ πάντων. In Pausan. 7. 12. 1 we read βεβαιοὶ δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον, ὡς ἄρ' ἔν καὶ πῦρ εἰς πλέον ἄλλου πυρὸς κίβητος, καὶ λύκος ἀγριώτερος λύκων ἄλλων, καὶ ἀκρίτερος ἱμάξ ἱμάξε πίστεσθαι.

17. κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον. Cp. c. 17. 1288 a 19 sqq.

18. For the juxtaposition of τὸν ἕνα and πάντων, see notes on 1281 a 13 and 1285 a 3.

23. οὐκοῦν κ.τ.λ., 'therefore if the Many also really ought to be supreme because they are stronger' (κρείττους, not ἀμείνους) 'than the Few.' Cp. 1283 a 40 sqq. Aristotle has before him Plato, Gorg. 489 E sqq. (Eaton). For αἱ . . . γε, cp. Plato, Rep. 433 C, αἱ δέοι γε κρῖναι.

27. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. 'Οροι are 'here 'criteria,' such as wealth or virtue, on the strength of which men claim political supremacy. Plato had already used the expression ὁρθεῖ ἔπος in Polit. 293 C, ταῖς θήσομεν, ὡς αἶμα, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῃ, τοῦτον ἔπος ὁρθεῖ εἶναι μόνον ἱατρικῆς καὶ ἄλλης ἡστυασοῦν ἀρχῆς. Aristotle's conclusion is not convincing. It does not follow that a claim is bad because it does not hold under all circumstances.

30. καὶ γὰρ δὲ, 'for surely.'

31. For κυρίους τοῦ πολιτεύματος, an expression which does not, I think, occur elsewhere in the Politics, cp. Diod. 15. 45. 2, τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίου ἐπιστάσις κυρίους γεγονόσι τοῦ πολιτεύματος.

32. ἔχουσιν δὲ is in the plural, though τὰ πλῆθῃ is neuter, possibly because Aristotle is thinking of the individuals of whom τὰ πλῆθῃ are composed (cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 2, ἐφ' αἷς τὰ πλῆθῃ χαλεπαίνουσιν). He often, however, uses a plural verb with a neut. plur. nominative, even where this explanation does not hold good: see Waitz on Anal. Pr. 2. 26. 69 b 3, and Bonitz on Metaph. A. 4. 985 a 27.

τὰ πλήθη, as in 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 2 and Diod. 9. 24. 2, *ὁ μὴ τὰ πλήθη καταλέγει αὐτοῦ τὴν βαρύνειν*: so also in Plato, Gorg. 452 E and Soph. 268 B (Liddell and Scott).

35. *ἀθρόους*, not *ἀθρόων*: cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 14, *οἶκος . . . οὗτος κ.τ.λ.*

διδὼ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ. *Κοί* appears to mean that we are not only led to the conclusion stated in 27 sqq., but are enabled to solve an *ἀπορία* which is raised by some persons. *Τούτων τὸν τρόπον*, 'on this basis,' i. e. on the basis of a recognition of the claims both of the Better and of the Many. Who were the persons who raised this *ἀπορία*? It is difficult to say, though some approach is made to the question by the disputants in Plato, Gorg. 488 B sqq.: cp. also 483 B, *ἀλλ', οἶμαι, οἱ τίθενται τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἀνθρώποι εἰσι καὶ οἱ πολλοί· πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τοὺς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσι κ.τ.λ.*, and Laws 757 D. Andocides says in c. Alcib. c. 6, *καίτοι ταῦτα δίδυνται ἀριστα τῶν δογμάτων, ἃ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀλίγοις ἀρμόττοντα μάλιστα τυγχάνει καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιθυμητὰ ἔχει.*

38. *τίθεσθαι*. We expect rather *τιθέναι* (Harpocr. s. v. *θεῖσθαι*, *ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν νόμων λέγεται ὡς ἔθηκε μὲν ὁ νομοθέτης, ἔθετο δὲ ὁ δῆμος*). So we have *ἐτίθει νόμον* in 2. 8. 1268 a 6: cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 36.

39. *ὅταν συμβαίῃ τὸ λεχθέν*, i. e. when the Many taken collectively are better than the Few. The contrary case is dealt with in 1284 a 3, *εἰ δὲ τίς ἕσται εἰς κ.τ.λ.* Bern. and Sus. take *ὅταν συμβαίῃ τὸ λεχθέν* with *ἐνδεχεται ἀπαντῶν*, thus making the sentence *ἀποροῦσι*, 36 . . . *πλείονων*, 39, parenthetical, but the length of the parenthesis by which on this view these words are parted from the words which they qualify makes against this interpretation, and it seems preferable to take them, as Bekker and others do, with *ἀποροῦσι γὰρ τινες κ.τ.λ.*

40. *τὸ δ' ὁρᾶν λεπτέον ἴσως*, 'but [the advantage of neither is to be studied exclusively, for] we must determine that which is correct and normal in a fair and equal fashion.' For *λεπτέον*, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 36, *τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω λεπτέον*. 'Omnino λαμβάνειν est animo concipere, ita quidem ut modo investigandi (Waits ad Anal. Post. 1. 4. 73 a 24), modo inveniendi cognoscendi definiendi intelligendi vim habeat' (Bon. Ind. 422 b 38). 'ἴσως is used in the sense of 'equally' in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 22, *ἀληρωτοὺς ἴσως ἐκ τῶν μορίων*.

τὸ δ' ἴσως ὁρᾶν κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 7. 1279 a 31 sq. Plato had already said the same thing, as Giph. points out, p. 371: cp. Cic. De Offic.

1. 25. 85, omnino qui rei publicae praefuturi sunt duo Platonis praecepta teneant: unum, ut utilitatem civium sic tueantur, ut quaecumque agunt ad eam referant obliti commodorum suorum; alterum, ut totum corpus rei publicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas deserant. Cicero perhaps refers to Plato, Rep. 420 B. Solon claimed that he had endeavoured to be fair both to the Few and to the Many (Fragm. 5).

42. πολίτης δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the absence of the article, see note on 1276 b 28. Compare with the form of the sentence which commences here 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 7, ταύτην μίμναι τὴν ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἔστι τὴν αὐτὴν τιθίσαι, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἴσαστος καὶ τὴν ἔξω τὴν αὐτῶν, ὃ δ' ἀριστος τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν καλλίστων. The statement that the citizen in general is he who shares in ruling and being ruled is based on c. 4: in c. 1, on the other hand, the citizen is defined as ὁ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κεραικῆς.

1284 a. 1. πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην, 'and to suit the best': cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 11, διήρηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τούτων τὸν τρόπον. Aristotle takes it for granted here that the citizens of the 'best State' will both rule and be ruled, and thus anticipates the conclusion at which he arrives after a discussion in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12 sqq.

3. τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν. For virtue is the main source of 'the most desirable life,' which the citizens of the best State are said to live in 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 14 sqq. Cp. also 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 30 sqq.

εἰ δὲ τίς ἐστιν εἰς κ.τ.λ. This sentence is closely connected with what precedes; it deals with the contrary case to that supposed in εἴπω συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, 1283 b 39. The sense is, 'but if there is one man or a few of transcendent virtue, we must not treat them as citizens on a level with the rest, or expect them to be content with ruling and being ruled; their part is to rule.' To insert 1283 b 9-13 between πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν and εἰ δὲ τίς ἐστιν εἰς κ.τ.λ., as Sus. does, is to destroy the connexion. Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 540 D, εἴπω οἱ ὡς ἀληθεὶς φιλόσοφοι δυνάσται ἢ πλείους ἢ εἰς κ.τ.λ.

4. μὴ μίμναι δυνατοὶ πλήρωμα παρασχέσθαι πόλεως. These words are added because Aristotle is now dealing only with the case in which the Good exist in the same community with those possessing other attributes essential to the State (cp. 1283 a 42 sqq.). If the Good are numerous enough themselves to constitute a State, as in

the case of the State sketched in the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books, then the State will consist of equals, and they may each of them be treated as part of it and subjected to law.

6. τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν. Translate (with Bern. and Sus.) here and in 10, 'their political capacity,' and τῇ δυνάμει, 13, 'in capacity.' So Plut. Cic. c. 4, ἀνεκίει τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν. Sepulveda explains, 'facultatem civilem vocat quicquid opis in homine est quod faciat ad civilem societatem iuvandam tuendamque, sive administrandam.' Δύναμις πολιτικὴ answers to δυνάμενος, 2, as ἀρετὴ answers to προαιρούμενος. For the distinction implied between virtue and political capacity, cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq., where virtue is distinguished from δύναμις τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς, and 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10 sqq., where it is distinguished from δύναμις ἢ πρακτικὴ τῶν ἀρίστων. Δυνάμει is used in a different sense, that of 'political influence,' in 20, and πολιτικὴ δύναμις often bears this sense (e.g. in Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 a 33 sqq. and Plato, Rep. 473 D), but not, I think, here.

8. οὐκέτι θετέον τοῦτους μέρος πόλεως, i.e. we must not treat them as mere fellow-citizens of the rest (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 20), and expect them to take their turn with the rest of ruling and being ruled. Men of this transcendent excellence stand to their inferiors as a whole stands to its part (3. 17. 1288 a 26 sqq.).

9. ἀδικήσονται γὰρ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ἰσῶν. Τῶν ἰσῶν refers to 1283 b 40, τὸ δ' ὁρθὸν λεπτέον ἰσῶς. 'Classic authorities always use the future middle ἀδικήσομαι as passive in place of ἀδικηθήσομαι' (Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective a.v.).

10. ὥσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις stands in tacit contrast to θεὸν ἐν θεοῖς. A god among men is in a position of transcendent superiority not enjoyed by a god among gods. For the meaning of θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, cp. Plut. Alex. c. 51, "οὐ δοκούσιν," εἶπεν, "ὅτι οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐν τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ὥσπερ ἐν θηρίοις ἡμίθεοι περιπατοῦν," Θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις was a proverbial expression: cp. Theogn. 339,

χοῦτος ἐν δοκίμῳ μετ' ἀνθρώποις θεὸς εἶναι,
εἰ μ' ἐποτισάμενον μοῖρα κίχαι θανάτου,

and (with Crusius, Untersuchungen zu den Mimiamben des Herondas, p. 3) Antiphanes, Τριταγωνιστῆς (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 121),

θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἢ
ἐκείνος, εἰδὼς τὴν ἀληθεῖς μουσιάν.

See Crusius *ibid.* Cp. also Plato, Rep. 360 C.

11. *ἴσον*, because treating them as part of a State involves injustice.

12. *καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν*, 'legislation no less than treating men as part of a State.' Aristotle still has the lawgiver in view whom he has imagined in 1283 b 36 sqq., and is still advising him as to the course he should adopt. If men of the type described exist in the State, he must abstain from meddling with them; he must not attempt to fetter them by legislation.

τοὺς ἴσους καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, 'equals both in race and in capacity.' Gods are superior to men in both these respects: as to kings, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12. Proportional equals are no doubt included under *τοὺς ἴσους*: we may infer this from Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 26, *τοῦτο δὲ* (i.e. τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον) *ἔστιν ἐπὶ κοινούων βίον πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἴσων ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὥστε ἴσους μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, οἷα ἔστι τούτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τι δίκαιον καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν* *ἔστι γὰρ δίκαιον οἷα καὶ νόμος πρὸς αὐτοὺς*. Contrast with this view of law as existing only between equals or proportionate equals the Stoical view set forth by Cicero in De Legibus 1. 7. 23, *est igitur, quoniam nihil est ratione melius estque et in homine et in deo, prima homini cum deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio est communis. Quae cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum dis putandi sumus. Inter quos porro est communio legis, inter eos communio iuris est.*

13. *κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος*. This expression recurs in St. Paul, Galat. v. 22-23, *ὁ δὲ καρπὸς τοῦ Πνεύματος ἔστιν ἀγάπη χαρὰ εἰρήνη . . . κατὰ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος*, where the meaning of *κατὰ* is no doubt 'against,' but of *κατὰ* in the passage before us among others Bonitz says (Ind. 368 a 34), 'saepe per *κατὰ* *τινος* ea res significatur de qua aliquid dicitur vel cogitatur.' See for instance 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 2, *ὑπερ εἰρηται ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καθόλου κατὰ πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν*. Still Aristotle may remember here the expression of Callicles in Plato, Gorg. 488 D, where he says of the Many, *οἱ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νόμους τίθενται ἐπὶ τῷ ἐνί*, and *κατὰ* may be used (and not *περί*, as in *περὶ τοὺς ἴσους*, 12) because unfavourable laws are especially thought of, laws, for instance, enforcing on the persons referred to an equality of rights (cp. *κατ' αὐτῶν*, 15). I incline to think that 'against' is nearer to the meaning of *κατὰ* here than 'concerning.' Bern. Sus. and Welldon translate in a more neutral fashion 'for.'

14. αἰτοὶ γὰρ εἰσι νόμοι. Cp. c. 17. 1288 a 2, ὅτε μὴ νόμον ὦναι, ἀλλ' αἰτὸν ὡς ὅτι νόμος. This is as much as to say that they are Absolute Kings. The Persian King was a law to the Persians (Plut. Artox. c. 23, χαίρειν εἰσὼντα δέξαι Ἑλλήνων καὶ νόμους, Πέρσης δὲ νόμον αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ δικαστῆν ἀσχερῶν καὶ πολλῶν ἀποδεδυγμένον). This explains the exclamation of Anaxarchus to Alexander, when the latter had murdered Cleitus and was lying speechless from remorse, ὅστις ἔστιν Ἀλέξανδρος, εἰς ὃν ἡ εἰσαυριμένη τῶν ἐπεβλήτων ὁ δὲ ἔρρεται κλαίον ὥσπερ ἀνδρέεσσαν ἀνθρώπων νόμον καὶ φύγον δεδοικας, οἷς αὐτὸν προσήκει νόμον εἶναι καὶ ἔρρει τῶν δικαίων (Plut. Alex. c. 52). So Xenophon (Cyrus. 8. 1. 22) says of his Cyrus, τὸν δὲ ἐγαθὸν ἀρχόντα βλέποντα νόμον ἀνθρώποις ἐνόμισεν, ὅτι καὶ τῷ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ἔστι καὶ ἔρρει τὸν ἀτακτοῦντα καὶ καλῶν. It was claimed in Justinian's time that to the power of the Roman Emperor αἰτοῦσι ὁ θεὸς τοὺς νόμους ὑποτίθεται, νόμον αὐτῆν ἱμψυχον καταπέμψας ἀνθρώποις (Nov. 105. c. 4, quoted by Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 713. 2, ed. 1).

15. λέγοιεν γὰρ ὃν κ.τ.λ. Coray remarks on this passage, "ἐντεῦθεν ὁ μῦθος, ἢ μᾶλλον τὸ μῦθον λείψων τοῦτο, προσετιθέη τῇ Συναγωγῇ τῶν Λισυπείων μύθων (Μύθ. 347 ἐμὲς ἐκδόσεις)." See Fabulae Aesopicae, ed. Halm, Fab. 241. The lions asked the hares, 'Where are your claws and teeth?' (Camerarius, Interp. p. 132). Cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 b 4, αἰ γὰρ ζητοῦσι τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οἱ ἥττους, οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν, and the words of Callicles in Plato, Gorg. 483 E, πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέου λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας καταπύδοντες τε καὶ γοητεύοντες, καταδουλοῦμεθα λέγοντες, ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρή ἔχειν καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. Cp. also Philemon, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 3 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 32),

ἅπαντες οἱ λέοντες εἰσι δαίμονες,

δαίμοι πάλιν ἐξῆς πάντες εἰσὶν οἱ λεγολ.

Antisthenes may have related the fable here alluded to in his 'Cyrus, or on Kingship,' a work mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, 6. 16. Had he before him a version of the fable of the Lion and the Wild Ass (Babrius, Fab. 67) in which lions and hares joined in hunting and fell into a dispute as to the division of the spoil? Compare the fragment of the lyrical poet Cydias preserved by Plato, Charmides 155 D, ἐνόμισα σοφώτατον εἶναι τὸν Κυδίαν τὰ ἐρωτικά, ὅς ἐῖπεν ἐπὶ καλοῦ λέγων παιδὸς, ἀλλὰ ὑποτιθέμενος, τίλαβεῖσθαι μὴ κατέκωπα λέοντος νεβρὸν ἐλθόντα μοῖραν αἰρεῖσθαι κρείων αὐτὸς γὰρ μοι ἰδούκουν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου θρέμματος ἐαλωκέναι. See Bergk on Cydias, Fragm. 1.

17. διὰ καὶ τῶντων κ.τ.λ., 'hence' (i.e. from a sense of the immense superiority of certain men) 'States democratically constituted also institute the ostracism [in addition to adopting other democratic measures] for the reason which has been mentioned' (i.e. because they feel that these men are too superior to the rest to be treated as equals). It appears indeed later on (35) that oligarchies also got rid of over-powerful individuals, and in a less humane way than democracies, for they exiled them and put them to death. The democratically constituted States referred to include (in addition to Athens) Argos (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 18), Miletus, and Megara (Schol. Aristoph. Eq. 855). At Syracuse the ostracism was for a time represented by the petalism, which, it may be noted, would seem to have been introduced when the constitution of Syracuse was not a democracy, but what Aristotle variously terms an *ἀριστοκρατία* (7 (5). 10. 1312 b 8) or a *πολιτεία* (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 27 sqq.). The account given in the passage before us of the object of the ostracism resembles that given in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 15 sqq. and (in substance) the more detailed account given in 'Aθ. Παλ. c. 22, and it is probably correct. It is accepted by Schömann, Gr. Alt. 1. 188 sqq. and by Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 151 sq., though Grote (Hist. of Greece, 3. 197 sq.) and Susemihl (Sus.², Note 603: Sus.⁴, 1. p. 415) conceive the object of the ostracism to have been to put an end to dangerous rivalries between two leading statesmen by removing one of them beyond the limits of the State. Aristotle's account of its object receives confirmation from Thuc. 8. 73. 3, from Philochorus, Fragm. 79 b (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 396), and from Diod. 11. 55 and 19. 1 (compare Diodorus' account of the object of petalism, 11. 86. 5-87. 2). See also Plut. Aristid. c. 1, Pericl. c. 7, and Themist. c. 22. At Athens, however, and probably elsewhere (cp. 1284 b 20, τὰς πόλεις), the ostracism ceased after a time to be used for the object for which it was instituted and was perverted into an instrument of faction (*στρατηστικὴς*, 22). Aristides was not ostracized because he was disproportionately powerful, but because he was an opponent of whom Themistocles wished to be rid. Damon the musician was not ostracized because he was dangerous to the State, but because he was a friend of Pericles. Aristotle regards the original object of the ostracism as not wholly illegitimate. He would indeed prefer that the constitution and the laws should be so framed as to prevent the rise within

the State of any disproportionately powerful person (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 18 sqq. : 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 10—18)—with this end in view he would avoid creating great offices held for long terms (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 18 sqq., b 10 sqq. : cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 20 sqq.), and would seek to equalize property (2. 7. 1266 b 14 sqq. : 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 23 sqq.) and to increase the number of the moderately well-to-do (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 1—5)—but, if measures of this kind should fail of their object, he recommends (7 (5). 8. 1308 b 19) that any sentence of removal inflicted on disproportionately powerful men shall be a sentence of removal beyond the limits of the State, in other words he recommends something very like the ostracism. That both the petalism and the ostracism had the evil effect of discouraging the participation of the more distinguished citizens in political life, we see from Diod. 11. 87. 3 sqq. and from Plutarch's Life of Pericles (c. 7). If there is any truth in Plutarch's view that in choosing the side of the Many Pericles was influenced to some extent by a dread of the ostracism, the institution gave a decisive turn at that moment to the constitutional development of Athens.

19. αὐταὶ γὰρ δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'for these, I suppose, are thought to pursue equality more than anything else': cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 34 sq. and 8 (6). 2. 1318 a 3 sqq. Aristotle says 'are thought,' because democracies pursue only one kind of equality, arithmetical equality, and lose sight of equality based on desert (7 (5). 1. 1301 b 29 sqq.). 'Even now one discovers a tendency in the United States, particularly in the West, to dislike, possibly to resent, any outward manifestation of social superiority. A man would be ill looked upon who should build a castle in a park, surround his pleasure-grounds with a high wall, and receive an exclusive society in gilded saloons' (Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, 3. 315).

20. διὰ πλεόντων ἢ πολυφιλίας ἢ τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἰσχύν. Cp. Soph. O. T. 540,

ὅρ' οὐχὶ μῦθόν ἐστι τοῦ γυμνασίου σου,
ἀνευ τε πλῆθους καὶ φίλων τυραννίδα
θηρῶν, ὃ πλῆθει χρόμασιν θ' ἀλίσσεται;

Plato, Rep. 434 B, ὅπῃτε ἐπαιρόμενος ἢ πλοῦτος ἢ πλῆθος ἢ ἰσχὺς ἢ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ τοῦ πολέμου εἶδος ἐπιχειρῆν λέγει : Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 13, οἱ μὲν ἐν ὑπεροχαῖς εὐτυχημάτων ὄντες, ἰσχύος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ φίλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. That the possessor of these advantages was not unlikely to be ostracized, we see from what is said of Pericles in Plut. Pericl. c. 7, πλοῦτον δὲ καὶ γένουσι προσόντες αὐτῷ

λαμπροῦ καὶ φίλου, αἱ πλείους ἠδύναντο, φοβοίμενος ἐξοστρακισθῆναι. We learn what Aristotle means by τὴν ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἰσχύν from Plut. Aristid. c. 1, τῇ δ' ὁστράκῃ πῶς ὁ διὰ δόξαν ἢ γένος ἢ λόγου δύναμις ἐπὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς νομιζόμενος ἐπέκεινται, though he may perhaps hint that even virtue, as in the case of Aristides, was a cause of ostracism at Athens.

21. μεθίστασαν, the technical word used in cases of ostracism: cp. Philoch. Fragn. 79 b (Müller, Fragn. Hist. Gr. i. 396), τοῦτον εἶδει . . . ἐν δέκα ἡμέραις μεταστῆναι τῇ πόλει τῇ δέκα: Diod. ii. 55. 1: [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 2. 6. The same word is used of the banishment of involuntary homicides (Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 45, τῶν ἐπ' αἰουσίῃ φόῳ λέγει μεθεστηκότων). It is used in contrast to φυγαδεύειν and is a milder term than even ἐβάλλειν.

22. χρόνους ὀρισμένους. Cp. c. 14. 1285 a 34 and 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 27. Ten years, or, according to Philoch. Fragn. 79 b, originally ten, and afterwards five. Diodorus (ii. 55. 2) makes the term five years. In the petalism it was five (Diod. ii. 87. 1). A temporary absence from the State would not indeed make the ostracized person less wealthy or less well-born, but it would sever him from his friends and followers, and so tend to diminish his influence.

μυθολογεῖται δὲ κ.τ.λ. See Sus.², Note 604 (Sus.⁴, i. p. 416), who refers to Pherecydes of Leros, Fragn. 67 (ap. Schol. Apollon. i. 1290: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 88), 'Αντίμαχος ἐν τῇ Αἰδῇ φησὶν ἐμβασιάνειν τὸν Ἡρακλῆα διὰ τὸ καταβαρῆσθαι τὴν Ἀργὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔρκου. Τούτῳ καὶ Ποσειδάωνος ὁ ἐπιγραμματογράφος ἠκολούθησε καὶ Φερεκύδης, and Apollodor. Biblioth. i. 9. 19, Φερεκύδης αὐτὸν ἐν Ἀφείταις τῆς Θεσσαλίας ἀπολειφθῆναι λέγει, τῆς Ἀργοῦς φθιγγαμένης μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὸ τοῦτου βάρος. See also Prof. Robinson Ellis' note on Catullus 64. 23, where the expression 'mater' probably refers to the Argo—'the idea is not unnatural in itself and agrees with the recurring representations of the Argo as an animate being ('Αργὴ a proper name, like Eido, Hypso, Aphro, Brimo, Ioulo), possessed of voice and reason and in part divine. Philo Iud. vol. ii. p. 468 (quoted by Nauck, Fr. Aesch. 20), οὐδ' ἡ Ἀργὴ ναυαρχοῦντος Ἰδῆουτος ἐπέτρπευεν ἐπιβαίνειν οἰκταῖς μεμοιραμένη καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ λογισμοῦ, φύσις οὕσα φιλαιεὶθερος ὅθεν καὶ Αἰσχυλὸς ἐπ' αὐτῇς εἶπε: Πού δ' ἐστὶν Ἀργοῦς ἱερὸν αἰδάσσειν (rather αἰδέσσειν) ξύλον; Apollod. i. 9. 19' (quoted above), 'cf. i. 9. 24, places which all seem to refer to the piece of speaking timber (αἰδῆν δῶρον) which Athene built into the cut-water, and which

Apollonius describes as urging the start from Pagasae (i. 525) and warning the Argonauts to expiate the murder of Absyrtus by a visit to Circe (iv. 580 sqq.).'

23. διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, 'for a similar reason': cp. 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 19 and 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 6 and b 17. Not τὴν τοιαύτην, as in 18.

26. διὰ κ.τ.λ. Καὶ τοὺς ψέγοντας, 'among others those who blame.' In τοὺς ψέγοντας κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers to Sosicles the Corinthian and the speech which he is represented in Hdt. 5. 92 to have addressed to the representatives of the Lacedaemonians and their allies gathered in council, in which, while recounting the misdeeds of the tyrants of Corinth, he dwelt especially on the hint given by Thrasybulus tyrant of Miletus to Periander tyrant of Corinth to get rid of the men who overtopped the rest. Compare Eurip. Suppl. 433 Bothe, 447 Dindorf,

πῶς οὖν ἔτ' ἐν γένει' ἐν ἰσχυρᾷ πόλει,
ἴσταν τις, ὥς λευκῶτος ἥρωος στέγῃ,
τάλμας ἀφαιρῇ κάπολατίῳ νέον;

Herodotus, as has been said, makes Thrasybulus give the hint to Periander, whereas Aristotle here makes Periander give the hint to Thrasybulus, but any one who compares the two narratives will see that the story as told by Aristotle is a shortened version of that of Herodotus. How then are we to account for the inversion in it of the parts played by Periander and Thrasybulus? We have already noticed other instances in which a slight divergence from a narrative of Herodotus is observable (see above on 1262 a 19 and 1276 a 28), and the same thing occurs again in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 17 sq. Aristotle's memory may have betrayed him, as it did in the mention of Hector in Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1116 a 33 (see below on 1285 a 12) and of Calypso in Eth. Nic. 2. 9. 1109 a 31, where Hom. Odys. 12. 219 is referred to, but, if this was so, the slip must have been something more than a mere momentary one, for it recurs in 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 20. It is natural that Aristotle should credit Periander with the advice, for he believed that many of the traditional maxims of tyranny came originally from Periander (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 36). We notice that Herodotus, a Greek of Asia Minor, ascribes the famous hint to a tyrant of Miletus, while Aristotle, a Greek of Europe, ascribes it to a tyrant of Corinth. For the dative *Θρασυβούλῳ* dependent on the substantive *συμβουλίαν*, cp. De Part. An. 2. 17. 660 a 35, καὶ χρῶνται τῇ

γλώττῃ καὶ πρὸς ἑρμηνείαν ἀλλήλοις, and see Bon. Ind. 166 a 61 sqq. In 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 20 we have τὸ Περιάνδρου πρὸς Θρασίβουλον συμβούλευμα.

28. τὸν πεμφθέντα κήρυκα περὶ τῆς συμβουλίας. For the order of these words, cp. 1284 b 8, τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πόδα τῆς συμμετρίας, and c. 12. 1282 b 31, τὼν ὁμοίων αὐλητῶν τὴν τέχνην, and see Vahlen on Poet. 15. 1454 b 16, τὰς ἀκολουθούσας αἰσθήσεις τῇ ποικιλίᾳ.

30. ὁμαλύνειν. 'Ομαλύνειν is a rare word, but it is used by Plato in Tim. 45 E.

35. καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐλιγαρχίας καὶ τὰς δημοκρατίας. In sentences of this kind the preposition is usually repeated in the Politics before the second substantive (e.g. in 1. 8. 1256 b 17 we have καὶ διὰ τὴν χρῆσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφήν), and this is so whether 'both . . . and' is expressed by καὶ . . . καὶ or by τε . . . καί, but sometimes the preposition is not thus repeated (e.g. in the passage before us and in 38: in 2. 12. 1274 b 24: 3. 11. 1281 b 33: 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 20: 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 19: 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 29 and b 25 sqq.: see also critical note on 1330 b 31). I have not noticed that the preposition is similarly omitted in the Politics when ἤ . . . ἢ, ὅτε . . . ὅτε (or μήτε . . . μήτε), εἴτε . . . εἴτε, or πότερον . . . ἢ are used, except that in 3. 1. 1275 b 17 M^s P¹ omit the second περὶ in ἢ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τινῶν.

37. τρέπον τινά. See above on 1255 a 13.

38. οἱ κύριοι τῆς δυνάμεως. Cp. Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 187, οἱ τῆς ψήφου κυνὶ γεγονότες κύριοι.

39. οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν κ.τ.λ. It is clear from this that the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians were the most powerful States of the Athenian alliance. They had been the leaders in the transfer of the headship of the maritime league against Persia from the Lacedaemonians to Athens (Plut. Aristid. c. 23). Miletus was no longer their equal. We read in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 24, πισθίοντες δὲ ταῦτα καὶ λαβόντες τὴν ἀρχὴν (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι) τοῖς τε συμμάχοις δεσποτικῶς ἐχρῶντο πλὴν Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων καὶ Σαμίων τοῖσι δὲ φύλακας εἶχον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὥστε τὰς τε πολιτείας παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀρχεῖν ὡς ἔτυχον ἀρχόντες. This remark is obviously not true of the period subsequent to the revolt and subjugation of Samos in B.C. 440, and it probably refers to the Athenian Confederacy in its earlier days before it was converted into an Empire. If we understand it thus, it is not inconsistent with the passage before us. But it is not easy to say what were the infractions of treaties to which Aristotle

alludes. He appears to refer to humiliations inflicted by Athens on Samos, Chios, and Lesbos at a comparatively early period of her ascendancy, 'as soon as she had taken a firm grip of her rule.' He can hardly refer, therefore, to humiliations which followed the suppression of revolts, for Samos did not revolt till *B.C.* 440, nor Mytilene till *B.C.* 428, nor Chios till *B.C.* 412. Besides, he seems to be speaking not of humiliations brought about by disloyalty on the part of these States, but of humiliations prompted by Athenian jealousy of their greatness. Athens may have prohibited wars between one of these States and other members of her alliance (see the speech of Hermocrates in Thuc. 6. 76)—it was a prohibition of this kind that led to the revolt of Samos (Thuc. 1. 115)—or demanded the removal of fortifications (compare the case of Chios in *B.C.* 425, Thuc. 4. 51), or meddled with their territory (as in the case of Thasos, Thuc. 1. 100). No doubt, the Mytilenean envoys in Thuc. 3. 9 sqq. (see Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, 6. 309), speaking in *B.C.* 428, do not charge Athens with any infractions of treaties; on the contrary, they speak of their State having been 'honoured' by Athens, and ascribe their revolt to fear of ultimate subjugation, not to actual wrongs inflicted on Lesbos in the past. Still Plutarch implies in Aristid. c. 25 (where he perhaps follows the same authority as Aristotle does in the passage before us, for he uses the words, ὑστερον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων ἄρχην ἐγκατείστηεν, ὡς τοιαύτην, ἐκβιαζομένους, cp. Thuc. 1. 76. 1) that Athens was guilty of infractions of treaties in her relations with her dependent allies, and it is likely enough that Samos, Chios, and Lesbos did not escape. That a time did come when Athens changed her original easy-going headship into a firm imperial control, we see from Thuc. 6. 76 and Diod. 11. 70. Diodorus (who may here represent Ephorus, a witness likely to be favourable to the dependent allies, as he belonged to the Aeolic Cyme) dates the commencement of this change from the time when Athens became aware that the Lacedaemonians had abandoned all thought of attempting to regain the headship of the maritime league by war. This happened as early as *B.C.* 475, if Diodorus' chronology is to be trusted (Diod. 11. 50. 8).

41. ὁ δὲ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers not only to severities inflicted by the Persians on the Medes, Babylonians, and others after the suppression of revolts (see as to Babylon Hdt. 1. 183 and 3. 159 and Arrian, *Anab.* 3. 16. 4 and

7. 17. 2), but also and more especially to unprovoked evidences of distrust like that mentioned in Diod. 11. 6. 3, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν ἀναλαβὼν (ὁ Χίρξης) ἦεν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐν Θερμοπύλαις Ἕλλησιν προτάξας ἀπάντων τῶν ἐθνῶν Μήδους, εἶπε δ' ἀνδρείαν προκρίνας αὐτοὺς εἶπε καὶ βουλόμενος ἅπαντας ἀπολέσθαι· ἐτὴν γὰρ ἐπὶ φρόνημα τοῖς Μήδοις, τῆς τῶν προγόνων ἡγεμονίας οὐ πάλαι καταπεποιημένης: cp. Xen. Cyrop. 7. 5. 69, μισθὸν δὲ καὶ τούτοις (i. e. τοῖς φρουροῖς) Βαβυλωνίους ἔταξεν (ὁ Κύρος) παρέχων, βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς ὡς μηχανωτάτους εἶναι, ὥστε ἐπὶ ταπεινώσασθαι καὶ εὐκαθεκτότατοι εἶναι. Egypt is probably referred to in τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς πεφρονηματισμένους διὰ τὸ γενέσθαι ποτ' ἐκ' ἀρχῆς: cp. Diod. 17. 49, οἱ γὰρ Αἰγύπτιοι, τῶν Περσῶν ἡσβεσθέντων εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ βίαιως ἀρχόντων, ἄσμενοι προσεδέξαντο τοὺς Μακεδόνας. Compare Plato's picture of Persian rule in Laws 697 D, which explains Alexander's triumph.

1284 b. 2. πεφρονηματισμένους. 'A word occurring in the Politics alone of Aristotle's writings, but not very uncommon there, is φρονηματίζεσθαι. It occurs later in Polybius and is certainly un-Attic. It is entirely absent from the 'Αθ. Πολ., where θαρρεῖν takes its place' (Kaibel, Stil und Text der Πολιτεία Ἀθηναίων des Aristoteles, p. 37).

ἐπικοπτε. Ἐπικόπτω is a rare word; the passage before us is, so far as I know, the earliest prose passage in which it occurs. It is a technical term of arboriculture, to 'lop' or 'pollard' (Theophr. Caus. Plant. 5. 17. 3, περὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπικοπῆς καὶ τῆς καλούσας ἐν δόλοις ἢ σκέψις . . . καλοῦσι δ' ἐπικοπήν, ὅταν ἀφαιρεθείσῃς τῆς κόμης ἐπικόπη τις τὸ ἄκρον), and its metaphorical meaning in the passage before us agrees pretty closely with that of ἐταπεινώσων in 1284 a 41.

3. περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς ὀρθάς, 'with regard to all constitutions, even the normal ones.' Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 2. 767 a 32, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστὶ τροφή τοῦτο (i. e. τὸ ὕδωρ), καὶ ἐν τοῖς ξηροῖς. We gather from 25 sqq. that the best constitution will expel, if necessary, men who are disproportionately superior in wealth or political influence, though not men disproportionately superior in virtue. As to the importance of συμμετρία in the members of a State, see 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 33 sqq.

4. μὲν is answered by οὐ μὴν ἄλλᾳ, as in c. 4. 1276 b 34, c. 6. 1278 b 19, and 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 39 sqq.

5. πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαι. The opposition between πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαι and τὰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπισκοπούσας will be noticed. The Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of the use of ἀποσκοπεῖν by Aristotle. Ἐπισκοπεῖν is also rare in the sense in which it is used in 6. It is not perhaps necessary to supply

ἀγαθόν from the next line with τὸ δῖον: cp. Rhct. ad Alex. 30. 1437 a 36, καὶ γὰρ οἷοντος ἐκείνου δῖον δακτύλῳ τὸ δῖον ἀπαιτῶν (referred to by Bonitz, Ind. 339 a 22).

7. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 12. 1282 b 30. Τοῦτο, i.e. the fact that a part of a whole which is disproportionate to the whole to which it belongs is not tolerated.

8. οἷον is here followed by οἷον and οἶδι δὲ ('nor yet surely'). See above on 1272 b 38, and compare the somewhat similar sequence in c. 17. 1288 a 24 sqq. In the passage before us the change from οἷον . . . οἷον to οἶδι δὲ is enough to cause the future ἴσσει to take the place of the optative ἴσσειν δέ.

10. οἷον τραπεζῆς πρέμειν κ.τ.λ. We must apparently supply ἴσσειν δὲ ὑπερβάλλειν τῆς συμμετρίας.

13. ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο μὲν κ.τ.λ. '[The teacher of a chorus does not fall out with his chorus because he excludes from it a disproportionately excellent singer, for his rule over his chorus is beneficial to it, as being exercised for the advantage of the ruled (c. 6. 1278 b 39 sqq.),] and thus, so far as this practice at any rate is concerned, there is no reason why monarchs should not be in harmony with the States they rule, if, when they resort to it, their rule is beneficial to their States.' For μὲν *solitarium* see above on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34. Ταῖς πόλεσιν I take to mean 'the States ruled by them': cp. 33, ὥστε βασιλείας εἶναι τοῖς τοιούτοις αἰδίοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. For τῆς οἰκίας ἀρχῆς, cp. 21; and 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 26, τὰς οἰκίας γυνῆας.

15. διὰ κ.τ.λ., 'hence in relation to acknowledged superiorities the argument in favour of the ostracism is not without a certain element of political justice.' Δὲ introduces an inference from the fact that constitutions which aim at the common good and practitioners of the arts resort to measures akin to the ostracism. Whatever restores the symmetry of the constitution is in a certain degree just. Κατὰ τὰς ἐμολογουμένας ὑπεροχάς (cp. 26, οὐ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν, οἷον ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ πολυφιλίας, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς γίνεσθαι διαφέρων κατ' ἀρετὴν) is added to exclude the application of the ostracism to cases in which there is no acknowledged superiority (such, for instance, as that of Hyperbolus). For the phrase τὰς ἐμολογουμένας ὑπεροχάς cp. Plato, Rep. 569 B and Meno 96 B, and Isocr. Hel. § 12. Ὑπεροχάς is in the plural because there are more kinds of superiority than one (Bon. Ind. 793 a 40, 'ὑπεροχαί, i.e. varia τῆς ὑπεροχῆς genera'); there is superiority in

virtue, in wealth, in command of friends, in birth, and so forth. For *ὁ λόγος ὁ περὶ τὸν δοτρακισμόν*, cp. c. 9. 1280 a 27.

17. *βέλτιον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* 'True, it is better,' etc. The same thing is said in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 18 sqq. For the means by which Aristotle would effect this, see above on 1284 a 17.

19. *δεύτερος δὲ πλοῦς κ.τ.λ.* On the proverb *δεύτερος πλοῦς*, see Leutsch and Schneidewin, *Paroem. Gr.* 1. 359 and 2. 24, where the lines of Menander are quoted (*Θρασύλειον*, *Fragm.* 2, ap. Stob. *Floril.* 59. 9: Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.* 4. 139),

*ὁ δεύτερος πλοῦς ἴστί δῆπον λεγόμενος,
ἐν ἀποτυχῇ τις οὐρίου, κάπνισι πλεῖν*

(*οὐρίου* Grotius, *πρώτον*, *ἐν* or simply *ἐν* MSS.: see Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.* 5. ccliii). '*Ἄν συμβῇ*, sc. *τὸ δέισθαι τοιαύτης λαρείας*. *Δυσφοῖν*, sc. *τὴν πολιτείαν*.

20. *ὅπερ οὐκ ἐγένετο περὶ τὰς πόλεις*, 'which did not come about in connexion with the States' (see note on 1327 b 7), a softened way of saying 'which was not done by the States.' Greek States did not use the ostracism to heal a defect in the constitution.

22. *τοῖς δοτρακισμοῖς*, plural in the sense of 'acts of ostracizing.'

ἐν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'in the deviation-forms of constitution, then, that the practice of removing persons disproportionately superior is of advantage to each form severally and just according to their several views of justice, is evident, and perhaps this also is evident that it is not absolutely just.' It is not absolutely just, because it is resorted to in the interest of the holders of power, not in the common interest of all the citizens (4 sq.). *Μὲν οὖν* is answered by *ἀλλὰ*, 25.

26. *ὁ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν*. *Τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν* is emphasized by being placed before *τὴν ὑπεροχὴν*: cp. c. 14. 1285 b 18, *τῶν πολιτικῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν*, and 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 25, *τῶν ἐπὶ πόρει*, and 34, *τῶν μὲν οὖν δημοκρατιῶν αἱ μεταβολαί*.

27. *ισχύος* must mean 'political strength': cp. 1284 a 21, *ἢ τινα ἄλλην πολιτικὴν ἰσχίον*.

28. *ἂν τις γένηται διαφέρων κατ' ἀρετὴν*. Cp. c. 17. 1288 a 16, *συμβῇ διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν*.

ὁ γὰρ δὴ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle no doubt remembers, as Vict. points out, Heraclitus' indignant censure of the Ephesians for their expulsion of Hermodorus (see vol. i. p. 263, note 2). Compare the language ascribed to the Persian King when Themistocles was driven from Greece to his court (Plut. *Themist.* c. 28, *μακαρίους δὲ*

πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἑαυτῶν, ὡς ἐκ' ἐπιτύχῃς μεγίστης, καὶ καταξέμενος διὰ τοῦ πολυεπίου τοιαύτης φθόνου δίδωκε τὸν Ἀριστέον, ὅπως διαίονται τοὺς ἀρίστους ἐξ ἑαυτῶν κ.τ.λ.). Athens was popularly credited with 'envy of the good,' as we see from the epitaph on Aeschylus in Anthol. Pal. 7: 40,

τίς φθόνος, εἴ εἴ,

Θησεύδα ἀγαθῶν ἔγκονος αἰὲν ἔχει;

Theseus was believed by some to have been ostracized at Athens (Theophr. Fragm. 131). A current proverb ascribed a similar jealousy to the Megarians—*μηδέποτε μηδὲς Μεγαρίων γίνετο σφετέρως* (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 528). Observe that *ὁ τοιοῦτος* recurs four times in 28—34. This is probably intentional. As to repetitions of this kind see notes on 1331 b 18, 1317 b 5, 1307 a 14, and 1325 b 11, and compare the frequency with which *τοῖς ἔθεσιν* or *τῶν ἔθῶν* recurs in 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 28—39.

30. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε, 'but certainly,' as elsewhere. Supply *φαῖεν ὡς δεῖν*. A question then arises as to the construction and punctuation of the sentence. Hampke (followed by Sus., though not without a good deal of hesitation) places *παραπλήσιον γὰρ πᾶν εἰ τοῦ Διὸς ἄρχειν ἔξισιεν* in a parenthesis, and takes *μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς* with *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄρχειν γε τοῦ τοιούτου* (*φαῖεν ὡς δεῖν*), but Susenmühl doubts with some reason whether, if we adopt this view of the construction of the sentence, *μερίζοντες* should not be *μερίζοντας*. In any case perhaps the more natural course is (with Bernays) to take *μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς* with what immediately precedes, i. e. with *παραπλήσιον . . . ἔξισιεν*, and not with *ἀλλὰ . . . τοιούτου*. But then the further question arises, what is the meaning of *μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς*? Some have fancied that there is a reference to the 'distribution of offices' by Zeus among the other gods, when he had won supremacy in heaven (cp. Hesiod, Theog. 881—5, 112, and Aesch. Prom. Vinc. 228 sqq.), and have translated the passage, 'for to do so would be much the same thing as if men were to claim to rule over Zeus, distributing the offices (as he did when he succeeded to power).' But it is not likely that this is the meaning of the words. A different interpretation is suggested by the passage in which the conclusion arrived at here is repeated, c. 17. 1288 a 24, *οὐτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἢ φυγαδεύειν οὐδ' ὀστρακίζειν δὴ που τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπειν ἐστίν, οὐτ' ἔξιόν ἀρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῇ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. ὥστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ*

πειθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ κύριον εἶναι μὴ κατὰ μέρος τοῦτον ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. Compare with this passage 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 23-27 and 3. 16. 1287 a 16-18, and we shall find that the three passages lend support to Bernays' rendering of *μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς*, 'by a rotation in their tenure of the offices' ('gemäss einem reihenweisen Wechsel der Aemterbekleidung'), in which he is anticipated by Sepulveda, who however erroneously supplies *et* *deus* as the nom. to *ἀξιοῖεν*. Sepulveda, in fact, explains the passage in his commentary thus — 'simile, inquit, esset ac si Dii statuerent inter se, ut sic per omnes aut aliquos ipsorum iret imperandi vicissitudo, ut Iuppiter modo imperium teneret, modo esset sub imperio, quod esset absurdissimum.' But does *μερίζω* bear this sense in any other passage? I am not aware that any such passage has been produced, and till it has, it will be safer to translate *μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς* in the ordinary way, 'distributing the offices,' i. e. distributing them among themselves and Zeus, and treating him as on a level with themselves in the matter of ruling, or, in other words, as partly ruling and partly ruled, instead of making him sole ruler. Cp. 1284 a 9, *ἀδικήσουσιν γὰρ ἀξιοῦμενοι τῶν ἰσῶν*. I take *μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχάς* to mean the same as *ἀξιοῦντες αὐτὸν τῶν ἰσῶν*. In Aristoph. Aves 467 sq. and 1225 sqq. (Didot) the Birds go further and claim to rule over Zeus and the gods without giving them even a turn of office. Bonitz remarks (Ind. 41 a 31) on the construction *παραπλήσιον αὐτῷ* *et* 'insolentior videtur usus formulae αὐτῷ *et* ubi καὶ pertinet ad vocabulum similitudinem significans (*παραπλήσιον, ὁμοιον, τὸ αὐτό*),' as in the passage before us, with which he compares Phys. 8. 5. 257 a 7 sqq. and (a passage very similar in structure to ours) *περὶ ἀσπερίτης* 9. 475 a 11, *παραπλήσιον γὰρ συμβαίνει αὐτῷ εἴ τίς τινα τῶν ἀσπερίων πτόι, τὸ στόμα κατασχέει*. The difficulty of getting the better of Zeus was proverbial (Hom. Il. 1. 396 sqq. and 8. 209 sq.), and indeed the difficulty of ruling over the gods (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1145 a 10 sq., already referred to by Eaton: Aesch. Prom. Vinc. 49, 356 sqq., Pers. 749: Hom. Il. 8. 18 sqq.: Aristoph. Plut. 141 sqq. Didot: Diod. 17. 41. 1).

32. *λείπεται τοῖσιν κ.τ.λ.* When willing obedience is rendered to a man, it is a sign that he is a natural King (Xen. Cyrop. 5. 1. 24 sqq.). Cp. 1. 12. 1259 b 10, *ὃ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἀρχὴ βασιλική τὸ γὰρ γενήσθαι καὶ κατὰ φύλιν ἀρχῶν καὶ κατὰ πρεσβείαν ἰστί, ὅπερ ἰστί βασιλικῆς εἶδος ἀρχῆς*. Is the passage before us present to Milton's memory in the address to Cromwell in the *Defensio Secunda*,

where we read, 'We all willingly yield the palm of sovereignty to your unrivalled ability and virtue, except the few among us who are either ... or who do not know that nothing in the world is more pleasing to God, more agreeable to reason, more politically just, or more generally useful, than that the supreme power should be vested in the best and the wisest of men' (Prose Works, i. 288 Bohn)?

33. βασιλέας διδίους. 'Forma accusativi pluralis plerumque βασιλεῖς, veluti 2. 9. 1271 a 26: 2. 11. 1272 b 37: 3. 14. 1285 a 26: 3. 15. 1286 b 11, sed βασιλέας legitur 3. 13. 1284 b 33' (Bon. Ind. 135 a 21 sqq.), and also in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 24. Βασιλέας is the form found in Attic Inscriptions, though βασιλεῖς appears after B.C. 307 (Meisterhans, Gramm. d. att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 110). The acc. plur. of *ἡρώς* in the Politics is *ἡρώς* and of *ἑκπύς* *ἑκπύς*. For the meaning of *διδίους* see above on 1271 a 40. Not mere temporary kings, like the βασιλεῖς mentioned in 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 29, but perpetual kings.

35 sqq. μεταβῆναι, because a transition is now made from C. 14. a question affecting all constitutions to the study of a single constitution, Kingship. Aristotle had said in c. 7. 1279 a 23 sqq. that he would discuss the normal constitutions first, and Kingship is a normal constitution. The inquiries of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Chapters have had reference to the question of Justice, but now Aristotle asks whether Kingship is expedient, not whether it is just; the two questions, however, do not lie far apart, and when he at length arrives at the end of the inquiry in c. 17. 1287 b 36 sqq., we find that an answer is given to both of them (1287 b 39, *δικαιον καὶ συμφέρον*: 1288 a 1, *ὅτι συμφέρον ὅτι δίκαιον*: 1288 a 18, *δίκαιον*: 1288 a 30, *πότερον οὐ συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ συμφέρει*). The question of the expediency of Kingship cannot be discussed until the various kinds of Kingship have been distinguished, for it may well be that one and the same answer will not hold good of all. Besides, Aristotle is not sorry to seize the opportunity which his classification of Kingships affords him of describing the various forms of Kingship and of correcting the error of those who regarded the Lacedaemonian Kingship as Kingship in a truer sense than any other Kingship according to law (1285 a 3 sqq.); for he holds that the Lacedaemonian Kingship is, in fact, the least of those according to law. It is the expediency of the Absolute Kingship, however, that he really wishes to discuss. In his account of this form Aristotle

probably has the Persian Kingship before him (see notes on 1284 a 14 and 1287 a 1). Socrates had described Kingship as always according to law (Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12, βασιλείῳ δὲ καὶ τυραννίδι ἀρχαὶ μὲν ἀμφοτέρως ἡγεῖτο εἶναι, διαφέρειν δὲ ἀλλήλων ἐνέμειν τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκόντων τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ νόμους τῶν πολλῶν ἀρχὴν βασιλείῳ ἡγεῖτο κ.τ.λ.). Aristotle takes a different view. Just as in the classification of democracies and oligarchies in the Sixth (Fourth) Book forms in which law is supreme are marked off from those in which it is not, so here in the classification of Kingships the same is the case; but while the democracies and oligarchies in which law is not supreme are the worst, the form of Kingship in which law is not supreme is the best and highest. Aristotle's classification of Kingships would have been simplified, if he had first divided them into Kingships according to law and not according to law, and had then subdivided the class of Kingships according to law. His study of Kingship would probably have been fuller and more complete if he had not studied Kingship according to law on the way, as it were, to an examination of the question as to Absolute Kingship. We are grateful to him for studying barbarian Kingship as well as Greek, for in the case of other constitutions he is silent as to the non-Greek world, if we except his notice of the Carthaginian ἀριστοκρατία, and not entirely for want of material, for non-monarchical constitutions appear to have existed, for instance, in Lycia (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 185); but his treatment of barbarian Kingship is cursory in the extreme. It makes no pretence of being exhaustive, for the kind of barbarian Kingship which Aristotle selects for notice is said by him to exist only among 'some of the barbarians' (c. 14. 1285 a 17). It should also be noted that in the inquiry respecting the downfall and the preservation of Kingship and Tyranny contained in the Seventh (Fifth) Book no notice is taken of the distinction drawn in the Third between different kinds of Kingship, or of that drawn in the Sixth (Fourth) between different kinds of Tyranny. So again in 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10 Aristotle evidently implies the existence of Kingships not κατὰ γένος, but it is not easy to say to what Kingships he there refers (see note on 1313 a 10). One remark may be added. Aristotle classes under the head of βασιλεία dignities to which we should not allow the name of Kingship. The Aesymneteship, for instance, might be held for only a few months or years, yet it is treated by Aristotle as a form of βασιλεία. It is so because it is

exercised over willing subjects and is invested with large powers, for these are the two characteristics of βασιλεία (7 (5). 10. 1313 a 5). Βασιλεία may or may not be according to law, may or may not be κυρία πάντων (c. 14. 1285 a 4, b 29), may or may not be elective, may or may not be hereditary, may even be for a less term than life, but these two characteristics are always found in connexion with it.

37. σκεπτόν δὲ πότερον κ.τ.λ. Compare the question raised in 2. 1. 1261 a 2, ἄλλὰ πότερον ὅσων ἐνδέχεται κοινωνῆσαι, πάντων βέλτιον κοινωνεῖν τὴν μίλλουσαν οὐκ εἶσθαι πᾶσι καλῶς, ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ οὐ βέλτιον; Τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς οὐκ εἶσθαι καὶ πᾶσι καὶ χώρας stands in opposition to τισὶ μὲν συμφέρει τισὶ δ' οὐ συμφέρει, therefore it must mean 'broadly to any city and country which is to be well-constituted politically.' We have been told in the preceding chapter that in some cases the best constitution must assume the form of a perpetual Kingship, but that does not preclude the raising of the question whether Kingship is advantageous to any political community which desires to be well-constituted or only to some. Aristotle's readiness to consider the question whether Kingship is expedient or not would be little in harmony with popular opinion in Greece, which was no doubt unfavourable to the institution: cp. Demosth. Philip. 2. 25, βασιλεὺς γὰρ καὶ τύραννος ἅπας ἐχθρὸς ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ νόμοις ἑαυτοῖς. Even Isocrates, though he praises Kingship in his Nicocles and Ad Nicoclem—he could hardly do otherwise in works written for a King—speaks of it in his Oration to Philip (§ 107) as little suited to Greeks, though indispensable to barbarians, and allows in his Nicocles (§ 24) that the Lacedaemonians and Carthaginians reserve it for use in war and are oligarchically governed at home. Xenophon's praises of Kingship in his Cyropaedia refer, at any rate nominally, to a Persian King. Plato, however, had been bolder in his Republic and Politicus, for he certainly has Greeks in view when he advocates in those dialogues Kingship of the most thorough-going kind. See on this subject vol. i. p. 277.

38. καὶ πόλιν καὶ χώραν. Χώρα probably here means not 'a territory occupied by villages,' as in Strabo, p. 336, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τόπους τοὺς κατὰ Πελοπόννησον πλὴν ἀλίγων, οὓς κατέλαβεν ὁ ποταμὸς, οὐ πόλιν ἀλλὰ χώραν νομίζω δεῖ, συστήματα δὲ μὲν ἔχουσιν ἐκάστην πλῆν, ἐξ ὧν ὑστερον αἱ γνωριζόμεναι πόλιν συνεκρίθησαν, but 'a territory occupied by an ἔθνος or ἔθνη,' as in Xen. Anab. 4. 8. 22,

ἐν τῇ Κόλῳ χάρα, for in c. 14. 1285 b 30 we have *δοῦναι* *ἐκδοῦναι* *καὶ* *πάλαι* *ἐκδοῦναι*, and in 1285 b 33 *πάλαι* *καὶ* *ἐκδοῦναι* *ἐκδοῦναι* *καὶ* *ἐκδοῦναι*. Nothing, however, is said of the *χάρα* or *ἐκδοῦναι* in the recapitulatory summaries in c. 17. 1288 a 30 sqq. and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 6 sqq.

41. ἡ *πλείους* *ἔχει* *διαφορές*, 'or has several different forms': cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 33, *οὐ γὰρ αὖτε* *τι* *ταῦτα* *ἔχον* *πλείους* *σώματα* *διαφορές*.

1285 a. 2. τῆς ἀρχῆς ὁ τρόπος. In some forms of Kingship (the barbarian Kingship and the Aesymneteship) the *τρόπος* *τῆς* *ἀρχῆς* is despotic (1285 a 22, b 2 sq.), in others not; in some the King is supreme over more things than in others (c. 15. 1285 b 35 sqq.).

3. *πρωτῶν*, sc. *τῶν βασιλευσίων*. For the juxtaposition of *αἰ* and *πρωτῶν* see note on 1281 a 13.

ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῇ Λακωνικῇ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ. Aristotle places first and second in his enumeration of forms of Kingship two existing forms, the Laconian and the barbarian, and then passes on to two obsolete forms, the Aesymneteship, which existed in the ancient days of Greece, and the Kingship of the heroic times.

δοκεῖ, 'is thought,' by whom we are not told: possibly Plato's language in Laws 691 D-692 B respecting the Lacedaemonian Kingship is present to Aristotle's mind. He does not agree with this view; he sees that there are Kingships according to law (the barbarian Kingship and the Aesymneteship) which are supreme over more things than the Laconian, and therefore are Kingships in a fuller sense, for the true King is *κύριος πάντων* (c. 17. 1288 a 18 sq.: cp. Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 37). In Diog. Laert. 3. 82 a classification of Kingships into Kingships *κατὰ γένος* and Kingships *κατὰ νόμον* is ascribed with very doubtful correctness to Plato, and the Lacedaemonian Kingship is brought under the former head, so that it is implied not to be *κατὰ νόμον*.

5. *ὅταν ἐξέλθῃ τὴν χάραν*, sc. *ὁ βασιλεὺς*. *ἔξελχεται* rarely takes the accusative (see Liddell and Scott).

ἡγεμὼν ἐστὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, 'he is the leader in all matters relating to war': cp. 1285 b 18, *τῶν πολέμων τὴν ἡγεμονίαν*, and Hdt. 9. 33, *Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ . . . μισθὸν ἐπεμύοντο πείσοντας Τισσαμένει ποιεῖσθαι ἅμα Ἡρακλείδῃ τοῖσι βασιλεῦσι ἡγεμόνα τῶν πολέμων*. For *τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον*, cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 12. 5, *ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἀσπείθῃ δημοσίῃ τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον*: Anab. 4. 3. 10: Cyrop. 1. 2. 10. *Ἡγεμὼν τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον* stands in tacit contrast to *ἡγεμονία πολιτεία*, of which

we read in c. 17. 1288 a 9. In Philip. § 33, *Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τοῖς ἀπ' ἐκείνου γεγονόσι καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν εἰς πάντα τὸν χρόνον δεδόκασι*, Isocrates appears to distinguish between the Kingship and the *ἡγεμονία*. According to Hdt. 6. 56 the Lacedaemonian Kings had the right to determine against whom war should be made (*πόλεμον ἐκφέρειν ἐπ' ἣν ἂν βούλωνται χεῖρην*), and Gilbert holds (Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 46) that there are some indications that this right remained to them even in Xenophon's time (Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 34: 2. 2. 7: 4. 7. 1), but Xenophon implies in Rep. Lac. 15. 2, *καὶ στρατιὸν ἔχει ἂν ἡ πόλις ἐκπέμπη, ἡγείσθαι*, that the State and not the Kings possessed it.

6. *ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς (cp. 1285 b 23) answers to τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον. Something more is meant by this phrase than the offering of sacrifices to the gods, sacrifices such as the Kings of the heroic times offered (1285 b 10: cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.), and it probably includes the right of the Lacedaemonian Kings to name the officers called Pythii, through whom the Delphic oracle was consulted (Hdt. 6. 57. 2), and to have the custody of oracles (6. 57. 4). We learn from Xen. Rep. Lac. 15. 1, *ἴθου γὰρ οὕτω μὲν βασιλεία πρὸ τῆς πόλεως τὰ δημόσια πάντα, ὥς ἀπὸ θεοῦ ἔντα*, why it fell to the Lacedaemonian King to sacrifice. It was natural that the same authorities should be charged with matters relating to the gods and to war, for success in war was held to be given by the gods. In his account of the prerogatives of the Lacedaemonian Kings Aristotle omits to notice their share in deliberative authority as members of the senate, and also the judicial authority which, as we know from Hdt. 6. 57, they possessed in a particular class of cases (this had perhaps been narrowed: see above on 1270 a 21).

7. *αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ βασιλεία κ.τ.λ.* Μὲν οὖν is taken up by *ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτῳ εἶδος βασιλείας*, 14, and then at length finds a δὲ to answer to it in *παρὰ ταύτην δέ*, 16. *Αὕτη ἡ βασιλεία* (cp. 14) means 'this kind of Kingship,' as *αὕτη ἡ δικαιοσύνη* in Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 25 means 'this kind of justice,' for the Lacedaemonian Kingship is not the only Kingship included in the class, as we see from 15, *τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσὶν, αἱ δ' ἀλγεαί*. It appears, in fact, from 10 sqq. that the Kingship held by Agamemnon as leader of the Greek forces before Troy is included in it, a Kingship which we must not confuse with his Kingship of Mycenae, for his Kingship of Mycenae belongs to the fourth class of Kingships, *αἱ κατὰ τοὺς*

ἡρώεσσι χρόνους βασιλείας (1285 b 4 sqq.). Aristotle may well have also referred to this class the Kingship, or Leadership, of Greece, which was held for a time by Agesilaus and for life by Philip and Alexander of Macedon. Compare Plat. Ages. c. 40, where Agesilaus is said to have been regarded until the defeat at Leuctra as οὐδὲν ὀλεῖ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡγεμὸν καὶ βασιλεῖς, with Ages. c. 6, where we read that in a dream which Agesilaus had at Aulis before embarking for Asia, he heard a voice addressing him thus, ὦ βασιλεῦ Λακωνικῶν, ὅτι μὲν οἶδός τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀπὸ σαρκεύς ἀπεδείχθη στρατηγὸς ἢ πρότερον Ἀγαμέμνων καὶ σὺ τῶν μετ' αὐτοῦ ἀνέστης, and with Isocr. Panath. § 76. At a later time Philip of Macedon was elected by the Congress at Corinth ἡγεμὸν (or στρατηγὸς) αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος (Diod. 16. 1, 89, 91: Arrian, Anab. 7. 9. 5: cp. Demosth. De Cor. c. 201 and Justin, 9. 4, and see Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 51. 3), and on his death his son Alexander was elected by the Congress to the same dignity (Diod. 17. 4. 9: Arrian, Anab. 1. 1. 2: Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 90. 1). Thus the office of ἡγεμὸν, or στρατηγὸς, αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος in the hands of Philip and Alexander was an elective office and tenable apparently for life. Long before the time of Agesilaus and Philip, Gelon had asked to be appointed στρατηγὸς τε καὶ ἡγεμὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον (Hdt. 7. 158). Aristotle can hardly intend to include the Carthaginian Kingship under this form of Kingship, for in 2. 11. 1273 a 30 he distinguishes between the offices of King and General at Carthage. He would seem to omit the Carthaginian Kingship from his enumeration, for it cannot fall under the head of the barbarian Kingship, though the Carthaginians were non-Greeks, inasmuch as its authority was by no means of a 'despotic' type. Would such an office as that of the *royés* of the Thessalians be classed by Aristotle under this form of Kingship?

στρατηγία τις αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ δίδωσι. *Δίδωσι* is explained by δὲ βίον in 15. A στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ δίδωσι evidently had not the power of life and death. Vict. would read αὐτοκράτωρ in place of αὐτοκράτωρ, partly because the rendering of Vet. Int. is 'imperialis,' and Schneider and Sus., adopting his suggestion, place αὐτοκράτωρ in their text (see critical note on 1285 a 8). But, though στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ is a recognized title, I do not remember to have met with στρατηγία αὐτοκράτωρ. With στρατηγία τις αὐτοκράτωρ may be compared 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18, δυναστείαν τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νικτερίζειν. A στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ differed from

an ordinary *στρατηγός* in having authority to deal with many questions for himself as to which an ordinary *στρατηγός* would have to consult the popular assembly or other supreme authority: cp. Polyb. 3. 87. 7, *ὁ δὲ δικτάτωρ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ὑπάρχων τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχων ἑκατέρῳ δώδεκα πελίκαις ἀκολουθοῦσι, τοῦτ' ὃ εἴκοσι καὶ τέτταρες, κακίοναι μὲν ἐν πολλοῖς προσδέονται τῆς συγλήτου πρὸς τὸ συντελεῖν τὰς ἐπιβολάς, οἷτος ὃ ἐστὶν αὐτοκράτωρ στρατηγός*. So in Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 37 A. § 4, *συναγωγῇ δὲ τῶν λογιστῶν ἢ βουλῇ αὐτοκράτωρ ἔστω*, the word *αὐτοκράτωρ* is explained by Mr. Hicks to mean 'not bound to consult the popular assembly.' Cp. also Thuc. 6. 26 and 5. 27. It was the practice of Greek States to create *στρατηγοὶ αὐτοκράτορες* to deal with crises, just as the Romans created a dictator, but the *στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ* had not, like the dictator, the power of life and death, and more *στρατηγοὶ* than one could be declared *αὐτοκράτορες*, whereas the dictatorship was always confided to a single individual, though on one or two occasions we find two dictators in existence at the same time (Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 131, ed. 1). Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in fact, identifies the Roman dictator, not with the *στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ*, but with the *αἰσχυρῆτης* (Ant. Rom. 5. 73). Still the position of sole *στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ* was often the first step to a tyranny in the hands of men like Phalaris (Rhet. 2. 20. 1393 b 10 sqq.: cp. Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 28), Aristodemus of Cumae (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 8), and Dionysius the Elder (Diod. 13. 94. 6).

8. *εἰ μὴ ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ κ.τ.λ.*, 'except in a particular Kingship, as for instance [in the Kingship existing] in the time of the ancients, on warlike expeditions by right of force.' *Ἐν χειρὶ νόμῳ* is probably to be rendered 'manuum iure' (Lamb. 'lege ea quae est in manibus et armis posita'). It is opposed to *ἐν δικῇ νόμῳ* (Liddell and Scott s. v. *νόμος*). Where a person is slain by an exercise of the right which superior force confers, he is said to be slain *ἐν χειρὶ νόμῳ*, whether he is slain by his adversary on the battlefield or, as in the passage before us, by his King for cowardice in presence of the enemy. Eaton compares Thuc. 3. 66, *οὗ μὲν ἐν χερσὶν ἀπεκτείναντε, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλγοῦμεν (κατὰ νόμον γὰρ δὴ τῶν ἑπασχόν)*: compare also the word *χειροδίκαι* in Hes. Op. et Dies, 189 ('men who use the right of might'). Bernays translates *ἐν χειρὶ νόμῳ* 'als standrechtliches Verfahren' ('by process of martial law'), and Mr. Weldon follows him, but the use of the word *χειροδίκαι* does not support this translation. In the kind of Kingship of

which Aristotle is speaking the King had, I conceive, the right to put to death with his own hand any of his warriors who showed cowardice on a warlike expedition; he had not the right to put any of them to death by judicial process. Sus. renders *ἐν χειρὶ τοῦ βασιλέως* 'im Handgemenge' ('in the mêlée'), but I much prefer the interpretation given above. How would the King be able to slay one of his own men while himself engaged in a hand-to-hand fight with the foe? For *ἐν τοῖς βασιλείς*, cp. c. 5. 1278 a 17, *ἐν τοῖς πολέταις*, and 1278 a 28, *ἐν τοῖς ἀγωνισταῖς*. Sus.²: '*ἐν τοῖς βασιλείς* seclussit Gifanius, *βασιλείς* eodem tempore secluserunt Bernaysius et Susemihlius.' The suggestion of Bern. and Sus. is not without plausibility, but I do not think that any change is called for. Aristotle's meaning is that the class of Kingship of which the Lacedaemonian Kingship is the type does not possess, as a class, the power of life and death, but that particular Kingships falling under the class do possess it, and he gives an instance of this. It is doubtful whether, as the emendation of Bern. and Sus. would imply, the Lacedaemonian King possessed the right to put a Spartan citizen to death 'in a certain case'; we expect also to be told what case is referred to, but the only case mentioned is that of *ἐν ἀρχαῖς*. The Lacedaemonian King does not appear to have possessed the power which Kings of this type possessed *ἐν τῶν ἀρχαίων*; the punishment provided by the Lacedaemonian law for *ἐν τρέψαντες* seems, on the contrary, to have been a severe form of *ἀντιμία* (Plut. Ages. c. 30).

11. καὶ οὕτως μὲν ἀκούειν κ.τ.λ. 'For instance, in Il. 1. 225 sqq.' (Sus.², Note 618: Sus.⁴, I. p. 422). See also Il. 2. 224 sqq.

12. ἐξελθόντων δὲ καὶ κτείνειν πέριος ἦν. For *ἐξελθόντων* see above on 1281 b 4, 13. Καὶ κτείνειν, not merely not to tolerate, but even to put to death.

λέγει γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The quotation is from Il. 2. 391, where Agamemnon says,

"ὅτε δὲ εἴ ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μέγχε ἐθλόντα νόησω
μυρρίξω παρὰ νηυσὶ παραίσω, οὐδ' αἱ ἔπειτα
ἄρκειν ἰστέϊται φηγέω κίονα ἢ δ' αἰανούε." *δε ἔφατ'* Ἀργεῖοι δὲ κ.τ.λ.

In Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1116 a 32 these threats are ascribed to Hector, for there we read, ἀναγλίζουσι γὰρ αἱ πόλεις, ὥσπερ δ' ἔπειτα

ὅτε δὲ εἴ ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μέγχε πτόσσοντα νόησω,
οὐδ' αἱ ἄρκειν ἰστέϊται φηγέω κίονα.

Aristotle probably remembered the similar threats placed by Homer in the mouth of Hector in *Il.* 15. 348 (cp. *Il.* 12. 248 sqq.),

ὅν δ' ἂν ἔγὼν ἀπάνευθε νεῶν ἐτέρωθεν νοήσω,
αὐτοῦ οἱ θάνατον μητίσμαι, οὐδέ νυ τέγγε
γυναιὶ τε γυναιὶ τε πυρὸς λαλέχουσι θανάτω,
ἀλλὰ κίνεε ἑρῶνσι πρὸ δαστεῖς ἡμετέροισι,

and was thus led into the error of ascribing the lines quoted by him to Hector, and not to Agamemnon. It will be seen that Aristotle abbreviates this passage of Homer in quoting it both here and in *Eth. Nic.* 3. 11, that in the latter passage he substitutes πτόσσοντα for ἰθίλοντα μμνάζειν παρὰ νηυσὶ παρασίειν, and that in the passage before us he adds πὰρ γὰρ ἑμὲ θάνατος after οἰωνούς, words which do not appear in our text. There is nothing surprising in the abbreviation or the substitution to which reference has been made, but the addition of πὰρ γὰρ ἑμὲ θάνατος is remarkable. The passages in which the text of Homer as quoted by Aristotle differs from the text handed down in the extant MSS. and other authorities are very numerous. A list of them will be found in *Bon. Ind.* 507 a 29 sqq. In some of them Aristotle's memory may well be at fault (compare his inaccurate quotation from Isocrates in *Rhet.* 3. 9. 1410 a 1, and see Prof. Butcher in *Class. Rev.* 5. 310 sq.), and if the addition before us stood alone, we might be tempted to account for it by supposing a confusion with αὐτοῦ οἱ θάνατον μητίσμαι in the similar passage, *Il.* 15. 348 sqq. But it does not stand alone. In 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 25 Aristotle attributes to Homer the line (which is not to be found in our Homer),

ἀλλ' οἷον μὲν ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαίτα θαλεῖρη,

and in *Rhet.* 2. 9. 1387 a 33 sqq. he adds after *Il.* 11. 542,

Λίαντος δ' ἀλείψει μάχην Τελαμωνιάδα,

the following line, which does not occur in the MSS., but which Plutarch also found there (see *De Audiend. Poet.* c. 6. 24 C and c. 14. 36 A),

Ζεὺς γάρ οἱ νεμίσασχ', ὅτ' ἀμείνονι φῶτι μάχοιτο.

So again, as we learn from *Soph. El.* 4. 166 b 6 sqq. (cp. *Poet.* 25. 1461 a 22) Aristotle found the words *δίδωμεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρίσθαι* in the address of the Dream to Agamemnon (*Il.* 2. 23 sqq.), but they are not to be found there now, though the words *δίδωμεν δέ οἱ*

εἶχε ἀρίσθαι occur in Il. 21. 297. For other instances of the same thing see Bon. Ind. 507 b 52 sqq. Variations of this nature must probably be ascribed to a difference between the text of Homer which Aristotle had before him and that which has come down to us. Even as early as the time of Alcibiades it seems to have been usual for grammarians to 'correct' the text of Homer (Plut. Alcib. c. 7, *ἐτίρου δὲ (γραμματοδιδασκάλου) φήσαντος ἔχειν Ὅμηρον ὑφ' αὐτοῦ διορθωμένον*, "εἰς," Ἰφθ, "γράμματα διδάσκουσιν Ὅμηρον ἐπαγορευθῆναι ἱκανὸς ᾄν; οὐχὶ τοὺς νέους παιδεύουσιν;"), and, as Camerarius long ago pointed out (Interp. p. 134), Alexander possessed a copy of the Iliad corrected by Aristotle himself (Plut. Alex. c. 8: Strabo, p. 594). It is likely enough, therefore, that in the time of Alexander, and even earlier, more texts than one of Homer were current, with not a few varieties of reading. Recent discoveries of Homeric papyri add to the likelihood of this. See as to them Mr. F. G. Kenyon 'On the Geneva Fragments of Homer' in *Class. Rev.* 8. 134 sqq., and also in *Class. Rev.* 11. 406. The text of the quotations from the Homeric Hymn to Apollo given in Thuc. 3. 104 differs widely from that of our MSS. (see Mr. T. W. Allen in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, vol. 15. p. 309).

13. οὐ εἰ ἀρκίον ἐσσεῖται φύγειν, 'it shall not be a sure thing for him to escape'—perhaps a Litotes for 'he shall have no hope of escaping.'

15. τοῦτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Κατὰ γένος does not perhaps necessarily imply that the Kingship passed from father to son, but only that it was confined to members of a given family. In place of *αἰσφαί* we have in c. 15. 1285 b 39 κατὰ μέρος, a wider term, for an office held κατὰ μέρος may be filled by election or otherwise. See below on 1285 b 39. To what elective Kingships of the Lacedaemonian type does Aristotle refer? Hardly to the Carthaginian (see above on 1285 a 7); perhaps, among others, to the office of ἡγεμὸν αἰσφαίης τῆς Ἑλλάδος held for life, as we have seen (above on 1285 a 7), by Philip of Macedon and Alexander: whether he refers to the office of ταγὼς of the Thessalians, is doubtful, though this office was elective.

16. παρὰ ταύτην δὲ κ.τ.λ. Μοναρχίας εἶδος, as in 29 sq., not βασιλείας, as in 15, while in 1285 b 4 we have εἶδος μοναρχίας βασιλικῆς. Yet in the recapitulation, 1285 b 20 sqq. (cp. c. 15. 1285 b 34, 1286 a 5), all the forms which Aristotle enumerates are classed as βασιλείας εἶδη. Perhaps he is in doubt whether the

barbarian Kingship and the Acsymneteship are really forms of Kingship or of Tyranny; in 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 7 sqq. they are treated as forms of Tyranny shading off into Kingship, and we are there told that the barbarian Kingship was elective, which we do not learn here, unless it is implied in 1285 b 2 sq. (see note). He speaks of the 'barbarian' form of Kingship as existing only among 'some' of the barbarians of Europe and Asia. Other barbarian races perhaps had hereditary Kings whose power was more limited. Others again were not ruled by Kings at all; we hear, for instance, of *Θρᾷκες ἀβασίλευτοι* in Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 17. The Kingship of the Thracians, Illyrians, Phoenicians, and Ethiopians may have been of the type here described by Aristotle. Hardly the Molossian Kingship (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 23 sq.), or the Macedonian, for the Macedonians were very outspoken to their King (Polyb. 5. 27. 6, *εἶχον γὰρ δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἰσχυροῦσαν Μακεδόνες πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς*), and the Macedonian people seem to have been the judges in capital cases in time of peace (Abel, Makedonien vor König Philipp, p. 136, note).

18. *ἔχουσι δ' αὖτοι κ.τ.λ.* It is natural to expect that when the power of a Kingship is great, it will not be governed by law and hereditary. Tyranny is regarded by Aristotle as not hereditary, for though tyrannies often passed from father to son, the inheritor of a tyranny was apt to lose it (7 (5). 10. 1312 b 31 sqq.). *Πατριὰς* is apparently not used by Aristotle elsewhere in the sense of 'hereditary,' and in 24, 33, and 1285 b 5, 9 we have *πάτριος* used in this sense, but *πατρικός* often bears this meaning (e.g. in Thuc. 1. 13). As to the extent of the authority of barbarian Kings, cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, *κατ' ἀρχὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινε πῶλες Ἑλλὰς ἐβασιλεύετο, πλὴν οὐχ ὥσπερ τὰ βάρβαρα ἴθνη δεσποτεῖατε, ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμους τινας καὶ ἰδιαιμοὺς πατρίους* (this is perhaps based on Theophrastus, but Aristotle would say that the barbarian King also governed according to law): Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Antig. 8. 182 C: Eurip. Hel. 246 Bothe, 276 Dind.,

τὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δοῦλα πάντα πλὴν ἐστί.

19. *διὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* This is added to explain how it happens that the law in these countries authorizes a despotic rule and that these Kingships are hereditary. As to the slavishness of barbarians, cp. Trag. Gr. Fragm. Adespota 291 Nauck,

ὡς τυραννὶ βαρβάρων ἀνδρῶν φύλα,

and Isocr. Philip. § 107. Aristotle advised Alexander in ruling his empire τοῖς μὲν Ἑλλήσιν ἡγεμονικῶς, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις δεσποτικῶς χρῆσθαι (Aristot. Fragm. 81. 1489 b 27 sqq.: see note on 1324 b 36). That Asiatics were especially slavish, we see from 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 27 sqq. and Plut. De Vitios. Pud. c. 10, πάντες οἱ τῆν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντες ἐν δουλείουσιν ἀνθρώποι διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι μίαν εἰπεῖν τὴν οὐ συλλαβήν.

22. τὴν δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν, not, as in c. 6. 1278 b 30 sqq., in the sense of 'rule exercised for the advantage of the master' (for then this form of Kingship would not be a normal constitution, as it is), but 'despotic rule,' as in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 21 (cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 3).

23. τυραννικαὶ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'thus while they are of a tyrannical type for the above-mentioned reason, they are safe' (and therefore unlike tyrannies), 'because they are hereditary and in accordance with law.' Does 'for the above-mentioned reason' mean because the subjects are slavish, or because the power of the King is as great as that of a tyrant? Bernays and Welldon take the former view, but, looking to 1285 b 2 sq. and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 15 sqq., I lean rather to the latter. It is easy to understand why conformity to law confers safety, but why are Kingships the safer for being hereditary? Probably because men more willingly submit to rule when it has come down to the ruler from his ancestors and has become traditional. Thus ἐκόντων takes the place of πάντων in 27.

24. καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The bodyguard of a barbarian King is composed of natives of the State for the same reason for which his tenure of power is safe, i. e. because it is hereditary and in accordance with law, and therefore willingly submitted to. We see that Kings no less than Tyrants and Aesymnetes (c. 15. 1286 b 37 sqq.) had a bodyguard—usually at any rate, though perhaps not invariably (c. 15. 1286 b 6 sqq.)—but the King's bodyguard was not intended, like the Tyrant's, to secure his throne, but merely to enforce obedience on any of his subjects who might be for the moment recalcitrant (c. 15. 1286 b 27 sqq.).

25. οἱ γὰρ πολῖται κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 7 and Isocr. Hel. § 37. The Lacedaemonian Kings were guarded by citizens (Isocr. Epist. 2. 6).

26. τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ξεικόν. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. 7. 8), Aristodemus of Cumae had

three bodyguards, one of the lowest of the citizens, another of manumitted slaves, and a third of hired barbarians.

30. ἑτερον δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and another which existed among the ancient Greeks, [the monarchy of those] who are called Aesymnetes.' The *εἶδος μοναρχίας* is loosely explained by the name given to those who held it: compare 2. 11. 1273 a 30, *τὰς μεγίστας (ἀρχάς), τοὺς τε βασιλεῖς καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς*, and 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 10. Pittacus and, it would seem, Peisistratus (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7 sqq.) are counted by Aristotle among the ancient Greeks, but not of course Dionysius the Elder (3. 15. 1286 b 37 sqq.). 'We find the word *αἰσυμνήτης* correctly explained in Etym. Magn. *αἰσυμῶν δ' ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσίων μῆμνον ποιῆσθαι*' (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 280. 1). The title *αἰσυμνήτης* was not confined to the extraordinary magistrates to whom Aristotle here refers. At Cyme (we are not told which Cyme) the magistrates generally were called by this name (Aristot. Fragm. 481. 1556 b 44 sqq.); in Hom. Odys. 8. 258 the *αἰσυμῆται* are umpires in contests for prizes; and in Megara and her colony Chalcedon and also in Chersonesus, a colony of the Pontic Heracleia, which was itself a Megarian colony, the functions of the *αἰσυμῶται* or *αἰσυμῶντες* seem to have been those of the *πρωτάνεις* at Athens (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 72. 3, 188. 1, 194. 5, 280. 1). We are here concerned, however, only with the extraordinary Aesymnete. The nature of his office may be gathered from Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 54 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 389), which refers to Miletus, *Ἐπιμνητης μετὰ ταῦτα αἰσυμνήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου χειροτονεῖται λαβὼν ἔξουσίαν κτείνειν οὐδὲ βούλευται καὶ δε τῶν μὲν παίδων Ἀμφιτρίτης οὐδενὸς οἷός τ' ἦν ἔγκρατης γενέσθαι ὑπεξήλθον γὰρ παραχρήμα δεισάντες τὰ δὲ ὕστα αὐτοῖς ἐδίδμευσεν, καὶ ἀργύριον ἐκήρυξεν, εἴ τις αὐτοὺς κτείνειν τῶν δὲ κοινῶν τοῦ φόρου τρεῖς ἀπέκτεινε, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις φυγὴν προσεΐπεν οἱ δὲ ἔχοντο. Οἱ μὲν δὲ Νηλεΐδαι κατελύθησαν ὧδε.* This is the earliest extraordinary Aesymnete we hear of, unless the Aesymneteship of Tynnondas in Euboea (Plut. Solon, c. 14) was still earlier. The *μόναρχος ἔξουσία* which the Athenian Aristarchus held at Ephesus at the time of the overthrow of the Medes by Cyrus (B.C. 559) may possibly, as Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 141, points out, have been that of an Aesymnete, but this is not certain. The Aesymnete had larger powers than any Greek King—larger than even the Greek King of heroic times, for the administration of the State lay wholly in his hands. He is, in fact, commonly described as a tyrant (31: cp. c. 15. 1286 b 38: Plut. Solon, c. 14: Theophrast. ap. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 6. 73),

though Pittacus is not unnaturally spoken of as a king in the popular ditty (Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr., Carm. Popul. 43),

Διαι μῦθε Διαι

καὶ γὰρ Πιττακὸς Διαι,

μεγάλας Μισυλάντας βασιλεύουσιν.

Thus tyrants in early days were called Aesymnetes (Aristot. Fragm. 481. 1557 a 5 sqq.). The Aesymnete ruled *κατὰ τὴν αἰτοῦ γνῶμην* (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 16), though his office is implied in 1285 a 32 to be *κατὰ νόμον*: the law, in fact, empowered him to rule *κατὰ τὴν αἰτοῦ γνῶμην*. Like the tyrant, he had a bodyguard, though his bodyguard would be smaller than the tyrant's (c. 15. 1286 b 35 sqq.) and composed of citizens, like the bodyguard of the king, not of mercenaries, like that of the tyrant. Aristotle evidently conceives a resemblance to exist between the Aesymneteship and the barbarian Kingship (32), and it is possible that the Greeks borrowed this great office from the barbarians, for we are told in 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 11 that elective *αὐτοκράτορες μέγαρχοι* existed among some of the barbarians. Dionysius of Halicarnassus finds its equivalent in the Roman Dictatorship (Ant. Rom. 5. 73, *ἔστι γὰρ αἰρετὴ τυραννὶς ἢ δικτατορία* δοκοῦσι δέ μοι καὶ τοῦτο παρ' Ἑλλήνων οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὸ πολίτευμα λαβεῖν οἱ γὰρ Διονυμῆται καλούμενοι παρ' Ἑλλήσι τὸ ἀρχαῖον, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ βασιλείας ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος, αἰρετοὶ τινες ἦσαν τυράννοι· ἤρουντο δὲ αὐτοὺς αἱ πόλεις οὐτ' εἰς ἀρίστον χρόνον οὐτε συνεχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς, ὅποτε δέξαιτο συμφέρειν καὶ εἰς ἀπὸστον χρόνον ὥσπερ καὶ Μισυλῆται οἱ πρὸς Πιττακὸν πρὸς τοὺς φυγάδας τοὺς περὶ Ἀλκίαν τὸν ποιητὴν, where Theophrastus evidently has this passage of the Politics before him, though he says nothing of the Aesymnetes mentioned by Aristotle who held office for life). The Aesymneteship resembled the Roman Dictatorship in being called into play 'in asperioribus bellis aut in civili motu difficiliore' (Speech of the Emperor Claudius in the Lyons Tables, 1. 28: Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 1. 140), but there were some important differences between the two offices. The Aesymnete, for instance, was elected by the people, whereas the dictator was named by one of the consuls. The dictator held office for not more than six months; Pittacus, on the contrary, remained Aesymnete for ten years (Diog. Laert. 1. 75), and Aristotle knew of Aesymnetes who held office for life. The dictator was always created to deal with some specified business; this was frequently, but not always, it would seem, the case with the Aesymnete. The Aesymnete was master of

the State in civil no less than in military affairs; the civil authority of the dictator was less extensive (Mommson, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, 2. 1. 141 sqq.). It is not surprising that the Aesymneteship soon fell into disuse. It might not have done so if its power had been less, or if its tenure had been limited, like that of the Roman dictatorship, to six months. Pittacus surrendered it after holding it for ten years and retired into private life, but there were not many Greeks of his stamp, and there must always have been a risk of Aesymnetes declining to retire. Hence the Greek States allowed the office to disappear, and made shift with *στρατηγοὶ αὐτοκράτορες* in its place. Indeed, the creation even of a sole *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* was sometimes attended with peril to the State, for the risk of the establishment of a tyranny was always greater in Greece than at Rome. Still Greece probably lost something by allowing the Aesymneteship to fall into disuse. It was an office which in the hands of good men was a means of suppressing tyranny.

32. τῆς βαρβαρικῆς, sc. *μοναρχίας*.

34. μέχρι τινῶν ὁρισμένων χρόνων ἢ πράξεων, 'till the expiration of some definite time or the performance of some definite actions.'

36. τοὺς φυγάδας ὧν προειστήκεσαν κ.τ.λ. Compare the very similar expression in *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 19, οἱ φυγάδες, ὧν οἱ Ἀλκιμενίδας προειστήκεσαν.

Ἀντιμενίδης καὶ Ἀλκαῖος ὁ ποιητής. In a passage of Diogenes Laertius based on Aristotle (2. 46: *Aristot. Fragm.* 65. 1486 b 34) we find the form Ἀντιμενίδας, which is the correct Lesbian form. He was a brother of Alcaeus, and another brother was named Κίς (Alcaeus, *Fragm.* 137), κίς meaning 'strength,' so that the names of all the three brothers were indicative of strength and prowess. See note on 1311 b 29.

37. θελοῖ δ' Ἀλκαῖος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle evidently anticipates that his statement that Pittacus was elected tyrant by the Mytileneans will hardly be credited by his own contemporaries—an elective tyranny would seem to them to be a contradiction in terms—and he supports it with the strongest testimony he can find, that of the foe whom Pittacus was elected to put down. The fact would hardly have been forgotten if the songs of Alcaeus had not, like those of Simonides (*Aristoph. Nub.* 1353 sqq.), passed somewhat out of fashion. Alcaeus, however, can only have known of Pittacus' election by hearsay, for he was an exile when it took place. His scolion, or convivial song, was probably composed in the camp of

the exiles leagued against Mytilene, but it would not be long in finding its way into the city. It would be sung with most zest by others than the Mytileneans, for it satirized them as *ἀλλόθουλα*, a grave reproach to Greeks (cp. Hdt. 3. 143 and 1. 62 sq., and Theogn. 847-850).

89. τὸν κακοπατέρα Πιττακὸν κ.τ.λ. Alcæus, *Fragm.* 37 A Bergk. There is a reference to this fragment in *Eh. Nic.* 9. 6. 1167 a 30 sqq. 'Respicit Plutarchus, *Erot.* c. 18, κατὰ τὸν Ἑρᾶν συγγράψουσαν εἰς θεοὺς πατρῶν αἱ κρίσεις αἱ παροχῶν αἱ φιλοσόφων ἀρᾶς φασὶ μίγα ἐκασίαντες, ὡς περ ἔφη τὸν Πιττακὸν ὁ ἄλλοις ἀρῆσθαι τοὺς Μεγαλῶνους τῶν αὐτῶν, ubi cum Reiske ἀρᾶς φασὶ coniecisset, illud ipsum Schneidewin Alcæo tribuit' (Bergk). The epithet *κακοπατρης*, 'born of a mean father,' is no doubt applied to Pittacus because his father was a Thracian and perhaps a slave. As to his Thracian extraction cp. *Duris*, ap. *Diog. Laert.* 1. 74: we see from *Thuc.* 4. 107 that Pittacus was a Thracian name. τὸν κακοπατέρα closes a line, and then follow two complete lines. In the second of these, Ἐστάντων κ.τ.λ., the second syllable is long, but this syllable may be either long or short in this metre, and thus we are not obliged to regard the α of Πιττακὸς as long. Ahrens (*De Graec. Ling. Dial.* 1. 246) accentuates Πιττακός: he remarks (1. 10), 'Grammatici uno ore testantur, Aeoles accentum in ultima acutum fugientes retraxisse in priores syllabas, exceptis tantummodo, ut accuratiores monent, praepositionibus et conjunctionibus.'

In place of πῶλος and ἐκασίαντες Alcæus probably wrote πῶλος (Ahrens, 1. 116) and ἐκασίαντες (Ahrens, 1. 142), but it is doubtful whether Aristotle did so in quoting his lines. Not much dependence can be placed on our MSS. in this matter, but it deserves notice that even when in citations from non-Attic writers they in the main preserve the dialect, as they do here—and this is often not the case (see for instance the quotation from Heraclitus in 7 (5). 11. 1315 a 30 sq.)—they allow Attic forms to slip in: thus we have *ἐβῶν* (not *ἐβῶ*) in the quotation from Sappho in *Rhet.* 1. 9. 1367 a 8 sqq., and Simonides may have written *ἔπερ* and *καλέουσαν* in the passage (*Fragm.* 12) quoted from him in *Hist. An.* 5. 8. 542 b 7 sqq. See also critical note on 1340 b 26. Ἐστάνων is not only the correct Lesbian form, but it is required by the metre, unless the third and fourth syllables of *ἐκασίαντες* can be regarded as coalescing. It may possibly be a technical word for the expression of assent to the election of a magistrate (cp. Alcæus,

Fragm. 128, Hesych. Ἐσαίνουσ' τὰς κρίσεις καὶ τὰς συμβουλίας καὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας Σοφοκλῆς Θυέστη Σικανωτὴ καὶ Ἀλκαίος (MSS. εὐαίος) ταῖς ἐπαινήσειν), but see Bergk on this fragment.

ἀχόλῳ, 'meek,' 'lacking gall.' Compare [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 1. 27, καὶ οὐδεὶς ὑμῶν χολῆν οὐδὲ ἀργὴν ἔχων φανήσεται ἐφ' οὗ εἰς ὃ βδελυρῆς καὶ ἀπαιδὴς ἄνθρωπος οὐτοσὶ βιάζεται τοὺς νόμους; and a passage quoted from Plutarch by Eusebius, Praep. Evang. 3. 1. 3 (referred to by Liddell and Scott), ὡς δέον ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀχόλῳ καὶ καθαρεύουσιν ἀργῆς καὶ πικρίας ἀπόσης τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ ἀνδρὶς εἶναι συμβίβασιν. Compare also Aristoph. Lysistr. 463,

πότερον ἐπὶ δούλῃς τῶν

ἦεν ἰνέμους, ἢ γυναῖξιν οὐκ εἰς

χολῆν ἐκείνας;

where the proverb ἦενσι καὶ μύρμηκι χολή (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 111) is alluded to. Hamlet's 'I lack gall To make oppression bitter' is familiar.

2 αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Αὐταί, 'these monarchies' (cp. αὐταί, 1285 b. 1285 a 18 and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 14). Εἰσί perhaps refers to the barbarian Kingship (cp. 17, εἰσί), and ἦσαν to the Aesymneteship (cp. 30, ἦν). If so, the barbarian Kingship is here implied to have been elective, which we have not been told before, though we learn the fact in 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 11 sq.

4 τέταρτον δ' εἶδος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not tell us whether he includes only Greek Kingships in this class, but probably this is his meaning, for he makes ἡ βαρβαρικὴ βασιλεία a separate kind. Κατὰ νόμον should be taken with γηγόμεναι ('which arose in accordance with law in the heroic times, voluntary and hereditary in character'); these Kingships are said to arise in accordance with law, because they do not, like tyranny, owe their origin to the arbitrary action of an individual (compare the contrast of κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν and κατὰ νόμον in c. 16. 1287 a 1 sqq. and c. 15. 1286 b 31 sqq.); they owe it, in fact, as is explained in the next sentence, to their subjects' gratitude for benefits conferred. Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 7, ὑπάρχει δ' ἡ γένεσις εἰδὺς ἐξ ἐναντίας ἐκατέρῃ τῶν μοναρχῶν κ.τ.λ. Τοῖς ἡρωϊκοῖς χρόνοις, 'the times of the heroes,' the times of Heracles (Probl. 30. 1. 953 a 13 sq.) and Priam (Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1100 a 7 sq.). Thus Isocrates (Evag. § 65) calls the Trojan War 'the war of the heroes.' The 'heroic times' seem to come to an end before, or perhaps with, the Dorian invasion of the Peloponnese (Paus. 7. 17. 1, Ἄργος μὲν ἐς πλείστον

ἀφαιρήσαντες ἀποφύγοντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνακτορέων ἱστῶν ἔπει τῇ συνουσίᾳ τῇ ἐν Δαφνίᾳ ἐστάσαν τὰ ἐκ τῆς τέχνης ἀφαιρέσει. As to 'the heretics,' cp. Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 17, ἀποφύγοντες γὰρ ἱστῶν μετὰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἀνακτορέων μένει ἔπειτα ἱστῶν, αἱ δὲ λαοὶ ἀφαιρέσαντες.

6. διὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Γὰρ justifies ἀποφύγειν as not πύργον γράφοντες ἀπὸ τῶν by introducing an explanation in detail of the way in which this came about.

τοὺς πρώτους, 'the first kings of each dynasty,' 'the founders of dynasties.'

τοὺς ἀρχαίους ἀπαγγέλλει. The founders of the heretic Kingdoms won their thrones, according to Aristotle, by services to the people, just as it was the revolt of the people that overthrew Kingdoms (15). Thurot (*Études sur Aristote*, p. 84) has already pointed out that this account is hardly consistent with 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9 sq., where Kingship is said to have come into being for the protection of the δαίμονες from the demons. However, the origin of Kingship generally (including the Persian Kingship, for Cyrus is referred to) is traced in a very similar way in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 31 sqq. Aristotle refers the origin of Kingship to the will of the people, but the Kings themselves would probably claim that they owed their thrones to Zeus, from whom they sprang (see Schömann, *Gr. Alt.* 1. 23).

7. κατὰ τέχνας, 'in connexion with arts.' Bernays translates 'by the invention of arts,' and no doubt services of this nature are especially present to Aristotle's mind, but the phrase is wide enough to include cases like that of Melampus, who was made joint-king of Argos with his brother and the previous King Anaxagoras for healing the Argive women of their madness (Pass. 2. 18. 4). As to Kings who won their thrones by discoveries in connexion with the arts, we may compare the words of Atreus in Eurip. *Frags.* 853.

δείξας γὰρ ἄντρον τῇ θεῶντι δίδω

δύναμις τ' ἔδωκε καὶ τύραννος ἔγενετο,

where Nitzsch refers to Strabo, p. 23 (Polyb. 34. 1. 4 sqq.), καὶ Παλίφωτος δ' ἔρως ἰσχυροῦ τὰ περὶ τῆς πλάνης τὸν γὰρ Αἰῶνα τὸν προσγμῆσαντα τοῖς ἔκπλοις ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν παρθένον τέκετος ἀμφιδρόμοις οἶσι καὶ δυσέκπλοις διὰ τὰς παλαρροίας ταμίαν τε ἀρῆσθαι τῶν δόλμων καὶ βασιλείαν καταρτίσθαι φησί, καθὼς δὲ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ τὰ ἐν Ἀργεὶ παραδείκνυται, Ἀτρεΐα δὲ τοῦ ἱλίου τὸν ἱερωτικὸν τῇ αἰσῇ δόλμων, μέντοι τε καὶ ἱεροποιουμένους ἀποδείκνυσθαι βασιλείας, τοῖς δ' ἱερίαι τῶν Ἀθηναίων

καὶ Χαλδαίους καὶ Μάγους σοφίᾳ τινὶ διαφέροντας τῶν ἄλλων ἡγεμονίας καὶ τιμῇ τυγχάνειν παρὰ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν. Camerarius (Interp. p. 137) compares Diod. 1. 43. 6.

ἢ πόλεμον. Aristotle no doubt remembers the way in which Bellerophon came to be King of the Lycians (Hom. Il. 6. 189 sqq.).

ἢ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν, sc. τὸ πλεῖθος. Συνάγειν is used here in the sense of 'forming into a πόλις' (cp. c. 6. 1278 b 21 sq., Diod. 3. 56. 3, μυθολογοῦσι δὲ πρῶτον παρ' αὐτοῖς Οὐρανὸν βασιλεῦσαι καὶ τοὺς ἄνθρωπους σκορὰδην οἰκούντας συναγαγεῖν εἰς πόλιν περιβαλόν, Paus. 2. 30. 9, and Isocr. Hel. § 35), so that it answers to κτίσαντες in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 38. In Plato, Laws 681 C we have τοῖς ἡγεμόσι καὶ ἀγαθοῖσι τοὺς δῆμους, οἷον βασιλεῖσι. Cp. also Conon ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 186. p. 131 a 23 Bekk., παραλαβὼν τὴν βασιλείαν (Αἰγυπιάδος), ἐπεὶ δὲ πατὴρ ἐτελεύτησεν, ἡβροσέ τε τὸν λαὸν σκορὰδην οἰκούντα καὶ πόλιν ἔκτισεν ἐπὶ τῇ ποταμῇ μεγάλῃ καὶ εὐδαίμονα, καίοντα ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπονομάσας.

ἢ πόρισαι χώραν. So the Heracleidae, being heirs to Argos, Lacedaemon, and Messene, made over their territories to their comrades in the invasion of Peloponnesus and received Kingships in return for them (Isocr. Archid. § 17 sqq. and especially § 20). Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 38, ἢ κτίσαντες ἢ κτησάμενοι χώραν, ὥστερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ Μολοτῶν, and Polyb. 6. 7. 4, χώραν κατακτάμενοι (sc. οἱ βασιλεῖς).

8. καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι πάτριοι, 'and hereditary for those who succeeded to them.' So Bern., 'und für die folgenden Geschlechter ward diess dann ein angestammtes Verhältniss.'

9. κύριοι δ' ἦσαν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle says nothing of the share of the Kings in deliberative authority as conveners of the γερουσία (Hom. Il. 9. 68 sqq.). For τῆς κατὰ πόλεμον ἡγεμονίας cp. 2. 10. 1272 a 9.

10. τῶν θυσιῶν, δοῦναι μὴ ἱερατικά. The sacrificial functions of the Kings passed to the βασιλεῖς or ἄρχοντες or πρυτάνεις, as to whom see 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq., and note on that passage. The Egyptian King was a priest according to Plato, Polit. 290 D sq.; not so the Greek King of heroic times. The sacrificial and judicial prerogatives of early Greek Kings were no doubt sources of profit to them, and their military position would bring them plunder.

καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις τὰς δίκας ἔκρινεν. Did the King try all the actions that were brought? If so, there cannot have been many of them, especially as the King would be from time to time absent

'Αθ. Παλ. c. 3. l. 11. See Liddell and Scott as to the use of *δρμία*, and Meisterhans, *Gramm. d. att. Inschr.*, ed. 2, p. 153. See also note on 1324 b 20.

12. δ' ὅς ὁρκος ἦν τοῦ σκῆπτρου ἐπαράστασις. The article is absent before *ἐπαράστασις*, as is often the case when the genitive comes first: cp. Thuc. 4. 12. 2, τῶν τε χαρίων χαλεπότητι, and 3. 58. 4, ἐκ πατρῶν τῶν ἡμετέρων θήκας (Richards). Cp. also 3. 4. 1277 a 11 sq., b 19, 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 29, τῶν ἐπαύλων συστάδας, and see critical note on 1331 b 5. Ἐπαράστασις, not simply *ἀδείκνυσις*, because the sceptre is lifted up in a particular direction. For the fact see Hom. Il. 7. 412: 10. 321. Compare the oath of Abraham (Gen. xiv. 22, And Abram said to the king of Sodom, I have lift up mine hand unto the Lord, the most high God, the possessor of heaven and earth, that I will not take from (thee?) a thread even to a shoelatchet, and that I will not take anything that is thine). The lifting-up of the sceptre perhaps signified that the King staked his sceptre on the honesty of the judgement. No words needed to be uttered, no gods to be named; in both these respects the oath referred to differed from ordinary oaths, in which it was common to name three gods (C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Ant.* 2. § 21. 9). Cp. Alexis, *Fragm.* *Θητιόνωντες* (Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.* 3. 420),

ὁρκος βίβραυς ἵσταν ἄν νύσω μέσσω,

and Cratin. *Χείρωνες*, *Fragm.* 11 (Meineke, 2. 155),

οἷς ἦν μέγιστος ὁρκος

ἅπαντι λόγῳ κύων, ἔπειτα χῆρ' θεοὺς δ' ἐσέγω,

where see Meineke's note.

13. οἱ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Οἱ ἀρχαῖοι χρόνοι include οἱ ἡρωικοὶ χρόνοι, in which these Kingships came into being, but also far later times (see above on 1285 a 30). For *ἀρχεῖν* with the accusative of the matters over which rule is exercised, cp. c. 16. 1287 a 9, where Π have *ἀρχεῖ πάντα*. If we read with all the MSS. (except M^a, which omits the first *τά*, and P¹, which adds *κατά* before *ἐνδομῆα*) *καὶ τὰ κατὰ πόλιν καὶ τὰ ἐνδομῆα καὶ τὰ ὑπερόρια* (St. Hilaire and Sus. would omit the first *καί*), we shall probably be right in translating, with Bernays, 'both matters in the city and matters in the territory and matters beyond the frontier,' though *τὰ ἐνδομῆα* usually means 'home-affairs,' and it would be possible to take it in this sense here, translating 'both matters in the city and home-affairs generally and matters beyond the frontier.' Those who strike out *καί* before *τὰ κατὰ πόλιν* translate 'the affairs of the State, both home-affairs and affairs beyond

the frontier.' τὰ κατὰ πόλιν *might* probably mean 'the affairs of the State' (cp. Plato, Polit. 287 B, D, 295 E, 305 E, and see Holden on Xen. Oecon. 11. 14), but τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν (Isocr. De Pace, § 49) or τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1145 a 11) is more commonly used in this sense, τὰ κατὰ πόλιν meaning rather 'matters in the city' in contradistinction to 'matters in the country': compare for the contrast of κατὰ πόλιν and κατ' ἄγρην Xen. Oecon. 11. 14 and Cyneg. 13. 15, Plato, Theact. 142 A and Rep. 475 D, and Menand. Ὑδρία Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 207). If we are right then in taking τὰ κατὰ πόλιν in the sense of 'matters in the city,' the three-fold division in the passage before us will answer to that in Plato, Phaedrus 230 C, οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου οὐτ' αὖτε τὴν ὑπερλίαν ἀποδομαίς, οὐτ' ἔξω τείχους ἔμεργε δευσις τὸ παρόντων ἔξωθεν.

14. συνεχῶς ἔρχων, unlike the later βασιλεῖς (8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.), who were annual officers.

ἄλλοτερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. As to the circumstances attending the fall of Kingship compare 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 38 sqq. and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, where Theophrastus is probably followed, as in the passage immediately preceding. Both Dionysius and Polybius (6. 7. 6-9) speak as if the Kingship of heroic Greece always passed into a tyranny before it fell (cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 10 sqq.), but we gather from the passage before us and from 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 40 sq. that this was not always the case.

15. τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν παλιέρων τῶν βασιλέων. Aristotle probably refers in the first place to Theseus (Plut. Thea. cc. 24, 25), but also to Theopompus the Lacedaemonian King (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 26 sqq.) and to the Kings of the Molossians (1313 a 23 sqq.).

τὰ δὲ τῶν ὅλων παραιρουμένων. The diminution of the powers of the Kingship is commonly attributed by the authorities to οἱ πολλοὶ or ὁ δῆμος. Cp. Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, ἀρξάμενον δὲ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις πλημμελεῖν, καὶ νόμοις μὲν ἄλλα χρημένον, ταῖς δ' ἐκείνων γνώμας τὰ πολλὰ διοικούντων, δυσχεράσαντες οὖν τὸ πρῶγμα οἱ πολλοὶ κατέλυσαν μὲν τὰ βασιλικὰ πολιτεύματα, νόμοις δὲ κατεστησάμενοι καὶ ἀρχὴς ἐποδείξαντες, ταῦτα ἐχρῶντο τῶν πόλεων φύλακας. Pausanias speaks of ὁ δῆμος in 4. 5. 10 and 2. 19. 2. Polybius also assigns the chief part in the overthrow of monarchy to the πλεῖστοι (6. 8. 1), and so does Lucretius (5. 1136 sqq.). Their view is confirmed by the fact that in the Achaean cities Kingship was succeeded by democracy (Polyb. 2. 41. 4 sq.). Aristotle speaks of Kingship as designed to protect the ἐπικρατίς from the δῆμος (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9), and it is

natural that he should regard the Many as the agents in its overthrow. If we ask how it happened that, though Kingship was overthrown by the Many, it was nevertheless usually succeeded by the supremacy of the Few, Polybius has an answer ready; the Many effected the overthrow of Monarchy by means of *προστάται*, and they allowed these *προστάται* to rule over them (Polyb. 6. 8. 1 sq.).

16. αἱ πατέριοι θυσίαι are so termed in contradistinction to αἱ ἐπίθετοι (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 3: Isocr. Areopag. § 29). The Kingship was reduced to priestly functions at Cyrene (Hdt. 4. 161) and Ephesus, where we read of the descendants of Androclus in Strabo, p. 633, καὶ ἔτι νῦν αἱ ἐκ τοῦ γένους ἀνομιάζονται βασιλεῖς ἔχοντες τινὰς τιμὰς, προεδρίαν τε ἐν ἀγῶσι καὶ πορφύραν ἐπίσημον τοῦ βασιλικοῦ γένους, σπάνια ἀπὸ σκῆπτρου, καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τῆς Ἐλευσινίας Δήμητρος.

20. μὲν οὖν is taken up by μὲν οὖν, 28, and then answered by πέμπτον δὲ κ.τ.λ., 29.

22. ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁρισμένοις, 'but held on certain fixed conditions.' Though the submission rendered to the heroic Kingship by its subjects was a willing submission, it was not unconditional. Aristotle conceives the heroic Kingship to have been granted to the Kings by the people on the condition that they should be generals and judges and supreme over matters relating to the gods. This form of νομικὴ βασιλεία resembles νομικὴ φύλα (Eth. Nic. 8. 15. 1162 b 25, ἵστοι δὲ νομικὴ μὲν (φύλα) ἢ ἐπὶ βῆτοῖς κ.τ.λ.).

24. ἐκ γένους, literally 'resulting from family,' 'by right of family.' Ἐκ here signifies the 'origo et causa' of the ἀρχή (Bon. Ind. 225 b 15). Cp. [Plato,] Menex. 238 D, οἳτοι δὲ (i. e. βασιλεῖς) τοῖς μὲν ἐκ γένους τοῖς δὲ ἀπ' αἵματος. Elsewhere we have κατὰ γένος.

26. For τετάρτη τοῦτων, 'fourth of these which I am enumerating,' cp. 2. 11. 1272 b 28, and see Vahlen on Poet. 3. 1448 a 19.

27. αὐτῇ δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle forgets that he has included under the Lacedaemonian type of Kingship not only hereditary but also elective Kingships (1285 a 15: cp. also c. 15. 1285 b 39). His recapitulations are not always exact: see vol. i. Appendix B, and above on 1258 a 17 and 1278 a 34.

29. πέμπτον δ' εἶδος κ.τ.λ. Πάντων is here neuter (though in c. 16. 1287 a 11 we have τὸ κύριον εἶνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν): cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1198 b 13, οὗτος γὰρ πάντων κύριος καὶ πάντα διοικεῖ, and Demosth. Ol. 1. 4, τὸ γὰρ εἶναι πάντων ἐκείνου εἶνα ὅσα κύριον καὶ βῆτοσιν καὶ ἀπορρήτων. It is characteristic of Monarchy to be supreme over

everything (Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 37 sq.), though all Kings were not so (1285 a 4). Compare with Aristotle's language here the address of the Chorus to the King of the Argives in Aesch. Suppl. 370 sqq. Sus. appears to take πάντων with τῶν κοινῶν, reading ὥστερ in place of ὡςπερ with Buecheler, but Bernays seems right in following Bekker, who places a comma after ὡ and takes ὥστερ ὡςπερ ἕθους καὶ πόλις ἐκείνη τῶν κοινῶν together.

30. τῶν κοινῶν, 'public matters,' as in c. 5. 1278 b 4 (not 'public property,' as Bern.).

31. τεταγμένη κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν, sc. ἀρχήν, 'answering to household rule.' Supply βασιλεία from εἶδος βασιλείας (cp. 34). Bonitz (Ind. 748 b 18 sqq.) explains τάσσειν here as used 'de notionum ordine logico,' and refers among other passages to 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 32, ἡ βασιλεία τάσσεται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν, Eth. Nic. 5. 5. 1130 b 18, ἡ κατὰ τὴν διὰν ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη, and Top. 5. 7. 1372 30 sqq., where τὸ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι λεγόμενον is used synonymously with τὸ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι τεταγμένον.

ὥστερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Supply ἀρχή with ἡ οἰκονομική. In saying that the rule over a household is a kind of Kingship (see above on 1278 b 37), Aristotle is thinking of the relation of the father to his children, not of that of the husband to his wife or of the master to his slaves.

32. οὕτως ἡ βασιλεία κ.τ.λ. Sus. would read παρβασιλεία in place of βασιλεία, but Aristotle speaks of the fifth kind of Kingship simply as Kingship (cp. τὴν βασιλείαν, c. 16. 1287 b 35), because it is Kingship κατ' ἐξοχήν. Πόλις καὶ ἔθνος ἐνδὲ ἡ πλειόνων is of course dependent on οἰκονομία, not on βασιλεία.

- G. 15. 33 sqq. Aristotle seems to take it for granted that if he discovers whether the two extreme forms are expedient or not, he will have solved the question of the expediency of the intermediate forms. In just the same way Hippocrates in his treatise De Aere, Aquis, Locis sketches the extreme variations of the human race under the influence of climate and region, closing the treatise with the words, αἱ μὲν ἐναντιώταται φύσεις τε καὶ ἰδέαι ἔχουσιν οὕτως ἀπὸ δι' αὐτῶν τεκμαιρόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἐνθυμίσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἀμαρτῆσαι. Aristotle may also have felt that a discussion of the expediency of the heroic Kingship and the Aesymneteship would have only an historical, and a discussion of the expediency of the barbarian Kingship only a scientific, interest for Greeks.

35. τῶν ἄλλων αἱ πολλαί. Aristotle probably refers to the heroic

Kingship and possibly also to the barbarian Kingship, for the power of the Aesymnete seems to have been quite unbounded.

38. *ἑταίρων μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* For the late appearance of *εἰσὶ* in this sentence cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 35 sqq. and see note on 1332 b 42.

τῆς παμβασιλείας, literally 'Kingship over everything' (cp. *παρμήτωρ* = *πάντων μήτηρ*), as we see from c. 16. 1287 a 8 sqq. It would seem from the expression *τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης*, 1287 a 8, and from the absence of any remark in the passage before us, that the word was not coined by Aristotle, as Schneider thinks, but was a recognized Greek word. *Παμβασιλεύς* does not occur in Aristotle's writings, though it occurs in *Σοφία Σειράχ* 50. 15 and in C. I. G. 4725. 6 (Liddell and Scott).

39. *ἢ κατὰ γένος ἢ κατὰ μέρος.* See above on 1285 a 15, where we have *τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσὶν, αἱ δ' αἰρεταί.* Tenure 'by family' is opposed to tenure 'by turns,' because tenure 'by turns' makes the office accessible to all, not indeed simultaneously but successively. Tenure 'by turns' is a wider term than tenure 'by election,' because, when tenure 'by turns' is the rule, the dignity may pass by election or it may not.

2. *τὸ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.*, 'now to inquire as to the kind of Generalship 1286 a. we have mentioned is to enter on an inquiry belonging in species rather to inquiries respecting laws than to inquiries respecting constitutions.' The inquiry started by Aristotle in c. 14. 1284 b 35 sqq. is an inquiry respecting Kingship as a constitution (cp. 1284 b 39, *ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἄλλη τις πολιτεία μᾶλλον*). So too in 3. 1. 1274 b 32 it is taken for granted that the subject for consideration is the constitution: cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 29, *ἡμῶν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας.* For *ἔχει εἶδος* Bonitz (Ind. 218 b 17) compares Rhet. 2. 22. 1395 b 20, *περὶ δ' ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου τε εἰπωμεν, τίνα τρόπον δεῖ ζητεῖν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς τόπους· ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος ἐκατέρου τούτων ἐστίν.* Notwithstanding what he says here, Aristotle describes in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 17 sqq. an attempt to abolish the Lacedaemonian Kingship as an attempt to alter 'a part of a constitution.'

4. *ἐν ἀπόσει γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. c. 16. 1287 a 4 sqq. and see note on that passage.

For *τοῦτο* referring to *τῆς τοιαύτης στρατηγίας*, see notes on 1263 a 1 and 1291 a 16, and cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 25, where *ταῦτα* refers to *φθοραὶ* and *σωτηρίαι*.

6. *δὲν ἀφαιέτω τὴν ἀρχήν*. Aristotle evidently intended to treat of laws some time or other: cp. 6. 4. 1. 1285 a 12 sqq.

7. *ἀρχὴ δὲ δὲν εἶναι*. This is the initial inquiry: it is followed by the further inquiries, *τίνα νομοφύλακα καὶ τίνα* c. 17. 1286 a 38 sqq. The question whether the rule of men or of law is best was as old as the time of Pisistratus, if we may trust *Thuc.* 9. 27. 4 and *Thuc.* *Laert.* 1. 77 (see above on 1281 a 34), and of Solon, to judge by *Plat.* *Solon*, c. 14, *καλλὸν δὲ καὶ τίνα διὰ πόλεως ἀναστήναι τὴν τῶν νόμων καὶ νόμων προστάτην ἐπὶ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἡγεμονῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ ὅπως οὖν αὐτοὶ ἀναστήσονται καὶ φρουρήσονται αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐπιγνώσκοντες*. A famous public opinion had long decided the question in favour of law; it identified Democracy with the rule of law and Monarchy and Oligarchy with the rule of persons (vol. i. p. 494, note), and it is in this spirit that Thucydides speaks as the representative of Democracy in *Euryp.* *Suppl.* 415 sqq. Bothe (429 sqq. Dind.): cp. also *Hyperid.* *Or. Fim.* cii. 9. 23. [5] *τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀνελόντες, ἀλλὰ νόμον φέρειν ἀρχὴν διὰ τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν*. The teaching of Socrates, however, gave new life to the discussion. No one rendered a more willing obedience to the laws than he, yet his view that he who knows is the true ruler, and that a parallel exists between the ruler of a State and the master of an art, furnished Monarchy, or at any rate Monarchy in the hands of a scientific ruler, with a fresh ground of claim. For what master of an art would he be prepared to fetter his practice of his art by written rule? It does not appear that Socrates himself ever raised this question, but his views undoubtedly suggested those to which Plato gives expression in *Polit.* 294 A sqq. and *Laws* 874 E sqq. See as to Plato's views vol. i. p. 270 sqq. Aristotle in his first inquiry on the subject, contained in c. 15, is led, after a brief discussion (1286 a 9-21) of the question whether the best men or the best laws should rule, to suggest a compromise—let the best man promulgate laws and let laws rule except where they deviate from what is right, or in other words let the best man rule in subjection to law, except where right requires that he shall overrule law. But at the beginning of c. 16 Aristotle discovers that a ruler in this position would not be an Absolute King, whereas it is the claims of Absolute Kingship that he has promised to examine. Hence the compromise has to be abandoned and a fresh inquiry into the subject undertaken in c. 16 with the result that law should rule in some cases and the One Best Man in others.

8. *ἑσθιωὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχήν*. Cp. Plato, *Polit.* 294 A sqq. Aristotle

agrees that the law from its inevitable generality is unable to regulate some things and fails to regulate others well (1286 a 24), even when the utmost possible degree of ἀρχή is imparted to it. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 14. 1137 b 13—32: Pol. 2. 8. 1269 a 9 sqq.: 3. 12. 1282 b 1—6: 3. 15. 1286 a 36 sq.: Rhet. 1. 13. 1374 a 18 sqq. Law is said in c. 16. 1287 b 22 to be unable to regulate things about which men deliberate. For *ἐπεὶ τὸ προσκείμενον ἐκείνῳ* cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 5. 16, *ἐπεὶ τὸ συμβαίνον ἐκείνῳ ἀναγκάζει*.

12. For *ἄρχων*, used of the master of an art, cp. c. 6. 1279 a 4 sq.

καὶ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ κ.τ.λ., 'and in Egypt it is permissible for the physicians to change' (i.e. to depart from) 'the rules of treatment prescribed by law after four days' treatment, while if a physician does this before, he does it at his peril.' Bonitz (Ind. 391 a 7) is probably right in supplying τοῖς γεγραμμένοις νόμοις with αὐτοῖς, unless indeed we should rather supply τὰ γράμματα from 12. With *μετὰ τὴν τετραήμερον* Prof. Postgate (Notes, p. 7) supplies *μολύνει*: perhaps, however, *θεραπεύει* is the word which is suppressed (cp. c. 16. 1287 a 40, *τὴν ἐκ τῶν γεγραμμένων θεραπείαν*). For *ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ* (not *αὐτῷ*) *καθίστη*, cp. c. 16. 1287 b 30, τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ αὐτῷ φίλους ποιούμεναι (οἱ μέντοι καὶ) συνέρχουσι, and Eth. Nic. 3. 1. 1110 a 9, *ἐπὶ αὐτῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐδέ τις ἀναβέβηκεν ἐπὶ αὐτῷ, ἐπὶ σωματικῇ δ' αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀποκρίνεται οἱ αὐτῷ ἔχοντες*. As to the fact Camerarius (Interp. p. 136) refers to Diod. 1. 82. 3, *κατὰ δὲ τὰς στρατείας καὶ τὰς τῆς χάρας ἐκδημίας θεραπεύονται πάντες οὐδένα μισθὸν διὰ δόλοντες οἱ γὰρ ἱατροὶ τὰς μὲν τροφὰς ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ λαμβάνουσι, τὰς δὲ θεραπείας προσέχουσι κατὰ νόμον ἔγγρηφον, ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ δεδοξασμένων ἱατρῶν ἀρχαίων συγγεγραμμένων καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς βίβλου νόμοις ἀναγνωστικοῖς ἀκολουθήσαντες ἀδυνατήσαντι σῶσαι τὸν αἰμῶνα, ἀθροὶ πάντες ἐγγράμματος ἀποκρίνονται, ἐὰν δὲ παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα ποιήσῃσι, θανάτου κρίναι ἐπιμένουσιν, ἡγουμένου τοῦ νομοθέτου τῆς ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων παρατεταγμένης θεραπείας καὶ συντεταγμένης ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρίστων τεχνικῶν δόξαις καὶ γινέσθαι συντεταγμένων*. The authority followed by Diodorus does not seem to have been aware that the physicians in Egypt were free after four days to depart from the treatment prescribed by law, if desirable. The reason why they were allowed to do so may have been that a crisis in the disease was thought to occur on the fourth day: cp. Hist. An. 5. 20. 553 a 9, *οἱ δὲ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται τοῖς πλείστοις κατὰ τριήμερον ἢ τετραήμερον, ὥστε καὶ οἱ τῶν νόσων συμβαίνουσι κρίσεις*. See also Hippocr. De Morb. 4. vol. ii. p. 347 sqq. Kühn, where the

writer explains that the crisis in fevers occurs on days uneven in number, the third, fifth, seventh, or ninth, and adds, *ῥῆσις δὲ τὸ πῦρ ἐν τῇσι περισῶσι διὰ τόδε, οἷον ἐν τῇσιν ἄρτίσιν τῶν ἡμερῶν ἔλκει τὸ σῶμα ἐκ τῆς κοιλίας, ἐν δὲ τῇσι περισῶσι ὀφείει*, but this teaching hardly agrees with that of the passage just quoted from the History of Animals. Or the view may have been that the full effect of the drugs administered would not be experienced by the patient till the third day: see Hippocr. De Morb. 4. vol. ii. p. 341 Kēhn.

16. *διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν*, for the same reason for which *ἡ αὐτὴ γράμματα καὶ νόμος θεραπεύει* is not the best—the reason being that the *γράμματα καὶ νόμος* may be unsuitable in the given case.

ἀλλὰ μὲν κ.τ.λ. This is the rejoinder of an advocate of law. 'But yet [if it is made an objection to law that it embodies an universal principle,] that universal principle too [no less than other things] must be possessed by the rulers, [so that their sway is open to the same objection,] and that from which the affective element is wholly absent is better than that in which it is innate. Now the affective element finds no place in the law, whereas every human soul must have it. [Hence the law is a better ruling authority than a man.]' *Καὶ οὕτως τὸν λόγον τὸν καθόλου* takes up 10, *τὸ καθόλου μέντοι λέγειν*. That without *ὁ καθόλου λόγος* a ruler cannot rule aright, we see from 1. 13. 1260 a 17, *διὰ τὸν μὲν ἀρχόντα τελείως ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἡθικὴν ἀρετὴν (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ ἀρχαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀρχαίου),* and Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 20–28: cp. Plat. Ad Princ. Inerud. c. 3, *τίς οὖν ἔρξει τοῦ ἀρχόντος; ὁ νόμος, ὁ πάσης βασιλεὺς θυγατρὶν τε καὶ ἀδελφὸν, ὡς φησὶ Πίνδαρος, οὐκ ἐν βασιλείᾳ ἔξω γεγραμμένοι, οὐδέ τις ξύλοις, ἀλλ' ἐκ ψυχῆς ὡς ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ συνουσίᾳ καὶ παραφυλάττειν καὶ μαρτυρεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς ἔργον ἡγεμονίας*.

17. *κρείττων δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 26 sqq. and Plato, Laws 713 E sqq. As to *τὸ παθητικόν* see above on 1254 b 8, and compare c. 16. 1287 a 28 sqq., where *τὸ παθητικόν* is represented by *ἐπιθυμία*. For *ἡ συμφύει* cp. Plato, Timaeus 70 E, *καὶ καθύπερθε δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον* (i.e. *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*) *ἐνταῦθα ὡς ὅρισμα ἄγρου, τρέφειν δὲ ζωνημένον ἀναγκάζει, εἴπερ τι μᾶλλον τὸ θυγὲν ἔσσεσθαι γένοιε*.

18. *ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπίνην*. Cp. c. 10. 1281 a 34 sqq., and Xen. Cyrop. 1. 3. 18, *καὶ ὁ οὗτος πατὴρ πρῶτος τὸ τετραγμῆνα μὲν ποιεῖ τῇ πόλει, τὸ τετραγμῆνα δὲ λαμβάνει, μέτρον δὲ αὐτῇ οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀλλὰ ὁ νόμος ἐστίν*. 'Ανθρωπίνην' is probably added because the proposal was to put a *man* in the place of the law.

20. *ἀντὶ τούτου*, perhaps rather 'in return for this' than 'in

compensation for this' ('pro eo quod affectibus non caret,' Bon. Ind. 63 a 57). The presence of an affective element in the individual human being is the price he pays for his deliberating better about particulars. Cp. Hdt. 3. 59, *παρὰ δὲ Ἑρμῶνιόν τῆσον ἀντὶ χρημάτων παράβατον*.

21. *ὅτι μὲν τοῖσιν κ.τ.λ. Αἰτόν*, i.e. τὸν ἀριστὸν ἄνδρα. Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, *Polit.* 295 D-E, 300 C. He draws the provisional conclusion that it will be best to have a Lawgiver-King content in general to leave supremacy to the law which he has made, but ready to overrule it when it is well that he should do so. (Compare c. 11. 1282 b 1 sqq., where a similar arrangement is suggested.) Plutarch describes in *Agea.* c. 30, how Agesilaus after Leuctra, seeing how numerous those were who had lost courage in the battle (*οἱ τρέσαντες*), advised that the laws which imposed a severe form of *δριμύς* in such cases should 'sleep for a while.' Aristotle, however, goes much further than this, and asks that his Lawgiver-King shall overrule the law not only in critical times, but whenever it deviates from the right. We may compare the powers of overruling law possessed by the Roman Senate, and afterwards by the Emperor, even before the Principate became an Absolute Monarchy (Mommson, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, 2. 823 sqq., ed. 1), and also the dispensing power of the Popes and the English Kings (Macaulay, *Hist. of England*, c. 6). Cowell in the earlier editions of his 'Interpreter, or Law Dictionary,' writing in the reign of James I, who found it necessary to suppress the work by proclamation, said under the title 'King,' 'And though at his coronation he take an oath not to alter the laws of the land, yet, this oath notwithstanding, he may alter or suspend any particular law that seemeth hurtful to the public estate' (Hallam, *Const. Hist. of England*, c. 6). It must be borne in mind that the King whom Aristotle would invest with powers of this nature is *ex hypothesi* an *ἀγὴρ ἀριστος*.

24. *ὅσα δὲ κ.τ.λ.* The antecedent to *ὅσα* is *τοῖσιν* or *ταῖς* (after *ἀρχῇ*). *Κρίνειν*, 'to decide,' as in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 29.

26. *καὶ γὰρ νῦν κ.τ.λ.* *Συνοδόντες* takes up *πάντας* (cp. c. 11. 1281 b 34, *πάντες . . . συνελθόντες*). *Κρίνουσι*, 'come to decisions.' Both judicial and deliberative decisions are probably referred to, whereas in c. 11. 1281 b 31, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 5, and 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 4 *κρίνειν* refers only to the former. The point of the addition, *αὐταὶ δ' αἱ κρίσεις εἰσι πᾶσαι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον*, will become clear if we supply

after τῶν καθ' ἑαυτοὺς the words 'which are just the things that the law cannot deal with.'

28. μὲν οὖν, 'true.' This passage seems to be based on c. 11. 1281 a 42 sqq.

29. ἀλλ' ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, 'but the State is made up of many individuals, [and therefore is better than any single individual].'
Cp. c. 11. 1282 a 38 sq.

30. μᾶς καὶ ἀπλῆς. Ἀν ἐστίασις συμφρογνός is really a number of ἐστίασεις, and it is compound, not ἀπλῆς.

διὰ τοῦτο. For the asyndeton cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 33, διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἤβξατο Φακυλίδης: 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 11, αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία διαφέρει τε ἀμφοῖν κ.τ.λ.: 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 12, ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τυραννικὰ μὲν καὶ σωτήρια τῆς ἀρχῆς: Rhet. 2. 6. 1384 a 36, διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς δὲ παραιομένοις μᾶλλον ἀσχύνονται: Magn. Mor. 2. 11. 1209 a 24, τῶν οὐχ ὁμοίως λέγουται.

καὶ κρίνει ἀμείνον, 'also decides better' [besides being better].

31. ἔτι μᾶλλον . . . 33. ἀδιαφθόροτερον. A numerous body not only arrives at better decisions than a single individual or a few, but is also less likely to be led astray from the just conclusions at which it arrives. For the structure of the sentence see above on 1253 b 35-37. μᾶλλον ἀδιαφθόρον, 'less easily seduced': cp. Plato, Laws 768 B, δικαστὰς ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα ἀδιαφθόρους ταῖς δόξαισι διαίξειν, where the word is explained in Bekk. Anecd. 1. p. 343 by τὸ μὴ παρακεκνημένον τῆς ὁρθῆς γνώμης (see Stallbaum on the passage). For the thought, cp. 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 41, καὶ τοῦτο δοκοῦσι ποιεῖν ὁρθῶς· εὐδιαφθόρωτεροι γὰρ (αἱ) ἀλήθει τῶν πολλῶν εἰσὶν κ[αὶ] κέρδει κ[αὶ] χάρισιν, and Bryce, American Commonwealth, 2. 78, 'The legislator can be "got at," the people cannot . . . The legislator may be subjected by the advocates of women's suffrage or liquor-prohibition to a pressure irresistible by ordinary mortals, but the citizens are too numerous to be all wheedled or threatened.' Yet the Constitution of the United States looks, and not in vain, to the President to act as a check on the tendency of Congress 'to yield to pressure from a section of its constituents or to temptations of a private nature' (Bryce, 1. 75 sq.).

33. τοῦ δ' ἐνὸς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just been pleading that the decisions of a multitude are less easily seduced by the wrongful influence of others than those of one man, and now he goes on to plead that they are less easily warped by internal passion. Sus. reads γὰρ ε conj. in place of δ', which is the reading of ΓΠ, but not,

I think, rightly. When a whole people *did* come to be mastered by anger, to appease it was impossible; the only thing possible was to let its anger have full course in the hope that it would exhaust itself after a time (Eurip. Orest. 678 sqq. Bothe, 696 sqq. Dindorf).

36. ἴστω δὲ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ ἐλευθέροι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 701 A, εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ δημοκρατία ἐν αὐτῇ τις μόνον ἐγένετο ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, οὐδὲν δὲ πᾶν γε δευτέρῃ ἢ τὸ γυγνός, c. 11. 1281 b 15 sqq., 23 sq., and c. 15. 1286 b 31 sq. Aristotle evidently connects the overriding of law with the rule of a πλῆθος of the kind which bears sway in extreme democracies (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 15, 23 sqq.: 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq.), a πλῆθος including other elements than οἱ ἐλευθέροι (6 (4). 6. 1293 b 38 sqq.).

38. εἰ δὲ δὴ κ.τ.λ. Τοῦτο, 'this abstinence from overriding of the law.' A high degree of virtue is not attainable by the Many (c. 7. 1279 a 39 sqq.: 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 39). 'Ἀλλ' εἰ πλείους κ.τ.λ., 'still if there were a plurality of persons good both as men and as citizens.' This is the characteristic of true ἀριστοκρατία (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 5 sq.). For ἄλλὰ cp. c. 5. 1278 a 9.

1. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ. As Giph. points out (p. 395), this view is 1286 b. implied in the argument of Darius in favour of Monarchy (Hdt. 3. 82): compare also the answer of Alexander to the proposal of Darius to share the Persian Kingship with him (Diod. 17. 54. 5). In the quaint story preserved in Stob. Floril. 10. 50 Aristotle hints that even in an individual the right side may fall out with the left. And if the One Man does escape internal discord, his rule may nevertheless be productive of στάσις, for others will be apt to fall out with him (Xen. Anab. 6. 1. 29).

2. ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Good men do not fall out among themselves (Eth. Nic. 8. 4. 1156 b 11 sq.). Σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχὴν, cp. Thuc. 2. 40. 5.

3. εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ. This is suggested by Plato, Rep. 445 D, ἐγγισσόμενον μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἐνὸς ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσι διαφέροντος βασιλείᾳ ἢ κληθείᾳ, πλείωνων δὲ ἀριστοκρατία. (Contrast the account given of ἀριστοκρατία in Plato, Polit. 301 A.) Aristotle is speaking aporetically in the passage before us. It is not his deliberate view that Kingship differs from Aristocracy in being the rule of one good man, while Aristocracy is the rule of several. The true King is one who surpasses in virtue and political capacity all the rest of the citizens put together. No such superiority is possessed by the individual rulers of an Aristocracy.

6. καὶ μετὰ θυνόμεως κ.τ.λ., 'both when the Kingly office is accompanied with a bodyguard and when it is not.' It was a drawback to Kingship that it usually involved a bodyguard, and Aristotle says that Aristocracy would be better than Kingship, even if the King had no bodyguard. That Kingship is an ἀρχή we see from 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 8.

7. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ., 'and it was perhaps only owing to this that,' etc. 'Only' is often left unexpressed by Aristotle: see above on 1282 a 36 and b 4. The account of the succession of constitutions given in the passage which commences here is aporetic only, and is not in agreement with Aristotle's deliberate opinion on the subject. A quite different account is given in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq., where constitutional changes are connected with changes in the art of war; indeed, in the criticism of Plato which is 'tacked on' (see vol. i. p. 519, note) at the close of the Book on Revolutions (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 1 sqq.) Aristotle seems to deny that there is any regular succession of constitutions (1316 a 20 sqq.). The object of the review here given of the succession of constitutions appears to be to show that the days of Kingship were long past, and that it was in place only when States were small and a few much surpassed the rest in virtue. When States became larger, its place was naturally taken, first by an equal constitution, and then by degenerate forms of this ending in democracy, and when they became larger still, democracy came to be the only constitution which could easily be introduced.

8. For σπάνιον with the infinitive see Liddell and Scott.

9. ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις. Πόλεις here seems to mean 'States,' not 'cities': see notes on 20 and 1310 b 17. It is implied in the latter passage that States were small when Kingship prevailed.

10. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'besides, men instituted their Kings in consequence of benefit conferred, and benefits are the work of good men, [and good men were then rare].' Ἀπὸ in ἀσ' εὐεργεσίας marks the 'origo et causa' (Bon. Ind. 77 b 51 sqq.). For the fact, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 10 sqq. That benefits are the work of good men is implied in Xen. Cyrop. 3. 3. 4, ὁ δ' Ἀρμένιος συμπερούπεμπε (τὸν Κύρον) καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι, ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν εὐεργέτην, τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθόν. In an inscription found at Lycosura and published by Cavvadias in his 'Lycosura' we read ὅπως ἢ πᾶσι ἀνθρώποις γνωστὰ ὅτι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν εὐεργεσία ἔστι τῆς πόλεως εἰς τοὺς ἀξίους εὐχαριστία.

Complimentary decrees declaring individuals *εὐεργέται* often speak of them as *ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί* (see e. g. Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 92 and No. 138, line 40).

12. οὐκέτι *δεδέμενον* κ.τ.λ., 'they no longer endured [to be ruled by Kings], but sought for something shared in common by all, and established a constitution.' Cp. Plato, *Polit.* 301 C (quoted on 1287 a 22), Isocr. *Hell.* § 35, *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα* (Θησοῦς) *κοινὴν τὴν πατρίδα καταστήσας καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν συμπολιτευομένων ἐλευθερώσας ἐξ Ἰσού τὴν ἀμύλλαν αὐτοῖς περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐποίησε* κ.τ.λ., and Paus. 9. 5. 16, *τὸ δὲ ἐνταῦθεν διὰ πλείωνων πολιτεύεσθαι μηδὲ ἀπ' ἀνδρὸς ἐνὸς ἡρτῆσθαι τὰ πάντα ἄμεινον ἐφαίνετο τοῖς Θηβαίοις*. We should infer from the passage before us that the constitution established after the fall of Kingship was one which gave supreme power to 'many' (cp. 12, *πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετῇ*), but we are told in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq. that it was an oligarchy of knights. For *κοινὸν τι*, cp. c. 3. 1276 b 1, *εἴτερ γὰρ ἔστι κοινωρία τις ἢ πόλις, ἔστι δὲ κοινωρία πολιτῶν πολιτείας*: Plut. *Aristid.* c. 22, *γράφει ψήφισμα* (Ἀριστοκλῆς) *κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἰρεῖσθαι*: and (with Bon. Ind. 399 a 60) *Pol.* 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 29 sqq. In the passage before us, as often elsewhere when the object is easily supplied, 'accusativus eius rei, quam quis *ὑπομένει*, omittitur' (see Bon. Ind. 800 b 61, where *Hist. An.* 9. 12. 615 b 18 is referred to among other passages). It is indeed quite in Aristotle's way to suppress the accusative governed by a verb: see below on 18, and see note on 1273 b 18. Here, as in the Seventh (Fifth) Book, Monarchies, or at any rate Kingships, are marked off from Constitutions (see vol. i. p. 521 and vol. ii. p. xxvii).

14. *ἐπεὶ δὲ* κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, *Rep.* 550 D sqq., which is corrected in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 39 sqq. The meaning of *ἐτιμον γὰρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλοῦτον* will be clearer if we translate 'for they made wealth [and not virtue] the honoured thing.' In an aristocracy virtue should be honoured above wealth, if it is to be durable (2. 11. 1273 a 37-b 1). That *τὸ ἐτιμον ποιεῖν τὸν πλοῦτον* is a sign of oligarchy, we see from Eurip. *Fragm.* 628,

*δήμῳ δὲ μήτε πᾶν ἀναρχίῃς κράτος
μήτ' αὖ κακώσῃς, πλοῦτον ἐτιμον τιθεῖς.*

Cp. also Plato, *Rep.* 564 D.

16. *ἐκ δὲ τούτων* κ.τ.λ. Plato in the *Republic* (555 B sqq.) had made oligarchy pass into democracy and democracy into tyranny, but Aristotle here makes oligarchy pass into tyranny and tyranny

into democracy, ingeniously suggesting that tyranny is an intensification of oligarchy, both these constitutions resting on a sordid love of gain (cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 8 sqq.), but differing in this that tyranny claims for one man what oligarchy claims for a few (cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 22 sqq.). Oligarchy did often pass into tyranny (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 sqq.), and tyranny into democracy (1316 a 32), but in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 20-39 Aristotle appears to reject anything like a fixed succession of constitutions. We are also there told that constitutions less often change into cognate forms than into opposite forms (1316 a 18 sqq.), so that we do not expect oligarchy often to pass into the cognate form, tyranny.

17. τῶν τυραννίδων. The article is added because τυραννίδας precedes in 16. For other instances of the same thing see 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12-15 (ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων followed by τοῖς ἀρχόντας καὶ τοῖς ἀρχομένοις), 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 38 sq., 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 36, 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 37, 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 33, 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 22 sq., etc.

18. αἰεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For the omission of the object of ἔχουσιν see above on 12: τὴν πολιτείαν is probably to be supplied, cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 36, ἔτι δ' ὅταν ἴσται εἰς ἐλάττωσις ἔλασσι τὴν ἀλιγαρχίαν, and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 25, αἱ τὸ μῖσθον ἐκβαίνοντες καθ' αἰτοὺς ἔχουσιν τὴν πολιτείαν. For the risks attaching to the exclusion of a large number of citizens from office see above on 1281 b 28. For ἰσχυρότερον τὸ πλῆθος κατίστησαν, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 7, τὸν δῆμον ποιεῖν ἰσχυρόν.

20. ἔπει δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but now that States have come to be even larger [than they were when it first happened that many were alike in virtue], perhaps it is no longer even easily possible, [much less suitable to the circumstances,] for any other constitution than democracy to come into existence.' ἔπει δὲ καὶ μείζονες εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς πόλεις answers to 11, ἔπει δὲ συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετήν. I translate τὰς πόλεις 'States' (with Sus. and Welldon), not 'cities' (as Bernays), because the words must apparently bear the same meaning as in 10, where I render πόλεις 'States.' Cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq., 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22, and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 17 sq. Compare also Isocr. Arcopag. § 62, where the word πόλεις seems to mean 'States,' not 'cities.' In [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 75 it is not clear whether ἡ πόλις means 'the State' or 'the city.' In 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sqq. τὰς πόλεις evidently means 'the cities.' For οὐδὲ ῥῆδον, cp. c. 16. 1287 a 10, οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν, 1287 b 8, οὐδὲ ῥῆδον, and c. 2. 1275 b 32, οὐδὲ δυνατόν.

23. *πότερον καὶ τὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν*; Bonitz (Ind. 150 b 4) explains τὸ γένος here by τὸ τέκος, but perhaps it means the descendants generally (cp. Thuc. 1. 126. 12, 13).

25. *κύριος ὢν*, 'although he has the power to do so.'

26. *ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.*, 'but here we reach a statement which it is no longer easy to believe,' 'here we pass the point at which belief is easy.' For *οὐκ ἐστὶ* cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 3 sqq. Aristotle's friend Antipater, however, refrained on his deathbed from passing on his regency to his son Cassander and appointed Polysperchon, who was not related to him, regent instead (Diod. 18. 48. 4: Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, 7. 238). Marcus Aurelius, on the other hand, shrank from excluding his son Commodus from the succession, 'and his weakness must reflect strongly on his memory. He may have judged, indeed, that the danger to the State from a bad prince was less than the danger from a disputed succession, especially in the face of the disasters accumulating around it' (Merivale, Hist. of the Romans under the Empire, 8. 348). Giphanius (p. 397) thinks that Aristotle is led by the difficulties which he raises in the passage before us to reject hereditary Monarchy altogether, but this is not the case, for he believes in the existence of families in which surpassing virtue is hereditary, and in their case he approves of hereditary Monarchy (c. 17. 1288 a 15 sqq.).

27. *ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ.*, 'there is matter for debate, again, in the question with respect to the bodyguard also [as well as in that with respect to the children], whether,' etc. *ἔχει* is here used impersonally: see Bon. Ind. 305 b 31 sqq., where Phys. 1. 2. 185 b 11, *ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν περὶ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τοῦ ὅλου . . . πότερον ἐν ᾧ πλείον τὸ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλον*, is referred to. The Lacedaemonian Kings had a bodyguard (Isocr. Epist. 2. § 6), and in Hom. Il. 1. 324 Agamemnon says of Achilles,

*εἰ δέ κε μὴ δώσω, ἐγὼ δέ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλαρμαι
ἐλθὼν ξὺν πλεόνησσι· τό οἱ καὶ ῥήγον ἔσται.*

31. *μηδὲν πρόττων κ.τ.λ.* Cp. 1286 a 36 sq. and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74, *νόμοις μὲν ὀλίγα χρωμένους, ταῖς δ' ἐαυτῶν γνώμας τὰ πολλὰ διοικούντων*.

34. *μὲν οὖν* is answered by *δέ*, c. 16. 1287 a 1.

τὸν βασιλεῖα τὸν τοιοῦτον, i.e. *τὸν κατὰ νόμον βασιλεῖα*.

35. *δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν μὲν ἔχειν ἰσχὺν κ.τ.λ.* *Μὲν* really belongs to *ἰσχύν*, but 'interdum non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis

cernitur' (Bon. Ind. 454 a 20, where 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 12 sqq. is referred to: cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 32 sqq.).

36. ὅστε κ.τ.λ. For the suppression of εἶναι, see Vahlen on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7, where reference is made to Poet. 15. 1454 a 34, ζῆτεν ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τὸ εἶναι, ὅστε τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγων ἢ πράττειν ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἶναι (sc. εἶναι). See also notes on 1277 a 38 and 1327 a 34.

ἐκδοῦν καὶ ἐπὶ καὶ συμπλεῖν. Cp. Plato, Laws 932 C, οἱ δικαστῆριον εἰσαγόμενον αἰτοῦς οἱ εἶναι καὶ ἔκδοσιν τῶν πολιτῶν, αἰτοῦς δὲ οἱ προσβότατοι ἀπάντων, where εἶναι καὶ ἔκδοσιν seems to mean much the same thing as εἶναι ἔκδοσιν. No other instance of the occurrence of the word συμπλεῖν in Aristotle's writings is given in the Index Aristotelicus, and it is an extremely rare word. Χύμαλλαι occurs in Plato, Polit. 261 E and elsewhere.

37. τοῦ πλήθους, 'the whole body of citizens': cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 18, περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους.

καθέπερ κ.τ.λ., 'after the fashion in which the ancients granted bodyguards, whenever they set up one whom they called Aesymnete or tyrant of the State.' Bonitz (Ind. 779 b 52) is probably right in making τύραννον as well as αἰσυνόγην in the accusative after ἐδωκεν and not taking τύραννον with καθιστάναι. As to οἱ ἀρχαῖοι see above on 1285 a 30. For εἴτε καθιστάναι, 'whenever they set up,' cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7, 21. The contrast with εἴτε ἦν illustrates Encken's remark (De Partic. Usu, p. 67), 'εἴτε utrum cum indicativo an cum optativo ponatur, ab Aristotele accurate distinguitur.'

39. εἴτ' ἦναι τοὺς φύλακας. Cp. Diod. 13. 95. 3 sqq.

C. 16. 1287 a. 1. τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν πάντα πράττοντος. Aristotle is thinking of a King like the King of the Persians (Hdt. 3. 31, ἄλλων μόντοι ἐξευργαῖται νόμον, τῷ βασιλεύοντι Περσίῳ ἐξῆς ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ βούληται).

4. καθέπερ εἴπομεν, in c. 15. 1286 a 2 sqq.

ἐν πόσεσσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The example of the Lacedaemonian ἀριστοκρατία shows that a perpetual, and indeed an hereditary, generalship might exist in an ἀριστοκρατία. Perpetual magistracies were also not unknown in democracies, though the tendency there was to clip their wings (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 41 sqq.). As to Thessaly, cp. Diod. 15. 60. 2, διόπερ οἱ Θετταλοὶ προστησάμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ἡγεμόνα ἴασσα τούτῳ τὸ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐπέτρεψαν. We are reminded of the Stadtholders of Holland, as to whom see Lord Macaulay, Hist. of England, c. 2. 'The Stadtholder,' he says, 'commanded the forces of the common-

wealth, disposed of all military commands, had a large share of the civil patronage, and was surrounded by pomp almost regal.'

6. καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἓνα κέριον τῆς διοικήσεως, 'and many make one man supreme over the internal administration of the State'—the opposite province to that of a perpetual general—and thus virtually constitute a Kingship according to law of a different kind. Διοίκησις is here opposed to στρατηγία, as Sus.³ (Index s.v.) has already pointed out: cp. Isocr. Panath. § 128, καὶ κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ περὶ διοίκησιν τῆς πόλεως, and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 43 *inil.*, where αἱ περὶ τὴν ἐγκύκλιον διοίκησιν ἀρχαὶ are distinguished from αἱ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον. Cp. also Deinarch. c. Demosth. c. 97, τὸν μὲν ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς πράξεσιν ἔπιστον γεγενημένον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οἰκονομίαις ἄχρηστον. As to Epidamnus, cp. 7 (5). i. 1301 b 25. Epidamnus and Opus were both of them oligarchical States (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 39 sqq., 236). Some oligarchies went further and placed the greatest offices—both military and civil, it would seem—in the hands of one man (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 22). Pharsalus was probably an oligarchy when it placed the administration in the hands of Polydamas (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 2, οὗτος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ Θετταλίᾳ μάλᾳ εὐδοκίμει, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ πόλει οὕτως ἰδοῦναι καλῶς τε κάγαθός ἐστιν ὥστε καὶ στασιδασυντες οἱ Φαρσάλιοι παρακατίθεντο αὐτῷ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ τὰς προσόδους ἐπέτρεψαν λαμβάνουσι, ὅσα ἐγγράπτο ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, εἰς τε τὰ ἱερὰ ἀναλίσκειν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄλλην διοίκησιν). But the same tendency is traceable even in democracies. For instance, we find a great authority wielded at Athens by ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ διοίκησει (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 248). This important office, however, to judge by the silence of the 'Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία, did not exist at the time when this treatise was written (Gilbert, *ibid.*), and very possibly did not come into existence till after Aristotle's death. A multiplicity of magistrates (ἡ πολυαρχία), with the attendant 'circumlocution' and rivalries, often did harm to Greek States, as we can judge from Xen. Anab. 6. 1. 18 and Plut. Camill. c. 18, and they often gained by placing power in the hands of one man, thus anticipating on a small scale the experience of the Romans in relation to the Empire.

7. καὶ περὶ 'Επίδαμον, 'at Epidamnus for instance' (see above on 1266 b 22, καὶ περὶ Λευκάδα).

καὶ περὶ 'Οπούντα δὲ κατὰ τι μέρος Ἰλαττον, 'and indeed at Opus to a certain smaller extent': cp. Plato, Laws 757 D, αἱ μάλιστα στέσειεν ἐαυτῇ μὴ προσκυνηθήσειν κατὰ τι μέρος, and Tim. 86 D, τὸ δὲ

ἐληθείς, ἡ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἀκολασία κατὰ τὸ πολὺ μέρος διὰ τὴν ἐνὶ
γένοις ἔξιν ἐπὶ μαρότητος δοτῶν ἐν σώματι βυβλῇ καὶ ὑγραίνουσιν νόσους
ψυχῆς γίγναι: Diog. ap. Stob. Floril. 9. 49, οὐ γὰρ πειράσεται αὐτῶν
ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲ καθ' ἐν μέρος. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 41. 1) thinks
that the office at Opus referred to is that of the ἀρχε mentioned
in an inscription (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 63,
p. 118), but this is uncertain. The office of κοσμοπολίς, to which
Sus.¹, Note 671 (Sus.⁴, 1. p. 439), takes Aristotle to refer, existed
at the Epizephyrian Locri (Polyb. 12. 16. 6, 9), but we do not
know that it existed among the Opuntian Locrians.

8. περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης κ.τ.λ. Susemihl places
the mark of a lacuna after δ βασιλεύς, 10, but not, it would seem,
rightly, for a sentence constructed in a very similar way occurs in
5 (8). 5. 1339 b 40, περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν τῆς μουσικῆς, οὐ διὰ ταύτην
μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὰς ἀναπαύσεις, ὥς τοιαῦτα—οὐ
μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μή ποτε τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε κ.τ.λ. We should
probably supply ποιητέον τὴν σκέψιν after βασιλεύς, 10, from 2.

9. ἄρχαι πάντα, cp. c. 14. 1285 b 13 sq.

10. αὐτοῦ. In 1287 a 1 all MSS. have αὐτοῦ (except those
which have wrongly αὐτοῦ), and this form 'longe frequentius apud
Aristotelem exhibetur' (Bon. Ind. 311 b 45). In 6 (4). 10. 1295 a
17 all MSS. have κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γνώμην.

οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν, 'not even natural,' much less expedient, and
the question raised at the commencement of c. 14 was whether
Kingship is expedient. Cp. Eurip. Fragm. 172 (from the Ἀντιγόνη),

οὐτ' εἶδος ἀρχῆν οὐτ' ἐχρῆν ἄντι νόμον (εἶναι νόμον libri)
τύραννον εἶναι· μαρτία δὲ καὶ θέλειν,
δε τῶν ὁμοίων βούλεται κρατεῖν νόσος.

11. For εἶνα πάντων see note on 1281 a 13.

12. τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 12. 1282 b 26, τοῖς γὰρ διαφέ-
ρουσιν ἑτέρον εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, and 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 27.

14. οὐτ' εἴπερ . . . 18. τοὺς ἴσους. For the structure of this
sentence see above on 1253 b 35-37. Goettling and Sus. add καὶ
ε conj. before οὕτως, but without necessity. The pleonastic addi-
tion of τοῖνυν in the apodosis, 16 (Π¹ omit it, but in all probability
wrongly), is quite Aristotelian (see περὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρευσεως 2.
455 a 12-26 and Bonitz, Aristotel. Studien, 2. 72 sq.), no less than
the similar use of οὖν in the apodosis, as to which see Bon. Ind.
540 b 15 sqq. and Bonitz, Aristot. Stud. 2. 59 sqq. Ἐχει is to be
supplied with τὸ ἀνίσουν τοὺς ἴσους in 16.

τροφῆν ἢ ἰσθῆτα. As to τροφῆν, Mr. Broughton has already referred to Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 36 sqq. (cp. also Plato, Laws 691 C). As to ἰσθῆτα, a big man in a small garment would suffer physically from cold, and a small man in a large garment from heat.

16. διόπερ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 32 sqq. The subject of ἀρχων is τοὺς ἴσους supplied from the preceding sentence.

18. ἢ γὰρ τάξιν νόμος. Τάξις and νόμος are conjoined in Plato, Phileb. 26 B and Laws 673 E. Cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 29.

τὸν ἀρα νόμον κ.τ.λ. 'Inter articulum et nomen ἀρα collocatum legitur in De Caelo 4. 4. 311 b 27, τὸ ἀρα πῦρ οὐδὲν ἔχει βάρους' (Bon. Ind. s.v.). μᾶλλον is occasionally used by Aristotle not only in the same clause with a comparative (as in Plato, Polit. 259 C *sub fin.*), but also, it would seem, in close connexion with it (e.g. in Hist. An. 9. 1. 608 b 5, μᾶλλον φανερότερα: see other instances given in Bon. Ind. 402 b 53 sqq.), and it may be so used here (cp. Top. 3. 1. 116 b 23, καὶ ὅπως τὸ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος αἰρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο τι, οἷον τὸ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντείνον ἢ τὸ πρὸς φρόνησιν). But as Bonitz says of the passages in which μᾶλλον is used with a comparative, 'saepe dubites utrum μᾶλλον "magis" an "potius" significet,' and μᾶλλον ἢ may mean 'potius quam' in the passage before us.

20. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and in accordance with this same contention, even if it should be better that certain individuals should rule [and not the law alone], it will be right to make these individuals guardians of the laws and ministers to the laws, [for otherwise the law will not rule].' Magistrates who are only guardians of the laws are contrasted with Kings by Plato in Polit. 305 C, καὶ τὴν τῶν δικαστῶν ἀρα βόμην ἀνευρίσκομεν οὐ βασιλικὴν οὖσαν, ἀλλὰ νόμον φύλακα καὶ ὑπηρέτην ἐκείνης: compare what Plutarch says of Theseus in Thea. c. 24, τοῖς δὲ δυνατοῖς ἀβασίλευτον πολιτείαν προτείνων καὶ δημοκρατίαν αὐτῷ μόνον ἀρχοντι πολέμου καὶ νόμον φύλακα χρησομένην. Cp. also Plato, Laws 715 C-D. The archons at Athens swore συμφυλάξαι τοὺς νόμους (Pollux, 8. 86).

22. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Magistrates are necessary, because there are things which the law cannot regulate (1287 b 19-25). With ἔνα τούτων (cp. c. 17. 1288 a 19) supply ἀρχων, and cp. Plato, Polit. 301 C, οὕτω δὲ τύραννός τε γέγονε, φασίν, καὶ βασιλεὺς καὶ δευαρχία καὶ ἀριστοκρατία καὶ δημοκρατία, δυσχερανόντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν ἕνα ἐκείνων μόνον αὐτῶν.

23. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. See on this passage vol. i. p. 273, note 2, where the view which Bernays takes of it has been explained. His rendering is, '[hier wendet vielleicht Jemand ein: gegen die Lückenhaftigkeit des Gesetzes helfen Beamte nicht, denn] wo das Gesetz ausser Stande scheint, etwas Bestimmtes zu verordnen, wird auch wohl kein Mensch im Stande sein, sich ein festes Urtheil zu bilden.' I still prefer the explanation which has been given in vol. i. p. 273. I take ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γὰρ to introduce not an objection proceeding from an advocate of the claims of the One Best Man—objections are commonly introduced by ἀλλὰ, as in c. 15. 1286 b 24, 26—but a still more cogent argument in favour of the claims of Law than those which have hitherto been urged. (ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γὰρ introduces a similar transition from a statement advanced with less emphasis to a statement advanced with more in 2. 9. 1271 a 18–22, 3. 13. 1284 b 30, and 3. 16. 1287 a 41.) Aristotle has been reminded by what he has just said, ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εἶναι τινὰς ἀρχάς (22), that there are things which the law cannot regulate, so that as to them the law cannot rule, as he has said in 18 sqq. that it ought to do, and now he adds that with respect to these things the law is no worse off than a human being would be. They are as much beyond the cognizance of a human being as they are beyond definition by the law. But the law does all that can be done in relation to them, for it educates the magistrates to supply its own defect of particularity, and it also allows of its own amendment.

25. ἀλλ' ἐπίτηδες κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1287 b 25, κρίνει γὰρ ἕκαστος ἀρχὸν πεπαιδευμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς. It has already been pointed out (vol. i. p. 273, note 1), that Aristotle here has before him the oath taken by the Athenian juror. See Demosth. in Lept. c. 118. A similar oath is prescribed to be taken by jurors in an inscription from Eresus in Lesbos (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 125, p. 211). The expression κατὰ γράμματα τὰν δικαιοσύνην occurs also in an inscription from Calymna and in the oath of the Delphian Amphictyons (Dareste, Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques, i. 170). Its meaning may be gathered from Demosth. in Eubulid. c. 63, ἐκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἔρκου ἐξέλκεισαν τὸ ψηφισθαι γράμμη τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ οὕτε χάριτος εἶναι οὐτ' ἐχθρας. The term τοὺς ἀρχοντας, however, includes not only jurors (cp. 1287 b 15 sq.) but office-holders generally, as may be inferred from the words κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν. For ἐπίστησι κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἀρχοντας Schneider compares Isocr. Areopag.

§ 37, ὅστε τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴν ἐπέστησαν ἐπιμαλῆσθαι τῆς εὐκοσμίας. Τὰ λοιπὰ, 'whatever it cannot regulate in detail.'

27. ἐπὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Laws 772 B, ζῶντος μὲν τοῦ τάξαντος νομοθέτου κοινῇ, τέλος δὲ σχάτος αὐτὰς ἐκάστας τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς τοὺς νομοφύλακας εἰσφερούσας τὸ παραλειπόμενον τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρχῆς ἐπαγορεύουσαι, μέχρι περ ἂν τέλος ἔχων ἕκαστος δόξῃ τοῦ καλῶς ἐξεργάσθαι. Contrast Plato's language in Polit. 294 B sq.

28. ὁ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. I take οὖν here to contain an inference, as in 1. 1. 1252 a 7 (see note), and translate 'therefore.' Attention has been drawn in what precedes to the reasonableness of law. The contrast of θεός and θηρίον and of both with ἄνθρωπος is familiar to us from 1. 2. 1253 a 27 sqq. The rule of law had been represented by Plato (Laws 713 C—714 A) as an approach to the rule of the δαίμονες of Cronus, νόμος being explained as τοῦ διανομή (cp. Laws 674 B). Reason is, in fact, often identified with God, e. g. in Eurip. Fragm. 1007,

ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἐν ἐκάστῳ θεός:

cp. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 281, καὶ πείθου: ὁμοίᾳ τῇ, πείθου θεῷ. Aristotle conceives a human being as an union of a god in the shape of reason (cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 26 sqq.) with a brute, much as Plato in Rep. 588 C sqq. conceives the human soul as three shapes under the external aspect of a man, the shape of a many-headed animal, the shape of a lion, and the shape of a man, representing respectively desire, θυμός, and reason. That a brute is present in every human being was suggested by such phrases as those used by the Chorus of Women in the Lysistrata of Aristophanes (683 sq. Didot),

εἰ γὰρ τὸ θεῷ με ζευγρήσεις,

λύσω τὴν ἑμαυτῆς ἐν ἑγὼ δὲ,

where a proverb is alluded to (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 318).

31. καὶ ὁ θυμός κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably remembers Hom. Il. 9. 553,

ἄλλ' ὅτε δὲ Μελιάγρον ἔδου χάλος, ὅτε καὶ ἄλλων
αἰδάνει ἐν στήθεσσι νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντων,

and Pindar, Olymp. 7. 27—31. The remark would gain in interest if it was suggested by the complicity of Dion in the murder of Heracleides at Syracuse (Plut. Dion, cc. 47, 53) or by Alexander's murder of Cleitus in B. C. 328, but it would be rash to assume this.

For διαστρέφει cp. Polyb. 8. 24. 3, Καύραος ὁ Γαλάτης, ὃν πολλὰ ἀνὰ ἀγαθὸς, ὑπὸ Σωστράτου τοῦ κίλακος διαστρέφεται.

32. διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν, 'hence' (i.e. because Law is God and Reason unmixed with anything else) 'Law is Reason without appetite,' and Reason without appetite is better than Reason with appetite (c. 15. 1286 a 17 sq.). Cp. De An. 3. 10. 433 a 26, νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὀρθός· ὁρεξίς δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή. Anaxagoras had said that it is by virtue of being ἀμύγης and pure that νοῦς subdues everything (Fragm. 6 in Mullach, Fragm. Philoa. Gr. 1. 249: Aristot. Phys. 8. 5. 256 b 24 sqq.: De An. 3. 4. 429 a 18 sqq.).

33. τὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν κ.τ.λ. This corrects the argument used in c. 15. 1286 a 11 sqq. Ὅτι κ.τ.λ. gives, in explanation of τὸ τῶν τεχνῶν παράδειγμα, the point which the parallel of the arts is adduced to prove.

34. For καὶ αἰρετέτερον cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 6, οἱ γὰρ ἰδιώται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἤττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπικειῆ πρότερον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον, Pol. 2. 4. 1262 a 30, and 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 37. See critical note.

35. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for [it is better to be treated by physicians rather than by written rule only because] physicians do not do anything contrary to right reason for the sake of friendship.' I follow Bernays in thus completing the reasoning. For παρὰ τὸν λόγον cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 11. 1151 b 34, ὃ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς ὅλος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιῶν καὶ ὁ σόφρων κ.τ.λ., and 4. 11. 1125 b 33 sqq.

37. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plut. Aristid. c. 4, where Plutarch says of Aristides, οὐ μόνον δὲ πρὸς εὐνοίαν καὶ χάριν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν καὶ πρὸς ἔχθραν λυχυρότατος ἦν ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαίων ἀντιστήναι. As to ἐπήρεια see note on 1311 a 37.

38. ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. This passage may be rendered in two different ways. 1. With Liddell and Scott (who compare Strabo, p. 259, πρῶτοι δὲ νόμοις ἐγγράφοις χρήσασθαι πεπιστευμένοι εἰσι) and others, we may take διαφθεῖρην as in the infinitive after πιστευθέντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, and translate 'since when [the case is otherwise and] patients suspect physicians of being commissioned by their enemies to destroy them for the sake of gain.' 2. We may (with Bernays) take διαφθεῖρην as in the infinitive after ὑποπτεύουσι τοὺς λατρούς. I incline to prefer the latter rendering, especially as διὰ κέρδος comes in a little awkwardly, if we adopt the former. Aristotle has

before him here Plato, *Polit.* 298 A, καὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτῶντες ἢ παρὰ ξυγγενῶν ἢ παρὰ τινων ἐχθρῶν τοῦ κείμενου χρήματα μισθῶ λαμβάνοντες (οἱ ἱατροὶ) ἀποκτανίσσων: indeed, he only repeats what Plato himself in effect says in *Polit.* 300 A. If it was not clear that he has this passage of Plato before him, we might be tempted to imagine that he alludes to a well-known incident in Alexander's career, the relation of which in Plutarch's *Life of Alexander* (c. 19) begins thus, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Παρμενίων ἐπεμψεν ἐπιστολὴν ἀπὸ στρατοπέδου, διακελευόμενος αὐτῷ (i. e. Ἀλεξάνδρῳ) φυλάσσειν τὸν Φίλιππον (his physician Philip the Acarnanian) ὥς ὑπὸ Δαρείου πεποιημένον (cp. πιστευόμενος τοῖς ἐχθροῖς) ἐπὶ δουραῖς μεγάλαις (cp. διὰ κέρδος) καὶ γάμψ θυγατρὸς Ἀντικλῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου: compare *Arrian, Anab.* 2. 4. 9, ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δοθῆναι ἐπιστολὴν παρὰ Παρμενίωνος φυλάσσειν Φίλιππον ἀκούειν γὰρ διεφθάρθαι ὑπὸ Δαρείου χρήμασιν ὥστε φαρμάκῳ ἀποκτείναν Ἀλεξάνδρου. This happened in B. C. 333.

40. τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν, 'the treatment prescribed by the writings,' like τὸν ἐκ τῶν νόμων χρόνον in *Demosth. c. Timocr.* c. 28.

41. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . γε, 'but certainly,' as elsewhere. 'Ἰατρὸν εἰσάγειν τινί, to call in a physician for another, *Xen. Mem.* 2. 4. 3, *Demosth. c. Everg. et Mnesib.* c. 67, but in *Med.* of the physician himself when ill' (Liddell and Scott, who refer to the passage before us). Ἐφ' ἑαυτούς, 'to take charge of themselves' (see note on 1273 b 19, ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις). Not only do patients prefer a written scheme of treatment to treatment by physicians whom they regard as corrupted by their foes, but physicians themselves show distrust even of medical advice which is simply wanting in dispassionateness, for, when they are sick, they do not treat themselves, but call in other physicians. They do so because they feel that they are themselves at such a time under the influence of emotion, and that they need the guidance of a neutral dispassionate authority.

3. διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες. Cp. *Thuc.* 1. 1287 b. 63, παρῆλθε παρὰ τὴν χρῆλὴν διὰ τῆς θαλάσσης βαλλόμενός τε καὶ χαλεπῶς, and see Mr. W. H. Forbes, *Thucydides Book i.* p. 151. For ἐν πάθει ὄντες cp. *Eth. Nic.* 7. 8. 1150 a 27 sqq. and 7. 5. 1147 b 9 sqq. Aristotle seems to think that not only sick physicians, but also gymnastic trainers, when engaged in gymnastic exercises, would be ἐν πάθει.

ὥστε δῆλον κ.τ.λ. Supply οἱ τὸν νόμον ζητοῦντες as the nom. to

ζητοῦσιν. In 1287 b 23 we have to supply in a similar way 'the advocates of the supremacy of law.' 'And so it is clear that [those who seek for written law] in seeking for that which is just seek for that which is neutral, for the law is that which is neutral.' This is made clear by the practice of physicians to which reference has just been made. So that the parallel of the arts, far from telling against the use of written law in the State, as some claimed that it does, in reality furnishes an argument in favour of its use. That the way to the just lies through the neutral, we see from Eth. Nic. 5. 7. 1132 a 19 (already compared by Eaton), δὲ καὶ ὅταν ἀφυσβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἵσταται ἵσταται ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἔμφυχον καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν εἶναι μεσιδίον, ὡς ἐν τοῦ μέσου τύχῃσι, τοῦ δικαίου τευζόμενοι. Sus., following Thurot, reads ὁ δὲ νόμος in place of ὁ γὰρ νόμος without MS. authority and not, I think, rightly.

5. ἔτι κυριώτεροι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just been asserting the value of written law (cp. 1287 a 34, κατὰ γράμματα, and 40, τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν), and now he says that the case is even stronger in favour of unwritten law. For the distinction between οἱ κατὰ γράμματα νόμοι, 'laws resting on writings,' and οἱ κατὰ τὴν ἔθην, 'laws resting on (unwritten) customs,' cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 86 (a passage professing to record Plato's views), νόμον διακρίσεις δύο· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ γεγραμμένος, ὁ δὲ ἀγραφος· ὁ μὲν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι παλαιότερα, γεγραμμένος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ ἔθην γινόμενος, οὗτος ἀγραφος καλεῖται, and Plato, Polit. 299 A, κατηγορεῖν δὲ τὸν βουλευόμενον, ὡς οὐ κατὰ τὰ γράμματα τὸν ἐναντιὸν ἐκυβέρνησε τὰς ταῦτε, οἷδι κατὰ τὰ παλαιὰ τῶν προγόνων ἔθην. For οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθην νόμοι, which are here implied to be unwritten (as ἔθην are in Plato, Polit. 295 A, 299 A, and Laws 841 B), cp. 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 40 sq. On ἀγραφοὶ νόμοι see Cope, Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 239-244, where he concludes (p. 244) that customs are 'what we are to understand principally by the νόμοι ἀγραφοὶ in the Politics,' so that the term is used in the Politics in a wider sense than it is when it refers, as it sometimes does (see Cope), to 'the great fundamental conceptions and duties of morality,' such as 'the worship of God, duty to parents, gratitude, the requital of benefits,' and the like. For the fact that more important matters are dealt with by unwritten than by written laws, cp. Plut. Apophth. Lac. Zeuxidam. 1, 221 B, Ζευξίδαμος, πεθομένον τινὰ διὰ τὶ τοῖς περὶ ἀνδρείας νόμοις ἀγράφους τηροῦσι, καὶ τοῖς νόμοις ἀπογραφόμενοι οὐ διδάσκει ἀναγνώσκεις, 'Οτι, ἔφη, συνθίξασθαι [δαί] ταῖς

ἀνδραγαθίαις κρείττων ἢ ταῖς γραφαῖς προσίχων. As to ἀσφαλίστερος see vol. i. p. 270, note. We have *οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη* in 6 and *τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἔθος* in 7. Compare the change from *ἔθος* in 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 14 to *ἔθεισιν* in 1292 b 16.

8. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ., 'then again, it is not even easy, [much less well,] for the one man to keep an eye on many things.' Eurip. *Phoeniss.* 692 Bothe (745 Dindorf), *εἰς ἀνὴρ οὐ πάνθ' ὀρέῃ*, had passed into a proverb (Leutsch and Schneidewin, *Paroem. Gr.* 2. 378). Cp. also Xen. *Oecon.* 4. 6, *καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀμφὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ οἰκίαν* (sc. *τῶν μισθοφόρων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἷς ὑπλίσθαι προστέτακται*) *αὐτὸς* (i. e. *ὁ βασιλεὺς*) *ἐφορεῖ*, *τοὺς δὲ πρόσω ἀποικοῦντας πιστοὺς πέμπει ἐπισκοπεῖν*, and *Cyrop.* 8. 2. 11, *εἰ δὲ τις οἶεται ἓνα αἰρετὸν εἶναι ὀφθαλμὸν βασιλεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἶται· ὀλίγα γὰρ εἰς γ' ἂν ᾧ καὶ εἰς ἀκούσειν*. Were the Lacedaemonian ephors at their origin designed to be the 'eyes' of the Kings? The word *ἐφοροι* is used in the sense of 'spies' by Megasthenes ap. Strab. p. 707 (see note on 1313 b 12).

10. τοῦτο, i. e. τὸ πλείονας εἶναι ἀρχοντας.

11. πρότερον, in c. 15. 1286 b 3 sqq.

12. εἴπερ κ.τ.λ. In τοῦ δὲ ἐνὸς κ.τ.λ. the apodosis is introduced by *δέ*. For the use of *δέ* in the apodosis after a conditional sentence introduced by *εἰ* or *ἐάν*, see above on 1278 a 32.

18. τὸ "σύν τε δὺ ἐρχομένω," Hom. *Il.* 10. 224,
σύν τε δὺ ἐρχομένω, καὶ τε πρὸ δ' τοῦ ἐνέστην,
ἔπικε κέρδος ἔη· μῦθος δ' εἴπερ τε νόσος,
ἀλλὰ τί οἱ βράσσων τε νόος, λεπτὴ δὲ τε μήτις,
 and 13. 235 sqq. Cp. *Trag. Gr. Fragm. Adespota* 450,
ναῦν τοι μὲ' ἄγκυρ' οὐδαμῶς σώξω φίλει,
ὥς τρεῖς ἀφέντε προστάτης θ' ἀπλοῦς πύλαι
σφαλερές, ὑπὸν δὲ κἄλλος οὐ κακὸν πύλαι,
 and *Archil. Fragm.* 144 (ap. *Aristid.* 2. 137), *καὶ ὁ μὲν γε κατ' ἰσχὺν προφέρων, εἰ καὶ ἐνὸς εἷη κρείττων, ὑπὸ δυοῖν γ' ἂν αὐτὸν καταίργεσθαι φησὶ καὶ Ἀρχιλόχος καὶ ἡ παροιμία*, where the Scholiast (quoted by Bergk) adds, *ἡ μὲν παροιμία φησὶν· οὐδὲ Ἡρακλῆς πρὸς δύο· τὸ δὲ Ἀρχιλόχου ῥήτων οἶον μὲν ἴστω, οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἴσως δὲ ἂν εἷη τοιοῦτον*.

14. καὶ ἡ εὐχή κ.τ.λ. Hom. *Il.* 2. 372, where Agamemnon is speaking of Nestor (Sus.², Note 651).

15. εἰσι δὲ καὶ νῦν κ.τ.λ. This takes up 1287 b 8, *δεήσει ἄρα... 11, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον*, in which words the suggestion is made that the powers which it is proposed to entrust to the One Man should rather be given to a plurality of magistrates. Ὡσπερ ὁ δικαστής, for

it was well known from the terms of the dicast's oath (see above on 1287 a 25) that he had to regulate matters as to which the law was silent. Aristotle has already implied in 1287 a 25 sqq. that the magistrates have to do so too in relation to some matters. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 32 sqq.

18. ἀρξαιε καὶ κρίνειεν. Cp. 1287 a 26, κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν.

20. διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν. Διαπορεῖν here = ἀπορεῖν according to Bon. Ind. 187 b 1 sqq., where Eth. Eud. 1. 5. 1216 a 11, διαπορούμενα τοιαῦτ' ἄλλα καὶ θεωρούμενα τίνος ἔνεκα κ.τ.λ., is placed next to the passage before us.

23. οὐ τοῖνυν κ.τ.λ., 'nay, [the advocates of the supremacy of law] do not make this counter-assertion that' etc. Οὐ τοῖνυν is used in self-correction: see above on 1267 a 5 and compare in addition to the passages there referred to Plato, Rep. 603 B, and Strato, Fragm. Φωνικίδης, 31 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 546),

"οὕτω λαλεῖν εἰσθε." μὴ τοῖνυν λαλεῖν
οὕτως παρ' ἐμοὶ γ' ἔσθ'.

24. ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐχ ἓνα μόνον, sc. εἶναι δὲ τὸν κρινοῦντα περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων.

26. ἀποπὼν τ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ. For the thought compare Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 10-12, a passage which seems to be present to Aristotle's memory here. "ἴδαι evidently suits ἑμμοσι only, not ἀκοαῖς or what follows, but Aristotle 'often expects us to supply a word from a previous clause which is not altogether suitable': see above on 1257 a 21. For ἀκοαῖς in the sense of 'organs of hearing' see Bon. Ind. s.v.

27. θεωεῖν is apparently the reading of all extant MSS. (one cannot tell from 'duobus' what reading Vet. Int. found in his text), but the Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of its occurrence in Aristotle's writings as the dative of θεω—it is common enough in them as the genitive, but θεωί or θεω are the forms of the dative mostly used by Aristotle—and here it strikes us as all the more strange because it is followed by θεωεῖν and θεωί. According to Meisterhans, Grammatik der att. Inschriften, p. 124 (ed. 2), θεωεῖν is used as the genitive and dative in Attic Inscriptions down to B.C. 329, θεωεῖν from B.C. 329 to B.C. 229, and θεω as the genitive, θεωί as the dative, in Roman times. Thus, if the MSS. are to be trusted, Aristotle often departs in this matter from the usage of the Attic Inscriptions of his time.

29. ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν κ.τ.λ. Παλλοῦς is emphatic (see note on 1275 a 32): cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 11, ἐκ τούτου δὲ καὶ πολλοὶ ἐνομισθῆσαν βασιλείας ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ πολλὰ ὄψα· εἰ δέ τις οἴεται ἓνα αἰρετὸν εἶναι ὀφθαλμὸν βασιλεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴεται· ὀλίγα γὰρ εἰς γ' ἂν ἴδοι καὶ εἰς ἀκούσει κ.τ.λ., where Xenophon probably intends to correct Hdt. 1. 114, ὁ δὲ αὐτίων δῖταζε τοὺς μὲν οἰκίας οἰκοδομεῖν, τοὺς δὲ δορυφόρους εἶναι, τὸν δὲ κού τινα αὐτίων ὀφθαλμὸν βασιλέος εἶναι· τῷ δὲ τι τὰς ἀγγελίας ἐσφέρειν ἰδίδου γέρας, ὥς ἐκάστη ἔργον προστάσων. The messengers mentioned by Herodotus would be included among the 'King's feet' referred to by Aristotle here. The 'many ears and eyes' of a King became proverbial: cp. Lucian, Adv. Indoct. c. 23, οὐκ οἶσθα ὥς ὄψα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ πολλοὶ βασιλείας; The important fact that Cyrus had fallen in the battle of Cunaxa was discovered and reported to Artaxerxes by an 'eye of the King,' Artasuras (Plut. Artox. c. 12). Institutions as unlike as the ἀπακουσταὶ of Hiero I of Syracuse (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 13 sqq.: cp. Plut. De Curiositate, c. 16) and the 'younger members' of the Nocturnal Council of Plato's Laws (964 E: see vol. i. p. 448 sq.) were probably suggested by this Persian institution. According to Megasthenes (ap. Strab. p. 707) a similar institution existed in India: see his account of the ἑφοραί.

30. τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ αὐτοῦ φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχοντες. Aristotle probably remembers the words of Achilles to his friend Phoenix in II. 9. 616,

ἴσον ἐμοὶ βασιλεῦσι καὶ ἡμῶν μίτρος τιμῆς.

Cp. also Plut. De Fraterno Amore, c. 18 *sub fin.*, καὶ τὸ Δαρείων γένος ἐβασίλευσεν, ἀνδρὸς οὐ μόνον ἀδελφοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ φίλοις ἐπισταμένους κοινωνεῖν πραγμάτων καὶ δυνάμεως, and Thuc. 2. 97. 3, where we read of οἱ παραδυναστεύοντές τε καὶ γενναῖοι Ὀδρυῶν (i.e. associates of the King of the Odrysae in his rule). Monarchs expect of those whom they make partners in rule not only friendliness to their rule but also friendliness to themselves. The two things are not the same. Alexander, we remember, called Craterus φιλοβασιλεύς and Hephaestion φιλαλέξανδρος (Plut. Alex. c. 47: Diod. 17. 114): cp. Plut. Brut. c. 8, λέγεται δὲ Βρούτος μὲν τὴν ἀρχὴν βαρύνεσθαι, Κάσιος δὲ τὸν ἀρχόντα μισεῖν, where Julius Caesar is of course referred to. Τῆς ἀρχῆς φίλοι should probably be read (with Casaubon and Richards: see critical note) in place of τῇ ἀρχῇ φίλοι, though this expression is used in an unfavourable sense in Lucian, Catapl. c. 11, ἀγροῖς ὅτι πάντες οἱ καὶ προσκυνοῦντες καὶ τῶν λεγομένων

καὶ πραγματοποιεῖται ἕκαστα ἐκαστῶντες ἢ φίλοι ἢ δαίμονες ἔχον τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄντες φίλοι καὶ πρὸς τὸν κατὰ ἐκτελέσαντες; In place of αἰνοῖ (MSS. wrongly αἰνοῖ) Sus. would read αἰνοῖς, which is found in the version of the passage given by the Aldine edition of the Scholia on Aristophanes (Acharn. 92: Duebner excludes this quotation from the Politics from his text of the Scholia—see Dindorf's Preface, pp. iv-v Duebner, as to the Aldine edition), but not, I think, rightly: see above on 1286 a 12. The title 'friend of the King' probably came originally from Egypt, where we trace it as early as the Twelfth Dynasty (see Maspero, *Histoire Ancienne des Peuples de l'Orient*, p. 104, ed. 1), and even the Sixth (Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, Eng. Trans., p. 72). The Macedonian Kings made those whom they raised to the dignity of 'friends' so far partners in rule that they consulted them on the most important matters and employed them on the most important commissions (see Spitta, *De Amicorum*, qui vocantur, in *Macedonum Regno Condicione*, p. 38, who refers among other passages to Diod. 17. 54, and Arrian, *Anab.* 1. 25. 4). Ποιοῦντας here takes the place of ποιῶντας, 29, just as in c. 5. 1278 a 34 ποιῶντας takes the place of ποιῶντας, 1278 a 30.

31. μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες κ.τ.λ., '[friends indeed they must of necessity be, for] if they are not friends,' etc.

33. ὁ γε φίλος ἴσως καὶ ὁμοιος. Cp. Plato, *Laws* 837 A, φίλος μὲν που καλοῦμεν ὁμοιος ὁμοίῳ κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ ἴσως ἴσῳ.

34. οἴεται δεῖν ἔρχεσθαι, sc. ὁ βασιλεὺς.

35. οἱ διαμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν. Cp. 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 24, where see note.

G. 17. 36. ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν, 'in the case of some persons.' I follow Bernays, from whom Sus. differs (Sus.⁴, i. p. 443: Qu. Crit. p. 396 sqq.), in taking τῶν to be masculine: cp. c. 14. 1284 b 40, ἢ τίσι μὲν συμφέρει τίσι δ' οὐ συμφέρει, and c. 17. 1288 a 31, καὶ τίσι.

37. ἔστι γὰρ τι φύσει δεσποτὸν κ.τ.λ., 'for there is that which is marked out by nature to be ruled by a master, and another to be ruled by a King, and another marked out for free government, and it is expedient and just that each should be thus ruled.' For καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον, cp. 41, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε φανερόν ἐστι ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ ἴσοις οὐτε συμφέρον ἐστὶν οὐτε δίκαιον εἶναι κύριον εἶναι πάντων, 1. 6. 1255 b 6 sqq., and 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 16 sq. I prefer the rendering which I have given of καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον to that of Sepulveda, 'et horum imperiorum cuiusque aliud est ius et alia commoditas,' though Bernays translates the passage in a somewhat

similar way. Richards would add *τοῦτο* after *δικαίον*, 39. For *ἵτι* γὰρ *τι φύσει διαποσθέν*, cp. 1. 6. 1255 b 6 sqq. and 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 36 sqq. *Πολιτικόν* in 38, *καὶ ἄλλο πολιτικόν*, appears to be used in reference to the kind of free government which obtains in a Polity, for Aristotle is evidently speaking of normal constitutions only, and he can hardly refer in *πολιτικόν* to Aristocracy. Of course, if we regard 1288 a 6—15 as authentic and as placed where it stands by Aristotle, we have an additional reason for taking *πολιτικόν* to refer to the Polity, for it clearly refers to the Polity in 1288 a 7, 12.

40. οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, 'nor any of the other constitutions.' For the genitive, cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 30, and Diod. 5. 21. 2, οὐτε γὰρ Διόνυσον οὐδ' Ἡρακλῆα παρελήφαμεν οὐτε τῶν ἄλλων ἡρώων ἢ δυναστῶν ἰσχυρατέρων ἐπ' αὐτοῖς.

41. ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημέτων γε κ.τ.λ. See as to this passage vol. i. p. 274—5. In 1288 a 1 we have a *μέν solitarium* (see above on 1262 a 6).

2. πάντων is here masculine (cp. c. 16. 1287 a 11, τὸ κύριον ἵνα 1288 a. πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν). This is clear from 3, οὐτε ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν κ.τ.λ.

3. ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὥς ὄντα νόμον. Supply κύριον ὄντα after αὐτόν. As to the chiasmus in οὐτε ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν οὐτε μὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθόν, see note on 1277 a 31.

4. οὐδ' ἂν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀμείνων ἢ may be added to correct a dictum of Plato to Dionysius the Elder recorded in Diog. Laert. 3. 18, ὁ δὲ διαλεγόμενος περὶ τυραννίδος καὶ φάσκων ὥς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτο κρείττον ὃ συμφέρει αὐτῷ μόνον, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἀρετῇ διαφέρει, προσέκρουσεν αὐτῷ. Cp. also Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 37.

6. πρότερον, in c. 13. 1284 a 3 sqq.

πρῶτον δὲ . . . 15. ἀρχάς. Susemihl brackets this paragraph as an interpolation, and it looks at any rate like a subsequently added passage. It may well be from the pen of Aristotle—its contents do not seem to be seriously at variance with his teaching elsewhere (see vol. i. Appendix D)—but it is doubtful whether it was placed where it stands by his hand or by that of another. A similar doubt arises as to other passages in the Politics (see for instance vol. i. p. 569 and p. 519, note). The position of this paragraph in relation to its context is certainly remarkable. Aristotle is discussing Kingship, and in particular is about to describe what degree of superiority over those he rules an Absolute King should possess: why should he pause at this point to explain

who are fit subjects for Kingship, Aristocracy, and Polity, when he is concerned for the moment only with Kingship? And why is it necessary to enter into this question as to Aristocracy and Polity first (*πρῶτον*, 1288 a 6), before stating what degree of superiority over those he rules an Absolute King should possess? Then again, though the recapitulation in 1288 a 30 sqq. makes it clear that in what has preceded it has been explained for whom Kingship is an expedient institution, this may refer only to what has been said in 1288 a 15-19. On the other hand, it may be urged in defence of the paragraph that it is after a long argument in favour of Aristocracy (in the sense of the rule of a plurality of good men) that Aristotle interposes his closing remark in 1287 b 36 sq., 'but perhaps these things are so in the case of certain persons and not in the case of others,' and that therefore he may naturally wish to explain before he goes further who are the persons in whose case the arguments in favour of Aristocracy hold good, no less than who are the persons in whose case the arguments in favour of Kingship hold good. Nor is it altogether surprising that he should add a similar explanation as to Polity, for he has implied in 1287 b 37 sqq. that there are those who are marked out by nature for each of the normal constitutions. Still it must be admitted that the paragraph has an intrusive look where it stands.

8. τὸ τοιοῦτον here refers not to anything preceding, but to what follows. See for other instances of the same thing note on 1337 b 6. As to *φέρειν*, see vol. i p. 290, note 1. The case is omitted in which Kingship falls to a single individual, not a γένος.

9. πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικῇ. Πολιτικῇ is added to show that a mere fitness for ἡγεμονία πολεμικῇ is not enough. Cp. πολιτικῇ ἀρχῇ in 12 and πλῆθος πολεμικόν in 13. The King is to be capable of πολιτικῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ, the rulers in an aristocracy of πολιτικῇ ἀρχῇ. The word ἡγεμονία belongs especially to Kingship: cp. Rhet. ad Alex. I. 1420 a 21, where οἱ ὑπὸ τὴν τῆς βασιλείας ἡγεμονίαν τεταγμένοι are contrasted with οἱ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ πολιτευόμενοι, and Plut. adv. Colot. c. 31, οὐχ οἱ τῶν τῆς ἀναρχίας στίβανος ἀσύμβλητον εἶναι ταῖς μεγάλαις ἡγεμονίαις λέγοντες; οὐχ οἱ τὸ βασιλείῳ ἀμαρτίαν καὶ διέπτωσιν ἐκφεύγοντες; Cp. also Plato, Laws 711 C, τῇ τῶν δυναστευόντων ἡγεμονίᾳ.

ἀριστοκρατικὸν δὲ . . . 15. τὰς ἀρχάς. See vol. i Appendix D.

11. κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικῶν, and not κατὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δύναντα, as in oligarchies (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1161 a 2 sq.).

12. πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, the rule which is exercised over persons ὁμοῖαι τῷ γένει καὶ διαίθετοι (c. 4. 1277 b 7 sqq.).

πολιτικῶν δὲ πλῆθος κ.τ.λ. The law in a polity gives office to the well-to-do, just as in an aristocracy office falls to the γυμναῖοι (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2). Does κατ' ἀξίαν imply that office will be elective in a polity? If so, cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 10 sqq. and contrast 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 8—11 and 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 34 sqq., passages which, however defective the text of the latter may be, seem to show that magistrates might be appointed by lot in a polity (see vol. i. pp. 509, 573).

15. As to τῶν ἄλλων see critical note.

18. καὶ κέρειον πάντων is added because not all Kings are κέρειον πάντων (c. 14. 1285 a 4).

19. πρότερον, in c. 13. 1284 b 25 sqq.

20. τὸ δίκαιον, i.e. τὸ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν δίκαιον, cp. c. 13. 1283 b 17, κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον.

22. πάντῃ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for they entirely claim on the basis of superiority, though not the same superiority.' Aristotle's account in Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 25 sqq. of the 'superiority' on which the partisans of democracy base their claims does not agree with the account given in Pol. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 sqq., for in the former passage (cp. Pol. 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 28 sqq.) they are said to base their claims on ἀξία—the ἀξία, in fact, which διανοθερία confers—and in the latter not on ἀξία but on number. Still, whichever of the two passages we follow, they base their claims on a 'superiority.'

24. ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν, i.e. because no other course is becoming or in accordance with nature: cp. c. 13. 1284 b 28 sqq.

28. τοῦτο, i.e. to constitute the whole of which the rest are parts.

31. πῶς, 'under what conditions' (so Bern.). Cp. c. 3. 1276 a 17, τοῖσι δ' εὐαίς δὲ λόγος εἶναι τῆς ἀρετῆς ταύτης, πῶς ποτὶ χρηλὸν λόγῳ τῶν πολλῶν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ἑτέραν.

32. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. At this point a transition is made from the G. 18. question what are the different forms of Kingship and for whom Kingship is advantageous to the question how a Kingship or an Aristocracy (for the two forms turn out in 34 sqq. to be nearly related, cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 31 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 2 sq., 31 sq.) is to be brought into being. For a similar transition cp. 6 (4).

8. 1294 a 25 sqq. The reasoning of the paragraph which commences at ἐνὶ δὲ is—the best State is an aristocratical or Kingly State, but the virtue of a citizen of the best State is the same as the virtue of a good man; hence the virtue of a citizen of an aristocratical State or of a man of Kingly mould is identical with the virtue of a good man; hence to institute an aristocratical or Kingly State it is necessary to have recourse to the education and customs which produce good men. This preface prepares us to find in the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books what we do find there—inquiries directed to the discovery of the education and customs which produce good men. As to the transition from the Third to the Fourth Book see vol. i. p. 292 sqq.

34. The use of the word *ἐκτετακμένον* indicates the completeness of the control exercised: cp. c. 14. 1285 b 31 sqq.

37. ἐν δὲ κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. Appendix B.

39. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν. Cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 41, ἄλλων τρόπων καὶ δι' ἄλλων, and 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 5, οὗς δὲ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔστιν κ.τ.λ.

41. ὧς' ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle corrects the view expressed by Plato in his *Politicus* that the essence of the *βασιλεύς* and the *πολιτεύς* is to possess a certain science. Just as he had said in 1. 7. 1255 b 20 that ὁ δεσπότης οὐ λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιάδε εἶναι, so he now implies the same thing as to the *βασιλεύς* and the *πολιτεύς*. The education which is to produce them is not the communication of a science; it is the communication of an *ἔξis*. Contrast Plato, *Polit.* 292 B, τῷ βασιλεὺς ἀρχὴ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἶναι τοιαύτην, εἶναι, and 292 E; also 259 B. Aristotle, however, allows in 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10 sqq. (cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 5 sqq. and 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq.) that the ruler should possess not only virtue but also political aptitude. In 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 8 certain *πολεμικαὶ καὶ πολιτικαὶ ἀσκήσεις* are referred to which find a place apparently in Aristotle's scheme of education, though their exact nature is left obscure, and these *πολεμικαὶ ἀσκήσεις* may perhaps be one means by which he would seek to develop this political aptitude, but he probably thought that the art of ruling was mainly acquired in the course of being ruled (3. 4. 1277 b 8 sqq.).

1288 b. 1. καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθος. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16, *εὐθισμένοι καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι*, and *Menex.* 241 C, *μαθήντας καὶ εὐθισθέντας μὴ φοβήσασθαι τοὺς βαρβάρους*. In 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10, on the other hand, it is implied that *παιδεία* comprises an element of habituation.

2. In place of πολιτικόν we expect ἀριστοκρατικόν, but the rulers in the best State have already been spoken of as πολιτικοί in c. 5. 1278 b 3.

4. τίνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι τρόπον καὶ καθίστασθαι πῶς. The same two questions are raised as to the Polity in 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 30 sqq.

BOOK IV (VII).

14. Compare the very similar sentence in De An. 2. 4. 415 a 14, *οἱ ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν μᾶλλοντα περὶ τούτων σκέψιν ποιῆσθαι λαβεῖν ἔκαστον* 1323 a. αὐτῶν τί ἐστιν. For μέλλω with the aor. infin. Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) compares Eth. Nic. 2. 3. 1105 b 11, *ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μὲλλήσειεν γενέσθαι ἀγαθός*. Phrynichus condemns as un-Attic the use of μέλλω with the aor. infin., but that it is so used by Attic writers is undoubted: see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 74. Schanz remarks in his Prolegomena to Plato's Symposium, § 5, 'aoristi infinitivi cum μέλλω a Platone copulati exempli apud Platonem exstant, quae haud facile quispiam in dubitationem vocare possit.' He refers among other passages to Protag. 312 B, *μέλλεις παρσχέω*, and Gorg. 512 E, *ὅν μέλλοι χρόνον βιῶναι*, and 525 A. It is natural that Aristotle should find the clue to the best constitution in the inquiry what is the most desirable life, for we read in 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40 that 'the constitution is the mode of life chosen by the State.' See vol. i. p. 209 sqq. An instructive commentary on the first chapter will be found in the second of Vahlen's Aristotelische Aufsätze, Über ein Capitel aus Aristoteles' Politik, from which I shall frequently have occasion to make quotations.

16. For πρῶτον in the sense of πρότερον Vahlen (Aristot. Aufs. 2. 5, note) compares 3. 4. 1276 b 19.

17. ἄριστα γὰρ πράττειν κ.τ.λ., 'for [the best constitution and the most desirable life go together, inasmuch as] it is fitting that those who live under the best constitution their circumstances enable them to attain should fare best, unless something contrary to expectation happens.' It has already been pointed out (vol. i. p. 294, note 2) that the reasoning latent in the Greek cannot be fully expressed in English. For the thought cp. Plato, Laws 828 D, *ὡς ἔσθ' ἡμῖν ἢ πόλις οἶαν οὐκ ἂν τις ἐτέρῳ εὔροι τῶν νῦν περὶ χρόνου σχολῆς καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξουσίας, δεῖ δὲ αὐτήν, καθάπερ ἔνα ἄνθρωπον, ζῆν εὖ*. We hardly expect Aristotle to add the

qualification 'their circumstances enable them to attain' (*ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς*), for those who fare best must be those who live under the *absolutely* best constitution, which is contrasted in 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 25 sq., 32 with the best attainable under given circumstances (*ἢ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστη, ἢ ἰνδεχομένη ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων*).

20. πᾶσιν ὡς εἰπεῖν, 'all individuals, so to say,' for πᾶσιν corresponds to *ἐκάστω*, cp. 1323 b 21. Aristotle first discusses the question what is the most desirable life for the individual (1323 a 21-b 29), and then the same question as to the State.

21. χωρίς, i.e. *ἐκάστω*, 'for the individual': cp. 1323 b 40, καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστω καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν, 3. 6. 1278 b 24, and Soph. *Fragm.* 521, *νῦν δ' οὐδέν εἰμι χωρὶς ἀλλὰ πολλὰς ἔβλεψα ταύτῃ τὴν γυναικίαν φύσιν, ὡς οὐδέν ἴσμεν*,

where, as Gomperz remarks (*Die Bruchstücke der griech. Tragiker*, p. 33), χωρὶς (= *idē*, 'privativ,' 'seorsum') serves to distinguish the individual lot of the speaker from the general lot of women.

νομίσαντας οὖν . . . 23. αὐτοῖς, 'holding then that many of the things said in the non-scientific inquiries also respecting the best life are adequately said, we must now too make use of them.' On the question what 'non-scientific inquiries' are here referred to, something has been said in vol. i. p. 299, note 1. The expression *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, when used by Aristotle, does not necessarily refer to non-scientific inquiries of his own, still less to writings of his own, but it probably refers to writings of his own in the passage before us, for, besides that, as Zeller remarks (*Gr. Ph.* 2. 2. 119. 2: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, *Eng. Trans.*, vol. i. p. 116, note 4), the contents of the passage are quite Aristotelian in spirit, it seems to be implied in the words καὶ νῦν, 'now too,' that Aristotle has himself said these things before (cp. *Meteor.* 1. 3. 339 b 36, *εἴρηται μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὸν ἀνὴρ τόπον θεωρήμασι, λέγουμεν δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ νῦν*, and 341 a 12 sqq.). Whether, as Bernays held (*Dialogue des Aristoteles*, p. 69 sqq.), a Dialogue of Aristotle is here 'used,' is uncertain, for the non-scientific writings of Aristotle were not all of them Dialogues (Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* 2. 2. 123: *Eng. Trans.*, vol. i. p. 119 sq.). What is the exact meaning of *χρηστέον*? The word recurs in *Eth. Nic.* 1. 13. 1102 a 26, *λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς (i.e. τῆς ψυχῆς) καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνα, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς*, where *χρηστέον* seems to introduce merely a statement of results, but it does not follow that it always means no more than

this. Bernays thought that we have in 1323 a 24 sqq. a *verbatim* extract from the non-scientific composition made use of. Against this Vahlen argues in the second of his *Aristotelische Aufsätze*. Zeller holds (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 119. 2: Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 115, note 4) that the contents of the non-scientific composition are reproduced, not indeed *verbatim*, but pretty closely ('ziemlich eng anzuschliessen scheint'), and we are certainly conscious (with Bernays) of a freer flow of periods in the first chapter than we often meet with in Aristotle's writings, though Vahlen has shown that many of the expressions used occur elsewhere in them. Bernays takes the use of the *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* to extend to the end of the first chapter, and it would seem from the words *περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς* in 23 that all that is said on this subject is based on them, so that they will have been used at any rate down to *σέφρων*, 1323 b 36. If we ask why Aristotle has recourse on this subject to the *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι*, and not, as in c. 13. 1332 a 7 sqq. and 21 sqq., to the *Nicomachean Ethics*—Zeller finds teaching to the same effect in *Eth. Nic.* 1. 6 sqq., 10. 6 sqq.—the answer probably is that he prefers, when he can, to refer to the more popularly written and more generally accessible class of compositions. Zeller (*Hermes*, 15. 553 sqq.: see vol. ii. p. x, note 1) thinks that the passage 1323 a 21 sqq., in addition to *Eth. Nic.* 1. 8. 1098 b 9 sqq., was before the writer of *Eth. Eud.* 2. 1. 1218 b 32, *πάντα δὲ τὰγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ τοῦτων αἰρετώτερά τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ διακρίνεται καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις*: φράσεις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡς ἔτι α ἢ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσι, but perhaps the passage in the *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* was itself before him. For the aorist *νομίσαντας*, cp. c. 7. 1328 a 3 and 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 27, and see above on 1271 b 4. As to the case of *νομίσαντας* see note on 1275 a 16.

24. *ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, 'for in truth against one division [of goods] at any rate no one would contend,' etc. *Γάρ* introduces a justification of the use of the *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* on the ground of the absence of dissent. For *ἀμφισβητεῖν πρὸς*, cp. 3. 16. 1287 b 35: *Isaeus* 11. 9, *ἀμφισβητήσας πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνου διαθήκας*: *Demosth.* in *Phorm.* c. 33, *ἀμφισβητεῖς πρὸς ἐν ῥῆμα τῶν ἐν τῇ συγγραφῇ*: *Polyb.* 2. 2. 10, *ἀμφισβητούντων πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα*. But how would an assertion that the happy need not possess all three kinds of goods run counter to the division of goods into these three kinds? Apparently in this way. The division implies that all the three kinds of goods are goods, and it is taken for granted that those who are to

be happy should possess all goods (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 28 sqq.). There were other divisions of goods—among them a division into *ἐπαινετά, τίμια, and δυνάμεις* (Eth. Nic. 1. 12). As to the division into external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul, see vol. i. p. 299, note 1. That wealth should be accompanied by virtue had often been said by the poets (Sappho, Fragm. 81: Pindar, Olymp. 2. 53 sqq. and Pyth. 5. 1 sqq.: Eurip. Fragm. 163: compare Lysander's remark to the younger Cyrus in Cic. De Senect. 17. 59, recte vero te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtutis tuae fortuna coniuncta est), and Simonides (Fragm. 70) had said that health should accompany wisdom. Cp. also Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 14 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 17 sqq. When Aristotle sought to show in the inquiry which commences here that the chief ingredient in *εὐδαιμονία* is virtue, his work was half done for him by the ordinary use of the Greek language. To the Greeks *ὁ εὐδαίμων* was *ὁ εὖ πράττων* (1323 b 29 sqq.), and *ὁ εὖ πράττων* was *ὁ τὸ καλὸν πράττων*, and *τὸ καλὸν πράττων* implied virtue. Our word 'happiness' has no such link with virtue.

27. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The word *μακάριος* is used throughout the first chapter as interchangeable with *εὐδαίμων*, but it is a slightly stronger word, as we see from Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1101 a 6-8. Aristotle offers no proof that the happy should possess external goods and the goods of the body, no doubt because he considers it unnecessary to do so; the only question likely to be raised is whether they need possess the goods of the soul. Compare Plato, Phileb. 21, which is evidently present to his memory. For *φαῖς μακάριον* without *εἶναι* cp. 2. 3. 1261 b 22.

29. δεδιότα μὲν τὰς παραπετομένας μοῖας. We read in a fragment of Plutarch (Libr. Perdit. Fragm. 7. 10), *φαρμακωπάλιν δὲ τὰς εἶδεναι ὑπὸ μὲν δρακόντων καὶ ἀσπίδων μηδὲν πάσχειν, μύσας δὲ φεύγειν μέχρι βοῆς καὶ ἐκπύσεως*, but Aristotle is thinking not of gadflies, but of harmless flies. As to cowardice of this kind see Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1149 a 4 sqq.

30. ἀπεχόμενον δὲ κ.τ.λ. *Τὸν ἐσχάτων* is in the gen. after *μηδενός*. To act thus is to be like a wild beast: cp. Plato, Laws 831 D, *μηδὲν δυσχεραίνοντα, ἅν μόνον ἔχῃ δύναμιν καθάπερ θηρίον τοῦ φαγεῖν παυτοδανὲ καὶ πικρῷ, ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀφροδισίων πᾶσαν πάντως παρασχέειν πληρομοσῆν*, which is imitated in Epist. 7. 335 A sq. For *ἐπιθυμία* τοῦ φαγεῖν § πικρῷ Vahlen compares Xen. Mem. 3. 6. 16, τοῦ εὐδοξίου ἐπιθυμῶν, and 1. 7. 3, and Xen. Oecon. 14. 9.

32. ἁρτίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1174 a 1, αὐτὸς γὰρ ἔστιν ὅσον καὶ δύνανται ἔχειν διὰ βίαν, ἡμίσηται δὲ αὐτὸς τὸ καὶ τὸ πλεονέκτημα. For τὰ περὶ τὴν δύνανται αὐτὸς ἄρτιως καὶ ἀφαιρέσειν Vahlen compares Phylarch. ap. Athen. Deipn. 536 c, αὐτὸς ἐξουσιάζεται τὴν δύνανται . . . ὥστε τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἐκτελεῖται καὶ λόγῳ διὰ μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀδυναμίαν. For πὶ καὶ, cp. 1323 b 8, ἐργάζεσθαι τι, and see Bon. Ind. 763 a 16 sqq., where Meteor. 3. 3. 372 b 13, καὶ διδοὶ περὶ τοῦ φέροντος ἢ τὴν σελήνην, ἁρτίως δὲ καὶ περὶ πᾶν ἄλλων ὁσίων, is referred to.

34. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'but these things almost all men would admit when said; they differ, however, in respect of the quantity they desire of each good and in respect of their relative superiority.' As to λεγόμενα Vahlen remarks that it is to be taken in close connexion with συγχαρήσεις, and compares among other passages Eth. Nic. 6. 1. 1138 b 32, διὰ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς εἴηαι μὴ μόνον ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτ' εἰρημένον: Plato, Rep. 436 E, αὐτὸν ἄρα ἡμῖν τῶν τοιοῦτων λεγόμενον ἐκπλήξει: Hdt. 2. 146, τοῦτων δὲ ἀφαιρέσειν πῆρσι χρᾶσθαι τοῖσι τις πείσεται λεγομένοις πολλὰν, and 4. 11; ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος λόγος ἔχειν ἔδει, τῷ μάλιστα λεγομένῳ αὐτὸς πρόσκαιρος. For ὥσπερ πάντες, where ὥσπερ = 'fere,' Vahlen compares Rhet. 1. 6. 1363 a 11, ὥσπερ γὰρ πάντες ἦδη ὁμολογοῦσιν, εἰ καὶ οἱ κακῶς πεπεισμένοι, perhaps not a quite conclusive parallel. Closer ones may be found in Plato: see Ast, Lex. Platon. s.v., who refers in illustration of the use of ὥσπερ in the sense of 'fere' to Protag. 346 A, ὥσπερ δομῖναι, among other passages. For ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς cp. 1323 b 14, κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν. A different interpretation of ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς from that given above is, however, possible; it might mean 'in respect of the excess they desire of this or that good' (cp. τὴν ὑπερβολήν, 38, and 1323 b 8), but 'superiority,' not 'excess,' is probably the meaning. Ὑπεροχαῖς appears to be in the plural because three different sorts of goods are measured against each other, so that whichever sort is preferred will conceivably possess one degree of superiority over the second and another over the third.

36. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς κ.τ.λ. Ὁμοειδέων is severed from τῆς ἀρετῆς by the whole length of the sentence for the sake of emphasis: see above on 1281 a 14. Aristotle here remembers Plato, Apol. Socr. 29 D, ὃ ἀρετὴν ἀδελφεῖν, Ἀθηναίος δὲ, πλείους τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδαίμωντάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἐσχάτην χρημύτην μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνην ἐπιμελούμενος, ὥστε οὐ ἔστιν ὡς πλείους, καὶ δέξεται καὶ τῆς φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὥστε δὲ βελτίστη ἔστιν, οὐκ

ἐπιμελεῖ αὐτῷ φρονεῖν; and 29 E, ἀλλὰ οὐ καὶ πλείονα ἔχει παρὰ
 διαχρίτους ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φιλοτέρως παρὰ πλείονα.

37. For πλείονα καὶ χρημίων Valden compares L. 9. 1257 b 7,
 ποιεῖται γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦ πλείονα καὶ χρημίων. Πλείονα is explained in
 I. 13. 1259 b 20 23 ἡ τῆς κτήσεως ἡμεῖς. Cp. also C. 5. 1326 b 33,
 παρὰ κτήσεως καὶ τῆς παρὰ τῇ αὐτῇ αἰσχύνης.

38. ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐροῦμεν. See vol. I p. 295, note 2. Valden
 compares the use of ἡμεῖς δ' ἡμετέρων in De An. I. 3. 406 b 22,
 also Metaph. Γ. 5. 1010 a 15, ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῦτον οὐ λόγῳ
 ἐροῦμεν, and Pol. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 16 sqq. As to ἡμεῖς see above on
 1270 a 9.

39. ὅτι βέλιν μὲν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν is taken up by αὐτὸς μὲν ἀλλή,
 1323 b 6 (see note on 1284 b 4). Παρὰ τοῦτον, i.e. whether it is
 right to be content with a small amount of virtue and to seek an
 unlimited amount of external goods. In place of ἀκαρτέων
 Lambinus followed by Bekk.² reads λατρίων (See. and Bonitz, Ind.
 s.v., also bracket the αὐτῷ), and it is true that in 2. 3. 1262 a 17 we
 have ἀκαρτέων λατρίων παρὰ ἀλλήλων τοῖς πόνοις, and that no parallel
 has hitherto been adduced for the expression ἀκαρτέων τῶν πόνων,
 but it is not perhaps absolutely certain that ἀκαρτέων is wrong.
 Many verbs compounded with αὐτῷ are occasionally used in a sense
 but little removed from that of the simple verb, e.g. ἀκαρτεῖν,
 διακαρτεῖν, διαλατρίων, διαφιλοτέρων, etc.

40. ἐπίοντες ὅτι κ.τ.λ. So that those who possess the virtues
 have the means of acquiring external goods in addition, whereas
 those who possess external goods have not necessarily the means
 of acquiring the virtues, whence it follows that the virtues are to be
 sought in preference to external goods. A little later, however,
 Aristotle says that external goods are the gift of fortune (1323 b
 27 sq.). He continues here to make use of the Apology of Plato,
 30 A, αὐτὸν γὰρ ἄλλο πρῶτον ἐγὼ περιέχεται ἢ τοῦτον ἐπὶ καὶ ποσὶ-
 ρου καὶ πρᾶξις μῆτις σφαιρῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μῆτις χρημάτων πρῶτον
 μὲν αὐτῷ σφαιρῶν, ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ζῶναι, λόγῳ δὲ οὐ
 χρημάτων ἀρετῇ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς
 ἀνθρώποις δίδονται καὶ ἄλλοι καὶ ἀγαθὰ. Compare the definition of
 εὐδαιμονία in Rhet. I. 5. 1360 b 16 23 εὐδαιμονία κτήσεων καὶ σφαιρῶν
 μετὰ δυνάμεως φιλοκατεῖν τε καὶ πρᾶξις τοῦτον: Isocr. De Pace,
 § 32, τοῖς γὰρ ἀγαθοῖς οὐ ἔχοντες ὡς τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῖς τε κτήμασι καὶ τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ἐφελκείας ὡς δίδονται τυγχάνουσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δυνάμεως
 ἐπιμελοῦντες λαμβάνει σφῶς αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ τε φρονεῖν ἔχοντες καὶ τοῦ

πράττειν βέλτιον τῶν ἄλλων διανοοῦντες: Xenocr. Fragm. 63 (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 3. 127), *Κενοκράτης δὲ ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀποδίδωσι κτήσιν τῆς οὐκείας ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς διηρητικῆς αὐτῇ δυσίμεως*· εἰτα ὡς μὲν ἐν ᾧ γίνεταί, φαίνεται λέγων τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς δὲ ὑφ' αὐτῆς, τὰς ἀρετὰς ὡς δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς, ὡς μερῶν, τὰς καλὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς σπουδαίας ἔξεις τε καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ καὶ σκέψεις ὡς τούτων οὐκ ἄνευ τὰ σεματιὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκτός (cp. Plato, Rep. 403 D): Democrit. Fragm. Mor. 58 (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. 1. 344), *δέξαι καὶ πλοῦτος ἄνευ ξυρίσιος οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς κτήματα*.

1. τῇ χαίρειν = ἡδονῇ, as in De Gen. An. 1. 18. 724 a 1 (referred 1828 b. to in Bon. Ind. s. v. *χαίρειν*). Protarchus in Plato, Phileb. 31 A sqq. finds the Good to be τὸ χαίρειν or pleasure. The word *μακάριος* was supposed to be derived from *χαίρειν* (Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b 6 sq., quoted by Vahlen). Tyrants were thought to be *εὐδαιμονες* καὶ *μακάριοι* if they were seen to be in the daily enjoyment of bodily pleasures (7 (5). 11. 1314 b 28 sqq.).

2. εἰτ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν. Cp. Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1218 b 34, *φρόνησις γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἐν ψυχῇ, ἅν ἔνια ἢ πάντα τῶν εἶναι δοκῇ πᾶσι*. *Εὐδαιμονία* is said to be a combination of τὸ καλόν and pleasure in 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 19: see vol. i. p. 296, note 1.

3. ὅτι μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει κ.τ.λ. Compare the remark of Solon quoted in Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 9, *καὶ Σόλων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφάνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτός κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγμένοι δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ', ὡς φέρεται, καὶ βεβαιώτας σφρόνους ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτημένους πρᾶττειν ἂν δεῖ*, and Plato, Euthyd. 281 B, *ἂν γε οὐκ ἴσται ἂν ἀνθρώπος πολλὰ κεκτημένος καὶ πολλὰ πρᾶττων νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; ἢ μᾶλλον ὀλίγα νοῦν ἔχων;* (cp. Laws 660 E). Compare also the remark of Bias to Croesus, made in support of Solon (Diod. 9. 27. 3), *τὰ γὰρ ἐν σοὶ βούλεται (ὁ Σόλων) θεωρήσας ἀγαθὰ διαγινώσκει, νοῦν δὲ τὰ παρὰ σοὶ μόνον ἔδρακεν εἶναι δὲ δι' ἐκείνα μᾶλλον ἢ ταῦτα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εὐδαίμονας*, and two lines variously ascribed to Antiphanes (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 63: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 154), Alexis (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 41: Meineke, 3. 521), and Menander (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 175: Meineke, 4. 273),

*ψυχὴν ἔχων δεῖ πλουσίαν τὰ δὲ χρήματα
ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὄψις, παραπέτασμα τοῦ βίου.*

4. τὴν ἔξω κτήσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, 'the external acquisition of goods.' Vahlen (Aristot. Aufz. 2. 16, note 1) compares Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1098 b 26, *τὴν ἐκτός εὐτηρίαν*. Compare also Plato, Rep. 443 C, *τὸ δὲ γε ἀληθές, τοιοῦτο μὲν τι ἔν, ὡς ἴσκειν, ἢ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τῆς*

ἔξω πρᾶξι τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀληθῆς, περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ ἔσσαντα τὰλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῇ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη, and Aristot. De Gen. An. 3. 3. 754 a 33, τὸ τῶν βατράχων φῶν μόνον στερεόν ἐστι καὶ στυφρὸν πρὸς τὴν ἔξω σπηρίαν.

5. πλείω τῶν χρησίμων, cp. Pol. 1. 9. 1257 a 16, τῇ τὰ μὲν πλείω τὰ δ' ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους (Vahlen), and Isocr. De Pace, § 90, πλείω τῶν ἱκανῶν.

τοῦτοις, i. e. τοῖς περὶ τὸ ἥθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀγαθοῖς, or (as in 10) τοῖς περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθοῖς.

6. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle proves that it is not well to be content with a small amount of virtue and to seek an unlimited amount of external goods by showing (1) that the goods of the soul are not, like external goods and *δραμα* generally, harmful or useless when in excess, but on the contrary increase in utility with every increase in their amount; (2) that the best state of the soul is as much more precious (*τιμωτέρον*) than the best state of property and of the body as the soul is more precious than property and the body; (3) that external and bodily goods are desirable for the sake of the soul, not the soul for the sake of external and bodily goods. On all these three grounds it is clear that the goods of the soul are to be sought to a far greater extent than the goods of the body and external goods.

7. ὥσπερ ὄργανόν τι, cp. 3. 16. 1287 b 16, ὥσπερ δ' ἀκαστήρ. That instruments have a limit, we see from 1. 8. 1256 b 35 sqq. and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 35 sqq.

8. πᾶν δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον κ.τ.λ., 'and everything that is useful' (not merely external goods but bodily goods also, vol. i. p. 299, note 2, and *εὐτυχία* as a whole, Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 21 sqq.) 'belongs to the class of things whose,' etc. Supply *τούτων* with *ἴστω* (with Giph.). Τὰ χρήσιμα (or ἀφίλιμα) are goods that are desirable for the sake of other goods (Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1096 b 13 sqq.: 1. 3. 1096 a 7, *χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλον χάριν*: 8. 2. 1155 b 19). Cp. Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 3 sqq. and De Part. An. 2. 5. 651 a 36 sqq.

9. ἀναγκαῖον. 'In the first chapter of the Fourth Book of the Politics, which Bernays is probably right in believing to be taken over (herübergenommen) from an ethical dialogue, ἀνάγκη and ἀναγκαῖον are interchanged in such a way that the latter stands where the use of ἀνάγκη owing to its being followed by a vowel would have produced an hiatus' (Kaibel, Stil und Text der *Politica*

'*Adhuc* des Aristoteles, p. 10). Kaibel has apparently overlooked the fact that the same rule is followed throughout the *Politics*: see for instance 3. 11. 1282 b 8—13 and 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 39—b 1. I have noticed only one passage in the *Politics* in which ἀέγω stands before a vowel, 2. 4. 1262 b 14, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀέγω ἀμφοτέρους ἐφ' ἑτέρου ἢ τὸν αὐτὸν, and the reason why it is used there probably is that ἀεγανῶν occurs in the next line, unless indeed τοῖς should be added before ἀμφοτέρους. On the other hand there are several passages in which ἀεγανῶν stands before a consonant.

For αὐτῶν used pleonastically in addition to the relative, cp. Plato, Rep. 395 D, and Stallbaum's notes on this passage and on Gorg. 452 D. The same usage occurs in English, e. g. in 'Who is the poet but lately arrived in Elysium whom I saw Spenser lead in and present him to Virgil?' (Lyttelton's *Dialogues of the Dead*).

10. τῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. With εἶναι supply ἀεγανῶν from 9. Δί answers to μέν in 7, τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἑκείναι, and we expect in 11 not χρήσιμον εἶναι, but χρήσιμόν εἶναι. See however Vahlen, Aristot. Aufs. 2. 24 sqq., who adduces other passages (Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 2 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9 sqq.: De An. 2. 5. 417 a 22 sqq.) in which the second limb of an antithesis suffers a similar change, and is caught into the structure of an intervening sentence.

11. εἰ δαὶ κ.τ.λ. Menand. Monost. 579 is in the same spirit:

τοῖς ἐστὶ πάντων ἡγεμὸν τῶν χρησίμων.

13. ὅλως τε κ.τ.λ., 'and broadly it is manifest that we shall say that the best state of every individual thing, if we match one against another, corresponds in respect of superiority to the distance between the things of which we say that these very states are states,' i. e. if we match two things one against the other, the superiority of the best state of the one thing over the best state of the other corresponds to the distance between the one thing and the other. ὅλως marks a transition from statements as to this or that class of goods to a broad universal proposition as to *ἐκαστον πρᾶγμα*: see above on 1262 b 3. For *ἐκαστον πρᾶγματος πρὸς ἄλλα* Vahlen compares among other passages Poet. 23. 1459 a 24, ὡς ἐκαστον ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχει πρὸς ἄλλα. Ἦνπερ εἴληφε διάστασιν = τῇ διαστάσει ἣνπερ εἴληφε, and τῇ διαστάσει is dependent on ἀκολουθεῖν. In Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 15 sq. and Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 23 we find ἀκολουθεῖν followed by κατὰ, and many have connected it here with κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν, but Vahlen (whose interpretation I have

followed) is probably right in connecting εὐδαιμονίᾳ with τῇ διανοίᾳ (understood), and not with καὶ τῇ ἰσχυρίᾳ. That εὐφρῆ διάνους is a perfectly possible phrase (no less than εὐφρῆ διάνους, the reading of II¹) is shown by Vahlen (Aristot. Anst. 2. 30), who compares among many other passages Plato, Tim. 65 A, εὐφρῆ δὲ κατὰ σμυρὸν τὰς ἀσχετρίους διάνους καὶ καίους εὐφρῆ, τὰς δὲ αὐφρίους εὐφρῆς καὶ κατὰ μυρία.

16. δὲτ' αἰσὺρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 697 B, 777 D sq., 731 C, Symp. 210 B, and Protag. 313 A. When Alcetas says in Eurip. Alcest. 292 Bothe, 301 Dindorf,

ψυχὴ γὰρ αἰδῶ ἐστιν ταμίαντα,

she means by ψυχὴ 'life.'

17. καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν καὶ ἡμῶν. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 2. 1129 b 5 and Rhet. 3. 19. 1419 b 16 sq.

καὶ τῇ διέθεσιν τῇ ἀρίστην διέθεσιν. *Diéthesis* is said to be the ἀρίστη of *πίστις* in 1. 13. 1359 b 30.

22. ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, 'moral and intellectual virtue': cp. 1323 a 27-34 and 1323 b 2, τὸ ἥθῆ καὶ τῇ διάνοι.

καὶ τοῦ πρᾶττεν κατὰ ταύτας. An important addition. Hitherto we have been told only this, that those who are to be happy must possess as much virtue as possible, but now we are told that action in accordance with the virtues is also essential to happiness, and this is not lost sight of in the sequel (cp. 31-36, 41 sqq.).

23. μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρημέτους, 'appealing to the happiness of the Deity in proof of this.' Vict. 'quod inquit posuit nos hoc videre utentes Deo teste, non intellexit debere nos adhibere ipsam testem et quasi invocare ut hoc confirmet, sed uti illo tanquam signo quodam certo et exemplo huius rei claro atque illustri.' *Μάρτυρι χρημέται* τινι is commonly used in the sense of 'producing some one as a witness,' as in Rhet. 1. 15. 1375 b 30, 'ὁ θεὸς ὅτι μάρτυρι ἐχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμῖνος, but here, as Vahlen points out, *μάρτυρι* has the same meaning as in Plato, Phileb. 67 B, τοὺς θεοὺς ἱσταντας αἰσῶντι κυρίως εἶναι μάρτυρας πάντων ἡ κ.τ.λ. or as 'testes' in Cic. De Fin. 2. 33. 109. Cp. also Metaph. A. 1. 1069 a 25.

24. ὅς ἐδδαιμον μὲν ἐστι καὶ πανάρετος κ.τ.λ. As to the source and nature of the happiness of God, cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 12. 1245 b 18, αἰσῶν δ' ἐστὶ ἡμῶν μὲν τὸ εὖ καὶ ἔτερον, αἰσῶν δὲ (i. e. τῷ θεῷ) αἰσῶν αἰσῶν τὸ εὖ ἐστίν, and Plat. De Is. et Osir. c. 1, εὖ γὰρ ἀγγέλλει καὶ χρυσὸν πανάρετον τὸ θεῖον, αἰδὲ βρονταῖς καὶ κεραταῖς ἰσχυρόν, ἀλλ' ἐσωτερικῶς καὶ φρονήσει. As to the phrase *ἐδδαιμον καὶ πανάρετος* see note on 1314 b

28. 'In the earlier days of Greece *eudaimon* would hardly be used of a deity, as we can easily understand if we look to the original meaning of the word; later also it appears to have gone out of use again to some extent as an epithet of the gods. On the other hand we often find it thus used by Plato and other writers of his time (see Ast, *Lexicon Platonicum*). I have found it elsewhere in Aristoph. *Aves* 1741, τῆς τ' εὐδαιμονος Ἥρας, in Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* 10. 8. 1178 b 8, τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπελήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαιμονοὺς εἶναι, and' in the passage of the *Politics* before us (Heinze, *Der Eudämonismus in der griech. Philosophie*, 1. 663).

26. ἐπεὶ καὶ κ.τ.λ., 'since it is just on account of this' (i.e. because happiness does not spring from external goods) 'that prosperity also differs from happiness [no less than external goods differ from goods of the soul], for the spontaneous and fortune are the cause of goods external to the soul [the abundance of which constitutes prosperity], whereas no one is just or temperate [or consequently happy] from fortune or owing to fortune.' *Eud.* introduces a justification of the statement that the happiness of the individual is proportionate to his virtue and moral prudence and to the degree in which he acts in accordance with them: if this were not so and his happiness sprang from external goods, it would not differ from prosperity. That prosperity consists in an abundance of external goods, we see from *Rhet.* 1. 5. 1361 b 39, εὐτυχία δ' ἐστίν, ὣν ἡ τύχη ἀγαθῶν αἰτία, ταῦτα γίνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν ἢ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλείστα ἢ τὰ μέγιστα. That it was identified by many with happiness we see from *Eth. Nic.* 1. 9. 1099 b 7 sq. and 7. 14. 1153 b 21 sqq.

28. As to ταυτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη see vol. i. p. 21 sqq.

δικαίως δ' οὐδαίς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, *Protag.* 323 D sq.

29. ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην. This expression is used for the sake of emphasis: cp. Plut. *De Fortuna*, c. 1, πότερον οὐδὲ δικαιοσύνη τὰ θνητῶν πράγματα, οὐδὲ ἰσότης, οὐδὲ σωφροσύνη, οὐδὲ κοσμιότης, ἀλλ' ἐκ τύχης μὲν καὶ διὰ τύχην Ἀριστείδης ἐνκατατίθησε τῇ πατρί . . . ἐκ τύχης δὲ καὶ διὰ τύχην Φιλοκράτης λαβὼν χρυσίον παρὰ Φιλίππου πόρνας καὶ ἰχθύς ἡγάραξε;

ἐχόμενον δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ., 'and next in order, and calling for the same arguments to establish it, comes the truth that the best *State* also is happy and does well.' But it cannot do well—Aristotle in effect proceeds—unless it does noble things, and it cannot do noble things without moral and intellectual virtue, and the courage,

justice, and wisdom of a State are identical in nature with the same virtues in an individual, so that the happiness of a State, like that of an individual, cannot exist apart from the moral and intellectual virtues and action in accordance with them; its happiness is inseparable from the very same virtues with which happiness is associated in the individual. Bernays and Susemihl, who substitute γάρ in 31 for the δέ of the MSS., regard the passage ἀδύνατον, 31-σάφρων, 36, as containing the proof of the preceding sentence ἐχόμενον, 29-καλῶς, 31, but Vahlen has already pointed out (Aristot. Aufg. 2. 45 sq.) that the former passage is rather a deduction from the latter. The arguments used in the passage 31-36 are not the same as those used in 1323 a 38-b 29, nor do they prove that the best State is happy; what is proved in 31-36 is that the happy State will possess the same courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom which are possessed by the virtuous individual. One can conceive that the State might be happy without possessing the virtues of the virtuous individual; the object of 31-36 is to show that this is not the case, and that any happy State must possess these virtues, and thus to supplement and complete 29-31. It follows that the best State will possess them. In saying that the courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom of a State are identical with the courage, justice, temperance, and wisdom of an individual Aristotle follows in the track of Plato, Rep. 435 B sq. and 441 C sq. With ἀδύνατον δὲ καλῶς πράττειν κ.τ.λ. compare the reasoning in Plato, Gorg. 507 C.

34. ἔχει, not ἔχουσι, cp. 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 34 sq. and Plato, Phileb. 64 E, μετρίότης γὰρ καὶ ἑυμετρία κάλλος δέητον καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι.

35. μορφήν. Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) remarks of this passage, 'μορφή idem fere quod δύναμις significat.'

The suppressed antecedent of ἐν must be τῇ ἀνδρίᾳ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ φρονήσει: we expect therefore ἀνδρείος καὶ δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος in place of δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σάφρων, but Aristotle is not careful of exact correspondence in enumerations of this kind, as Vahlen shows by comparing Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1103 a 4-8, Pol. 1. 13. 1259 b 39-1260 a 2, Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 6-9, and Pol. 3. 12. 1282 b 36-1283 a 3, where we expect τοῦ κάλλους in place of τοῦ πλοῦτους in 1283 a 2. The same thing is observable in Plato: see Stallbaum on Plato, Rep. 490 C.

37. μὲν is probably answered not by δέ in οὖν δὲ ὑποκείμενα, 40,

but by *δέ* in *πότερον δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, 1324 a 5 (see Vahlen, *Aristot. Aufg.* 2. 25).

πεφρομισμένα. Not only what has been said on this subject, but the whole contents of the first three chapters are introductory, because they merely prepare the way for the inquiry with which Aristotle is mainly concerned, the inquiry as to the best constitution (cp. c. 2. 1324 a 19 sqq., c. 4. 1325 b 33 sqq.).

38. *θιγγάνειν* 'is rare in the best Prose (*ἄποροι* being the common verb), but is used by Xenophon, *Cyrop.* 1. 3. 5, 5. 1. 16, 6. 4. 9, and by Aristotle' (Liddell and Scott s.v.). See also Rutherford, *New Phrynichus*, pp. 169, 391. *Ἐπεξελθεῖν* (aor. infin.) is used though *θιγγάνειν* (pres. infin.) has preceded, probably because *ἐπεξέρχισθαι* is not used in this sense.

39. *ἐτέρας σχολῆς*, i.e. *ἐτέρας μεθόδου* (Sus.² Ind. s.v. *σχολή*), cp. 1324 a 2, *ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου*, and 21, *ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προσηρμήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν*. Compare also Plut. *Pericl.* c. 39, *ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἐτέρας ὁδεῖ πραγματείας εἶναι*. *Νῦν δέ*, 40, is in opposition to *ἐτέρας σχολῆς*.

40. *μὲν* should rather follow *ὑποκείσθαι*, but '*μὲν* interdum non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis cernitur' (Bon. Ind. s.v.).

41. *κεχωρηγημένης κ.τ.λ.* Cp. *Eth. Nic.* 1. 9. 1099 a 32 sq. and 10. 9. 1179 a 4 sqq. Xenocrates, on the other hand, had identified the good and the happy life, and his view is consequently corrected here (*Top.* 7. 1. 152 a 7, *καθάπερ Ξενοκράτης τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀποδείκνυσιν τὸν αὐτόν, ἐπειδὴ πάντων τῶν βίων ἀρετέτατος ὁ σπουδαῖος καὶ ὁ εὐδαίμων ἐν γὰρ τὸ ἀρετέτατον καὶ μέγιστον*), and also that of the Cynics, for they held that virtue needed only the addition of the strength which Socrates possessed to be sufficient for happiness (*Diog. Laert.* 6. 11, *αὐτάρκη γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδὲνδὲ προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος*).

1. The suppressed subject of *μετέχειν* probably is, not *τὸν βίον*, but 1324 a. *ἕκαστον καὶ τὰς πόλεις*.

2. *ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου*, 'for the time of the present inquiry': cp. *Eth. Nic.* 9. 4. 1166 a 34, *ἀφείσθαι ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος*, and *Isocr.* *Paneg.* § 167, *ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν ἡλικίας*, and see Bon. Ind. 268 a 5-13.

3. *Πότερον δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle has just said that the courage, C. 2. justice, etc., of a State are the same as the corresponding virtues in an individual, and now he asks whether this is also true of happiness. The question marked out for inquiry in 1323 a 20 sq., *πότερον δὲ ἀρετέτατος βίος κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἢ ἕτερος*, has been so

far answered that we have been told that the most desirable life both for the State and for the individual is *μετ' ἀρετῆς*, but we have not yet learnt whether the happiness of the State resembles the happiness of the individual (1323 b 21 sqq.) in springing from virtue and being proportionate to it, and, till we know this, we cannot affirm that the happiness of the State and that of the individual are the same. We are now told that this is the case (1324 a 13, *καὶ πόλις εὐδαιμονοτέρα φησὶ τῇ σπουδαιοτέρῃ*). Plutarch claims that Lycurgus was already aware of this (Lycurg. c. 31, *ὥσπερ ἐνδεὶς ἀνὴρ ἐβίη καὶ πόλις διὰ νομίσαν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ἐγγίνασθαι καὶ ὁμοίως τῇ πρὸς αὐτὴν*, and Ages. c. 33). He often seems tacitly to defend Lycurgus against Aristotle's criticisms (see notes on 1270 a 4, 19, and 1324 b 7).

12. ἀποδέχεται, 'accipit cum assensu, probat' (Bon. Ind. a.v.). Cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 25.

14. ἐν μὲν κ.τ.λ. For *συμμελετεῖσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλει* see note on 1293 a 4, *κοινωνοῦσι καὶ μελετεῖσθαι*. As to the question here raised and the parties to the discussion, see vol. i. p. 305 sqq. In using the words *ὁ ξένος καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίας ἀπολαυόμενος* Aristotle probably has before him no: only the language of Aristippus in Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 13, *ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοι . . . οὐδ' εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμαυτὸν καταλύω, ἀλλὰ ζῶντα πανταχοῦ εἰμι*, but also the example of Anaxagoras, who lived many years at Athens, though a Clazomenian, and when he was forced to leave it, did not return to his native city, but preferred to live a stranger's life at Lampsacus and died there (Rhet. 2. 23. 1398 b 15).

17. For *βιάσθαι πόλιν* cp. Plato, Rep. 579 E, *εἴτερ τῇ τῇ πόλει διαβίῃ ἢ ἀρχῇ ζῶεν*.

18. *κοινωνεῖν πόλιν* = *συμμελετεῖσθαι*, to take an active share in a State (cp. 15).

19. εἴτε καὶ τοὶ μὲν καὶ τοῖς δὲ πλείστοις. For *καί*, cp. c. 9. 1329 a 7, *τρόπον μὲν τοιαυτοῖς αὐτοῖς, τρόπον δὲ τοιαυτὸν καὶ ἑτέροις*.

ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The best MSS. have *ἐπεὶ μὲν γάρ* in 22, though P^a L^a omit *γάρ* and Vet. Int. has no equivalent for it (Vet. Int. occasionally fails to render *γάρ*: see vol. ii. p. lxiij). *γάρ* should probably be retained in the text, and if we retain it, we must place the apodosis at *ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.*, 23. After a string of protases introduced by *ἐπεὶ*, the apodosis is often introduced by *οὖν* in Aristotle's writings (see Bonitz, Aristot. Studien, 2. 59 sqq.). In c. 13. 1331 b 26 sqq. and in De An. 1. 4. 408 a 5 sqq. the

apodosis is introduced by *μὲν οὖν* after a protasis introduced by *ἐὰν* or *εἰ*.

τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας. Cp. c. 3. 1325 b 20, θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις. Bonitz (Ind. 186 a 28) explains *διάνοια* here as 'cogitandi actio' (i.e. 'thought'), referring to Metaph. E. 1. 1025 b 6, πῶσα ἐπιστήμη διανοητικὴ ἢ μετέχουσα τι διανοίας, Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 b 11 sq., and De Interp. 14. 23 a 32 sq.

23. ταύτην καθ' ἣν τάξιν, i.e. ταύτην τὴν τάξιν καθ' ἣν. Vahlen (Aristot. Aufg. 2. 33) compares 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 19, ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ μὴ ποῦν ὑπάρχειν ἑτέρῃ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, ἐξ ἧς συνίσταται μερῶν ἢ πόλεως, ἀλλὰ δὲ μέρει τὸ ποσόν: 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 28: 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 8. Cp. also De Gen. An. 4. 4. 772 a 2.

24. καὶ ὁποιοῦν, whether πρακτικὸς or θεωρητικὸς.

25. ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ὁμολογούντων κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 16. 1335 a 39, τὰ παρὰ τῶν λατρῶν λεγόμενα (where see note), and Xen. Cyrop. 1. 6. 2, τὰ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν συμβουλευόμενα. For this use of *παρὰ* see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 440 a. 1.

27. ὁ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀποκαλυμμένος, οἷον θεωρητικὸς τις, ὃν μόνον τινὲς φασιν εἶναι φιλόσοφον. Aristotle was on the point of saying ὁ φιλόσοφος, as in 32, but he substitutes this long phrase, because he declines to identify this kind of life exclusively with the philosophic life. He selects three strong assertions for review, each containing the word *μόνον*, and this is the first of them. The other two are *μόνον γὰρ ἄνθρωπος τὸν πρακτικὸν εἶναι βίον καὶ πολιτικόν*, 39, and *οἱ δὲ τὸν δεσποτικὸν καὶ τυραννικὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι μόνον εὐδαίμονες φασιν*, 1324 b 2. As to the passage before us cp. c. 3. 1325 a 18, *οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποδοκιμίζουσι τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, νομίζοντες τὸν τε τοῦ ἐλευθέρου βίον ἑτερόν τινα εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων ἀρετῆς, οἱ δὲ τοῦτον ἀριστον*. Πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀποκαλυμμένος, however, means something more than a mere rejection of political office; Aristotle probably has Anaxagoras in his mind, his refusal to be cumbered even with property, his passion for *θεωρία* and *ἐλευθερία*: compare the account of Anaxagoras in Plut. Pericl. c. 16, where ἀνέργων καὶ ἀπροσδιῆ τῆς ἐκτὸς ὕλης ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν may be compared with πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀποκαλυμμένος, in Himer. ap. Phot. Biblioth. 1088 R (quoted by Menage on Diog. Laert. 2. 6), where πάσης ἑαυτοῦ τῆς ἐξωθεν ἀσχολίας ἐλευθέρωσας may be compared with the same phrase, and in Diog. Laert. 2. 6, οὗτος (i.e. Ἀναξαγόρας) εὐγενὴς καὶ πλοῦτος διαφέρειν ἦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνη, ὥς γε τὰ πατρῷα παραχώρησε τοῖς οἰκείοις, αἰτιαθεὶς γὰρ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὡς ἀμελῶν, "Τί οὖν," ἔφη,

"οὐχ ἱρεῖς ἐπιμελείσθαι;" καὶ τίλος ἐπίσται καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν θεωρίαν ἦν, οὐ φροντίζον τῶν πολιτικῶν. See also Clemens, Strom. 2. 416 D (quoted by Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 912. 5), "Ἀμφιγύρως...τὴν θεωρίαν φάσκει τοῦ βίου τίλος εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ ταύτης διαθερίαν: Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 13 sqq.: Eth. End. 1. 4. 1215 b 6 sqq. and 1. 5. 1216 a 10 sqq. Aristotle, however, may also be thinking of Empedocles (cp. Diog. Laert. 8. 63, quoted below on 1325 a 19). "Ὁν μόνον τοῖς φασιν εἶναι φιλοσόφον perhaps contains a reminiscence of Plato, Theact. 175 D, οὗτος δὲ ἑκατέρου τρέσσει, ὃ θεοῖσιν, ὃ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν διαθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένον, ἐν δὲ φιλοσοφίᾳ καλεῖται, and Rep. 476 A, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγος, οὗ μόνον ἐν τῇ ἰδέᾳ προσέειται φιλοσόφους: cp. Plut. De Facie in Orbe Lunae, c. 30, αἱ σάφρονες (ψυχαὶ) μετὰ σχολῆς ἀπράγματοι καὶ φιλόσοφον στήριξαν βίον. Aristotle hints in these words that it is possible to lead a philosophic life without withdrawing altogether from politics; he probably remembers that Socrates, Archytas, and Epaminondas had done so. Cp. Plut. An Seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 26, much of which chapter is thought by Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 892. 1 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 441, note 1), to be based, in substance at any rate, on Dicaearchus, Ζωαρχία: γὰρ οὐτε βιάσθαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐκ θρόνων καθίσας οὐτε ἄρην διατρέχειν ἢ περιπατεῖν τοῖς γυμνασίοις τεταγμένον φυλάττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καίειν, ὅτε τύχῃ, καὶ συγκρίναι καὶ συντραπεύειναι ἐπίοις, καὶ συναγοράζειν, τίλος δὲ καὶ συνεδριεῖναι καὶ πῶς τὸ φέρονται ἐφιλοσόφει, πρῶτος ἀποδείξας τὸν βίον ἔσσαντι χρόνῳ καὶ μέρει καὶ πάθει καὶ πράγματι ἀπλῶς ἔσσαντι φιλοσοφίᾳ δεχόμενον, and Cic. de Orat. 3. 34. 137, septem fuisse dicuntur uno tempore, qui sapientes et haberentur et vocarentur. Hi omnes, praefer Milesium Thales civitatibus suis praefuerunt. Plato, again, though he speaks of the true philosopher as scorning political office (Rep. 521 A sq.), will not hear of his philosophic class refusing political office, at any rate in his ideal State. Cp. also Gorg. 500 D. Chrysippus was so far from thinking the σχολαστικὸς βίος the only one fit for a philosopher that he classed it as an ἡδονικὸς βίος (Plut. De Stoicor. Repugnantia, c. 2).

29. σχεδὸν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1. 7. 1255 b 36, αἰεὶ δὲ πολιτικώτατοι ἢ φιλοσοφώτατοι. For αἱ φιλοτιμύματα πρὸς ἀρετὴν, cp. (with Eaton) 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 29, μεγαλοφυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν. ταῖς αὐτοῖς προαιρούμεται, 'evidently choose.'

31. καὶ τῶν προτέρων (e.g. Anaxagoras and, as we shall see, Gorgias) καὶ τῶν νῦν (e.g. Isocrates and Epaminondas). Of

πρότεροι does not, I think, occur elsewhere in the *Politics* (*πρότερον* is the usual phrase), but it occurs in Plato, *Phaedr.* 274 B and *Menex.* 241 D.

λέγω δὲ ὅσο κ.τ.λ. See critical note.

32. διαφέρει δὲ ὁ μικρὸν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably has before him the words of Socrates in Plato, *Gorg.* 500 C, ὅρῃς γὰρ εἰ περὶ τούτου εἰσὶν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι, οὗ τί ἐν μᾶλλον σπουδάζει τις καὶ σμαρῶν νοῦν ἔχων ἄνθρωπος, ἢ τοῦτο, ὅτινα χρὴ τρέψω (ἤν, πότῃ ἐπὶ ἐν εὐ παρακαλεῖς ἐμὲ (the political life) . . . ἢ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ.

33. ἀνάγκη γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, *Rep.* 540 A, ἀναγκαστίον . . . ἰδόντας τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, παραδείγματι χραισμένους δαίμωνι, καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτας καὶ ἑαυτοὺς κοσμεῖν τὸν ἐπιλοισκῶν βίον ἐν μέρει ἑκάστου κ.τ.λ. (cp. *Laws* 702 A *sub fin.*).

35. νομίζουσι δ' οἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ. It is possible that Anaxagoras had expressed himself to this effect: he seems at any rate to have implied in his account of the happy man that he was not a *δυναστής* (*Eth. Nic.* 10. 9. 1179 a 13 sqq.). Isocrates had said in his *Letter to the Sons of Jason* (§ 11), ἐμοὶ γὰρ αἰρετώτερος ὁ βίος εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ βελτίων ὁ τῶν ἰδιωτευόντων ἢ ὁ τῶν τυραννοῦντων, καὶ τὰς τιμὰς ἡδίστου ἡγοῦμαι τὰς ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις ἢ τὰς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις: compare the spurious Fourth Philippic ascribed to Demosthenes, c. 70. As Eaton points out, Plato had already made Thrasyarchus in *Rep.* 344 A sqq. speak of *τυραννίς* as ἡ τελευτάτη ἀδικία: cp. also *Gorg.* 478 E, *Polyb.* 2. 59. 6, αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦνομα (of tyrant) περιέχει τὴν ἀντιστάτην ἔμφασιν, καὶ πάσας περιεἶληφε τὰς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδικίας καὶ παρανομίας, and *Paus.* 8. 27. 11, τούτῳ τῷ Ἀριστοδῆμῳ καὶ τυραννοῦντι ἐξίγινετο ὅμως ἐπικληθῆναι Χρηστῆ, and 8. 36. 5. In *per' ἀδικίας* τινὲς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης ('accompanied with injustice of the very greatest kind') τινὲς lends emphasis: cp. *Xen. Mem.* 1. 3. 12, ὃ Ἐράκλει, ὡς δεινὴν τινα λέγεις δύναμιν τοῦ φιλήματος εἶναι ('how very terrible'), and *Soph. O. C.* 560, and see Liddell and Scott, s.v. *tis* A. ii. 2.

37. πολιτικῶς δέ, i.e. if rule is exercised as it should be exercised over men free and equal (cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 7 sqq.: 1. 7. 1255 b 20).

38. ἐμπόδιον ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερίᾳ, and so not to be productive of τὸ ἀριστα πράττειν καὶ τὸ εἶναι μακαρίως (24). As to ἐμπόδιον ἔχειν see above on 1266 a 27. Τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερίᾳ, in contrast to ἡ ἐκτὸς εὐημερία (health, food, etc.), *Eth. Nic.* 10. 9. 1178 b 33 sqq.

τοῦτον δὲ κ.τ.λ. As Bonitz points out (Ind. 247 b 23), εἰς ἀωνίαν takes a dative in Pol. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 31.

39. μέντοι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This was the view of Gorgias as expressed by Meno in Plato, Meno 71 E, αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἀδελφεὶ ἀρετῇ, ἡμεῖς δὲ αὖτε τῆς πόλεως πρῶτον (and perhaps also of Prodicus and Protagoras, Rep. 600 C sq.): compare what Socrates says to Callicles, the friend of Gorgias, in Gorg. 500 C, ὅπου καὶ τρέψω (πρ., πύργον ἐπὶ δὲ σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμεῖ, τὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ δὲ ταῦτα πρῶτοντα, λέγοντάς τε δὲ τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥητορικῶν ἀσπασίοντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον ταῦτον τὸν τρέψω, ἐν ἧτις οὐκ ἐπὶ πολιτείας, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, and what Callicles himself says in Gorg. 485 D of one who continues to study philosophy after he has ceased to be young, ἐπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κἄν πῶς εἴποις, ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἐπὶ γένεσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέγα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγαθίας, δὲ αὖτε εἴη δὲ παρὲς τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς ἀρετικῶς γίνεσθαι κ.τ.λ., and Hipp. Maj. 281 B sq. Gorgias formed himself (Hipp. Maj. 282 B) and his disciples (Xen. Anab. 2. 6. 16) on this model; his ideal of human life stood in the strongest possible contrast to that of Anaxagoras. Nowhere can it have found more sympathy than at Athens (cp. Thuc. 2. 40). The added remark (c. 3. 1325 a 21 sqq.), ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν μαθόντα πρῶτοντα πρῶτον εἶναι, τὴν δ' εὐπρωτίαν καὶ τὴν εὐδαμονίαν εἶναι ταῦτά, may also be due to Gorgias. In 2. 2. 1261 b 1 (cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 8 sqq.) Aristotle leaves the question open whether ruling is a good thing or not.

40. ἐφ' ἐκείνης γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This was not the general view: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 6, τοῦτο δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴς οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς τῶν δυναστῶν οὐκ ἔστιν δοκῶσι τὰ ἐκείνῃ πρῶτοντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλόν. Aristotle, however, seems to have said, if the *προσπεποιημένη* ascribed to him was really his, that Kings were favourably circumstanced for philosophizing (Fragm. 47. 1483 a 41 sqq.): compare the view of Marcus Aurelius (Comm. 11. 7), and contrast Plut. Ad Princ. Inerud. c. 5, where Plutarch suspects that Alexander was half inclined to regard his own splendour and power *ὡς κάλλους ἀρετῆς καὶ ἀσυχλίας*. For ἐπὶ with the gen. in the sense of 'in respect of,' cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 17, and Plato, Rep. 460 A, ὥστε τὸν φαῖλον λαίοντα εὐκρίνεσθαι ἐφ' ἐκείνης συνείδητος τύχῃ.

1324 b. 2. οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ. By 'the despotic and tyrannical form of the constitution' Aristotle means a form of constitution devised *πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ δεσπόζειν τῶν πύλων*. No notice is taken of those who praised the life of the tyrant, probably because no one would claim

that the tyrant was alone happy. For *τρίτων τῆς πολυταίας*, cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 11, *ὁ τρίτων τῆς ἀπὸ πολυταίας*, and 2. 7. 1267 a 17, *ὁ τρίτων τῆς πολυταίας πολυταίας*. Thibron and other writers on the Lacedaemonian constitution are probably referred to (see c. 14. 1333 b 18 sqq.), for they seem to have called the Lacedaemonian State happy because it ruled over many, and to have ascribed its happiness to the framer of its constitution (1333 b 22 sq. 29 sqq.). Aristotle may have thought that Alexander needed warning on the subject (cp. *Plot. De Transq. An.* c. 13: *Aristot. Fragm.* 614. 1581 b 18 sqq.).

3. *καὶ ἐν τοῖς δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, 'and in some States this is the distinctive aim both of the constitution and of the laws, that the members of the State may exercise a despotic rule over others.' In the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States, for instance, both constitution and laws were framed with this end in view (c. 14. 1333 b 5 sqq.). For *ἄρα τῆς πολυταίας* cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 10 sq. Compare also the use of *ἐνθάδε* in 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 27 sqq.

5. *ὁ δὲ καὶ τὸν πλείονα περιέχει χῶρον* *ὅς ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ τοὺς πλείονας*. *καὶ* = 'though': cp. *Xen. Hell.* 3. 5. 2, *Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ οἱ πελοποννησῖες τοὺς τοῦ χροῖου ἄρα περιέχειν ἔχουσιν αἱ τῶν πόλεων*, and see Liddell and Scott s.v. *καὶ* B. ii. 4.

περιέχειν = *περιέχειν*: cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 42 and 1269 a 1, and see Bon. *Ind.* s.v. *περιέχειν*.

6. *οἱ τοὺς π. πρὸς τὸ οἱ πόλιν βλάπτουσιν*, cp. *Plato, Laws* 963 A, *πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἔφατον δὲν αἱ πόλεις ἡμῶν τὰ τῶν πόλεων βλάπτουσιν* *ὅτιν*, *τοῖς δ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν τοῦ συσχετισμοῦ τὸν ὅρον λέγουσιν*.

7. *ὁμοίαν κ.τ.λ.* The same thing is said in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 5 sqq. and of Lacedaemon in 2. 9. 1271 b 2 sqq.: cp. also 1325 a 3, and *Plato, Laws* 626 A, *καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνυπόστατον αὐτὸν ἐστὶν τὸν Κρητικὸν νομοθετικόν, ὅς οἱ τὸν πόλεμον ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀνδρείου καὶ ἰσχύος τὸν πόλεμον ἡμῶν ἀντιβλέποντες ἐκτελέσκειν*. We should hardly have guessed that this was so from the part of the Code of Gortyna which has come down to us, but the account of Cretan institutions given in *Strab.* p. 480 on the authority of Ephorus so far bears out the testimony of Plato and Aristotle, that it represents the development of courage in the young citizens to have been one main aim of the constitution. Plutarch probably has similar charges before him when in *Lycurg.* c. 31 and *Ages.* c. 33 he tries to make out that the aim of Lycurgus was very much that which Plato and Aristotle said that it ought to have been (see above on 1324 a 5). For *ἡ τε συνέσις καὶ τὸ τῶν πόλεων πλεόνει*, cp. c. 14. 1333 b 9, *τοὺς πόλεους καὶ τὴν συνέσις*. For *τὸ*

τῶν νόμων πλεῖστος, 'most of the laws,' Bonitz (Ind. 603 b 17 sqq.) compares 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 31, 32 and 2. 5. 1264 a 13.

9. ἐπὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and further in all the non-Greek nations that are capable of winning at the expense of others warlike prowess is honoured.' Aristotle has before him Hdt. 2. 167, Ἑρῶν καὶ Θρᾷκας καὶ Σκύθας καὶ Πέρσας καὶ Λυδοὺς (he substitutes the Celts for the Lydians) καὶ σχεδὸν πάντας τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀποτιμωμένους τῶν ἄλλων ἡγούμενους πολυγυῖαν τοῖς τὰ τέχνας μαθήσασιν καὶ τοῖς ἐγγύουσιν τοῦτοις τοῖς δὲ ἀπαλλαγμένοις τῶν χαρναξείων γενναίους παρμαίνουσιν εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἀναμένοντες μεμαθήσασιν ὃ δὲ τοῦτο πάντες οἱ Ἕλληνες, καὶ μάλιστα Λακεδαιμόνιοι, where there is a transition from the barbarians to the Lacedaemonians, just as in the passage before us there is a transition from the Lacedaemonians to the barbarians. He probably also has before him Plato, Laws 637 D, πότμον, ὥσπερ Σκύθαι χροῦνται καὶ Πέρσαι, χρηστίαν, καὶ ἐπὶ Καρχηδόνα καὶ Κελτοὶ καὶ Ἰβηρες καὶ Θρᾷκες, πολέμια ξύμπαστα ἔσται ταῦτα γένη, ἢ καθάπερ ὑμεῖς (i. e. the Lacedaemonians and Cretans), and perhaps Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 10. Cp. also Isocr. Paneg. § 67, ὅτι γὰρ ἀρχαῖοτα μὲν τῶν γένων καὶ μεγίστας δυναστείας ἔχοντα Σκύθαι καὶ Θρᾷκες καὶ Πέρσαι. The phrase τοῖς δυναμένοις πλεονεκτεῖν recurs in 8 (6). 3. 1318 b 4, where οἱ κρατούντες takes its place in the next line: cp. Demosth. De Chers. c. 42, ὅτι γὰρ ὑμεῖς οἱ αὐτοὶ πλεονεκτεῖτε καὶ κατασχεῖν ἀρχὴν εἰς πεφυκότες. No doubt among the barbarians of Europe in Aristotle's day, as among those of Africa in our own, there were raiding and raided races. 'Ἡ τριακότη δύναμις, i. e. ἡ πολέμικὴ δύναμις, referring to πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους, 8 (cp. τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην, 13). Thus πολέμιος is emphatic in 16 and 18, and τῶν πολέμιων in 20. For the perfect τετίμηται see above on 1280 a 16, δέχηται, and see Holden's note on Xen. Oecon. 9. 4, ἀνατίστανται.

12. καὶ νόμοι τυτὲς εἰσι, 'laws also' providing for the giving of honours, as well as honours. The honours might be given apart from any provisions of law.

13. καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι κ.τ.λ., 'as for instance at Carthage men receive, we are told, their decoration composed of armlets with as many armlets as they have served campaigns.' Coray would read ἐκ τοσούτων κρίκων, but Vahlen (Aristot. Aufz. 2. 34) rightly disapproves of this attempt to secure a more exact correspondence between antecedent and relative. I translate κρίκων 'armlets,' not 'rings,' for the κρίκος which Demosthenes wore was not a ring but an armlet (Plut. Demosth. c. 30, Ἐρατοσθένης δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν κρίκῳ

φησὶ κοίλῃ τὸ φάρμακον φυλάσσειν τὸν δὲ κρίκον εἶναι τοῦτον αὐτῷ φόρημα περιβραχύνιον: cp. Dec. Orat. Vit. Demosth. 847 B), and those worn by Carthaginian soldiers may well have been so too. Compare the armillae given to Roman soldiers for brilliant feats of arms (Liv. 10. 44: Guhl and Koner, *Life of the Greeks and Romans*, Eng. Trans. p. 586). We hear very little of similar rewards for gallant service in Greece. It was with land that Pittacus was rewarded for slaying his antagonist Phrynop (Plut. De Herod. Malign. c. 15). It was not by rewards given to the brave but by the education of youth that the Lacedaemonians and Cretans developed military prowess in their citizens. The Carthaginian custom may have been derived from the Libyans around them (cp. Hdt. 4. 176), or possibly from Egypt (Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hypotyp. 3. 201, p. 168. 25 sqq. Bekker). It seems likely from the passage before us that the decoration of κρίκον was confined to citizens of Carthage and was intended to induce them to serve in war and not to leave military service to mercenaries.

15. ἦν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and there was at one time a law in Macedon also that he who had slain no foeman should be girded with his halter (instead of a belt).' A man girded with a halter would cut a sorry figure beside one girded with a handsome belt adorned with metal, and possibly golden, buckles (Guhl and Koner, Eng. Trans. p. 235). Among the Cappadocians to wear a belt meant to be an officer (Anth. Pal. 11. 238: Liddell and Scott s. v. ζώνη). Compare the Macedonian custom mentioned by Hegesander, quoted in Athen. Deipn. 18 a, 'Ἡγήσανδρος δὲ φησὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ κατακλίνεσθαι τινα ἐν δείπνῳ, εἰ μὴ τις ἔξω λίανον ἐν κεντήσῃ, ὥς δὲ τότε καθήμενοι ἰδεύουσιν, where we read that Cassander, though a brave man and a skilful hunter, had not been able to fulfil this requirement at the age of thirty-five and still sat at dinner. A closer parallel may be found in the iron ring worn by many of the Chatti till they had slain an enemy in war (Tac. Germ. c. 31, et aliis Germanorum populis usurpatum raro et privata cuiusque audentia apud Chattos in consensum vertit, ut primum adoleverint, crimem barbarumque submittere, nec, nisi hoste caeso, exuere votivum obligatumque virtutis oris habitum . . . Fortissimus quisque ferreum insuper anulum (ignominiosum id genti) velut vinculum gestat, donec se caede hostis absolvat. Plurimis Chattorum hic placet habitus). Similar customs are traceable among the Sauromatae (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 122: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 460). 'It is a rule

among all the tribes' [of the head-hunting Malays of Borneo] 'that no youth can regularly wear a mandau (sword) or be married or associate with the opposite sex, till he has been on one or more head-hunting expeditions. A mandau is presented to him probably at his birth or when he receives a name, but not till he has washed it in the blood of an enemy can he presume to carry it as part of his every-day equipment' (Bock, *Head-hunters of Borneo*, p. 216). Under Cetewayo, a Zulu who had not 'washed his spear,' that is, who had not killed an enemy, could not marry. We light on a more genial form of the same custom in the island of Skye. 'In Dunvegan Castle is kept an ox's horn, hollowed so as to hold perhaps two quarts' (of what liquid?) 'which the heir of Macleod was expected to swallow at one draught as a test of his manhood, before he was permitted to bear arms or could claim a seat among the men' (Dr. Johnson's *Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland*, Works, 8. 289).

17. ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις κ.τ.λ. Now we pass from laws to customs (cp. 22). The result is attained by law at Carthage and in Macedon, by custom among the Scythians and Iberians. Eaton compares Hdt. 4. 66, where however there is no mention of the σκύφος περιφερόμενος, so that it is doubtful whether Aristotle derives his statement from this source. See however above on 1262 a 19, 1276 a 28, and 1284 a 26. The σκύφος was used by herdsmen and country people (Athen. Deipn. 498 f) and is quite in place among the Scythians: some, in fact, imagined an etymological connexion between σκύφος and Σκύθης (Athen. Deipn. 499 f). For πίνων σκύφον Eaton compares Hom. Il. 8. 232,

πίνοντες κρητῆρας ἐπιστεφίας οἶνον.

18. ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἰβηροῖς κ.τ.λ. Why have we ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις in 17, and ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἰβηροῖς here? Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 21, where see note. A similar custom existed among the Sindi, a Scythian race dwelling at the foot of the Caucasus on the East coast of the Euxine (Nic. Damasc. *Fragm.* 121: Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 3. 460, Σίνδοι τοσοῦτους ἰχθῦς ἐπὶ τοὺς τάφους ἐπιβάλλουσιν, ὅσους (ἀν) πολέμιους ὁ θαντόμενος ἀπεκονῶς ᾗ). For καταπηγνύουσι περὶ τὸν τάφον, cp. Thuc. 5. 11. 1, περιέβαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ μνημεῖον (with Arnold's note). The word ὀβελίσκος is usually explained here as meaning 'an obelisk,' but this use of it is rare, and if we explain it thus, we must suppose that a long pointed stone is referred to, for soldiers after a battle would not find it easy to set up real obelisks at the grave

of a comrade. It is possible that the word should be translated here 'a small spit.' This is its usual meaning, and every soldier had a small spit ready to hand (Plut. Reg. et Imperat. Apophth., Scipio Minor 16; 201 B). Spits might be thought likely to be useful to the dead man, like the fish thrown on the grave by the Sindi. I am glad to see since the foregoing words were written, that Dr. Jackson also translates ἀβελίσκους 'spits' (see his note in *Sus.*). Professor Ridgeway (*Academy*, Aug. 29, 1885), rendering the word 'obelisk,' makes the interesting suggestion that the passage before us throws light on the original purpose of stone circles. I read in the *Athenaeum* for Dec. 14, 1895, that 'at Monte Pitti in the province of Pisa, near some remains of ancient walls, an Etruscan necropolis has been discovered, the tombs of which are enclosed in circles of rude stones.' See also Dr. Thurnam, *Ancient British Barrows in Archaeologia* 42, p. 211, quoted by Prof. Boyd Dawkins, *Early Man in Britain*, p. 285, and the remarks of Mr. Arthur Evans quoted by Prof. Windle, *Life in Early Britain*, p. 54 sq. We expect διαφθαρκῶς ᾧ, not διαφθείρη, for the destruction of the foe must necessarily precede the fixing of the ἀβελίσκοι, but compare the use of the present participle in 2. 8. 1268 a 8, καὶ τοῖς παῖσι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τελευτώντων ἐκ δημοσίου γίνεσθαι τὴν τροφήν. The present is probably used in these passages because a thing occurring frequently is referred to. That the Iberians were a warlike race, had been remarked by Plato, *Laws* 637 D, and by Thucydides (6. 90, Ἰβήρας καὶ ἄλλους τῶν ἐκεί ἀμολογούμενους τῶν βαρβάρων μαχηματέους): compare the story told in Diod. 14. 75. 8 of their gallant behaviour when deserted by the Carthaginians. Aristotle mentions the fact, partly in confirmation of the statement in 10 that it is among warlike races that these customs prevail, partly because the Iberians were little known to the Greeks, though they had been mentioned by Hecataeus, Herodotus, and Thucydides. They must have become better known in Greece after their employment as mercenaries by Dionysius the Elder, and still more after the arrival in Greece of a contingent of Celtic and Iberian mercenaries sent by him in B.C. 369 to aid the Lacedaemonians against the Thebans (*Xen. Hell.* 7. 1. 20). It is possible indeed that an Iberian belonging to this contingent may have been buried in Greece in the manner here described by Aristotle.

20. καταπηγνύουσι. The forms πηγνύω, καταπηγνύω are 'rare in classical authors' (Veitch, *Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective*,

s.v. *πῆγνυμι*). We find *ἀπαλλάττει* in 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 12 (in 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 23 some MSS. have *ἀπαλλάττει* and others *ἀπαλλάττει*). As to *δεικνύουσι* see Bon. Ind. 167 b 50 sqq., and cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 36. As to *ἀντιόουσι* see note on 1285 b 11.

21. καὶ ἕτερα δὴ κ.τ.λ. For καὶ . . . δὴ, see above on 1253 a 18. Νόμοις κατεληγμένα, 'ratified by laws,' cp. Plato, Laws 823 A, τὰ ταῖς *ζημίαις* ὑπὸ νόμων κατεληγμένα, and Plut. Lycurg. c. 29, κατεληγμένων δὲ τοῖς *ἰσμοῖς* ἢ δὴ τῶν *κυρωσάτων* ἐκ' αὐτοῦ, and see Prof. J. C. Wilson on Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 16 sqq. in *Academy*, Feb. 18, 1888.

24. The suppressed nominative to *ἄρχῃ* is probably not *ὁ πολιτικός*, but *τις*: see as to this use of the third person singular Bon. Ind. 589 b 47 sqq.

26. πῶς γὰρ ἂν κ.τ.λ. 'Ἡ νομοθετικὴν is added to strengthen the argument, for it is still more difficult to suppose that what is not νόμιμον is νομοθετικόν than that it is πολιτικόν. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 12, τὰ τε γὰρ ἁριστά ἐκ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναι φανερόν, and Eurip. Ion 404 Bothe (442 Dind.),

πῶς οὐ δίκαιον τοὺς νόμους ἱρᾶς βροτέας
γράφαντες αὐτοὺς ἀνομίαν ἐφελκυσάν;

27. οὐ νόμιμον δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and it is not lawful to rule not only justly but unjustly, and it is possible to conquer [and so to acquire rule] unjustly as well as justly,' so that it is possible to rule over unwilling subjects unjustly. This is added because some held that Might is Right (1. 6. 1255 a 18). Conquering (τὸ *κρατεῖν*) is the first step to ruling over others (c. 14. 1333 b 30). Οὐ νόμιμον δέ, as always, like οὐ καλῶς *δίδχει* (c. 7. 1328 a 8), οὐ βέλδιον δέ (c. 10. 1330 a 6), οὐκ ἔστι δέ (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 9), οὐκ ἐμπίσταται δέ (6 (4). 16. 1300 b 34), etc.

29. τοῦτε, i. e. that it is the function of the master of the art to rule over unwilling, no less than willing, subjects.

30. τὸ ἢ πείσαι ἢ βιάσασθαι, which are the characteristics of rule over the unwilling, for they are the characteristics of despotic rule: cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 22, τὰς ἐν τῇ πολέμῳ *πλευραξίας ἀπάσας* (αἱ *μοναρχίαι*) *περιελήφασιν* καὶ γὰρ *παρασκευάσασθαι δυνάμεις* καὶ *χρῆσασθαι ταύταις*, ὥστε καὶ *λαθεῖν* καὶ *ὀφθῆναι*, καὶ τοὺς μὲν *χεῖραι*, τοὺς δὲ *βιάσασθαι* . . . μᾶλλον αἱ *τυραννίδες* τῶν ἄλλων *πολιτικῶν*, οἷα τ' εἰσιν. Plato contemplates the use of persuasion and force by the physician in Laws 720 D and Polit. 296 B (cp. Gorg. 4. 6 B), but perhaps

he would not dispute what Aristotle here says, that the function of the physician, *qua* physician, is not to persuade or coerce, but to heal (cp. Rep. 488, esp. D-E). Cp. also Athen. Deipn. 427 f sq.

32. ἀλλ' ἰοίκασι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 91, ἐν ἀμείλιστοις οἱ γενόμενοι μετ' ἐκείνους οὐκ ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ τυραννεῖν ἐπεθύμησαν, ἃ δοκεῖ μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν δύναμιν, πλείστον δ' ἀλλήλων ἐκχέριστα.

33. καὶ ὅπερ κ.τ.λ. Τοῦτο, the antecedent to ὅπερ, = τὸ ἄρχειν μὴ βουλομένων, οἱ τὸ δεσποτικῶς ἄρχειν. Cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 41 sqq.

36. ἄτοπον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 37, ἔστι γὰρ τι φύσει δεσποτόν, and 1. 6. 1255 b 6 sqq. Thus Aristotle urged Alexander to rule the Greeks ἡγεμονικῶς and the barbarians only δεσποτικῶς (Aristot. Fragm. 81. 1489 b 27 sqq.), perhaps remembering the advice of Isocrates to Philip (Philip. § 154, φησὶ γὰρ χρῆσθαι σε τοὺς μὲν Ἕλληνας εὐεργετῆν, Μακεδόνας δὲ βασιλεύειν, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων ὅς πλείστον ἄρχειν).

40. ἔστι δὲ θηρευτόν, sc. πρὸς τοῦτο, i.e. ἐπὶ θύτῃ ἢ θυσίᾳ, for as a rule only animals fit to be eaten were offered in sacrifice, though it is true that dogs were sacrificed to Hecatē and that some other exceptions to the rule occur (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 26).

41. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle no doubt has before him the State sketched in the Laws of Plato (704 C, ΑΘ. γέγωνε δὲ αὐτῆς πόλις ὅρ' ἔσται τις πλυσίων; ΚΑ. οὐ πάντ' διὰ καὶ κατακίχεται· παλαιὰ γὰρ τις ἐξοικεῖσις ἐν τῇ τόπῃ γενομένη τὴν χώραν ταύτην ἱερμον ἀπείργασται χρόνον ἀμήχανον ὅσον). The Islands of the Blest (to which Aristotle playfully compares his best State in c. 15. 1334 a 28 sqq.) lay far away from men: cp. Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 167,

τοῖς δὲ δίχ' ἀνθρώπων βίωσαν καὶ ἤδ' ἐπέσσαν
Ζεὺς Κρονίδης κατένασσε πατὴρ ἐς πέλαγα γαίης.

It was a situation of this kind that the Phacacians were taught by experience to seek out: cp. Hom. Odys. 6. 2,

αὐτὰρ Ἀδύνη
βῆ ῥ' ἐς Φαιήκων ἀνδρῶν δῆμον τε πόλιν τε,
οἱ πρὶν μὲν ποτ' ἴθαιον ἐν εἰρηχόρῳ Ὑπερίῃ,
ἀγχοῦ Κυκλώπων, ἀνδρῶν ὑπερμαρείων,
οἱ σφείας σινίσκοντο βίβηφι δὲ φέρτεροι ἦσαν.
ἴθην ἀναστήσας ἄγε Ναυσίβοας θεοαῖδε,
εἴσω δ' ἐν Σχερίῃ, ἑκάς ἀνδρῶν ἀλφειοτάων.

4. ἔσται. For the future cp. 2. 7. 1267 a 18, 2. 8. 1267 b 1325 a. 34 sqq., etc.

5. τοιοῦτον, i.e. πολέμιον.

ἐπὶ δὲ ἔστι κ.τ.λ., 'it is evident, then, that while all cares and studies with a view to war are to be considered noble, they are not to be so considered as being the highest end of all, but as existing for the sake of that end.' That they are not the highest end of all, or in other words that they do not constitute happiness, is evident because happiness is attainable by States in which they are not practised, and also because they are not the *ἔργον τοῦ πολιτισμοῦ* (1324 b 22 sqq.), whose end is to produce happiness. There were probably those who regarded 'cares and studies with a view to war' as the highest end of all; thus an admirer of the Lacedaemonians claims in Isocr. Panath. § 202 that gratitude is due to them, *ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ τοῦ ἀποφεισμένου εὐρέντος αἰνὰι τε χρεῖται καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις συμβάλλουσιν*, and explains in § 217 that he refers to τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν καθεστῶτα καὶ τὴν ἀσπασιν τῆς ἀφροσύνης καὶ τὴν ἐλπίσιν καὶ συνήθειαν τὴν περὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἐκτρέφουσιν. As to ἐπὶ δὲ ἔστι see critical note.

7. τοῦ δὲ νομοθέτου κ.τ.λ., 'and the good lawgiver's business is to see with respect to a State and a race of men and every other association how they are to share [not in conquest, but] in good life and the measure of happiness attainable by them.' Cp. Plato, Laws 631 B, where happiness is implied to be the end of laws, and Rep. 521 A, of τῆς ἐπὶ εὐδαιμονίας, οὗ χρεῖται, ἀλλ' οὗ δὲ τὸν εὐδαιμονίας πλοῦτον, (οὗτος δὲ ἄλλος τε καὶ ἑρμῆς). Γένος = ἔθνος, as in 2. 9. 1269 b 25 sq. (cp. Plato, Gorg. 483 D, τὸν ἀφροσύνης ἐν δόξῃ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ τοῖς γένεσιν). Aristotle keeps both *πολις* and *ἔθνος* in view here, because he has had both in view in his criticisms (1324 b 3 sqq.). It should be noticed that he regards the *ἔθνος* as a kind of κοινωμία. Ζαῖς ἐγδοῖς is emphasized by its position in the sentence: cp. Plato, Rep. 413 C, τοῦτο δὲ κοινωμία.

10. βούλει μέντοι κ.τ.λ., i.e. though this will always be the end at which he aims, the laws by which he seeks to attain it will differ according as his State has neighbours or not. If it has no neighbours, his laws will be less directed to the encouragement of military prowess than in the contrary case. For τὸν ταπεινότερον ἐννοεῖται cp. Plato, Laws 743 E, τὸν προσηγορευμένον ἀντιπάλιν νόμον.

11. καὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ., 'and it is the province of the legislative art, if the State has neighbours, to consider this, [not how to subjugate them all indiscriminately, but] what sort of studies should be practised in relation to each sort of neighbour, or how the State is to adopt the measures which are appropriate in relation to each of

its neighbours.' Τῆς νομοθετικῆς takes up τοῦ νομοθέτου τοῦ σπουδαίου. Πρὸς ποίους and πρὸς ἐκάστους are emphatic. The lawgiver should not lay down one indiscriminating rule, as the Lacedaemonian lawgiver had done, but rather a rule varying according to the character of the neighbours with whom the State has to deal. Ποία means πολεμικὰ ἢ εἰρημικὰ. We may infer from c. 14. 1333 b 38 sqq. that the lawgiver will teach his State to practise military studies in relation to aggressive neighbours or neighbours who deserve to be enslaved, but not in relation to others. Πῶς τοῖς καθέκαστοι πρὸς ἐκάστους χρηστέον is a wider inquiry than ποία πρὸς ποίους ἀσκητέον, and includes the whole subject of the action of the State in relation to its neighbours both in peace and in war, which of them should be ruled ἡγεμονικῶς and which δεσποτικῶς, how war should be waged with them, if they are Greeks (cp. Plato, Rep. 471 A sqq.), and other questions of the same kind. Aristotle evidently does not agree with Isocrates when he says that laws affect only the internal organization of States, and not their mutual relations (De Antid. § 79: see vol. I. p. 552).

14. ὕστερον, in c. 13. 1331 b 26 sqq. and c. 14. 1333 a 11 sqq.

19. τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχάς, so termed, as we see from 3. 6. 1279 a 8 C. 2. (where see note), in contrast to the ἀρχαί of the head of a household, a ship-captain, or a training-master, and the like, and also to priesthoods (6 (4). 15. 1299 a 18).

τε should follow not τὸν, but ἕτερον: for other instances of its displacement see Bon. Ind. 749 b 44 sqq. and above on 1259 a 13.

τοῦ ἐλευθέρου, cp. Diog. Laert. 8. 63, φησι δ' αὐτὸν (i.e. Empedocles) καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐλευθέρου γεγονέναι καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς ἀλλότριον, εἴ γε τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτῇ δεδομένην παρητήσατο, καθάπερ Πάνθος ἐν τοῖς περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγοις, τὴν λιτότητα δηλοῦντι πλέον ἀγαπήσας: Clemens, Strom. 2. 416 D (quoted above on 1324 a 27), Ἀναξαγόρας . . . τὴν θεωρίαν φάναι τοῦ βίου τέλος εἶναι καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ ταύτης ἐλευθερίαν: Plut. De Exil. c. 12, οὕτω τῆς φιγῆς πρὸς ἐν μέρος τὸ ἀδοξον ἐντεταμένους παρρηῶνας τὴν ἀπραγμοσύνην καὶ τὴν σχολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.

20. With τοῦ πολιτικοῦ supply βίου, as with τοῦ δεσποτικοῦ in 24.

21. οἱ δὲ τοῦτον Ἀριστον, sc. εἶναι νομίζουσιν.

ἀδύνατον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Gorgias may probably have used this argument. Aristotle is of the same opinion: cp. 1325 b 14 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1095 b 32 sqq.

22. τὴν δ' ἐδραγίαν κ.τ.λ., so that one who does nothing cannot be happy. Cp. Phys. 2. 6. 197 b 5, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξις τις

εὐπραγία γάρ, and Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 14, where *εὐδαιμονία* is said to be often defined as *εὐπραγία μετ' ἀρετῆς*.

24. οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ κ.τ.λ. Τοῦ ἀποτρέφου = the man who avoids political offices. Cp. Isocr. Epist. 6. § 11, ἐπὶ γὰρ αἰσχροτέρους ὁ βίαιος εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ βελτίους ὁ τῶν ἀποτρέφου καὶ ὁ τῶν τυραννεύοντων, a proposition in favour of which Xenophon often makes Hiero argue (e.g. in Hiero 1. 2, 7 sqq.).

25. οὐδὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Ἡ ἐστὶν αὖτε ἡ περὶ τῶν δουρατῶν is implied to be the function of ὁ δουρατῶν (cp. 1. 7. 1255 b 33 sqq.: 3-4 1277 a 33 sqq.).

27. τὸ μέντοι τυραννέειν κ.τ.λ. It is apparently implied that those who rejected political office regarded all rule as despotic, yet in c. 2. 1324 a 35 sqq. they are said to have distinguished between despotic and constitutional rule.

28. οὐ γὰρ θαύτω κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 14. 1333 b 27 sq.

30. ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, in 1. 7. 1255 b 16 sqq. This reference to the *πρῶτοι λόγοι* might well be taken to show that the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books do not fall within them, were it not that a similar reference occurs in 3. 6. 1278 b 17 sq., a chapter which certainly seems to form part of the *πρῶτοι λόγοι* (see vol. ii. p. xxi).

32. ἐπὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and further the actions of the just and temperate have in them the perfect realization of many things that are noble': cp. Plato, Tim. 90 D, ἀρμόσονται δὲ τῶνδε ἔχον τοῦ προτεθέντος ἀθρόοντος ἐπὶ θεῶν ἀρίστου βίαι, and Epinomis 985 A, θεῶν μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὸν τῶνδε ἔχοντα τῆς βίαις μέγας ἔξω τούτων εἶναι, λόγους τε καὶ ἡθάρη. Παλλῶν καὶ καλῶν τῶνδε ἔχουσιν stands in contrast to οὐδὲν μετρίχου τῶν καλῶν (26).

34. καίτοι τόχ' ἐν κ.τ.λ. The tyrant Jason is here alluded to (see vol. i. p. 237, note 1). A saying of his is mentioned in Rhet. 1. 12. 1373 a 25 (cp. Plut. Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 24 and De Sanitate Tuenda, c. 22), δὲν ἀδικεῖν ἐστὶ, δυνεῖ δύναιτο καὶ δικαιοὺς πολλὰ ποιῶν, which no doubt referred to the acquisition of a tyranny. Jason was a great admirer of Gorgias (Pans. 6. 17. 9), and it is possible that Gorgias' praises of the practical and political life may have influenced him. Be that as it may, Aristotle evidently fears that his own identification of *εὐδαιμονία* with τὸ εὖ πράττειν (for this is what he means by τούτων οὕτω διακρίσεων, cp. 1325 b 14 sq.) may lead some one to the same conclusion as Jason, but he hastens to explain that absolute power does not bring with it τὸ εὖ πράττειν, except in the hands of one who is as superior to those he rules as

a master is to his slaves (1325 b 3 sqq.). Aristotle does not dispute that political power makes it easier to do noble things (cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 a 32 sqq.), but then political power must not be out of proportion to the worth of its possessor.

36. *πλείστον καὶ καλλίστων* ... *πράξων*. This takes up *πολλὸν καὶ καλὸν*, 32.

δοτε οὐ δᾶ κ.τ.λ. Susemihl reads *ε* conj. δᾶν for δᾶ, but cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 5, where the *indirecta oratio* is similarly abandoned, though Aristotle is describing the views of others. In the Phoenissae of Euripides Eteocles, who has deprived his brother Polyneices of his share of the Kingship, or Tyranny, of Thebes, refuses to give up the Tyranny to him, and Aristotle no doubt has his famous speech in his memory. He says (470 sqq. Bothe, 504 sqq. Dindorf).

ἄνθρωπε δὲ Διότρε' φίλον πρὸς ἀνελπίδι
καὶ γὰρ ἔγχεθι, δουρεὶς δὲ ἑρῶσαι τῷδε,
τὴν θεῶν μεγίστην δοτ' ἔχων τυραννίδα.
τοῦτ' οὐδὲν τὸ χρηστόν, μήτερ, οὐχὶ βούλασμα
ἄλλο παρὶσι μάλλον ἢ σῆξω ἐμεῖ.

38. καὶ μήτε πατέρα παῖδων κ.τ.λ. This reads as if Aristotle were quoting from some solemn covenant for the establishment of a tyranny: compare the oath taken in support of Drusus in Diod. 37. 11, τὸν αἰὲν φίλον καὶ πατέρα ἡγήσασθαι Δρούσην, καὶ μήτε βίον μήτε τίςτις καὶ γένειοι μὲνδεμιᾶς φείσασθαι ψυχῆς, ἐὰν (μὴ) συμφέρον Δρούσην τε καὶ τοῖς τὸν αἰὲν ἔσται ἡρόσμεται. Polybius (7. 8. 9) dwells with emphasis, and perhaps with a little surprise, on the loyalty of Gelon to his father Hiero II, tyrant of Syracuse.

39. ὅλος, 'broadly,' not only fathers and children (who are one kind of friends), but friends of all sorts.

As to *ἐπαλογίζων* see critical note.

πρὸς τοῦτο, 'in comparison with this': cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 8. 1108b 16, αἱ μέντοι ἔξω πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις υπερβαλλούσι, πρὸς δὲ τὰς υπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσι.

1. τὸ τῶν ὄντων αἰρετότατον, i.e. τὸ εὖ πρέπουσιν. Isocrates had 1325 b, called *τυραννίς* in Evag. § 40 τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὄντων and τῶν θεῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μέγιστον καὶ σεμνότερον καὶ παραμεινέμεν.

2. ὑποτίθεται τοῦτο ψεῦδος, 'in assuming this as the foundation of their argument they assume what is false.'

3. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ κ.τ.λ. The reply of the Chorus to the speech of

Eteocles referred to above on 1325 a 36 (Eurip. *Phoenissæ*. 492 sq. Bothe: 526 sq. Dind.) is perhaps present to Aristotle's memory:

οὐκ οὐ λέγων χρεὶ μὴ 'αἰ τοῖς ἔργοις καλῶν
οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τοῦτ', ἀλλὰ τῇ δυνάμει.

Compare also the remark of Plato to Dionysius the Elder quoted above on 1288 a 4, Hdt. 3. 142, and Eurip. *Fragm.* 172.

7. τοῖς γὰρ ἑρσίοις κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 16. 1287 a 10 sqq. Τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον is an expression which frequently recurs: cp. Plato, *Gorg.* 484 A, ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρεὶ ἔχω, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, and *Laws* 854 C, ὡς δεῖ τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια πάντα δοῦναι τῷ νόμῳ.

10. διὰ κἄν ἄλλος τις κ.τ.λ. This takes up and corrects 1325 a 36 sqq. Aristotle perhaps remembers the saying of Aristides when he surrendered his day of command at Marathon to Miltiades (*Plat. Aristid.* c. 5, καὶ παρ' ἡμέραν ἐπίσταντο στρατηγῶ τὸ κρείσσον ἔχοντες, ὡς περιῆλθεν εἰς αὐτὸν ἡ ἀρχή, παρῶντος Μιλτιάδεω δαδόντων τοὺς σωτήρας ὅτι τὸ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς οὐ φρονέουσιν οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ συμφέρον ἐστι καὶ σωτήριον). Aristides behaved in just the same way to Themistocles also, serving under him willingly and accepting the second place in the State (*Plat. Aristid.* c. 8: *Aristid. et Cat. inter se comp.* c. 5).

κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναντον τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων, 'in virtue and in the power which is capable of effecting the best things': cp. *Eth. Nic.* 1. 10. 1099b 31, πρακτικὴς τῶν καλῶν. Some take τῶν ἀρίστων after κρείσσων and as masc., 'superior to the best men,' but not, I think, rightly. For ἀρετὴ καὶ δύναμις see above on 1284 a 6. The repetition of κατὰ may be for the sake of emphasis (κατὰ is not repeated in 3. 13. 1284 a 9, δυνάμει τοσούτων κατ' ἀρετὴν ὄντες καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν). That Aristotle attaches importance to the presence of both qualifications is evident from 13 sqq. Compare the effect of the repetition of prepositions in 3. 11. 1281 b 15, περὶ πάντα δῆμον καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος, and in 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 4, οὐκ ἐν Μαντινίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἰστρῷ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεσι συμβέβηκεν.

11. For the repetition of τοῦτον see notes on 1317 b 5 and 1284 b 28.

12. δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but [if a man is to be followed and obeyed as a sovereign,] he should possess, etc. So in 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq. Aristotle requires of those who are to hold the more important magistracies that they shall possess not only virtue, but δύναμις μεγίστη τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς and attachment to the

existing constitution. Compare Callicles' description of *oi κρείττους* in Plato, Gorg. 491 A sq.

15. *εὐπραγίαν*. Aristotle uses both *εὐπραγία* and *εὐπραξία*: 'in Attic prose *εὐπραγία* was preferred' (Liddell and Scott).

16. ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Two separate assertions are here made—(1) that activity is not necessarily in relation to others, and (2) that it is not necessarily a means to something else, but that thoughts which are an end in themselves may be of an active type. The first of these two assertions does not seem to be quite in harmony with the spirit at any rate of Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 a 30 sqq., but still we gather from Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 31 sqq. that there is an use of virtue not *πρὸς ἕτερον* but *καθ' αὐτόν* (*τελεία δ' ἐστὶν* (sc. ἡ ἀληθὴς δικαιοσύνη), *ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτόν*). The second of them clearly conflicts with De An. 1. 3. 407 a 23, *τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρακτικῶν νοήσεως ἐστὶ πέρατα* (*πᾶσαι γὰρ ἑτέρου χάριν*), *αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαὶ τοῖς λόγοις ὁραῖαι ὀρίζονται*. But Zeller has already remarked (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 368. 1: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 400, note 1) that Aristotle sometimes uses the word *πρᾶξις* in the Nicomachean Ethics in a wider sense than usual, and includes even pure thought under it—e. g. in Eth. Nic. 7. 15. 1154 b 24, *ἐπεὶ εἴ τοι ἡ φύσις ἀπλὴ εἴη, ἀεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται*, where he must refer in *ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις* to contemplative activity.

17. *καθέπερ οἴονται τυχεῖς*. Aristotle probably refers to the persons whose opinion is stated in 1325 a 21 sqq., for they appear to have held that a man who lives a contemplative life does nothing and is not *πρακτικός*. Epaminondas was regarded at the outset of his career as *ἀπράγμων* because he was a philosopher, and was consequently despised (Plut. Pelop. c. 5).

18. For the severance of *ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν* from *τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν*, on which it depends, compare c. 4. 1326 b 8, *ὁ πρῶτον πλῆθος ἀδυνάμεις πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν*, where *κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν* is similarly severed from *πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν*. As here *πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν*, so in the passage before us *τῶν ἀποβαινόντων χάριν* is emphasized by its position in the sentence. Cp. also Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 179, *τὰ ἐξεργηθέντα ἐκ τῆς χάρας ἐρὰ ἀγῶματα ὑπὸ τῶν Περσῶν*.

20. *θεωρίας καὶ διανοήσεις*, cp. c. 2. 1324 a 19, *τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας*.

21. *ἡ γὰρ εὐπραξία κ.τ.λ.*, 'for doing well is the end, and there-

fore there is a kind of action which is the end, [so that there is nothing strange in thoughts which are an end in themselves being active,] and we predicate action also [as well as thought] in the truest and fullest sense, even in the case of actions done in relation to others, of those who as master-agents direct action by their thoughts, [and whose thoughts are therefore more an end in themselves than those of the journeymen they direct].’ Τῶν ἐξουσιῶν πρῶτον is in the gen. after ἀρχαίους. For καὶ πρῶτον (i.e. πρῶτον as well as διανοεῖσθαι), see above on 1255 a 14, καὶ βιάσθαι. That the thoughts of a master-agent are more an end in themselves than those of a subordinate, we see from Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 14, ἐν ἐαυτοῖς δὲ (ταῖς τέχναις) τὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων τῶν τέλῶν ἐστὶν αἰετύτερα τῶν ἐκ’ αὐτῶν τούτων γὰρ χεῖρ εἰσὶν αἰετὰ δύνανται. In 21–23 Aristotle corrects Plato, who in Polit. 259 C, E had identified πρακταὶ with χειροτεχνεῖς, and had said that the ἀρχαίους is γνωστικός, not πρακτικός (XE. τῆς δὲ γνωστικῆς μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς χειροτεχνικῆς καὶ οὖτοι πρακτικῆς βούλει τὸν βασιλέα φῶμεν αἰετύτερον εἶναι; and XE. καὶ γὰρ ἀρχαίους γε πᾶς οἷα αὐτοὶ ἐργατικός, ἀλλὰ ἐργῶν ἄρχων. NE. 10. καὶ XE. παρεχόμενος γὰρ τοῦ γνῶσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ χειροτεχνίας. NE. 10. οὐτοί. XE. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ μετέχω ἐν λόγῳ τῆς γνωστικῆς ἐν στήθεϊ). In Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 24 sqq., however, the word πρακτικός is used in the narrower sense in which Plato had used it in the Politicus, for here ἡ ἀρχαίοντι φρόνησις is marked off from another kind which is said to be πρακτική (cp. Eth. End. 1. 6 1217 a 6, τῶν μὲν ἐχόντων μῆτι διανοεῖσθαι δύνανται ἀρχαίοντι καὶ πρακτικῶν). For ἡ γὰρ εὐπραγία τέλος, ἐστὶ καὶ πρᾶξις τις, cp. Phys. 2 6. 197 b 5, ἡ δ’ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξις τῆς εὐπραγίας γάρ, and De An. 3. 1 426 a 27, αἱ δ’ ἡ συμφωνία φωνῇ τίς ἐστιν.

23. ἀλλὰ μὲν κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle, after proving the second of the two assertions contained in 16 sqq. (οὐδὲ τὰς διανοίας κ.τ.λ.) takes up and proves the first of them (τὸν πρακτικὸν οἷα ἀνεγκλῆτον εἶναι πρὸς ἑτέρον). States situated by themselves have already been said not to be necessarily unhappy (c. 2. 1324 b 41 sqq.), and now they are shown not to be necessarily inactive.

25. οὐτοί, i.e. καὶ αὐτοὶ and not πρὸς ἑτέρον.

ἐνδύχεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., ‘for this also [as well as other things] can take place by sections [and not alone between whole States].’ Τοῦτο = τὸ πρᾶττον. For καὶ τοῦτο cp. c. 4. 1326 a 13, καὶ πόλιν. For κατὰ μέρος cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 27 sqq. Among the ‘other things’ referred to rule would be included, for it was a familiar fa-

that rule might be exercised by successive sections of the citizen-body (1325 b 7 sq.).

26. πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It is implied that, if there are *συνάσεις* ('relations') between the parts of the State, activity will exist. We may suppose that when the parts of the State have relations with each other, inter-action results or co-operative action or both. What is meant here by the expression 'the parts of the State'? Among the parts referred to are probably rulers and ruled: cp. c. 4. 1326 b 12, εἰσὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις τῆς πόλεως τῶν μὲν ἀρχόντων τῶν δ' ἀρχομένων, and c. 14. 1332 b 12, ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀρχομένων.

27. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. Τοῦτο = τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἀρκεῖν τὸν (ἢ καὶ αὐτὸν προηρημένον. For ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τινας, cp. De Interp. 3. 16 b 13 and Anal. Pr. 2. 22. 67 b 28.

28. σχολῇ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for otherwise God and the whole universe [could hardly be active, and so] could hardly be well circumstanced [which all agree that they are], seeing that they have no actions external to them over and above their internal actions.' That God is well circumstanced we see from De Caelo, 2. 12. 292 a 22, *τοῦτο γὰρ τῷ μὲν ἄριστον ἔχοντι ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι ἀπὸ πράξεως*. The universe consists according to Aristotle of concentric spheres with the earth in the centre (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 447 sqq.: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 487 sqq.), and God, who is an incorporeal being distinct from the universe, is outside its outermost sphere, so far as an incorporeal being can be said to be in any particular place. He is the First Mover of the universe, but he moves it passively, as the object of love (Metaph. A. 7. 1072 b 3, *κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον*); he does not act upon it otherwise. Action is not to be predicated of him (Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 b 8 sqq.: De Caelo, 2. 12. 292 a 22 sq., quoted above); at least not action in the ordinary sense of the word, for it would be beneath him; his only activity is thought, and as his thought must be exercised on what is best, it must be exercised on himself (Metaph. A. 9. 1074 b 33, *αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κρείττον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόσις νοήσεως νόσις*). Acts of thought exercised by God on himself, therefore, are the *αἰεταὶ πράξεις* ascribed to God in the passage before us. But if God has no *ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις*, neither has the universe, for in Aristotle's view there is but one universe in existence (De Caelo, 2. 8. 276 a 18 sqq.: Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 446 sq.—Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 485 sq.); there is nothing corporeal outside the universe,

and therefore nothing on which it can act. Plutarch maintains the opposite view, arguing for a plurality of worlds, in *De Defect. Orac.* c. 24, *οὐκ οὐδ' ἐκτὸς ἔργου θεῶν καὶ κόσμου, πρὶς οὗ καὶ χρεῖται (ὁ θεὸς) τοῖς κακοῦσι ἀρεταῖς, οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὶς αὐτῷ οὐδὲ μέρος αὐτοῦ χρεῖται ὡς διακοσμήτης ἢ χεῖρας ἢ χρηστέοντος, ἀλλὰ πρὶς ἑαυτοῦ.* For *ὁ θεὸς καὶ πῶς ὁ κόσμος* cp. Plato, *Laws* 821 A, *τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον.* For the contrast here of *αἰετίας* and *ἐξουσιᾶς* cp. *Eth. Nic.* 5. 3. 1129 b 33, where *ἐν τοῖς αἰετίαις* stands in opposition to *ἐν τοῖς πρὶς ἔργον*: cp. also Plato, *Rep.* 521 A, *αἰετίας δὲ καὶ ὅθεν ὁ τοσούτος κόσμος.*

32. *τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*, = *τοῖς πολιταῖς*, cp. c. 4. 1326 a 6, where *τῶν ἀνθρώπων* corresponds to *πολιτῶν*, c. 4. 1325 b 40, and also Isocr. *Archid.* § 81, *οὐ γὰρ μεγάλα τῆς πόλεως οὐδὲ τῆς ἐλπίδος τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, and *Thuc.* 6. 18. 7.

C. 4. 33. *περὶ αὐτῶν*, cp. *Eth. Nic.* 6. 4. 1140 a 2, *παντοίῳ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξουσιᾶς λόγῳ.*

34. *καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας κ.τ.λ.* This would seem to refer to the contents of the Second Book: cp. 2. 1. 1260 b 29, *καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκεψάμεθα πολιτείας.*

37. *οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε κ.τ.λ.* Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 39, *οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἀποκρίνῃ καὶ διακρίνῃ πολλὰς χωρτίας ὑποκρίναι μένος.*

38. *καὶ οὕτως κ.τ.λ.* See above on 1265 a 17, where the same remark occurs. We read in Plato, *Rep.* 456 C, *οἷα ἀπὸ ἀδύνατά γε οὐδὲ εὐχαις ἔρπον ἀνορθοποιῶνται*, and in Demosth. c. *Timocr.* c. 68, *οὐ γὰρ οὐδὲ καλῶς μὲν εἶναι, καὶ δυνατὸν δὲ πὶ φράζειν, εὐχῆν, οὐ γὰρ, διακρίνεται' ὅν τ' ἔργον*, and these passages agree with that before us in implying that men often pray for impossibilities: yet *εὐχῶν δυνατά* is one of the Precepts ascribed to the Seven Wise Men in the Collection of Sosiades (*Stob. Floril.* 3. 80: *Mullach, Fragm. Philoa. Gr.* 1. 217). *Προὔπορευθῆναι* is middle; the perfects *τέθειμαι*, *ἐντέθειμαι* are used more commonly in a middle than in a passive sense (see *Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective*, pp. 635, 636). The reason of this is, as Richards points out, that *αἰεῖσθαι* is used in their place to express the passive.

39. *λέγω δὲ οἷον περὶ τοῦ ἐλπίδους πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας*, sc. *καὶ πολλὰ προὔπορευθῆναι, εἶναι μέντοι μᾶλλον τοῦτων ἀδύνατον.* Plato, who begins the construction of his State in the *Laws* (737 C sqq.) with arrangements respecting these matters, had in Aristotle's opinion (2. 6. 1265 a 10 sqq.) fixed the number of the citizens at an impossibly high figure.

40. *Σωφ γὰρ κ.ε.λ.* Cp. Plato, Laws 709 C sq. (which Aristotle probably has before him), and Xen. Hipparch. 6. 1, *ὅλλε γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τοις ἀνθρώποις οὐκ ὁ βέλτερος, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἔστι τοις ἀνθρώποις ὑπερτερὸν αἶμα ἢ τοῦ βέλτερος τοῦ γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος γρηγορὸς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ ἔξ ἀδελφοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ὅτι αἶμα ὑπερτερὸν ἔστιν αἰ φιλίας τοῦ ἔχοντος τοῦτο κ.ε.λ.*

4. tu malakunā ni tu repalāy. See note on 1274 b 36.

1526 a.

ἡ ἀνὰ δὲ α.ε.λ., 'and under the head of political equipment falls first [for consideration] the body of men composing the State, how many and what sort of men they should be by nature,' etc. Compare the similar sentences in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 4, *ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τοὺς τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πολιτικῆς συνθέσεως διαφορὰς, πόσους τε ἀνθρώπους, καὶ αἰῶνα χρόνον α.ε.λ.*, and 4 (7). 16. 1334 b 30-32. *Πολιτικὴ χρομή*, 'the equipment necessary to a State' (answering to τὸ αἰῶνος ἄρ., 4), is different from the equipment necessary to an individual, but both are the gift of Nature and Fortune (c. 13. 1331 b 40 sqq.: 1332 a 29 sqq., 39 sqq.: 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 27 sq.). Nature supplies men possessing the needful qualities of body and soul (1332 a 40 sqq.), and Fortune supplies external and bodily goods (c. 1. 1323 b 27 sq.). *Τὸν ἀνθρώπου* = *πολιτικῶν*, 1325 b 40, and *τὸν πολιτευομένων*, c. 7. 1328 a 17. Aristotle is not here concerned with the number or quality of the slaves of the State or of its metoeci. As he says that the question of the characteristics of the men and the territory is the *first* which needs consideration under the head of 'political equipment,' we infer that there are others which need consideration, and what are they? Probably the questions which arise as to the subsidiary classes of cultivators and artisans; these are dealt with in cc. 8-10. *Τὸς* in 6 seems to belong both to *πόσους* and to *ποιούς*, and *τοὺς* in 8 both to *δορυ* and to *ποῖον*, cp. c. 7. 1328 a 17, *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτευομένων, πόσους τε ὑπάρχονας δεῖ καὶ ποίους τοὺς τῆς φύσεως, ὅτι δὲ τῆς χώρας πόσων τέ τῶν καὶ ποῖον τοῦτο, δαίρμεναι σχηθεύει*, and c. 10. 1329 b 38, *καὶ πόσων τοῦτο χρὴ καὶ ποῖον εἶναι τῆς χώρας* (so apparently Bonitz, Ind. 533 a 59 sqq.). For *κατὰ τὴν χώραν*, 7 ('in connexion with the territory'), cp. Oecon. 1. 3. 1343 b 7, *τῶν δὲ περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ κατὰ γυναικῶν πρώτη ἐπιμελεῖται*. 'Οσσην, 7, is probably right: see Stallbaum's note on Plato, Crito 48 A, and cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 18, *τῇ δὲ ἐργασίᾳ τε προβέβαλε πεφροτιστάμενος δαίμονα ἀποκρίσεις, ὡς ὅστις ἀριστος ἐν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἢ ποῖα τις ἢ τοῦδε πράξει*, and Herondas 2. 28, *ὅστις ἐστὶ καὶ ποῖον Περὶ τοῦ πεφύργμεν*. Ma P¹ have *ἀνδρῶν*, not *πόσων*, in 1328 a 18.

8. οἴονται μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has before him Plato, *Laws* 742 D, ἔστι δὲ τοῦ τοῦν ἔχοντος πολιτικοῦ βούλησις, φασί, οὐχ ἥτις αὐτοὶ πολλοὶ φαίεν, δεῦν βούλεσθαι τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην δε μάλιστα τε αὖτις τὴν πόλιν, ἢ τοῦν εἰ νομοθετοῖ, καὶ ὁ τι μάλιστα πλουσιώ: cp. also *Rep.* 460 A, where there may be an allusion to the name of Megalopolis founded in B.C. 369 shortly before the time when many think that the Republic saw the light. See also *Rep.* 423 A sq. (referred to by Eaton) and *Laws* 737 D.

11. τῶν ἐνοικοόντων, 'of the inhabitants,' not merely of the citizens, so that according to these authorities a city would be *μεγαλή* which included a large number of slaves, metoeci, and aliens.

12. δεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ. Cp. *De Caelo*, I. 5. 271 b 11, τοῦτον δ' αἶτιον ἐστὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ διαίρει μείζων ἢ μείζονα, and *Xen. Anab.* 7. 7. 36, οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶν ὁ ἐρίζων τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἀλγύν, ἀλλ' ἡ δύναμις τοῦ τε ἀποδιδόντος καὶ τοῦ λαμβάνοντος. Eucken (*De Partic. Usu*, p. 32) remarks that δὲ in *eis δὲ δύναμις* is used in the same sense as ἀλλὰ, and compares *Metaph.* E. 3. 1061 a 23, μὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λέγου, τοῦ ταυτοταίου δὲ εἰδού, and *De An.* I. 5. 409 b 28.

13. καὶ πᾶσι, 'of a State also [as well as of other things]': cp. c. 3. 1325 b 25, καὶ τοῦτα.

18. οὐ κατὰ κ.τ.λ., 'it is not in respect of any and every multitude that we must do so.' For κατὰ τὸ τευχὲς πλεόν cp. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 26 and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 11 sqq. It is evident from what follows that Aristotle counts βάραντοι here among δοῦλοι, just as he does in 3. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq. Camerarius (*Interp.* p. 279) has already referred to the story told of Agesilaus by Plutarch in *Ages.* c. 26. The allies of the Lacedaemonians had contrasted the large number of troops which they contributed to the army of Agesilaus with the small number of the Spartans, and Agesilaus by way of reply ordered all the potters, smiths, carpenters, masons, and other βάραντοι τεχνῖται in his army to stand up successively. Nearly every man in the contingent of the allies stood up, but not a single Spartan, and Agesilaus remarked, with a smile, ἔπειτα, ὁ ἀνὴρ, ὅσῳ πλείονας ἡμῶν στρατιώτας ἐπέμπερον ἡμεῖς. Aristotle may remember this story.

ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This would be especially the case in a State like that which Aristotle is constructing—a State in which the citizens are not allowed to practise handicrafts or to till the soil. It would also be the case in a State like that of Plato's *Laws* (848 A). But even in actual Greek States *ἑῶν* were numerous.

Many handicraftsmen were *ξῶν* (3. 5. 1378 a 7). *ξῶν* were especially numerous in seaports (4 (7). 6. 1327 a 11 sqq.), but even at Sparta there were *ξῶν* (Plut. Agis, cc. 8, 10), not merely slaves. The rapid development of the arts and of commerce in ancient Greece was largely due to the ease with which its chief cities drew metoeci and other *αἰῶν* from the Greek colonies in Asia and elsewhere and from Asia generally (see as to Sidonian residents in Athens Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, p. 157). Many of these metoeci were skilled craftsmen. Asia and probably Egypt were to some of the arts of ancient Greece what Italy was to those of mediæval Europe. Italy, indeed, did not supply metoeci to the ruler nations to the same extent. Even at the present day 'in Roumania commerce and industry are in the hands of foreigners, principally Jews, the upper classes being landed proprietors' (*Times*, March 18, 1897).

19. *δοῦλον ἀμφότερον πολλῶν*. Here, as in 2. 7. 1366 b 10 sqq., *ἀμφότερα* takes the place of *ἐκείνα*. So in *Phys.* 6. 7. 237 b 33 *τῷ ἐκείνῳ τῶν μαρίων* = *τῷ ἀμφότερῳ τῶν μαρίων* (Bon. Ind. 603 a 41).

20. *ἀλλ' ὅταν κτλ.* *Καὶ ἐξ ἧς συνίσταται πόλις αἰεὶ μαρίων* is added to explain in what sense *δοῦναι πόλιν αἰεὶ μαρίων* is used. It is implied in what follows that hoplites are *αἰεὶ μαρίων τῆς πόλεως* (cp. c. 9. 1329 a 37, *μήν δὲ τῆς πόλεως τό τε ἐκτετατοῦ καὶ βουλευτικοῦ*, and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq.), but not *βόσκουσιν*, who are here contrasted with hoplites, though it is clear (see above on 18) that they often served as hoplites.

23. *ἐξέφρασαν*. Aristotle probably remembers the description of the Egyptian Thebes in *Horn.* II. 9. 383,

*αἱ δ' ἐκτετατοὶ εἰσι, διπλοῦν δ' αὖ ἐκείναι
ἀνέρες ἐκχυροῦσι σὺν ἱπποσὺ καὶ ἔχουσιν,*

and perhaps also *ἐκτετατοῦ* in the story of Agesilaus related above on 18.

24. *ὃ γὰρ ταῦτόν μὲν αὖτε τε πόλις καὶ πολυπλοκάμωνος*. For the use of *τε*, compare c. 10. 1329 b 1, *καὶ τό τε μέγιστον ἔτερον αἶμα καὶ τό γενομένον*.

25. *ἀλλὰ μὲν . . . γε*, 'but certainly,' as elsewhere. *Καὶ τοῦτο*, 'this also,' i. e. that not only is a populous State not necessarily a large one, but that a very populous State cannot easily be a well-ordered one. And a State which is not well-ordered is only a State in name (3. 9. 1280 b 5-8).

27. τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν κ.τ.λ. 'Αναμένειν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος, 'set free in the direction of number': cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 10, διαφθείροντες ἅμα τοῖς ἡδέσι τὰ σώματα πρὸς πῶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀναμένα καὶ πληρομένη. Carthage must have been an exception, unless we suppose its citizen-body to have been smaller in Aristotle's day than it afterwards became (see vol. ii. Appendix B). As to the Lacedaemonian State, cp. Isocr. Archid. § 81, where Archidamus is made to say, τῶν Ἑλλήνων διατρέχαμεν οὐ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς πόλεως αἰδῶ τῷ πλῆθει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ., and as to Athens, which was in the contrary plight, De Antid. § 172, διὰ γὰρ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνοικούντων οὐκ εὐεύστατος ἐστὶν αἰδῶ ἀκριβῆς κ.τ.λ.

29. ὁ τε γὰρ νόμος τάξις τίς ἐστι. 'Id etiam conversum posuit libro tertio' (3. 16. 1287 a 18), 'ὃ γὰρ τάξις νόμος' (Camerarius, Interp. p. 280).

32. θείας γὰρ δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'for surely this' (i.e. the ordering of a great number of things) 'is [beyond the power of man and] is the function of divine power, which is such as to hold together even the vast universe in which we live; the beautiful, in fact, [which is closely allied with order,] is commonly found in connexion with a given number and magnitude.' For *θεία δύναμις* Bonitz (Ind. 324 a 1) compares the spurious De Mundo, 6. 397 b 19. Aristotle clearly has before him Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 22, ἀλλὰ θεός γε τοὺς δαί ὄντας καὶ πάντ' ἐφορεύσας καὶ πάντα διατάμειν, οἱ καὶ τῆρθε τὴν τῶν ὅλων τάξιν συνέχουσιν ἀκριβῶς καὶ ἀγέλατον καὶ ἀταράκτερον καὶ ὑπὸ ἀλλοῦ καὶ μεγέθους ἀδιήγητον, τοίτους φοβούμενοι μήποτε ἀσαφὲς μηδὲν μηδὲ ἀόριστον μήτε ποιήσῃτε μήτε βουλευσῃτε: cp. also Plut. Dion, c. 10, πρὸς τὸ θεϊκώτατον ἀφομοιωθεὶς παράδειγμα τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀλλιστων, ὃ τὸ πᾶν ἡγουμένην πευθόμενον ἐξ ἀκοσμίας κόσμος ἐστί, and for τοὺς δαί πᾶν, Plato, Polit. 269 C, τὸ γὰρ πᾶν τοῦτο τοῖ μὲν αὐτοῖς ὁ θεὸς ἐννοεῖται παρεῖναι καὶ συγκυλεῖ, τοῖ δ' ἀνθρώποις, and Gorg. 508 A, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμος καλεῖται. Συνέχειν is used as equivalent to ἐννοεῖν in De An. 1. 5. 410 b 10, ἀπορήσκει δ' ἂν τις καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐννοεῖν αὐτὴν (i.e. τὰ στοιχεῖα): ὡς γὰρ ἔχει τὰ γε στοιχεῖα κυριώτατον γὰρ ἔχειν τὸ συνέχειν ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, and τὸ μίαν ποιῖν in De An. 1. 5. 411 b 6 sqq.: cp. Polyb. 11. 19. 3. Aristotle probably regards God as holding the universe together passively by being the common object towards which everything strives: see above on 1325 b 28. That the beautiful is closely allied with order we see from Metaph. M. 3. 1078 a 36, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἶδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὁρισμένον: cp. Plato, Phileb. 64 E, μετρίτης γὰρ καὶ

συμμετρία πολλὰς ἀρετῶν καὶ ἀρετῇ συνεχεῖ συλλαβεῖν γίγνεται (both passages already quoted by Estlin). Vict. compares with the passage before us Poet. 7. 1450 b 34, ἐν δ' ἀρετῇ τὸ πολλὸν καὶ ἥκιστα καὶ ἄνω πρῶτον δ' οὐκ ὀλίγον ἐκ τούτων οὐ μόνον ταῦτα τετραγώνια δεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγας ὑπόχρον μὴ τὸ τοῦδε τὸ γὰρ πολλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν, and Eth. Nic. 4. 7. 1123 b 6, ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοφυΐα, ὥστε καὶ τὸ πολλὸν ἐν μεγάλῃ οὐρανεῖ, αἱ μὲν δ' ἀρεταὶ καὶ σύμμετροι, καὶ δ' αἱ.

34. καὶ καὶ πόλις κ.τ.λ., 'hence a State also,' as well as other things. For the 'nominativus pendens' πόλις, see Bon. Ind. a. v. Anacoluthia, where 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 9 sqq. is referred to among other passages, and see Stallbaum on Plato, Cratylus 403 A, ὁ δὲ 'Αἰ. γ, αἱ πόλεις μὲν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐνταλασφύονται τὸ ἀντὶ προστιθέμεν τῇ οὐρανῇ τοῖς, and Riddell, Apology of Plato (Digest of Idioms, § 271 b), who quotes among other instances Theact. 173 D. and Rep. 565 D-E. Cp. also De Gen. An. 4. 1. 765 b 31 sqq. and De Part. An. 3. 8. 671 a 12 sqq., and see Vahlen on Poet. 4. 1449 a 19. Bekker and Sus. have πόλις in place of πόλις, but all MSS. except Γ M^s have πόλις, and there can be little doubt that πόλις is right, for this 'nominativus pendens' is a not uncommon form of anacoluthon.

ἔς κ.τ.λ., i.e. ἔς ἄρας μὲν μεγέθους δ' ὀλίγοις ἄρας ὑπόχρον. Cp. 1326 b 23, οὐδὲ ἐστὶ πόλις ἄρας ἄρας. So in 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 15, ἀλλ' ὁ τόπος καὶ μὴ βουλομένης the words τόπος ἐστὶ are to be supplied. See also note on 1279 b 38. 'Ὁ ὀλίγοις ἄρας is the standard of not being too large to be well-ordered.

35. ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τι κ.τ.λ., 'but in fact [apart from questions of beauty and good order] there is a due measure of size for a State also, as well as for everything else.' Not only will too large a State fail of being well-ordered and beautiful, but it will fail also to be able to discharge the function of a State and to realize self-completeness in respect of good life, and the same thing may be said of too small a State likewise. Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 29, τοῦ δὲ σπουδαίου πλείονος πλείονος κατ' ἀμείβαν, ἡ ἐστὶ τι μέγαν καὶ φιλικὸν πλείονος, ὥστε πόλις; ὥστε γὰρ ἐκ δέου ἀνθρώπων γίνεσθαι ὡς πόλις οὗτ' ἐκ δέου μυριάδων ἐστὶ πόλις ἐστίν: De Gen. An. 2. 6. 745 a 5, ἐστὶ γὰρ τι πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴων πείρας τοῦ μεγέθους, καὶ καὶ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐξέσεως: De An. 2. 4. 416 a 16, τῶν δὲ φύσει συνεστασμένων πείρας ἐστὶ πείρας καὶ λόγος μεγέθους τι καὶ εὐξέσεως: De An. Motione, 3. 699 a 34, ἐστὶ γὰρ τι πλείονος ὀλίγοις καὶ ἀνείκελος καὶ ἢ μὲν τὸ μέγαν,

ὥστερ καὶ καὶ ἢ καὶ τὸ κοινόν: Plat. Sympos. 5. 5. 1, καὶ γὰρ συγκοινωνία μέγεθος ἰκανὸν ὂντα, ἔχου αὖ συμπόσιον ὁμοῖον μέγεθος αὖ δὲ ὑπερβαλὺς δὲ πλεονέξας, ὡς μοῖναι προσήγγον ἑαυτῷ καὶ συμπόσιον αὖτα τοῖς φιλοφροσύναις καὶ γούργας, οὕτω συμπόσιον ὂντα. Compare also Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 21-35. As to ἔργον, see I. 8. 1256 b 35 sq. We note that a State is distinguished by Aristotle from an ἔργον. It is not a mere ἔργον πρὸς ἀγαθόν (as for the individual, but a moral being like the individual, only nobler and greater than he (Eth. Nic. I. 1. 1094 b 7 sqq.).

39. ὑπερβαλόντων ὂντα τῆς φύσεως. Compare such expressions as ἐξίστασθαι τῆς φύσεως (Meteor. 4. 11. 389 b 10, φθορὰς καὶ ἐξοτάρματα τῆς φύσεως) or χαρίζεσθαι τῆς φύσεως (Meteor. 4. 1. 379 a 14), which stand in contrast to ἔχειν τὴν φύσιν (Poet. 4. 1449 a 15, ὡς ἔχει ἡ τραγῳδία τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν).

41. δοῦν σταδίον, cp. Poet. 7. 1451 a 2, αὖ αὖ μοῖναι σταδίων αἶψα (ἔργον).

eis 24 π. μέγεθος ὁμοῖον, 'but when it has assumed a measured size.' Cp. Meteor. 1. 14. 352 a 6, ἐκαστοῦ γὰρ αὖ τῶν ἐργον αἶψα eis τὸ καλὸν ἔχειν.

1326 b. 2. ἢ μὲν ἐξ ὁλίγων λίαν αἰα ἀνέστηκε. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 11 sqq., where the view expressed by the Platonic Socrates in Rep. 369 D, αἶψα δ' αὖ ἢ γὰρ ἀναγκασιότατα πῶς αὖ τετάρτων ἢ πάντων ἀνέστη, is corrected.

3. ἢ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν ἔργον κ.τ.λ. A πῶς consisting of too large a number of citizens is not a πῶς because a πῶς is a συνορία πολέων πολέων (3. 3. 1276 b 1), and a constitution cannot easily exist in a very large πῶς, for magistrates cannot easily exist in it, and a constitution implies the existence of magistracies (6 (4). 1. 1289 a 15, πολεὺς μὲν γὰρ ὂντα τῶν πῶσιν ἢ περὶ τὸ ἀρχεῖν, τίνα τρέπον νεύματα). It seems to be implied that the constitution is the source of 'completeness in respect of good life.' Aristotle's argument here throws some light on his reference to Babylon in 3. 3. 1276 a 27 sqq., where it is implied that Babylon covered too large a space to be one city. He would probably also say that its inhabitants were too numerous to possess a constitution or to be marshalled by a general. When he says that an ἔθνος possesses only 'completeness in respect of necessities,' is he speaking of ἔθνη composed of πῶσιν (see note on 1261 a 27), as well as of ἔθνη composed of villages? As to Aristotle's account of the ἔθνος something has already been said in vol. i. p. 39. We should have been glad if he had told us more on the subject (see note on 1274 b 34 sqq.).

The *ἔθνος* appears to be a *κοινωνία* (cp. 4 (7). 2. 1325 a 8, *πῶς καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν*): it has *νόμιμα* or *νόμοι* (4 (7). 2. 1324 b 9 sqq.); it is bound together not only by internal trade and by united action against external foes, but also by intermarriage and common sacrifices; it is often ruled by a King, and may even have an Absolute King at its head (3. 14. 1285 b 31 sq.), but it is too large to have a constitution—we must suppose that the word 'constitution' is here used in a sense exclusive of Kingship—apparently because it is too large to be controlled by common magistrates (cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 40). We may conjecture that in Aristotle's view the members of an *ἔθνος* have not that desire to promote the virtue of their fellows which is to him one distinguishing mark of a citizen (3. 9. 1280 b 1 sqq.). An *ἔθνος* is, in fact, rather a *συμμαχία* and something more than a *πολιτικὴ κοινωνία*.

7. διὰ κ.τ.λ. Here again, as in 2, the Platonic Socrates is corrected (see above on 2). Cp. c. 8. 1328 b 16 sq. and 2. 2. 1261 b 12. Take *πρὸς τὸ εἶ. ἔν κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν* together (see note on 1325 b 18). *Κατὰ* seems to mean 'in connexion with': cp. c. 2. 1324 a 15, *ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως (βίος) ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ξενικὸς καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀποκαλυμμένος*. For *τοσοῦτον* followed by *εἰ*, see above on 1267 a 24.

9. ἐνδέχεται δὲ κ.τ.λ. *Μεῖζω* is bracketed by Schneider, Bekker², and Susemihl, but it appears to be correct: cp. De Gen. An. 4. 4. 771 b 33, *ἀλλ', ὥσπερ καὶ τελουμένων τῶν ζῴων ἴστω ἐκείνου τι μέγεθος καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἥλαττον, ἐν οὗτ' ἂν μείζον γένοιτο οὗτ' ἥλαττον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ μεταξύ διαστήματι τοῦ μεγέθους λαμβάνουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἥλειψιν, καὶ γίνεται μείζων ὁ δ' ἥλαττον ἀνθρώπος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτιοῦν, οὕτω καὶ κ.τ.λ.* A man must be of a certain minimum size, if he is to be a man at all; if he exceeds that minimum and does not exceed the maximum, he is a larger man; if he exceeds the maximum, he ceases to be a man. The same thing, we are told in the passage before us, holds of the *πόλις*.

11. ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, in 1326 a 34 sqq.

14. ἀρχόντος δ' ἐπίταξις καὶ κρίσις ἔργον. *Κρίσις* here refers especially to judicial decisions (cp. τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων in the next sentence). In the similar passage, 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 25 sqq., on the other hand (*μάλιστα δ' ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀρχὴς λεγέσθαι ταύτας, ὥσπερ ἀποδίδονται βουλευέσθαι τε περὶ τῶν καὶ κρῖναι καὶ ἐπιτάττειν, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιτάττειν ἀρχικώτερόν ἐστιν*), *κρῖναι* does not refer to judicial decisions, for here Aristotle is speaking of *ἀρχαί* in

a sense exclusive of τὸ δικαστικόν, of which he treats in another chapter of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (c. 16).

πρὸς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικῶν seems to be given as an instance of αἱ τῶν ἀρχόντων πράξεις, and τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς διαίρειν αὐτ' ἀξίαν as an instance of αἱ τῶν ἀρχόντων. Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, Laws 738 D, *ἔσται δὲ . . . φιλοφρονεῖσθαι τε ἀλλήλους μετὰ θυσιῶν καὶ οἰκειώσεως καὶ γυμνάζεσθαι, ὃ μῆζον εὐδὲν πόλει ἔγχαθ' ἢ γυμνῶν αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς εἶναι* ἔπου γὰρ μὴ φῶς ἀλλήλους ἰσθὶν ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς τρέποις, ἀλλὰ σκότος, ὅτ' ἐν τμητῇ τῇ ἀξίᾳ ὅτ' ἀρχῶν ὅτε δίκαι πορί τις ἐν τῇ προσηκούσῃ ἑρῶς τυγχάνει: cp. also Laws 751 D and 766 E. Dr. Johnson says of the lairds' courts in the Highlands of Scotland (Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland, Works, 8. 320)—'When the chiefs were men of knowledge and virtue, the convenience of a domestic judicature was great. No long journeys were necessary, no artificial delays could be practised; the character, the alliances, and interests of the litigants were known to the court, and all false pretences were easily detected.' See also vol. i. p. 314, note 3. In *de sensu rōtis* μὴ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers to Athens, for though in addressing an Athenian audience Hyperides says (Pro Lycophr. col. xii. 5, ed. Blass), *λαθεῖν γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ἐμπέρεον οὐκ ἐστὶν ὅτε πομπῶν ὅτε εὐδύνων τῶν ἐν τῇ[ι] πόλει ὅτε ἐν[ι] ταῖς*, Isocrates describes Athens in *De Antid.* § 172 as too large to be ἐνδύνοστος (cp. Thuc. 8. 66. 3, already referred to by Eaton). Still even at Athens owing to the publicity of men's life in ancient Greece fellow-citizens knew each other far better than they do in a modern city of the same size: see Haussoullier, *Vie Municipale en Attique*, p. 179 sq., who however goes too far when he says, 'tout se savait, tous se connaissaient à Athènes.' It is, indeed, difficult to understand how even in a citizen-body of (say) 5,000, with all the help derivable from frequent festivals, every citizen could be known, either personally or by repute, to his fellows. Yet Aristotle seems to imply that the citizens of a State ought to be acquainted with the character of every member of their body, if not with his person. The experience of the United States fully confirms the view of Plato and Aristotle that where fellow-citizens are not well acquainted with each other's characters, offices will not be well filled. 'In moderately-sized communities men's characters are known, and the presence of a bad man in office brings on his fellow-citizens evils which they are not too numerous to feel individually. . . . In large cities the results are different because the

circumstances are different' (Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, Part 3, c. 62). 'City governments begin to be bad when the population begins to exceed 100,000 and includes a large proportion of recent immigrants. They are generally pure in smaller places, that is to say, they are as pure as those of an average English, French, or German city' (ibid. Part 3, c. 67: vol. ii. p. 521, ed. 1. See also c. 61, vol. ii. p. 435). Aristotle would, of course, think a citizen-body even of 100,000 ten times more numerous than it ought to be. As to London, compare a remark made by a member of the County Council of London at its first meeting. 'Provincial corporations could easily proceed to elect aldermen, because in the provincial towns persons knew all about each other, but it was quite different in the metropolis' (*Times*, Feb. 1, 1889).

20. *ἐν δὲ ξένοις καὶ μετοίκαις κ.τ.λ.* This frequently happened at Athens. The register of citizens was kept by the deme: 'l'assemblée du dème est peu fréquentée; c'est un petit nombre de voix qu'il faut acheter, et quelques drachmes suffisent: ici cinq drachmes par tête, ailleurs peut-être moins encore.' See Hanssoullet, *Vie Municipale en Attique*, p. 32 sqq., who refers to Demosth. in Eubulid. c. 59, *οἷται γὰρ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, βουλευόμενοι τινὰς ἀνθρώπους ξένους πολίτας γενέσθαι, Ἀναξιμένην καὶ Νικίστρατον, κοινῇ διακειμήμενοι πέντε δραχμὰς ἕκαστος προσδίδεσθαι*. Those whose names got upon the register in this or in other unlawful ways were called *παρέγγραστοι*. The larger the State was, the less check there would be on the registering authority. The Attic demes of Halimus, Sunium, and Potami, all of them on the coast, were especially credited with a readiness to admit aliens to the register (Hug, *Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum*, p. 32). It will be noticed that Aristotle speaks only of aliens and metoeci, not of slaves.

22. *δηλον τοῖον κ.τ.λ.* See vol. i. p. 314.

24. *εὐσύνετος* must apparently mean 'easily within the view of the magistrates and the citizens' (cp. 14 sqq.).

26. *Παραπλησίως δὲ κ.τ.λ.* 'Similarly,' because Aristotle has just C. 5. said that the larger the State is, the better, if only it is *εὐσύνετος*, and now he goes on to say that the most self-complete territory is the best, and one which is large enough to support its citizens in a life, not temperate only, but temperate and liberal, though it must be *εὐσύνετος* (1327 a 1). *Διταρυστάτην*, 27, takes up

αὐτάρκειαν, 24. For τὰ περὶ τῆς χώρας, cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 23, τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων. We more often have the acc. after περὶ in phrases of this kind in the Politics.

περὶ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For περὶ in the sense of 'quod attinet ad,' see Vahlen on Poet. 23. 1459 a 16, who quotes Rhet. 1. 15. 1375 b 21 καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν νόμων οὕτω διωρίσθω περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων, μάρτυρές εἰς δικτοί, and Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 29. With ποῖαν τινά supply δὲ εἰς τὴν χώραν. In his preference for a territory as self-complete as possible Aristotle follows Plato, Laws 704 C, ΑΘ. τί δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς χώρα; πότερα πάμφορος ἢ καὶ τῶν ἐπιδηΐς; ΚΑ. σχεδὸν οὐδενὸς ἐπιδηΐας and Critias 110 E, and also Solon (Hdt. 1. 32, ὥσπερ χώρα οὐδεμὴ καταρτίζει πάντα ἑαυτῇ παρέχουσα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο μὲν ἔχει, ἐτέρου δὲ ἐπιδηΐας ἢ δὲ ἂν τὰ πλείστα ἔχῃ, ἀρίστη αὐτῇ). Hesiod, indeed, had already said of the just (Op. et Dies, 236),

θάλλουσιν δ' ἀγαθοῖσι διαμπερές οἶδ' ἐπὶ νῆων
νίσσονται, καρπὸν δὲ φέρει ζειδωρὸς ἄρουρα,

with which Virgil's lines (Ecl. 4. 38 sq.) may be compared,

Cedet et ipse mari vector, nec nautica pinus

Mutabit merces: omnis feret omnia tellus.

Thessaly was famed for the variety of its produce; it was rich in corn and wine and timber, and in pasture for horses cattle and sheep (Bursian, Geographie von Griechenland, 1. 47); Cyprus was rich in corn, wine, oil, timber, and copper (Strabo, p. 684). We read of the χώρα πάμφορος of the Tyrrhenians in Diod. 5. 40; and of the νῆσος εὐδαίμων καὶ πάμφορος of Sardinia in [Aristot.] I Mir. Auscult. 100. 838 b 22. Isocrates speaks of Egypt in Busi § 12 as πλείστα καὶ παντοδαπὰ φέρειν δυναμένη. Messenia (Eurip. Fragm. 1068) and Laconia (E. Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 218) were remarkable for the variety of their produce. All these were fertile regions, but there were countries which were at once πάμφορος and rugged, and it is a territory of this kind that Plato prefers (Laws 704 D). Aristotle would hardly follow him in this. He would hardly be satisfied with a territory like the Attic, which comprised much poor land (Plut. Solon, c. 22), though it is called παμφορωτάτη by Xenophon (De Vect. 1. 3: cp. Plato, Critias 110 I and Antiphanes, Fragm. Ὀμώνυμοι: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 98). The main reason which leads both Plato and Aristotle to prefer a πάμφορος territory is that in a State possessing such a territory importation and exportation are reduced to a minimum, and consequently also the commercial class. States with a barren territory

have often in the history of the world been forced to become commercial in order to exist—e.g. Aegina (above on 1258 a 34), Phocaea (Justin, 43. 3. 5), Elea (Strabo, p. 252). As to Chios see note on 1291 b 20. Much of the territory of Corinth was infertile, and this helped to make her a commercial State (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 516). 'It was on a bare rock surrounded by deep sea that the streets of Tyre were piled up to a dizzy height' (Macanlay, Hist. of England, c. 24). As to Venice see H. F. Brown, Venice, p. 251. 'Nuremberga, cuius agro nihil magis sterile fieri potest, omnium tamen Germaniae urbium populosissima et opificum multitudine florentissima putatur' (Bodinus, De Republica, p. 518). The word *παντοφόρος* appears to be extremely rare: *πάντοφορος* is common enough.

30. *πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγέθει κ.τ.λ.* With *τοσαύτην* we should probably supply, not *πῶς τις ἀν' ἐκταύσει*, but *δεῖ εἶναι* as with *περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ποίαν τιμῆς*, 26 (cp. c. 11. 1330 a 41 sqq.). See 2. 6. 1265 a 28—38, where the same standard is adopted, in correction of Plato, Laws 737 D, *γῆς μὲν ὁπόση πόσους σάφρονας ὄντας ἱκανὴ γράψαι*. Yet Plato's language in Critias 112 C, *τὸ μέσον ὑπερηφανίας καὶ ἀνελυθερίας μεταδιώκοντες κοσμίως φιλοδομοῦντο ἀκρίτους*, is quite in the spirit of that of Aristotle here. Aristotle does not wish the citizens of his 'best State' to live either like the people of Myconus, who were charged with stinginess (Cratin. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 6: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 175), or like the Boeotians, of whom the comic poet Eubulus said (Meineke, 3. 222),

*κίττε Βοιωτῶν πόλις
ἀνδρῶν ἀρίστων ἐσθίειν δὲ ἡμέρας.*

See also vol. i. p. 316, note 1. For the use here of *πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει*, cp. c. 6. 1327 b 3, *περὶ δὲ πλήθους ἥδη καὶ μεγέθους τῆς δουλείας ταύτης*. We have *μείζων καὶ πλείων* used in a somewhat similar way in Meteor. 2. 5. 363 a 15, *ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τὸν τόπον εἶναι πολλὸ πλείων ἐκείνων καὶ ἀναπεπταμένον μείζων καὶ πλείων καὶ μᾶλλον ἀλευρὸς ἀνεμος ὁ ὅστις ἐστὶ τοῦ βορείου*, and in Aen. Poliorc. c. 8, *προσδεχόμενον πλείων καὶ μείζον δύναμιν πολέμιον*. Σχολάζοντας, 31, 'though at leisure.'

33. *ὑστερον*. This is one of the promises of future investigations which are not fulfilled in the Politics as we have it (see vol. ii. p. xxvii sqq.).

περὶ κτήσεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας. *Καὶ* is explanatory, *καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας* being added to make it clear in what sense *κῆσις* will be dealt with. *Κρήσις* has been dealt with from

another point of view in 1. 8. 1256 a 1 sqq. Compare what Plato says on the subject in Rep. 591 D sq. For τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 3, προσόδων εὐπορίας, and Isocr. Panath. § 7, τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον εὐπορίας. See also below on 1327 a 8, τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης.

35. πῶς δεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτὴν, 'how and in what way it should stand to the use made of it': cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 99, εὐπορία δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τις πρὸς τὰς ἐν τῇ βίῳ χρήσεις οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥστε καὶ φίλους εὖ ποιῆσαι καὶ φιλοτίμως καὶ εὐπόρως ἀπολαιτουργῆσαι, and Xen. Hiero. 4. 8, οὐ γὰρ τῇ ἀριθμῷ ὅτε τὰ πολλὰ κρίνεται ὅτε τὰ ἱκανά, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις ὥστε τὰ μὲν ὑπερβάλλοντα τὰ ἱκανά πολλά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἱκανῶν ἀλλείποντα ὀλίγα. For πῶς καὶ τίνα τρόπον, cp. Phys. 8. 5. 257 a 31, ὥστε τοῦτο σκεπτικῶς λαβοῦσιν ἄλλην ἀρχήν, εἰ τι κινεῖ αὐτὸ αὐτό, πῶς κινεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον: Hippocr. De Capitis Vulneribus, vol. iii. p. 356 Kühn, χρὴ δὲ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν τὸν τετραμμένον ὅπως ἔπαθε καὶ τίνα τρόπον: Plato, Laws 964 D, πῶς οὖν δὴ καὶ τίνα τρόπον, ὃ ξίε, ἀπεικάζοντες αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον τοῖς λέγομεν; and Polyb. 1. 32. 2, πῶς καὶ τίνα τρόπον γέγονεν, and 2. 31. 7, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον τῇ τρώπῃ: see also Stallbaum's note on Plato, Laws 681 D, οὕτω τε καὶ ταύτῃ. Αὐτὴν is added to τὴν χρῆσιν to contrast 'the use itself' with τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν: cp. c. 13. 1331 b 24, περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, where 'the constitution itself' is tacitly contrasted with matters preliminary to the constitution and not falling within it. Vet. Int. wrongly refers αὐτὴν to τῆς περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εὐπορίας, translating 'qualiter oportet habere et quo modo ipsam ad usum.'

36. πολλαὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for there are many disputes on the subject of this inquiry, arising because of those who,' etc. For ἔλαυν ἐφ' ἑκατέραν τὴν ὑπερβολήν, cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 22, ἐλαυνουσιν εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν, and Plato, Laws 890 A, ἐλαύνων πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν ὁρῶν βίον. Should τὴν χρῆσιν be supplied with ἐλαυντας? On the side of γλισχρότης were the Pythagoreans (see a fragment of Aristophan in Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 362, and fragments of Alexis, ibid. 3. 474, 483), the Cynics (Diog. Laert. 6. 8 *sub fin.*: 6. 25: Diog. Cynicus, Fragm. 273 Mullach), and writers like Ephorus (see above on 1265 a 30), to say nothing of the lawgivers of Sparta (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 5 sq.: Plut. Lycurg. c. 17) and Crete (2. 10. 1272 a 22); while on the side of τρυφή were Aristippus (Diog. Laert. 2. 68, 69, 84) and others (vol. i. p. 301, and p. 302, note 1: also p. 199, note 1).

39. τὸ δ' εἶδος τῆς χώρας κ.τ.λ. Wyse, followed by Sus.⁴, is

probably right in placing *δεῖ δ' ἔτι*—*ἐμπείροις* in a parenthesis and making *ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* dependent on *εἰπεῖν*. Τὸ εἶδος τῆς χώρας, 'the character of the territory,' i.e. its geographical character, as distinguished from the character of the soil, which has been dealt with in 1326 b 26—30. Cp. Plato, *Laws* 625 C, τὴν γὰρ τῆς χώρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσιν ὁράτε, ὥς οὐκ ἔστι, καθάπερ ἡ τῶν Θετταλῶν, πεδιάς, and 834 C.

δεῖ δ' ἔτι κ.τ.λ., 'and we must be guided in respect of some matters by the opinion also of those who are experienced in questions of generalship [as well as that of those who look especially to the supply of commodities, the subject which has just been before us].' Aristotle may probably have before him the work of Aeneas Tacticus entitled *Στρατηγικὰ βιβλία* or *περὶ τῶν στρατηγικῶν ὑπομήματα*, of which we possess a part in the *Commentarius Poliorceticus* of Aeneas (see below on 1331 a 16): cp. c. 8, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰς τὴν χώραν προσδιδόμενον πλεῖα καὶ μείζω δύναμιν πολεμίων πρῶτον μὲν τὴν χώραν δυσείσβολον τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ δυσστρατηγέδοντον καὶ δυσπόρυντον κατασκευάζειν καὶ τοὺς ποταμοὺς δυσδιαβάτους καὶ δύσπλους, and c. 16. 16 sqq. Aristotle learns something from generals in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 16 sqq. as well as here.

40. *ὅτι χρή μὲν τοῖς πολεμίοις εἶναι δυσέμβολον, αὐτοῖς δ' εὐέξοδον*. Compare what is said of the city in c. 11. 1330 b 2 sqq. and 1331 a 3 sqq. Egypt (see vol. i. p. 316, note 2, and Strabo, p. 819) and Persis (Plut. *Alex.* c. 37) were difficult of access to foes, and Socrates claimed (vol. i. p. 316, note 2) that Attica was so, but Laconia is probably especially present to Aristotle's mind, for it was *δυσεμβολωτάτη* (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 24: Eurip. *Fragm.* 1068: see Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, 2. 217, 311). Boeotia, on the contrary, lay comparatively open to the foe (Plut. *Reg. et Imp. Apophth.* Epaminond. 18. 193 E, καὶ τὴν χώραν ὑπτίαν οὖσαν καὶ ἀναπεταμένην πολέμου ὁρήστραν προσσηρόρευεν, ὥς μὴ δυναμένους κρατεῖν αἰτίας, ἀν μὴ τὴν χεῖρα διὰ πόρπακος ἔχουσι), and of Elis we read in Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, 2. 6, 'No region of the Peloponnese is less protected against attacks from without. A broad river-valley leads, like an open entrance-road, from the interior into the midst of Elis; the mountains at the back of the territory afford little protection, because they are only the lower ranges of higher mountains. The level coast-line offers the easiest of approaches from the North and the South; the plains and the villages are exposed on all sides to landings from a hostile fleet.' That a country might be at once

hard of entrance to foes and easy of exit for friends we see from Plato, *Laws* 761 A, *δύσβατα δὲ διὰ πάντα πρὸς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, τοὺς δὲ φίλους ὁ τι μάλιστα εὐβάτα, ἀσθράτους τε καὶ ὑπογυγίους καὶ βουκίρμας, ὁδὸν τε ἐπιμελουμένους* κ.τ.λ. Another characteristic which the territory should possess, but which is not noticed here, is that it should be such as to favour the unity of the State (7 (5). 3-1303 b 7 sqq.). *Χρὴ τοῖς μὲν*, not *χρὴ μὲν τοῖς*, is the logical order, but '*μὲν* interdum non ei additur vocabulo, in quo vis oppositionis cernitur' (Bon. Ind. 454 a 20): see above on 1268 b 12.

1327 a. 2. οὕτω καὶ τὴν χώραν, sc. εὐσυνέστην εἶναι δεῖ.

3. τῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν θέσιν κ.τ.λ. The recommendation that the territory should be well within reach for purposes of protection leads on naturally to the question as to the site of the city. This question is here dealt with only so far as the position of the city with reference to the territory and the sea is concerned; other matters come up for consideration in c. 11. 1330 a 34 sqq. The city should be placed where it will be readily able to protect the territory and to receive supplies of commodities. For both purposes it must be near the sea, yet it must also be well situated with respect to the territory. Whether Aristotle's opinion was known to Alexander when he founded Alexandria in B.C. 332, it is impossible to say, but at any rate the site of this city in many respects fulfilled Aristotle's requirements. Cp. Strabo, p. 798, τῆς δ' εὐκαρίας τῆς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τὸ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ὅτι τῆς Αἰγύπτου πύλης μόνος ἐστὶν οὗτος ὁ τόπος πρὸς ἄμφω πεφυκὸς εἶναι, τὰ τε ἐκ θαλάσσης διὰ τὸ εὐλίμενον, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς χώρας ὅτι πρῶτα εἰμαρῆς ὁ ποταμὸς περὶ τὴν συνάγειν τε εἰς τοιοῦτον χάριν ὡς ἐπὶ μέγιστον ἐμπόριον τῆς αἰουμένης ἐστί. (No doubt Aristotle would not rejoice in the greatness of Alexandria as an emporium or in its close contiguity to the sea.) Some cities had the fault of being at a great distance from their territory (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 32 sqq.). In not a few cases part of the territory was cut off from the city by mountains (this was the case with the Thyrean territory of Argos and the Lepreate territory of Elis), or by an arm of the sea (as when island cities held territory on the adjacent mainland). On the other hand, there were cities like Sparta, which were too far from the sea. Sparta is probably especially present to Aristotle's mind in 1327 a 3-27. It was evidently in his opinion not situated so well either for the protection of its territory or for the transmission of produce from its territory, as it would have been if it had been nearer to the sea.

Nor was it (18 sqq.) easily within reach of rescue by sea or capable of striking a blow by sea, nor could it well receive by sea commodities lacking to it or send away by sea its surplus produce. The cities of Elis and Messene were also too far from the sea. Cp. Polyb. 2. 5, ταύτας γὰρ αἰετὶ τὰς χώρας (i.e. τῆς Ἠλείας καὶ τῆς Μεσσηνίας) Ἰλλυριοὶ πορθοῦντες διετίλουν διὰ γὰρ τὸ μῆκος τῆς παραλίας καὶ διὰ τὸ μεσογαῖον εἶναι τὰς δυναστευούσας ἐν αὐταῖς πόλεις μακρὰ καὶ βραδείαι λίαν ἐγίνοντο τοῖς προσηρημένοις αἱ παραβοήθαι πρὸς τὰς ἀποβάσεις τῶν Ἰλλυρίων, ὅθεν ἀδεῶς ἐπείτρεχον καὶ κατίσχυον αἰετὶ ταύτας τὰς χώρας. In Aristotle's view the ideal site for a city was one which placed it in easy communication with both land and sea. Rome, according to Cicero (De Rep. 2. 5. 10), was marked out for empire by a position of this kind, and much the same thing may be said of London. We learn, indeed, from c. 11. 1330 a 34 sqq. that a city should be in easy communication, not only with its own territory and with the sea, but also with the mainland on the verge of which it lies. Such was the situation of Athens: cp. Xen. De Vect. 1. 7, καὶ μὴν οὐ περιρρυτός γε οὖσα (ἡ Ἀττικὴ) ὁμοῦ ὥσπερ τῆς πύσιν ἀνέμοις προσάγεται τε ὡς δέεται καὶ ἀποπέμπεται ἡ βούλευσις ἀμφιβάλλαντος γὰρ ἐστί. καὶ κατὰ γῆν δὲ πολλὰ δέχεται ἐμπόρια· ἡπειροὶ γὰρ ἐστί. Aristotle evidently prefers the site of Athens to that of Sparta, and indeed to those of most other Greek cities. It is easy to see from 1327 a 3—27 that Greek cities at a distance from the sea, and especially those whose communications with the coast were difficult—such cities, for instance, as Tegea and Mantinea—were neither very secure from foes nor very well supplied with commodities, and that cities immediately on the coast—and most Greek colonies were thus situated—tended to become denationalized and disorderly owing to the multitude of aliens which flocked to them, and also to suffer an increase in the number of their citizens not conducive to efficient government. In this matter as in others Aristotle favours a mean; the city should be neither on the sea nor too far from it.

4. πρὸς τε τὴν θάλατταν κ.τ.λ. For the order of the words cp. c. 11. 1331 a 12 sqq. and c. 16. 1335 b 5 sqq. 'Te . . . τε, ut apud omnes prosarios, apud Aristotelem quoque raro in usum venit' (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 16, who gives as another instance in the Politics c. 10. 1329 b 2 sq.).

5. εἰς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὁρος. We expect μὲν οὖν in place of μὲν, but cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 19, εἰς μὲν τρόπος διδασκαλίας ἦν αὐτῷ οὗτος τοῦ

παρίνας' ἄλλος δὲ κ.τ.λ., and Thuc. 2. 97. 2, τὰ μὲν πρὸς θάλασσαν τοσαύτη ἦν.

7. ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς κ.τ.λ., i.e. ὁ δὲ λοιπὸς ὅρος ἐστὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι εὐπαρακόμιστον κ.τ.λ. I follow the punctuation of Jackson, Welldon, and Sus. The fact that Athens lay near the coast must have greatly facilitated and cheapened the transport to it of the produce of its territory, and especially the transport of heavy commodities like timber, stone, marble, and metals.

8. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and further, of material for timber and for any other industry of the kind that the territory may possess.' Aristotle passes from τῶν γενομένων καρπῶν, γ, to commodities like wood, stone, and metals which are ἀκαρπα μὲν χρήσιμα δέ (I. II. 1258 b 27 sqq.: cp. Xen. De Vect. 1. 5, ἵσται δὲ καὶ γῆ ἢ σπειρομένη μὲν οὐ φέρει καρπόν, ὀρυττομένη δὲ πολλαπλασίους τρέφει ἢ εἰ σίτον ἔφερε). Attica was rich in marble and silver (ibid. 1. 4 sq.). For ἐργασίαν, cp. Thuc. 4. 105, κτήσιν τε ἔχειν τῶν χρυσείων μετάλλων ἐργασίας ἐν τῇ περὶ ταῦτα θέρει. For τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης, cp. 1326 b 34, τῆς περὶ τὴν εἰσίαν εὐπορίας, and Top. 2. 7. 113 a 31, διὰ γὰρ τῆς περὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἰσθήσεως τὴν ἐν ἑκάστῃ μορφῇν γινώσκοντες, and see Bon. Ind. 579 b 43 sqq.

- C. 6. 11. Περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κοινωνίας κ.τ.λ. The persons referred to here held that nearness to the sea was prejudicial to orderly government in two ways—(1) it involved the residence in the city of aliens bred up under other laws and likely to exercise an unfavourable moral influence on the citizens; (2) it involved the existence of a very numerous citizen-body, inasmuch as the numbers of the citizen-body would be swollen by a body of merchants, who, it is taken for granted, would be citizens. (That the word πολυανθρωπία refers to the number of the citizens appears from 1327 b 7-9, where it is explained that in Aristotle's 'best State' there will be no πολυανθρωπία in connexion with the oarsmen of the fleet, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς μέρος εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πόλεως.) Aristotle contends, on the contrary, that nearness to the sea does not necessarily involve either of these results. The city might be placed at a little distance from the sea and might possess a port on the coast, whose inhabitants might be restrained from free communication with the inhabitants of the city; and this port should be a small port, intended for the supply of the needs of the members of the State, not of those of the world in general. Who were the critics whose views are here controverted? Possibly Plato is referred to, but this is not certain, for though he objects

to nearness to the sea in Laws 704 D sqq. (see Stallbaum on this passage, who refers to Cic. De Rep. 2.3.5 sqq., and cp. Laws 949 E sq., 952 D sqq.) on account of the risk of evil influences from aliens, he does not object to it on the ground of its involving *πολυαθροσία*. In all probability the views here controverted were those of persons oligarchically inclined. That *πολυαθροσία* is unfavourable to good government we have already seen (c. 4. 1326 a 25 sqq.). Many Greek cities were much exposed to the influence of aliens. Byzantium was overrun with them (Aelian, Var. Hist. 3. 14: cp. Athen. Deipn. 526 c), and at Agrigentum in its palmy days, if we may trust Diodorus (13. 84. 4), there were 180,000 aliens, while the citizens numbered somewhat more than 20,000. Haussoullier (*Vie Municipale en Attique*, p. 189) shows how foreign worships were instituted at the Peiræus by aliens for their own behoof, and some of these probably spread to the citizens. We know that the seaports of Dundee and Leith were the channels through which the Reformation found its way into Scotland. "The knowledge of God," says Knox, "did considerably increase within the realm; and this was chiefly effected by merchants and mariners belonging to Dundee and Leith," who imported the reformed doctrines from abroad' (*Academy*, Feb. 11, 1893). That contact with aliens might have ill results, we see from Cic. De Leg. Agrar. 2. 35. 95; *Carthaginienses fraudulentum et mendacem non gentem, sed naturam loci, quod propter portus suos multis et variis mercatorum et advenarum sermonibus ad studium fallendi studio quaestus vocabantur*. Contact with aliens even of a satisfactory type might well affect the fidelity of the citizens of a Greek State to its traditions, and many of the aliens who crowded to Greek seaports were Asiatics of a type the reverse of satisfactory. The people of Epidamnus found that those of their citizens who had much communication with their Illyrian neighbours became demoralized (Plut. Quaest. Graec. 29, *γυρομένους ποτηρούς*). We read of the Spartan Callicratidas in Diod. 13. 76. 2, *οὗτος δὲ νέος μὲν ἦν πατερός, ἀνακός δὲ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπλοῦς, οὐκ οὖν τῶν ξενικῶν ἡθῶν πεπειραμένος, δικαίτατος δὲ Σπαρτιατῶν*. Machiavelli in his Discourses on the First Decad of Livy (1. 55) ascribes the integrity and piety of the Germans of his day in part to the fact that 'they have never had much commerce with their neighbours, being seldom visited by them and seldom going abroad themselves, but live contented with the food and clothing that are the product of their own country, thereby preventing

all opportunities of evil conversation that might corrupt their manners.' It should be noticed that the argument here reproduced by Aristotle assumes that aliens did not take up their abode in inland cities; this does not, however, seem to have been invariably the case, for we hear of metoeci at Thebes (Diod. 17. 11 : Lys. Or. 23. 15) and under the name of *πάρουσι* at Thespieae (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 294. 1). Indeed, Aristotle himself speaks in c. 4. 1326 a 18 sqq. as if a body of aliens and metoeci was a necessary appendage to every Greek State.

15. γίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., sc. τὴν πολυκαθροῦσιν. With *διατρέπτους καὶ δεχομένους ἐμπόρων πλῆθος* Bonitz (Ind. s. v. *διατρέπτειν*) compares De Part. An. 4. 5. 681 a 28, ἔχει δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ζῆον δύο πόρους καὶ μίαν διαίρεσιν, ἥ τε δέχεται τὴν ὑγρότητα τὴν εἰς τροφήν, καὶ ἥ πάλιν διατρέπτει τὴν ὑπολειπομένην λιμνὴν.

18. μὲν οὖν appears to be answered by δέ, 32.

ταῦτα, i. e. τὸ ἐπιτείνουσθαι τινας καὶ ἡ πολυκαθροῦσι.

19. πρὸς εὐπορίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων. States in command of the sea were for one thing less exposed to famine than States which were not ([Xen.] De Rep. Ath. 2. 6). See also Plato, Laws 705 A (quoted in the next note). We can imagine with what anxiety cities at a distance from the sea, for instance those of Arcadia, watched the prospects of the corn-harvest. The worship of Demeter and of Zeus, the giver of rain, would be especially congenial to such localities. They no doubt kept a vigilant eye on their rivers and the catabothra through which they in some cases flowed off to see that no flooding occurred and that they were not interfered with by rival neighbouring States. Greek colonies, on the other hand, were mostly at no great distance from the sea, and their command of necessities must consequently have been much superior to that of many districts of Greece proper.

μετέχειν τὴν πῶλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν τῆς θαλάττης, cp. 25, ἀμφοτέρω (i. e. γῆς καὶ θαλάττης) μετίχουσιν. Susemihl, following Bojesen, reads μετέχειν τὴν πῶλιν καὶ τῆς χώρας καὶ τῆς θαλάττης, referring to c. 5. 1327 a 3 sqq. and to c. 11. 1330 a 34 sqq., but compare on the other hand 32, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὀρώμεν πολλὰς ὑπάρχοντα καὶ χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν ἐπίουσι καὶ λιμένας κ.τ.λ., and Plato, Laws 705 A (a passage perhaps present to Aristotle's mind here), πρόσκοτος γὰρ θάλαττα χώρα τὸ μὲν παρ' ἐκείστην ἡμέραν ἡδύ, μᾶλα γε μὴν ὄντως ἀμυρόν καὶ πικρόν γαιόνημα. The territory no less than the city may be said μετέχειν τῆς θαλάττης, for it draws part of its supplies from the sea and sends part of its

surplus produce away by sea, besides being more easily protected against foes. Aristotle had advised in c. 5. 1327 a 3 sqq. that the city should be well placed in relation both to its territory and to the sea. No one had disputed that it should be well placed in relation to its territory, but a doubt had been raised whether it ought to stand in any relation whatever to the sea. Hence what is uppermost in Aristotle's mind is to show that it should not be far from the sea. That it will be well placed in relation to its territory, he takes for granted.

21. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For evidence of this fact, see vol. i. p. 317. Compare also Thuc. 5. 82. 5 sq. The successful resistance of the seaport Stralsund to the besieging army of Wallenstein illustrates Aristotle's remark. 'The problem of overcoming the resistance of a fortress open to unlimited succours by sea is one of the most difficult in the whole art of war' (S. R. Gardiner, *Thirty Years' War*, p. 107). The Duke of Wellington preferred Calcutta to Agra as the seat of British Government in India (Lord Stanhope's *Conversations with the Duke of Wellington*, p. 306). For πρὸς τὸ ῥῆμα φέρειν τοὺς πολέμους (for so we should probably read with Sylburg in place of τοὺς πολέμους, which is the reading of ΓΠ), cp. 2. 7. 1267 a 27, πόλεμον ὑπερυγκύν, and 2. 9. 1270 a 33, μίαν γὰρ πληγὴν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις.

23. καὶ πρὸς τὸ βλάψαι κ.τ.λ., 'and with a view to injuring assailants, if it should not be possible [to be easily succourable] both by land and by sea, the State will be more in a position to be so by one or the other, if it shares in both.' I do not think with Susemihl (*Bericht über Aristoteles*, etc., in the *Jahresbericht für Altertumswissenschaft*, lxxix. 1894, p. 273) that Argyriades is right in bracketing πρὸς before τὸ βλάψαι. The suppressed nom. το δυνατὸν (ἴστω) is not τὸ βλάψαι, but τὸ εἰσβολήτους εἶναι. Greece defended itself in both ways against Xerxes, and Syracuse against Athens. Agrigentum, on the other hand, had no fleet when it was besieged by the Carthaginians (Diod. 13. 85 sqq.: Holm, *Griech. Gesch.* 2. 592). Athens would have had little prospect of success in the Peloponnesian War if she had only been able to strike at her assailants by land. The Lacedaemonian State suffered from not being able to attack its Theban invaders by sea. Compare a saying of Epaminondas (Aristid. *Leuctr.* 1. p. 421, 18, quoted by Schäfer, *Demosth.* 1. 104. 4), λέγειν γὰρ ἰσφὴ πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἐπαμεινώνδαν ὅτι οὐδὲν ὀφέλος τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ πλεονεκτημάτων, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν θάλατταν δι' αὐτὸν ἔχουσιν.

28. *δοτα τ' ἂν κ.τ.λ.* It seems to be implied that the import and export of commodities was only possible by sea: Athens, however, imported many commodities by land (Xen. De Vect. 1. 7, *καὶ κατὰ γῆν δι' πολλὰ (ἢ Ἀττικῇ) δέχεται ἐμπορία*), and that there was traffic by land in Greece we see from Plato, Polit. 289 E, *οἱ δὲ πῶλον ἐκ πώλεως ἀλλήττορες κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ περὶ*. But the land-trade of Greece was not comparable in extent to its trade by sea (see Büchschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 444 sqq.).

27. *αὐτῇ γὰρ ἐμπορικῇ κ.τ.λ.* takes up and justifies *δοτα τ' ἂν μὴ τυγχάνη παρ' αὐτοῖς δοτα κ.τ.λ.* A State may do things for itself which it would demean itself by doing for others (cp. 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 19 sqq. and 3. 4. 1377 b 5 sqq.).

29. *οἱ δὲ παρέχοντες κ.τ.λ.* This remark is directed against Athens. Isocrates had claimed that in instituting a great mart at the Peiraeus, Athens had done Greece a service (Paneg. § 42); Aristotle, however, asserts that Athens had had the increase of her revenue in view. No doubt she derived a large revenue from the Peiraeus (see Xen. De Vect. 3. 12 sq., 4. 40, and [Aristot.] Oecon. 2. 1346 a 5 sqq.), but the existence of a great emporium there also added largely to her influence; we see how bitterly the Megarians felt their exclusion from it (Thuc. 1. 67, 139). Among the chief sources of revenue at Athens were the fiftieth on exports and imports, the duty on sales, and the impost paid by metoeci (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 350 sqq.); the existence of a great emporium at the Peiraeus would largely increase the receipts from these and other sources. The revenue of States which did not possess an emporium must have been much smaller than the revenue of those which did. The revenue of inland States especially must have been limited, and few inland democracies can have been able to provide pay for attendance at meetings of the assembly and dicasteries.

30. *τοιούτης μετέχειν πλεονεξίας*, 'to share in greed of this kind,' i. e. greed for revenue, for *πλεονεξία* probably does not mean 'gain' here, though it often bears this meaning. Cp. Plato, Tim. 27 C, *πάντες δοσι καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσιν*.

32. *πολλαῖς . . . καὶ χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν*, e. g. the territories and cities of Athens, Corinth, Megara, etc.

33. *ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας*. *Ἐπίνεια* are port-towns: cp. Suidas s.v., *πόλις παραθαλάσσιον, ἵνα τὰ πέρατα τῶν πόλεων εἰσιν, ὥσπερ Πειραιεὶς τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Νίσαια τῆς Μεγαρίδος* δύνασαι δὲ ἐπὶ παντὶς

ἐμπορίου καὶ παραθαλασσίῳ χρήσασθαι τῷ ὀνόματι τούτῳ, ὃ νῦν οἱ πολλοὶ κατὰβολον καλοῦσιν.

εὐφυῶς κείμενα. Cp. Diod. 13. 85. 4, λόφον . . . κατὰ τῆς πόλεως εὐφυῶς κείμενον.

34. ὥστε μήτε τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἔστω μήτε πόρρω λίαν, sc. εἶναι, 'so as neither to occupy the same city [as the buildings of the city] nor to be very far away.' The subject of νέμειν appears to be ἐπίκρια καὶ λιμένας understood, unless we supply τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας. Ἄστυ is used of the central city of the State lying round its central acropolis, in contradistinction to other cities comprised within the territory. For the omission of εἶναι, see above on 1277 a 38 and 1286 b 36. Cyllene, the port of Elis, and Gytheium, the port of Sparta, would be thought by Aristotle to be too far from Elis and Sparta.

35. ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ., 'but to be held in subjection by walls and other similar defences' (such as trenches, cp. Xen. Anab. 2. 4. 22).

36. διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, 'through participation in them,' i. e. in ports and harbours.

37. εἰ δέ τι βλαβερὸν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 952 D sqq. Compare the plan adopted by the people of Epidamnus of appointing a πωλητῆς, through whom alone all purchases from, and sales to, their Illyrian neighbours were to be made (Plut. Quaest. Gr. 29).

41. βέλτιστον, thus used, is less common in the Politics than βέλτιον, but we have it in Plato, Gorg. 500 C.

οὐ γὰρ μόνον κ.τ.λ. We read of Dionysius the Elder in Diod. 14. 107. 4 that he required Rhegium to surrender to him its fleet of seventy triremes, διελάμβανε γὰρ τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν βοήθειας ἀπολεισθείσης ῥῥαδίως ἐκπολιορκήσεν τὴν πόλιν. For αὐτοῖς φοβεροὺς εἶναι, cp. c. 8. 1328 b 7-10 and 3. 15. 1286 b 27-31. Sections of the citizen-body were often the originators of στάσις (7 (5). 3-4) and might need to be controlled.

3. περὶ δὲ πλήθους ἥδη καὶ μεγέθους κ.τ.λ., 'but when we come 1327 b. to the amount and magnitude of this force, with respect to that,' etc. For πλήθους καὶ μεγέθους, see above on 1326 b 30.

4. εἰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. That a Greek State could not live a life of hegemony without possessing a fleet, is virtually implied by the view, which dates back as far as the days of the Persian Wars, that a hegemony confined to the land is a 'lame hegemony' (Diod. 11.

50). Epaminondas held this view (see above on 1327 a 23, and also Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, 10. 416-419, and Schäfer, *Demosthenes*, 1. 104 sq.).

5. πολιτικόν, 'spent in relations with other States,' not a solitary life, like that of the States referred to in c. 3. 1325 b 23 sqq. Cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 22. Πολιτικόν is a broader term than ἡγεμονικόν, for a State may have political relations with others without standing to them in a relation of hegemony.

7. τὴν πολυαθροσίαν τὴν γιγνομένην περὶ τὸν ναυτικὸν ὄχλον, 'the excessive number of citizens which arises in connexion with the mass of trireme-oarsmen.' So Sus. 'jene Pöbelmenge die aus dem Schiffsvolk entspringt.' For γιγνομένην περὶ τὸν ναυτικὸν ὄχλον, cp. 3. 13. 1284 b 20, *ἐπερ οὐκ ἐγίγνετο περὶ τὰς πόλεις. Γίγνεσθαι περὶ* with the acc. means 'to happen to' in Plato, *Protag.* 309 B, and in Polyb. 1. 16. 7, 1. 22. 1, and 5. 110. 7, but I do not think that this is what it means here. As to πολυαθροσία, see above on 1327 a 11. The Athenian demos was largely composed of trireme-oarsmen (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 23).

11. πλήθους δὲ κ.τ.λ. The connexion of this sentence with that which precedes it would have been clearer if it had run, 'but the oarsmen need not be citizens, for, as a mass of perioeci and cultivators of the territory will be forthcoming, there will necessarily be no lack of sailors also.' Would Aristotle's serfs, who are not to be *θεοποιεῖς*, make good sailors? His plan of employing serfs as oarsmen had been anticipated not only at Heracleia on the Euxine, but also by Jason of Pherae (*Xen. Hell.* 6. 1. 11, *ἀνδρῶν γε μὴν ταύτας* (sc. τὰς ναῦς) *πληροῦν πότερον Ἀθηναίους ἢ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς μᾶλλον δύνασθαι, τοσοῦτους καὶ τοιοῦτους ἔχοντας πενίστας*;). 'Quod idem nostra quoque aetate Veneti facit, qui ad instruendas classes in agris delectum habere et valentiores agricolas triremibus adscribere consuerunt' (*Giph.* p. 945). Even at Athens, where a large section of the demos was composed of trireme-oarsmen (see above on 7), metoeci and aliens, and occasionally slaves, were also thus employed (*Thuc.* 1. 143, 3. 16, 8. 73: *Isocr. De Pace*, §§ 48, 79). The oarsmen of the Lacedaemonian fleet were Helots or hired men (*Xen. Hell.* 7. 1. 12).

13. ὁρῶμεν δὲ κ.τ.λ. takes up 1327 a 32 sqq. Καὶ τοῦτα, 'this also,' i.e. τὸ ἀφθονίαν εἶναι ναυτῶν, as well as favourably situated ports and harbours. As to the fleet of the Pontic Heracleia, see Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, 12. 623. 3. Heracleia waged a vigorous

naval war with Leucon, prince of the Cimmerian Bosporus, who reigned from about B.C. 392 to 352. In later days (B.C. 280) her ships of war with five and six banks of oars and her one great *δετήρης* helped Ptolemy Ceraunus to defeat the fleet of Antigonus Gonatas (Memnon, ap. Phot. Biblioth. p. 226 b 19 sqq. Bekker: Droysen, *Gesch. des Hellenismus* 2. 2. 332).

14. Ἡρακλειωτῶν. P^{1.2} Sb Vb have Ἡρακλειωτῶν, but the forms Ἡρακλειώτης, Ἡρακλειωτικός appear elsewhere in Aristotle's writings without any recorded variant. Ἡρακλειώτης is the earlier form (see Meisterhans, *Grammatik der att. Inschr.*, p. 34, ed. 2) and appears in an Attic inscription prior to B.C. 403, but Aristotle probably used the form Ἡρακλειώτης, which is found in an Attic inscription of B.C. 298.

15. τῇ μεγέθει, i.e. in respect of the number of its citizens.

16. λιμάνων is placed next to χώρας, because the harbours were to be outside the city, not, as was often the case, within it.

πόλεων, i.e. the *ἄστυ* and its *ἐπίκτιον* or port.

17. ἄστυ διωρισμένα. Cp. I. II. 1258 b 39, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνίοις γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων.

19. πρότερον, in c. 4. 1326 b 22 sqq.

21. βλέψας κ.τ.λ. A similar contrast is drawn between *αἱ ἐπιφαι* C. 7. *κίσταται πόλεις* and *ἡ ὅλη οἰκουμένη* in Polyb. I. 4. 6. The change in the preposition (*ἐπὶ*—*πρὸς*) finds many parallels in Aristotle's way of writing. Cp. c. I. 1330 b 16, *χωρὶς τὰ τε εἰς τροφὴν ὕδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρεῖαν*: 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 38, *ὅσον εἰς γηδίου κτήσιν, αἱ δὲ μή, πρὸς ἀφορμὴν ἐμπορίας καὶ γεωργίας*: 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 17, *οὕτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴους οὕτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἰθύνων*. See also 2. 8. 1267 b 27, 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 33 sq., 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 38–41, and 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 16 sq.; and Kühner, *Ausführl. gr. Gramm.*, ed. 2, § 450.

22. ὡς διειληπται τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, literally 'how it is divided into sections by nations': cp. c. 12. 1331 a 20, and Plato, *Laws* 886 A, *τὰ τῶν ὁρῶν διακεκοσμημένα καλῶς οὕτως, ἐνιαυτοῖς τε καὶ μηνὶ διειλημμένα*, and Phaedo 110 B, *ἡ γὰρ αὕτη . . . ποικίλη, χρώμασι διειλημμένη*.

23. τὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for the nations inhabiting cold countries, and in particular those in Europe,' etc. *καὶ* introduces an explanation and limitation of *τὰ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη*, as in I. 9. 1257 b 9, *τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν*. Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, *Rep.* 435 E, and of Hippocrates, *De Aere, Aquia, Locis*, vol. i. p. 547 sqq. Kühn, and esp. p. 553 (as Giph. points out, p. 948: see also Eaton): cp. Androt. *Fragm.* 36 (Müller, *Fr. Hist.*

Gr. 1. 375). Aristotle probably held that a connexion exists between coldness of climate and abundance of *θυμός*. He may have traced the connexion thus. Cold hardens the animal frame and makes it dry and earthy, not watery (De Gen. An. 5. 3. 783 a 15 sqq.), and animals in whose blood the earthy element predominates are spirited in character (De Part. An. 2. 4. 650 b 33 sqq.), whereas those whose blood is of a more watery nature have a more subtle intelligence, and, if this wateriness is extreme, are cowardly (650 b 18 sqq.). See vol. i. p. 319, note 1, and De Part. An. 2. 2. 648 a 2-11. A different explanation may be deduced from passages in the Problems ascribed to Aristotle, which are not, however, one of his authentic works (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 100: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 96). *Θυμός* is connected with internal warmth (De Part. An. 2. 4. 650 b 35, *θερμότητος γὰρ ποιητὸν δ θυμός*: cp. Probl. 10. 60. 898 a 5; *ἢ ἔτι δ θυμός μετὰ θερμότητος; δ γὰρ φόβος κατὰψυξιν ὥσων ὅν (sc. ζῴων) τὸ αἷμα ἰσθερμὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ θυμοειδῆ*), and a cold climate, according to Probl. 14. 16. 910 a 38 sqq., makes the flesh close and solid, and so prevents the escape of the internal heat. As to the 'spirit' of the barbarians to whom Aristotle refers, cp. Eth. End. 3. 1. 1229 b 28, *διὰ θυμόν, οἷον οἱ Κέλτοι πρὸς τὰ κύματα ὅλα ἀπαιτῶσι λαβόντες, καὶ ὧς ἢ βαρβαρικῇ ἀνδρίᾳ μετὰ θυμοῦ ἐστίν*: Polyb. 2. 35. 3, *διὰ τὸ μὴ τὸ πλείον ἀλλὰ συλλήβδην ἅπας τὸ γινόμενον ἐπὶ τῶν Γαλατῶν θυμῷ μᾶλλον ἢ λογισμῷ βραβεύεσθαι*: Seneca, De Ira, 1. 11, *quid Cimbrorum Teutonorumque tot millia superfusa Alpibus ita sustulit ut tantae cladis notitiam ad suos non nuntius sed fama pertulerit, nisi quod erat illis ira pro virtute*, and 2. 15 (referred to by Giph. p. 948), *'ut scias,' inquit, 'iram habere in se generosi aliquid, liberas videbis gentes quae iracundissimae sunt, ut Germanos et Scythas'*. . . Deinde omnes istae feritate liberae gentes, leonum luporumque ritu, ut servire non possunt, ita nec imperare. Non enim humani vim ingenii, sed feret et intractabilis habent: nemo autem regere potest, nisi qui et regi. Fere itaque imperia penes eos fuere populos qui mitiore caelo utuntur. As to the meaning of *Εἰρώπη* here, see vol. i. p. 318, note 3. In Hom. Hymn. in Apoll. 250 sq., 290 sq. *Εἰρώπη* is distinguished from the Peloponnese and the islands, but not from Hellas.

25. *διόπερ κ.τ.λ.*, 'hence they continue comparatively free, but devoid of constitutional organization and unable to rule their neighbours.' They are free in comparison with Asiatics (3. 14.

1285 a 21). Aristotle can hardly include the Macedonians among the 'nations of Europe,' for they were not unable to rule over others, but does he regard them as Greeks? He is probably thinking of the Scythians, Thracians, and Illyrians among other European races: cp. Xen. Cyrop. 1. 1. 4, *καὶ γὰρ τοὶ τοσούτων διέργαται (Κύρος) τῶν ἄλλων βασιλείῃς . . . ὡσθ' ὁ μὲν Σκύθης, καίπερ παραπύλλων ὅτῳ Σκυθῶν, ἄλλων μὲν οὐδενὸς δύναι' ἐν ἔθνεσι ἐπάρχειν, ἀγαπήν δ' ἐν αἰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἔθνεσι ἀρχῶν διαγίνεσθαι, καὶ ὁ Θρᾷξ Θρακῶν καὶ ὁ Ἰλλυριοῦν Ἰλλυριοῦν, καὶ πολλὰ δὲ ὁσάυτως ἔθνη ἀποδύμενα τὰ γούν ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ ἔτι καὶ τῶν αὐτόνομα εἶναι καὶ λελύσθαι ἐπ' ἀλλήλους.* Contrast Isocr. Paneg. § 67, where the Scythians and Thracians, as well as the Persians, are described as *ἀρχαιότατα τῶν γεγῶν καὶ μεγίσταις δυναστείαις ἔχοντα.*

27. τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆν Ἀσίαν κ.τ.λ. For *ἄθυμα*, cp. Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 553 Kühn, *περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀθυμίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆς ἀναδρείας, ὅτι ἀπολεμνότεροί εἰσι τῶν Εὐρωπαϊῶν οἱ Ἀσιακοὶ καὶ ἡμερώτεροι τὰ ἔθνη κ.τ.λ.* Hippocrates, however, in the same treatise (p. 554 Kühn) says justly enough, *εὐρήσκει δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἀσιτικούς διαφέροντας αὐτοῖς ἑαυτίων, τοὺς μὲν βελτίους τοὺς δὲ φαυλοτέρους ἑόντας.* Would Aristotle say of the Persians (cp. c. 2. 1324 b 11) what he says of the Asiatics here? Modern observers take much the same view of Asiatic character. 'The Asiatic is as clever as the European with his hands and wits, though he lacks initiative and the power of government' (Speech of Sir H. H. Johnston, *Times*, Nov. 7, 1894). Aristotle's account of the Asiatics was hardly flattering to Alexander as the conqueror of Asia, nor did it lend support to his scheme of fusing Greeks and Asiatics. See on the subject vol. i. p. 319, note 3. Aristotle traces similar contrasts between animals to those which he here traces between the nations of Europe and Asia (Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 b 12, *διαφέρονται δὲ (τὰ ζῷα) καὶ ταῖς τοιαύταις διαφοραῖς κατὰ τὸ ἔθος· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ πρῶα καὶ δύσθυμα καὶ οὐκ ἰσχυρικά, ὡς βοῦς, τὰ δὲ θυμώδη καὶ ἰσχυρικά καὶ ἀμαθῆ, ὡς ὄνος ἄγριος, τὰ δὲ φρόνιμα καὶ δευλά, ὡς ἔλαφος, δασύπους κ.τ.λ.).*

28. διότι ἀρχόμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεῖ, i.e. enslaved to their rulers. Kingship prevailed over most of Asia (Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 553 Kühn), and in many places of a despotic type (3. 14. 1285 a 16 sqq.).

29. τὰ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένος κ.τ.λ. Contrast Isocrates' account of the difference between Greeks and barbarians in De Antid. § 293, *καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ προίχετε καὶ διαφέρετε τῶν ἄλλων οὐ ταῖς περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιμελείαις, οὐδ' ὅτι κάλλιστα πολιτεύεσθε καὶ μάλιστα φιλοῦντες*

τοὺς νόμους οὗς ὑμῖν οἱ πρόγονοι κατέλιπον, ἀλλὰ τοῖτοισι ὅσπερ ἡ φύσις ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἄλλων ζῆον διήνεγκε καὶ τὸ γένος τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῶν βαρβάρων, τῇ καὶ πρὸς τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ἀμεινον πεπαιδευῆσθαι τῶν ἄλλων.

Ὅσπερ μεσεῖει κατὰ τοὺς τόπους. The ὀμφαλός at Delphi was regarded as the centre both of Greece and of the habitable earth, (Strabo, p. 419, τῆς γὰρ Ἑλλάδος ἐν μέσῳ πῶς ἐστὶ τῆς συμπαράσης, τῆς τε ἐντὸς Ἰσθμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς, ἐνομήσθη δὲ καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης, καὶ ἐκάλεσαν τῆς γῆς ὀμφαλὸν κ.τ.λ.). Xenophon claims the same position for Athens (De Vect. 1.6), and Strabo for Italy (p. 286). Cp. also [Plato,] Epinomis 987 D, τόδε γε μὴν διανοηθῆναι χρή πάντ' ἄνδρα Ἕλληνα, ὡς τόπον ἔχομεν τὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐν τοῖς σχεδὸν ἔριστον. τὸ δ' ἐκαινεῖν αὐτοῦ χρή λέγειν, ὅτι μῖνος ἂν εἴη χειμῶνων τε καὶ τῆς θεριότης φύσιν.

32. καὶ δυνάμενον ἔρχειν πάντων, μιᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας. See vol. i. p. 321, note 1, and compare also the exclamation of Agesilaus in Plut. Ages. c. 16, and Isocr. Paneg. § 131. For μιᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας, cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 16 sqq.: Plut. Pelop. c. 24, πῶσαν Ἀρκαδίαν εἰς μίαν δύναμιν συνέστησαν, and Diod. 15. 59, ἔπεισε τοὺς Ἀρκάδας εἰς μίαν συντίλειαν ταχθῆναι: Demosth. De Fala. Leg. c. 263, ὅπως Χαλκιδέων πάντων εἰς ἐν συναρισμένων. What kind of 'unity of constitution' Aristotle has in his mind is not clear; he may be thinking of the establishment of a common council of Greece by Philip of Macedon after the battle of Chaeroneia (vol. i. p. 321, note 1), or of an union of the free States of Greece, not under the headship of Macedon, but under some Federal bond. The latter kind of union would be more truly an union of Greeks than an union under the headship of Macedon, and it is of an union of Greeks that Aristotle speaks.

34. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει τὴν φύσιν μονέκκλον. Among Hellenic races possessed only of θυμός Aristotle probably counted the Arcadian (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 168) and Aetolian, and possibly also the Boeotian (see above on 1274 a 32), and among those possessed only of δῖαναια some of the Ionians of Asia Minor.

36. φανερόν τοίνυν κ.τ.λ. Compare for the phrase εὐαγέγους τῇ νομοθίῃ Plato, Laws 671 B. Plato had claimed (Rep. 376 A sqq.) that the mildness of the dog to those whom he knows is due to the philosophic element in his nature, and had concluded (376 B), οἰκοῖν βαρροῖντες τιθῶμεν καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, εἰ μᾶλλον πρὸς τοὺς οἰκίοντες καὶ γνωρίζοντες πρῶς τις ἔσσεσθαι, φύσει φιλόσοφον καὶ φιλομαθῆ αὐτὸν δεῖν

εἶναι; Aristotle claims, on the contrary, that what Plato ascribes to the philosophic element is really due to *θυμός* (38 sqq.), inasmuch as it is *θυμός* that makes men loving. Few ruling races have possessed in perfection the combination of qualities which Aristotle demands in the citizens of his best State. In most perhaps there has been more *θυμός* than *διδόνα*.

38. *ὑπερ γάρ κ.τ.λ.*, 'for as to what,' etc. The reference is to Plato, Rep. 375 D sqq. Plato is referred to as *τινές* also in c. 10. 1329 b 41 sq. and in other passages collected by Zeller, Plato, Eng. Trans., p. 62, note 41. Plato's remark that dogs are fierce to those whom they do not know was no doubt suggested by Heraclitus, Fragm. 115 Bywater, *κύνες καὶ βαῖζονσι ἐν ἃν μὴ γινώσκωσι*. The connexion of *θυμός* with affectionateness appears also in Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 b 31, *τὰ δὲ (τῶν ζῴων) θυμικὰ καὶ φιλητικὰ καὶ θωπευτικὰ, ὡς κύνων*. Compare also Top. 2. 7. 113 a 35 (referred to by Schneider), *ὡς ἐὰν τὸ μῖσος ἴσθαι ὀργὴν ἐφήσει, εἴη ἂν τὸ μῖσος ἐν τῷ θυμοειδέϊ· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἡ ὀργὴ σκεπτικὸν ὡς ἐὰν καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐν τῷ θυμοειδέϊ, ἢ φίλια· ἐὰν γὰρ μή, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ ἴσθαι ἢ φίλια, οὐκ ἂν ἴσταιτο μῖσος ὀργῇ*. Camerarius (Interp. p. 289) remarks that Theognis had already connected love and hatred with *θυμός* (Theogn. 1091,

ἀργαλίως μοι θυμός τ' ἔχει περὶ σῆς φιλότῆτος
οὔτε γὰρ ἐχθαίρειν οὔτε φιλεῖν δύναμαι).

41. For *ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις*, cp. De An. 2. 3. 414 a 29 sqq.: *Περὶ νόστιμος καὶ γήρως* 1. 467 b 16 sqq.: and other passages collected by Bonitz, Ind. 207 a 46 sqq.

1. *σημεῖον δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 42, *σημεῖον γὰρ οὐ μικρὸν 1328 a. ὅτι δύναται τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἀλυμπιονίκαις κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle finds an indication that *θυμός* is the faculty of love in the fact that when it is stirred it is more stirred in relation to those we love than in relation to those who are unknown to us. Is the following fragment of the Medea of Neophron (Fragm. 2), a tragic poet of the time of Euripides or possibly somewhat earlier, based on the passage of Archilochus of which Aristotle quotes a part?

εἴαν τί δράσεις, θυμέ; βούλευσαι καλῶς
πρὶν ἢ ἐξαμαρτεῖν καὶ τὰ προσφιλέστατα
ἔχθιστα θέσθαι. ποῖ ποτ' ἐξῆξας (cp. αἰρεται), τάλας;
κάτισχε λῆμα καὶ σθένος θεοσυγγεί.
καὶ πρὸς τί ταῦτα δύρομαι ψυχὴν ἐμὴν
ὀρώσ' ἔρημον καὶ παρημελημένην (cp. ἀλεγευεῖσθαι)
πρὸς ὧν ἐχρῆν ἦναι;

Cp. also Plato, Laws 717 D, θυμουμένοις τε οὖν (τοῖς γονεῦσιν) ἐπέκειν δέι καὶ ἀποπειλάσει τὸν θυμὸν . . . ξυγγεγνώσασθαι ὡς εἰσέτω μάλιστα πατὴρ υἱεὶ δοξάζων ἀδικεῖσθαι θυμοῖς' ἂν διαφερόντως, and (with Eaton), Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 b 2, καὶ τοῖς φίλοις (ὀργίζονται) μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις οἰονται γὰρ προσήκειν μᾶλλον πάσχειν εὖ ἐκ' αὐτῶν ἢ μή. For ὁ θυμὸς αἶρεται, cp. Probl. 27. 3. 947 b 32, διὸ καὶ τὸ ἀπαρεῖν καὶ τὸ ὀρίνεσθαι τὸν θυμὸν καὶ ταράττεσθαι, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα λέγουσιν οὐ κατὰ δὴ ἀλλ' οἰκίᾳ, and 2. 26. 869 a 5, καὶ γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ζῆσις τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐστὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν, and also Fragm. Trag. Gr. Adespota, 321 Nauck,
 πρὸς δὲ θυμὸς τῶν φρενῶν ἀνωτέρα.

3. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχιλόχος κ.τ.λ., 'hence Archilochus for instance' (see above on 1255 a 36), 'when he complains of his friends, fittingly enough discourses to his spirit [which is closely connected with friends, saying,] "For thy tortures surely were from friends."' See Archil. Fragm. 66, 67. For ἀπέγχεα, cp. Aristoph. Vesp. 686 Didot, ὁ μάλιστα μ' ἀπέγχει ('excruciat').

6. καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δι κ.τ.λ., i.e. the principle of rule and freedom as well as the capability of affection. Here Aristotle does not dissent from Plato, but agrees with him. He remembers Plato, Rep. 375 B, ἢ οὐκ ἐννεόηκας ὡς ἀμαχὸν τε καὶ ἀνίκητον θυμὸς, οὐ παρότερος ψυχῇ πᾶσα πρὸς πάντα ἀφοβός τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀήττητος; where there is evidently a tacit reminiscence of the saying of Heraclitus quoted in 7 (5). 11. 1315 a 30 sq. Compare also Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1229 a 27, ὅμως δὲ μάλιστα φυσικῇ ἢ τοῦ θυμοῦ (ἀνδρεία) ἀήττητον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς, διὸ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἀριστα μάχονται, and Eth. Nic. 4. 11. 1126 a 36, ἐπίστε γὰρ τοῖς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πρᾶντες φαιμέν, καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδράδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν.

8. οὐ καλῶς δ' ἔχει κ.τ.λ. With χαλεποὺς εἶναι supply δύν, as in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 3. See note on 1335 b 5. This takes up 1327 b 40, πρὸς δὲ τοῖς ἀγνώτοις ἀγρίους, and corrects Plato, Rep. 375 D sqq. Magnanimous men are fierce only to those who act unjustly, and so far from being fiercer to such persons when unknown to them, they will be fiercer to them when they are familiar friends. Plato, however, had himself said in Laws 731 B, θυμοειδῇ μὲν δὴ χρὴ πάντα ἄνδρα εἶναι, πρᾶν δὲ ὡς δ τε μάλιστα.

10. πλήν. Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares De An. 2. 1. 412 b 20, ἥς ἀπολειπούσης οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμός, πλήν ὁμνυόμενα.

13. παρ' οἷς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for in quarters in which they conceive there should be a feeling that the benefit conferred in the past is owed back [and ought to be requited], they think that in addition

to the injury done them they are defrauded also of the benefit.' Aristotle mentions in *Rhet.* 2. 8. 1386 a 11, among things that arouse compassion, τὸ δὲν προσήκειν ἀγαθόν τι πράξει, κακὸν τι συμβῆναι.

15. δὲν εἴρηται "χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν." We learn from *Plut. De Fraterno Amore*, c. 5, χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν, ὡς Εὐριπίδης εἴρηκεν, ὅντες, χαλεπώτατοι τοῖς γασσέουσιν αὐτοῖς εἰσιν, that this is a fragment of Euripides (*Fragm.* 965): cp. *Democrit. Fragm. Mor.* 228 (*Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr.* 1. 355), ἡ τῶν ξυγγενέων ἔχθρη τῆς τῶν ὀνείων χαλεπωτέρη μάλα.

16. οἱ τοι πέρα κ.τ.λ. Cp. *Plato, Rep.* 563 E, καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ εἶναι τι ποιεῖν μεγάλην φιλεῖ εἰς τοῦναντίον μεταβολὴν ἀνταποδοδόναν ἐν ἄραις τε καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ἥκιστα.

17. τῶν πολιτευομένων, 'those who exercise the rights of citizens in the State': cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 40 and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16, and also 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 4 sq.

18. For πόσην, see above on 1326 a 5.

19. οὐ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for we must not aim at the same exactness of detail by means of theoretical inquiries as is realized by means of what is presented to us through sense-perception.' For ζητεῖν διὰ τῶν λόγων κ.τ.λ., cp. c. 17. 1336 a 5 sqq., and *Plut. Pericl.* c. 9, θεωρεῖσθαι διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν ἢ αἰτία τῆς μεταβολῆς. For τῶν γυγνομένων διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, cp. *De Caelo*, 3. 4. 303 a 22, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἐνδόξων καὶ τῶν φαινόμενων κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀναιρεῖν, and for the contrast of οἱ λόγοι and τὰ γυγνόμενα διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, see *Bon. Ind.* 20 b 30—39, and above on 1261 b 29. The double διὰ is awkward, but of this kind of awkwardness there are many instances in the *Politics*: see 2. 6. 1266 a 21 sq., 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 1 sqq., and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 9 sqq. The same thing happens with other prepositions—with πρὸς in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 18 sqq., and 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 38, with περὶ in 6 (4). 14. 1297 b 35 sq. and 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 34, and with ἐν in 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 29 sq. and 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 2.

21 sqq. Aristotle here passes on to the question who are to be C. 8. 'parts of the State.' It is from cc. 8—10 that we learn most of the little that he tells us as to the constitutional and social organization of his 'best State.' He begins by laying down a principle which holds of all things existing by nature, and therefore of the πόλις, and indeed of all κοινωνίαι which issue in 'something one in kind.' In all things that exist by nature the necessary conditions of the existence of the thing are to be distinguished from its parts. Not

all the necessary conditions are parts of the thing, but only those which have something in common. In a *polis* the 'something in common' is 'the best attainable life' (1328 a 36), or in other words *eudaimonia*, and as this is inseparable from virtue (c. 9. 1329 a 22), no class of persons is rightly a part of the State whose occupation precludes its attainment of virtue. Hence cultivators, artisans, day-labourers (c. 9. 1329 a 35 sq.), and traders (c. 9. 1328 b 39) are not to be parts of the State, or in other words are not to be citizens. The classes which will be parts of the State and which will constitute its citizen-body will be *τὸ πολέμιον* (c. 9. 1329 a 2), or rather *τὸ ἐπλετικόν* (c. 9. 1329 a 31, 37), *τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων*, and *τὸ κρίνον περὶ τῶν δίκαιων*. Aristotle takes no notice here of a class which he recognizes in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 34 sqq., the official class (*τὸ δημοκρατικόν*), but this also he would no doubt reckon as a part of the State. He is not, however, satisfied with excluding from citizenship the classes which are not *δημοῦργοι τῆς ἀρετῆς* (c. 9. 1329 a 20); he requires that those who exercise deliberative and judicial functions in his 'best State' shall be over a certain age and yet not too old. In other words he gives supreme authority in his State to men of mature but not too advanced age, who will be presumably possessed of *φρόνησις*. Plato in his Republic had reserved the rule of the State for a special class of men highly gifted in intellect and character and prepared for rule by a long-continued philosophical training, but Aristotle does not think that the soldiers of the State would submit to be ruled by a class into which they would not ultimately rise; he also insists rather on the possession of *φρόνησις* by his rulers than on a philosophical training, and *φρόνησις* is according to him the fruit in fit minds of a ripe age. He follows in fact rather in the track of Plato's Laws than in that of his Republic, for Plato had required in the Laws that the holders of the chief offices should be men of mature years. But Plato had not, like Aristotle, arranged that deliberative and judicial functions should be withdrawn from men over a certain age, though he contemplates in Rep. 498 C the retirement of infirm old men from political and military duties. This was, it would seem, a more or less novel suggestion. Its importance was no doubt brought home to Aristotle's mind by his observation of the ill effects of advanced age on the holders of life-offices in the Lacedaemonian State (2. 9. 1270 b 38 sqq.), and probably also in many oligarchies. It will be

noticed that in Aristotle's 'best State' the right of deciding questions of peace, war, and alliance would rest, not with the soldiers who would have to fight for the State in case of war, but with the older citizens (contrast the view of the young Archidamus in Isocr. Archid. § 3 sqq.), and that judicial authority, including no doubt the momentous right of inflicting the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation, would also rest with the older citizens. Aristotle evidently thinks that the prospect of succeeding to these great powers after the attainment of a certain age would reconcile the younger citizens to their non-possession of them. He appears to allow the younger citizens to be owners of land (c. 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.), and perhaps to hold all but the chief military offices. But they are to have nothing to do with deliberative or judicial functions. In this Aristotle would seem to go too far. The attainment of a certain age has often been made a condition of the tenure of the highest political offices. This was the case at Rome (Willems, *Droit Public Romain*, p. 242). Even restrictions of this kind would now and then exclude a William the Silent or a William Pitt. But it is one thing to impose a limit of age on the tenure of the highest offices and another to exclude the younger men from the exercise of all deliberative and judicial functions. How is the future statesman to learn his business, if his earlier career is to be exclusively devoted to the profession of arms, and he is not allowed to hold even minor civil offices? Aristotle is evidently too uncompromising, but we must bear in mind two things, if we wish to do him justice—(1) that he desires supreme authority in the State to be in the hands of those who are morally as well as politically ripe for its exercise; he desires Reason to rule in the State as it rules in the well-constituted individual; (2) that one of his aims is the limitation of war and of indiscriminate conquest, and that his exclusion of the more martially-disposed part of the citizen-body from supreme power in his 'best State' is closely connected with this aim. Nothing had done more to break up and weaken Greece in the fourth century B.C. than the incessant wars which had been waged between the various States—between the Lacedaemonians and the Thebans, the Thebans and the Phocians, the Thessalians of Pherae and the Thessalians of Larissa—and Aristotle may well have thought that the best way to check these wars was to place supreme power in the hands of the older citizens.

21. ἐπεὶ δ' ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν κ.τ.λ., 'but since, as in the other things which are constituted according to nature, not all those things are parts of the whole organization without which the whole would not exist, it is evident that neither must all those things be taken to be parts of the State which must necessarily be possessed by States, nor must we take as parts of any other union issuing in something one in kind all the things which are essential to such an union.' As this sentence stands, the words τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνιστάμενων would seem to be in the gen. after τῆς ὅλης συνστάσεως, but it is probable that Aristotle began the sentence with the intention of making these words in the gen. after μόρια and inserted τῆς ὅλης συνστάσεως only by an afterthought. For the thought, cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 2, τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐ πάντας θετίους πολίτας ἐν ἄνθρωποις οὐκ ἐν εἰς πόλιν, and for the distinction between ἐν οὐκ ἄνθρωποις and μέρη, cp. (with Eaton) Eth. Eud. 1. 2. 1214 b 26, ἐν ἄνθρωποις γὰρ οὐχ οἷον τε εὐδαιμονοῦν, ἔστι μέρη τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι νομίζουσιν. Plato had already drawn a similar distinction: cp. Polit. 287 D, ὅσοι γὰρ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα τι δημιουργοῦσι κατὰ πόλιν ἔργων, θετίους ἀπάσας ταύτας ἐς οὐσας συναίτους· ἄνθρωποι γὰρ τούτων οὐκ ἐν ποτε γίνονται πόλιν οὐδὲ πολιτικῇ, τούτων δ' αὖ βασιλικῆς ἔργον τέχνης οὐδὲν πον θήσομεν, and (with Eaton) Phaedo 99 B, and see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 331. 1 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 360, note 1). Τὰ κατὰ φύσιν συνιστάμενα are so termed in contradistinction to τὰ ἀπὸ τέχνης and to τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης and ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου (De Part. An. 1. 1. 640 a 27-b 4). They are things which have in them a principle of motion and rest, whether that motion takes the form of locomotion, or increase and decay, or alteration: cp. Phys. 2. 1. 192 b 8, τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἔστι φύσει, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας, φύσει μὲν τὰ τε ζῆα καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ἀπλὰ τῶν σωμάτων, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ αἶρ καὶ ὕδωρ· ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φύσει φανέν. πάντα δὲ τὰ ῥηθέντα φαίνεται διαφέροντα πρὸς τὰ μὴ φύσει συνιστάμενα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ φύσει ὄντα πάντα φαίνεται ἔχοντα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὰ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν καὶ φθίσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν (whereas the products of art have no such principle of motion and rest in them, except accidentally, so far as they are formed of earth or stone or other natural entities). Some of these natural entities are eternal, others are subject to generation and decay (De Part. An. 1. 5. 644 b 22 sqq.); some of them are bodies and magnitudes (for instance, the human body), others possess body and magnitude (for instance, a human being), others are principles within beings possessing

body and magnitude (for instance, the soul): cp. De Caelo, i. 1. 268 a 4 sqq., and see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 384. 3 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 417, note 2). The *πῶλις*, we learn from the passage before us, belongs to the class of natural entities; it must belong to the subdivision of this class which consists of 'things possessing body and magnitude.' As to the words *οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδαμῶς, εἴς ἑστιν τι τὸ γένος*, see vol. i. p. 43, note 1.

27. *οἷον εἴτε τροφή κ.τ.λ.* Food is the 'common thing' in the case of a *συσσίτιον*, a certain amount of land in the case of the owners of an undivided estate (2. 5. 1263 b 23 sq.).

28. *ὅταν δ' ἦ κ.τ.λ.* That there is nothing in common between the craftsman who uses an instrument and the instrument used, we learn in Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 32, *ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ ἄρχοντι καὶ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδέ φιλία οὐδέ γὰρ δίκαιον ἄλλ' οἷον τεχνίτης πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ δεσπότης πρὸς δοῦλον ὠφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ' οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδέ δίκαιον ἄλλ' οὐδέ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἢ βοῖν, οὐδέ πρὸς δοῦλον ἢ δοῦλος οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἐμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ' ἄψυχον ἄψυχος δοῦλος*: cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 9. 1241 b 17—24 and 7. 10. 1242 a 11 sqq. A slightly different lesson is taught in the passage before us. Here we learn that there is nothing in common between the instrument and the craftsman on the one hand and the product they bring into being on the other, except this, that the instrument and the craftsman act and the product is acted upon. That where one thing acts and another is acted upon there must be something common to the two things, we see from De An. 3. 4. 429 b 22, *ἀπορήσει δ' ἂν τις, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἀπλοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ μηδὲν μηδὲν ἔχει κοινόν, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, πῶς νοήσει, εἰ τὸ νοεῖν πάσχειν τί ἐστιν ἢ γὰρ τι κοινόν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν*. But two things thus related to each other need not have much in common: see vol. i. p. 323, note 1. The usual antithesis to *ποιεῖν* is *πάσχειν*, not *λαμβάνειν*, but we find *λαμβάνειν* τὴν *μορφὴν* contrasted with *ποιεῖν* in De Gen. An. 1. 21. 729 b 6 sqq.: cp. also Hist. An. 6. 23. 577 a 29 sqq., where *λαμβάνειν* = *δέχεσθαι*. In the passage before us the instrument and the craftsman who uses it are said *ποιῆσαι* and the work produced by them *λαβεῖν*.

34. *οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν ἢ κτήσις μέρος τῆς πῶλις*, because property stands to the *πῶλις* as a means stands to the end to which it is a means, and thus there is nothing in common between property and the *πῶλις* except that the former acts on the *πῶλις* and the *πῶλις*

is acted upon. It follows that slaves, who are animate articles of property—and *χερσῆτες*, including *βάνυσσαι τεχνίται*, are brought under the head of slaves in 3. 4. 1277 a 37 sqq.—are not parts of the State. 'It was a maxim of ancient jurisprudence,' says Gibbon (Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, c. 2), 'that a slave had not any country of his own; he acquired with his liberty an admission into the political society of which his patron was a member.' Contrast with *οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν ἢ κτῆσι μέρος τῆς πόλεως*, Oecon. 1. 1. 1343 a 10, *πόλις μὲν οὐκ οὐκὼν πληθὺς ἐστὶ καὶ χώρας καὶ χρημάτων αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ εἶ ζῆν*.

35. *ἢ δὲ πόλις κ.τ.λ.* *Τῶν ὁμοίων* is emphatic. *Κοινωνία τις*, because there are other *κοινωνίαι τῶν ὁμοίων* besides the *πόλις*, e.g. trading or religious associations. For the thought, cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25, *βούλεται δὲ γε ἢ πόλις ἐξ ἴσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίων ἐπὶ μάλιστα*. When Aristotle says in 2. 2. 1261 a 22, *οὐ μόνον δ' ἐκ πλείονων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἢ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ εἰδῶν διαφερόντων οὐ γὰρ γίνονται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων*, he is thinking of the distinction between rulers and ruled, so far as he is not using the word *πόλις* in a wider sense (see vol. i. p. 40).

37. *αὐτῇ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. c. 13. 1332 a 7 sqq.

38. *τελειός* is here the fem., as in Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 16, Metaph. A. 6. 1016 b 17, and Phys. 8. 8. 264 b 28. In c. 13. 1332 a 9 we have *χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείας*, and the form *τελεία* seems to be the commoner form of the fem. in Aristotle's writings, to judge by the Index Aristotelicus.

συμβέβηκε δὲ κ.τ.λ. Slaves have no share in happiness (3. 9. 1280 a 33). *βάνυσσαι, ἀγοραῖοι, and γεωργοὶ* live lives unfavourable to virtue (c. 9. 1328 b 40 sqq.), and so do not share in happiness. There are persons excluded from happiness on account of some defect of nature or fortune (c. 13. 1331 b 40 sq.). For *συμβαίνει ὥστε*, cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 34 sq. and 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 12.

40. *ἕτερον ὡς κ.τ.λ.* For the various accounts given in the Politics of the causes of constitutional diversity, see vol. i. p. 220 sqq. For *εἶδη καὶ διαφοράς*, cp. Phys. 3. 5. 205 b 31, *τόπων δὲ εἶδη καὶ διαφοραὶ τῶν καὶ κάτω καὶ ὑπεροσθεν καὶ ἐπισθεν καὶ δεξιῶν καὶ ἀριστετέρων*.

41. *ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον κ.τ.λ.* *Ἄλλον τρόπον* is a wider expression than *δὲ ἄλλων*, which is added in explanation and to give increased precision to its meaning. Cp. c. 15. 1334 b 5, *πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἴσται*, and 3. 18. 1288 a 39. For *τοῖς τε βίους καὶ τὰς πολιτείας*, cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40, *ἢ γὰρ πολιτεία βίος τίς ἐστι πόλις*. For the

middle ποιούνται, 'make for themselves' (not ποιῶσιν), cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 31, συμβίβηται δι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιῆσθαι τὰς παιδικὰς τέλει, and Meteor. 1. 5. 342 b 22, τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων φασμάτων ὅσα ταχέας ποιεῖται τὰς φαντασίας.

2. καὶ πόσα κ.τ.λ., i.e. not only what the parts of the State are, 1328 b. but also how many are the things without which the State cannot exist. For the omission of the article before πόλις, cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 2, τοῦτο γὰρ ἀληθές, ὅς οὐ πάντας θεοῖας πολίτας ἔν ἄνεν οὐκ ἔν εἰς πόλις, and 2. 2. 1261 a 24, οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὁμοίων: also 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 34 sq.

4. ἐν τούτοις ἂν εἴη (Δ) ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. See critical note.

5. τῶν ἔργων, 'the services which a State needs' (cp. 1328 b 19, ἔργασίας).

ἔσται δῆλον, i.e. πόσα ταυτί ἔστω ἔν ἄνεν πόλις οὐκ ἔν εἰς.

6. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle has before him Plato, Rep. 369 C, ἀλλὰ μὴν πρώτη γε καὶ μεγίστη τῶν χρειῶν ἡ τῆς τροφῆς παρασκευὴ τοῦ εἶναι τε καὶ ζῆν ἔνεκα. Παντάπασι γε. Δευτέρα δὲ οἰκίσσεω, τρίτη δὲ ἐσθῆτος καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. Ἔστι ταῦτα: also Critias 110 C, ἔκει δὲ δὴ τότε ἐν τῇδε τῇ χάρις τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔθνη τῶν πολιτῶν περὶ τὰς δημοουργίας ὄντα καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς τροφήν, τὸ δὲ μάχιμον ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν θέμεν κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀφορισθέν ἔκει χωρὶς κ.τ.λ.

7. ὀργάνων. Cp. 1. 8. 1256 b 20, καὶ ἐσθῆς καὶ ἄλλα ἔργα.

8. καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς, 'within their own body also,' as well as in the hands of any mercenaries they may employ or any allies they may possess. Cp. Plato, Laws 697 E, where the misery of a State dependent for its defence on mercenaries is depicted, and Philoch. Fragm. 132 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 406), μὴ ξενικὴν ἀλλ' αὐτῶν Ἀθηναίων. Cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6 sqq., and Thuc. 1. 121, δάνεισμα γὰρ ποιησόμενοι ὑπολαβεῖν οἱ τ' ἐσμέν μισθῷ μέλζον τοὺς ξένους αὐτῶν ναυβάτας ἀνητὴ γὰρ Ἀθηναίων ἡ δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία.

πρὸς τε τὴν ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθούντων χάριν. Cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 27-31.

10. χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, 'a certain abundance of money,' in contradistinction to εἰσπορία τροφῆς, ὀργάνων, etc.

11. καὶ πρὸς πολεμικάς. Schneider, Bekker², and Susemihl add τὰς before πολεμικάς, but cp. c. 11. 1330 a 41, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πρὸς τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς καλῶς ἔχειν. 'In the non-repetition of the article, and also of prepositions, Aristotle appears, if I do not mistake, to go further than other prose-writers' (Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik, 3. 330).

12. καὶ πρῶτον, 'and first in excellence,' cp. Isocr. Areop. § 29, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἐντεῖθεν γὰρ ἀρχεσθαι δίκαν. Τὰ δαιμόνια are placed first in the list of subjects of official competence given in 8. (6). 8. 1322 b 29 sqq. Cp. also 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 40, τῆς πρώτης καὶ θειοτάτης (πολιτείας), and Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 a 23, τῶν δὲ τεχνάτων πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἀναγκαϊότατον τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ ἡγεμονικώτατον τοῦτο δ' ἔν ἁθρώποις.

13. πάντων ἀναγκαϊότατον. Cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 5 sqq. and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 22-b' 2.

15. μὲν οὖν is answered by δέ, 24. Susemihl places in a parenthesis everything between ἡ γὰρ, 16, and συμφερόντων, 23, but the parenthesis should stop at ταύτην, 19, for ἀνάγκη ταύτων, 19, introduces an inference from 15, τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὅν δέκται πᾶσα πόλις ὡς εἰπεῖν.

17. ὡς φανερόν. Cp. 2. 2. 1261 b 12 sq.: 3. 1. 1275 b 20 sq.: 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 26.

ἐὰν δέ τι τεχνήσῃ τοῦτων ἐκλείπον κ.τ.λ. Τοῦτων, sc. τῶν ἔργων. This would be the case in the ἀναγκαϊότητι πόλις of Plato, Rep. 369 C-E, where there are no soldiers or priests or men of judicial or deliberative skill. For τῇ κοινωνίᾳ ταύτῃ, 'the society in which this occurs,' see above on 1276 a 14.

19. κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας ταύτας συνεστάναι πόλιν, 'should be composed in accordance with these industries': cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32, βούλεται γὰρ ἑκάτερα (i.e. ἀριστοκρατία καὶ βασιλεία) κατ' ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κτηρογῆμῃ.

20. Aristotle forgets that herdsmen, fishermen, and hunters are also providers of food.

22. κριτὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ συμφερόντων. Lamb, followed by Bekk.³ and Sus., reads δικαίων in place of ἀναγκαίων (cp. 14 sq.), but compare the passages collected in vol. i. p. 323, note 2, and also Polyæn. Strateg. 6. 1. 5, ὡς συμβούλῃ χρησόμενος τῶν ἀναγκαίων τῆς ἀρχῆς, and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 40, τοῖσι οὖν προσέχεται τὸν αὐτὸν, καὶ ἐὰν ἡμῖν δέξῃ δίκαιά τι καὶ συμφέροντα τῇ κοινῇ, προσθήσω δ' ὅτι καὶ ἀναγκαῖα, συγχωρήσεται ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τυχὼν ἐκόντες. Judges are probably included under κριταὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, the broad term τὰ ἀναγκαῖα comprising τὰ δίκαια τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

C. 9. 25. πάντων τοῦτων, sc. τῶν ἔργων.

ἐνδέχεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for it is possible that the same men should be all of them both cultivators and artisans and the deliberators and judges.' Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 2 sqq.

27. ἡ καθ' ἑκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους ὑποδείξιν, 'or whether for each of the above-mentioned services we are to assume the existence of a separate class.' For καθ' ἑκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων, not καθ' ἑκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων ἔργων, see note on 1283 b 4, καθ' ἑκάστην πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων.

29. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ ταὐτὸ πολιτεία, 'but the same arrangement does not prevail in every constitution.'

καθάπερ εἴπομεν, in 24—28.

31. ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for these differing arrangements as to participation [besides being different themselves] also make constitutions different.' This proves their possibility. Cp. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 3 sqq.

34. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 2. 1324 a 23 sqq.

36. εἴρηται πρότερον, in c. 1. 1323 b 29 sqq.

38. τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίους ἀνδρας ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, 'that which possesses men absolutely just and not merely just relatively to the principle which may happen to be taken as the groundwork of the State': cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 3 sqq.: 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36 sqq.: 2. 9. 1269 a 32 sqq. See also Bon. Ind. 797 a 52 sqq.

39. οὔτε βάναισον βίον οὐτ' ἀγοραίων δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς πολίτας. Plato had already forbidden the citizens of the State of the Laws, or even their slaves, to practise a handicraft (846 D), and had forbidden the practice of retail trade with a view to money-making to any one except strangers (847 D: 849 C sq.: 920 A). Thus he goes farther in this matter than Aristotle.

40. ἀγεννῆς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 26 sqq., and (with Eaton) I. II. 1258 b 38, ἀγεννέσταται δὲ (τῶν ἐργασίων) ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἀρετῆς.

πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπεραντίος. Plato (Laws 920 B) had reckoned retail trade among the ἐπιτηδεύματα ἃ προτροπὴν ἔχει τὰ ἰσχυρὰ πρὸς τὸ προτρέπεω κακοῖς γίγνεσθαι. He has in his mind not only the adulteration practised by retailers (Laws 917 E, 920 C), but also their habit of exacting an excessive profit (Laws 918 D, 920 C).

41. οὐδὲ δὲ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 10. 1142 b 6, οὐδὲ δὲ δέξαι ἡ εἰσβολία οὐδεμία, and other passages collected in Bon. Ind. 173 a 33 sqq.

τοὺς μέλλοντας ἔσεσθαι, sc. πολίτας. Omissions of this kind are not rare in the Politics: see vol. II. p. II, note 4, and note on 1266 b 1.

1329 a. 1. δαί γάρ κ.τ.λ. For the connexion of leisure with virtue and capacity for rule, cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 28, σχολαστικώτεροι γὰρ γινόμενοι διὰ τὰς εὐπορίας καὶ μεγαλοφυχότεροι πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν: 2. 11. 1273 a 24, ἀδύνατος γὰρ τὸν ἀπορούντα καλῶς ἀρχειν καὶ σχολάζειν: 2. 9. 1269 a 34 sqq. Compare also Eurip. Suppl. 406 Bothe (420 Dind.),

γαστέροι δ' ἀνὴρ πίνετ,
εἰ καὶ γένοιτο μὴ ἀμαθῆς, ἔργων ὅπο
οὐκ ἔν δύναιτο πρὸς τὰ κοῖν' ἀποβλέπειν.

4. καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς πόλεως μάλιστα ὅντα, 'and evidently are in an especial sense parts of the State, [so that there is no question to be raised as to their citizenship, such as has been raised as to the citizenship of the βάνουσι and γεωργοί].'

5. ἕτερα καὶ ταῦτα θετέον. Susemihl, following Coray and Bekk.², inserts ἐτίροις after ἕτερα, but cp. c. 10. 1329 a 41, οἱ δαὶ διηγήσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸ τε μάχιμον ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ τὸ γεωργικόν.

6. ἀμφα, sc. τὰ ἔργα, i. e. τὸ πολεμεῖν and τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ κρίνειν: cp. 8, ἐκότερον τῶν ἔργων.

φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτα. It has already (1328 b 37) been said to be φανερόν that the citizens must not be βάνουσι or ἀγοραῖοι or γεωργοί.

διότι τρόπον μὲν τινα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 14. 1332 b 41, ἔστι μὲν ἄρα ὡς τοῖς αἰτοῖς ἀρχειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι φατέον, ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἐτίρους. For καὶ before ἐτίροις, see above on 1324 a 19.

8. ἐτίρας ἀκμῆς, 'a different prime.' Warlike activity suits the prime of the body, which, according to Rhet. 2. 14. 1390 b 9 sqq., falls between thirty and thirty-five years of age, whereas deliberative and judicial activity suits the prime of the soul and the intelligence, which Aristotle places at forty-nine (ibid.) or fifty (Pol. 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 32 sqq.). Plato places the prime both of body and of wisdom for men between thirty and fifty-five years of age; he does not seem to have discriminated the two primes, like Aristotle: cp. Rep. 460 E, ἀμφοτέρων γούν, ἔφη, αὕτη ἀκμὴ σώματος τε καὶ φρονήσεως.

9. δυνάμεις = ισχύος: cp. c. 17. 1336 a 4 and 5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4. ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀδυνάτων κ.τ.λ. Eaton compares Xen. Cyrop. 7. 5. 79 and Thuc. 3. 27. Cp. also Plut. Aristid. c. 22.

12. For the construction of μένειν ἢ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν, cp. Plato, Rep. 429 B, οὐ γάρ, οἶμαι, εἶπεν, οἱ γε ἄλλοι ἐν αὐτῇ ἢ δεῖλαι ἢ ἀνδρείαι ὄντες κύριοι ἐν εἶναι ἢ τοῖαν αὐτὰν εἶναι ἢ τοῖαν.

13. λείπεται τοίνυν κ.τ.λ., 'the only course left, then, is to assign these constitutional rights' (i. e. those of fighting, judging, and

deliberating) 'to the same men and to both classes' (i.e. both to those who have strength and to those who have wisdom), 'not however simultaneously; but in the natural order of things strength is found in younger men and wisdom in older men; therefore it is advantageous that distribution should be made to both classes in this way' (i.e. so that fighting should fall to the younger men, and deliberating and judging to the older men), 'and it is just that this should be so, for this division of functions has in it conformity to desert.' *Ἀποδιδόναι* takes up τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποδοτέον ἀμφω, 6. For τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην, see note on 1264 a 38. There is, however, just a possibility that πολιτείας has been repeated from the preceding line by an error on the part of the copyist of the archetype and has taken the place of λειτουργίας or τάξιν or some such word: cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 20, where πολιτείας, repeated from πολιτεῖαν in the preceding line, has taken the place of βοηθείας in Γ M^s and Vat. Pal. Vict. interprets τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην 'hanc curam in republica' and Bonitz (Ind. 612 b 47 sq.) 'hanc partem reipublicae administrandae.' Sua would substitute ἀμφοτέρω for ἀμφοτέροις and ταῦτα for ταύτην (Mr. Welldon follows him in the former change but not in the latter), and would make τὴν πολιτείαν (in the sense of 'the best constitution') the subject of ἀποδιδόναι. But perhaps no change in ἀμφοτέροις is necessary. The reading ἀμφοτέροις is supported by ἀμφοῖν, 16. For ὅσπερ πέφυκεν, cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 11, ᾧ πέφυκεν, and Meteor. 2. 4. 360 b 2, ὡς πέφυκεν. For the addition of καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι (sc. οὕτως), compare the addition of καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον in 3. 17. 1287 b 37 sqq. and that of καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν in 1. 9. 1256 b 40. Welldon, however, may possibly be right in reading δίκαιόν ἐστιν in place of δίκαιον εἶναι (see critical note). In assigning strength to younger men and wisdom to older, Aristotle perhaps has before him Hom. Il. 13. 727-734, 19. 216-219, and 3. 108 sqq.: cp. also Eurip. Fragm. 293 and 511, and Aeschin. c. Timarch. cc. 24, 139. Wisdom was often ascribed not to πρεσβύτεροι, but to old men (e.g. by Pindar, Fragm. 182, cp. Plut. An Seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 10, and Plato, Laws 653 A: by Sophocles, Fragm. 240, contrast Eurip. Fragm. 25: and by Euripides, Fragm. 622), but Aristotle ascribes it to πρεσβύτεροι. What exact age Aristotle designates by this word, it is difficult to say. In c. 16. 1335 b 29 (see note) those over fifty or even fifty-five years of age are referred to: on the other hand, in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 23 of πρεσβύτεροι are contrasted not with of νεώτεροι, but with

of *νόν*. As the prime of the intelligence is placed by him at forty-nine or fifty (see above on 8), perhaps this is the age intended. Alcibiades was probably about thirty-five when he became the advocate of the Syracusan expedition. The saying of Euripides in his *Demi*, *μή μάλ' αὖ μῶν* (Meineke, *Fragn. Com. Gr.* 2. 417: cf. Meineke, *Hist. Crit. Com. Gr.* p. 12F, was famous. Aristophanes makes the Athenian Demos say of the young men *Ἐγὼ 138*: Didot: cp. *ISOCR. ASCOP.* § 45).

μή δ' αὖ, ἀλλ' ἀναιδέως παρρησίᾳ ἵπῳ

τοῖντο δυνάμει, ἀναιδέως φησισμένῳ.

In the Polity or moderate Democracy which existed at Syracuse before the Athenian attack, the younger men were excluded from office by law (*Thuc.* 6. 32. 5). We read in *[Hesiod. Poet.] De Rebuspubl.* 31, *οἷος δὲ ἔσ' ἑλκεθῆναι μὴ ἄρ' αὖ μᾶλλον* *τοῖντο δὲν παρρησίᾳ*. A somewhat similar principle underlay the *ordo magistratum* at Rome. Alcibiades, on the other hand, contends in *Thuc.* 6. 18. 6 that deliberation is most likely to be successful when it is carried on by old and young men together: compare the arguments put in the mouth of the young Archidamus by Isocrates (*Archid.* § 3 sqq.).

17. *ἀλλὰ μὲν κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle here passes on from the *γοῦροι*, *τεχνῖται*, *τὸ πείραμα*, and the *ἀρετὴ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ συμφέρειναι* (c. 2. 1328 b 20 sqq.) to *τὸ δύναναι* (1328 b 22), and in 1329 a 27 sqq. to *ἐκ τῆς*. *Περὶ τοῦτον* corresponds to *τοῖντο*, 25 (*Rom. Ind.* 579 b 43 sqq.). By *τοῖντο* Aristotle means soldiers, judges, and deliberators (cp. c. 10. 1329 b 36 sqq.). I add *οὖν* with Bekk, Sae., and others, though its omission may possibly be defensible, cp. c. 10. 1330 a 25, where however there is an *οὖν* close at hand, and *Rhet.* 3. 12. 1414 a 18, *τὸ δὲ προδιακρίνεται τὴν λέξιν, ὅτι ἴδιον δὲ καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὲς, περίργον*, and see Vahlen on *Poet.* c. 24. 1459 b 7. *Εἰσπρία* must be possessed by the citizens, for otherwise they will not be at leisure to attend to politics.

21. *τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργία*. This phrase comes from Plato, *Rep.* 500 D, *ἔστι καὶ αὐτὴ δημιουργία αἰεὶν οὐκ ἐκείνηται σφαιροειδὲς τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ξηραῖα τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς*; It is, however, implied in the saying of Protagoras in Plato, *Protag.* 326 E, *τοῖντο τοῦ πρίμματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτὸς, οὐδὲν δὲ ἔκείνηται*. Contrast the description of the *χρηματισμός* in Plato, *Gorg.* 452 C as *πλοῦτον δημιουργία*.

τοῦτο δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but this' (i.e. the fact that *βένεσθαι* and generally

those who are not producers of virtue ought not to be citizens) 'is manifest from the principle which forms the basis of our State, for happiness must be forthcoming in it in close alliance with virtue, and we should pronounce a State happy, looking not to a part of it, but to all its citizens, [so that all the citizens must be virtuous, whence it follows that βέλαιοι and their likes must not be citizens].' In requiring that all the citizens shall be happy, Aristotle here goes beyond 2. 5. 1264 b 17 sqq., and in requiring that they shall all be virtuous beyond 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 36 sqq. For τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, cp. c. 9. 1328 b 35, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἶρηται πρότερον, and Plato, *Laws* 742 E, σχεδὸν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαίμονας ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι.

25. φανερόν 82 κ.τ.λ., 'and this also is evident that the landed properties should belong to these' (i.e. to the soldiers, judges, and deliberators), 'if, as is the case,' etc. The landed properties might have been given to the cultivators (to whom Plato had given them in the *Republic*, 2. 5. 1264 a 32 sqq.), if it were not necessary that they should be slaves or barbarian serfs.

28. οὕτε γὰρ γεωργὸν κ.τ.λ. Compare the regulation as to the purchase of a priesthood in Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr. Gr.* No. 369, ἀνείσθω δὲ δὲ [καὶ ἢ δλ]έκταρος καὶ οἱ δημοσιουργίας [μύνεσσι], and see Haussoullier's note quoted by Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr. Gr.* No. 323, note 5, and also No. 358, μὴ ἐξίναυ κα[τάρ]χισθαι εἰς τὸ Ἑρα[σ] ξίναυ μηδενί, and [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 73.

30. ἐπεὶ 82 κ.τ.λ. The reasoning is—the gods should be worshipped by citizens, but we have ranged all the active citizens either in the hoplite or in the deliberative class (Aristotle here appears to merge the judicial in the deliberative class: cp. 1328 b 26, τοὺς βουλευομένους καὶ δικάζοντας, and 1329 a 3 sq.), so that we must assign the priesthoods to those of the citizens who are past the age for work. Citizens who are past work are still πᾶσι πολίταις (3. 1. 1275 a 14 sqq.). Aristotle thinks it fitting that the easy and recreative work of paying honour to the gods should fall, not, as was often the case in Greece, to those whose strength was unimpaired, but to those who had become infirm through age (cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 20 sqq., where easy harmonies are recommended to αἱ ἀπειρηκότες διὰ χρόνον). Plato, on the contrary, had advised (*Rep.* 498 C sqq.) that in old age, when strength declines and military and political work is over, men who are to be happy should reserve themselves exclusively for philosophy. See also on this subject

vol. i. p. 329 sq. At Sparta men of advanced years were allowed to discharge important public functions (2. 9. 1270 b 38 sqq.), and this Aristotle does not approve. He does not intend to withdraw from the *βασίλεις*, *ἀρχοντες*, or *πρυτάνεις* the public sacrifices connected with the common hearth of the State which it was their function to offer (8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.). These were not priestly sacrifices, and it is of priests alone that Aristotle is speaking in the passage before us. *Ἀνάπαυσις* is rather 'relaxation' than 'repose': cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 15 sqq. For the connexion of relaxation with the worship of the gods, cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 24, *τιμὰς ἀναπαύσεσσι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναπαύσεσσι πορίζοντες μεθ' ἡδονῆς*, and Plato, Rep. 364 E (where Stallbaum compares Hdt. 8. 99, *ἐν θυσίῳ τε καὶ εὐπαθείῳ*), and 9. 11, *Ἰακίνοδά τε ἀγῶνι καὶ παύσει*), and Laws 803 D sq.

34. *ὅν μὲν τοῖνυν . . . 1329 b 35, ζητεῖν*. I incline to regard this passage as an interpolation and as not being from the pen of Aristotle. As to 40, *τοῖσι δὲ . . . 1329 b 35, ζητεῖν*, I have already spoken in vol. i. Appendix E, and if we reject this passage, as we should probably do, it is difficult to retain the recapitulation, 34, *ὅν μὲν τοῖνυν . . . 39, κατὰ μέρος*. For this recapitulation cannot have been immediately followed by the second recapitulation 1329 b 36, *ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . . 39, χάραν*, and to expunge (with Sus.) this second recapitulation is not advisable, for then the mention of *τῆς διανομῆς* in 39 becomes extremely abrupt, inasmuch as the reference to the territory which prepares the way for it in the text as it stands will have disappeared. The passage 40, *τοῖσι δὲ . . . 1329 b 35, ζητεῖν* appears still more clearly to have been interpolated. It may have been originally an annotation written by some member of the Peripatetic School on the margin of his copy of the Politics, and may have crept from the margin into the text. It is apparently intended to excuse and account for the absence of a special investigation of the question whether the fighting class should be distinct from the cultivating class. Thus we are told at its close (1329 b 33 sqq.) that it is useless to waste time in investigating what is well settled, and that one should investigate only what has been overlooked. It should be noticed that it says nothing of the existence in India both of castes and of a distinction between the fighting and cultivating classes, though Megasthenes, not very long after the time when the Politics was written, testified to this (ap. Strab. p. 703, *φησὶ δὲ (ὁ Μεγασθένης) τὰ τῶν Ἰνδῶν πλῆθος εἰς ἐκτὰ μέρος*

διηρῆσθαι κ.τ.λ.), but it would be rash to conclude that, if the passage is an interpolation, its author wrote before the publication of Megasthenes' work. That it stood where it stands in the Politics in the days of the authority followed by Stobaeus in his account (Ecl. 2. 6. 17) of the Political Theory of the Peripatetics is likely, for he says of the distribution of functions between the young, the elders, and the old, ταύτην δ' ἀρχαίαν εἶναι πάντῃ τὴν διάταξιν, Αἰγυπτίων πρώτων καταστησαμένων, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐχ ἦντων, which evidently refers, however inaccurately, to the views expressed in this part of c. 10. The late Prof. Chandler and Bojesen, indeed, contented themselves with rejecting only a part of the passage 1329 a 40 . . . b 35; the former rejected 1329 b 3, τὰ τε περὶ τὴν Κρήτην . . . 25, Ζεφώστριος, and the latter 1329 b 5, ἀρχαία . . . 25, Ζεφώστριος. The part they reject is certainly the most evidently spurious part, but much suspicion also attaches to the part which they retain, 1329 b 25—35 (see vol. i. Appendix E), and on the whole I incline to reject the entire passage 1329 a 40—b 35, together with the recapitulation which precedes it, 1329 a 34—39.

35. γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for cultivators and artisans and the whole class of labourers are a necessary appurtenance of the State' (literally, 'a thing necessary to belong to States'): compare for the construction c. 10. 1330 a 3, περὶ συσσιτίων τε συνδοκῇ πάντι χρήσιμον εἶναι (sc. τὰ συσσίτια) ταῖς εἰς κατασκευασμένας πόλεις ὑπάρχειν, and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 7, δ' τοῦτων οὐδὲν ἥττω ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, and see Stallbaum on Plato, Laws 643 C, δεῖα ἀναγκαῖα προμεμαθημένα.

37. τό τε ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικόν. For the absence of the article before βουλευτικόν, cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 8, τί τὸ δίκαιον τό τε δικταρχικόν καὶ δημοκρατικόν.

38. καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ κ.τ.λ. For καὶ . . . δὴ see above on 1253 a 18. Κατὰ μέρος, Vict. 'per vices,' i.e. in such a way that the one succeeds the other.

40. Ἔοικε δὲ κ.τ.λ. As has been pointed out in vol. i. C. 10. Appendix E, Greek writers are always glad to claim the authority of antiquity in support of their suggestions. Reference has already there been made to Demosth. in Lept. c. 89: compare also Lucian, De Saltat. c. 7, καὶ πρῶτόν γε ἐκείνῳ πάντῃ ἡγοούμενοι μαι δοκίμῃ, ὡς οὐ νεώτερον τὸ τῆς ἀρχήσεως ἐπιτήδευμα τοῦτό ἐστιν, οὐδὲ χεῖς καὶ πρῶτον ἀρξάμενον, ὅταν κατὰ τοὺς προπάτορας ἡμῶν ἢ τοὺς ἐκείνων, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Isocrates says (De Antid. § 82) that the most ancient laws were

thought the best. For τοῖς περὶ πολιτείας φιλοσοφοῦσιν cp. 3. 1. 1274 b 32, τῇ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντι. Δηρῆσθαι χωρὶς, 41, appears to take up καχέρισται, 38. For δηρῆσθαι χωρὶς κατὰ γένη cp. 1329 b 23, ὁ χωρισμὸς ὁ κατὰ γένος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλῆθος. States were also divided κατὰ συσσίτια and κατὰ φραγρίας καὶ φυλὰς (2. 5. 1264 a 6 sqq.).

- 1329 b. 2. ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. In Egypt there was a general distribution of the population into γένη (Hdt. 2. 164, where, however, the γεωργοὶ are not mentioned as one of the γένη: contrast Diod. 1. 73 sq., where the classes enumerated are priests, kings, warriors, herdsmen, *cultivators*, and artisans). Herodotus dwells rather on the prohibition of βάνασσαι τίχουσι to the warrior class in Egypt than on the prohibition of agriculture (2. 165, καὶ τοῦτων βασιανσίης οὐδεὶς δίδασκει οὐδέιν, ἀλλ' ἐνέονται ἐς τὸ μέγιστον), and so do Isocrates (Busir. § 18) and Plutarch (Lycurg. c. 4 *sub fin.*), but Plato in Tim. 24 B refers to the separation of the warrior class in Egypt from the herdsmen, hunters, and cultivators. The names of Sesostris and Minos are mentioned in the passage before us to show the antiquity of this institution in Egypt and Crete. The separation of the warriors from those who practise other arts is ascribed by Isocrates (Busir. § 15 sqq.) not to Sesostris, but to Busiris; 'legislation respecting the warrior class,' however, is ascribed by Diodorus (1. 94. 4) to Sesosis (Sesostris), whom he calls the third lawgiver of Egypt, and Dicaearchus (Fragm. 7: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 235) credits him with a law making all arts hereditary. The passage before us evidently implies that the distinction between warriors and cultivators survived in Egypt even in the writer's day, i.e. that the cultivators did not serve as soldiers, nor the soldiers as cultivators.

5. ἀρχαία δὲ κ.τ.λ. With the object of proving that political institutions and laws are of early date (cp. 31 sqq.), the writer instances another institution, that of the syssitia. Compare the similar transition from the subject of the distinction of warriors and cultivators to that of syssitia in 2. 10. 1271 b 41 sqq.

6. τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην, sc. συσσίτια, in apposition to τῶν συσσιτίων ἢ τάξις.

7. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολλῇ παλαιότερα τούτων. This results from the fact that in Italy syssitia were as old as the introduction of the names 'Italy' and 'Italians' and the conversion of the Italians from nomads into cultivators.

8. φασὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Antiochus of Syracuse is probably referred to, for the facts here related are derived from him: cp. Antioch. Fragm. 3 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 181), "Ἀντίοχος Ξενοφάνους τάδε συνέγραψε περὶ Ἰταλίας . . . τὴν γῆν ταύτην, ἥτις νῦν Ἰταλία καλεῖται, τὸ παλαιὸν εἶχεσθαι Οἰωντροί." "Ἐπειτα διεξελθὼν ἐν τρόπῳ ἐκαστεύοντο καὶ ὡς βασιλεῖς ἐν αὐτοῖς Ἰταλὸς ἀπὸ χρόνου ἐγένετο, ἀφ' οὗ μετωνομάσθησαν Ἰταλοί, κ.τ.λ.: Fragm. 4, Ἰταλία δὲ ἀπὸ χρόνου ὠνομάσθη ἐπ' ἀνδρὸς δυνατοῦ, ὄνομα Ἰταλοῦ. Τοῦτον δὲ φησὶν Ἀντίοχος ὁ Συρακούσιος . . . ἄσασαν ἐφ' ἑαυτῇ ποιήσασθαι τὴν γῆν, ὅση ἐντὸς ἦν τῶν κλίσεων τοῦ τε Ναπητίνου καὶ τοῦ Ζκυλλητίνου ἢ δὴ πρότερον κληθῆναι Ἰταλίαν ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἰταλοῦ: and Fragm. 6, εἶτι δ' ἀνέτερον ('apud vetustiores') Οἰωντροὺς τε καὶ Ἰταλοὺς μόνους εἶφη καλεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐντὸς τοῦ ἰσθμοῦ πρὸς τὸν Ζικελικὸν κεκλιμένους πορθρόν. Ἔστι δ' αὐτὸς ὁ ἰσθμὸς ἑκατὸν καὶ ἐξήκοντα στάδια, μετὰ δὲ δυοῖν κλίσεων, τοῦ τε Ἰππωνιάτου, ὃν Ἀντίοχος Ναπητίνον εἴρηκε, καὶ τοῦ Ζκυλλητικῶ. Compare also Virgil, Aen. i. 532 sq. The origin of *syssitia* is here traced to the territory in which the Epizephyrian Locri was situated, and not to Crete, in much the same way in which the Locrian Onomacritus was made out by some authorities (2. 12. 1274 2 25 sqq.) to have been the spiritual progenitor of a number of great lawgivers.

11. ἀκτὴν, 'peninsula': cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 6. 198 R, περιχεῖσθαι τε ὀλίγου πᾶσαν αὐτὴν (i.e. τὴν Ἀττικὴν) ὑπὸ τῆς θαλάττης· ὅθεν δὲ καὶ τοῦνομα λαβεῖν, οἷον ἀκτὴν τινα ὁδοῦ.

Ἰταλίαν τοῦνομα λαβεῖν. The name taken is put in the acc.: cp. Aristoph. Fragm. 304 Didot, Ἀμφόδοι ἐχρῆν αὐτῇ τεθεῖσθαι τοῦνομα.

12. ἐντὸς κ.τ.λ. The peninsula is apparently reckoned from its point, so that the territory lying between the point and the two gulfs is said to be within them, and the territory lying beyond the two gulfs, looking from the point, is implied to be outside them.

τοῦ Λαμητικῶ. Antiochus called this gulf, the modern gulf of S. Eufemia, by the name *Ναπητίνος* or *Ναπιτίνος*, a name the origin of which is uncertain; how it comes to be called *Λαμητικῶς* in the passage before us, which is based on Antiochus, is not clear. The name *Λαμητικῶς* is derived from that of a city called *Lametini*, probably situated on the shore of the gulf of S. Eufemia and near the stream which still bears the name of *Lamato* (the ancient *Lamētus*). See Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, art. *Lametini* and art. *Napetinus Sinus*.

13. ἀπέχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for these two gulfs are distant from each other [only] half a day's journey.' For the omission of 'only' see

note on 1282 a 36. The near approach of the two gulfs to each other is mentioned in justification of the description of Italy as lying 'within' them. They were 160 stadia, or about eighteen miles, apart (see above on 8), hence a day's journey is calculated here at thirty-six miles.

14. τοῦτον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Italus is probably regarded as the first lawgiver of the Oenotrians, and if this is so, the introduction of legislation among them is connected with the change from a pastoral to an agricultural life: see Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, Eng. Trans., 1. 21, and cp. Plut. *De Iside et Osiride*, c. 13, βασιλεύοντα δ' Ὀσίρω Αἰγυπτίους μὲν εἰδὼς ἀγέρον βίον καὶ θηριάδων ἀπαλλάξαι, παραυτὶς τε δείκναι καὶ νέμεσι θέμενον αὐτοῖς, καὶ θεοῖς δείκναι τιμῶν, and Ovid, *Metam.* 5. 341,

Prima Ceres unco glebas dimovit aratro,

Prima dedit fruges alimentaque mitia terra,

Prima dedit leges.

Janus takes the place of Italus in Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* c. 22, ἡ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν αὐτὸς ἐγγίαι καὶ ἀνέροις χρημαίνοντες φθεῖναι εἰς ἕτερον βίον σχῆμα, πείσεις καὶ γεωργίαν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι, μετέβαλε καὶ μετεκόμηναι; Compare the language of Strabo as to Masinissa (p. 833), καὶ γὰρ δὲ καὶ οὕτως ἔστιν ὁ τοῖς νομάδας πολιτικῶς κατασκευάσας καὶ γεωργούς, ἐπὶ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ληστοῦντος δαδύξας στρατεύων. Syssitia (σίσις, 'corn') are probably conceived as connected with agriculture. For τοῦτον δὲ τὸν Ἰταλὸν Encken (*De Partic. Usu*, p. 39) compares 1. 6. 1255 a 7, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δίκαιον. Δὲ introduces in both passages a statement about the person or thing which has been described in what precedes. We expect θεῖναι rather than δίσσθαι, but cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 38.

16. διὰ κ.τ.λ. On the resemblance of this passage to 2. 10. 1271 b 30 sqq., see vol. i p. 575, note 2. The continued existence of the institution and of certain of the laws of Italus among some of his descendants is apparently mentioned in confirmation of the statement that he introduced the syssitia and was the author of other laws also.

18. ὅκων δὲ κ.τ.λ. It would seem that the whole region from the Lameitic Gulf to Tyrrhenia (i.e. Latium Campania and Lucania) is here conceived as inhabited by Opici surnamed Ausones. That Aristotle included Latium in Opica we see from *Fragm.* 567. 1571 a 24 sq. Campania, according to Antiochus of Syracuse, was inhabited by 'Opici, who were also called Ausones' (*Fragm.* 8:

Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 183). But we do not find that Lucania is elsewhere said to be inhabited by Opici surnamed Ausones, or indeed by Opici of any kind. Herodotus regards Elea, which was in the region ultimately known as Lucania, as in Oenotria, not in Opica (i. 167).

20. τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν Ἰαπυγίαν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Antioch. ap. Strab. p. 255 (Fragm. 6: Müller, i. 182), μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐπικτείνεται, φησί, τοῖονμα καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας καὶ τὸ τῶν Οἰνωτρῶν μέχρι τῆς Μεταποντίας καὶ τῆς Ζεφύριδος· αἰκῆσαι γὰρ τοὺς τόπους τούτους Χώας, Οἰνωτρικὸν ἴδιον κατακοσμούμενον, καὶ τὴν γῆν ὀνομάσαι Χάων.

τὸν Ἰόνιον, sc. κόλπον, cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 11, and see Liddell and Scott.

23. ὁ δὲ χωρισμὸς κ.τ.λ. The Egyptians; according to Plut. Lycurg. c. 4, claimed that Lycurgus visited Egypt and borrowed there the separation of the warriors from the other classes which he introduced at Sparta, and Isocrates in his Busiris (§ 17 sq.) traces this and other Lacedaemonian institutions to Egypt: cp. Pherecr. Ἄγριοι, Fragg. 5 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 257), where Lycurgus is connected with Egypt. Aristotle, however, in 2. 10. 1271 b 22 sqq., like the Lacedaemonians themselves (see above on 1271 b 22), traces the laws of Lycurgus to Crete.

24. πολλὸν γὰρ ὑπερτείνει κ.τ.λ. According to Dicaearchus, Fragg. 7 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 235), Sesostris was king of Egypt immediately after Orus, the son of Osiris and Isis, and lived 2936 years before the first Olympiad. Herodotus, however, would seem to place Sesostris much later. Camerarius remarks (Interp. p. 298), 'quod quidem nunc ait autor, regnum Sesostris longe superare annis regnum Minois, cum narratione Herodoti non videtur congruere. Hic enim' (2. 112 sqq.) 'Proteum regem Aegypti facit tertium a Sesostri, cuius regnum inciderit in tempus belli Troiani. Et in exercitu Graecorum illius belli fuit secundum Homerum' (Odys. 19. 178 sqq.) 'Idomeneus et ipse tertius a Minoe, ut paene aequales ita reperiantur Sesostris et Minos; hoc modo, Sesostris, Pheron, Proteus, et Minos, Deucalion, Idomeneus.'

25. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The sense is—'So then, just as we have seen that syssitia were invented first in Italy and afterwards in Crete, and the division of the population into different classes first in Egypt and afterwards in Crete, we may take it that all other discoveries have been made over and over again an indefinite number of times—for discovery comes easily to men, need reveal-

ing discoveries of a necessary kind, and others following in due course—and this holds of political institutions as fully as of anything else; but that all political institutions are ancient, [which is what concerns us now,] is proved by the example of Egypt.' The view that everything has been invented over and over again is quite Aristotelian: cp. *Metaph. A. 8.* 1074 b 10, κατὰ τὸ αἰεὶ πολλὰς εὐρημένους εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἐκείνους καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθινομένων: *De Caelo*, 1. 3. 270 b 19, οὐ γὰρ ἀπαξ οὐδέ τις ἀλλ' ἀπειράκις δεῖ νομίζειν τὰς αὐτὰς ἀφικνίσθαι δόξας εἰς ἡμᾶς: *Meteor.* 1. 3. 339 b 27 sqq. This view may have been suggested by the fact that the inventions which were ascribed in Greece to Palamedes, Orpheus, and others were ascribed in Egypt to far earlier inventors, so that it was natural to suppose that in the interval between the Egyptian inventors and Palamedes and the rest the arts invented by the former had been lost. It is likely enough that arts have been lost and rediscovered. A writer in the *Times* of Sept. 27, 1886, remarks of some 'glazed bricks' of the time of Rameses II from Tel-el-Jahûdt, now in the British Museum, 'Historians of Italian art speak of the "discovery" of Luca della Robbia; here is the *faience* decoration in the highest state of excellence more than 2,700 years before he was born.' For ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 1 sqq. Aristotle believed that the human race had existed from everlasting (see note on 1269 a 5). For the contrast of τὰ ἀναγκαῖα and τὰ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν, Camerarius (*Interp.* p. 298) compares *Top.* 3. 2. 118 a 6, καὶ τὰ ἐκ περιουσίας τῶν ἀναγκαίων βελτίαι, ἐπίτοι δὲ καὶ ἀρετώτερα· βελτίων γὰρ τοῦ ζῆν τὸ εὖ ζῆν, τὸ δὲ εὖ ζῆν ἐστὶν ἐκ περιουσίας, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαῖον . . . τὸ δ' ἐκ περιουσίας ἐστίν, ὅταν ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄλλα τινὰ προσκατασκευάζηται τις τῶν καλῶν: cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 2 sqq. For τὴν χρεῖαν διδάσκον αὐτῇ, cp. Eurip. *Fragm.* 709 (Leutsch and Schneidewin, *Paroem. Gr.* 2. 729),

οὐ τὰρ 'Ὀδυσσεύς ἐστιν αἰμύλος μένος
χρεῖα διδάσκει, πλὴν βραβύς τις ᾧ, σάφει,

and Leutsch and Schneidewin, 2. 203,

πολλῶν δ' λιμὸς γίνεται διδάσκαλος.

That necessary things are discovered first had already been implied by Democritus (see vol. i. p. 356, note 1).

81. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαῖα κ.τ.λ. The argument is—'we might expect the Egyptians, who are thought to be the most ancient race in the world, to have come into existence before laws and

constitutions were invented, in which case we should find them lacking these still, but the fact is quite otherwise; hence laws and institutions must be of very ancient origin.' Thus the statement with which the passage commences as to the antiquity of the distinction between the fighting and cultivating classes is fully borne out. In the reference to the Egyptians it is evidently assumed with much *naïveté* that as a race is when it first comes into being, so it will remain. Bernays (*Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit*, p. 169) and Susemihl would insert *ἀπὸ* after *ῥα*, but in my opinion without necessity. We are familiar with the belief that the Egyptian race was the most ancient in the world from the well-known story in *Hdt.* 2. 2. There was a general agreement as to the fact, though some claimed priority for the Phrygians (*ibid.*) or the Scythians (Justin, 2. 1. 5 sqq.) and Aristotle himself for the Magi (Diog. Laert. 1. 8), but there was much disagreement as to the cause. For one theory, see Hippys of Rhegium, *Fragm.* 1 (Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 2. 13), Diod. 1. 10. 1, and Justin, 2. 1. 5 sqq. Aristotle's own theory may be gathered from *Meteor.* 1. 14. 352 b 20 sqq. The priests of Sais in the *Timaeus* of Plato (22 C sqq.) assign a different cause.

33. *ὅδ' οὐκ ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.*, 'hence we should make use of what has been adequately said [without spending time on its further investigation], and attempt to investigate [only] what has been left untouched': cp. c. 1. 1323 a 21 sqq.: *Eth. Nic.* 10. 10. 1181 b 12 sqq.: *Isocr.* *Ad Nicocl.* § 8, *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τό γε ἐπιχείρημα καλῶς ἔχει, τὸ ζῆτεῖν τὰ παραλελειμμένα καὶ νομοθετεῖν ταῖς μοναρχίαις*. I follow Sepulveda, Vict., and Lamb. in taking *καλῶς* with *τοῖς εἰρημίοις*, and not (as do Sus. and Welldon) with *χρησθαι*: cp. *Eth. Nic.* 1. 3. 1096 a 3, *καλῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίαις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν*, and *Pol.* 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 10, *διόπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κομφύως τοῦτο, οὐχ ἡκαῶς δὲ εἴρηται*. Looking to these passages and to the very similar passage c. 1. 1323 a 21 sqq., I incline on the whole to retain the reading of Γ Π *εἰρημίοις*, and not (with Lamb., Bekk.³, and Sus.) to substitute *εἰρημίοις* for it, though c. 11. 1331 a 16 might be quoted in favour of this reading. It is true also that the antithesis to *παραλελειμμένα* is often *εἰρημίοις* (e.g. in *Soph. El.* 33. 184 b 6 sqq. and *Demosth. De Symmor.* c. 23: cp. *Pol.* 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 15 sqq.), but this is not always the case, as we see from *Isocr. Hel.* § 67, *πολὺν δὲ πλεονέκτημα τὰ παραλελειμμένα τῶν εἰρημίων ἐστίν*. For the suppression of 'only,' see above on 1329 b 13 and 1282 a 36.

36. τῶν ὅπλα κεκτημένων. For the absence of τῶν before ὅπλα, cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 29, περὶ τοῦ ὅπλα κεκτηῖσθαι, and see critical note on 1267 b 33. As to the distinction here implied between the hoplites and those who share in the constitution, see vol. i. p. 324 and note 1 on that page.

37. εἴρηται πρότερον, in c. 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.

38. αὐτῶν ἐτέρους, 'distinct from them': cp. c. 12. 1331 b 1 and Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1173 b 28, ἕτεροι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν (ἵδουσι) τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν.

40. τίνες καὶ πόλεις. The answer to τίνες (given in 1330 a 25 sqq.) is 'slaves or non-Greek serfs,' and to πόλεις (ibid.) is 'not of one race nor spirited in character.'

41. πρῶτον. Aristotle afterwards deals with the site of the city.

φαγεῖν, in 2. 5. 1263 a 37 sqq. That no citizen should want for food, is implied in 1263 a 21 sqq.: see above on 1263 a 24.

1330 a. 1. For the reference here to Plato as τινές, see above on 1327 b 38. Lycurgus (In Leocr. cc. 92 and 132) carries this use of τινές so far as to say that τινές wrote this or that passage of verse which he quotes (Richards).

ἀλλὰ τῇ χρήσει φιλικῶς γινομένην κοινήν, sc. εἶναι δεῖν. Φιλικῶς qualifies κοινήν, 'common in friendly fashion,' 'common as the goods of friends are common': cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 29, δι' ἀρετὴν ὅ ἐστιν πρὸς τὸ χρησθαι κατὰ τὴν παρομοίαν κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. Γινομένην = ποιουμένην: cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 37, φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἰδίας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινάς. For εἶναι γινομένην, cp. Hdt. 1. 146, ταῦτα δὲ ἦν γινόμενα ἐν Μιλήτῳ, and Plato, Polit. 301 D, and see above on 1259 b 11. Sus. and Welldon adopt Congreve's conjecture of γινομένην for γινόμενην (Sus. adding γίνεσθαι after γινόμενην), but, as it seems to me, not rightly.

2. οὐτ' ἀπορεῖν κ.τ.λ. As to the importance of this, see Isocr. Areop. §§ 53, 83, and Plato, Laws 735 E.

3. περὶ συσσιτίων τε κ.τ.λ., 'and with regard to common meals, all agree that they are an useful thing to belong to well-constituted States.' For the construction, compare c. 9. 1329 a 35 sqq. Aristotle passes on to the subject of common meals, because, like the friendly community of property which he has just recommended, they are a means of securing the citizens against a want of food. It was also necessary to settle the question of their existence before proceeding to the division of the territory, inasmuch as a portion of the territory is to be set apart for their support. Aristotle

nowhere fulfils, in what we possess of the Politics, the promise which he makes in 4, so that we can only guess why he approved of the institution. He probably valued it as a means of regulating habits of life and of enforcing the 'temperate and liberal' standard which he commends (c. 5. 1326 b 30 sqq.), as a means of making an approach to community of property (2. 5. 1263 b 40 sqq.), and also as a means of developing a high spirit and mutual confidence in his citizens and securing their acquaintance with each other (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 41 sqq.). See vol. I. p. 333 sqq. For an account of the purpose for which, according to Plato, the institution was originally introduced, see Laws 780 B sq.

5. $\delta\epsilon\iota\ \delta\epsilon\ \kappa\tau\lambda$. All the citizens ought to share in the common meals, and not, as at Sparta, that portion only of them which could afford to pay a contribution. See 2. 9. 1271 a 26 sqq. and 2. 10. 1272 a 12 sqq. Aristotle appears here to contemplate the existence of $\delta\epsilon\sigma\phi\omicron\iota$ in his 'best State.' $\tau\acute{o}\ \sigma\upsilon\sigma\tau\epsilon\tau\alpha\gamma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$, 'the assessed sum' (Liddell and Scott).

7. $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\iota\omicron\iota\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu\ \tau\eta\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\eta\nu\ \omicron\iota\kappa\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$, 'and to manage the rest of the housekeeping.' For $\tau\eta\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\eta\nu\ \omicron\iota\kappa\acute{\iota}\alpha\nu$, cp. c. 17. 1336 a 40 sq. and Plato, Rep. 458 D, $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\nu\ \gamma\upsilon\mu\upsilon\alpha\sigma\iota\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\nu\ \tau\eta\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\eta\ \tau\upsilon\phi\eta$.

8. $\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\delta\varsigma\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\delta\epsilon\varsigma\ \delta\alpha\pi\alpha\tau\eta\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$, 'expenses in relation to the gods,' cp. 12, $\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\delta\epsilon\varsigma\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \lambda\epsilon\iota\tau\upsilon\tau\upsilon\rho\gamma\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$, and 2. 8. 1267 b 34 sq.

9. $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\gamma\kappa\alpha\iota\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \tau\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\nu\ \kappa\tau\lambda$. As Aristotle's principle seems to be that expenses which fall on all the citizens should be provided for by public land set apart for the purpose, we might have expected him to have gone farther in this direction, and (e.g.) to have set apart public land to defray the expenses of the public education which the citizens are to receive (5 (8). 1. 1337 a 21 sqq.). As to the public land in Greek States, see Büchschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 63 sq. Aristotle does not, like Hippodamus (2. 8. 1267 b 33 sqq.), divide the territory of his State into three parts—sacred, public, and private—but only into two, public and private. He devotes a part of the public land to expenses connected with the gods, i.e. to the provision of sacrifices, repairs of temples, and perhaps also liturgies connected with festivals.

14. $\tau\eta\varsigma\ \delta\epsilon\ \tau\omega\nu\ \iota\delta\iota\omega\tau\omega\nu\ \kappa\tau\lambda$. Aristotle follows in the track of Plato, Laws 745 C, $\kappa\lambda\acute{\eta}\rho\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \delta\epsilon\ \delta\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu\ \tau\epsilon\tau\tau\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \kappa\omicron\tau\alpha\kappa\iota\sigma\chi\acute{\alpha}\lambda\iota\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, $\tau\omicron\iota\upsilon\tau\omega\nu\ \tau\epsilon\ \alpha\upsilon\ \delta\acute{\iota}\chi\alpha\ \tau\epsilon\mu\acute{\epsilon}\iota\nu\ \epsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omega\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \xi\upsilon\gamma\kappa\lambda\eta\rho\acute{\omega}\sigma\alpha\iota\ \delta\upsilon\omicron\ \tau\mu\acute{\eta}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$, $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \tau\epsilon\ \epsilon\gamma\gamma\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\acute{\omicron}\rho\omicron\varsigma\ \mu\epsilon\tau\acute{\iota}\chi\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\ \acute{\iota}\alpha\tau\epsilon\rho\omega\nu\ \tau\acute{o}\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \tau\eta\ \pi\acute{\omicron}\lambda\iota\epsilon\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\varsigma\ \tau\eta\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\chi\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \kappa\lambda\acute{\eta}\rho\omicron\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \tau\acute{o}\ \delta\epsilon\upsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omega\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\ \pi\acute{\omicron}\lambda\iota\epsilon\ \tau\eta\ \acute{\alpha}\nu' \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\chi\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega\varsigma\ \delta\epsilon\upsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\eta$

καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω πάντα. (Compare the process by which lots of land are assigned to the peasants of a Russian commune, as described by M. Leroy-Beaulieu in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Nov. 15, 1876, 'Chaque paysan reçoit une parcelle d'autant de sortes de terrain qu'il y a de qualités de terre dans la commune.' 'Quand les terres seraient tous de même qualité . . . l'inégale distance du village leur donne encore pour le paysan une inégale valeur.') Aristotle, however, does not approve (2. 6. 1265 b 24 sqq.) Plato's further suggestion (Laws 745 E) of two houses: see above on 1265 b 25. But would not the cultivation of two lots of land at a distance from each other be almost as troublesome as living in two houses? The reason for the arrangement which Aristotle follows Plato in adopting is obvious enough. Land near the city was probably as a rule far more valuable in ancient Greece than land at a distance from it. It was land in this situation that rich men were most likely to buy up (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 8 sqq.). Cp. Xen. De Vect. 4. 50, καὶ οἱ γε χώροι οὐδὲν ἔν εἰεν μείονος ἄξιοι τοῖς κερτημένοις ἐνταῦθα (at Laurium in Attica) ἢ τοῖς περὶ τὸ δασυ, and Hdt. 6. 20, τῆς δὲ Μιλησίης χώρας αὐτοὶ μὲν οἱ Πέρσαι εἶχον τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὸ πεδίον, τὰ δὲ ὑπεράκρια ἴδοσαν Καροὶ Πηλᾶσσι τοῖς ἐκτῆσθαι. So on the foundation of the colony of Thurii οἱ προὔπαρχοντες Συβαρίται . . . τὴν μὲν σύνορον τῇ πόλει χώραν κατεκληρούχουν ἑαυτοῖς, τὴν δὲ πόρρον κειμένην τοῖς ἐπὶ πόλει (Diod. 12. 11. 1). The owners of land near the city would not only be better able than others to take an active part in politics and be nearer to the conveniences and the handicraftsmen of the city, but would also command a better market for their produce, and would be less exposed to attack in case of invasion. Frontier-landowners, on the contrary, were the first to suffer in that event. Thus the Lacedaemonian owners of frontier-land suffered so much from the Messenians in Eira during the Second Messenian War that civil trouble resulted (Paus. 4. 18. 1: see note on 1306 b 37). Compare the case of the citizens of Corinth who owned the fertile and extensive frontier-plain between Corinth and Sicyon. This plain 'was rendered uncultivable during 393 and 392 B.C.' by the Corinthian War, and though its owners withdrew their servants and cattle to Peiracum, their loss 'was still so great that two successive seasons of it were quite enough to inspire them with a strong aversion to the war' (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 9. 455). As to the Acharnians, see Thuc. 2. 21, and the notes of Mr. Congreve and Prof. Jowett on the passage before us. The frontier-landowners

of ancient Greece, unlike those of the English and Scotch Border and of the Welsh Marches of England in the middle ages, seem to have feared more from the loss of their own goods than they hoped from raids on those of the foe.

16. For τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 b 1 sqq.

21. συμμετέχειν βουλῆς τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων. The story about the sufferings of the Lacedaemonian frontier-owners in the Second Messenian War comes from the *Εἰνομία* of Tyrtaeus (7 (5). 7. 1306 b 37 sqq.), and it is just possible that συμμετέχειν βουλῆς τῶν ὁμόρων πολέμων was a line in that poem. The Lacedaemonian State may well have been one of those in which the law referred to existed. For the absence of περί before τῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολέμων, cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 37, τὸ βουλευόμενον τῶν κοινῶν.

22. διὰ τὸ ἴδιον, 'on account of their private interest': cp. 3. 13. 1284 b 4, αἱ μὲν γὰρ παρεβίβηκυῖαι πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἀποσκοποῦσαι τοῦτο δρῶσιν. For the thought, cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 14 sqq. and 3. 16. 1287 b 2 sq.

25. τοὺς δὲ γεωργήσοντας κ.τ.λ. Plato also makes agriculture over to slaves in the State described in the Laws (806 D sq.). *Περίοικοι* differ from slaves in being only half-enslaved (see above on 1269 a 34). Thus the Mariandynian *περίοικοι* of the Pontic Heracleia could not be sold for export beyond the limits of the State (Strabo, p. 542), nor could the Helots (Strabo, p. 365).

εἰ δεῖ κατ' εὐχὴν. For the omission of εἶναι, see above on 1329 a 17 and 1277 a 38. Its omission is facilitated by the nearness of δούλους εἶναι.

26. μήτε ὁμοφύλων πάντων μήτε θυμοειδῶν, 'and should consist neither of men all of one kin nor of men spirited in character.' The gen. appears to be partitive, as in 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 28. Polybius distinguishes ὁμόφυλοι from ὁμοειθεῖς in 11. 19, ἀσταςίαστα διετήρησε τοσαῦτα πλήθη καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα, καίπερ οὐχ οἷον ὁμοειθέων ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁμοφύλοις χρησάμενος στρατοπέδοις' εἶχε γὰρ Λίβυνας Ἰβήρας Λιγυστίνους Κελτοὺς Φοίνικας Ἰταλοὺς Ἕλληνας, so that, if we take Aristotle to mean the same thing by ὁμόφυλος as Polybius does in this passage, he would be opposed to the employment of slaves belonging to one and the same great stock (Libyan, Celtic, Italian, or the like), even though they belonged to different *ἔθνη*, but this is not the sense in which the word is used in 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 25 sqq., and Aristotle probably means ὁμοειθής by ὁμόφυλος. In the corresponding passage in Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 b 18 in fact—καὶ μὴ κτῶσθαι

δροειθνείς (δούλους) πολλούς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν—the word *δροειθνής* is used, not *δροφύλος*. Plato had already said in *Laws* 777 C, *δύο δὴ λείπεσθον μόνω μηχανά, μήτε πατριώτας ἀλλήλων εἶναι τοῖς μέλλοντας ῥῆον δουλεύσειν, ἀσυμφώνους τε* ('different in language') *εἰς δύναμιν δὲ τι μάλιστα*, and Aristotle follows in his track. His especial object is to avoid the errors committed by the Lacedaemonian State in its organization of slavery. The Helots were serfs (*περίουκοι*), not slaves, and Hellenic serfs into the bargain, both *δροφύλοι* and *δροειθεῖς* (cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 34 sqq.). But other Greek States also probably had slaves whom he would regard as too nearly akin to each other and too spirited to be submissive. The fugitive slaves who under the name of Bruttians (*Βρῆττιοι*) did much to ruin some of the Greek colonies in South Italy (Diod. 16. 15) were apparently an instance in point. Attic slaves, on the contrary, came from a variety of sources, Lydia, Phrygia, Paphlagonia, Syria, and the Euxine (Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 170). Dionysius the Elder wished his mercenaries to be collected *ἐκ πολλῶν ἔθνων* (Diod. 14. 44. 3). Aristotle would no doubt disapprove of a body of slaves wholly composed of negroes, and the experience of the island of St. Domingo in modern times bears out his view. 'It is always a wise arrangement to have different tribes in a caravan, for in the event of a strike, and there are always strikes, there is less chance of concerted action' (Prof. Drummond, *Tropical Africa*, p. 90). Some went so far as to advise the actual promotion of discord among slaves (Menand. *Inc. Fab. Fragm.* 30, in Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.* 4. 242 and 5. cclxxii, and Plut. *Cato Maior*, c. 21, quoted by Meineke), but Aristotle says nothing about this. We notice that he imposes no limit on the number of the slaves in his 'best State,' though we might have expected him to do so.

28. *δεύτερον δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Non-Greek serfs, unlike the Helots. Aristotle probably has in his mind the Mariandynian serfs of the Pontic Heracleia (see above on 1269 a 34). Serfs of this type would have the drawback of being almost inevitably *δροφύλοι*.

30. *τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Here again Aristotle departs from the Lacedaemonian practice. The Helots employed on private estates did not belong to the owners of those estates (Strabo, p. 365, *τρόπον γὰρ τινα δημοσίους δούλους εἶχον οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τούτους, ἰ.ε. τοὺς Ἐλλώτας*): the owners could not free the Helots employed on their estates or sell them beyond the limits of the State (Strabo, *ibid.*).

31. τίνα δὲ κ.τ.λ. Plato had gone on to deal with this subject in the passage of the Laws (777 C sqq.) which Aristotle has before him here. The difficulty of the question is recognized in 2. 9. 1269 b 7 sqq. The promised solution is nowhere given in the Politics as we have it, but we have many suggestions on the subject in Oecon. 1. 5.

32. καὶ διότι κ.τ.λ. Διότι is here 'why.' This promise also remains unfulfilled in the Politics as we have it, but cp. Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 b 4, ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅταν μὴ γίγνηται τοῖς βέλτεροι βέλτιον μηδὲ ἄλλα ἢ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, γίνονται χεῖροντες, οὕτω καὶ περὶ οἰκίας, and 14, χρὴ δὲ καὶ τέλος ὀρίσθαι πᾶσιν δίκαιον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κῆσθαι ἄλλων βούλονται γὰρ ποιεῖν, ὅταν ἢ ἄλλων καὶ ὁ χρόνος ὀρισμένως. Xenophon had already said in Oecon. 5. 16, καὶ ἐλπίδων δὲ ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲν ἔττον οἱ δοῦλοι τῶν ἐλευθέρων δέονται ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅπως μένειν ἐθέλωσι. Aristotle perhaps merely means by πᾶσι τοῖς δούλοις both public and private slaves. But it is possible that, as the slave often purchased his freedom from his master, emancipation was most within the reach of the slaves who stood highest in their master's service, or who had learnt some lucrative handicraft.

34. Τὴν δὲ πόλιν κ.τ.λ. Τὴν μὲν οὖν χώραν, c. 10. 1330 a 23, has C. 11. already been answered by τοῖς δὲ γεωργήσοντας, 1330 a 25, but here it is further answered by τὴν δὲ πόλιν. Εἴρηται πρότερον, in c. 5. 1327 a 3-c. 6. 1327 a 40.

36. αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν κ.τ.λ. Various attempts have been made to interpret this passage as it stands. Göttling, Stahr, Busse (De praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 17 sqq.), and Broughton, in his edition of Pol. 1, 3, and 4 (7), take εἶναι to be used in αὐτῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν θέσιν as it is used in such phrases as ἐκὼν εἶναι, κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι (Plato, Protag. 317 A), εἰς δύναμιν εἶναι (Polit. 300 C), and the like, and translate these words 'so far as concerns the position of the city in relation to itself,' but the objection to this view is that no instance is produced of the use of εἶναι in this sense in combination with a similar collection of words. Εἶναι, when thus used, commonly goes with one word, or two or three, of a simple and closely connected kind. Prof. Jowett, on the other hand (Politics 2. 273), thinks that 'the order of the words is as follows, δεῖ εὐχεσθαι κατατυγχάνειν (τοῦ) τὴν θέσιν εἶναι,' but Sus.⁴ (1. p. 519) objects that, if we take the passage thus, we require τοῦ τὴν θέσιν, οἷαν δεῖ, εἶναι, or something similar, not simply τοῦ τὴν θέσιν

εἶναι. The difficulty of interpreting the passage as it stands being so great, it is not surprising that emendations of the text have been suggested. Coray and Bekk.³ bracket εἶναι, while Bonitz (Ind. 375 b 8) places a query after κατανογχάνειν. For Susemihl's view see his note in Sus.⁴ Richards suggests that κατ' εὐχὴν should be read in place of κατανογχάνειν, translating 'but we should pray that the position of the city in relation to itself may be the best possible,' etc. If, however, κατ' εὐχὴν was the original reading, we should expect it to be corrupted into κατανοχέειν rather than κατανογχάνειν, and perhaps also to stand nearer in the sentence to εἶναι than it does. In defence of κατανογχάνειν it may be pointed out that κατανοχέειν is used in the same sense ('votis potiri') in Demosth. De Cor. c. 178, εἰν' ὃ δ' ἄρα μὴ συμβῇ κατανοχέειν: cp. also Plut. Apophth. Lac. Ages. 59. 213 A and De Gen. Socr. c. 9. 580 B. I am myself inclined to suggest that some words may be wanting in the text. The rendering of Vet. Int. is 'ipsius autem ad se ipsam si ad votum oportet adipisci positionem, quattuor utique respicientes.' Sus. thinks that he here renders a gloss, Busse (De praesidiis, etc., p. 18) that he fills up a lacuna in his Greek text by borrowing words from c. 5. 1327 a 3 sq. It is, however, possible that the text of F differed here from that of the MSS. known to us, and that some words have really dropped out in our MSS. of which the rendering of Vet. Int. preserves a trace. The text, in fact, may have originally run, αὐτῆς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν (εἰ δὲ κατ' εὐχὴν) εἶναι τὴν θέσιν, εὐχεσθαι δὲ κατανογχάνειν πρὸς τέτταρα δὲ βλαύοντας. The four things seem to be health, adaptation to the needs of political life, adaptation to those of war, and beauty (κόσμος, 1330 b 31), though Aristotle in his haste omits to mention the last. Less attention seems generally to have been paid by the founders of cities in ancient Greece to the first two points than to the rest: cp. Strabo, p. 235, τῶν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων περὶ τὰς κτίσεις εἰστοχῆσαι μάλιστα δοξάστωσιν ὅτι καλλίους εἰστοχάζοντο καὶ ἐρμηνόητος καὶ λιμένας καὶ χώρας εὐφροῦς κ.τ.λ. Myscellus, however, the founder of Crotona, had looked to health rather than to wealth (Strabo, p. 269), and in later days Hippocrates in his treatise De Aere, Aquis, Locis had paid great attention to the question what site and aspect are most favourable to the health of a city. Plato also had taken health into consideration (Laws 778 E). For πρὸς τέτταρα δὲ, cp. Pindar, Pyth. 9. 90,

Ἀγίης τε γὰρ

φαμί Νίσου τ' ἐν λόφῳ τρεῖς δὲ πόλιν πάνθ' ἐυελίξαι.

αἷ thus used strengthens (Holden, Index to the Oeconomics of Xenophon 2 v.).

38. πρῶτον μὲν, ὡς ἀσθενῶν, πρὸς ὑγίαν. Sepulveda translates, 'primum ad valetudinem, ut rem necessariam' (and so Lamb.); Vict. 'primum quidem, ut necesse est, ad corporis sanitatem.' But perhaps it is better (with Richards) to supply *δε* with ἀσθενῶν and to take *δε* ἀσθενῶν as = *δε* ἀσθενῶν *δε* βλάπτεται πρὸς τοῖα. A thing may deserve to be looked to first either on account of its excellence (cp. c. 8. 1328 b 11 sq. and 6 (4). 11. 1296 b 5 sq.) or on account of its indispensability (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 29 sq.), and Aristotle is careful to explain that health is to be looked to first for the latter reason. Cp. 1. 10. 1258 a 29, αἷναι δὲ ὑγίαν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν αἰσίαν, ὥστερ (ἢ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀσθενῶν, and Plato, Laws 743 E, αἱ δὲ τις τῶν προσεταγμένων αἰνέει νόμον σωφροσύνης ἐμπροσθεν ὑγίαν ἐν τῇ πόλει φανερὰ τοῖς τοῖς, ἢ κλοῖον ὑγίαν καὶ τοῦ σωφρονέω, οἷα ἑρῶς ἀσφαλέως τοῖς. Some had regarded health as the most excellent thing in the world (Plato, Gorg. 451 E sq.: Anaxandrides, Θουρῶς, Fragg. 1, in Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 169, a line of which,

τὸ μὲν ὑγίαν πρῶτον *δε* ἔσται *δε*,

may be in Aristotle's memory here: Rhet. 2. 21. 1394 b 13 sq.: Lucian, Pro Lapsu inter Salutandum, c. 5 sqq.: Eth. Eud. 1. 1. 1214 a 1 sqq.).

αἱ τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. *Te* should follow *αἱ*, not *αἱ*: for other cases in which it is found out of its proper place, see above on 1325 a 19 and 1259 a 13. Πόλις is omitted as a word which will be readily supplied: for other cases of its omission, see above on 1266 b 1. Hippocrates, as Stahr and others have pointed out, had already pronounced in favour of an Eastern aspect for cities in De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 530 Kühn, ἀέρας μὲν (τῶν πόλεων) πρὸς τὰς ἀνατολὰς τοῦ ἡλίου κίονται, τοῖς αἰετὶς αἷμα ὑγιανερώς τῶν πρὸς τὰς ἀρκτοὺς ἰσχυροτέρως καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ βόρρῃ, ἢ καὶ σταθμῶν τὸ μεταξὺ β. Compare Columella, De Re Rustica, 1. 5. 5, optime autem salubribus locis ad orientem vel meridiem... villa convertitur. The climate of Patras, the ancient Patrae, is thought unhealthy for strangers, because the mountains which rise above it close at hand screen it from the East winds (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 440). Cities whose site slopes towards the East are exposed to the wind ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνατολῆος (Probl. 26. 12. 941 b 17, καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τὰ *δε* ἀνατολῆς κεινὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνατολῆος ἀνέμους ἔχειν (ὁ ἡλίας), οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ βορρῆς κεινὸν

ρέτους ἐγίρει), a wind which is in a mean between hot and cold winds (Probl. 26. 55. 946 b 24 sq.), and health results when things hot and cold are in due proportion to each other (Anal. Post. 1. 13. 78 b 18 sqq.). The East wind is described as 'warm' in Probl. 26. 31. 943 b 24, and as 'comparatively warm' in Meteor. 2. 6. 364 a 19 sqq. See also vol. i. p. 337, note 4.

40. *δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ βορέαν*, 'and in the second place those which are sheltered from the North wind.' Here Aristotle differs from Hippocrates, who appears to regard cities facing North and sheltered from the South as more favourably situated for health than cities facing South and sheltered from the North (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. pp. 525-9 Kühn). For *κατὰ βορέαν*, cp. *κατὰ βορρῆς*, Oecon. 1. 6. 1345 a 33. We expect *αὐτὰ κατὰ βορέαν*, but cp. 1330 b 10, *δεύτερον δὲ ὕδασι ὑγιεινῶς χρῆσθαι*, where *ἐν τῇ ὕδασι ὑγιεινῶς χρῆσθαι* would have been more regular. See vol. i. p. 337, note 5. Some places suffered much from the North wind, e.g. Ismarus in Thrace: cp. Eustath. on Dionys. Perieg. 27, p. 90 Bernhardt (quoted by Ellis, Commentary on Catullus, p. 384), *καθὼς καὶ Ἰσμερικὲς ἐν τοῖς ἔξῃς ὁ βορρῆς, ἀπὸ Ἰσμερίου πόλεως θρηακικῆς, ἵστα μάλιστα βορρῆς καταρρήγνεται*. Plataea was exposed to the North wind, though, as it happened, the North wind was gentle there (Theophrast. Fragm. 5. c. 32 Wimmer). Plato had given the plain around the city in the island of Atlantis a Southern aspect sheltered from the North wind (Critias 118 A).

41. *τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν κ.τ.λ.* *Δεῖ* should probably be supplied, as in c. 5. 1326 b 30 sqq. The sentence would have been more regularly constructed if *καλῶς ἔχειν* had not been added, for then *πρὸς τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς* would have depended on *ἐλέγχοντες*, 38, but as a long parenthesis has intervened (*αἶ τε*, 38-*μᾶλλον*, 41), Aristotle adds *καλῶς ἔχειν* to make his meaning clear, and might have added *δεῖ* also. For *πρὸς τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικὰς*, cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 17, *ἐκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ*, and 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 7, *πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις*. Aristotle does not explain what sort of site would be well adapted for political activity, but he would perhaps regard as such a site which, while fairly level and favourable to easy communication had within it a spot suitable for the common life of the elder citizens who are to rule the State, and somewhat withdrawn from the turmoil of buying and selling, such a spot as he sketches in c. 12. 1331 a 24 sqq.

2. πρὸς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is answered by δέ, 8. Similar 1330 b. advice is given as to the territory in c. 5. 1326 b 40, *χαρὶ μὲν (τὴν χώραν) τοῖς πολέμοις εἶναι δυσέμβολον, αἰντοῖς δ' εὐέξοδον*. A city would be (1) 'hard of approach' (*δυσπρόσδοτος*), if it lay, like Sparta, behind mountains penetrable at only a few easily-guarded points (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 24). Compare the description of Thalamae in Elis in Polyb. 4. 75. 2, *πλείστη δ' ἀποσκευὴ καὶ πλείστοις ὅχλος ἤθροισθη σαρμάτων καὶ θρεμμάτων εἰς τὸ χωρίον ὃ καλοῦσι Θαλάμας, διὰ τὸ τὴν τε χώραν τὴν πῖρξιν αὐτοῦ στενὴν εἶναι καὶ δυσέμβολον τὸ τε χωρίον ἀργυμύεντων καὶ δυσπρόσδοτον*. So we read of Rome in Plut. Romul. c. 17, *ἦν δὲ δυσπρόσδοτος ἢ πάλαι ἔχουσα πρόβλημα τὸ εἶναι Καπιτώλειον, ἐφ' ὧρον καὶ καθιστάμενα*. A lake or a river or cliffs would answer the same purpose as a mountain: see as to the site of Oeniadae Thuc. 2. 102. 3, as to the acropolis of Sicyon (the site to which the city was removed by Demetrius Poliorcetes) Diod. 20. 102. 4, and as to the site of Psophis Polyb. 4. 70. 7 sqq. A city would be (2) 'hard to beleaguer' (*δυσπεριληπτός*), if the ground about it was made difficult by chasms or unfordable rivers or marshes. Pella was surrounded by marshes (Liv. 44. 46, *sita est in tumulo vergente in occidentem hibernum: cingunt paludes inexcuperabilis altitudinis aestate et hieme, quas restagnantes faciunt lacus*). Looking to the advances that the art of siege-warfare had made (1331 a 1 sq.), a city's best chance of safety in Aristotle's days probably lay in the difficulty of approaching or beleaguering it.

4. ὁδῶν τε καὶ νερμάτων κ.τ.λ., 'and of waters and streams there should, if possible, be forthcoming a native supply.' *Οἰκίαν*, in opposition to *ὀμβρίους*, 6: rain-water is not 'native,' but comes from the clouds. Compare the contrast of *ὀμβρίων* and *γηγενὲς ὕδωρ* in Plut. De Facie in Orbe Lunae, c. 25. 939 C, and also the contrast of *οἰκίαν* and *ἐξωτερικαὶ πράξεις* in c. 3. 1325 b 29 sq. *Νερμάτων* is added to explain and limit *ὁδῶν*, which, if it stood by itself, would include *ὀμβρία ὕδατα*. The term *νέματα* comprises both spring and river water: cp. Plut. Quaest. Nat. 2. 912 A, *τὰ πηγὰ καὶ ποταμοὶ νέματα*. Aristotle may possibly have in his memory here some lines of Pindar of which Quintilian has preserved a trace: see Pindar, Fragm. 258 Bergk (Quintil. 10. 1. 109), *non enim 'pluvias,' ut ait Pindarus, 'aquas colligit,' sed vivo gurgite exundat* (Cicero), where Bergk remarks, 'Pindarus *συνέγειν ὕδατα ὀμβρία dixisse videtur*,' but is not 'vivo gurgite exundat' also probably a translation from Pindar! Many Greek cities were famous for

their springs. Corinth was so, and especially for its spring Peirene (cp. Paus. 2. 3. 5. *κρήνη δὲ πολλὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως πεποιμένη παῖσιν, ἀπὸ ἀφ' ὧν μάλιστα σφισιν ὕδατος*, and see as to Peirene, Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 519, 592); Pherae was famous for its spring Hypercia (Pindar, Pyth. 4. 125: Strabo, p. 439); Cyrene was built round the inexhaustible 'spring of Apollo,' and Hermione also had an inexhaustible spring (Paus. 2. 35. 3). Compare with Aristotle's recommendations as to water-supply those of Columella, *De Re Rustica*, 1. 5. 1 sqq. We see from the passage before us that a city was all the stronger from a military point of view if its water-supply was good and safe from interference in the event of a siege. Athens was ill-supplied with water (see next note), and her weakness in this respect must have been keenly felt when the country-population was cooped up in the city during the Peloponnesian War.

5. *εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, 'but if a supply of this nature is not forthcoming, a way has been discovered to obtain water by constructing,' etc. For *εὔρηται*, cp. 1331 a 15 sqq., and for *τοῦτό γε* c. 7. 1327 b 21. *Τοῦτό γε εὔρηται* means that we need not begin an investigation as to that, inasmuch as the problem has been already solved. 'Ομβρίαις is placed before ὕδατων because it is meant to be emphatic. Hippocrates has a good opinion of rain-water (*De Aere, Aquis, Locis*, vol. i. p. 537 Kühn, *τὰ μὲν οὖν ὀμβρία (ὕδατα) ποσφότα καὶ γλυκύτερά ἐστιν καὶ λεπτότατα καὶ λαμπρότατα*). So too Columella (*De Re Rustica*, 1. 5. 2). Aristotle perhaps intends this hint for Athens. 'There were three or four springs at Athens, but one only, that of Callirrhoe, was drinkable' (Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, c. 66, vol. viii. p. 217, note). See also below on 1330 b 25. Cisterns for storing rain-water existed in many Greek cities—at Alexandria (Stuart Poole, *Cities of Egypt*, p. 181), Cnidus (*Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography*, art. Cnidus), and Termessus (Davis, *Anatolica*, p. 231). They existed also in the insular part of Tyre (Maspero, *Hist. Ancienne des Peuples de l'Orient*, p. 192) and at Jerusalem (*Tac. Hist.* 5. 12). 'The sky is the only source from which fresh water is obtained in the smaller towns of Dalmatia, and especially on the islands, where there are neither springs nor streams' (T. G. Jackson, *Dalmatia*, 1. 241). Aristotle does not refer to the possibility of bringing water into the city from a distance, but aqueducts existed in his day both at Samos (*Hdt.* 3. 60) and at Athens (*Athenaeum*,

No. 3355, p. 223). He would probably, however, feel that aqueducts lay at the mercy of an invading foe.

7. *μηδέποτε ὑπολείπειν εἰργαζόμενος τῆς χάρας*. For the construction, cp. Rhet. 3. 17. 1418 a 34, *καὶ ὁ ἔλεγε Γαργίας, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος, τοῦτό ἐστιν*.

8. *τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ κείσθαι τὸν τόπον κ.τ.λ.* For *εἶνα ἐν*, see Bon. Ind. 245 b 25 sqq., where among other passages c. 1. 1323 b 1, *καὶ τὸ (ἦν εὐδαίμονες, εἰς' ἐν τῇ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εἰς' ἐν ἀρετῇ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰς' ἐν ἀρφοῖς*, is referred to. *Τοῦτο* is *ὑγίεια*. For the use of the neuter in reference to a fem. substantive, cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 1, and see Bon. Ind. 484 a 59 sqq., where Metaph. Z. 10. 1035 b 14, *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν ζῴων ψυχὴ (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐσία τοῦ ἐμφύχου) κ.τ.λ.* is quoted.

9. *ἐν τε τοιοῦτῃ καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον*, 'both in a healthy spot and facing a healthy quarter' (cp. Plato, Rep. 401 C).

10. *δεύτερον δὲ ὕδασιν ὑγιεινοῖς χρῆσθαι*. We expect *ἐν τῇ ὕδασιν ὑγιεινοῖς χρῆσθαι*, but Schneider rightly compares c. 13. 1331 b 27, *τούτων δ' ἐστὶν ἐν μὲν ἐν τῇ τὸν σκοπὸν κίεσθαι καὶ τὸ τίλος τῶν πρέξων ἄρθω, ἐν δὲ τὰς πρὸς τὸ τίλος φερούσας πρέξεις εὐρίσκου*: cp. also 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 7—10, and 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 33 sqq. As to the fact, cp. De Gen. An. 4. 2. 767 a 28, *διαφέρει δὲ καὶ χώρα χώρας εἰς ταῦτα* (i.e. *εἰς γένεσιν καὶ ἔργων καὶ ἀρρυστογόνων καὶ θάλυστογόνων*) *καὶ ὕδωρ ὕδατος διὰ τὰς αἰτίας αἰτίας* ποῦ γὰρ τις ἡ τροφὴ γίνεται μάλιστα καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἡ διάθεσις διὰ τε τῆν κρᾶσιν τοῦ περιεστώτος ἄφρος καὶ τῶν εἰσώτων, μάλιστα δὲ διὰ τῆν τοῦ ὕδατος τροφὴν τοῦτο γὰρ πλείστον εἰσφέρεισθαι, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστὶ τροφὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ξηροῖς διὰ καὶ τὰ ἐτίμασιν ὕδατα καὶ ψυχρὰ τὰ μὲν ἀεικνίαν ποῦ τὰ δὲ θάλυστογόνων (see also Hist. An. 6. 19. 573 b 32 sqq.).

καὶ τοῦτον κ.τ.λ. With *ἔχειν* supply *δαί* from 8.

11. *οἷς γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* For *οἷς* πλείστοις *χράμεθα*, see Vahlen on Poet. 16. 1454 b 20. For the thought cp. Hippocr. De Natura Hominis vol. i. p. 361 Kühn, *αἱ δὲ τοῦσαι γίνονται αἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν διατημάτων, αἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πνέματος, ὁ ἐσπόμενος ζῶειν. τῆν δὲ διαγρῶσιν χρὴ ἐκπύρων ὅδε ποιέσθαι* ἄσταν μὲν ὑπὸ νοσήματος ἐνὲ πολλοῖς ἀσθματικαί εἰσπικνῶται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον, τῆν αἰτίαν χρὴ ἀναθεῖναι τοῦτ' ὁ τι κοινώτατόν ἐστι καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῇ πάντες χράμεθα ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ὁ ἀναπνέμεν. As to water, cp. Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 532 Kühn (a passage which Aristotle seems to have before him), *πλείστον γὰρ μέρος συμβάλλεται (ὕδωρ) ἐς τῆν ὑγίαν*.

As to air, cp. Philyll. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 864),

ἔλαυν τὸ βίβη σωτήριον προσέχομαι,
ὅπερ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ὑγίαις μέρος,
τὸ τῶν αἰρ' ἔλαυν καθαρὸν οὐ τεθλαμένον.

Aristotle does not say anything about the importance to health of other kinds of food than water. The Egyptians believed that all maladies arose from food (Hdt. 2. 77: Diod. 1. 82). See on this subject De Part. An. 3. 12. 673 b 25-28.

13. ἡ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and water and air possess this kind of nature,' i.e. are of such a nature as to be largely and frequently used by us (so Vict. 'talem naturam habere ut crebro cogamur ad illa confugere'). Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 15. 'Ἡ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος δύναμις is little more than a periphrasis for τὰ ὕδατα καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα: see Bon. Ind. 206 b 38, 'sed etiam ea res cui aliqua facultas inest δύναμις nominatur, ut interdum δύναμις prope ad paraphrasin videri possit delitescere, cf. φύσις' in such phrases as ἡ τοῦ γυλακτοῦ φύσις, Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 14: Bonitz refers among many other passages to Meteor. 1. 2. 339 a 22, ὅτι πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ (i.e. τοῦ κόσμου) τὴν δύναμιν κυβερνεῖται ἐκείθεν. The same usage is traceable in Plato: see Ast, Lex. Platon. s.v. δύναμις sub *fin.*

14. διόπερ κ.τ.λ. 'Ἐὰν μὴ πάνθ' ὅμοια μὴτ' ἀφθονία τοιούτων ἡ παράτω, 'if all the springs are not equally good, and there is not an unlimited supply of wholesome springs.' Πάντα, sc. τὰ νάματα. Τοιούτων, i.e. ὑγιεινῶν. For μὴ followed by μήτε, see critical note on 1257 b 12. The arrangement recommended by Aristotle had probably already been adopted by some Greek cities when he wrote: thus we read of Pellene in Paus. 7. 27. 4, ἐφοδόμηνται δὲ καὶ ἑλκτρον κρήνης ἐν τῇ ἀγορῇ, καὶ λουτρά ἐστιν αὐτοῖς τὸ ὕδωρ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐπεὶ τοὶ πίνουσιν πηγὰς σφισιν ὑπὸ τὴν πόλιν εἰσὶν οὐ πολλαί. It has been adopted in more than one city of modern Europe; for instance, at Nice (*Times*, Nov. 1, 1883).

17. περὶ δὲ τόπων τῶν ἐρυμνῶν. Aristotle has been speaking of the τόπος τῆς πόλεως from the point of view of salubrity (9), and now he turns to consider the question of ἐρυμνοὶ τόποι. Τῶν ἐρυμνῶν follows, instead of preceding, τόπων for the sake of emphasis. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 2, πρὶν δῆμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἰσχυατον, and Diod. 13. 111. 3, τοὺς δὲ γονεῖς καὶ τέκνα τὰ νήπια λαβόντες, where stress is laid on 'infant children' as being the most helpless.

19. οἷον ἀκρόπολιν ἐλυγαρχικὴν καὶ μοναρχικὴν κ.τ.λ. Plato has

provided the city which he founds in the Laws with an acropolis (Laws 745 B, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα μέρη δώδεκα διελίσθαι, θέμενον Ἑστίας πρώτων καὶ Διὸς καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς ἱερὸν, ἀκρόπολιν ὀνομάζοντα), but we seem to gather from 20, ἀριστοκρατικὸν δ' οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἰσχυροὶ τόσαι πλείους, that Aristotle's ideal city is to have more strong places than one, and that its chief strong place (c. 12. 1331 a 24 sqq.) is not an acropolis. For μοναρχικόν, cp. Pollux, 9. 40, τάχα δὲ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ βασιλείον ἢ τις εἴποι καὶ τυραννέιον. The word, however, hints that an acropolis savours rather of Tyranny than of Kingship: cp. Diod. 16. 70, Τιμολέων δὲ . . . τὰς μὲν κατὰ τὴν νῆσον ἀκροπόλεις καὶ τὰ τυραννεία κατέσκαψε, Plut. Timol. c. 24, and Juv. 10. 306 sq. That a level site was congenial to democracies may be inferred from the fact that the cities of Mantinea (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 339: Bursian, Geogr. von Griechenland, 2. 209) and Megalopolis (Curtius, 1. 281 sq.: Bursian, 2. 244), both of them designed to be democratically ruled, were built on comparatively level sites. Aristotle does not explain why there should be more strong places than one in the central city of an ἀριστοκρατία (see above on 1273 a 19)—perhaps he regards an ἀριστοκρατία as giving a share of power to a plurality of social elements (virtue, wealth, and the demos), each of which would have a strong place of its own—but it is a fact that at Sparta, Carthage, and the Epizephyrian Locri, the seats of three famous ἀριστοκρατίαι, there were more strong places than one within the city. As to Sparta, cp. Polyb. 5. 22. 1, τῆς γὰρ Σπάρτης τῇ μὲν καθύλου σχήματι περιφερούσῃ ἐπαρχούσῃ καὶ κυμένης ἐν τόποις ἰσιπέδοις, κατὰ μέρος δὲ περιεχούσῃ ἐν αὐτῇ διαφόρους ἀνωμαλοὺς καὶ βουνώδεις τόπους κ.τ.λ., and Paus. 3. 17. 1, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ ἀκρόπολιν μὴ εἶναι ὑψος περιφανὲς ἐξίσχουσα οὐκ ἔστι, καθὰ δὲ Θηβαίους τε ἡ Καστρία καὶ ἡ Λάρισα Ἀργείοις ὄντων δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει λόφους καὶ ἄλλων, τὸ μάλιστα ἐς μετῴρων ἀνθρώκων ὀνομάζουσιν ἀκρόπολιν (see Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography, art. Sparta, vol. ii. p. 1026 b). The site of Carthage was 'a peninsula with water on three sides. On the three hills within this peninsula stood Carthage and its surroundings; its suburbs, and its necropolis' (E. A. Freeman, *Contemporary Review*, Sept. 1890, p. 368). See also Meltzer, *Gesch. der Karthager*, 2. 165 sqq. As to Locri, see Liv. 29. 6. 14 sqq. The seven hills of Rome, which was in its best days an ἀριστοκρατία, are famous.

23. τὰς ἄλλας πρῆξις, i.e. other than those of war, e.g. ἀνεγκαίαις (c. 12. 1331 b 13) and πολιτικὰς πρῆξις.

κατὰ τὸν νεότερον καὶ τὸν ἱπποδάμειον τρόπον. *Kat* is explanatory, as in 1. 9. 1257 b 9, τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν ἀστυλιαν. Holm (Griech. Gesch. 2. 324) denies that Hippodamus was the first to lay out cities with straight streets. The Campanian Neapolis, he says, was laid out altogether in this way, and Selinus was laid out with two main streets crossing each other at right angles. 'New cities, therefore, were built in this fashion before the fifth century B.C.,' and all that Hippodamus did was to introduce the method in places of the highest importance. But is this view reconcilable with 2. 8. 1267 b 22 sq.?

25. ὡς εἶχον κατὰ τὸν ἀρχαῖον χρόνον. Like Athens, of which we read in Pseudo-Dicaearch. De Graeciae Urbibus (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 254), ἡ δὲ πόλις ἔφη πᾶσα, οὐκ εὐδορε, κακίως ἐρρηγομεγαλήν διὰ τὴν ἀρχαότητα, and like Rome till its rebuilding by Nero (Tac. Ann. 15. 43, ceterum urbis quae domui supererant non, ut post Gallica incendia, nulla distinctione nec passim erecta, sed dimensis vicorum ordinibus et latis viarum spatiis cohibitaque aedificiorum altitudine ac patefactis areis). Compare also the contrast between the laying out of Rome and Capua in Cic. De Leg. Agrar. 2. 35-96.

26. δυσέξοδος γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for that arrangement of private dwellings is hard of exit for foreign troops and hard of exploration for assailants [whether foreign or not].' The fate of the Thebans who were admitted into Plataea in B.C. 431 is probably present to Aristotle's mind. They found much difficulty in escaping from the city when their attempt on it had failed (Thuc. 2. 4. 2, 5). Compare the difficult position in which Xenophon's troops found themselves in assaulting the city of the Drilae not far from Trapezus on the Euxine (Xen. Anab. 5. 2. 7, ὁ δ' ἔλεθεν λόγῳ ὅτι ἔστι χωρίον χρημάτων πολλῶν μεστὸν τοῦτο οὐτε λαβεῖν δυσάμερον ἰσχυρὸν γὰρ ἔστιν οὐτε ἀπελθεῖν ῥῆδιον μάχονται γὰρ ἐπεξεληλυθότες καὶ ἡ ἀφοδὸς χαλεπή). An attacking force did not relish assaulting a city which it was at once difficult to explore, and consequently to reduce, and difficult to get out of in case of failure.

27. διὰ θεῶν τοῦτων ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν, i.e. διὰ θεῶν τὴν τῶν ἰδίων οἰκήσεων διάθεσιν μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ ἡδῆος καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τὰς πολεμίας ἀσφαλείας χρησίμου (cp. 31, οὕτω γὰρ καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ πόσμον ἔξει καλῶς). It is not quite clear whether Aristotle adds (in 29) καὶ τὴν μὲν οὖν μὴ ποιεῖν πόλιν εὐτρομον, κατὰ μέρος δὲ καὶ τόπους in explanation of his suggestion that the houses should be arranged in clumps or

quincunxes, or as an alternative plan. Perhaps the former is the case. His plan will then be to drive straight wide streets between the clumps or quincunxes of houses, but to leave the interior of each quincunx a tangle of narrow lanes. Compare J. R. Green's description of Roman London (*Making of England*, p. 106); it was 'little more than a mass of brick houses and red-tiled roofs, pierced with a network of the narrow alleys which passed for streets in the Roman world, and cleft throughout its area by two wider roads from the bridge.' Silchester and St. Alban's, however, were laid out with great regularity (Fox and St. John Hope, *On the Desirability of the complete Excavation of the Site of Silchester*, p. 41).

28. ἀνακαταστήσας, π. τῶν τοῦ ἑκαστοῦ οἰκίας.

ἀνατίρας κ.τ.λ., π. ἀνακαταστήσας, 'as among farmers what some call clumps of vines are arranged.' For τῶν ἑκαστοῦ οἰκίας, cp. Πολύτ., 7. 146, καὶ ἑστῶσι πρὸς καὶ οὐρανίους • ἢ ἀνακαταστήσας γῆν, ἢ πρὸς οὐρανίους σφραγιστάς, οὐραγὰς δὲ ἢ κατὰ οὐρανίους. Vines were planted in clumps or quincunxes, partly because they looked better when thus arranged, and partly because they were more productive (Varro, *De Re Rustica*, 1. 7. 2 sqq. : Columella, 3. 13. 4 : Quintil. 8. 3. 9). The younger Cyrus seems to have planted trees in this way (Xen. *Oecon.* 4. 20 sqq. : cp. Cic. *De Senect.* 17. 59). Sat., following Scaliger, reads ἐν τοῖς γρουππίαις ('in the fields,' or 'farms') in place of ἐν τοῖς γρουππαῖς, which is the reading of all the MSS., but the word γρουππαῖς is nowhere else used by Aristotle (is it used by any writer earlier than Philo, *Mechan. Synt.* p. 96, l. 49 Schoene?), and ἐν τοῖς γρουππαῖς ('among farmers'), which is retained by Bekk., appears to be defensible: cp. Pherecr. *Καπνοῦς*, *Fragm.* 2 (Meincke, *Fr. Com. Gr.* 2. 281),

ἐν τοῖς Μεγαροῦσις ἐστῶσι βαρβάρους

χέρους ἀνατίρας τὰς πολέμους ἐργασίας,

and Xen. *Cyrop.* 1. 3. 2, ἀ δὲ εὐραὶα ἔσθ' ἐν Μήδοις. 'En τοῖς γρουππίαις, 'in the farms,' would probably be preferable to ἐν τοῖς γρουππαῖς (cp. Plato, *Laws* 762 A). But Aristotle often refers to practices prevailing among farmers (e.g. in *De Gen. et Corr.* 2. 8. 335 a 13 : *Hist. An.* 5. 32. 557 b 29 sqq.).

31. καὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν καὶ κέρπον. See critical note.

32. περὶ δὲ τοῦτων κ.τ.λ. This takes up 1330 b 17, περὶ δὲ δόξαν τῶν ἐπειρησῶν. Aristotle has just pronounced in favour of an old-fashioned arrangement of private houses, and now he passes

on naturally enough to the question whether it is not the best plan to be old-fashioned in the matter of walls, and to dispense with them altogether. He has before him Plato, *Laws* 778 D, *περὶ δὲ τειχῶν, ὃ Μιγάλλε, ἔγωγ' ἂν τῇ Σπάρτῃ συμφερόμενον τὸ καθύπευθε ἔαν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα τὰ τεῖχη καὶ μὴ ἐπαιστώσκει κ.τ.λ.* The State of the *Laws* was pre-eminently one which laid claim to virtue (696 A: 731 A sqq.). Agesilaus ([*Plut.*] *Apophth. Lac. Ages.* 30) had been asked why Sparta had no walls, and had replied, *Ὁ λίκουρ δὲ καὶ ξύλοις τετειχίσθαι τὰς πόλεις, ταῖς δὲ τῶν ἐνοικοούντων ἀρεταῖς*, and a similar dictum was ascribed to Lycurgus (*Plut. Lycurg.* c. 19). Isocrates had spoken of the Lacedaemonians as *ἀρετῇ ἀμφισβητοῦντες* in *Archid.* § 91, and had used the expression *τοὺς ἀρετῇ ἀντιστοιχοῦντες* in *Panath.* § 228 (cp. § 120). For *λίαν ἀρχαίως ὑπολαμβάνουσιν*, cp. *Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr.* 2. 57, *ἀρχαίᾳ φρονεῖς: ἦτοι εὐθῆς*, where *Aristoph. Nub.* 821 (*Didot*) and *Plato, Euthydem.* 295 C are referred to.

34. *καὶ ταῦθ' ὁρώντες κ.τ.λ.* This refers to the humiliation (cp. 40, *μὴ πάσχειν κακῶς μηδὲ ὑβρίζεσθαι*) which Epaminondas' invasions of Laconia inflicted on Sparta. For the sing. *ἔργον*, cp. *Meteor.* 1. 13. 349 b 35, *ὅλοϊ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἔργον*, and *Plato, Symp.* 182 C, *ἔργον δὲ τοῦτο ἔμβονον*. In 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 15 we have *τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξηλέγχεται* and in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 1 *ἐξηλέγχεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἔργων*.

35. *ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ.* So far as this Aristotle agrees with Plato's censure of those who seek safety in walls (*Laws* 779 A, *τείχεσι δὲ καὶ φύλας διανοεῖσθαι φραχθείστας τε καὶ καθυπόκοντας σωτηρίας ὕψους ἕξαι μηχανὰς κ.τ.λ.*). Compare *Thuc.* 1. 32. 5, where the Corcyreans say, *τὴν μὲν οὖν γενομένην ναυμαχίαν αὐτοὶ κατὰ μόνας ἀπευσάμεθα Κορυθίους· ἐπειδὴ δὲ μίξοι παρασκευῇ ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἄρμονται, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατοι ὁρῶμεν ὅτε τῇ οἰκίᾳ μόνον δυνάμει περιγενέσθαι κ.τ.λ.*

37. *ἔπει δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Take the case of Plataea or Phlius besieged by the Lacedaemonians and their allies, or of Haarlem besieged by the forces of Spain (*Motley, Rise of the Dutch Republic, Part 3, c. 8*). For *καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται*, see above on 1264 b 18.

38. *καὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀλίγοις ἀρετῆς.* Cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 26, *μήτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν συγκρίνουσι τὴν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας*, *Eth. Nic.* 7. 1. 1145 a 18, *πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα μάλιστ' ἂν ἀρμόττει λέγειν τὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ἀρετὴν, ἡρωϊκὴν τινα καὶ θείαν*, *Magn. Mor.* 2. 5. 1200 b 11 sqq., and *Xen. Hell.* 7. 4. 32, *οἱ δ' αὖ ἥλθιοι . . . ἀπῆλθον εἰς τὸ ἔστυ, τοιοῦτοι γενόμενοι οἷους τὴν ἀρετὴν θεὸς μὲν ἂν ἐμπνεύσας δύναιτο καὶ*

ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἀποδείξαι, ἰσθρῶσαι δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ τοὺς μὴ ἴστας
ἀλαίμους ποιήσων.

40. τὴν ἀσφαλεστάτην ἐρυμνότητα κ.τ.λ. So far from strong walls being a sign of effeminacy, as many thought (Plato, Laws 778 E: [Plut.] Apophth. Lac. Agis 6, Ages. 55, and Panthoid. 1), they are really a sign of warlike forethought.

1. ἄλλως τε καὶ νῦν εὐρημένῳ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle refers among other 1331 a. things to the invention of the catapult made under Dionysius the Elder at Syracuse (Diod. 14. 42. 1, καὶ γὰρ τὸ καταπελτικὸν εὐρέθη κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ἐν Συρακούσαις, ὥς ἂν τῶν κρατίστων τεχνιτῶν πανταχόθεν εἰς ἓνα τόπον συνηγμένων . . . διόπερ ἀντιέριβλητον φιλοτιμίαν εἰσφέροντες οἱ τεχνῖται πολλὰ προστεροῦντο βέλη καὶ μηχανήματα ξύα καὶ δυνάμενα παρέχειναι μεγάλας χρεῖας, and 14. 50. 4). The term μηχαναί, however, probably includes not only catapults, but also battering-rams with shelter-sheds for those who worked them, movable wooden towers with drawbridges which could be lowered so as to give the besiegers access to the top of the city-wall, scaling-ladders, etc. (Droysen, Gr. Kriegsalterth. p. 309. 1). Of these contrivances, catapults and (apparently) movable wooden towers were introduced into Greek warfare under Dionysius the Elder (Droysen, p. 211). He had to contend against the Carthaginians, who were the first to use battering-rams and towers for sieges in the West, and whose use of them against the Greeks gave them a great superiority in their Sicilian campaigns (Meltzer, Gesch. der Karthager, 2. 134). His catapults and wooden towers revolutionized the art of besieging cities. They cleared the walls of their defenders and thus facilitated the use of the battering-ram. Nor did the development of the art stop here. As time went on, the towers became higher and better armed, and the battering-rams longer and better sheltered. The new methods of siege-warfare were inherited by Philip of Macedon, whose engines of war were famous (Demosth. Phil. 3. c. 50). See on the whole subject Droysen, op. cit. p. 211 sqq. For εἰς ἀκρίβειαν, cp. Plato, Gorg. 487 C, εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν.

3. ὁμοιον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Ταῖς πόλεσιν finds its correlative in τὴν χώραν and ταῖς οἰκήσεσι ταῖς ἰδίαις. If we are to deprive cities of their defence for fear of making the citizens unmanly, why should we stop there? Why should we not deprive the territory and private dwellings of their defences also?

4. τὸ τὴν χώραν εὐέμβολον ζητεῖν, 'to seek that the territory shall be easy of invasion,' for εἶναι should be supplied with εὐέμβολον.

Compare for the construction 1. 9. 1257 b 17 sqq. and Plato, Rep. 443 B and 375 E.

περιαιρεῖν τοὺς ὄρεινους τόπους, 'strip off (from the territory) its mountainous spots,' as one might strip off an outer coating. Περιαιρεῖν answers to μὴ περιβάλλειν, 3.

7. For ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ . . . γε see note on 1339 a 29.

10. ταῖς δὲ μὴ κεκτημένας. See critical note.

11. οὐχ ὅτι τεῖχη μόνον περιβλητέον. Coray brackets μόνον, but, as Sus.² has already pointed out, quite wrongly: see Stallbaum on Plato, Symp. 179 B, καὶ μὴν ὑπεραποθνήσκουσιν γε μόναι ἐθέλουσιν οἱ ἐρωῶντες, οὐ μόνον οὐτοί τε ἄνδρες, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες, where he refers to Xen. Mem. 2. 9. 8, ὁ δὲ Ἀρχίδemos τῷ Κρίτωνι ἡδύνει ἰχαρίζετο, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι μόνος ὁ Κρίτων ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ ἦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ φίλοι αὐτοῦ.

ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἐπιμελητέον κ.τ.λ., 'but attention must also be paid to them to secure that they shall be in a state befitting the city not only with a view to ornament, but also with a view to military procedures, both those already in use and those further ones which have recently been discovered.' The 'military procedures' here referred to are probably those of besiegers, not those of the besieged, but this is not quite certain. For τὰς πολεμικὰς χρεῖας, cp. c. 8. 1328 b 11, 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 34, and Plato, Phaedr. 239 D. How were walls to be made proof against recent improvements in siege-methods? By being made higher, for one thing, to resist scaling, and thicker, to resist battering-rams and heavy artillery (see Droysen, op. cit. p. 253). Aristotle's remark is perhaps based on the experience of Athens. The dangerous position in which she found herself after the defeat of Chaeroneia prompted a hasty effort to repair the walls (Aeschin. c. Ctea. cc. 27, 31), which was continued in the years B.C. 334-326 (Corp. Inscr. Att. 2. 167, referred to by Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 239, note 1, and Droysen, op. cit. p. 237. 1).

12. ὅπως κ.τ.λ. For the order of the words see note on 1327 a 4.

15. δι' ὧν τρέπων. See note on 1314 a 30 and cp. Diod. 13. 95. 3, δι' οὗ τρέπων.

16. τὰ μὲν εὐρηται. Many of these devices are mentioned in the Commentarius Poliorceticus of Aeneas Tacticus (τακτικὸν ὑπόμνημα περὶ τοῦ πῶς χρὴ πολιορκουμένους ἀντίχειν), which was written (according to Christ, Gesch. der gr. Litteratur, p. 308) soon after B.C. 360. It is the only part which has come down to us of a larger work

referred to by Polybius (10. 44) under the title of τὰ περὶ τῶν στρατηγικῶν ὑπομνήματα. See above on 1326 b 39.

ἵητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν. Cp. Isocr. Epist. 7. § 3, χρὴ ἱητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν, and De Pace, § 116, φιλοσοφήσετε καὶ σκέψεσθε.

17. ἀρχὴν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Thuc. 1. 93. 8, ἐβούλετο γὰρ (ὁ Θερμοτοκλῆς) τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ πλάτει (τῶν τειχῶν) ἀφιστάναι τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιβουλὰς. The Index Aristotelicus refers to no other passage in which ἀρχὴν is similarly used. The use of ἐξ ἀρχῆς in Poet. 24. 1460 a 33 sq., however, approaches that of ἀρχὴν here.

19. Ἐπει δὲ κ.τ.λ. As the citizen-body must be divided into C.12. syssitia, and the walls must be dotted with guard-rooms and towers, it is a natural arrangement to locate some of the syssitia in the guard-rooms. Aristotle appears to intend the guard-rooms to be in the towers, but a common plan was to build city-walls solid only up to a certain height, and to place guard-rooms in them above that height (Droysen, op. cit. p. 251). As to κατὰ τόπους ἐπικαίρους (with which Liddell and Scott compare Demosth. De Cor. c. 27, προλαβὼν τοὺς ἐπικαίρους τῶν τόπων), towers were often placed along the wall close to a gate which needed guarding, or at an angle where two curtains of wall met which could be commanded by weapons discharged from the tower, or at intervals along the curtain. In times of pressing danger, and especially during a siege, it must have been a common practice for the defenders of the walls to take their meals either on them or close to them (cp. Damon, ap. Athen. Deipn. 442 c, διὰ καὶ πολεμουμένων ποτὶ αὐτῶν (i.e. τῶν Βυζαντίων) καὶ οὐ προσκαρτερούντων τοῖς τείχεσι, Λεωνίδης δὲ στρατηγὸς ἐκέλευσε τὰ καπηλεία ἐπὶ τῶν τειχῶν σκηνοπηγεῖν, καὶ μολις ποτὶ ἐπαύσαντο λιποτακτοῦντες, and Aelian, Var. Hist. 3. 14), but Aristotle's recommendation refers to times of peace as well as times of war, and it probably went far beyond the practice of most cities. We find, indeed, that the polemarchs of Cynaetha spent the day at the gates of their city (Polyb. 4. 18. 2, πολέμαρχοι τῶν καταληλυθότων τινῶν ἐγγόνοις αὐτὴν δὲ συμβαίνει τὴν ἀρχὴν κλείειν τὰς πύλας καὶ τὸν μεταξὺ χρόνον κυριεύειν τῶν κλειδῶν, ποιῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν τὴν διάτακιν ἐπὶ τῶν πυλῶνων), but Aristotle does not appear to be speaking here of high magistrates like polemarchs; he seems rather to have in view some part of the military force of the State. For τὰ τεῖχη διεληφθαι φυλακτηρίοις καὶ πύργοις, cp. Diod. 2. 7. 3, τείχεος διελημμένον πύργοις πυκνοῖς καὶ μεγάλοις.

21. αὐτὰ, Lamb. 'eae res': cp. c. 4. 1325 b 33, ἐπεὶ δὲ πεφρο-

μίσσται τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν. Bonitz (Ind. 125 a 34) compares Top. 1. 5. 102 a 10, οἱ δὲ πάντα τὰ νῦν βηθίοντα τοιαῦτ' ἐστί, ὅλων ἐξ αὐτῶν, and 102 b 20, but would read αὐτῶν in place of αὐτῆ.

23. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ κ.τ.λ. Ταῦτα, 'these things,' probably refers not to *συσσίτια*, but to the matters which form the subject of the preceding sentence. Just as some of the *syssitia* and the guard-rooms are to be conjoined, so we must conjoin the temples of the gods and the *syssitia* of highest authority. As to μὲν δὴ, Eucken remarks (De Partic. Usu, p. 46), 'diverso modo usurpatur, saepissime quidem ita ut inquisitione quadam finita omnia quae antecedunt comprehendat': he compares Phya. 1. 8. 191 b 27, εἰς μὲν δὴ τρόπος οὗτος, ἄλλος δὲ κ.τ.λ., and adds 'simili modo μὲν οὖν adhibetur.' See also Bon. Ind. 173 a 38 sqq.

24. τὰς δὲ κ.τ.λ. The suggestion just made as to some minor *syssitia* leads on to the question where 'the highest *syssitia* of the magistracies' are to be placed (τὰ κυριώτατα τῶν ἀρχέων *συσσίτια*, not τὰ τῶν κυριωτάτων ἀρχέων *συσσίτια*, because Aristotle has the contrast of *ἑνα τῶν συσσιτίων* still in his mind), and to the general question how the various *syssitia* are to be distributed over the city, for it is not proposed that all citizens—priests, magistrates lower and higher, and soldiers—should meet for meals at one and the same spot. On the contrary, the soldiers will have their *syssitia* on the walls, the highest magistrates and the priests on the hill on which the temples stand, and the less dignified magistrates near the commercial agora. For τὰς τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδομένους οἰκήσεις (contrast αἱ ἰδίαι οἰκήσεις, c. 11. 1330 b 21), cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 21, τὰ πάντα τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τίταται πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς. Τοῖς θεοῖς = τοῖς τῶν θεῶν, 'the things of the gods,' and especially 'religious observances' (cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 8. 2, and Pol. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 31, τὰ δαιμόνια): so Lamb. 'rebus divinis,' while Vict. translates 'divinis naturis.' Aristotle takes pains to sever the temples and the highest magistrates from all else, keeping them apart even from the free agora, much more from the commercial agora: contrast Plato, Laws 778 C, τὰ μὲν τοῖνυν ἑκὰς πᾶσαν περίξ τὴν τε ἀγορὰν χρὴ κατασκευάζειν . . . πρὸς δὲ αὐτοῖς οἰκήσεις τε ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων, ἐν οἷς τὰς δίκας ὡς ἱερωτάτοις οἴσι λήγονται τε καὶ δάσονται, τὰ μὲν ὡς δόκιμον πέρι, τὰ δὲ καὶ τοιούτων θεῶν ἱερύματα, καὶ ἐν τοῖσιν (i. e. 'deorum aedibus,' Stallbaum) δικαστήρια, ἐν οἷς αἱ τε τῶν φόνων πρέπουσαι δίκαι γίγνουν' ἂν καὶ ὅσα θαλίτων ἄξια ἀδικήματα. The agora at Leontini seems to have been arranged on a plan

somewhat resembling that of Plato. Cp. Polyb. 7. 6, ἡ γὰρ τῶν Λεοντίων πόλις τῇ μὲν ἅλῃ κλίματι τέταρται πρὸς τὰς ἀρακτοὺς, ἵστι δὲ διὰ μέσης αὐτῆς ἀλλὰ ἐπίπεδος, ἐν ᾗ συμβαίνει τὰς τε τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ δικαστηρίων κατασκευὰς καὶ καθέλου τῆν ἀγορὰν ὑπάρχειν. Aristotle does not tell us where he would place the more important law-courts; he would probably place the less important ones at any rate near the commercial agora. His scheme differs from that of Plato in another point. Plato reserves his acropolis in the Laws (745 B) for Hestia, Zeus, and Athena, whereas Aristotle brings all the gods together on the central hill except those whose temples must necessarily be placed elsewhere. He follows Plato, however, in placing the more important magistracies of the State—its strategî, treasurers, and auditors (8 (6). 8. 1322 a 30 sqq.: 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 9 sqq.)—in the immediate neighbourhood of the temples. Their moral influence would thus be strengthened and their sense of responsibility increased. Whether his plan of placing the 'Downing Street' of his State on the top of a hill was a wise one, may well be doubted. At Athens the magistrates lived not on the acropolis, but at its foot. It is true that at Athens the Boulê sometimes met in the acropolis (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 20), and that at Megara the offices of the chief magistracy seem to have been in the acropolis (Plut. Ages. c. 27). The wisdom of separating the offices of the major from those of the minor magistracies seems also questionable. But Aristotle's wish is to gather together in one easily defensible spot the animating forces of his State: cp. De Part. An. 3. 7. 670 a 23, καρδία μὲν οὖν καὶ ἦπαρ πῶς ἐν ἀναγκαίᾳ τοῖς ζῴοις, ἡ μὲν διὰ τὴν τῆς θερμότητος ἀρχὴν (δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τινα ὅλον ἐστίαν, ἐν ᾗ κίεσται τῆς φύσεως τὸ ζωοποιόν, καὶ τοῦτο εὐφύλακτον, ὥστε ἀκρόπολις οὕσα τοῦ σώματος), τὸ δ' ἦπαρ τῆς πέψουσι χεῖρον.

26. ὅσα μὴ τῶν ἱερῶν κ.τ.λ. Compare the way in which Plato severs the worship of the gods of the nether world from that of the heavenly gods (Laws 828 C, ἵτι δὲ καὶ τὸ τῶν χθονίων καὶ ὄντων αὐ θεοῖς οὐρανίων ἐπονομαστίαν καὶ τὸ τῶν τούτοις ἐπομένων οὐ ἐννομαστίαν, ἀλλὰ χωριστίαν ἐν τῇ τοῦ Πλούτωνος μὲν τῇ δωδεκάτῃ κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδόντας). Among the temples to which Aristotle refers are probably those of Aesculapius, which were often situated outside the city (Plut. Quaest. Rom. c. 94, "διὰ τί τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ τὸ ἱερὸν ἔξω πόλεως ἐστὶ;" πότερον ὅτι τὰς ἔξω διατριβὰς ὑγιεινοτέρας ἐνέμεινον εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀστει; καὶ γὰρ Ἕλληνες ἐν τόποις καθαροῖς καὶ ὑψηλοῖς ἐπικαλεῖται ἱδρυμένα τὰ Ἀσκληπεία ἔχουσιν ἢ ὅτι τὸν θεὸν ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρου μετέφεραν

ἦκειν τομίζουσιν, Ἐπιδαυρίους δ' οὐ κατὰ πόλιν ἀλλὰ πόρῳ τὸ Ἀσκληπιείον ἴστω). As to other temples, cp. Plutarch *περὶ ἡσυχίας* ap. Stob. Floril. 58. 14, διὰ τοῦτό τοι καὶ τῶν θεῶν τὰ ἱερά, ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ πάλαι ἀρχαίου γενόμεναι, τοῖς ἐρημοτάτοις χωρίοις οἱ πρῶτοι (ἐνίδρυσαν), μάλιστα δὲ Μουσῶν τε καὶ Πανὸς καὶ Νυμφῶν καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ ὅσοι μουσικῇ ἡγεμόνες θεοί. The temples of Eileithyia in the Peloponnesus were often outside the gate of the city (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 536); there was, for instance, a temple of Eileithyia outside the gate in the walls of Corinth which led to Tenaea (Paus. 2. 5. 4). The same was occasionally the case with the temples of the Chthonian Demeter; thus at Agrigentum 'the place chosen for' the Thesmophoria of Demeter 'was far beyond the walls of the elder city; it is barely within the walls of the enlarged city' (Freeman, Sicily, 2. 80), and at Syracuse the temple of Demeter and Persephonē 'was placed by Gelon outside the bounds of his enlarged city' (ibid. 2. 213: see Diod. 14. 63. 1). For ὁ νόμος, cp. c. 17. 1336 b 16, εἰ μὴ παρὰ τισι θεοῖς τοιούτοις οἷς καὶ τὸν ταθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος. For an instance of the founding of a temple in a given spot in obedience to the commands of Delphi, cp. Paus. 1. 13. 8, καὶ σφισιν ἔστι τοῦ θεοῦ χρῆσαντες, ἴδθα ὁ Πύρρος ἐτελεύτησεν, ἱερὸν Διμήτρος, ἐν δὲ αὐτῇ καὶ ὁ Πύρρος τίθασθαι. Obedience was proverbially due to a command from Delphi (Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 5, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀνέλε (i.e. Apollo at Delphi) τῇ παντὶ ἀμεινον εἶναι (πειθισθαι τοῖς Λυκοῦργοι νόμοις), τότε ἀπέδωκεν (ὁ Λυκοῦργος), οὐ μόνον ἀνομον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνόστιον θεῖς τὸ πυθοχρήστοις νόμοις μὴ πειθισθαι: Sext. Empir. adv. Math. 8. 443, οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς Χρυσίππου φωναῖς ὡς πυθοχρήστοις παραγγέλμασιν ἀνάγκη πειθισθαι κ.τ.λ.). Aristotle speaks only of the Delphic oracle, whereas Plato in Laws 738 B sqq. makes a similar reservation in favour of the commands of those of Dodona and Ammon also, and even of τινὲς παλαιὸι λόγοι.

28. εἴη δ' αὖ κ.τ.λ., 'and the place would be suitable which is such as to (δοῦναι) possess adequate conspicuousness for the enthronement of virtue and a superiority of strength in relation to the adjacent parts of the city.' For ὁ τόπος δοῦναι (not δε), cp. Xen. Oecon. c. 21. 10, τοῦ δὲ δισπύτου ἐπιφανέστερος . . . ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον, ὅστις δύναται καὶ μέγιστα βλάψαι τὸν κακὸν τῶν ἐργατῶν καὶ μέγιστα τιμῆσαι τὸν πρόθυμον. For the use of the word ἐπιφάνεια in a not very dissimilar sense, see the passages collected in Stallbaum's note on Plato, Alcib. 1. 124 C. Aristotle continues the sentence in καὶ πρὸς τὰ γειτνιώντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρυμοστέρας as if he had written

not ἐπιφάνειαν ἔχει ἰκανῶς, but ἐπιφανιστίως ἔχει. For the use of ἔχειν in this double sense (transitive and intransitive), cp. Plato, Rep. 370 E, and Stallbaum's note. The 'virtue' referred to is apparently that of the gods and the supreme magistrates. That virtue should not be hidden, we see from Paroem. Gr. 2. 760, μὴ κρύπτε τὸ κάλλος ὥσπερ τὸ ποηφάγον : ἐπὶ τῶν διὰ δειλίαν κρυπτόντων καὶ ἦν ἔχουσιν ἀρετὴν· ὁ δὲ ποηφάγος (φῶν ἔστιν ἐν Ἰνδοῖς (cp. Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 621): Pindar, Nem. 9. 6,

ἔστι δέ τις λόγος ἀνθρώπων, τεταλεισμένων ἐσλάν
μὴ χαμῶ σιγῇ καλύψαι :

Hor. Carm. 4. 9. 29,

Paullum sepultae distat inertiae
Celata virtus:

and Plut. Pericl. c. 7, τῆς ἀληθυῆς δ' ἀρετῆς κάλλιστα φαίνεται τὰ μάλιστα φαινόμενα, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐδὲν οὕτω θαυμάσιον τοῖς ἑσπερὶς ὡς ὁ καθ' ἡμέραν βίος τοῖς συνοῦσιν. Cp. also Simonides, Fragm. 58,

ἔστι τις λόγος

τῶν ἀρετῶν καίεν δυσамβάτους ἐπὶ πέτραις.

Temples especially were wont to be placed on conspicuous sites: see vol. I. p. 338, note 1, and compare also Xen. Mem. 3. 8. 10, καὶς γε μὴν καὶ βωμοῖς χάραν ἔφη εἶναι προπεδεστάτην ἥτις ἐμφανιστάτη οὖσα ἀστιβεστάτη εἴη· ἥδὲ μὲν γὰρ ἰδόντας προσεύξασθαι, ἥδὲ δὲ ἀγρῶς ἔχοντας προσίεναι, Corp. Inscr. Gr. 2140. 35 (referred to by Bursian, Geogr. von Griechenland, 2. 83. 2), where the temple of Apollo in Aegina is described as situate in the ἐπιφανίστατος τόπος τῆς πόλεως, and Polyæn. Strateg. 5. 1. See also Hom. Hymn. in Aphrod. 100 sq. That the place assigned to the gods should be strong we see from Hdt. 5. 67; there are obvious reasons why the abode of the chief magistrates should be so.

80. πρέπει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Μὲν is answered by δέ in τῇ δὲ τῶν ἀνέων ἀγορᾷ, 1331 b 1. Κατασκευήν, 'provision' or 'establishment,' cp. 1331 b 10, κατασκευάσθαι. The agora here referred to is to be below the hill on which the gods and the magistrates dwell, but still on high ground (cp. 1331 b 12, τῇ ἀνῶ, sc. ἀγορᾷ). It would be in this agora that the citizens would come together to elect magistrates, for magistracies were to be elective in Aristotle's 'best State' (c. 4. 1326 b 15), and here too the ecclesia would meet, if indeed, which is uncertain, Aristotle intends an ecclesia to exist. But the main function of this agora seems to be to serve as

a place for the enjoyment of leisure (1331 b 12), the highest and best thing in human life (c. 14. 1333 a 30-b 3). The buildings round it would not be the buildings which usually surrounded an agora. They would include no temples, for the temples were to be on the top of the hill above it, and no public offices either, if the public offices were also to be on the top of the hill, with the exception of those which adjoined the commercial agora. The only buildings which we are distinctly told would adjoin the 'free agora' are those of the gymnasium of the elders. These buildings are placed close to it, partly in order that the shady walks and the streams of the gymnasium may add a fresh charm to the agora, partly in order that the elder citizens may obtain recreation without straying from the region which is especially theirs, partly also perhaps in order that they may be encouraged to carry on in their years of maturity the physical training of their earlier years, and may not be tempted to drop it as they probably often did in ancient Greece. There were already cities in which the agora and the gymnasium were close together—e. g. Elis (Curtius, Peloponnesos, 2. 29) and Sparta (ibid. 2. 234)—but it should be noticed that Aristotle brings into the neighbourhood of his 'free agora' only the gymnasium of the elder men; if he had placed the gymnasium of the younger men near it, he would have seriously altered the character of the spot.

31. οἶον κ.τ.λ., '(such an agora) as they call by the name of agora in Thessaly, for example—I mean the agora which they term "free."' With *δομαζουσιν* we should supply *ἀγοράν*: cp. Isocr. Panath. § 183, τοῖς ἀρετῆς ἀντιποιουμένοις, μὴ τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν *δομαζομένης* καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων, where *δομαζομένης* means 'called by that name.' The word *ἀγορά* was connected in the minds of Greeks with *ἀγοράειν*, and to use the word as the Thessalians did of a place in which nothing was bought or sold would seem strange to them. Lambinus, followed by Bekk.², Bonitz (Ind. 487 b 51), and Sus., would read *νομίζουσιν* in place of *δομαζουσιν*, but it seems to me that this change involves the loss of the point of the passage. For *καὶ* in the sense of 'for example,' see above on 1255 a 36. 'Ἐλευθέραν' is evidently interpreted by *καθαρὰν τῶν ὀνίων πάντων* in the next line. The word *ἐλευθέρος* is occasionally used by Aristotle in opposition to *δασυκαῖος* (e. g. in 1. 11. 1258 b 11), and we read of *τῆς δασυκαίας ἀγοράς* in 1331 b 11. Camerarius (Interp. p. 305) refers to Xen. Cyrop. 1. 2. 3 (a passage which Aristotle evidently

remembers), οἱ δὲ Περσικοὶ νόμοι προλαβόντες ἐπιμύλονται δευτέρῃ ἀρχῇ μὴ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται οἱ πολῖται οἷα ποιεῖν τινα ἢ ἀσχεροῦ ἔργου ἐφίεσθαι. ἐπιμύλονται δὲ ἔδει. ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἐλευθερία ἀγορὰ καλουμένη, ἐνθα τὰ τε βασιλεια καὶ τὰλλα ἀρχεῖα πεποιήται. ἐντεῦθεν τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καὶ οἱ ἀγοραῖοι καὶ οἱ τοῦτων φωναὶ καὶ ἀπειροκαλῶν ἀνελθόντων εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, ὅς μὴ μνησθῆται ἢ τοῦτων τύρβη τῇ τῶν πεπαιδευμένων εἰσοσμή· διήρηται δὲ αὕτη ἢ ἀγορὰ ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀρχεῖα γύτταρα μέρη· τοῦτων δ' ἔστιν ἐν μὲν πασίν, ἐν δὲ ἐφήβοις, ἄλλο τελείους ἀνδράσι, ἄλλο τοῖς ἐπὶ τὰ στρατεύσιμα ἔτη γεγεσῶσι. At the opposite pole to an agora of this kind stands the γυναικεία ἀγορὰ of Menander (Pollux, 10. 18, καὶ μὴν εἰ γυναικείαν ἀγορὰν τὸν τόπον οὗ τὰ σκεύη τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶσσεύουσιν ἐβόλοις καλεῖν, εὖροις δὲ ἐν ταῖς Συναριστώσεσι Μενάνδρου τὸ ὄνομα: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 204). According to Holm, Gr. Gesch. 2. 309 (see also Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 361), the agora at Athens was divided into two parts, a Southern part used for political purposes, and a Northern part used for trade and social intercourse. That Aristotle would not be satisfied with a mere division of one and the same agora into two parts, we see from 1331 b 1, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὁρίων ἀγορὰν ἐτέραν τε δεῖ ταύτης εἶναι καὶ χωρὶς. As to Sparta and Rome in relation to this matter, see vol. i. p. 339, note 1. The two kinds of agora are traceable in some Southern cities still. At Zara there is a Piazza dei Signori, and also a Piazza dell' Erbe (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 1. 239, 243). At San Marino the Borgo, which is 'the business centre of the State,' where the market is held, is some little way below the town of San Marino; 'it lies on a small plateau beneath the steep long ridge with its three crags crowned with castles' on which the town is built (E. Armstrong, 'A Political Survival,' in *Macmillan's Magazine*, No. 375, Jan. 1891, p. 197).

33. καὶ μήτε βάνουσιν κ.τ.λ. Supply εἰς τὸ δεῖ. For παραβάλλειν, 'enter,' see Bon. Ind. s.v., where De Mir. Auscult. 81. 836 a 28, ὅτε . . . εἰς τοῦτους τοὺς τόπους παρέβαλε, is quoted among other passages.

35. εἴη δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ. At Athens in Aristotle's day the gymnasia were outside the walls, but Plato had already proposed a change in this respect (see vol. i. p. 338, note 2). One gymnasium at any rate at Thebes was outside the city (Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 25). At Sparta and Elis, on the other hand, the gymnasium was within the city (see above on 30), and this was the case also at Megalopolis (Paus. 8. 31. 8), and apparently at Pellene (Paus. 7. 27. 5: Curtius, Pelopon-

nesos, i. 483). The gymnasium built by the grave of Timoleon at Syracuse and called Timoleonteum was in the agora (Plut. Timol. c. 39). The plan of separating the gymnasium of the elder from that of the younger men may be borrowed by Aristotle from Sparta; we read at any rate in Plut. Cimon, c. 16, of the ephebi and the young men (*τῶν ἐφήβων καὶ τῶν νεανίσκων*) exercising together in a stoa at Sparta as far back as the time of the great earthquake, when Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, was King. In the imaginary Persia of Xenophon's Cyropaedia the boys, the ephebi, the full-grown men, and those past the military age have each of them a separate part of the agora for their use (Xen. Cyrop. i. 2. 4, quoted above on 31).

38. καὶ τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον = καὶ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν, 'this arrangement' (or 'institution') 'also,' i.e. the gymnasia as well as the syssitia: cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 20, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὀρισμένα ταῖς ἡλικίαις, and for κόσμον, 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 5, ὥς ἂν πάντα κινήσωσι τὸν κόσμον, and 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 5, τῶν συσσιτίων ἡ τάξις.

40. ἡ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here implies that there are two kinds of αἰδώς, one genuine and the other not (cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 21. 273 M, τῆς ἀληθοῦς αἰδοῦς). Phaedra in the Hippolytus of Euripides (363 Bothe: 385 Dindorf) had already said,

αἰδώς τε διῶσαι ὅ' εἰσὶν, ἡ μὲν σὲ κακῇ,
ἡ δ' ἄχθος οἴκῳ,

but she is distinguishing between the αἰδώς which holds back where there should be no holding back and the αἰδώς which is not inopportune. Aristotle's distinction, on the contrary, is drawn between the αἰδώς which befits freemen and the αἰδώς which does not. The *δῖος* *οὐρανῶν* *πρὸς* *δεσπότας* of which we read in Aristot. Fragm. 178. 1507 b 22, 37 was probably miscalled αἰδώς by some. True αἰδώς was rather to be sought in the respectful awe with which the Spartans regarded the members of the *γερονσία* (Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 180, *παρελθόν τις τῶν γερόντων, οὗ ἐκείνου καὶ αἰσχύνονται καὶ δεδίασι*: cp. Plut. Apophth. Lac. Polydor. 4. 231 F, *ἐρωτηθεὶς δὲ διὰ τί Σπαρτιάται κατὰ πόλεμον κινδυνεύουσιν ἀνδρείως, ὅτι, ἴφη, αἰδεῖσθαι τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἔμαθον, σὲ φοβεῖσθαι*). The nature of the αἰδώς which befits freemen may best be learnt from Plato, Laws 671 C sq. (where it is called *θεῖος φόβος*), 647 A, 698 B, and 699 C: we gather that it makes men obedient to law and order and content with their share of speech and silence, and also courageous and

good (699 C: cp. Democrit. Fragm. Mor. 235 Mullach). Compare Soph. Aj. 1073,

οὐ γὰρ ποτ' οὐτ' ἂν ἐν πόλει νόμοι καλῶς
φέροντ' ἂν, ἵνα μὴ καθιστήῃ δέος,
οὐτ' ἂν στρατός γε σωφρόνως ἄρχοι' ἔτι
μηδὲν φόβον πρέβλημα μηδ' αἰδοῦς ἔχων,

and the language of Protagoras in Plato, Protag. 322 D. At Sparta the presence of *elders* was held to be enough, in the absence of magistrates, to produce *aídos* (cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 10, ὅπως δὲ μηδ' εἰ ὁ παιδονόμος ἀπέλθοι, ἱρημοὶ ποτε οἱ παῖδες εἰν ἄρχοντες, ἐποίησε τὸν αἰὶ παράντα τῶν πολιτῶν κύριον εἶναι καὶ ἐπιτάττειν τοῖς παισίν, ὃ τι [ἂν] ἀγαθὸν δοκοῖ εἶναι, καὶ καλέσειν, εἰ τι ἁμαρτάνοιεν. τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσας διέπραξε καὶ αἰδημονιστέροις εἶναι τοῖς παῖδας· οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως αἰδοῦνται οὐτε παῖδες οὐτε ἄνδρες ὥς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, and 5. 5: also Plut. Lycurg. c. 17)—indeed, some held that the presence, or even the existence, of *erōn* produced *aídos* (Xen. Symp. 8. 33 sq.: Plato, Symp. 178 D sq.)—but Aristotle thinks that nothing produces it so well as the visible presence of magistrates: cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 16 and Hell. 7. 3. 6, and on the whole subject Plut. Cleom. c. 9, a passage which shows that Aristotle's views were much influenced by those which prevailed at Sparta. A current proverb, however, is also probably present to his memory, αἰδᾶς ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 381): cp. Rhet. 2. 6. 1384 a 34, καὶ τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐν φανερῷ μᾶλλον (αἰσχύνονται)· ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία, τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδᾶ. διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς αἰὶ παρεσμένους μᾶλλον αἰσχύνονται καὶ τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμφοτέρω. See Cope's note on this passage.

1. τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀνίων ἀγορὰν κ.τ.λ. This answers to 1331 a 30, 1331 b. πρέπει δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦτον τὸν τύπον κ.τ.λ. "Ἐχουσιν τόπον εἰσσεύεσθαι κ.τ.λ., 'on a site easily made a meeting-point for all commodities, both those coming from the sea and those coming from the territory.' Compare the use of εἰπαράκομιστον in c. 5. 1327 a 7 sqq.

4. †πληθῶσι. See critical note.

εἰς ἱερεῖς, εἰς ἄρχοντας. See critical note. Here, as in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 16 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 17 sqq.), priests are distinguished from magistrates.

5. καὶ τῶν ἱερῶν συσσίτια, i.e. as well as the *syssitia* of the chief magistracies. For the absence of τὰ before τῶν ἱερῶν, see note on 1285 b 12, τοῦ σκήπτρου ἐκπανάσαι. Vict. 'cum enim frequentes ipsos

oporteat esse in fanis illis, ut serviant officio suo, quod sine scelere deseri non potest, facilius id praestabunt, si explebunt desideria corporis propinquo in loco.' Aristotle's aim probably is to secure more attention to their duties on the part of the priests than was often forthcoming from them. 'By the *ιερός νόμος* of Oropus (*Εφ. Ἀρχ.* 1885, 94) the priest of Amphiaraus was only required *μείνειν ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ μὴ ἑλאתον ἢ δέκα ἡμέρας τοῦ μηνὸς ἐκδοσίου*. He probably spent the remainder of his time in the city, where he had a civil occupation in addition to his sacred office. Compare von Wilamowitz, *Hermes*, 21. 93' (Toepffer, *Attische Genealogie*, p. 160. 2).

περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων. Schn. is probably right in supplying *τάξιν*. Compare the suppression of *διανομὴν* in Plato, *Laws* 745 D.

6. *τῶν δ' ἀρχαίων κ.τ.λ.*, 'but all the magistracies which have in their charge contracts and indictments in lawsuits and callings into courts and other administrative work of the kind just mentioned.' Aristotle does not rate these functions highly (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 10 sqq.), nor does Plato (*Rep.* 425 C sqq.). The magistracies which have the supervision of contracts are here marked off from the *agoranomi*, though in 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 12, *πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐπιμίλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἢ περὶ τὴν ἀγοράν, ἐφ' ἧ δὲ τίνα ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὴν ἐφορῶσαν περὶ τε τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ τὴν εὐκοσμίαν*, the functions of the *agoranomi* are implied to include the supervision of contracts. Aristotle is perhaps here thinking of magistrates with whom contracts were registered: see as to these 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 34 sqq. and note.

9. *τὴν καλουμένην δονομίαν*. Probably the word *δονομία* was not familiar everywhere (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 23, *καλοῖσι δ' δονομίαν οἱ πλείστοι τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχήν*). The title, indeed, seems to be too grand for the functions of the office. See note on 1317 a 18. Yet Aristotle adds *οἱ καλούμενοι* to such simple and everyday words as *γεωργοί* and *βάναντοι* in 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 40 sq., so that the addition of *τὴν καλουμένην* here may need no special explanation.

10. *πρὸς ἀγορᾷ μὲν δεῖ κ.τ.λ.*, 'must be established near indeed to some agora and place of public concourse, but the place adapted for the business done by them is [not the place near the free agora, but] the place near the necessary agora, for,' etc. For *σύνδοκος*, see note on 1319 a 31. For *τοιούτος*, cp. 1331 a 28. For the contrast of *ἀναγκαία ἀγορά* and *ἐλευθέρα ἀγορά*, cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 10.

12. *ἐνσχολάζειν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἄνθρωπον τιθεμεν*. For *ἐνσχολάζειν*, where the infinitive expresses the purpose, see Goodwin, *Moods and*

Tenses, § 770, who refers among other passages to Plato, *Phaedr.* 228 E, *παρόντος δὲ καὶ Δυσίου ἑμαυτὸν σοὶ ἑμμελεῖν παρέχειν οὐ πῶς δέδοκται*, and *Thuc.* 2. 44. 2. For *τὴν ἀνα*, cp. *Thuc.* 1. 93. 9, *τὴν τε Πειραιᾷ ὠφελιμώτερον ἐνόμιζε τῆς ἀνα πόλεως*. For *τίθεμεν*, cp. c. 13. 1332 a 30 sq.

ταύτην δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀναγκαίας πράξεις, 'and this for necessary activities, [with the supervision of which these magistracies are concerned].'

13. *νεμεῖσθαι δὲ χρὴ κ.τ.λ.*, 'and matters in the territory should be distributed on the plan which has been described,' i.e. so that sites shall be allotted for guard-houses and *syssitia* of magistrates in them and for temples. Aristotle here has before him Plato, *Laws* 848 C sqq., and especially *δώδεκα κόμης εἶναι χρὴ, κατὰ μέγεθος δὲ δωδεκατημέριον ἕκαστον μίαν, ἐν τῇ κόμῃ δὲ ἑκάστη πρῶτον μὲν ἱερὰ καὶ ἀγορὰν ἐξηρησθαι θεῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων θεοῖς δαμῶναι . . . πρῶτον δὲ οἰκοδομίας εἶναι περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ ταῦτα, ὅπῃ ἂν ὁ τόπος ὑψηλότερος ᾖ, τοῖς φρουροῖς ὑποδοχὴν δὲ τι μάλιστα εὐερεῖν*. He also follows the example of Plato (*Laws* 760 B sqq.) in creating the magistracy of the *agronomi* to keep watch and ward over the rural districts. We nowhere find a mention of *ἀγρονόμοι* except in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, nor of *ὕληροί* except in the *Politics* (Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 333), though *Suidas* has an article under the head of *ὕληροί*. See as to these magistrates below on 1321 b. 27. Plato had already established *syssitia* for the *agronomi* (*Laws* 762 B, *διατάσθων δὲ οἱ τε ἀρχόντες οἱ τε ἀγρονόμοι τὰ δύο ἔτη τοῖνδε τὴν τρόπον πρῶτον μὲν διὰ καθ' ἑκάστου τοῦ τόπου εἶναι ξυσσίτια, ἐν οἷς κοινῇ τὴν δαίτην ποιήσιν ἅπαντες*). As to the *φυλακή* τῆς χώρας, see *Xen. Mem.* 3. 6. 10 sqq. (where one of its objects is implied to be the protection of property against robbers), and *Rhet.* 1. 4. 1360 a 6 sqq. *Φυλακῆρια* were scattered over Attica (see Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 312, note 1, and *Haussoullier, Vie Municipale en Attique*, p. 193); we read in *Xen. De Vect.* 4. 43 of a *τείχος* at *Anaphlystus* and of another at *Thoricus*. A description of the castle at *Oenoe* will be found in *Droysen, Gr. Kriegsalterthümer*, p. 259. We may perhaps infer from *Laws* 848 C sqq. (quoted above) that Greek villages often had a fortress on high ground towering over them quite in the style which we associate with the middle ages. These *φυλακῆρια* furnished quarters for the young citizens of Athens during the year in which they served as *περίπολοι* (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 42, § 4, with *Sandy*).

note: cp. Eupolis, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 56, *καὶ τοὺς περιπόλους ἀντί' εἰς τὰ φρούρια*). How important a part they sometimes played in the defence of the State appears from Diod. 14. 57. 6, where we read that after the city of Messana in Sicily had been captured by the Carthaginians, *τὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν φρούρια*, in which most of the citizens had taken refuge, offered a successful resistance.

17. *ἔτι δὲ ἱερὰ κ.τ.λ.*, 'and further temples must be marked out all over the territory, some for gods and others for heroes.' Cp. Plato, Laws 848 D, where it is arranged that in each village there shall be temples of the gods *καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων θεοῖς δαίμωνων*: elsewhere also in the Laws he recommends worship to be paid not only to gods and heroes but also to *δαίμονες* (Laws 717 B, *μετὰ θεοῖς δὲ τοῖσδε καὶ τοῖς δαίμοσιν ὃ γὰρ ἔμφρων ὀργάζονται* *ἄν, ἥρωσι δὲ μετὰ τοῖσιν*: cp. 738 B and D). As to the position given by Plato to *δαίμονες*, see the passages from his writings referred to by Zeller, Plato, Eng. Trans., p. 501, note 38. Plutarch says (*De Defect. Orac.* c. 10: see also c. 17, and *De Iside et Osiride*, c. 25), 'Ἡσιόδοι δὲ καθαρῶς καὶ διαρισμένως πρῶτος ἐξέθηκε τῶν λογικῶν τέσσαρα γένη, θεοὺς, εἴτα δαίμονας πολλοὺς καγαθοὺς, εἴτα ἥρωας, εἴτα ἀνθρώπους, τῶν ἡμιθέων εἰς ἥρωας ἀποκριθέντων. Aristotle is acquainted with the distinction between gods and *δαίμονες* (cp. *Περὶ τῆς καθ' ὕπνον μαντικῆς*, c. 2. 463 b 13 sqq.), and his silence in this passage about *δαίμονες* is significant. That heroes were believed sometimes to fight for the State which worshipped them, appears from Diod. 15. 53. 4. Attica was full of village-shrines (*Liv.* 31. 26: see Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, 8. 290). We see from the passage before us that the word *ἱερόν* was used of the building dedicated to a hero, though the sacred enclosure round it was properly called not a *τέμενος*, but a *σηαίς* (*Pollux*, 1. 6).

18. *ἀλλὰ τὸ διατρέβειν τῶν ἀκριβολογουμένων κ.τ.λ.* Cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 34, *τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρέβειν*, and 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 29 sqq. *καὶ λέγοντας* is added in contradistinction to *ποιοῦντας*, cp. 20 sqq. *τῶν τοιούτων* is repeated in 19 and 22, and in 20 we have *τὰ τοιαῦτα*. See note on 1284 b 28.

20. *οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν κ.τ.λ.* There is a designed antithesis between the similarly sounding words *νοῆσαι* and *ποιῆσαι*, *εὐχή* and *τύχη*. For the contrast of *νοῆσαι* and *ποιῆσαι*, cp. *Metaph.* Z. 7. 1032 b 15 sqq. Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 745 B, *τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο πρῶτον μὲν τὴν πόλιν ἱδρῦσθαι δεῖ τῆς χώρας ὃ τι μάλιστα ἐν μέσῳ*,

καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα πρόσφορα πάλαι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἔχοντα τόπον ἐλεξέμενον, δ' νοῆσαι τε καὶ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν: cp. also Phileb. 16 C, and Philem. Ἐφεδρεῖται, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 10),

χαλεπὸν τὸ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ καλεῖσθαι ῥῆδιον.

21. τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν εὐχῆς ἔργον ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ συμβῆναι τύχης. Bonitz (Ind. 303 a 54) compares c. 13. 1332 a 29, διὰ κατ' εὐχὴν εὐχόμεθα τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν, ὥς ἡ τύχη κυρία. To pray is easy (Demosth. Ol. 3. 18, εὐξασθαι μὲν γάρ, δ' ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ῥῆδιον). For εὐχῆς ἔργον, cp. Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 68, εὐχῆς, οὐ πόμον, διαπράττους' ἂν ἔργον, and [Plut.] De Liberis Educandis, c. 20 *sub fin.*, τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσας τὰς προειρημένας συμπεριλαβεῖν παραινήσεις εὐχῆς ἴσως ἔργον ἐστὶ. For the use in the same sentence of the pres. infin. λέγειν and the aor. infin. συμβῆναι, cp. c. 13. 1332 a 28 sq. and 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 3 sq. Cp. also 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 21 sq.

22. Περὶ δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ. The contents of the c. 13. thirteenth and following chapters have been sketched in vol. i. p. 340 sqq. The answer given in them to the question here raised is—a State that is to be happy must consist of citizens who are endowed by nature, fortune, and education with the means of making an absolutely, and not merely conditionally, perfect use of virtue, or in other words of citizens who are not only good men (*σπουδαῖοι*), but are also supplied with an adequate amount of bodily and external goods, i.e. of citizens possessed of ἀρετῇ κεκορηγημένη (1332 a 28 sqq.: 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32 sq.). Aristotle insists on this because he holds that Plato had starved the life of his guardians in the Republic and robbed it of happiness (2. 5. 1264 b 15 sqq.), and had sought to construct a happy State without making any class of his citizens happy (see vol. i. p. 427 sq.); he probably thought that Plato would not have made this mistake if he had studied the nature of happiness more closely. Aristotle's own ideal of a happy State, which is a sound and noble one, is conceived in direct and designed contrast to that of Plato's Republic and also to the model of the Lacedaemonian State. His ideal State consists of a body of citizens fully supplied with absolute goods and living a life in which work is crowned with leisure, yet unspoilt by their good fortune and enabled by a wisely ordered education to use their leisure aright. For τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς, 'the constitution itself, as distinguished from matters outside it,' see above on 1326 b 35, and cp. Plut. De Cohib. Ira, c. 12, where αὐτῇ ἡ ὀργή is contrasted with τὰ ἐν ὀργῇ ἀμαρτήματα, and Demosth. in

Lept. c. 144, καὶ νυνὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου πᾶς ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, τούτῳ δ' (i.e. to the proposer of the law) οἰδεῖς ἐστὶ κίνδυνος. For ἐκ τίνων καὶ ἐκ ποίων, cp. c. 10. 1329 b 40, and see above on 1274 b 32. As to the repetition of ἐκ, see critical note.

26. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The apodosis is introduced by μὲν οὖν, 39, as in c. 2. 1324 a 19 sqq., where see note. Plato (Laws 962 A) and Isocrates (De Pace, § 28 and Epist. 6. 8) had already dwelt on the importance in any inquiry of ascertaining both the end and the means of attaining it. For τὸ εἶ, see Bon. Ind. 291 b 25 sqq. Bonitz (Ind. 685 a 40) contrasts τὸν σκοπὸν καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πράξεων with 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 14, ποτηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὰ τέλεις. See note on the latter passage.

28. ἐν δὲ τὰς κ.τ.λ., not ἐν τῇ τὰς: see above on 1330 b 10.

30. ταῦτα, i.e. τὸ τέλος and τὰς πρὸς τὸ τέλος φερούσας πράξεις.

31. ἔκκεται καλῶς, 'is proposed well.' Compare (with Liddell and Scott) Megasthenes, ap. Strab. p. 707, τοῖς δ' ὀπλοποιεῖς καὶ ναυπηγοῖς μισθοὶ καὶ τροφαὶ παρὰ βασιλέως ἔκκενται. In 28 we have κείσθαι ὁρθῶς, and in 36 τὸν ὑποκείμενον αὐτοῖς ἔρον.

ἐν τῇ πράττειν, as distinguished from τὸ εἶναι, which is a prior stage: cp. Metaph. Z. 7. 1032 b 6 sqq.

33. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The Platonic Socrates in the Republic is charged with this twofold error in 2. 2. 1261 a 11-16.

34. οἷον περὶ ἱατρικὴν, sc. διαμαρτάνουσιν: cp. Plato, Laws 962 A, ἱατροὶ δὲ περὶ σῶμα ἀγνοοῦν, ὃ προσείπομεν ὑγίειαν νῦν, ἣ εἴη ἐν στρατηγῇ ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα δὲ διήλθομεν, ἴσθ' ὅπως ἂν τοῖν περὶ τὰ τούτων ἂν ἔχων φαίνοιστο;

36. ἔρον here = τέλος.

38. κρατεῖσθαι, 'obtineri' (Bon. Ind. s. v.): see Vahlen on Poet. 18. 1456 a 10, πολλοὶ δὲ πλέζοντες εἰς λούους κακῶς δεῖ δὲ ἀμφοῖν εἰς κρατεῖσθαι, and cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 21, ὥστε δεῖ ἀμφοῖν ἔχων, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. See vol. i. p. 341, note 1.

τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις. We expect πρὸς in place of εἰς, but cp. c. 11. 1330 b 16, χωρὶς τὰ τε εἰς τροφὴν ὕδατα καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλαν χρείαν, and c. 15. 1334 a 14, τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετὰς. Cp. also 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 23, τὰ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον.

39. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ τε εἰς ζῆν καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐφίεται πάντες, φανερόν. Here the apodosis begins. Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Meno 78 A, ἵστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ἀθλιός καὶ κακοδαίμων εἶναι; and the argument which follows. Cp. also Rhet. 1. 5. 1360 b 4, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι σκοπὸς τις ἐστίν, εἰς στοχασ-

ζόμενοι καὶ αἰρούμενοι καὶ φεύγουσιν καὶ τοὺτ' ἐστὶν ἐν κεφαλῇ εἰπεῖν ἢ τ' εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς.

40. ἄλλα τοῦτων κ.τ.λ. As to those who have not the power to attain happiness, cp. c. 8. 1328 a 38 sqq. In some of these there is a defect of φύσις (c. 13. 1332 a 40 sqq.: 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 8 sqq.); this is the case with natural slaves (3. 9. 1280 a 33 sqq.). In others there is a defect of τύχη (41 sqq.: cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 27, μήτε πρὸς παιδείαν ἢ φύσεως δέεται καὶ χορηγίας τυχερῶς). Compare Plato, Laws 747 C (quoted in vol. i. p. 341, note 2) and 934 D.

41. δέεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is added in explanation of διὰ τὴν τύχην, for a defect of χορηγία is due to a defect of fortune. Καὶ χορηγίας τινός, as well as of φύσις.

1. τοῦτου δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably remembers a saying of 1832 a. Pelopidas recorded by Plutarch, Pelop. c. 3, τῶν δὲ φίλων νοθευομένων καὶ λεγόντων ὡς ἀναγκαῖον πράγματος ἀλιγορεῖ, τοῦ χρήματος ἔχειν "Ἀναγκαίου, ἢ Δία, Νικοδήμω τούτῳ," ἔφη, δείξας τινὰ χαλὸν καὶ τυφλόν, and by Aelian, Var. Hist. 11. 9. Cp. also Plut. Aristid. et Cato inter se comp. c. 4, ὡς γὰρ σῶμα τὸ καλῶς πρὸς εὐεξίαν κεκραμένον οὐτ' ἐσθίῃσιν οὔτε τροφῇ δέεται περιττῇ, οὔτε καὶ βίος καὶ οἶκος ὑγαιῶν ἀπὸ τῶν τυχόντων διοικεῖται, and Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 a 32, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὅν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος ἢ μᾶλλον.

2. οἱ δ' ἐξῆς κ.τ.λ. Εἰθὺς, 'from the outset,' because, unlike the others, who start aright but fail later on, they are wrong at starting. So we read in 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 31 sqq. that there are persons who seek happiness in the pleasures of recreation, mistaking them for the pleasures of the true end of life. Cp. Eurip. Hippol. 360 Bothe (382 Dindorf), where some are said to miss what is good,

ἥδονην προθέιντες ἀπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ
ἄλλην τιν',

and Arrian, Epictet. 3. 23. 34.

7. φαμέν δὲ κ.τ.λ. As to the question whether we have here a reference to the Nicomachean Ethics, see vol. i. Appendix F. Aristotle has already given part of this definition in c. 8. 1328 a 37, ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἀριστον, αὕτη δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις τῆς τελείας. We find a similar definition of εὐδαιμονία ascribed to the Peripatetics in Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 12, εὐδαιμονίας δ' εἶναι χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς τελείας ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ προηγουμένην . . . προηγουμένην δὲ τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαν (sc. εἶναι δεῖν) διὰ τὸ πάντως ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθοῖς ὑπάρχειν: compare another Peripatetic definition of εὐδαιμονία there given, χρῆσιν ἀρετῆς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἀνεμπόδιστον. Speusippus

had defined εὐδαιμονία as εἶναι τοιαύτη ἐν ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν or εἶναι ἀγαθόν (Zeller, *Plato, Eng. Trans.*, p. 579. 62), but Aristotle substitutes χρεῖς for εἶναι. For καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡθραῖς, compare the frequent use of καὶ, when the ἐξωτερικαὶ λόγαι are added (e.g. in c. 1. 1323 a 22, καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξωτερικαῖς λόγοις, *Eth. Nic.* 1. 13. 1102 a 26 and 6. 4. 1140 a 2 sq., and *Metaph. M.* 1. 1076 a 28), and also *Eth. Nic.* 6. 3. 1139 b 26, ὥστερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀπολευσταῖς λόγοις. If add διαρίεσθαι after καὶ, but probably wrongly; this may be a gloss on φανέν which has crept into the text.

9. καὶ ταύτην κ.τ.λ., i.e. 'and this perfect use of virtue not an use of virtue conditionally, but absolutely,' or, in other words, not a merely necessary use of virtue, but a noble use of virtue. A conditional use of virtue is an use of virtue which is called for under certain circumstances: for instance, if an offence has been committed, it is under the circumstances an use of virtue to punish the offender, but this is not an absolute use of virtue, because it is an use of virtue dictated by circumstances not desirable in themselves; it is the adoption and acceptance of an evil for the sake of the good which under the circumstances it will ultimately produce, whereas an absolute use of virtue is concerned with absolute goods, not with evils which are under given circumstances goods; it is concerned with the calling into existence of honours and wealth. In depicting the life of the citizens of his 'best State,' Aristotle often has in his mind the model furnished by the life of the gods (e.g. in c. 1. 1323 b 23 sqq. and c. 3. 1325 b 28 sqq.), and here too he probably remembers the θεοὶ θαῖντες ἰάνω of Homer (*Odysa.* 8. 325): cp. *Isocr. Philip.* § 117, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν θεῶν τοῖς μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτίους ἡμῶν ὄντας Ὀλυμπίους προσαγορεύουσιν, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς συμφοραῖς καὶ ταῖς τιμαῖς τεταγμένους δυσχεμεστέραις τὰς ἐκουσίας ἔχοντας, καὶ τῶν μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τοὺς καὶ βασιλεῖς ἰδρυμένους, τοὺς δ' οὐτ' ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς οὐτ' ἐν ταῖς θυσίαις τιμαμένους, ἀλλ' ἀποπομπὰς αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς ποιούμενοι: *Menander, Kollaf Fragm.* 3, with *Meineke's* note, *Fragm. Com. Gr.* 4. 153: and the remarks of *Plutarch* on the epithet 'Olympian' conferred on *Pericles* in *Peric.* c. 39, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὴν μαιρακιδίη καὶ σοβαρίῳ ἐκείνῳ προσωνυμίαν ἐν τοίτῳ ποιῆν ἀνεπίφθονον καὶ πρέπουσαν, οὕτως εὐμενὲς ἔχει καὶ βίον ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀμείνων Ὀλύμπιον προσαγορεύεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ τῶν θεῶν γένος ἀξιοῦμεν αἰτίων μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἀναίτων δι' κακῶν πεφονδῆ ἀρχῶν καὶ βασιλείων τῶν ἔστων. For the association of τίλλιος and ἀπλῶς, cp. *Eth. Nic.* 5. 15. 1138 a 32, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικίῳ μετὰ πακίας καὶ ψεκτός,

καὶ κακίας ἢ τῆς τελείας καὶ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐγγύς (οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν τὸ ἐκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας).

10. λέγω δ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τἀναγκαῖα, 'and by the term "conditionally" I mean things which are necessary': i. e. things which are necessary if good is to come about, but which are not in themselves desirable. Bonitz (Ind. 797 a 43) explains τἀναγκαῖα here by *ὃν οὐκ ἄνεν τὸ εὖ*, comparing Metaph. Δ. 5. 1015 b 3. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συνακρίτων τοῦ ζῆν καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως (sc. ἀναγκαῖον λέγεται): ἔταν γὰρ μὴ ἐνδέχεται εὖ εἶναι μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν εὖ εἶναι δὲ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἄνεν τινῶν, ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖα καὶ ἡ αἰτία ἀνάγκη τίς ἐστὶν αὐτῇ. Cp. also Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1238 b 5, καὶ βουλήσεται τὰ ἀγαθὰ (sc. ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τῷ φαύλῳ) ἀπλῶς μὲν τὰ ἀπλᾶ, τὰ δ' ἐκείνῳ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, ἢ περὶ συμφέρεει ἢ νόσει.

11. οἷον τὰ περὶ τὰς δικαίας πράξεις κ.τ.λ., 'as for instance, if we take just actions' (i. e. uses of the virtue justice), 'just vengeance and punishments proceed indeed from virtue' (i. e. are uses of virtue), 'but they are necessary,' i. e. not desirable in themselves, 'and are noble only in a necessary way.' Aristotle here has before him, and slightly corrects, Plato, Laws 728 C, τοῦτο οὖν δὴ τὸ πάθος δίκη μὲν οὐκ ἔστι—καλὸν γὰρ τό γε δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δίκη—τιμωρία δέ, ὀδύς ἀκόλουθος πάθῃ, ἥς δ' τε τυχὼν καὶ μὴ τυγχάνων ἀθλίωσι, ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἱερνόμενος, ὁ δέ, ἵνα ἕτεροι πολλοὶ σώζωνται, ἀπολλύμενος. In Laws 859 D—860 B the difficulty of classing just punishments either as καλὰ or as αἰσχροῖα is dwelt on, and Aristotle himself says in Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 b 30, καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ δίκαιως (sc. πεπραγμένα) ἔργα (sc. ἀνάγκη καλὰ εἶναι), πάθος δέ οὐ: it would seem, however, from the passage before us, that just vengeance and punishments τὸ καλῶς ἀναγκαῖως ἔχουσιν. For the difference between τιμωρία and κόλασις, cp. Rhet. 1. 10. 1369 b 12, διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἐνικὰ ἐστὶν, ἡ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιούντος, ἵνα ἀποκληρωθῇ, Eth. Nic. 4. 11. 1126 a 26 sqq., and Gell. 6. 14, puniendis peccatis tres esse debere causas existimatum est. Una est quae reus vel κόλασις vel παραινέσις dicitur; cum poena adhibetur castigandi atque emendandi gratia, ut is qui fortuito deliquit attentior fiat correctiorque. Altera est quam ii qui vocabula ista curiosius diviserunt τιμωρίαν appellant. Ea causa animadvertendi est, cum dignitas auctoritasque eius in quem est peccatum tuenda est, ne praetermissa animadversio contemptum eius pariat et honorem levaret; idcircoque id ei vocabulum a conservatione honoris factum putant. For ἀπ' ἀρετῆς, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 11, πράττειν τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, and Plut. Pericl. c. 1, ἐν τοῖς ἀπ' ἀρετῆς ἔργοις.

14. αἰρετώτερον μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Gorg. 507 D and 478 C: also Laws 628 C sqq. For μὲν *solitarium*, see above on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34. Here the suppressed clause is 'though it is desirable that, if punishments are needed, they should be inflicted.'

15. αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς κ.τ.λ., 'but actions with a view to [the production of] honours and wealth are the noblest actions in an absolute sense': cp. 18, κατασκευαὶ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ γεννήσεις. For the thought, cp. De Gen. An. 2. 1. 731 b 25, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τὸ θεῖον αἷτιον αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν τοῦ βελτίονος ἐν τοῖς ἐνδεχομένοις, and Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 a 36, ἀρετὴ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν δύναμις, ὡς δοκεῖ, ποριστικὴ ἀγαθῶν καὶ φυλακτικὴ, καὶ δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων, and 1. 6. 1362 b 2, καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δὲ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὸν εἶναι: κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας εὖ τε διάκεινται οἱ ἔχοντες, καὶ ποιητικαὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ πρακτικαί. Prodicus, indeed, according to Plato, Charm. 163 D, would give the name of πράξεις only to τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήσεις.

16. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἕτερον κ.τ.λ. Τὸ ἕτερον = αἱ δίκαιαι τιμωρίαι καὶ κολάσεις. As Schneider points out in his Addenda (2. 506), Sepulveda (p. 229: see his note, p. 230 b, which Schneider quotes) translates, 'illud enim est malum tollere,' but, as αἵρεσις can hardly bear this meaning, Schn. would read ἀναίρεσις in place of it, and this reading is adopted by Bekk.⁸ and Sus. The change certainly makes the antithesis neater, for κακοῦ τινὸς ἀναίρεσις answers well to κατασκευαὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ γεννήσεις, and it receives support (which has not hitherto been observed, so far as I have seen) from Plato, Gorg. 478 C sq. and esp. 478 D, ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην δίδοναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἦν, πονηρίας; ΠΩΛ. ἦν γάρ. ΣΩ. σωφρονίζει γὰρ πον καὶ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ καὶ ἱατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἢ δίκη. Thus Plato at any rate regarded punishment as the 'removal of an evil,' the 'evil' being the wickedness of the offender, but the question is whether Aristotle took this view of punishment. This is very doubtful. He says indeed in Rhet. 1. 14. 1374 b 31, καὶ [ἀδίκημα μείζον ἐστιν] οὐ μὴ ἐστιν ἴσους: χαλεπὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὐ μὴ ᾖσι δίκην λαβεῖν τὸν παθόντα: ἀνάστων γάρ: ἢ γὰρ δίκη καὶ κολάσις ἴσους (cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 b 16 sqq. and Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1220 a 35 sqq.). But it is one thing to say that punishment heals the injustice committed, and another to say that it heals and removes the wickedness of the wrong-doer. I incline on the whole to think that the reading of the MSS., κακοῦ τινὸς αἵρεσις, is right, and to regard the ζημία as the κακόν τι referred to: cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 7. 1132 a 15, τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον ἐναντίας,

τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλείον τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἔλαττον κέρδος, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ζημία; and Rhet. 3. 10. 1411 b 19, *ὅτι καὶ αἱ πόλεις τῇ ψήγῃ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεγάλας εἰθύναι διδόναι ἢ γὰρ εἰθύναι βλάβη τις δικαία ἐστίν* (where *εἰθύναι* means the penalty inflicted as a result of the *εἰθύναι* properly so called, see Bernays, *Dialoge des Aristoteles*, p. 16). The meaning of the sentence will then be that just punishments are 'a choice of what is in a degree an evil' (i. e. of βλάβη or ζημία). This interpretation harmonizes well with what follows in 19 sqq. (see the next note); it also has the merit of giving the proper force to *κακοῦ τινός*, where *τινός* softens *κακοῦ* and marks the contrast with τὸ ἀπλῶς κακόν (cp. 1. 6. 1255 a 22, *ἀντεχόμενοί τινος, ὡς οἴονται, δικαίου τινός, ὃ γὰρ νόμος δικάζειν τι*), and with the *φαιλά τύχαι* mentioned in 20. Evil is not a fit object of choice; men should choose the good (Plato, *Protag.* 358 C sq.: *Gorg.* 499 E: *Isocr. De Pace* § 106: cp. also *Plut. Galba*, c. 14, *κατ' οὐδένα λογισμὸν οὐδέ αἵρεσιν ἀμεινύνειν*).

19. *χρήσαιτο δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle continues, 'Yes, and a good man would make an in some sense noble use of virtue in relation not only to evils which are in the particular case goods (such as just punishments), but also to absolute evils like poverty, disease, and other evil contingencies; still beatitude is not to be found in them but in their opposites. For the use which the good man makes of things which are not goods to him—and no things are goods to him which are not absolute goods—is not an absolutely noble use, and therefore happiness is not to be found in it, for we have defined happiness to be an absolutely noble use of virtue.' Aristotle perhaps has before him a saying which Plutarch places in the mouth of Epaminondas in *De Gen. Socr.* c. 14, *ἀλλ' ἀπέγγελλε τοῖς ἐκεί γυναιμένοι, ὅτι καλλίστα μὲν αἰντοί πλοῦτι χρώνται, καλῶς δὲ πενίᾳ χρωμένους αὐτόθι φίλους ἔχουσι*: cp. *Isocr. Hel.* § 8, *τασοῦτω δ' ἐπιδεδωκέναι πεποιήκασι τὸ ψευδολογεῖν, ὥστ' ἔβη τινές, ἐρώσιντες τοῦτους ἐκ τῶν τοιοῦτων ἀφελουμένους, τολμῶσι γράφειν, ὡς ἴστω δὲ τῶν πτωχεύωντων καὶ φευγόντων βίος ζηλωτότερος ἢ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων*, and *Hor. Carm.* 4. 9. 46,

rectius occupat

Nomen beati, qui deorum

Muneribus sapienter uti

Duramque callet pauperiem pati.

φαιλά τύχη is a milder term than *δυστυχία*: cp. *Phys.* 2. 5. 197 a 25, *τύχη δὲ ἀγαθὴ μὲν λέγεται ὅταν ἀγαθόν τι ἀποβῇ, φαιλά δέ, ὅταν φαιλὸν τι, εὐτυχία δὲ καὶ δυστυχία, ὅταν μέγεθος ἔχοντα ταῦτα*, and *Metaph.* κ. 8.

1065 a 35 sq. What Aristotle includes under *φασίαι τύχαι* may be gathered from Eth. Nic. 3. 9. 1115 a 10, *φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν, πέναν, νόσον, ἀφίλειαν, θάνατον*. A reminiscence of the passage before us may be traced in Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 12, *ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν κακοῖς ἀρετῇ χρήσασθαι ἂν καλῶς ὁ σπουδαῖος, οὐ μὲν γε μακάριος ἔσται*. For the conjunction of *πενία* and *νόσος*, cp. Bacchylides 1. 32 sq. and Plato, Protag. 353 D.

21. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The reference to ἡθικοὶ λόγοι may be a reference to Eth. Nic. 3. 6. 1113 a 25, *τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν* (sc. *βουλευτὴν φατίον βουλευτὴν*) *εἶναι* (see Sus.⁴, 1. p. 530), and Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a 21, *τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ τῇ ἐπιμικτεῖ*: in some respects, however, we trace a nearer approach to the definition before us in Eth. Eud. 7. 15. 1248 b 26, *ἀγαθὸν μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ὃ τὰ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ*, and in Magn. Mor. 2. 9. 1207 b 31, *ἔστιν οὖν ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὃ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀπλῶς καλὰ καλὰ ἔστιν* (both passages referred to by Eaton), but there is nothing in either passage about *διὰ τὴν ἀρετήν*. For *τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ* cp. Top. 3. 1. 116 b 8 sqq. For the thought compare Plato, Laws 661 C sq.

23. *ὁῦλον δ' ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*, 'and it is evident that [just as absolute goods are absolutely good and noble, so] these uses also' (i.e. the good man's uses of absolute goods) 'are necessarily absolutely good and noble.'

25. *ὁδὸ κ.τ.λ.*, 'hence,' i.e. because men see that the uses made by the *σπουδαῖος* of absolute goods are absolutely good and noble and confer happiness on him, men think that external goods are the causes of happiness, forgetting that the *σπουδαῖος* owes his happiness not to them but to his own virtue, and that even in his case they are only conditions, not causes, of happiness, while in the case of those who are not *σπουδαῖοι* they may be the causes not of happiness, but of unhappiness, inasmuch as they may not be goods at all to them. For *ἄνθρωποι*, cp. Plato, Symp. 189 C, *ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι πατάσασθαι τὴν τοῦ ἔρωτος δύναμιν οὐκ ἡσθήσθαι*, and 205 E, *ὡς οὐδὲν γε ἄλλο ἔστιν οὐ ἔρῳσιν ἄνθρωποι ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, where see Stallbaum's critical note. We have *οἱ ἄνθρωποι* in 2. 7. 1267 a 2 sq. and in Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 a 15, just as we sometimes have *ἄνθρωπος* and sometimes *ὁ ἄνθρωπος* (see critical note on 1253 a 2). For the fact that men take external goods to be the causes of happiness, cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 9. 1099 b 6 sqq. and 7. 14. 1153 b 21 sqq., and Plut. De Virt. et Vit. c. 1.

26. *κιθαρίζειν λαμπρόν*, cp. Hom. Il. 18. 570, *ἡμερόν κινάριζε*.

27. αἰπύρο. For the absence of *πρ*, cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1113 a 2, *οἱ δὲ αἰὶ βουλευόμενοι, εἰς ἀπειρὸν ἤξει*, and other passages collected by Bonitz, Ind. 589 b 47 sqq.

28. ἀναγκαῖον τοῖνυν κ.τ.λ., 'it is necessary, therefore, as a result of what has been said,' etc.: see above on 1267 b 14. Τὰ μὲν, i. e. the external goods which are the gifts of Fortune. For ὑπάρχειν and παρασκευάσαι see note on 1331 b 21.

29. διὰ κ.τ.λ. These words are susceptible of two interpretations: either we may take *κατ' εὐχάν* as adverbial to *εὐχόμεθα* and translate with Sepulv. 'precibus optamus' (so Vict. and Lamb.), or we may supply *εἰς* and translate 'hence in respect of those things over which fortune is supreme we pray that the composition of the State may be all that can be wished.' Perhaps the second interpretation is the better. Compare with the passage before us Soph. Fragm. 731,

τὰ μὲν διδασκὰ μαθήσασθαι, τὰ δ' εὐρεῖν
ζητῶν, τὰ δ' εὐκτὰ (al. ἴτερα) παρὰ θεῶν ἡγησάμεν.

31. τὸ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 39, ὅπως δὲ γίνονται τοιοῦτοι, τοῦ νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἔργον ἰδίον ἐστίν. Ἐπιστήμης καὶ προαίρεσις, because science is not enough by itself: cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 1, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην (sc. πολιτείαν πολίτης ἐστίν) ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ἀρχεῖν πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν. It should be noticed that if, as we are told in 39 sq., φύσις is one of the sources of virtue, it does not entirely depend on the lawgiver whether the citizens are virtuous or not. It is impossible, for instance, to turn barbarians into Greeks: still much may be done by attention to marriage and rearing to secure that the 'nature' of the citizens is what it should be.

32. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. It is implied here that a man might be a citizen without sharing in the constitution: see vol. i p. 229.

34. ἡμῖν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but in our State all the citizens share in the constitution, [so that all our citizens must be good].' See as to this vol. i p. 324 and note 1, and Appendix B *sub fin.* Here Aristotle seems to use the word *πολίται* in a sense exclusive of the *πυῶτεροι*, or in other words *οἱ ὅπλα κεκτημένοι*, for in c. 10. 1329 b 36 it is implied that *οἱ ὅπλα κεκτημένοι* do not share in the constitution.

35. τοῦτ' ἔρα σκεπτέον, πῶς ἀληθὲς γίνεται σπουδαῖος. In some lines of Eupolis (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 457) Nicias asks Aristides,

πῶς γὰρ ἐγένον δίκαιοι;

and Aristides answers,

ἡ μὲν φύσις τὸ μέγιστον ἔσθ', ταῦτα δὲ
καὶ γὰρ προθύμως τῇ φύσει συνελέμβανον.

36. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It is more desirable that each individual citizen should be good than that all the citizens collectively should be good but not each individual citizen, because in the former case not only will each citizen be good but all will be good, and a good which includes another is more desirable than the good which it includes (Top. 3. 2. 117 a 16 sqq.). It appears from 2. 5. 1264 b 17, ἀδύνατον δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὅλην (sc. τὴν πόλιν), μὴ τῶν πλείονων ἢ μὴ πάντων μερῶν ἢ τῶν ἰχόντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, that a State may be happy if only some of its members are happy.

38. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. For ἀγαθοὶ καὶ σπουδαῖαι, cp. Rhet. 2. 9. 1387 b 7. Cp. also Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 12, ἀγαθοὶ καὶ δίκαιοι. Eaton and Congreve compare Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 20, γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδασκῶν (= λόγῳ): cp. also Eth. Nic. 1. 10. 1099 b 9 sqq. The passage before us is perhaps present to the mind of the writer of [Plut.] De Liberis Educandis, c. 4. 2 A, ὥς εἰς τὴν παντελῆ δικαιοπραγίαν τρία δεῖ συνδραμεῖν, φύσιν καὶ λόγον καὶ ἔθος· καλῶ δὲ λόγον μὲν τὴν μάθησιν, ἔθος δὲ τὴν ἀσκήσιν (already quoted by Eaton). Theognis (429-438) and Pindar (Olymp. 9. 100 sqq.: Nem. 3. 40 sqq.: see L. Schmidt, Ethik d. alten Griechen, 1. 158 sqq.) are already familiar with the contrast of nature and teaching as sources of virtue, and both insist on the importance of nature, but the maxim in the form in which it appears in the passage before us is perhaps found earliest in Protag. Fragm. 8 (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2. 134), φύσεις καὶ ἀσκήσεις διδασκαλία δέεται, words which refer to the teaching not only of virtue, but of other things, and which are all the more remarkable as coming from Protagoras, because there were sophists who promised to teach virtue without dwelling on the necessity of natural aptitude and of practice (Plato, Meno 95 B). Compare (with Camerarius, Interp. p. 309) Hippocr. Lex, vol. i. p. 3 Kühn, if this work is by Hippocrates, χρὴ γὰρ ὅστις μέλλει ἱερτικῆς ζήτεισιν ἀρεταῖς ἀρμόζεσθαι, τῶνδ' ἐμὴ ἐπιβόλων γενέσθαι, φύσεις, διδασκαλίης, τρόπων εἰφνείας, παιδομαθίης, φιλοπονίης, χρόνου. The saying reappears in Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 2, Plato, Phaedr. 269 D, and Isocr. De Antid. § 187. See also Wyttenbach's note on the passage of [Plut.] De Liberis Educandis quoted above. ἔθος is mentioned before λόγος, because

education through habit precedes education through the reason. (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 4 sq.: Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 23 sqq.).

40. καὶ γὰρ φῦναι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps remembers a saying variously ascribed to Thales, Socrates, and Plato: cp. Diog. Laert. 1. 33, 'Ερμύππος δ' ἐν τοῖς βίοις εἰς τοῦτον (i. e. Thales) ἀναφέρει τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τινων περὶ Σακράτους· ἔφασκε γάρ, φησί, τριῶν τούτων ἕνεκα χάριν ἔχειν τῇ τύχῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος ἐγενόμην καὶ οὐ θηρίον, εἴτα ὅτι ἀνὴρ καὶ οὐ γυνή, τρίτον ὅτι Ἕλλην καὶ οὐ βάρβαρος, and Plut. Marius, c. 46, Πλάτων μὲν οὖν ἔδη πρὸς τῇ τελευτῇ γενόμενος ὕμνοι τῶν αὐτοῦ δαίμονα καὶ τὴν τύχην, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ἄνθρωπος, εἴτα Ἕλλην, οὐ βάρβαρος οὐδὲ ἀλογον τῇ φύσει θηρίον γένοιτο, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ὅτι τοῖς Σακράτους χρόνους ἀπέτησεν ἡ γένεσις αὐτοῦ. See Prof. J. E. B. Mayor in *Class. Rev.* 10. 191.

41. οὕτω καὶ ποῖόν τινα τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, 'so also of a certain quality in body and soul.' For οὕτω see critical note. Aristotle continues with οὕτω as if ὅσπερ, and not πρῶτον, had preceded, for I do not think that οὕτω here means 'then,' as it seems to do in Rhet. 3. 19. 1419 b 15. That a man may be born too faulty to be made good by education, we see from 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 8 sqq.

42. ἐνὶ δὲ τε κ.τ.λ., 'and in respect of some qualities it is no good to be born this or that, for habits cause them to change; some qualities, in fact, are made by nature to be susceptible of change under the influence of habits in two directions, towards that which is worse and that which is better.' I follow Stahr and Weldon in my rendering of ἐνὶ δὲ τε οὐδὲν ὄφελος φῦναι: Sepulv. Vict. and Sus.⁴ less well make ἐνὶ δὲ the subject of φῦναι. In ἐνὶ δὲ Aristotle refers to those elements in man which may be made better or worse by good or bad habituation, for instance the emotions: see note on 1253 a 34, and cp. Plut. Themist. c. 2, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πρώταις τῆς νούτου ἁμαρτίαις ἀνώμαλος ἦν (ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς) καὶ ἀστάθμητος, ἀνὴρ τῇ φύσει καθ' αὐτὴν χρώμενος ἀνὴρ λόγου καὶ παιδείας ἐκ' ἀμφότερα μεγάλης ποιουμένη μεταβολὰς τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ πολλάκις ἐξισταμένη πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον, ὡς ὑπερὸν αὐτὸς ἐμολόγει, καὶ τοὺς τραχηνιάτους πάλους ἀρίστους ἔπαινε γίνεσθαι φάσκων, ὅταν ἡ προσήκει τύχῃσι παιδείας καὶ κατάρτισσεως, Nic. c. 9, οὕτως ἡ Ἀλκιβιάδου φύσις ἐκ' ἀμφότερα πολλὰ βύβριση καὶ λαμπρὰ μεγάλων ἐνέδωκεν ἀρχὰς νεωτερισμῶν, and Coriolan. c. 1. For ἐπαμφοτερίζοντα ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ βέλτιον, cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1197 a 30, ἡ δὲ ὑπόληψις ἐστίν, ἥ ὑπὲρ ἀπάντων ἐπαμφοτερίζομεν πρὸς τὸ καὶ εἶναι ταῦτα οὕτω καὶ μὴ εἶναι. For διὰ τῆς φύσεως, cp. διὰ

τριῶν (i. e. φύσις, ἔθος, λόγος), 39. Elsewhere we find ἐπὶ τῆς φύσεως, as in Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 19 sq. and De Part. An. 2. 13. 657 a 31 sq. (Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 73).

1332 b. 3. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. For τῇ φύσει ᾧ ('live guided by nature'), cp. Metaph. A. 1. 980 b 25, τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα (ζῷα) ταῖς φαντασίαις ᾧ καὶ ταῖς μνήμασι, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ τέχνη καὶ λογισμοῖς, Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 a 27, τῇ ὀρέξει (ᾧ, and Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 35, τῇ γὰρ ἥθει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ λογισμῷ (cp. 2. 13. 1390 a 16, καὶ μᾶλλον ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἥθος). For the implied contrast between φύσις and λόγος, cp. 1. 2. 1252 a 28 sqq., where a contrast between φύσις and προαίρεσις is implied.

4. μικρὰ δ' ἔνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, 'and some to a small extent guided by habits also.' For μικρά, cp. Plato, Rep. 404 A, ἐὰν σμικρὰ ἐκβῶσι τῆς τεταγμένης διαίτης, and 527 A, ὅσαι καὶ σμικρὰ γεωμετρίας ἔμπειροι. As to the habituation of animals, cp. [Plut.] De Virtute Morali, c. 4, κύνας καὶ ἱπποὺς καὶ θρῦνθας οἰκουροὺς ὀρώντες, ἔθει καὶ τροφῇ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ φωνῆς τε συνετὰς καὶ πρὸς λόγον ὑπηκόους κινήσεις καὶ σχήσεις ἀποδιδόντας, καὶ πράξεις τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡμῶν ἐχούσας.

5. μόνον, sc. τῶν ζῴων: cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 9, λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων.

ὥστε δεῖ κ.τ.λ., 'and so [in his case] these three things must harmonize with each other, [for it will not do to leave reason out,] since men are led by reason to do many things contrary to habituation and to nature, if they are persuaded that these things are better done otherwise [than as habit and nature dictate].' We learn from c. 15. 1334 b 9 sqq. that the three things must not only harmonize, but harmonize in the best way, i. e. by all being adapted to the best end. Plato speaks of education in Laws 653 B as being the bringing of the child's feelings of pain and pleasure into harmony with reason (cp. Rep. 401 C, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων λανθάνει εἰς ὁμοειδητά τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῇ καλῇ λόγῳ ἀγούσα). I cannot follow Sus. and Welldon in placing ὥστε δεῖ τοῦτα συμφωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις after βέλτιον, 3, for, if we place these words there, what Aristotle says will be that nature and habit should harmonize, whereas the lesson which he wishes to enforce is surely this, that nature, habit, and reason should harmonize. As to πολλὰ γὰρ—βέλτιον, Laius in the Chrysippus of Euripides (Fragm. 837) had been made to plead,

λέληθεν οὐδὲν τῶνδ' ἐμ' ἐν σὺ νοθεύεις,
γρόμην δ' ἔχοντά μ' ἢ φύσις βιάζεται,

but the Chorus in Aristoph. Vesp. 1457 sqq. (Didot) says,

τὸ γὰρ ἀποστῆναι χαλεπὸν
φύστος ἢν ἔχει τις δαί.
καίτοι πολλοὶ ταῦτ' ἔπαθον
ξυρότεροι γόμοις ἱέρων
μεταβάλλοντο τοὺς τρέποντες.

Cp. also Rhet. I. II. 1370 a 25, μετὰ λόγου δὲ (ἐπιθυμοῦσιν), ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ πεισθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ θεάσασθαι καὶ κτήσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ πεισθέντες, and Plato, Rep. 452 D, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ, ὁμαί, χρωμένους ἄμεινον τὸ ἀποδύεσθαι τοῦ συγκαλύπτειν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐφάνη, καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς δὴ γελοῖον ἐξερρίγη ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μηνυθέντος ἀρίστου. A reference is given in the Index Aristotelicus for the plural of *ἐθισμός* to Eth. Nic. 3. 15. 1119 a 26, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκύνδνοι. The word *ἐθισμός* does not appear to occur in the writings of Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, or Isocrates; it occurs, however, in [Demosth.] Or. 17. c. 27, and it is frequently used by Polybius not only in the singular, but also in the plural (e.g. in I. 17. 11 and 3. 76. 12).

9. For *διωρίσμεθα* in a middle sense, cp. Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 192 (Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s. v. *ὀρίζω*). *Διόρισμαι* does not appear to be often thus used by Aristotle: Bonitz, however (Ind. 200 a 27), takes *διωρίσθαι* to be middle in De Caelo, 4. 2. 308 b 1.

πρότερον, in c. 7. 1327 b 19 sqq. *Εὐχεράτους τῷ νομοθέτῃ* in the passage before us takes the place of *εὐαγέτους τῷ νομοθέτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν* in 1327 b 38.

10. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐθιζόμενοι μαθάνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες. 'Ακούοντες answers to τὸν λόγον, γ. Here *μαθάνειν* includes both *ἐθίζεισθαι* and *ἀκοῦειν*. Contrast 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 16, *μαθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι*. Sus.³ refers to Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 14, διττῆς δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσίας, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν . . . ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἑθους περιγίγνεται. Cp. also Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν I. 437 a 11, κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ πρὸς φρόνησιν ἢ ἀκοὴν πλείστον συμβάλλεται μέρος· ὁ γὰρ λόγος αἰτιὸς ἐστὶ τῆς μαθήσεως ἀκουστός ὢν, οὐ καθ' αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, Hist. An. 9. 1. 608 a 17 sqq., and Metaph. Θ. 5. 1047 b 31, ἀπασι δὲ τῶν δυνάμεων οὐσῶν τῶν μὲν συγγενῶν οἷον τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τῶν δὲ ἴσθαι οἷον τῆς τοῦ αὐλεῖν, τῶν δὲ μαθήσει οἷον τῆς τῶν τεχνῶν, τὰς μὲν ἀνάγκη προειργήσοντας ἔχειν ὅσαι ἴσθαι καὶ λόγῳ, τὰς δὲ μὴ τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν

οὐκ ἀνάγκη. Add Philem. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 6 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 34: cp. 5. ccxxxi),

ἤκουσα τοῦτο καί τις, οὐδὲ φύεται
αὐτόματον ἀνθρώποισιν, ὃ βελτιστε, τοῦτε,
ὥσπερ ἐν ἀργῇ θύμῳ· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ λέγειν τε καὶ
ἐτέρων ἀκούειν καὶ θεωρῆσαι * *
κατὰ μικρὸν αἰεὶ, φασί, φύονται φέροντες.

C. 14. 13. τοῦτο δὲ σκεπτέον. Cp. c. 15. 1334 b 5, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων
ἴσται, τοῦτο δὲ θεωρητέον.

ἐτέρους εἶναι, sc. διὰ βίου.

15. δῆλον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 16, καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθὺς
ἐτέρων εἶναι λέγουσί τινες ἀρχόντοι. For ἀκολουθεῖν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν
ταύτην, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 23, κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς
ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις.

16. εἰ μὲν τούτων κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle has before him Plato,
Polit. 301 D, οὐν δὲ γε ὅποτε οὐκ ἴσται γινόμενος, ὥς δὲ φαμέν, ἐν τοῖς
πύλσι βασιλεὺς εἶος ἐν σμήνεσιν ἐμφύεται, τό τε σῶμα εὐθὺς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν
διαφέρειν εἰς, δεῖ δὲ συνελθόντας ἐγγράμματα γράφειν κ.τ.λ. Cp. also 1.
5. 1254 b 34 sqq. and Isocr. Hel. § 56, τίς δὲ καλοῖς εἶθις ἰδόντες
εὐνοὶ γινόμεθα, καὶ μένουσι αὐτοὺς ὥσπερ τοὺς θεοὺς οὐκ ἀπαγορεύομεν
θεραπεύοντες, ἀλλ' ἦδιον δουλεύομεν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχομεν.
The passage before us shows that not only gods (1. 5. 1254 b 34 sqq.)
but also heroes were credited with surpassing personal beauty, so
that we are not surprised to find that Philip of Crotona, who excelled
in this respect, was worshipped as a hero at Eggesta after his death
(Hdt. 5. 47). For ἄνθρωποι τῶν ἄλλων (not τῶν ἐτέρων), see Bon. Ind.
34 b 34 sqq., where Eth. Nic. 8. 7. 1158 a 28, ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ
χρήσιμοι καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἡδεῖς, Eth. Nic. 9. 4. 1166 b 7, and Meteor. 2. 6.
365 a 3 sq. are referred to.

20. ὥστε κ.τ.λ. Lamb. 'ita ut in controversa et in promptu posita
esset eorum qui imperant prae iis qui sub imperio sunt excellentia':
Sus. 'dass diese Ueberlegenheit der Herrschenden für die Be-
herrschten (selber) unzweifelhaft und einleuchtend wäre.' Thus
Lamb. takes τοῖς ἀρχομένοις as in the dat. after ὑπεροχῇ (so too
Mr. Welldon), Sus. as in the dat. after ἀναμφισβήτητον καὶ φανερόν.
I have not noticed any passage in which the construction assumed
by Lamb. occurs, and I incline to follow Sus., at any rate till
a parallel passage is produced.

23. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but since it is not easy to light on this highly
superior element, and we have not among ourselves anything to

answer to the vast superiority of the kings to their subjects, which Scylax says exists in India.' For λαβεῖν in this sense, cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 7, Rhct. 1. 1. 1354 a 34, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐν λαβεῖν καὶ ἀλγόνος βῆρον ἢ πολλοὺς εἰς φρονούντας καὶ δυναμένους νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικάζειν, and Eth. Nic. 10. 3. 1174 a 17. As to τοῦτο, Aristotle often uses the neuter in referring to persons, e.g. in 2. 5. 1263 a 1 and 3. 13. 1283 b 9. He would seem to have had before him the genuine narrative of Scylax of Caryanda in Caria, as to whom see Hdt. 4. 44. The Periplus which we possess bearing his name is not the genuine work by him, and does not contain the statement here repeated by Aristotle. The testimony of Scylax as to the superiority—both physical and mental, apparently—of the kings in India to their subjects may well have been perfectly true. 'Throughout Polynesia the chiefs and upper classes are taller than the lower orders, and with a finer physical they combine a greater mental development. They are in every respect superior to the people whom they rule. They are as genuine an aristocracy as ever existed in any country. They know every plant, animal, rock, river, and mountain, are familiar with their history, legends, and traditions, and strict in observing every point of their own complicated etiquette. They swim, row, sail, shoot, and fight better than the common people, and excel in house and canoe building' (Seemann, Viti, p. 79). For the form βασιλείας see note on 1284 b 33.

25. φανερόν ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'it is clear that it is for many reasons necessary that all should share alike in ruling and being ruled in turn [and that rulers and ruled should be the same persons], for when the sharers are alike, equality demands that each shall have the same share' (i.e. an identity of political privilege), 'and [the constitution must be just, for] it is difficult for a constitution to last which is framed in contravention of what is just.' For τὸ τε γὰρ ἴσων ταῦτόν τοῖς ὁμοίοις, cp. 3. 16. 1287 a 12 sqq. and 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 7 sq., and also Thuc. 6. 38. 5, καὶ πῶς δίκαιον τοῖς αὐτοῖς μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι;

29. μετὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for together with the ruled [citizens] are forthcoming desirous of revolution all those who are scattered over the territory,' i.e. the cultivators and other residents in the country (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 30, οἱ δὲ γεωργοῦντες διὰ τὸ διεσπάρθαι κατὰ τὴν χώραν, and 38, τοῦ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλήθους). Aristotle has arranged in c. 10. 1330 a 25 sqq. that the cultivators shall not be δημοσιδεῖς or

ἐμόθυλοι, still he takes it for granted here that they will be desirous of revolution, though unable to make a revolution without the help of the ἀρχόμενοι παλῖναι. Reiz followed by Sus. would read βουλομένων, but βουλόμενοι is probably right, for Aristotle is apt to suspect slave or serf cultivators of a tendency to νεωτερισμός (2. 4. 1262 a 40 sqq.: 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 28).

32. ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 18 sqq., and Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 37, ὅτι μὲν οὖν οἱ αἰετὸς προσήκειν οὐδεὶς ἀρχῆς ὅστις μὴ βελτίων εἴη τῶν ἀρχομένων, καὶ τοῖς προειρημένους πῶσι δῆλον καὶ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

34. πῶς οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'how then this difference is to exist, and how they are to share [in ruling and being ruled by turns], the lawgiver must consider.' Μερίζουσι takes up κοινωνεῖν, 26.

35. πρότερον, in c. 9. 1329 a 2 sqq.

36. ἡ γὰρ φύσις δέδωκε τὴν διαίρεσιν κ.τ.λ., 'for nature has furnished us with the distinction, having made that which is the same in kind itself of two parts, the one younger and the other older.' For διαίρεσιν, see critical note. For a similar acceptance of the guidance of nature, cp. c. 17. 1337 a 1 and 1. 8. 1256 b 7 sqq.: also De Caelo, 1. 1. 268 a 13, διὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως εὐληφέστες ὥσπερ νέμους ἐκείνης, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀγαστείας χράμεθα τῶν θεῶν τῷ Ἀριθμῷ τούτῳ (the number three), and Poet. 24. 1460 a 3, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις διδάσκει τὸ ἀρμόνιον αὐτῇ διαιρεῖσθαι. By 'that which is the same in kind,' is meant man.

37. ὡς τοῖς μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 690 A, καὶ τρίτον ἐπὶ τούτοις ξυνέπεται τὸ πρεσβυτέρους μὲν ἀρχεῖν δεῖν, νεωτέρους δὲ ἀρχεσθαι, and Rep. 412 C, ὅτι μὲν πρεσβυτέρους τοὺς ἀρχοντας δεῖ εἶναι, νεωτέρους δὲ τοὺς ἀρχομένους, δῆλον; Cp. also 1. 12. 1259 b 10-17.

38. ἀγανακτεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 2. 10. 1388 a 6, τοῖς γὰρ ἔγγυς καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ τόπῳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ δόξῃ φθονοῦσιν. Aristotle perhaps remembers the words of the aged Nestor to Agamemnon and Achilles (Hom. Il. 1. 259),

ἀλλὰ τίθεσθ' ἀμφὺ δὲ νεωτέρω ἰσθὲν ἐμῷ,
and what Agamemnon says of Achilles in Il. 9. 160,

καὶ μοι ὑποστήτω, ὅσσον βασιλεύετερος εἰμι
ἢ δ' ὅσσον γενεῇ προγενέστερος εἶχαμαι εἶναι.

Plutarch may have the passage before us in his memory in An Seni sit gerenda Respublica, c. 7, καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἄλλαις ὑπεροχαῖς προσράχονται καὶ διαμφισβητοῦσιν ἀρετῆς καὶ γένους καὶ φιλοτιμίας, ὥς ἀφαιρούμεντες αὐτῶν ὅσον ἄλλοις. ὑφίστανται, τὸ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ χρόνου πρωτεύει, ὃ καλεῖται κυρίως πρεσβείον, ὁ ζήλοτύπητόν ἐστι καὶ παραχωρούμενον . . . ἔτι

τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ πλούτου δύναμιν ἢ λόγον δεικνύσας ἢ σοφίας οὐ πάντες αὐτοῖς γενήσασθαι προσδοκῶσιν, ἐφ' ἧν δὲ προάγει τὸ γῆρας αἰδῶ καὶ δέξαι, οὐδεὶς ἀπελπίζει τῶν πολιτευομένων. I have questioned this in vol. ii. p. xix, but I had not then remarked the resemblance which exists between An Seni, etc., c. 18. 793 A, ὥστερ γὰρ . . . φθονε, and 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 20 sqq. A similar calculation to that of Aristotle probably underlay the distinction drawn by Diocletian between the Augusti and the Caesares, the former being 'elder princes' and the latter 'rising in their turn to the first rank' (Gibbon, Decline and Fall, c. 13: vol. ii. p. 168, ed. 1812).

39. οὐδὲ νομίζει εἶναι κρείττων, sc. τῶν ἀρχόντων—a step in the direction of discontent (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 36, ἀρξάμενος γὰρ οὐχ ἑστ' ἄλλων χειρότερος).

ἄλλως τε κ.τ.λ., 'especially as he may expect to be repaid this contribution [of obedience], when he has reached the right age.' An ἔρανος is a contribution of service or money for which in fairness a return should be forthcoming: cp. Eurip. Suppl. 349 Bothe (363 Dindorf),

καλλίστων ἔρανον δοῦς γὰρ ἀντιλάξεται
παίδων παρ' αὐτοῦ τοιῶδ' ἂν τοκῆσι δῆ,

Isocr. Hel. § 20, νομίζων ὀφείλειν τοῦτον τὸν ἔρανον, μηδενὸς ἀποστῆναι τῶν ἐπὶ Πειρίβου προσταχθέντων, ἀνθ' ὧν ἑαυτὸς αὐτῷ συνεκωδύνευσεν, and Isocr. Plat. § 57, where τοῦτον τὸν ἔρανον is explained by τὴν αὐτὴν εὐεργεσίαν. It is not quite clear what is meant by τοῦτον τὸν ἔρανον (40). Sus., followed by Welldon, takes the words to mean 'den Ehrenvorzug zu befehlen' ('the honourable privilege of ruling'). To me it seems that the ἔρανος referred to is rather the contribution of submission to the rule of others which the young citizen makes in his youth and receives from those younger than himself in years of maturity.

42. ὥστε καὶ τὴν παιδείαν κ.τ.λ. Rulers and ruled will be the same persons at different ages, so that they will be in a sense the same and in a sense different, and similarly the education given to rulers and ruled will be the same but will be different at different ages, the young learning to be ruled and later on learning through being ruled to rule, so that the education also of rulers and ruled will be in a sense the same and in a sense different. For the late appearance of εἶναι in this sentence, cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 29, ἴσθα μὲν γὰρ ἀρμόττει μεγάλας ἵσθα δ' εἶναι μικρὰς τὰς αὐτίκα, and see note on 1285 b 36.

1333 a. 2. *τε γάρ* here is not taken up by *καί* or any equivalent to *καί*, a thing which rarely happens (see Eucken, *De Partic. Usu*, p. 19 sq.), so rarely that Eucken pronounces the passage before us corrupt. Sus.², however, rightly remarks that we have here 'one of the few cases in which *τε γάρ* = "etenim."' 'English readers may consult Shilleto's critical note to Demosth. *De Fals. Leg.* c. 176' (Sus.). Eucken points out that in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 33, *αἱ τε γάρ ἀρχαὶ αἰεὶ διὰ τῶν βελτίστων ἴσονται τοῦ δήμου βουλομένου καὶ τοῖς ἐπεικίσιν οὐ φθονούσας*, the use of *τε γάρ* is only apparently similar, inasmuch as the last eight words are virtually equivalent to *καὶ ὁ δῆμος βουλήσεται καὶ τοῖς ἐπεικίσιν οὐ φθονήσει*. So again in *De Part. An.* 3. 10. 673 a 3, *γαργαλιζόμενοι τε γάρ ταχὺ γελῶσι διὰ τὸ τῇ κίνησιν ἀφικεῖσθαι ταχὺ πρὸς τὸν τόπον τοῦτον*, we find *τε γάρ* virtually taken up in *συμβαίνειν δὲ φασὶ κ.τ.λ.*, 673 a 10.

3. *ἔστι δὲ ἀρχή κ.τ.λ.*, 'but [we do not mean that he should have been ruled otherwise than a freeman should be ruled, for] rule is, as was shown in the first discussions' (i. e. in 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq. and 3. 6. 1278 b 30 sqq.), 'in one of its forms for the sake of the ruler and in another for the sake of the ruled, and we say that the former of these is rule such as is exercised by a master over slaves and the latter rule such as is exercised over freemen, [so that the latter is the kind of rule to which it is fitting that the young freeman should submit before ruling].'

5. *φαιμεν*, in 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq. and 3. 6. 1278 b 30 sqq.

6. *διαφέρει δ' ἔστι κ.τ.λ.* This was probably written later than 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq., for we hear nothing there to the same effect. Aristotle had identified *δεσποτική ἀρχή* in that passage with *ἡ περὶ τὰναγκαία*, and had added, *θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἀνδραποδῶδες, λέγω δὲ θάτερον τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ ὑπηρετεῖν τὰς διακοινὰς πράξεις*. Now we are told that even service of this kind may become noble if it is rendered for a noble end. What Aristotle would consider a noble end may be gathered from 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 17 sqq. and 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 10 sqq. (cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 5 sq.). He probably has in his mind among other things the *ἐνυθραπόντων αὐτοῖς ταῦτων* (*αὐτῶν ταῦτων*?) *διακονήσεις* of the young Spartans employed in the Crypteia (Plato, *Laws* 633 B sq.). Plato had already recommended his agronomi and their youthful assistants to do the like (*Laws* 762 E sqq., cp. especially *καὶ καλλιεργεῖσθαι χρὴ τῷ καλῶς δουλεύειν μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ καλῶς ἄρχειν, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς νόμοις ... ἔπειτα τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις τε καὶ ἐντίμοις βαβυλῶσι τοὺς νέους*, and 763 A, *τὰ δ' ἄλλα αὐτοὶ δὲ αὐτῶν διανοηθήτωσαν ὅς*

βιωσόμενοι διακονοῦντές τε καὶ διακονούμενοι ἑαυτοῖς). Perhaps the young Athenians who served as *περίτολοι* had more done for them by slaves than Plato and Aristotle approved. Vict. refers to the story of Favonius and Pompey told in Plut. Pomp. c. 73, *ἐπεὶ δὲ καιρὸς ἦν δέικναι καὶ παρесеύσασιν ὁ ναύκληρος ἐκ τῶν παρόντων, ἰδὼν δὲ Φαβνίος οἰκετῶν ἀπορία τὸν Πομπήιον ἀρχόμενον αὐτὸν ὑπολβεῖν προσέειπε καὶ ἐπέλυσε καὶ συνήλθεψεν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ τούτου περιέπων καὶ θεραπεύων δσα δεσπότας δούλοι, μέχρι νύφως πυδῶν καὶ δείκναι παρασκευῇς διετίθεσεν, ὥστε τὴν ἐλευθερίδῃ τῇς ὑπουργίας ἐκείνης θεασάμενος ἂν τινα καὶ τὸ ἀφελὲς καὶ ἀπλᾶστον εἶπεν*

Φῦ τοῖσι γυναικίσιν ὥς ἄπαν καλόν (Eurip. Fragm. 953).

Vict. adds, referring to the siege of Florence in 1529, 'Recordor ego, cum premeretur obsidione nostra civitas, hostisque ad portas castra posuisset, universam nostram iuventutem in operibus faciendis muniendaque urbe occupatam fuisse, neque tamen eo tempore quicquam quod nobilitati suae non conveniret gessisse, non enim ob mercedem inde capiendam, sed ob libertatem defendendam id. faciebat.'

11. *ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* If we take Aristotle to refer in *πολίῳ* here, as also in 3. 18. 1288 a 37 sqq., to the full citizen of the 'best State,' who is *ex hypothesi* capable of ruling, we shall not need to read *πολιτικῷ* with Rassow and Sussemihl. See vol. I. Appendix B. The argument is—since the virtue of a ruling citizen and the virtue of the best man are the same, and in our State the ruled citizen becomes sooner or later a ruler, so that he will need sooner or later to possess the virtue of a good man, the lawgiver must make this the aim of his labours, that the citizens may become good men, and [must seek to ascertain] by means of what pursuits [they may best be made so] and what is the end of the best life. For *πραγματευόμενος ὥπως . . . γίγνεται* Bonitz (Ind. 630 a 14) compares Rhet. I. I. 1354 b 19, *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο πραγματεύονται πλὴν ὥπως τὸν κρεττὸν ποιῶν τινα ποιήσῃται*. The end of the best life is leisure (c. 15. 1334 a 11 sqq.).

12. *διήρηται δὲ κ.τ.λ.* In c. 15. 1334 b 17 sqq., as in I. 13. 1260 a 5 sqq., the two parts of the soul are *τὸ λόγον ἔχον* and *τὸ ἄλογον*: here they are *τὸ λόγον ἔχον καθ' αὐτό*, and *τὸ λόγον οὐκ ἔχον καθ' αὐτό*, *λόγῳ δ' ὑπακούειν δυνάμενον*. Thus here Aristotle adopts the division of the soul which is mentioned as feasible in Eth. Nic. I. 13. 1103 a 1, *εἰ δὲ χρή καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ*

λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικὸν τι. διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς τὰς δὲ ἠθικὰς, σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικὰς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικὰς, a passage which throws much light on that before us, though καθ' αὐτό, 17 ('per se,' in contradistinction to καθ' ἑτερον: cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 12. 1245 b 18, quoted above on 1323 b 24, and Eth. Nic. 2. 3. 1105 a 22 sq., and see Bon. Ind. 290 b 34), means more than ἐν αὐτῷ, 1103 a 2. The part of the soul referred to as λόγον οὐκ ἔχον καθ' αὐτό, λόγῳ δ' ὑπακούειν δυνάμενον is τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ διὰς ὁρεκτικόν (Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 b 30), or, as it is occasionally called in the Politics (see above on 1254 b 8), τὸ παθητικόν. Τὸ θρεπτικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς is omitted, as in Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 b 12, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμωρον πέφυκεν. Aristotle recalls this division of the soul because he wishes to throw light on the relative worth of the virtues connected with each part of the soul, and to show, in opposition to the eulogists of the Lacedaemonian constitution, that the virtues of the rational part have more of the character of ends than those of the other part. For the perfect διήρηται, cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 17 and 2. 9. 1269 b 16. For the participle δυνάμενον, see note on 1254 b 23.

19. πως, 'in any way,' as in Xen. Oecon. 9. 1, ἡ γυνὴ ἰδὼκει σοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, δ' Ἰσχόμαχε, πῶς τι ὑπακούειν ὡς σὺ ἐσπούδαζες διδάσκων; τοῦτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Ὅς ἡμεῖς φαμέν = ὡς ἡμεῖς διαιρούμεν, for it is hardly likely that διαιρετίον εἶναι should be supplied. Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 32 sq. For the μὲν *solitarium* in τοῖς μὲν οὕτω διαιροῦσιν, see above on 1332 a 14, 1262 a 6, and 1270 a 34.

21. αἰεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We learn in what sense the appetitive part of the soul exists for the sake of the rational part from Magn. Mor. 2. 10. 1208 a 12, ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τι τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἔχομεν τὸ δὲ βέλτιον, αἰεὶ δὲ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονος ἑκέν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς ἑκέν, καὶ τὸν ἑρούμεν ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα καλῶς, ὅταν οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥστε μὴ καλῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ συμβάλλεσθαι καὶ συμπαρορμᾶν πρὸς τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπιτελεῖν τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον· τὸ γὰρ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονος ἑκέν πρὸς τὸ συνεργεῖν τῷ βελτίονι. Cp. also M. Antonin. Comm. 5. 16, ἡ οὐκ ἦν ἱναργής, ὅτι τὰ χεῖρα τῶν κρείττωνων ἑκέν, τὰ δὲ κρείττω ἀλλήλων; κρείττω δὲ τῶν μὲν ἀψύχων τὰ ἐμψυχα, τῶν δὲ ἐμψύχων τὰ λογικά. On the far-reaching principle, αἰεὶ τὸ χεῖρον τοῦ βελτίονος ἐστὶν ἑκέν, see vol. i. p. 58 sq.

22. καὶ τοῦτο φανερόν κ.τ.λ. When a principle holds good in reference both to art and to nature, Aristotle is often careful

to point out the fact: e.g. in Meteor. 4. 3. 381 a 10 sq., De Part. An. 1. 1. 639 b 15 sq., and De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 20 sqq.

24. διήρηται τε διχῶ. Sepulv., Lamb, Schn., Sus.², Welldon, and others supply ὁ λόγος, but Vict. and Sus.⁴ supply τὸ λόγον ἔχον, and perhaps this is better.

καθ' ὅπερ εἰδόμενον τρόπον διαιρεῖν. E.g. in De An. 3. 10. 433 a 14, τοῖς δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ καὶ ὁ πρακτικῆς διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ εἶδει: cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 2. 1139 a 3 sqq.

26. ὡσαύτως, in the same way as ὁ λόγος, i.e. into τὸ λόγον ἔχον πρακτικόν and τὸ λόγον ἔχον θεωρητικόν.

τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, i.e. τὸ λόγον ἔχον μέρος καθ' αὐτό.

δηλονότι is adverbial, as in c. 2. 1325 a 1: see on this use Bon. Ind. 173 b 30 sqq.

27. καὶ τὰς πράξεις δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and indeed we shall say that the activities of the soul stand in a corresponding relation to each other.' Three classes of activities are apparently referred to—

(1) πράξεις τοῦ λόγον οὐκ ἔχοντος καθ' αὐτά, λόγῳ δ' ὑπακούειν δυναμένου (e.g. ἐλευθέρως, σάφρονες πράξεις: cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1103 a 6 and 3. 3. 1111 b 1 sq.); (2) πράξεις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος πρακτικῶν (φρόνιμοι πράξεις): (3) πράξεις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος θεωρητικῶν (σοφῶν πράξεις).

28. τοῖς δυναμένοις τυγχάνειν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τοῦ δυοῖν, 'for those who can attain either to all the three activities of the soul or to the two lower ones of the three.' I take the meaning to be, that even if a man can attain only to the activities of the irrational part of the soul and to those of the lower, or practical, section of its rational part, the latter class of activities, being activities of the better part of the two, are more desirable for him than the former. If a man can attain to all three, then of course the activities of the theoretic section of the rational part are the most desirable for him.

29. αἰεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for that is always most desirable for each man which is the highest to which it is possible for him to attain,' whether it is absolutely the highest or not. See vol. I. p. 60.

30. πᾶς ὁ βίος, 'life as a whole': see above on 1253 b 33. In 40 we have τοὺς βίους. By πᾶς ὁ βίος Aristotle means πᾶς ὁ πολιτικὸς βίος: cp. 1. 5. 1254 b 30, χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διηρημένος εἰς τὴν πολεμικὴν χρεῖαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνηκῆν). In 1. 8. 1256 a 30 sqq. we have a classification of human life, so far as it is concerned with getting food. For the association of ἀσχολία and πόλεμος and of εἰρήνη and σχολή, cp. 41 sq., c. 15. 1334 a 38 sqq., and Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 4 sqq.

32. καὶ τῶν πρακτῶν κ.τ.λ. 'Bonitz brackets *ἐκ τῶν* in 32 and 33 (Ind. 42 b 26 sqq. and 632 a 29 sq.), but see Vahlen in the *Zeitschrift für d. östr. Gymn.* 1872, p. 540' (Sus.², p. 453). I have not seen Vahlen's article. The construction, if we supply *δοῖσθαι*, as we must apparently do, is certainly remarkable. For τῶν πρακτῶν we have τῶν πραγμάτων in 40.

34. For αἵρεσιν, cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 106, εὐρήσετε γὰρ τοὺς πλείστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων περὶ τὰς αἵρέσεις τῶν πραγμάτων διαρτάνοντας.

35. πόλεμον μὲν εἰρήνης χάριν. Aristotle continues his sentence as if ἡ ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως αἰρετὰ εἶναι had preceded in 33, and not περὶ τῆς ἀνάγκης τὴν αὐτὴν αἵρεσιν εἶναι. He here has before him Plato, Laws 628 D sq. (referred to by Eaton) and 803 D. Cp. (with Eaton) Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 4, δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵνα εἰρήνην ἔχωμεν.

σχολίαν δὲ σχολῆς. See last note. There was much to suggest the view that σχολή is a nobler thing than ἀσχολία in the Greek conception of the gods as *θεοὶ ζῶντες*, and in Aristotle's own conception of the life of the Deity (see above on 1325 b 28), to say nothing of the close connexion which the Greeks held to exist between σχολή and *λευτερία* (Plato, Theaet. 175 D) and between σχολή and culture (Isocr. Busir. § 21 sq.: Metaph. A. 1. 981 b 20 sqq.). As has often been pointed out by others, Aristotle does not mean idleness or recreation by σχολή. Σχολή is marked off by him both from ἀσχολία and from παιδίᾳ or ἀνάπαυσις: it is not, like παιδίᾳ and ἀνάπαυσις, recreation after toil (5 (8). 3. 1337 b 37 sqq.: 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 36 sqq.), nor is it, like ἀσχολία, the doing of work which is done not for its own sake, but as a means to something else; it is employment in work desirable for its own sake—the hearing of noble music and no doubt also of noble poetry, intercourse with friends chosen for their worth (Eth. Nic. 9. 11. 1171 b 12 sqq.), and above all the exercise, in company or otherwise, of the speculative faculty. 'Ασχολία and the παιδίᾳ or ἀνάπαυσις which makes ἀσχολία possible must necessarily find a place in human life, for men cannot exist without them, but the noblest element in human life is σχολή, and it is the end for which work and recreation exist. We hardly know whether Aristotle would class the sight of noble pictures or statues with the hearing of noble music and poetry as a right use of σχολή: he would probably not regard in this light the exercise of an art even for its own sake. Many will differ from him here, and some may ask whether work

done as a means to something else is not often as desirable for its own sake as anything which could be brought under the head of *σχολή*. May we not say this of work done in a noble cause, like that of the victors of Marathon and Salamis, or that of Pitt and Stein, when they 'weathered the storm'? It should be noticed that while Aristotle is following in the track of Plato when he exalts peace above war, he is not a borrower from Plato in his exaltation of *σχολή* at the expense of *δυσκολία*. His view of human life as comprising in its best form *δυσκολία*, *παιδεία*, and *σχολή* is a remarkable one, and I am not aware that he owes it to any one.

2. καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα δέ, 'and indeed things useful': cp. Plato, 1333 b. Theaet. 171 E, *ἐβλήθησαν δὲ φάναι μὴ πᾶν γίνεσθαι καὶ παιδίον καὶ θηρίον δὲ ἱκανὸν εἶναι λᾶσθαι αὐτὸ γυγνώσκοντα αὐτῷ τὸ ἴδιον*.

3. καὶ παῖδας ἐπὶ ὄντας παιδευτέον καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας, *δοταί δέονται παιδείας*. According to the common view (a different view is ascribed to Pythagoras in Diog. Laert. 8. 10), boyhood ceased at puberty (cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 6, *ἐγὼ γὰρ παῖς τε ἂν τὰ ἐν παισὶ νομιζόμενα καλὰ δοκῶ κεκαρπῶσθαι, ἐπεὶ τε ἤβησα, τὰ ἐν νεανίσκοις, τέλειος τε ἀνὴρ γενόμενος τὰ ἐν ἀνδράσι*). Παις, however, is otherwise used in 3. 1. 1275 a 14. The words *τὰς ἄλλας ἡλικίας δοταί δέονται παιδείας* seem to imply that education in the 'best State' will extend over more *ἡλικίας* than the two represented by boyhood and the years from puberty to twenty-one (see note on 1336 b 37).

5. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἰρυστα κ.τ.λ. The Lacedaemonians and Cretans are especially referred to (cp. 12 sqq. and c. 2. 1324 b 7 sqq.: see also note on 1337 a 31). Plato had said much the same in Laws 628 C sqq. Are we to infer from the use of *καὶ* in 11, *καὶ τῶν ὑστερῶν τινος γραψάντων*, that Aristotle regarded the Lacedaemonian and Cretan lawgivers as the authors of written constitutions and laws? Aristotle turns aside to censure the Lacedaemonian training in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 9 sqq. also. The Fourth and Fifth Books of the Politics are written in a strongly anti-Laonian spirit. The Lacedaemonian lawgiver is more severely criticized in them than he is in the Second. It is true that the Spartans are said in the Second Book (c. 9. 1271 b 9) to prefer external goods to virtue—a strong thing to say of men who prided themselves on their virtue (4 (7). 11. 1330 b 32)—but this fault is not explicitly traced back to the lawgiver. In the Fourth Book, on the other hand (c. 2. 1324 b 27 sq.), the lawgiver is charged with pursuing an

unlawful end; it is also implied in 1325 a 7 sqq. (cp. c. 14. 1333 b 23) that he was not a good lawgiver (contrast 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 18-21). Aristotle's criticisms of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver throughout the Fourth and Fifth Books are, in fact, more in the spirit of those of Isocrates (see e.g. Panath. § 210 sqq.) than of those of Plato.

6. ταύτας = τὰς τούτων. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 40, and see note on 1276 a 14.

7. οὔτε πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τέλος φαίνονται συντάξαντες κ.τ.λ., 'evidently have neither framed their constitutional arrangements with a view to the better end,' etc. Πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον τέλος answers to πρὸς τὸ βελτίον καὶ τὰ τέλη, 1333 a 39, and πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, 8, to πρὸς πάντα, 1333 a 36. The 'better end' is leisure and peace and things noble.

9. τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν παιδείαν. Cp. c. 2. 1324 b 9.

ἀλλὰ φορτικῶς ἀπέκλιναν κ.τ.λ. We have been told in 1333 a 36 that things noble are to be preferred to things necessary and useful. Compare the very similar sentence in De Part. An. 1. 1. 642 a 28, ἐπὶ Σωκράτους δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἠρέθη, τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν τὰ περὶ φύσεως ἔληξε, πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρήσιμον ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀπέκλιναν οἱ φιλοσοφούντες: also Pol. 2. 9. 1271 b 3, Probl. 27. 5. 948 a 31, διὰ τί μάλιστα τὴν ἀνδρείαν τιμῶσι αἱ πόλεις, οὐ βελτίστην οὖσαν τῶν ἀρετῶν; ἢ ὅτι διατελοῦσιν ἢ πολεμοῦντες ἢ πολεμούμενοι, αὕτη δὲ ἐν ἀμφοῖν χρησιμωτάτη ἐστὶν τιμῶσι δὲ οὐ τὰ βέλτιστα, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτοῖς βέλτιστα, and Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 b 3, ἀνάγκη δὲ μεγίστας εἶναι ἀρετὰς τὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις χρησιμωτάτας, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ δύναμις ἐνεργητικῇ. Φορτικῶς, for τὸ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρήσιμον ἥκιστα ἀρμόττει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ελευθεροῖς (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 2). The Spartans valued themselves on their ελευθεριότητα—compare the proverb ελευθεριώτερος Σπάρτης (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 246: 2. 393)—and when Aristotle hints here that their lawgiver was φορτικός, and in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 32 sqq. that his famous training made them βάνανσοι, he says as severe a thing as it was possible for him to say. In πλεονεκτικωτέρας Aristotle echoes Plato, Laches 182 E, οἷς (i.e. Λακεδαιμονίοις) οὐδὲν ἄλλο μέλει ἐν τῇ βίῃ ἢ τοῦτο ζητεῖν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν, ὃ τι ἂν μαθόντες καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσαντες πλεονεκτοῖεν τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τὸν πόλεμον: cp. also Isocr. Panath. § 188 and Plut. Lycurg. c. 28, ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖτοις οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀδικίας ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ πλεονεξίας, ἢ ἐγκαλοῦσιν ἑτοίμοι τοῖς Λυκούργου νόμοις, ὥς ἱκανῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀνδρείαν, ἐνδεῶς δὲ πρὸς δικαιοσύνην.

11. παραπλησίως τούτοις. I do not think that Aristotle means by these words φορτικῶς. Cp. Metcor. 1. 6. 342 b 35, παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ οἱ περὶ Ἱπποκράτην τὸν Χίον καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν αὐτοῦ Αἰσχύλον ἀπεφώνοντα.

14. ὃ, 'which praises.'

16. ὥσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for just in the same spirit in which,' etc. Thibron's grounds of praise are those of οἱ πολλοί, and are therefore sordid and easily overthrown by reasoning. Οἱ πολλοί are athirst for εὐτυχήματα: cp. 2. 7. 1267 b 3, ἄπειρος γὰρ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἥς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ζῶσιν. Ζηλοῦσι, as in Isocr. De Pace, § 83, καὶ ταῦτα δρῶντες αὐτοὶ τε τὴν πόλιν εὐδαιμόνιζον καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν τοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντων ἐμακάριζον αὐτήν, τῶν μὲν συμβῆσθαι διὰ ταῦτα μολόντων οὐδὲμίαν ποιούμενοι πρόνοιαν, τὸν δὲ πλοῦτον θαυμάζοντες καὶ ζηλοῦντες.

18. τῶν εὐτυχημάτων. The term εὐτύχημα is applied to τὰ ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθά, such as high birth, wealth, and political power: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 a 20 sqq.

ἀγόμενος φαίνεται, 'evidently admires.' There is perhaps a reference to Thibron in Isocr. Panath. § 41, τὴν Σπαρτιατῶν (πόλιν), ἣν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ μετρίως ἐπαινοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ τινας ὥσπερ τῶν ἡμιθέων ἐκὶ πεπολιτευμένων μέμνηται περὶ αὐτῶν. As to the other writers on the Lacedaemonian Constitution, see above on 1269 a 29.

20. ὅτι κ.τ.λ., 'because it was owing to their having been trained to meet dangers that they ruled over many,' and thus they owed their empire to their lawgiver. Γυμνάζεσθαι is not used exclusively of gymnastic training (cp. for instance 2. 12. 1274 a 26), but the gymnastic training enforced by the Lacedaemonian lawgiver (§ (8). 4. 1338 b 27 sqq.) is probably here referred to, for it was supposed at Sparta to produce courage (1338 b 12 sqq.). The notion that γυμνάσια lead to ἀλλων ἀρχαί occurs also in Plato, Protag. 354 A-B (cp. 342 B-C).

23. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. The sense is—besides it is not merely that they have lost noble living, but that they have lost it, notwithstanding that (as they claim) they have faithfully observed the laws given them by their lawgiver and there has been nothing to hinder them from doing so; this is indeed strange. Aristotle hints that either the fault must rest with the lawgiver or the Spartans had not really observed his laws. Γελοῖον has much the same meaning here as ἀτοπον (cp. Phys. 7. 3. 246 a 25, ἔτι καὶ ἄλλως ἀτοπον. τὸ γὰρ λέγειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἡλλοιωσθαι ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν λαβοῦσθαι

τέλος γελοίων κ.τ.λ.). An oracle given to Lycurgus, according to Nic. Damasc. Fragn. 57 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 390: cp. Diod. 7. 14. 7), *ὡς εἰδαίμεν ἢ πόλις ἴσταιτο εἰ τοῖς ἐκείνου νόμοις ἐμμένει*, is probably present to Aristotle's memory. In Isocr. Archid. § 61 the Lacedaemonian King Archidamus claims that the Spartans had abided by the laws which had been given them; there were, however, two views on this subject (see Isocr. De Pace, § 102 and above on 1270 a 19). There may be an allusion in *μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις* to the fact that the observance of Solon's laws at Athens had been interrupted by the Tyranny ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 22). *Μηδενός* is neuter, as in 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 23, *μηδενὸς ἐμποδίζοντος τῶν ἐκτός*. For *ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις*, cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 6, *ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς τὰς ὑστερον πράξεις*. For *μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ*, cp. 2. 8. 1269 a 7, *ὥστε ἀποπον τὸ μένειν ἐν τοῖς τούτων δόγμασι*.

26. οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Even if these eulogists of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver were right in praising him for making rule over other States his end, the kind of rule—despotic rule—which they praise him for honouring is not the kind of rule which a lawgiver should be seen to honour. Cp. c. 2. 1324 b 26 sqq., and for *τιμῶντα φαίνεσθαι*, Plato, Laws 962 A, *εἰ τις τὸν σκοπόν, οἱ βλάπτειν δὲ τὸν πολιτικόν, φαίνοιτο ἀγνοῶν κ.τ.λ.*

27. τοῦ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 3. 1325 a 24 sqq.

29. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Further, they praise the lawgiver not only for what brings no permanent happiness, but also for what is positively harmful.

30. κρατεῖν ἡσκησεν ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν πλεον ἄρχειν, 'trained the citizens to conquer with a view to ruling over others.' I have not met with an instance of *ἀσκεῖν* used with an acc. of the person and an infinitive, unless we except the passage of Photius quoted below on 1337 a 1, but Plutarch has in De Defect. Orac. c. 21 *γλώσσας δὲ πολλαῖς ἡσκητο χρῆσθαι*, and in Pyrrh. c. 24, *ἄνδρας ἡσκημένους μάχεσθαι*. Conquering is the first step to ruling over others: cp. c. 2. 1324 b 27 sq., and 1324 b 7 sqq., and also Plut. Lycurg. et Num. inter se comp. c. 2, *ἄλλο δὲ οὐδὲν εἰδὼτας οὐδὲ μελετῶντας ἢ πείθεσθαι τοῖς ἄρχουσι καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν πολέμων*.

32. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι κ.τ.λ. A shrewd remark and one which, so far as I know, Aristotle was the first to make. There is much in the history of ancient Rome and modern France to illustrate and confirm it. Τῷ δυνάμει, like *τὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχειν* in c. 3. 1325 a 37.

34. ὅπερ ἐγκαλοῦσι κ.τ.λ., 'yet this is just what the Laconians

charge Pausanias their king with doing, notwithstanding that he was already the holder of so great an office.' The Lacedaemonians praise their lawgiver for teaching the State to do to other States the very thing which they censure Pausanias for trying to do to his fellow-citizens. Aristotle has usually been taken to refer here and in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 20, *καὶ Πανσανίαν τὸν βασιλέα* (sc. *φασὶ τινες ἐπιχειρῆσαι καταλύσαι*) *τὴν ἐφορείαν*, to the victor of Plataea, whom he, however, describes in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 2 sqq. as *ὁ στρατηγὴς κατὰ τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον*. This Pausanias was not really king, but only guardian of King Pleistarchus, who was a minor (cp. Hdt. 9. 10 and Thuc. 1. 132, referred to by Eaton), but he is 'often loosely called king in the later writers, e. g. in [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 97: Duris, Fragm. 31 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 477), ap. Athen. Deipn. 535 e: Justin 9. 1' (Busolt, Gr. Gesch. 2. 380. 4, ed. 1), and Aristotle may be guilty of a similar looseness here. In the second edition, however, of his *Griechische Geschichte* (1. 513 and note 3, and 3. 1. 98. 1) Busolt, following E. Meyer, takes the reference here and in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 20 to be to the king Pausanias who was an opponent of Lysander. This Pausanias was really king, and might well be contrasted as such with *ὁ στρατηγὴς κατὰ τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον*, but see on the other side of the question Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 22. 2. Was the opponent of Lysander quite the man to entertain the hardy design of abolishing the ephorate and making himself master of the State?

35. *πολιτικός*. Cp. c. 2. 1324 b 26 sq.

36. *λόγων*, i. e. praises of the lawgiver for his training his citizens to conquer with a view to empire.

37. *ταῦτὰ γὰρ ἄριστα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ*. Cp. c. 15. 1334 a 11 sq. and c. 3. 1325 b 30 sqq. The 'best things' to which Aristotle refers appear to be temperance, justice, and wisdom in contradistinction to a capacity to conquer one's neighbours.

38. *τὴν τε τῶν πολεμικῶν ἄσκησιν κ.τ.λ.* See as to this account of the true aim of war, vol. i. p. 327 sq. Aristotle evidently has before him Isocr. Panath. § 219, *οἶμαι γὰρ ἅπαντας ἂν ὁμολογήσαι κακίους ἀνδρας εἶναι καὶ μεγίστης ζημίας ἀξίους, ὅσοι τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς εὐρημένοις ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ, τοῦτοις ἐπὶ βλάβῃ χρώμενοι τυγχάνουσιν, μὴ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους μηδὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας μηδὲ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν χώρην εἰσβάλλοντας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς οἰκιστάτους καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς συγγενείας μετέχοντας ἀπὲρ ἐποίουν Σπαρτιάται.*

40. *ἢ* is here followed by *ἔπειτα*. See Weber, *Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles*, p. 18 sqq., who gives a long list of passages in Aristotle's writings in which the same thing occurs, among them *Pol.* 2. 7. 1267 a 2 sqq., 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 6-17, and 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq. Kaissling (*Tempora und Modi in des Aristoteles Politica und in der Atheniensium Politia*, p. 32) compares *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 16. l. 7 sqq.

1334 a. 1. πάντων δεσποτείας, 'despotic rule over all' Πάντων is an objective genitive: cp. *Rhet.* 2. 2. 1379 a 21, προδουλοῦνται γὰρ ἑκάστος πρὸς τὴν ἑαίστων ὀργὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπάρχοντος πάθους, where ἑαίστων = πρὸς ἑκάστων (*Bon. Ind.* 149 b 10).

2. τρίτον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Supply ὅπως ζητῶσι.

5. τέξῃ. See above on 1260 a 36.

6. αἱ γὰρ πλείους κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 3 sqq.

τῶν τοιοῦτων πόλεων, i.e. τῶν πολυμικῶν πόλεων, States that make war their end.

8. τὴν γὰρ βαφὴν ἀφᾶσιν κ.τ.λ. Compare for the metaphor Plato, *Rep.* 430 A. Βαφή here means the temper which is produced by dipping, rather than the dipping itself. In *Plut. De Vitioso Pudore*, c. 4. 530 E, we have ὅσπερ βαφὴν τὴν φιλάττουσαν ἀπιστίας μαλαχθεῖσαν αἰσχύνῃ προίμενοι. Aristotle evidently thought (cp. 25 sqq.), with Isocrates (*De Pace*, § 95 sqq.), that when the Peloponnesian War came to an end and the Lacedaemonians found themselves at the head of an empire, they lost much of the justice and temperance which war had enforced on them and became ἔβριστοι (28) and ἀνδραποδίδεις (39). Compare *Isocr. De Pace*, § 96, ἐντὶ γὰρ τῶν καθεστῶτων παρ' αὐτοῖς (i.e. τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις) ἐπιτηδονμέτων τοῖς μὲν ιδιώταις ἐνέπλησεν (ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς θαλάττης) ἀδικίας, ῥθυμίας, ἀνομίας, φιλαργίας, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ὑπεροφίας μὲν τῶν συμμάχων, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀλγυρίας δὲ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν συνθηκῶν. Isocrates dwells on their insolent treatment of the Chians (§ 98) and of the islands generally (§ 99). He ascribes this change in them to their possession of maritime empire, which had already demoralized Athens, whereas Aristotle ascribes it to defective education and to the effect of leisure. The Lacedaemonian training was a training only for war; it did not impart justice and temperance, still less did it impart intellectual virtue. If this had been otherwise, the Lacedaemonians would have spent their leisure in pursuits which would have prevented the loss of 'temper' to which Aristotle refers. So Plato (*Rep.* 549 B) says of them that they lacked the

'saviour of virtue'—*λόγον μουσικῇ κεκραμένον, δε μένος ἡγησόμενος σωτὴρ ἀρετῆς διὰ βίον ἐνοικεῖ τῇ ἔχοντι*. Compare what Ephorus says of the Thebans in *Fragm. 67* (Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 1. 254). See above on 1271 b 4.

11. Ἐπει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 3. 1325 b 30 sqq. and c. 14. 1333 b 37. C. 15. The end is *σχολή*, as is explained in 14 sqq.

12. *δρον*, 'distinctive aim' (= *τέλος*, 11): cp. c. 2. 1324 b 3 sqq.

14. τὰς εἰς τὴν σχολὴν ἀρετάς. Cp. c. 11. 1330 b 16, τὰ εἰς τροφὴν ὕδατα, and c. 13. 1331 b 38, τὰς εἰς τὸ τέλος πράξεις.

ὁπάσχειν, sc. τῇ πόλει: cp. 34 sqq. and contrast c. 14. 1334 a 9 sq. That the best *man* will possess the capacity of using leisure aright, we have seen in c. 14. 1333 a 41 sqq.

15. πολλάκις, e. g. in c. 14. 1333 a 35.

16. τὴν σχολὴν καὶ διαγωγὴν. Cp. 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 10, τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν, and 21, τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγὴν. *Διαγωγή* is the use of leisure in occupations desirable for their own sake—such occupations as have been described above on 1333 a 35. See as to its nature, Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* 2. 2. 735. 5 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, *Eng. Trans.*, 2. 266. 5), and *Sus.*², Note 921 (*Sus.*¹, 1. p. 542). It is closely related to the end of human life (5 (8). 5. 1339 a 29–31), and therefore to happiness (1339 b 17–19), and hence, like happiness, it combines in itself both the pleasurable and the noble.

19. διὰ σφόδρα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 1. 1323 a 40, κτῆσται καὶ φυλάττουσιν οὐ τὰς ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκείνα ταῦτα. *Σωφροσύνη* is a security for the possession of an abundance of necessities, because it excludes the spendthrift habits of life which are a common concomitant of its opposite: cp. *Eth. Nic.* 4. 3. 1121 b 7, διὰ καὶ ἀπολαύσαι αὐτῶν (i. e. τῶν ἀσώτων) εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροὶ εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν (ᾧ πρὸς τὰς ἡβούας ἀποκλίνουν). It is implied that courage and other military virtues are productive of wealth in c. 14. 1333 b 10, 16 sqq.: cp. also *Xen. Symp.* 4. 13, τὸν μὲν ἰσχυρὸν ποιοῦσιν αἱ κτῆσθαι τέχνη καὶ τὸν ἀνδρείον κυνδυνεύοντα, τὸν δέ γε σοφὸν λέγοντα. That they are preservative of wealth is obvious.

20. κατὰ γὰρ τὴν παροιμίαν, οὐ σχολὴ δουλοῖς. See Leutsch and Schneidewin, *Paroem. Gr.* 2. 765, where a remark of Erasmus is quoted, 'dicitur in eos quibus propter obnoxiam ministeriis sordidioribus conditionem non vacat honestis disciplinis operam dare.'

The proverb seems to be remembered by Euripides in a fragment of the *Antiope* (Fr. 215),

οὐ χροὶ ποτ' ἄνδρα δοῦλον ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων
γρόμας δάσκων εἰδ' ἐς ἄργιον βλάπτει,

and probably by Plutarch in *Solon*, c. 22, *ἐπιστοιμαὶ πλεῖσθαι, ὁ βλάπτει ἢ μὴ σχολάζειν, ἀλλὰ τριβόμενον δεῖ καὶ παυεῖν ταπεινωθῆναι* (see note on 1313 b 18). So we read in *Plut. Cato Censor*, c. 21, of Cato's slaves, *οἱ δὲ ἢ πρᾶττον τι τῶν ἀσχαλίων εἶναι τὸν δοῦλον ἢ καθεύδον*. Compare also the saying ascribed to Socrates, ἢ *Ἀργίᾳ ἀδελφὴ τῆς Ἐλευθερίας ἐστὶ* (Aelian, *Var. Hist.* 10. 14).

21. οἱ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενοι κυθευέσθαι κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6-10, and Isocr. *Archid.* § 7.

23. φιλοσοφίας δὲ πρὸς τὴν σχολήν, 'and of intellectual virtue for leisure.' Bonitz (*Ind.* 821 a 6) rightly explains φιλοσοφία here as = 'virtus intellectualis.' See above on 1263 b 40. In 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 26 we find φρόνησις used in the sense of 'intellectual virtue' (see *Sus.*³, Note 1023: *Sus.*⁴, 1. p. 585). We do not learn in the Fifth Book how Aristotle proposes to develop intellectual virtue by his education; yet he keeps its development in view even in his arrangements respecting musical training; thus one reason why he rejects the study of pipe-playing is because it is εἰδὲν πρὸς τὴν δianoian (5 (8). 6. 1341 b 6).

24. σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης κ.τ.λ. Cp. *Rhet.* 1. 9. 1366 b 5, διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀνδρείοις μάλαστα τιμᾶται ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πολέμῳ, ἢ δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ χρήσιμος ἔσται. Aristotle hopes to develop temperance by means of the musical element in his education (5 (8). 5. 1340 a 18 sqq.) and possibly justice also (cp. τῶν ἄλλων ἰδιωτεῖν, 1340 a 21). Something, however, would have been done for the promotion of temperance even in childhood by careful attention to children's pastimes and to the tales told them, and by the prohibition of objectionable language in their presence, etc.

25. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμος κ.τ.λ., 'for war obliges men to be just and temperate,' so that in time of war men act justly and temperately, whether they have these virtues or not. *Ἀναγκάσει* is emphatic. Compare for the expression Eurip. *Fragm.* 528, τὸ φῶς δ' ἀνάγκη προστίθεται σωφρονεῖν, and for the thought Xen. *Cyrop.* 8. 4. 14, δοκεῖ δέ μοι, ὦ Κύρε, χαλεπώτερον εἶναι εἰρεῖν ἄνδρα ἢ γὰρ καλῶς φέρονται ἢ τὰ κακά τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑβρὸν τοῖς πολλοῖς, τὰ δὲ σωφροσύνην τοῖς πάνσι ἐμποιοῖ.

26. ἢ δὲ τῆς εὐτυχίας ἀπόλαυσις κ.τ.λ. For the phrase, compare

Diod. 14. 80. 2, εἰς τρυφὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν εἰρήρῃ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπολαύουσιν, and for the thought, Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 a 29, ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ἰβριστοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ (i.e. τὰ εὐτυχήματα) γίγνονται: Thuc. 8. 24. 4, Χῖοι γὰρ μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίους ἐν ἐγὼ ἡσθόμεν εὐδαιμονήσαντες ἔμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν: and the proverb Κολοφωνία ὕβρις, ἐπὶ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ἰβριστῶν, τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οἱ Κολοφώνιοι (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 266). See also Justin 8. 1. 4. It would be easy to multiply instances of this familiar saying. For τὸ σχολάζειν μετ' εἰρήνης, cp. Plato, Theaet. 172 D, τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήρῃ ἐπὶ σχολῇ ποιούνται. For μᾶλλον, see note on 1270 b 33.

28. πολλῆς οὖν κ.τ.λ. Schn. 'insolentiam structuræ annotavit cum Camerario [Interp. p. 319] Victorius; poetarum Atticorum exempla posuit Porson ad Euripidis Orestem versu 659, prosaicorum scriptorum locum præter hunc adhuc alium similem nondum reperi.' See Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 409. 4. Anm. 5, where Aesch. Prom. Vinc. 86, αὐτὸν γὰρ σὶ δαὶ προμηθεύς, is referred to among other passages from the poets. It is possible that μετέχειν has dropped out (cp. 35).

30. πάντων τῶν μακαριζομένων ἀπολαύοντας. Cp. c. i. 1323 a 25 sqq. and Plato, Laws 631 B. The possession of all possible goods was held to make men insolent and overbearing (Rhet. 2. 16. 1390 b 32 sqq.). Ἐν πᾶσι ἀγαθοῖς was a familiar Greek expression: cp. Bergk, Fragm. Adesp. Lyr. 18,

ἀνθεύσαν ἀγαθοῖς πᾶσι οἷς θέλλει πόλις,

and see Leutsch and Schneidewin's note on Gregor. Cypr. 1. 36 (Paroem. Gr. 2. 58). It is parodied in Aristoph. Acharn. 1025 Didot,

καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι νῆ Δι' ὅπερ μ' ἐτρεφέτην

ἐν πᾶσι βολίτους,

and Vesp. 709 Didot,

δύο μυριάδες τῶν δημοτικῶν ἔζω ἐν πᾶσι λαγφοῖς.

οἷον εἴ τινές κ.τ.λ. Homer (Odys. 4. 561 sqq.), as Camerarius points out (Interp. p. 319), speaks of the Elysian *plain*; it is from Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 170 sqq., that we first hear of the *Islands* of the Blest. See Liddell and Scott s.v. *μάκαρα*. Hesiod describes how some favoured heroes of the fourth race did not die like their fellows, but were removed by Zeus far from the haunts of men to the Islands of the Blest in the deep-eddying Ocean. Even in the later Iron Age there were those whose lot was thought to be the same—e.g. Harmodius (Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. Scol. 10) and those

who were initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries (Diog. Laert. 6. 39). Some found the *μακάριον νῆσος* in Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Cos, and Rhodes, the realm of Macareus (Diod. 5. 82), but they were more commonly believed to lie in the Atlantic Ocean at some distance from the West Coast of Libya (Plut. Sertor. c. 8: cp. Hor. Epod. 16. 41 sqq.).

32. φιλοσοφίας is introduced at some cost of trimness, but this is Aristotle's way: see note on 1323 b 35.

34. μὲν οὖν has no δέ to answer to it, as the text stands. Perhaps it was taken up by another μὲν οὖν in the lacuna which, as we shall see, probably exists in 1334 b 4, both being then answered by πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνα ἵσταται, 5.

35. τούτων τῶν ἀρετῶν, i.e. φιλοσοφία σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη.

36. αἰσχροῦ γὰρ ὄντος κ.τ.λ., 'for [if they have them not, they will not be able to use good things in leisure-time, and] while it is disgraceful,' etc. Leisure is the crown of life, and ἡ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγή is the διαγωγή τῶν ἐλευθέρων (5 (8). 3. 1338 a 21 sqq.), hence it is especially desirable to be able to make a right use of good things in leisure-time. Cp. also Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1105 a 9, περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιστον ἐν τούτῳ.

38. Observe the chiasmus in ἀσχολοῦντας καὶ πολεμοῦντας and εἰρήνην ἔχοντας καὶ σχολάζοντας.

40. διὸ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 2, πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἡ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἐστί, τὴν πολεμικὴν αὐτὴ γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τοιγαροῦν ἐσώζοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπώλλυντο δὲ ἀρξάντες διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰσίστασθαι σχολάζειν μαδὲ ψευδέασι μηδεμίαν ἀσκησιν ἐτίραν κυριωτέρων τῆς πολεμικῆς. Contrast the language of Xenophon in Rep. Lac. 10. 4, τότε γε μὴν τοῦ Λυκούργου πῶς οὐ μεγάλως ἄξιον ἀγασθῆναι; δε . . . ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ ἠγάγεσε δημοσίᾳ πάντας πάσας ἀσκεῖν τὰς ἀρετάς . . . ἐπίθηκε δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀντιπύστατον ἀνάγκην ἀσκεῖν ἅπασαν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν.

41. ἐκείνοι μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The meaning is—for they do not differ from other men in their views with regard to the question what are the greatest goods: the common herd think that external goods are the greatest of goods (Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 17, τούτων γάρ—i.e. χρημάτων καὶ τιμῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τῶν σωματικῶν—οἱ πολλοὶ δρῶνται, καὶ ἐσπουδάεασι περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἀριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν), and so do the Lacedaemonians (Pol. 2. 9. 1271 b 6 sqq.); it is only in this that they differ from the mass of men, that they hold these goods to be won by means of one of the virtues (courage or military virtue). So far we see our way clearly, but there is little

doubt that the sentence which follows, commencing with *ἐπεὶ δέ*, has reached us in an imperfect state, and that several words have dropped out after *τῶν ἀρετῶν*, 1334 b 4—how many, it is impossible to say. The lost words may well have ended with the word *ἀρετῆς*, and the omission of them may well have been due to the resemblance of *ἀρετῆς* to *ἀρετῶν*, 1334 b 4. Many attempts have been made to fill the lacuna (see Sus.³ on the passage), but with indifferent success. If I were to hazard a suggestion, it would be to insert after *ἀρετῶν* the words *νομίζουσι, τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα χρησίμην εἶναι δοκοῦσαν ἀρετὴν ἀσκοῦσι μόνον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἄλλῃ ἀσκητὶν τὴν ἀρετῆς*. It seems likely at any rate that this filling-up more or less represents the sense of the words which have fallen out. Compare with the passage before us 2. 9. 1271 a 41—b 10. Camerarius (Interp. p. 320) was the first to suggest 'locum mendis non carere.' For *οὐ ταύτῃ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων*, cp. Poet. 5. 1449 b 10 sqq. (already compared by Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 3. 327), and Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 20, *ἀλλ' εἰμὶ ἀπληστοί καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι χρημάτων τῇδε γὰρ μόντοι διαφέρειν μοι δοκᾷ τῶν πλείστων ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* For *ταύτῃ* referring to what follows Bonitz (Ind. 546 b 11) compares Poet. 23. 1459 a 30 sqq. 'Ἀλλὰ τῇ γενέσθαι ταῦτα (1334 b 2) = ἀλλὰ τῇ νομίζῃ γενέσθαι ταῦτα, as Vict. points out. Possibly *γινέσθαι* should be read (with Schn. Bekk.³ and Sus.) in place of *γενέσθαι*: cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 7, where we have *γινέσθαι*. Ταῦτα, 1334 b 2, 3 = *τὰ γὰρ τὰ περιμάχῃα*. For the thought, cp. Xen. Cyrop. 3. 3. 8.

4. καὶ ὅτι δι' αὐτήν. Aristotle does not mean that virtue is not 1334 b. to be practised for the sake of the happiness resulting from it; what he objects to is the practice of virtue for the sake of *τὰ περιμάχῃα ἀγαθά*.

5. πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται κ.τ.λ. For *πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων*, cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 41, *ἄλλαν τρέπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων*, 3. 18. 1288 a 39, and Rhet. 2. 18. 1391 b 22, and for *πῶς ἔσται*, Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 34, *πῶς οὖν ταῖν' ἔσται καὶ πῶς μεθίσκουσι, δεῖ σκίψασθαι τὸν νομοθέτην*. The answer to *διὰ τίνων* is *διὰ φύσεως ἔθους λόγου*: cp. c. 13. 1332 a 38 sqq. Τοῦτο δὲ, as in c. 14. 1332 b 13.

6. τυγχάνομεν δὴ διηρημένοι πρότερον κ.τ.λ. Δὴ here, as often elsewhere (see note on 1252 a 24), introduces an investigation. *Διηρημένοι* is middle and used in the sense of *διορίσειν* (cp. 3. 14. 1284 b 41, *διελίσθαι*). *Πρότερον*, in c. 13. 1332 a 38 sqq.

7. τούτων, 'of these things,' a partitive genitive: cp. c. 11. 1330 a 41, *τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν*.

8. πρότερον, in c. 7.

9. ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. explains why this question must be considered: we must ask whether training through habit should precede training through reason, because these two kinds of training must be so harmonized with each other as to be adjusted to the best end, and we shall be better able to adjust them to the best end when this question has been answered. Aristotle has already said (c. 13. 1332 b 5) that nature, habit, and reason must harmonize with each other; he now adds that they must be so harmonized as to be adjusted to the best end. He follows in the track of Plato, Laws 653 B and 659 D. At Sparta this best kind of harmony had been missed, for in the Lacedaemonian training nature and habit had not been brought into harmony with reason, nor had reason been adjusted to the best end.

11. καί, 'both.'

12. καὶ διὰ τῶν ἰθὺν ὁμοίων ἦχθαι, sc. τοὺς παιδευομένους. In Eth. Nic. 1. 2. 1095 b 4 we have τοῖς ἰθυσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς. For ὁμοίων (i. e. ὁμοίων τῷ λόγῳ), cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 26, πρὸς τὸν θεατὴν τὸν τοιοῦτον τοιοῦτον τῷ χρῆσθαι τῷ γίνεσθαι τῆς μουσικῆς, and Plato, Tim. 18 B, καὶ μὲν δὲ καὶ περὶ γυναικῶν ἐπεμνήσθημεν, ὥς τὰς φύσεις τοῖς ἀνδράσι παραπλησίαι εἴη ξυναρμωστέον, and Rep. 472 C, ὅς ἐν ἐκείνοις δ τι ὁμοιώτατος ᾖ, τὴν ἐκείνοις μοῖραν ὁμοιοτάτην ἔξειν.

φανερὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle is about to decide that training through habit must precede training through reason, but that training through habit must be adjusted to and pursued for the sake of reason, which is the end, and he proves the second proposition first (in 12-17) and then the first (in 17-25). Translate—'this then at any rate is evident, first that as in all other things, [so in the case of the human being,] generation starts from a beginning, and that the end of some beginnings is related to another end, and that reason and thought are the end of man's natural development, so that [reason and thought are the end of generation, and] it is with a view to these ends that we should order generation and our training in custom.' I follow Sepulveda, Vict., Lamb., Stahr, and Welldon in my rendering of ὥς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐστὶ. Sus.³ (cp. Sus.⁴, 1. p. 545) translates 'dass die Erzeugung und Geburt den Anfang macht (für den man zu sorgen hat)'—i. e. 'that generation and birth are the beginning (for which we have to care)'—comparing c. 16. 1334 b 29, but the next sentence, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τέλους,

suggests that ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐστὶ means 'start from a beginning.' It has not, I think, been noticed that Aristotle has before him Plato, Phaedr. 245 D, ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πῶν τὸ γηγόνμενον γίνεσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ μὲν ἐξ ἐνός· εἰ γὰρ ἔκ του ἀρχῇ γίγνεται, οὕτω δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνεται, which supports the interpretation adopted by me. With Sepulveda (p. 237 b) I take the 'beginning' from which generation 'starts' to be the union of the parents: cp. Plato, Laws 720 E, ΑΘ... ἀρ' οὐ κατὰ φύσιν τὴν περὶ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν πρώτην πόλειον περὶ κατακοσμήσει ταῖς τάξεσι; ΚΛ. τί μὲν; ΑΘ. ἀρχὴ δ' ἐστὶ τῶν γενέσεων πάσαις πόλεσιν ἀρ' οὐχ ἡ τῶν γάμων σύμμιξις καὶ κοινωνία; and c. 16. 1334 b 29—31, where it is implied that ἡ σύζευξις is the ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως. Compare with the passage before us those quoted in vol. i. p. 348, note 2, and Metaph. Θ. 8. 1050 a 7 sqq. Aristotle's aim is that in all arrangements connected with the generation of his future citizens and with the training of habit given them the ultimate development of reason and thought shall be kept in view, and we find that he bears this in mind later on (see above on 1334 a 23, and cp. c. 16. 1335 b 16 sqq., 29 sqq., and 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 24 sq., b 6 sqq.). We expect τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπὸ τινος ἀρχῆς in place of τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τινος ἀρχῆς, but cp. c. 16. 1334 b 41, ἡ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, and 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 35, τὰς κρίσεις ἐκ τῶν δικαστηρίων. See also below on 1336 a 41 and cp. Plato, Laws 715 A, τὰ τε πράγματα κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οὕτως ἐσφειτέρωσαν σφάδρα κ.τ.λ. For ἄλλων τέλους, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. 1174 a 19, ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πῶσε αἰήσεις καὶ τέλους τινός.

19. καὶ τὰς ἔξεις τὰς τούτων κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 6, where the soul is said to consist ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὁρέξεως, and De An. 3. 10. 433 a 9, φαίνεται δὲ γε δύο ταῦτα κινούμενα, ἡ ὁρεξις ἡ νοῦς, εἰ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθεῖν ὡς νόησιν τινα. That ὁρεξις belongs to the irrational part of the soul and νοῦς to the rational, is implied in 1. 5. 1254 b 5—9, but we are not told elsewhere, so far as I am aware, that ὁρεξις is the ἔξις of the one part of the soul and νοῦς of the other. For the meaning of ἔξεις, cp. Metaph. Δ. 20. 1022 b 10, ἄλλων δὲ τρόπον ἔξις λέγεται διάθεσις καθ' ἣν ἡ εὖ ἢ κακῶς διακίετα τὸ διακείμενον, καὶ ἡ καθ' αὐτὸ ἡ πρὸς ἄλλα, οἷον ἡ ὑγίεια ἔξις τις· διάθεσις γὰρ ἐστὶ τοιαύτη, and see note on 1254 a 39, where an ἔξις has been said to be a more permanent state than a διάθεσις. Thus ὁρεξις is a διάθεσις τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς καθ' ἣν τὸ ἀλογον μέρος ἡ εὖ ἢ κακῶς διακίετα, and νοῦς stands in a similar relation to τὸ λόγον ἔχον. Ὅρεξις is explained in 22 by θυμός, βούλησις, and ἐπιθυμία, for ὁρεξις is made up of these three things (De

An. 2. 3. 414 b 2, *ὁρεξίς μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις*, and Eth. Eud. 2. 7. 1223 a 26, *ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ὁρεξίς εἰς τρία διαιρεῖται, εἰς βούλησιν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν*). As Eaton points out, however, 'Aristotle's language is not uniform,' for he connects *βούλησις*, not with the irrational, but with the rational part of the soul in De An. 3. 9. 432 b 5, *ἐν τε τῇ λογιστικῇ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀλόγῳ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμὸς*. As to the nature of *βούλησις*, see Eth. Nic. 3. 4. 1111 b 19 sqq. Aristotle evidently regards infants as having wishes which are not *ἐπιθυμία*, and yet which belong wholly to the irrational part of the soul. One difference between *ἐπιθυμία* and *βούλησις* is that the former is always felt in relation to that which is possible, and that this is not always the case with the latter (1111 b 22).

22. *θυμὸς γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* Here Aristotle, as Eaton has already pointed out, follows in the track of Plato, Rep. 441 A, *καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παιδίοις τοῦτό ἐστι ἂν τις ἴδῃ, ὅτι θυμοῦ μὲν εὐθὺς γεγόμενα μετὰ ἑστί, λογισμοῦ δ' ἔπειτα μὲν ἔμογε δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμβάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὀψέ ποτε*. Cp. also Rep. 402 A: Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 8 sq.: Probl. 30. 5. 955 b 22: and the fragment of Philemon quoted above on 1332 b 10. Aristotle may perhaps regard *θυμὸς*, *βούλησις*, and *ἐπιθυμία* as closely connected with the body: cp. Virg. Aen. 6. 730 sqq.

23. *καὶ γενομένοις εὐθὺς*, 'even immediately after they are born': cp. De Gen. An. 5. 1. 778 a 27, *καὶ τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς ἀκολουθεῖ γενομένοις, τὰ δὲ προϋούσης τῆς ἡλικίας γίνεται ὁλῆα καὶ γηρασφόρων*: Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 9, *ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθὺς, οὕτω καὶ τελειοθεῖσιν*: and Meteor. 3. 1. 371 a 6, *εὐθὺς γεγενημένων*.

24. *ὁ δὲ λογισμὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς κ.τ.λ.* The expression comes to Aristotle from Plato, Rep. 586 C, *πλησμονὴν τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης καὶ θυμοῦ δῶκαν ἄνθρωποι λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ* (cp. 431 C and 524 B, and Laws 897 C). These are the faculties that control *ὁρεξίς* (Eth. Nic. 7. 8. 1150 b 22 sqq.) and bring it within bounds. They are absent in other animals than man (De An. 3. 10. 433 a 11 sq.), and the child has them in an imperfect form (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 13). At what age they develop we are not told. According to Probl. 30. 5. 955 b 22 sqq. *νοῦς* increases in men as they grow older, and reaches its highest development in old age (*ἐπὶ γῆρας*). Some further light is thrown on the subject by Plato, Symp. 181 D, *οὐ γὰρ ἐρῶσι παῖδες, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴν φθι ἀρχονται νοῦν ἴσχωσιν τοῦτο δὲ πλησιάζει τῇ γενεαίᾳ*. Compare with what Aristotle says here

Polyb. 3. 20. 4, *εἰ μὴ καὶ Δία πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἢ τύχη καὶ τοῦτο προσέτιμα Ῥωμαῖοις, τὸ φρονεῖν αὐτοὺς εὐθείας ἐκ γενετῆς.*

προϊούσιν. Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) compares De Part. An. 4. 10. 686 b 11, *προϊούσι δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀνθρώποις αἰξεται τὰ κίττωθεν.*

25. διὰ πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ. Πρῶτον μὲν is answered by *ἔπειτα*. With *ἔπειτα τὴν τῆς ἀρέτης* we must apparently supply *εἶναι* or some such word. See note on 1279 b 7.

27. *ἕνακα μέντοι τοῦ τοῦ τῆς ἀρέτης.* The *ἀρέτης* should be so trained as to obey *νοῦς* (1. 5. 1254 b 5: see note on 1333 a 21, and cp. Plato, Laws 653 B, 659 D).

τὴν δὲ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς. Cp. Plato, Rep. 591 C, *ἔπειτα δ', εἶπω, τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἔξω καὶ τροφὴν οὐχ ἕως τῇ θηριώδει καὶ δόγῃ ἡδονῇ ἐκτρέφας ἐνταῦθα τετραμμένος ἔσται, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίαν βλάπτον οὐδὲ τοῦτο προσβέβαιον, ὅπως ἰσχυρὸς ἢ ὑγρὸς ἢ καλὸς ἴσται, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ σωφροσύνην μέλλῃ δι' αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀρμονίας τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕνακα συμφορίας ἀρμονιόμενος [φασκεῖται].* As to the omission of *ἕνακα* with *τῆς ψυχῆς* Eucken remarks (Praepositionen, p. 20), 'if *ἕνακα* belongs to two notions, it is usually expressed only with the first, and must be supplied with the second.'

29 sqq. Cp. Plato, Laws 721 A. But Aristotle is less guided C. 16. by Plato in this chapter than he is in the seventeenth. He raises questions here which Plato had not raised and solves those which Plato had already raised in a different way. Plato had not inquired *ποῖους τινὲς ὄντας χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμικὴν ἐπιλειαν*, nor had he discussed the proper season of the year for marriage or the other questions raised in 1335 a 39 sqq. 'Ἄσ' *ἀρχῆς* is evidently equivalent to *ἀπὸ τῆς συζύγου*.

30. *τῶν τρεφόμενων*, 'of the children in process of rearing,' for not all that are born are to be reared. So Sepulv, whom Vict. follows.

πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'attention must first be given to the coupling of man and wife in marriage, [and the question must be considered] when'—i. e. at what age—'and in what condition [of body and mind] they should enter upon matrimonial intercourse with each other.' Critias, following no doubt Lacedaemonian traditions, had already said the same thing (see vol. i. p. 350, note 1). On the other hand, 'Chrysippus is reproached by Posidonius (Galen, Hipp. et Plat. 5. 1) for neglecting the first germs of education in his treatise on the subject, particularly those previous to birth' (Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, Eng. Trans., p. 303, note 2). In

relation to animals other than man nature herself had fixed the age and season of the year at which intercourse was to take place (Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 a 19, *ὅραι δὲ καὶ ἡλικίας τῆς ὀχρίας ἐκάστοις εἶσιν ὁρισμέναι τῶν ζῴων*), and Aristotle follows in her track. Indeed, Greek custom seems to have prescribed a certain season of the year for marriage (c. 16. 1335 a 36 sqq.), and particular Greek States seem often to have had an age of their own for its celebration (c. 16. 1335 a 15 sqq.). Another point is recognized in 1335 b 26 sqq. as needing consideration, *πόσον χρόνον λειτουργεῖν ἀρμόττει πρὸς τεκνοποιίαν*. It is not likely that regulations on this subject existed in any Greek State. *Πρῶτον μὲν* has nothing strictly answering to it, but it is in effect taken up by c. 17. 1336 a 3, *γονομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων κ.τ.λ. Ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζυφιν*, as in Plato, Laws 932 B, *τῶν περὶ γάμους γυναικῶν ἐπιμελουμένων*. The question *πότε κ.τ.λ.* is considered in 1334 b 32–1335 a 35, and the question *ποιούς τινὰς ὄντας κ.τ.λ.* is considered, so far as relates to the body, in 1335 b 2–12.

32. *δεῖ δ' ἀποβλέποντα κ.τ.λ.*, 'and the lawgiver in instituting this union should look both to the persons united [as distinguished from the children to be born] and to the [whole] time for which they will live [not merely to the time at which the union takes place], in order that they may arrive simultaneously in respect of age at the same epoch' (i. e. the epoch at which each of the two loses the power to have children: cp. 1335 a 7, *τέλος τῆς γενήσεως*, and for *συγκαταβαίνειν* 1335 a 10 sq., 31). If the lawgiver looked merely to the time at which the union takes place, and did not look forward to the time at which the power to have children is lost by husband and wife respectively, he might very well be led to arrange that husband and wife should both be of the same age and young, but to do this would be an error, and the right course for him is to keep in view the whole course of the lives of the wedded pair and to arrange that the husband shall be twenty years or so older than his wife. For *τὸν τοῦ ζῆν χρόνον*, cp. Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 17. 1098 E,

οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν μέτρον ὁ τοῦ βίου χρόνος,

ἀλλὰ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος ἐπιδραττόμενον τὸ φιλότιμον καὶ φιλόφρων ἐξαμύλλεται κ.τ.λ.: Euphron, Δίδυμοι Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 490),

*ὦ Ζεῦ, τί ποθ' ἡμῖν δοῦς χρόνον τοῦ ζῆν βραχὺν
πλέκειν ἀλύτως τοῦτον ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἔστι;*

Philemon, 'Εφηβοι Fragm. 1 (Meineke 4. 10),

οὐκ εἰς ἡμέραν
χειμάζομαι μίαν γάρ, εἰς τὸ ζῆν δ' ἔλασ:

and Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 444, Πιτύλος Ποσειδίππου ~~τῶν~~
~~ἰδίων~~ ~~θρεπτῶν~~ ~~Λυκαλίου~~ ~~ἀφῆκεν~~ ~~ἐλευθέρων~~ ~~παραμείναντα~~ ~~αὐτῷ~~ ~~τὸν~~ ~~τὰς~~ ~~ζωὴς~~
χρόνον. Camerarius (Interp. p. 323) rightly translates τὸν τοῦ ζῆν
χρόνον 'vitae ipsius spacium.' Susemihl's rendering of the sentence,
which Mr. Welldon follows, translating 'he should have in view not
only the persons themselves who are to marry but their time of
life,' needs the support of parallel instances of this use of τὸν τοῦ
ζῆν χρόνον. Aristotle follows in the track of Euripides (Fragm. 24:
cp. Fragm. 906, and contrast Fragm. 319, quoted below on
1335 a 1),

κακὴν γυναῖκα πρὸς νείαν ζυγεῖν νέον,
μακρὰ γὰρ ἰσχυρὴ μᾶλλον ἀρσένων μίνε,
θῆλεια δ' ἥβη θᾶσσον ἐκλείπει δέμας.

For νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν, cp. 2. 8. 1267 b 39, ἐνομοθέτει δὲ
καὶ δικαστήριον ἐν τῷ κέριον. That ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν refers to τῇ
σύζευξι, we see from 1335 a 35 sqq. The union of man and wife
is called a σύζυξις in 1. 3. 1253 b 9 sq. and a κοινωνία in 1. 2.
1252 b 9 sq.

37. καὶ στάσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ διαφορὰς. Cp. Isocr. Nicocl.
§ 41, εἴτα λανθάνουσιν ἔνθεν ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις στάσεις καὶ διαφορὰς
αὐτοῖς ἐγκαταλείποντες, and Plut. Amat. c. 2, ἐκ τῆς γενομένης τοῖς
γονεῦσιν αὐτῶν διαφορᾶς καὶ στάσεως. A 'difference' is less serious
and less long-continued than a 'state of discord,' though it may
often end in the production of discord: cp. 7 (5). 4. 1303 b 37, καὶ
ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐκ κηδείας γενομένης διαφορᾶς ἀρχὴ πασῶν ἐγένετο τῶν στάσεων
τῶν ὕστερον.

39. τῶν τέκνων includes female as well as male children.

40. τῶν πατέρων might well mean here, as often elsewhere, 'the
parents,' but it would seem to mean 'the fathers,' if we compare
1335 a 32—35, for there the father alone must be referred to, inas-
much as he alone would be seventy years of age at the time when
the children are approaching their acmé.

ἀνότητος γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for elderly fathers get no good from chil-
dren's return of service, nor do the children from the assistance
given by fathers.' If a man marries (say) at fifty-five, he will
probably be in his grave before he gets much assistance from his

children or is able to start them in life. See also vol. i. p. 184, note 2. For ἡ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, not ἡ χάρις ἡ παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, see above on 1334 b 12.

- 1335 a. 1. οὕτε λίαν πάρεγγυς εἶναι. Euripides puts very different advice into the mouth of one of his characters (Fragm. 319),

καὶ νῦν παραινῶ πᾶσι τοῖς νεωτέροις
μὴ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας τοὺς γάμους ποιοιμένοις
σχολῇ τεκνούσθαι παῖδας· οὐ γὰρ ἦδονή,
γυναικὶ τ' ἐχθρὸν χρήμα πρεσβύτης ἀνὴρ
ἄλλ' ὥς τάχιστα. καὶ γὰρ ἐκτροφαὶ καλαὶ
καὶ συντρέξων ἡδὺ παῖς εἴη πατρί.

On the un-Attic word πάρεγγυς see Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 120.

2. ἡ τε γὰρ αἰδώς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 5. 5, καὶ γὰρ δὴ ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν ὥς τὸ πολὺ οἱ ἡλικες ἀλλήλοισι σύνεισι, μεθ' ὧν περ καὶ ἐλαχίστη αἰδώς παραγίνεται. Τοῖς τοιοῦτοις, sc. τέκνοις, 'children of the kind we have just described,' i.e. near in age to their parents. Ὡς περ ἡλικιώταις, 'as it does also to those of the same age': cp. 3. 16. 1287 b 16, ὥς περ δ' δικαστῆς, and 2. 10. 1272 a 41, ὥς περ τοῖς ἐφόροις.

3. καὶ περὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 2. 10. 1388 a 5, φανερόν δέ καὶ οἷς φθονοῦσιν ἅμα γὰρ εἴρηται τοῖς γὰρ ἐγγυὺς καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ τόπῳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ δόξῃ φθονοῦσιν ὅθεν εἴρηται "τὸ συγγενὲς γὰρ καὶ φθονεῖν ἐπίσταται" (Aeschyl. Fraggm. 298).

4. εἴτε δὲ κ.τ.λ. We are apparently intended to supply δεῖ νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν before ὅπως κ.τ.λ. Ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοι δεῦρο μετίβημεν, cp. 1334 b 29 sqq. τῶν γεννωμένων, 'of the offspring in process of generation,' whether born or unborn, for τὸ γεννώμενον in De Gen. An. 1. 2. 716 a 22 refers to the latter and τοῖς γεννωμένοις in Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 13 to the former. After birth, however, τὰ γεγνόμενα is the usual designation, as in 1335 b 20, 22, and c. 17. 1336 a 16, and τὰ τέκνα is used of a still later stage (1334 b 39). Ὑπάρχη πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν, 'be such as to answer to the wish of the lawgiver.' For πρὸς with the acc. in this sense, cp. Rhet. 1. 15. 1375 b 16, ἐὰν δὲ δ' γεγραμμένος (νόμος) ἢ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, and other passages collected in Bon. Ind. 642 a 40-54: also Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 139, ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὕτως οἴονται δεῖν τοῖς πάλαι κειμένοις χρῆσθαι νόμοις καὶ τὰ πάτρια περιστέλλειν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὰς βουλήσεις μηδὲ πρὸς τὰς διαδύσεις τῶν ἀδικημάτων νομοθετεῖσθαι.

6. σχεδὸν δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'now all these things come about in connexion with one arrangement,' or 'one mode of dealing with the subject'—the arrangement being to place the commencement of wedlock at such ages in the case of husband and wife respectively as will enable it to close, so far as the production of children is concerned, at the age of seventy in the case of the husband and fifty in that of the wife, so that at no period of the cohabitation will the power of procreation be wanting to either party. It deserves notice that Aristotle himself was about forty years of age when he married the niece and adopted daughter of Hermias (see vol. i. p. 466). That this union was a happy one may be inferred from the direction in Aristotle's will that his wife's bones should be, in accordance with her request, disinterred and buried with his own (Diog. Laert. 5. 16). Πάντα ταῦτα, i.e. τὸ μὴ διαφρονεῖν τὰς δυνάμεις, τὸ μῆτε λίαν ὑπολείπεσθαι ταῖς ἡλικίαις τὰ τέκνα τῶν πατέρων μῆτε λίαν πάρεργον εἶναι, and τὸ τὰ σέματα τῶν γενημένων ὑπάρχειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου βούλησιν. For συμβαίνει κατὰ μίαν ἐπιμέλειαν, cp. Meteor. 1. 1. 338 b 20, ὅσα συμβαίνει κατὰ φύσιν, and Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 8, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνδρι καὶ κατὰ τύχην καὶ κατ' ἐπιμέλειαν ἐγκρίσθαι φύλακε κατὰ τὰς πύλας ταύτας. The phrase perhaps contains an allusion to the proverb μία μάστιξ δαίνει (or μία μάστιξ πάντας δαίνει, Suidas) ἐπὶ τοῦ βεδίου (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 280): cp. Herodes, Περὶ Πολιτείας, p. 175 (Bekker, Orat. Att., vol. v. p. 659), ἀπὸ μιᾶς οὖν τέχνης ἀρμόζοντες ἡμῶν τε κρατήσιν οἰεῖται καὶ τούτων ὡν δι' ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἄρξει. Sus. transposes σχεδόν, 6—τούτους, 11, to after 27, πληθύνει ἔτι (ἢ μικρόν), reading σχεδὸν δὲ in place of σχεδὸν δὴ, but the result of this transposition is to sever πάντα ταῦτα from the things to which these words refer.

8. ὁ τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς ἑξήκωτος, 'the extreme sum of seventy years' (cp. 35). For the fact, cp. Hist. An. 7. 6. 585 b 5 sqq. Camerarius remarks (Interp. p. 323), 'haec ita se habere putatur esse certum. Etsi pauca quaedam dissentanea memorantur, ut olim de Masinissa, quem Plutarchus in libello quo quaeritur an senibus capessenda sit respublica' (c. 15) 'ex Polybio' (37. 10. 5. 11 sq.) 'narrat, mortuum annos habentem nonaginta, reliquisse superstitem puerum annorum quatuor. Et de Constantia, quae nupsit Friderico Secundo, traditur peperisse eam filium grandiore annis quinquaginta.' See also Plin. Nat. Hist. 7. 61 sq. Bonitz (Ind. 289 b 16) couples with the passage before us Hist. An. 8. 15. 599 b 10, καὶ ἄρχονται θηρεῖσθαι (οἱ θύνναι) ἀπὸ Πλευάδος ἀνατολῆς μέχρι

'*Ἀρκετοῦρου δύσεως τὸ ἴσχατον*. For the order of the words, which is quite regular, cp. *1. 2. 1252 b 27*, ἡ ἐκ πλείονων κομῶν κοινωρία τέλειος: see Sandys' note on '*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 51. l. 10, δ ἐν ἀγορᾷ σίτος ἀργέε.

9. For *πεντήκοντα*, cp. 29, ἐπὶ καὶ τριάκοντα.

10. δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν κ.τ.λ., 'the commencement of the union, so far as age is concerned, should reach down at its close to these epochs' (i.e. the close of the union should arrive for the wife at the age of fifty and for the husband at the age of seventy, so that the husband should be twenty years older than the wife at the time of marriage). For *κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν*, 'in respect of age' as contrasted with time of year (*τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἔραν χρόνοις*, 36), cp. *De Gen. An.* 5. 3. 784 a 17, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν γίνεται χειμὼν καὶ θέρος καὶ ἔαρ καὶ μετόπωρον. For the use of *καταβαίνειν*, cp. *Plut. Demetr.* c. 53, κατίβη δὲ ταῖς διαδοχαῖς τὸ γένος αὐτοῦ βασιλεῖον εἰς Περσίαν τελευταῖον, ἐφ' οὗ *Ῥωμαῖοι Μακεδονίαν ὑπηγάγοντα*.

11. ἔστι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων συνδυασμός κ.τ.λ. Partly in support of the conclusion at which he has just arrived, which implies that the bridegroom will be twenty years older than the bride at the time of marriage, and therefore will not be young, and partly in order to settle the age of the bride, which has not yet been settled, Aristotle recalls the fact that the union of young persons is a bad thing. The substantive *συνδυασμός* is not used elsewhere in the *Politics* in the sense of 'coitus,' though it is often thus used in the zoological writings of Aristotle (see *Bon. Ind.* s.v.), but we have *συνδυασθέντων* in this sense in 1335 b 24 (cp. also *συνδυάζεσθαι* in 1. 2. 1252 a 26, so far as it refers to the union of male and female). With the passage 1335 a 11-28 should be compared *Plato, Rep.* 459 B: *Aristot. Hist. An.* 5. 14. 544 b 14, τὸ γὰρ τῶν νέων (sc. σπέρμα) ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔχουσιν, γονίμων δ' ὄντων ἀσθενέστερα καὶ ἐλάττω τὰ ἔχουσα τοῦτο δὲ μάλιστα ὄφλιν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τῶν ζῴων τετραπύδων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρνίθων, τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἔχουσα ἐλάττω, τῶν δὲ τὰ φέει, and 7. 1. 582 a 16, μέχρι μὲν οὖν τῶν τριῶν ἐπὶ τῶν τῶ μὲν πρῶτον ἔχοντα τὰ σπέρματά ἐστιν ἔπειτα γόνιμα μὲν μικρὰ δὲ καὶ ἀτελῆ γυνῶσι καὶ οἱ νέοι καὶ αἱ νέαι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τῶν πλείστων. συλλαμβάνουσι μὲν οὖν αἱ νέαι θάπτον ἔαν δὲ συλλάβωσιν, ἐν τοῖς τόκοις πονοῦσι μᾶλλον. καὶ τὰ σώματα δ' αὐτῶν ἀτελέστερα γίνονται ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ γηράσκει θάπτον, τῶν γ' ἀφροδισιαστικῶν ἀρρίνουν καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν τῶν τοῖς τόκοις χρωμένων πλείους δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐδ' ἡ ἀβήσις ἔτι γίνεσθαι μετὰ τοὺς τρεῖς τόκους, and *De Gen. An.* 4. 2. 766 b 29, τὰ τε γὰρ νέαι θηλυτόκα μᾶλλον τῶν ἀμαζόντων καὶ γηράσκειτα μᾶλλον (τὰ πρσιβύτερα

μᾶλλον P, i.e. Vat. 1339) τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὕτω τέλειον τὸ θερμόν, τοῖς δ' ἀπολείπει. Aubert and Wimmer, in their edition of the *De Generatione Animalium*, remark on this passage, 'this appears from statistical investigations to be correct'; among other authorities they refer to 'the very precise and interesting investigations of Quetelet, *Sur l'Homme*': see also below on 1335 a 15. According to Aristox. *Fragm.* 20 (Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 2. 278), Pythagoras recommended (he probably referred to males only) complete abstinence till twenty, ὅταν δὲ καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἀφίσταται, σπανίως εἶναι χρῆστίαν τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις· τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὴν τῶν γεννίων καὶ γεννησμένων εὐεξίαν πολὺ συμβάλλεισθαι: see also below on 1335 b 37, ἡγέας χάριν. At Sparta, care was taken that both bridegroom and bride should be in their bodily prime (Xen. *Rep. Lac.* 1. 6: Plut. *Lycurg.* c. 15, cp. *Num. et Lycurg.* inter se comp. c. 4, where the custom at Rome is contrasted with the Lacedaemonian custom). It is evident from 28 sq. that Aristotle does not class a girl of eighteen among the νέαι, at all events so far as fitness for marriage is concerned.

13. ἀτελεῖ, 'imperfect,' i.e. lacking some limb or organ, or with some limb or organ imperfectly developed, or lacking some sense, for instance the sense of sight or hearing (*De An.* 3. 1. 425 a 9 sqq.), or some power, for instance the power of movement (*De An.* 3. 9. 432 b 21—26) or speech, or the power to procreate (cp. *Hist. An.* 7. 1. 581 b 21 sqq., and *De An.* 2. 4. 415 a 26 sqq. and 3. 9. 432 b 21 sqq.), or possibly imperfect in mind (cp. 1335 b 29 sqq.), idiotic or the like. As infants born imperfect are not to be reared in Aristotle's 'best State' (1335 b 20), and the offspring of the over-young is often imperfect, much destruction of infant life would be saved by the prohibition of the marriage of those who are over-young.

μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, 'small in figure': cp. Pindar, *Isthm.* 4. 53, μορφὰν βραχύς. In 17 we have μικρὰ τὰ σώματα. To be small in person was to lack beauty (*Eth. Nic.* 4. 7. 1123 b 6 sqq.). 'Ὁ μικρός was 'a term of reproach at Athens' (Liddell and Scott s.v.: Leutsch and Schneidewin, *Paroem. Gr.* 1. 280, note: cp. also 7 (5). 10. 1311 b 3).

15. ἐν δούλῳ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Vict. 'hoc autem vulgo de plebe Galorum dicitur, apud quos mala haec consuetudo increbruit; unde notantur etiam voce ostendente erratum hoc ipsorum irridenteque brevitatem corporis eorundem et deformitatem.' Among the States

other than Troezen to which Aristotle here refers, Crete should probably be included. Cp. Ephor. Fragm. 64 (Strabo, p. 482: Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 1. 251), γαμῖν μὲν ἅμα πάντες ἀγαγάσονται παρ' αὐτοῖς ὁ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἐκ τῆς τῶν παίδων ἀγῆλης ἐκκριβόντες. The age referred to would be the expiration of the eighteenth year according to Dareste, *Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques*, p. 408. The bride in Crete might be no more than twelve years of age (*ibid.* p. 407). The early age at which daughters were given in marriage at Troezen is probably an indication of material prosperity, for the father no doubt had to provide his daughter with a dowry. In Crete the bridegroom did not take his bride home till she was old enough to manage a household (Strabo, p. 482), and the actual provision of a dowry by the father may have been delayed till then. 'In a meeting of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, M. Joseph Kőrösi, Director of the Buda-Pest Statistical Bureau, read a paper on the "Influence of Parents' Ages on the Vitality of Children." . . . M. Kőrösi has collected about 30,000 data, and has come to the following conclusions:—Mothers under twenty years of age and fathers under twenty-four have children more weakly than parents of riper age. Their children are more subject to pulmonary diseases. The healthiest children are those whose fathers are from twenty-five to forty years of age, and whose mothers are from twenty to thirty years old' (*Times*, Jan. 14, 1889).

16. ἐπιχωριάζεται. Ἐπιχωρίζει would be more usual, but Liddell and Scott refer to *Nymphis*, ap. Athen. Deipn. 619 f, κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχωριαζομένην παρ' αὐτοῖς συνήθειαν. See critical note.

18. διαφθείρονται, 'die.' Bonitz (*Ind. s.v.*) compares De Gen. An. 4. 4. 773 a 18 sqq.

διὰ καὶ τὸν χρησμὸν κ.τ.λ., 'the well-known oracle also' (in addition to other things). For τὸν χρησμὸν, cp. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 30, ὅθεν τὸ ἄγος συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις. P¹ and P² have preserved this oracle for us in their margins—τὸ μὴ τίμειν νέαν ἀλοκα (see Sus.). The literal meaning of these words was 'let fallow land remain fallow, do not plough up uncultivated land,' or in other words 'let the land rest.' The verb νεῶν and the substantive νεωτός (Xen. Oecon. 7. 20) were used of the ploughing-up of fallow land (see Liddell and Scott). Cp. also Anth. Pal. 6. 41,

χαλκὸν ἀροτριγῆν, κλασιβόλακα, νειοτομῆα.

As, however, the land which had been left for a time fallow was the land which would naturally be used for ploughing, the advice

of the oracle came in effect to this, that ploughing should cease for a time and that crops should not be raised. No wonder that men rejected this interpretation of the oracle and cast about for another—that given in the text. A third interpretation was, indeed, possible. The oracle might be understood as a warning against rash innovation: cp. Athen. Deipn. 461 e, καὶ κατακλιθέντων, ἀλλὰ μὴ, ὁ Πλούταρχος ἔφη, κατὰ τὸν Φλιάσιον ποιητὴν Πρατίναν, οὐ γὰρ αὐλακισμέναν ἄρῶν, ἀλλὰ σκύφαν ματεύων, κυλικηγορήσεων ἔρχομαι κ.τ.λ. For διὰ ταιούτην αἰτίαν, see above on 1284 a 23.

20. διὰ τὸ γαμίσκεσθαι τὰς νεωτέρας. Sepulv. 'propterea quod adolescentulae nuptui traderentur' (γαμίσκεσθαι being taken as passive: so Lamb. and Sus.), or 'because the custom was to take the younger women to wife' (γαμίσκεσθαι being taken as middle: so Liddell and Scott). Perhaps the words which follow, τὰς ἐκδόσεις ποιῆσθαι πρεσβυτέραις, where the act of the father, not the bridegroom, is referred to, make rather in favour of the former interpretation. Γαμίσκειν is a rare word.

22. καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην, as well as πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν (12).

τὰς ἐκδόσεις ποιῆσθαι πρεσβυτέραις, 'to give away their daughters in marriage, when they are older' (literally 'to make their givings-away in marriage for girls when older').

23. ἀκολαστότεραι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Aeschyl. Fragm. 239.

24. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and the bodies of the males also are thought to suffer injury in respect of growth, if they have intercourse with females while the seed is still increasing, for the seed also [as well as the body, the increase of which has just been referred to] is subject to a fixed limit of time, which it does not overpass in its increase, or overpasses only slightly, [so that it is not an indifferent matter whether intercourse occurs at an earlier or later age].' The editors from Vict. downward, so far as I have observed, with the exceptions of Reiz and Götting, read σώματος in place of σπέρματος, and there is much doubt as to the correct reading. The words σῶμα and σπέρμα are occasionally interchanged in the MSS.—e.g. in De Gen. An. 2. 3. 737 a 11 we should probably read σῶμα with Aubert and Wimmer in place of σπέρμα, and in Chaeremon, Fragm. 13, I would read 'Ἄρῶν σπέρμας' in place of 'Ἄρῶν σώμας'. It is therefore not without hesitation that I retain σπέρματος in the passage before us. I do so for the following reasons: (1) It is the reading of all the better MSS., for even in P², which now has σώματος, σπέρματος was the original reading;

P¹ has *ἄλλως σώματος* in its margin. Vet. Int. has 'corpore,' but whether he found *σώματος* in the Greek text used by him is doubtful, for he may well have translated a marginal reading. Susemihl ascribes the reading *σώματος* to Leonardus Aretinus, but Schneider says (*Politica*, vol. ii. p. 436), 'Aldinum et plurium Victorii codicum scripturam *σπέρματος* reddidit Aretinus,' and a manuscript of his Latin Translation belonging to Balliol College, Oxford (MS. Ball. 242)—I have not consulted any others—has 'ac masculorum corpora crescere impediuntur si adhuc augente semine consuetudinem ineant.' (2) If we read *σώματος*, it is not easy to see, as Schneider has already pointed out in his note on the passage, why Aristotle did not simply write *καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀρρένων δι' σώματα βλάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν, ἔαν ἔτι αὔξανόμενον (and not αὔξανόμενον τοῦ σώματος) ποιῶνται τὴν συνουσίαν*: Sepulveda, in fact (p. 240), found *αὔξανόμενον* (not *αὔξανόμενον τοῦ σώματος* or *σπέρματος*) in some MSS. and prefers this reading. Besides, the added remark *καὶ γὰρ —ἔτι* seems rather otiose, if it refers to the body, for every one knows that the growth of the body ceases after a certain age. (3) The difficulty has been raised by Schneider that we nowhere read in Aristotle of a 'certus temporis terminus seminis augmento atque incremento definitus, ultra quem progrediatur nunquam, quoque intercepto corporis incrementum impediatur.' 'Corporis incrementum,' he adds, 'intra vigesimum fere annum aetatis consistere solet, seminis vero incrementum et copia pro natura alimentorum aliasque per causas variatur usque ad annum sexagesimum.' The question is one for thorough students of Aristotle's physiology to decide, and I cannot pretend to be one of them, but it should be noticed that the expression *φθίνοντος τοῦ σπέρματος* occurs in *De Gen. An.* 3. 1. 750 a 34, *ὥς ἐξαλεισκομένου τοῦ περστώματος καὶ ἄμα τῆς ἡλικίας ληγοῦσης φθίνοντος τοῦ σπέρματος*, in reference to the old age not indeed of a man, but of an animal, and if he believed in a decrease of the secretion after a certain age, he may well have believed in an increase of it up to a certain age. Some indications of his having done so are traceable, if we can trust the Seventh Book of the *History of Animals*, c. 5. 585 a 36, *πλὴν οὐτ' ἀρχομένων* (sc. τοῦ σπέρματος καὶ τῶν καταμηρίων) *γόνιμα εὐθὺς οὐτ' ἔτι ἀλίγων γιγνομένων καὶ δσθενῶν*, and *Probl.* 20. 7. 923 a 35, *ἢ ἅπαντα μὲν μέχρι τούτου ἀκμάζει, ἕως ἂν κατὰ τὸ σπέρμα ἀκμάζη; ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν ἐπιδιδύσκουσιν, ὅτι μὲν τῇ πλῆθει ὅτι δὲ τῇ παχύτητι*. Compare what we read in *Hist. An.* 7. 1. 581 b 2 sqq. of the

effect on bodily growth of a discharge of τὰ λευκά in early childhood, for the catamenia in the female answer to the seed in the male (De Gen. An. 1. 19. 727 a 2 sqq.)—τὰ δὲ λευκά καὶ παιδίου γίνεται νόσις οδοσι πάμπαν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν ὑγρῇ χρώνται τροφῇ· καὶ καλῶς τὴν αἰξὴν καὶ τὰ σώματα λυχνάλει τῶν παιδίων. For ἀριστέος χρόνος, cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 22 and 3. 14. 1285 a 34. As to (ἡ μικρόν), see critical note.

28. διὰ κ.τ.λ. Διό is explained by ἐν τοσούτῳ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 30. We should have expected from Hist. An. 7. 1. 582 a 16—29 (quoted in part above on 11) that Aristotle would have delayed the age of marriage for women till twenty-one, but this would have involved a shortening of the duration of wedlock, as it is to close before the wife is fifty years of age. The male reaches the acmé of his physical development between thirty and thirty-five (see vol. i. p. 186, note 2, and cp. 1335 a 32 sq.), so that Aristotle might well have placed the age of marriage for the male a little earlier than he does, but he probably wishes to make the duration of wedlock the same for husband and wife (about thirty-two years). As to the ages recommended by Plato, see vol. i. p. 183.

29. As to [ἡ μικρόν], see critical note.

30. ἐν τοσούτῳ, sc. χρόνῳ, 'at an age no greater than this.'

ἀκμῶνός τε τοῖς σώμασι σύζευξις ἔσται, 'coupling will take place while their bodies are in their prime.' For the importance of this, cp. Plato, Rep. 459 B and Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 23.

31. συγκαταβήσεται, sc. σύζευξις, cp. 10.

32. τοῖς μὲν, the children, answering to τοῖς δέ, 34, the fathers.

33. ἀρχομένοις τῆς ἀκμῆς, cp. 1335 b 27, ἀρχεσθαι τῆς συζεύξεως.

34. ἡδὴ καταλευμένης τῆς ἡλικίας, 'their period of vigour having now been brought to a close' (cp. De Gen. An. 1. 19. 727 a 8, καὶ παύεται τῆς ἡλικίας ληγούσης τοῖς μὲν τὸ δύνασθαι γεννᾶν, ταῖς δὲ τὰ καταμύρνα, and Demosth. in Apatur. c. 4, οὐκ ἔτι ἐστὶν ἐντὰ ἀφ' οὗ τὸ μὲν πλεῖν καταλείψα), or possibly 'having now been wrecked.' For πρὸς, 'towards,' see Bon. Ind. 641 b 9, where we find a reference among other passages to De Gen. An. 5. 1. 778 a 25, τὰ μὲν γὰρ (τῶν ζώων) οὐ πολιοῦται πρὸς τὸ γῆρας ἐπιδῆλως.

36. τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν ἄραν χρόνοις κ.τ.λ. Cp. Philo, Mechan. Synt. p. 99. 11, δεῖ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἰσχυρίεσσι τῶν τευχῶν λαβραῖως χρᾶσθαι καθάπερ καὶ νῦν χρώνται μεταλλεύοντες. Τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἄραν χρόνοις, 'time in connexion with season,' in contradistinction to οἱ περὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν χρόνοι: cp. c. 5. 1327 a 8, τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὕλης, and for the distinction

Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 a 19, ἔραι δὲ καὶ ἡλικίας τῆς ὀχείας ἐκάστοις εἰσὶν ὁρισμένοι τῶν ζῴων.

37. οἷς οἱ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. There is a tacit antithesis between οἱ πολλοὶ and οἱ ἱατροὶ and οἱ φυσικοί, 40. In reference to the question of season, which is a very simple one, we need not have recourse to the opinion of learned men; the verdict of the many will suffice: cp. Top. 2. 2. 110 a 19, ὅλον ὑγιεινὸν μὲν ῥητίον τὸ ποιητικὸν ὑγείας, ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν· πότερον δὲ τὸ προκείμενον ποιητικὸν ὑγείας ἢ οὐ, οὐκ ἔστι ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ αληθέον ἀλλ' ὥς ὁ ἱατρός. See vol. i. p. 187, note 1. The mention of οἱ πολλοὶ would seem to show that it was usual to marry in the winter throughout Greece and not merely in Attica. In ὁρίσαντες Aristotle probably refers to a custom or unwritten law. Pythagoras went further (Diog. Laert. 8. 9, καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων δέ φησιν οὕτως "ἀφροδισία χαιμῶνος ποιέσθαι, μὴ θέρος· φθινοπώρου δὲ καὶ ἡρος κουφότερα, βαρὶα δὲ πᾶσαν ὥρην καὶ ἐς ὑγίην οὐκ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι": cp. Alcaeus, Fragm. 13, 39 with Bergk's notes, and Hist. An. 5. 8. 542 a 32). 'In 1876 Dr. Kulischer, in a paper in the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*, collected details of human pairing-seasons, as marked by festivals of plainly matrimonial intent, and brought forward still more distinct evidence from the statistics of births, which show maxima and minima pointing to two especial pairing-times, about New Year and in late spring. Dr. Westermarck ' [in his history of Human Marriage, Macmillan, 1891] 'brings new evidence to bear on the subject' (Prof. E. B. Tylor, *Academy*, Oct. 3, 1891).

38. τὴν συναυλίαν ταύτην, 'this kind of dwelling together.' Συναυλία in this sense is connected with αὐλή, not αὐλός, and is a very rare word, but Bekk.² is no doubt wrong in following Lamb., who reads συνουσίαν. The word ὁμαυλία occurs in Aesch. Choeph. 599, ξυζύγους δ' ὁμαυλίας ('wedded unions,' Liddell and Scott), and Schn. points out that Plato (Laws 721 D) 'caelibatum eodem modo μοναυλίαν vocavit.' There were other kinds of συναυλία, e. g. those of ὁμέστιοι and ὁμοτράπεζοι, not ὁμολεκτροί.

39. δεῖ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς ἤδη θεωρεῖν κ.τ.λ., 'and the married couple also in turn' (as well as the lawgiver, cp. 1334 b 33 and 1335 b 14) 'should study the teaching of physicians and that of physical philosophers.' For ἤδη see note on 1258 b 18: ἤδη here lends emphasis to a pronoun, as in that passage and often elsewhere (e.g. in 2. 8. 1268 b 21: 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 14: 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10). For θεωρεῖν τὰ κατὰ τῶν ἱατρῶν λεγόμενα, cp. Metaph. M. 1. 1076 a 12,

πρῶτον τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων λεγόμενα θεωρητίον, and Meteor. 2. 9. 370 a 21, τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα περὶ βροντῆς καὶ ἀστραπῆς παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ταῦτ' ἐστὶ, and see note on 1324 a 25.

41. οἱ τε γὰρ ἱατροὶ κ.τ.λ., 'for physicians state in an adequate way the favourable moments of the body [for the procreation of children].' Hesiod had recommended the time after a sacrificial feast (Op. et Dies 735,

μηδ' ἀπὸ δυσφύμῳ τάφῳ ἀπονοστήσαντα
σπερμαίνειν γενεήν, ἀλλ' ἀθωάτων ἀπὸ δασύος),

but some were wholly against the time after a feast of any kind, even the ordinary δείπνοι, and among them was Epicurus (Plut. Sympos. 3. 6: Usener, Epicurea, Fragm. 61, p. 117 sq.). Cp. Plato, Laws 674 B, Plut. Lycurg. c. 15, and Diog. Laert. 7. 18. We learn the opinion of the Athenian physician Mnesitheus (b. c. 400–350?) from Athen. Deipn. 357 c, τὸ δὲ τῶν μαλακίων γένος, οἷα πουλινυόων τε καὶ σηπιδίων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, τὴν μὲν σάρκα δύσπεπτον ἔχει· διὸ καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδισιασμοῖς ἀρμόττουσιν. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ εἰσι πνευματώδεις, ὁ δὲ τῶν ἀφροδισιασμῶν καιρὸς πνευματώδους προσδεΐταις διαθείσεται (cp. De Part. An. 4. 10. 689 a 29 sqq.). As to the dawn of day, see Aristoph. Lysistr. 966 Didot.

1. καὶ περὶ τῶν πνευμάτων οἱ φυσικοί. Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 2. 766 b 1335 b. 34, καὶ τὸ βορείως ἀρρενοτοκεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ νοτίως ὥστε καὶ περιττωματικώτερα. τὸ δὲ πλεῖον περιττώμα δυσπεπτότερον διὰ τοῖς μὲν ἄρρεσιν ὑγρότερον τὸ σπέρμα, ταῖς δὲ γυναιξὶν ἢ τῶν καταμηρίων ἱκτρισις (cp. 767 a 8 sqq.): Hist. An. 6. 19. 574 a 1: Probl. 1. 24. 862 a 30, ἔτι δὲ ἡ δύναμις ἡμῶν ἐν τοῖς ἄρρεσιν ἐστὶ, ταῦτα δὲ ἀνίσταται ὑπὸ τῶν νοτίων: Probl. 26. 43. 945 a 18 sq. Plato recognizes the influence of winds on generation in Laws 747 D.

2. πόλων δὲ τινων κ.τ.λ. Here the question announced for consideration in 1334 b 31 is taken up, so far at least as relates to the body. Plato had already said something on the subject in Laws 775 B sqq.: cp. 779 D sqq. The view which prevailed at Sparta may be gathered from Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 4, ταῖς δ' ἐλευθέραις μέγιστον νομίσας (ὁ Λυκούργος) εἶναι τὴν τεκνοποιάν πρῶτον μὲν σωμασκεῖν ἔταξεν οὐδὲν ἦττον τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρεος φύλον ἔπειτα δὲ δρόμον καὶ ἰσχύος, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, οὕτω καὶ ταῖς θηλείαις ἀγῶνας πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἐπέθηκε, νομίζων ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἰσχυρῶν καὶ τὰ ἱκανὰ ἔρωμνέστερα γέγενεσθαι, and Plut. Lycurg. c. 14: compare the fragment of Critias quoted in vol. i. p. 350, note 1.

3. ἐπιστήσασι μὲν κ.τ.λ. For the case of ἐπιστήσασι, see note on 1275 a 16. Subjects often receive only a hasty consideration in the Fourth Book, a fuller treatment of them later on being promised: see vol. i. p. 296. What Aristotle means by ἐπιστήσασι μᾶλλον (sc. τὸν λόγον, cp. Περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου 6. 470 b 5), we see from c. 17. 1336 b 25, ὕστερον δ' ἐπιστήσαντας δεῖ διορίσαι μᾶλλον, εἴτε μὴ δεῖ πρῶτον εἴτε δεῖ διαπορήσαντας, καὶ πῶς δεῖ. Ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς παιδονομίας, perhaps 'in the inquiries respecting the management of children,' rather than 'in the inquiries respecting the education of children,' which is the rendering of Sepulv., Vict., Lamb., and Liddell and Scott. Παιδονομία is used in a different sense in 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 39 and 1323 a 4. It seems strange that Aristotle should intend to treat the question ποῖον τινῶν κ.τ.λ. in an inquiry respecting the management of children. He apparently designed to include a discussion of the subject in the Politics; no such discussion, however, finds a place in the work as we have it (for other cases of the same thing, see vol. ii. p. xxvii).

5. τύπη δὲ ἱκανὸν εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν, 'but one should now also say what is adequate in outline.' Sus. inserts δεῖ after ἱκανόν, but, as he himself suggests in Sus.¹, Addenda, p. lxiv, it seems likely that δεῖ is to be supplied here from λεπτίον, 4: cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 3 sqq., where δεῖν must apparently be supplied with ὑπάρχειν and δεῖ with τάττειν. Bonitz does not refer to the passage before us in Ind. 168 a 54 sqq., where he considers one or two other cases in which δεῖ may be thought to be omitted. Aristotle inherits the expression τύπη from Plato, in whose writings it occurs frequently. A τύπος is the outline or περιγραφὴ (cp. Laws 876 D, περιγραφὴν τε καὶ τοὺς τύπους τῶν τιμωριῶν εἰπόντας) which an artist draws before filling in his picture: see note on 1263 a 31.

οὔτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 1. 1138 b 26, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἁλλαις ἐπιμελείαις, περὶ ὧν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔτε πλείον οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ ποιεῖν οὐδὲ βραδυμῆν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος. As to ἡ τῶν ἀθλητῶν ἔξις, cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 10, ἀθλητῶν ἔξις, Xenophanes, Fragm. 2 Bergk, Eurip. Fragm. 284, and Plato, Rep. 403 E-407 E, where Stallbaum compares Plut. Philopoemen c. 3. What Plato objects to in athletes, however, is their sleepiness and inability to stand the rapid changes of diet which are inseparable from a soldier's life, whereas Aristotle rather objects to the tendencies impressed on their constitution by severe toil of one monotonous kind. For the order of the words in 5-8, see note on 1327 a 4.

6. πρὸς πολιτικὴν εὐεξίαν, 'with a view to the kind of bodily fitness that is useful to a citizen': cp. Xen. Oecon. 11.13. *Εὐεξία* differs from strength, and it also differs from health; it is the business of a gymnastic trainer to produce *εὐεξία*, just as it is the business of a physician to produce health (Top. 5. 7. 137 a 3 sqq.). But the *εὐεξία* which Aristotle speaks of here is not gymnastic *εὐεξία*, but the *εὐεξία* which makes a man an efficient citizen, fit in body to bear the labours which fall to the lot of soldiers and citizens.

πρὸς ὑγίαν καὶ τεκνοποιίαν. As to the ill-effect of the training of athletes on health, cp. Plato, Rep. 403 E sq., and as to its ill-effect on *τεκνοποιία*, cp. De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 35, ἀναλίσκει γὰρ ὁ πόνος τὰ περιττώματα, and Hist. An. 6. 20. 574 b 28, ἴδιον δ' ἐστὶ τῶν Λακωνικῶν (κυνῶν) συμβαίνει πάθος· πονήσαντες γὰρ μᾶλλον δύνανται δρᾶν ἢ ἀργεῖν.

7. κακοπονητική, 'unfit for labour,' 'labouring ill,' like *κακάσπουε*, 'breathing ill,' or *κακοθάνατος*, 'dying ill.'

8. πεπονημένην μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Οὖν here contains an inference from what precedes, as in 1. 1. 1252 a 7 (see note on that passage). Πόνος is the source of *εὐεξία* (Phys. 2. 3. 195 a 8 sqq.: Metaph. Δ. 2. 1013 b 9 sq.: cp. Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 23 sqq.). Compare what Atalanta is made to say in Eurip. Fragm. 529,

εἰ δ' εἰς γάμοντι ἔλθοιμ', ὃ μὴ τύχοι, ποτέ,
τῶν ἐν δόμοισιν ἡμερευουσῶν ἀπὸ
βελτίου' ἂν τίκοιμι δόμασιν τέκνα
ἐκ γὰρ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς δοτὶς ἐκπονεῖ
σκληρὰς διαίτας οἱ γόνοι βελτίωνται.

But Atalanta's training had been that of a huntress, not that of an athlete. The toils which Aristotle would recommend to married women would, however, rather be the light and varied toils of the mistress of a household, as to which we learn much from the advice given by Ischomachus to his wife in Xen. Oecon. c. 10. 10 sq. For πόνους μὴ βιαίους, cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 40, τὴν βίαιον τροφήν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους.

9. πρὸς ἓνα μόνον, sc. πόνον (Ridgeway and Sus.⁴).

11. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and these physical characteristics should be possessed alike by men and women,' so that women no less than men should ἐπιμελίσθαι τῶν συμμάτων. (Ταῦτα is in the plural because the characteristics are many.) Aristotle's language is very similar to that of Plato in Laws 804 D, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ δὴ καὶ περὶ θηλειῶν ὃ μόνον

ἐμὲ νόμος ἀν εἶποι πάντα, ὅσαπερ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρρένων, ἴσα καὶ τὰς θηλείας ἀσκεῖν δεῖν, but Plato goes much further both in Rep. 451 C-457 B and in Laws 804 C-806 C than Aristotle does here.

12. χρῆ δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Pregnant women also,' as well as those marrying. Ἐγκύμων is the Attic word rather than ἔγκυος. Aristotle here follows in the track of Lycurgus and Plato: cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 3, αὐτίκα γὰρ περὶ τεκνοποιίας, ἵνα ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀρξωμαι, οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὰς μελλούσας τίκτειν καὶ καλῶς δοκούσας κόρας παιδεύεσθαι καὶ σίτην ἢ ἀνυστὸν μετρίωτάτῃ τρέφουσι καὶ ὄψῃ ἢ δυνατὸν μικροτάτῃ· οἶνον γὰρ μὴν ἢ πάμπαν ἀπεχομένας ἢ ὑδαρεῖ χρωμένας διέγουσιν, whereas Lycurgus ordered a different course, and Plato, Laws 788 D sqq. and 789 D, βούλειθε ἅμα γέλωτι φράζωμεν, τιθέντες νόμους, τὴν μὲν κύουσαν περιπατεῖν, τὸ γαστέρον δὲ πλάττειν τε οἷον κήρυον, ἕως ὑγρόν, καὶ μέχρι δυοῖν ἐτοῦ σπαργανῶν. Not only would the unborn child profit by the exercise taken by the mother, but the mother herself would secure an easier delivery (De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 30 sqq.).

14. τοῦτο δὲ ῥᾶδιον τῇ νομοθέτῃ ποιῆσαι, i. e. to secure that pregnant women shall not take little food and exercise.

προστάξαντι κ.τ.λ. Τὴν is of course to be taken with πορείαν. Aristotle here perhaps takes a hint from Plato, who in Laws 833 B had made a temple the goal of a foot-race: cp. also Laws 789 E. For θεῶν τῶν εἰληχότων τὴν περὶ τῆς γένεως τιμὴν, where ἡ γένεσις = 'partus' (Bon. Ind. 149 a 3 sqq.), cp. Plato, Phileb. 61 B, εἴτε Διόνυσος εἴτε Ἑφαιστος εἴθ' ὅστις θεῶν ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν εἰληχε τῆς συγκράσεως. Notwithstanding the gender of τῶν εἰληχότων, the gods referred to are no doubt Eileithyia (Hom. Il. 11. 270 sq.: Paus. 8. 32. 4: Theocr. 17. 60 sqq.) and Artemis (Plato, Theaet. 149 B, αἰτίας δὲ γὰρ τοῦτου φασὶν εἶναι τὴν Ἄρτεμιν, ὅτι ἀλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν εἰληχε): perhaps also Demeter Calligeneia (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 56. 19) and at Athens the Τριτοπάτορες (Phanodem. Fragm. 4: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 367). The temples of Eileithyia in the Peloponnesus were often just outside the city-gate (see note on 1331 a 26). Ἀποθεραπείαν, from ἀποθεραπεύειν, 'to honour zealously' or 'completely': cp. ἀποβάπτειν (c. 17. 1336 a 16), ἀφιλάσκεισθαι (Plato, Laws 873 A), ἀποδύρεσθαι, and ἀποθρηνεῖν. A daily offering at a temple would be an indication of zealous worship: cp. Plut. Nic. c. 4, σφόδρα γὰρ ᾗν (ὁ Νικίας) τῶν ἐκπεληγμένων τὰ δαιμόνια καὶ θιασμῷ προσκείμενος, δε φησι Θεουκλίδης, ἐν δὲ τιμῇ τῶν Πασφῶντος διολόγων γέγραπται, ὅτι καθ' ἡμέραν ἔδου τοῖς θεοῖς.

16. τὴν μέντοι διάνοιαν κ.τ.λ. What is the construction of τὴν

διάνοιαν? Is it in the acc. after διάγειν, the subject of διάγειν being τὰς ἐγκύους understood and διάγειν itself being here used in the sense of 'to keep,' as in Isocr. Nicocl. § 41, καίτοι χρεὶ τούτῳ δρθῶς βασιλεύοντας μὴ μόνον τὰς πώλεις ἐν δμῶσιν πειρᾶσθαι διάγειν, ἀνδρῶν ἀρχαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς οἴκους τοὺς ἰδίους? Or is τὰς ἐγκύους the subject of διάγειν used intransitively, and the proper rendering of τὴν διάνοιαν 'in respect of the mind'? Or is τὴν διάνοιαν the subject of διάγειν used intransitively? Sepulveda, who translates, 'mentem autem contra quam corpus tranquillam securamque gerere convenit,' appears to adopt the first of these interpretations, Victorius, who translates, 'mente autem contra atque corpore sedatius remissiusque degere convenit,' the second (so Stahr and Sus.), Mr. Welldon, who translates, 'their mind unlike their bodies should at such a time be comparatively indolent,' the third. I incline to the second interpretation: no instance of διάγειν being used in the sense of 'to keep' is given in the Index Aristotelicus, and in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 32 sq. the word is used intransitively. The reason why Aristotle advises the avoidance of mental labour appears to be because it would 'be a hindrance to the body' (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 7 sqq.) and he wishes the bodily state of the mother to be as good as possible. Compare the advice given by Plato in Laws 792 E, where however he counsels the avoidance of an excess of pleasures and pains rather than of mental labour. We expect τοῦ σώματος in 17 rather than τῶν σωμάτων.

18. ἀπολαύοντα . . . φαίνεται, 'evidently are influenced by.'

τῆς ἐχούσης, i.e. τῆς μητρός: see Bon. Ind. 305 b 38, where De Gen. An. 2. 4. 740 a 26, 37, and 3. 3. 754 b 1 are referred to.

19. ὥσπερ τὰ φύμενα τῆς γῆς. Cp. De Gen. An. 2. 4. 740 a 24, ἐπεὶ δὲ δύναμις μὲν ἦδη ζῶν ἀτελής δέ, ἄλλοθεν ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν τὴν τροφήν διὰ χητῆται τῇ ὑστέρῃ καὶ τῇ ἐχούσῃ, ὥσπερ γῆ φυτῶν, τοῦ λαμβάνειν τροφήν, ὥς ἂν τελεωθῇ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ἦδη ζῶν δύναμις πορευτικῆς. In this passage and also in that before us Aristotle seems to have in his memory Hippocr. De Natura Pueri, 1. 414 Kühn, φημι γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ φύμενα πάντα ζῆν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς τῆς ἱκανῆς, καὶ ὥς ἂν ἡ γῆ ἔχῃ ἱκανὸς ἐν ἑαυτῇ, οὕτω καὶ τὰ φύμενα ἔχει. οὕτω καὶ παῖδιον ζῆ ἀπὸ τῆς μητρός ἐν τῇσι μήτρῃσι καὶ ὥς ἂν ἡ μήτηρ ὑγιαίνει ἔχῃ, οὕτω καὶ τὸ παῖδιον ἔχει.

περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως κ.τ.λ., 'and with respect to the exposure or rearing of children, let there be a law that defective offspring shall not be reared, but that offspring shall not be exposed on the ground

of an excessive number of children [as distinguished from that of imperfection], in case the customs of the State, as regulated by the lawgiver' (literally, 'the ordering of the customs'), 'are opposed to an excessive number, for the amount of reproductive intercourse should be fixed, and if any parents have offspring in consequence of intercourse taking place beyond that limit, abortion should be produced before sensation and life develop in the embryo, for that which is holy in this matter will be marked off from that which is not by the absence or presence of sensation and life.' See on this passage vol. i. p. 187 and notes 2 and 3. In Greece the poor were often unwilling to rear children, especially daughters: cp. Plut. De Amore Proles c. 5, οἱ μὲν γὰρ πένητες οὐ τρέφουσι τέκνα, φοβούμενοι μὴ κ.τ.λ., and Poseidipp. Ἑρμαφρόδιτος Fragm. (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 516),

ὕδω τρέφει πᾶς κἄν πένη τις ἂν τύχη,
θυγατέρα δ' ἐκτίθῃσι κἄν ᾗ πλούσιος.

The Greeks noticed with surprise that in Egypt all children born were reared (Aristot. Fragm. 258. 1525 a 37 sqq.: Strabo, p. 824). In Aristotle's 'best State' exposure would be resorted to only in the case of imperfectly developed offspring, or rather of offspring the imperfection of which was obvious at the moment of birth, for not all the kinds of imperfection noticed above on 1335 a 13 would be traceable at birth. The rule at Sparta was not to rear anything ἀγεννὲς καὶ ἄμορφον (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16). Seneca says of Rome (De Ira i. 15), liberos quoque, si debiles monstrosisque editi sunt, mergimus. I know not whether ἀπόθεσις in the sense of the 'exposing of children' occurs elsewhere. For ἡ τάξις τῶν ἐθῶν, cp. τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων, 2. 10. 1271 b 29, 32. Καλὴν, sc. πλήθος τέκνων (so Vict. 'in illis locis ubi lege interdictum est ne quis pater aliat plures liberos quam lex patiat'): cp. c. 17. 1336 a 35, οἱ καλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις. Ὀρίσθαι γὰρ δεῖ κ.τ.λ., cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 6 sq. and 2. 7. 1266 b 8 sqq. In ἐὰν δέ τισι γίγνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, supply τέκνα with γίγνηται from what precedes, and take παρὰ ταῦτα (sc. τὰ ὤρισμένα) with συνδυασθέντων, 'in consequence of intercourse in excess of the legal limit' (so Vict. and Stahr), or possibly 'in contravention of the legal limit' (cp. Plato, Polit. 300 D, where παρὰ ταῦτα = παρὰ τοὺς νόμους). For the use of ταῦτα here see note on 1252 a 33. For the case of συνδυασθέντων (one might expect συνδυασθείσι), Reiz (quoted by Schn.) compares Hom. Il. 16. 531, ὅτι οἱ θεοὶ ἤκουσε μέγας θεὸς εὐξαμένοιο, and Odyss. 9. 256, ἦμιν δ'

αὐτε κατεκλύσθη φίλον ἦτορ Δεισάντων κ.τ.λ. Richards adds a reference to Thuc. 3. 13. 9 and Xen. Cyrop. 1. 4. 2. See also notes on 1281 b 4 and 13.

24. πρὶν αἰσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ ζῶην. Cp. De Gen. An. 5. 1. 778 b 32, εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν αἰσθησιν τὸ ζῆν, καὶ τότε πρῶτον ἐστὶ ζῆν, ὅταν αἰσθησις γίνηται πρῶτον κ.τ.λ., and Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a 16, τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὀρίζονται τοῖς ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώποις δ' αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως. Contrast the view of Democritus, De An. 1. 2. 404 a 9, διὰ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ὅρον εἶναι τὴν ἀναπνοήν, which was also that of Diogenes of Apollonia (Fragm. 5: Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 1. 254). Aristotle is here speaking not of life in general, but of animal life, for plants also live, and in their case ζῶην λέγομεν τὴν δ' αὐτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν (De An. 2. 1. 412 a 14): cp. De An. 3. 12. 434 a 27.

25. ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἀμβλωσιν. Bonitz (Ind. 243 b 17) takes ἐμποιεῖσθαι here as middle, but the verb seems to be rarely used in this sense in the middle voice, and perhaps Sus. is right in taking it as passive. In the 'oath of Hippocrates' which was sworn by aspirants to medical practice one of the promises made is that the taker of the oath will not produce abortion. The thing, however, was no doubt occasionally done not only by physicians but by midwives (Plato, Theaet. 149 D).

τὸ γὰρ δοῖον κ.τ.λ. As to the use of οὐχ ὅσιος and ἀνόσιος of violations of duty to near relatives, see note on 1262 a 28. The abortion of an embryo in which sensation and life had already developed would involve a violation of this nature.

26. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but since the commencement of the fit age for marriage for man and wife has been defined' (in 1335 a 28 sqq.), 'and it has been settled at what age they should begin their union.' As to the μὲν solilarium in ἡ μὲν ἀρχή, see notes on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34. The suppressed clause here is 'but the end of it has not.'

28. λειτουργεῖν πρὸς τεκνοποιάν, 'to serve the State' in relation to the begetting of children, according to Liddell and Scott (so also Mr. Weldon): Sus., on the other hand, translates 'sich diesem Geschäfte zu widmen' ('to devote themselves to this task'), and Stahr 'dem Kinderzeugen obzuliegen,' following in the track of Lamb., 'liberis procreandis operam dare.' Perhaps, as Plato speaks in Rep. 460 E of τίκειν τῇ πόλει and γενᾶν τῇ πόλει, the first of these two interpretations is to be preferred. For πρὸς, cp. 6 (4). 4.

1291 a 35, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς λειτουργοῦν. 'Ἀρμόττει is used in association with *χρῆ* here as with *δεῖ* in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 14.

29. τὰ γὰρ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἔκγονα κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 23 and Plato, Rep. 459 B. By *οἱ πρεσβύτεροι* Aristotle here means *οἱ παρηκμακότες*, i. e. those over fifty or perhaps fifty-five: cp. Rhet. 2. 13. 1389 b 13, *οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ παρηκμακότες*. In Probl. 38. 9. 967 b 13 sqq. *οἱ πρεσβύτεροι* are apparently identified with *οἱ γηράσκοντες*. See notes on 1329 a 13 and 1321 a 22. By *οἱ γενηράκοντες* Aristotle may probably mean men over sixty, or sixty-five. Membership of the Lacedaemonian *γερονσία* was confined to men who had passed their sixtieth year. When Aristotle says that the children of aged fathers are *ἀσθενεῖς*, he perhaps means more than that they are weak in body. *Οἱ ἀσθενεῖς* are specially subject to emotion (see note on 1342 a 11).

32. διδὲ κατὰ τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἀκμὴν, sc. ὡρίσθαι ὁ χρόνος τῆς τεκνοποιίας: so Lamb. 'quare id tempus praeфиниatur, in quo mens maxime viget ac floret,' Coray, and others. Aristotle is speaking of the mental prime of the husband, not the wife. The bodily prime of a man falls between thirty and thirty-five (see above on 1335 a 28).

33. τῶν ποιητῶν τινές. Solon (Fragm. 27) is referred to. He however places the mental prime between forty-two and fifty-six. There is a further reference to these poets in c. 17. 1336 b 40 sqq.

35. ὥστε τέτταρσιν κ.τ.λ. Plato also in the Republic (460 E) closes the period of *τεκνοποιία* for the man at fifty-five, adding that in his case the mental and bodily prime lies between twenty-five and fifty-five. Sir Nicholas Bacon (born in 1509) was fifty-two years of age when his famous son Francis was born to him in 1561. Lord Chatham was fifty-one when William Pitt was born to him. Sir John Herschel (born in 1792) was born when his father Sir William Herschel (born in 1738) was fifty-four years of age. How many other great men have had fathers over fifty at the time of their birth, I am unable to say. For *τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερόν γενήσεως*, cp. Plato, Rep. 461 C, *μηδ' εἰς ὥς ἐκφέρειν κύημα μηδέ γ' ἔν*.

37. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν κ.τ.λ. Compare Plato, Rep. 461 B sq., where Plato does not impose this restriction on the intercourse of those over the legal age, if only they take care that no offspring shall see the light or, supposing it does, shall live.

ὄψις χάριν. Cp. De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 8 sqq., 726 a 22, and 5. 3. 783 b 29 sq., and Probl. 4. 29. 880 a 22 sqq. See also

Plin. Nat. Hist. 28. 58, and the case of Timochares in Hippocr. De Morbis Vulgaribus 5, vol. iii. p. 574 Kühn. Pythagoras probably would not have admitted that health could ever be thus promoted (cp. Diog. Laert. 8. 9).

ἢ τινος ἄλλης τοιαύτης αἰτίας, such as εὐεξία, which is often mentioned in conjunction with ὑγίεια, e. g. in Phys. 7. 3. 246 b 4: Plato, Rep. 559 A, Protag. 354 B. Cp. Laws 708 B, *τισὶν ἄλλοις τοιοῦτος παθήμασιν*.

38. φαίνεσθαι δεῖ ποιουμένους τὴν ὁμιλίαν, 'ought manifestly to resort to the intercourse.'

περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον, sc. ὁμιλίας, 'but with respect to the intercourse of a husband with another woman than his wife, or of a wife with another man than her husband.' Aristotle has before him here Plato, Laws 784 E, *ὅταν δὲ δὴ παῖδας γεννῶσιν κατὰ νόμους, ἴαν ἄλλοτρίῃ τις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κοινῶν γυναικὶ ἢ γυνὴ ἀνδρὶ, ἴαν μὲν παιδοποιουμένοις ᾖ, τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτήμια αὐτοῖς ἴστω, καθάπερ τοῖς ἴτι γεννωμένοις εἴρηται μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὁ μὲν σωφρονῶν καὶ σωφρονοῦσα εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἴστω πάντα εὐδόκιμος, ὁ δὲ τοῦναντίον ἐναντίας τιμᾶσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀτιμαζέσθαι*, and 841 C sqq. Both Aristotle and Plato (in Laws 841 C sqq. at any rate, *μὴ λαθάνων ἄνδρας τι καὶ γυναῖκας πάσας*) seem to confine themselves to the prohibition of unconcealed adultery. Cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 40. The writer of the First Book of the Oeconomics (c. 4. 1344 a 8—13) appears to go further. Contrast with all this the occasional permission to Spartan wives of intercourse with other men than their husbands (Plut. Lycurg. c. 15).

39. ἀπλῶς, 'broadly,' 'at any time,' in contradistinction to *περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς τεκνοποιίας*: cp. Anal. Pr. 1. 15. 34 b 7, *δεῖ δὲ λαμβάνειν τὸ παντὶ ὑπάρχον μὴ κατὰ χρόνον ὀρίσαντας, οἷον νῦν ἢ ἐν τῷδε τῷ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς*.

40. ἀπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι, 'openly to touch': cp. Plato, Laws 816 E, *μηδέ τινα μαθάνοντα αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι φανερόν τῶν ἐλευθέρων*. Plato had already used the word ἀπτεσθαι in Laws 841 D, *μηδενὸς ἀπτεσθαι τῶν γυναικῶν ἅμα καὶ ἐλευθέρων*, and this is no doubt one of the passages which Aristotle has before him here. Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares Probl. 4. 29. 880 a 28 sq.

μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς occurs in Plato, Laws 777 E, and *μηδαμῶς μηδαμῇ* in Laws 820 B, but I know not whether *μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς* occurs elsewhere in Aristotle's writings. The Index Aristotelicus omits the phrase, and indeed by some error the word *μηδαμῶς*. Πάντη

πάντας is a phrase frequently employed by Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. s. v. *πάντες*).

ἐταν ἢ καὶ προσαγορευθῇ πόσις. *Καὶ* here probably means 'or,' as in 2. 3. 1262 a 8 (see notes on 1262 a 6 and 1303 a 20). The word *πόσις* is used here and in 1. 3. 1253 b 6 by Aristotle, but it is a poetical word, seldom used in prose. On *προσαγορευθῇ*, see Veitch, *Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective*, s. v. *ἐγορεύω*.

- C. 17. 3 sqq. Aristotle says little in this chapter which had not
1336 a. already been said by Plato, and throughout the whole of it he seems to write with the Seventh Book of the Laws before him, but he brings together, and thus makes more effective, what Plato had said in a scattered and often an incidental way. He sometimes differs from Plato; thus he is for rearing children under seven to a greater extent at home than Plato had proposed to do, he will not have their crying restrained, etc. In recommending, again, that children should be habituated from their earliest infancy to bear heat and cold, he goes beyond anything contemplated by Plato or practised at Sparta (*Xen. Rep. Lac.* 2. 4) or in Crete (*Ephor. Fragm.* 64: Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 1. 250), for neither the Spartans nor the Cretans seem to have begun this habituation in babyhood, and Plato speaks of *ἐκ παιδων* (*Rep.* 403 C), not, like Aristotle, of *ἐκ μικρῶν παιδων*, when he refers to the subject (*Rep.* 404 A); it is rather from some barbarian races, such as the Celts, that Aristotle learns this lesson, as indeed he himself tells us. He keeps the same end in view in his rules as to the rearing of children as he does in his rules as to marriage; he seeks in both to secure that the children shall be well-grown in body and sound in mind and likely to make good soldiers and citizens in after-years. Rearing comes first, covering the whole period up to seven years of age, and then comes education (c. 17. 1336 b 37 sqq.). Aristotle confines himself during the first two or three years of life to studying the physical development of the child in accordance with the principle laid down in c. 15. 1334 b 25 sqq., but after that age he pays attention to the development not only of the body, but of the *ἥρεσις* and character. Till seven the children must necessarily in his opinion be reared at home, and consequently must be more or less in the company of slaves, and he evidently fears that if they are much in the company of slaves at this impressible time—the age at which permanent tastes are acquired, *πάντα γὰρ στέργον τὰ πρῶτα μᾶλλον* (1336 b 33)—they may acquire a taint of

illiberal feeling and indecency of which it will not be easy to rid them in later life. This leads him to pay special attention to the years from two or three to seven.

Γενομένων δὲ τῶν τέκνων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle reproduces the turn of the opening sentences of the Seventh Book of the Laws (788 A, γενομένων δὲ παίδων ἀρρίων καὶ θηλειῶν τροφὴν μὲν πον καὶ παιδείαν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λέγειν ὀρθότατ' ὅν γίγνοιθ' ἡμῖν). Δεῖ must be supplied with οἶσθαι: Aristotle forgets that he has not used the word since c. 16. 1335 b 38, and that the imperatives ἴστω (39) and ζημιούσθω (1336 a 1), which however contain in them much of the force of δεῖ, have intervened. Μεγάλην εἶναι διαφορὰν, 'is a highly important determining influence one way or the other': 'we expect rather μέγα διαφέρειν (cp. 1. 13. 1260 b 16 sqq.) or μεγάλην ποιεῖν διαφορὰν (cp. De Part. An. 2. 4. 651 a 15) or μεγάλην ἔχειν διαφορὰν (Pol. 5 (8). 6. 1340 b 22), but that which produces a difference is often termed a διαφορὰ, just as that which produces fear is sometimes termed φόβος. Compare the construction noticed in the note on 1264 a 39.

5. φαίνεται τε κ.τ.λ., 'and evidently, if we investigate the question by a reference to the lower animals and to the barbarian nations which make it their aim to introduce the habit of body suitable for war, food abounding in milk is most congenial to the bodies [of infants], and with little wine in it on account of the diseases which wine produces.' With τὴν πολεμικὴν ἔξω contrast 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 10, ἀθλητικὴν ἔξω. For ἔγω see critical note. φαίνεσθαι without an infinitive or a participle may mean either 'to appear' or 'evidently to be' (Bon. Ind. 808 b 52 sqq.); here it probably means the latter. The nom. το φαίνεται is ἡ τοῦ γάλακτος πλήθουσα (or πληθύνουσα) τροφή δυνωτέρα δὲ διὰ τὰ νοσήματα. For διὰ, see note on 1328 a 19. The nations referred to are no doubt those mentioned in c. 2. 1324 b 9 sqq., and especially the Scythians: cp. Antiphanes, Μισοσπηγρος (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 85),

εἰτ' οὐ σοφοὶ δὴτ' εἰσὶν οἱ Σκύθαι σφόδρα,

οἱ γενομένοιςιν εὐδίας τοῖς παιδίοις

διδόσων ἵππων καὶ βοῶν πίειν γάλα;

We read of the milk-drinking Hippemolgi in Hom. Il. 13. 5. The Greeks, however, mostly used goats' milk (Büchschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 313); they used ewes' milk but little (ibid.), and they regarded the milk of cows (Plut. Pelop. c. 30) and asses (Plut. Demosth. c. 27) as food for invalids. It was on goats' milk that Jupiter was reared as an infant (Manil. Astron. 1. 364 sqq.).

Compare the rearing of the infant Camilla (Virg. Aen. 11. 570 sqq.). But Aristotle is recommending the use of milk not merely in the case of sucklings, who indeed *must* use it, but in the case of children generally, or at any rate of children under three or thereabouts. The great physical strength of the Suebi was due in part to their use of milk (Caesar, Bell. Gall. 4. 1. 8 sq.). In the early days of ancient Greece infants were sometimes given honey, not milk (Schol. Aristoph. Thesm. 506). Phoenix gave the infant Achilles wine (Hom. Il. 9. 489), and it was probably commonly given to infants (Dio Chrys. Or. 4. 155 R, ἡ σὺ οἶμι λέγειν αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ Διὸς τοὺς βασιλείας τρέφεσθαι, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τίτθης γάλακτι καὶ οἴνῳ καὶ σιτίοις;), but Hippocrates (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 542 Kühn) advises, καὶ φησὶ ἀμεινον εἶναι τοῖς παιδίοισιν τὸν οἶνον ὡς ὑδαρσστατον διδόναι ἥσσαν γὰρ τὰς φλίκας ξυγκαίει καὶ συναναίνει: one source of stone in the bladder was thus removed. According to Hist. An. 7. 12. 588 a 3 sqq., wine sometimes produced convulsions in infants (βλαβερόν δὲ πρὸς τὸ πάθος καὶ ὁ οἶνος ὁ μέλας μᾶλλον τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ ὁ μὴ ὑδαρῆς, καὶ τὰ πλείστα τῶν φυσικῶν: cp. De Somno, 3. 457 a 14, διὰ τοῖς παιδίοις οὐ συμφέρουσιν οἱ οἶνοι οὐδὲ ταῖς τίτθαις (διαφέρει γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲν αὐτὰ πίνειν ἢ τὰς τίτθαις), ἀλλὰ δεῖ πίνειν ὑδαρῆ καὶ δλίγον πνευματώδες γὰρ ὁ οἶνος, καὶ τούτου μᾶλλον ὁ μέλας). Compare also Plato, Laws 666 A and 672 B (together with Aristot. Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 19), and Athen. Deipn. 429 b.

8. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and further it is of advantage to have all the movements made [of the bodies of infants] that it is possible to have made in the case of creatures so young.' Τηλικούτων I take to be in the genitive after ὅσας κινήσεις. Ποιῖσθαι is to be supplied with συμφέρει. Aristotle has before him Plato, Theaet. 153 A, and 153 B, τί δέ, ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἔξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διδύλται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ σέβεται; and also Laws 789 E, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς τροφούς ἀναγκάζωμεν νόμῳ ζημοῦντες τὰ παιδιά ἢ πρὸς ἀγροὺς ἢ πρὸς ἱερὰ ἢ πρὸς οἰκίους αἰεὶ πη φέρειν, μέχρ' ἂν ἱκανῶς ἴστασθαι δυνατόν γίγηται, καὶ τότε διευλαβούμενας, ἔτι νέων ὄντων μὴ πη βίᾳ ἐκπερδομένων στρέφεται τὰ κῶλα, ἐπιπονέειν φερούσας, ὥς ἂν τρέιτες ἀποτελεσθῇ τὸ γεγόμενον; Συμφέρει, not merely πρὸς τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δύναμιν, as in 4, but probably also πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν (cp. 34 sqq.); perhaps indeed in other ways too (cp. Plato, Laws 790 C sqq.).

10. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ διαστρέφεισθαι κ.τ.λ. Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 8, διὰ δὲ τὸ κινεῖσθαι θραύεται μᾶλλον εὐθραυστον γὰρ τὸ νέον διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν. Plato was so much alive to this danger that he

recommended the use of swathing-bands, it would seem, during the whole of the first two years of life (Laws 789 E), though at Sparta they were not used at all (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16) and the general Greek custom (according to Blümner, *Home Life of the Ancient Greeks*, Eng. Trans., p. 80 sq.) probably was to drop them at the end of the fourth month. Plato had also advised with the same object in view that the unfortunate nurse should carry the child in her arms till he was three years old (see above on 8). Aristotle is silent as to all this; he apparently hopes to secure the same result by adopting from barbarian nations the use of certain *εργασμαχαικά*, which kept the body of the infant from being twisted. What these instruments were, it is difficult to say. Vict. compares the 'serperastra' of Varro, Ling. Lat. 9. 5, which were knee-splints or knee-bandages for straightening the crooked legs of children. As to the swaddling-clothes used, see Blümner, *Home Life of the Ancient Greeks*, Eng. Trans., p. 79 sq.

12. τῶν τοιούτων, i.e. *τηλικούτων*.

συμφέροι δὲ κ.τ.λ. The Spartans and Cretans sought to make their youth indifferent to heat and cold, but they do not seem to have begun their discipline in this respect as early in life as Aristotle recommends (see above on 1336 a 3 sqq.). As to its importance, see 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 22 sqq. and *Fragm. Trag. Gr. Adesp.* 461 (Nauck).

15. διὰ παρὰ πολλοῖς κ.τ.λ. See Götting's note, and that of Eaton, who adds references to Galen *Περὶ Ὑγιανῶν*, 1. 10 (vol. vi. p. 51 Kühn), Strabo, p. 165, where we read of the Iberian women, *ἐν τε τοῖς ἔργοις πολλάκις αἰτὰι καὶ λούουσι καὶ σπαργασοῦσι ἀποδείσαντες πρὸς τι βέβρον*, and Virg. *Aen.* 9. 603,

Durum ab stirpe genus, natos ad flumina primum

Deferimus, saevoque gelu duramus et undis.

See also the note of Leutsch and Schneidewin, *Paroem. Gr.* 2. p. 569, on the Greek proverb, 'Ὁ Ῥῆνος ἀλέγχει τὸν νέον', who quote Julian, *Epist.* 16. p. 383 D (cp. *Or.* 2. p. 81 D sq.), whence it appears that the dipping of the new-born babe in the Rhine was used as a test of its legitimacy, spurious offspring being held to sink and legitimate offspring to swim. They also refer to Valerius Flaccus, *Argonaut.* 6. 335, where we read of the Scythians on the Phasis,

Nunquam has hiemes, haec saxa relinquam,

Martis agros, ubi iam saevo duravimus amne

Progeniem natosque rudes.

They remark that neither Aristotle, who was, so far as they know, the first to refer to the custom, nor Galen says a word as to the use of the practice as a test of legitimacy. A few other references to a similar custom may be noted. Zeus was believed to have been dipped at his birth in the river Lusius, which flows through the Arcadian Gortyna and is the coldest of rivers (Paus. 8. 28). Thetis sought to make Achilles immortal by dipping him as an infant in the Styx, and the Styx was very cold (Hes. Theog. 785 sq.). 'The modern Beloochees plunge the new-born infant into a tub of snow-water' (Prof. Ridgeway, *Trans. Camb. Philol. Soc.* 2. 147). Compare also the proverb (Schol. Aristoph. Vesp. 1189),

ἐν Παρίῳ ψυχρόν μιν ὕδωρ, καλὰ δὲ γυναικεύει.

The Lacedaemonian practice was to bathe the infant after birth not in water, but in wine; this was held to be strengthening to healthy children (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16). Were all these customs connected with the wide-spread custom of infant baptism, which Mr. Whitley Stokes (*Academy*, Feb. 15, 1896) traces 'among the heathen Norsemen, the heathen Celts, two unconverted West African tribes, and lastly the Mexicans before the arrival of the Spaniards,' referring also to 'the cases mentioned by Prof. Tylor in his *Primitive Culture*, third edition, vol. ii. pp. 430-433'? Ἀποβάπτειν, 'to dip completely': see above on 1335 b 14, ἀποθεραπεῖν.

17. τοῖς δὲ κ.τ.λ. Ἀ σκέπασμα is a mere protection against cold, something much less elaborate than an ἱμάτιον. The Spartan youth were allowed an ἱμάτιον, though only one (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 4). Some modern physicians give very different advice. 'In infancy parents above all should not make the mistake of letting their infants be too thinly clad. . . . It was a monstrous mistake for parents to send out their children with bare necks and heads and bare legs. Children ought to be clothed from head to foot winter and summer' (Dr. Corfield, Address to Sanitary Institute, *Times*, Sept. 30, 1889).

18. πάντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Two interpretations of these words are possible. Lamb. translates, 'omnibus enim rebus quibus assuefieri possunt, statim ab ineunte aetate eos assuefacere melius est, dummodo sensim ac paulatim'; thus he takes πάντα to refer not to the beings which are to be habituated, but to the things to which they are to be habituated; and so Sus. 'zu Allem, wozu man Kinder überhaupt gewöhnen kann.' But it is also possible, and perhaps

simpler, to translate πάντα ὅσα δυνατόν ἐθίζω 'all things that are susceptible of habituation.' I am not sure whether I am right in inferring from the passages with which Bonitz (Ind. s. v. ἐθίζω) groups that before us that he takes the words in this sense. He refers, however, in the preceding line to Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 19—23 and Eth. Eud. 2. 2. 1220 b 1, where we learn that not all things are susceptible of habituation. The bodily habit of children, Aristotle goes on in 20 to tell us, *is* susceptible of habituation to cold. Μῶν here, as often elsewhere (Bon. Ind. s. v.), 'non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis cernitur'; it should have followed εἰθὺς ἀρχομένην, not βέλτιον. Ἐκ προσαγωγῆς is 'frequent in Hippocrates' (Liddell and Scott) and a favourite expression with Aristotle, but it is apparently not used by Thucydides, or Xenophon, or Plato, or (in the sense at least in which it is used here) by the Attic Orators. Compare for the thought Hist. An. 6. 12. 567 a 5 sqq. and Xen. Cyrop. 6. 2. 29, and for the turn of the sentence De Part. An. 3. 14. 675 a 6, ὥστε διελθεῖν μὲν δύνανται, φασὶν δὲ διελθεῖν.

20. διὰ θερμότητα. Cp. Rhet. 2. 12. 1389 a 19, ὥστε γὰρ οἱ οἰκιστοὶ, οὗτοι διάθερμοι εἰσιν οἱ νέοι ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, and Probl. 3. 7. 872 a 6, οἱ δὲ παῖδες ὑγροὶ καὶ θερμοί: also Plato, Laws 664 E and 666 A. This view is inherited from Hippocrates: cp. Hippocr. Aphor., vol. iii. p. 710 Kühn, τὰ αἰθανόμενα πλείστον ἔχει τὸ ἐμφυτον θερμόν. Τὴν τῶν ψυχρῶν ἀσκησιν, like τὴν τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀσκησιν, c. 14. 1333 b 38.

21. τὴν πρώτην, sc. ἡλικίαν, which must be supplied from 23. See note on 1281 a 26. The phrase occurs in Pindar, Nem. 9. 42 (ἐν ἀλικίᾳ πρώτη), and in De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 19, ὅτι οὐκ ἐνυπάρχει σπέρμα οὗτ' ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἡλικίᾳ οὗτ' ἐν τῇ γῆρᾳ οὗτ' ἐν ταῖς ἀρρωστίαις, but in a wider sense than in the passage before us, where it appears to refer to the first two or three years of life.

23. τὴν δ' ἐχομένην κ.τ.λ. Aristotle intended to say that the next period of life till five should be dealt with in a different manner, the child being now encouraged to play games, but his sentence breaks down in course of utterance, for Π¹ P¹⁻² Bekk. are probably wrong in omitting δέ, 26, which is needed to contrast δέ τοσαύτης τυγχάνει κινήσεως with what immediately precedes. The accusative τὴν ἐχομένην ταύτης ἡλικίας is thus left without anything to govern it: compare the position of the nominative ἰσομηνητευσάμενός τις in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 14 sqq. For the thought, cp. Plato, Laws 793 E,

τριάνει δὲ δὴ καὶ τετραίεται καὶ πενταίεται καὶ ἔτι ἐξίτει ἥθει ψυχῆς. παιδιῶν δέον ἂν εἶναι. For the child of six, however, Aristotle finds other occupation in 1336 b 35 sqq. Children under five are regarded by him as too young to be put to any study; it is not till seven that under his scheme of education children begin to learn what the gymnastic trainer and the παιδοτρίβη can teach them (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 6 sqq.), nor till after puberty apparently that they learn their letters (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.); among ourselves, on the contrary, to say nothing of the Kindergarten, children are taught their letters before five. The effect of hard physical labour in injuring growth is referred to in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 10 sq. Cp. also Plato, Rep. 377 A, οὐ μαθάνει, ἦρ δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; τοῦτο δέ που, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν, ψεῦδος, ἐπὶ δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ. πρότερον δὲ μύθους πρὸς τὰ παιδία ἢ γυμνασίοις χρέμεθα. Aristotle does not quite agree with the last sentence; he thinks that from two or three to five children should have nothing to do with γυμνάσια involving ἀναγκαῖοι πόνοι, but he does not agree that they should have no γυμνάσια at that age, but only stories. He provides a kind of gymnastic training for them in their pastimes and also in their διατάσεις καὶ εὐαισθητοί. He excludes γυμνάσια involving ἀναγκαῖοι πόνοι because they check physical growth (cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 40 sqq.), and any checking of physical growth is especially out of place in the first five years of life, inasmuch as physical growth is the main business of these years; in fact, according to Plato, Laws 788 D, the human being grows in height during them as much as he does in the twenty succeeding years (ἡ πρώτη βλάστη παρὸς ζῆον μεγίστη καὶ πλείστη φύεται, ὥστε καὶ ἔρην πολλοῖς παρίσχηκε μὴ γίγνεσθαι τὰ γ' ἀνθρώπων μὴκη διπλάσια ἀπὸ πέντε ἔτων ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς εἴκοσι ἔτεσιν αὐξανόμενα: cp. Aristot. De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 23, ἐν ἑτεσι γὰρ πέντε σχεδὸν ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡμῖν λαμβάνειν δοκεῖ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ μεγέθους τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ χρόνῳ γιγνομένου ἅπαντος). For ὥστε διαφεύγειν τὴν ἀργίαν τῶν σωματίων, cp. Plato, Theaet. 153 B (quoted above on 1336 a 8).

27. ἦν, sc. κίνησιν.

28. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς κ.τ.λ., 'and the pastimes also' (no less than the ἄλλαι πράξεις) 'should be neither unbefitting for freemen nor laborious nor relaxed and effeminate.' Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 558 B, εἰ μὴ τις ὑπερβιβλημένη φύσιν ἔχει, οὐποτ' ὂν γίνοιτο ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ παῖς ὂν εὖδὲς παίζει ἐν καλοῖς καὶ ἐπιτηδείῃσι τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα. The pastimes of little boys in ancient

Greece were no doubt often faulty in the ways referred to by Aristotle. He has hitherto been concerned almost, if not quite, exclusively with the training of the body, which precedes that of the *δρεξις* (c. 15. 1334 b 25 sqq.), but now he begins to provide for the training of the *δρεξις*, and here, as in 1336 b 2 sqq., he seeks to exclude *ἀνελυθρία*. Cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 14. 1128 a 19 sqq. *Μῆτε ἐπιπόνους*, because toilsome games will check the growth of the body (cp. 25). *Μῆτε ἀναιμίας*, Vict. 'neque remissas nimis atque enervatas': for the contrast of *ἐπιπόνους* and *ἀναιμίας*, cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 33 sqq.

30. καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just said by implication that the nature of the games which children over three should play is a matter to be attended to by those in authority, and now he adds the remark, 'Yes, and with regard to tales true and fictitious also,' etc. He here has before him Plato, Rep. 376 E, *λόγων δὲ διττὸν εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ψεύδος δ' ἕτερον; καὶ Παιδευτίον δ' ἐν ἀμφοτέροις, πρότερον δ' ἐν τοῖς ψευδίσιν; Οὐ μαθήσει, ἴφη, πῶς λέγει. Οὐ μαθήσεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὔτε πρῶτον τοῖς παιδίοις μύθους λέγομεν; τοῦτο δὲ πον, ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν, ψεύδος, ἴτι δὲ καὶ ἀληθῆ: cp. Phaedo 61 B, where Stallbaum remarks, 'tenendum est λόγων esse vocabulum generis atque significare quamcunque orationem et narrationem, sive veram sive fictam; sed interdum, ubi opponitur μῦθος, de narratione vera usurpari solet.' *Λόγος* is thus used in opposition to *μῦθος* in Laws 872 D, Gorg. 523 A, Protag. 320 C, Tim. 26 E. It is probable therefore that *περὶ λόγων καὶ μύθων* in the passage before us means 'with regard to tales true and fictitious' (Sus. 'Erzählungen und Märchen'), though it should be noted that Vahlen (Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik, 1. 34) does not take this view and regards *λόγοι* and *μῦθοι* here as synonymous, no less than in Poet. 5. 1449 b 8, where he interprets '*λόγους* id est *μῦθους*.' Aristotle is as careful as Plato (Rep. 377 B sq., 381 E) not to leave it to the uncontrolled discretion of mothers and nurses what tales are told to children, but his object seems to be to exclude tales which do not prepare the way for the pursuits of after-life—tales simply frivolous and amusing, for instance, or unsuitable to future soldiers and citizens—rather than tales giving a false impression of the gods, which were those specially objected to by Plato. Does Aristotle intend any kind of religious instruction to be conveyed through these *λόγοι καὶ μῦθοι*? If not, he does not seem to provide for any religious element in the education of youth.*

32. πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, 'all the things we have mentioned,' *παιδιαί, λόγοι, μῦθοι*.

33. διὰ τὰς παιδικὰς κ.τ.λ. This is based on Plato, Laws 643 B, a passage which is probably present to Aristotle's mind in Poet. 4. 1448 b 5, τό τε γὰρ μιμῆσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο διαφέρουσί τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας : cp. also Rep. 395 C. The Cretan lawgiver had already studied this (Ephor. Fragm. 64 : Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 250, ὅσπερ δὲ καὶ συντάξαντα τὴν κληθεῖσαν ἐκ' αὐτοῦ πυρρίχην, ὥστε μὴδὲ τὴν παιδικὴν ἁμοιβὴν εἶναι τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον χρησίμων), and a saying was ascribed to Anacharsis, παῖσιν δέ, ὅπως σπουδάσῃ (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. i. 233 : cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 33). Achilles as a child of six years had according to Pindar (Nem. 3. 43 sqq.) 'made mighty deeds his play.' The Tencteri learnt in the sports of childhood to become the formidable cavalry they proved themselves (Tac. Germ. c. 32). See also vol. i. p. 350, note 3, and cp. Plut. Sympos. 2. 5. 2 *in il.* Aristotle wishes the pastimes even of infancy to be a preparation for the life of the soldier and the citizen. Many of the games played by Greek children were 'games of imitation': on this class of games see Becq de Fouquières, Jeux des Anciens, p. 63 sqq., where the games of 'the King,' 'the Judge,' and 'the Architect' are described. Children's mimicries of riding, driving, building, and nursing are familiar enough to ourselves. The ways of Themistocles and of Cato of Utica as children in the matter of games may be studied in Plut. Themist. c. 2 and Cato c. 1. The late Rev. C. Kingsley is said to have preached to an audience of chairs at four years old. 'Even the games to which the little Chinese are addicted are always impregnated with the mercantile spirit; they amuse themselves with keeping shop and opening little pawnbroking establishments, and familiarize themselves with the jargon, the tricks, and the frauds of tradesmen' (Huc's Chinese Empire, Eng. Trans., 2. 149). These are exactly the sort of games which Aristotle would wish his infant citizen *not* to play.

34. τὰς δὲ διατάσεις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here passes naturally enough from *παιδιαί*, one means of producing movement, to *διατάσεις καὶ κλανθοί*, another and a more involuntary means of doing so. He had said in 25 that *ἀναγκαῖοι πόνοι* must be avoided in the years from two or three to five because they interfere with the growth of the body, and now he tells us that the *διατάσεις καὶ*

κλαυθμοί which he declines to follow others in checking are not open to this objection, for they contribute to the growth of the body. Thus they are in place at this age, while the ἀναγκαῖοι πόνοι are not. Plato is referred to in the words of καλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις: cp. Laws 791 E sqq., where he follows a Spartan tradition, for the nurses at Sparta sought to check fretfulness and crying in infants (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16). Plato is apparently speaking of new-born babes (791 D), and this might tempt us to transpose (with Sus. and Welldon) τὰς δὲ διατάσεις, 34—διατενομένους, 39, to after 20, τὴν τῶν ψυχρῶν ἀσκησιν, so as to group 34—39 with the part of the chapter which deals with infants (though even there the paragraph would not be in place, for it ought to follow the discussion of κήσεις and to come after either συμφέρει, 10, or ἀστραβίς, 12), but the transition from παιδιαὶ to διατάσεις is natural and easy, and, as I have pointed out, there is an evident reference in 34—39 to 25, ὅτε πρὸς ἀναγκαῖους πόνους, ὅπως μὴ τὴν αἰξίαν ἐμποδίσωσιν. I am therefore against any transposition. For the thought, cp. Plut. Sympos. 6. 1. 1, αὐτὸς τε ἑαστον αὐτοῦ γυμνάσια καὶ κραυγαὶ καὶ ὅσα τῇ κινεῖν αἰξὶ τὸ θερμόν, ἥδιον φαγεῖν ποιεῖ καὶ προθυμότερον. The word used by Plato in Laws 792 A is κλαυθμοναί, not κλαυθμοί: κλαυθμός is a poetic word, 'rare in Attic Prose' (Liddell and Scott).

37. γίνεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for they come to be in a way exercise for the body [and exercise makes the body grow]': cp. Probl. 21. 14. 928 b 28, αἱ μὲν οὖν ἔξω γυμναζόμεναι αἰξίονται καὶ ἐπιδιδάσκουσιν. Γίνεται is in the sing. by attraction to γυμνασία: cp. Thuc. 8. 9. 3, αἶψα δ' ἐγένετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν νεῶν αἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν Σίων οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ πρᾶσσόμενα, αἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ξυνιδότες τό τε πλῆθος οὐ βουλόμεναι πο πολέμιον ἔχειν κ.τ.λ.

ἡ γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις κ.τ.λ., 'for it is the holding of the breath [which accompanies exertion] that produces strength in those who labour [and therefore serves the same end as exercise], and this' (i. e. the holding of the breath) 'happens to children also when they exert themselves in crying [no less than to men taking exercise].' With Bonitz (Ind. 190 a 31) I take δ to refer to ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις only, and not to the whole of the preceding sentence. For the use of διατείνεσθαι here of straining which involves the holding of the breath, Bonitz compares Probl. 19. 15. 918 b 14, ἡ ὅτι αἱ μὲν νόμοι ἀγνωστῶν ἦσαν, ἐν ᾗ δὲ μμεῖσθαι δυναμένων καὶ διατείνεσθαι ἡ φθὴ ἐγένετο μακρὰ καὶ πολυειδής; Cp. also Plut. Timol. c. 27, where διατενόμενος is used of one who shouts ὑπερφωνῇ φωνῇ

καὶ μείζονι τῆς συνήθους. As to the effect of holding the breath in increasing strength, cp. De Somno 2. 456 a 16, *λοχύν δὲ ποιεῖ ἢ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις* (compared by Bonitz, Ind. 606 a 45), De Gen. An. 2. 4. 737 b 35 sqq., and 4. 6. 775 a 37 sqq. *τὴν λοχύν*, not simply *λοχύν*, cp. Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 25, *ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐκάστοις τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκείον*, and De Part. An. 2. 7. 653 a 10, *ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸν ὕπνον τοῖς ζῷοις τοῦτο τὸ μῦρον τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἐγκέφαλον*.

40. *τὴν τούτων διαγωγὴν*, 'the way in which these children pass their time.' *Διαγωγὴ* is here used in a wider sense than the special one in which (in 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 29) it is denied to children.

τὴν ἑ' ἄλλην, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι ἤκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται. The sentence looks as if it was intended to run *τὴν ἑ' ἄλλην καὶ τὴν μετὰ δούλων* and was only finished as it stands by an afterthought. For the thought, compare the saying of Isocrates ([Plut.,] Decem Oratorum Vitae, 838 A), *πρὸς δὲ τὸν εἰπόντα πατέρα, ὥς οἰδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ ἀνδράποδον συνέπιμψε τῇ παιδίῳ*. *Τοιγαροῦν (ἴφη) ἀπιδὲ δύο γὰρ ἀν' ἑνὸς ἔξεις ἀνδράποδα*, and Antiphanes, *Μισοπύνηρος* (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 85). At Sparta *παιδαγωγοί* were dispensed with (see Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 16, and vol. i. p. 351, note 2). But Aristotle is speaking here of an earlier age than that at which boys were commonly provided with *παιδαγωγοί*—they would hardly have *παιδαγωγοί* till they went to school at seven—and he must be thinking rather of slave-nurses and of the slaves, male and female, about the house with whom the child was likely to come in contact. At Rome in its early days, according to Tac. Dial. de Orat. c. 28, '*suus cuique filius, ex casta parente natus, non in cella emptae nutricis sed gremio ac sinu matris educabatur*.' The mother of Leopardi kept her children as much as possible out of the company of servants (see *Macmillan's Magazine*, vol. 56, p. 90). Aristotle is evidently afraid that children under seven may pick up *ἀνελυθερία* and *ἀσχρολογία* from the slaves about them, male and female. It must have taken imported slaves generally some little time to learn to speak Greek: even those employed as nurses and *παιδαγωγοί*, though they would commonly speak better Greek than most slaves, probably often spoke the language imperfectly (cp. Plato, Lysis 223 A): still they would speak it well enough to be occasionally guilty of *ἀσχρολογία*.

41. *ταύτην γὰρ τὴν ἡλικίαν*, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἐπὶ ἐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον οἴκει τὴν τροφήν ἔχειν. Sus. understands *τὴν* before *μέχρι* referring to Bon. Ind. 109 b 44 sqq., where among other passages Eth. Nic.

10. 2. 1174 a 10, *ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες αἰρεταὶ καθ' αὐτὰς (ἡδοναὶ) διαφέρουσιν τῷ εἶδει ἢ ἀφ' ὧν*, is quoted. See notes on 1330 b 10 and 1334 b 12 for other cases of the omission of the article. It was not till the age of seven that the Spartan boy was placed in an *ἀγλή* (Plut. Lycurg. c. 16), and this was the age at which the Athenian boy began to resort to a *γραμματιστής* and a *παιδοτρίβης* ([Plato,] Axioch. 366 D sq.), and the Persian boy to a riding-master (Alcib. 1. 121 E), though Herodotus (1. 136) makes Persian education begin at five. Plato, on the other hand, in the *Laws* (794) had brought children from three to six years old together for games at the village-temples.

2. *εὐλογον οὖν κ.τ.λ.* The meaning is that, as children under 1336 b. seven must be reared at home, where there are slaves and where illiberality of mind may easily be learnt, it is reasonable to expect that even at that early age they may acquire a taint of illiberality from what they see and hear. *Ἀνελευθερία* is used here in a wide and popular sense, not in the narrow and technical sense of *ἀνελευθερία περὶ χρήματα* in which it is discussed in *Eth. Nic.* 4. 1–3.

3. *ὧς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* *Μὲν οὖν* is taken up by *ἐὰν δέ*, 8, the sense being, 'we banish indecent language altogether from the State, but if we do not entirely succeed in accomplishing that, and any person should be found saying or doing anything that we prohibit, then' etc. For the intervening *μάλιστα μὲν οὖν*, 6, occurring by way of correction in the middle of a sentence, cp. *Rhet.* 2. 9. 1387 a 32, *καὶ τὸν ἦττω τῷ κρείττονι ἀμφισβητεῖν, μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ*. Bonitz remarks (*Ind.* 540 b 55) '*ὧς μὲν οὖν—μάλιστα μὲν οὖν—ἐὰν δέ* non debebat tentare Susemihl.' '*ὧς* goes with *ἐξορίζω*, as it probably also does in *Eth. Nic.* 10. 10. 1180 a 9, *τοὺς δ' ἀνάτους ὧς ἐξορίζω*. For the distance at which it stands from *ἐξορίζω* see note on 1255 a 21. For *ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι* ('more than anything else'), cp. 7 (5). 8. 1307 b 31. Aristotle passes on from *ἀνελευθερία* to *αἰσχρολογία*, because he regards *αἰσχρολογία* as a form of *ἀνελευθερία* (cp. 12, *ἀνδραποδίας χάριν*). In *ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν κ.τ.λ.* he probably has before him a saying of Democritus recorded in [Plut.] *De Liberis Educandis*, c. 14, *καὶ μέντοι καὶ τῆς αἰσχρολογίας ἀπακτίων τοὺς νιεῖς, λόγος γὰρ ἔργου σικὴ κατὰ Δημόκριτον*. Compare what we read of the Persians in *Hdt.* 1. 138, *ἅσα δέ σφι ποιεῖν οὐκ ἔξεισι, ταῦτα οὐδὲ λέγειν ἔξεισι*, and of Archytas in Aelian, *Var. Hist.* 14. 19. The sons of the *ἐμύτιμοι* of Cyrus in the *Cyropaedia* of Xenophon are described as brought up at his court *αἰσχρὸν μὲν μηδὲν μῆτε ὀρώμεναι μῆτε ἀκούμεναι* (Xen. *Cyrop.* 7. 5. 86). Some may ask why Aristotle

does not banish comedy, in which *αἰσχρολογία* was common, from the State. That he does not do so, we see from 1336 b 20. The reason is that those below a certain age will be forbidden to witness comedy, and that those above it will be protected from injury by the education they have received (1336 b 20 sqq.).

6. *μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 729 B.

9. As to *ἀπηγορευμένων*, see Liddell and Scott, and Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s.v. *ἀγορεύω*.

τὸν μὲν ἐλεύθερον μήπω δὲ κατακλίσεως ἡξιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις. As to the age at which the young freeman was allowed to recline, instead of sitting, at meals, cp. 21 sqq. The age intended may be twenty-one (cp. 1336 b 37 sqq.). It was probably at this age that the young Spartan became a member of one of the *φιδίτια* (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 66. 2). Sus.² (Note 966: Sus.⁴, 1. p. 558), however, regards the change as occurring in the seventeenth year, when the youths, as he believes (cp. 5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.), begin to have *syssitia* of their own, though he allows that, as they remain outside the general *syssitia* till twenty-one, *κατάκλισις* will not commence for them *there* till that age. *Κατάκλισις* is associated in 21 sq. with *μέθη*, and Plato in Laws 666 B will not allow any of his citizens to share in *μέθη* till forty, but it is not likely that Aristotle intended to be equally strict.

10. *ἀτιμίαις κολάζειν καὶ πληγαῖς.* Not with blows only, like a slave, but with indignities and blows combined—the former because the offender is a freeman (cp. Demosth. De Chersoneso, c. 51, *ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐλευθέρῳ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ μεγίστη ἀνάγκη ἢ ὑπὲρ τῶν γενομένων αἰσχύνῃ, καὶ μείζω ταύτης οὐκ οἶδ' ἔστιν ἂν εἶποι τις δοῦλῳ δὲ πληγαὶ καὶ ὁ τοῦ σώματος αἰσχυμός*, and c. Androt. c. 55), and the latter because he is under age (cp. Plato, Laws 700 C, *παισὶ δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγαῖς καὶ τῷ πλείστῳ ὀχλῷ, ῥάβδου κοσμοῦσης, ἢ νοθεύουσιν ἐγγενεῖ*). We read in Laws 721 B of offenders who are to be mulcted *χρήμασί τε καὶ ἀτιμίᾳ*. Freeman of full age, on the other hand, were to be punished *ἀτιμίαις ἀνελευθέρους*, i.e. with indignities usually inflicted not on freemen but on slaves. There were *ἀτιμίαι* not *ἀνελεύθεροι*, such as the withdrawal of political rights. In Laws 946 C we read of *βάσανοι ἐλεύθεροι*. Charondas had made use of humiliating punishments (Diod. 12. 16. 1). See on the subject Prof. Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, ed. 1, p. 116.

14. *ἢ λόγους ἀσχημονας*, 'or indecent speeches from the stage.'

Iambi and comedy are evidently referred to (cp. 20 sqq.). Prof. W. Christ (Gesch. der griech. Litteratur, p. 167. 4) takes λόγοι here to mean 'dialogue,' comparing the expression λόγοι Σωκρατικοί for Socratic Dialogues (see also Bon. Ind. 433 b 3 sqq.), but Aristotle must have objected to indecent monologue as much as to indecent dialogue. In speaking of the class of mimes called παίγνια, Plutarch (Sympos. 7. 8. 4) remarks, οἱ δὲ πολλοί (i.e. most of those who introduce παίγνια at banquets), καὶ γυναικῶν συγκατακειμένων καὶ παίδων ἀνέβων, ἐπιδείκνυνται μιμήματα πραγμάτων καὶ λόγων ἃ πάσης μέθης παραχέωδιστον τὰς ψυχὰς διατίθῃσι.

ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Οὖν here contains an inference, as in c. 16. 1335 b 8 and in i. 1. 1252 a 7.

τοῖς ἀρχουσι, not the paedonomi probably, but rather the astynomi and agronomi (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 18 sqq.).

15. μηδὲν μῆτε ἀγαλμα κ.τ.λ., 'that there is no image or picture representing indecent scenes' (Welldon).

τοιούτων, i.e. δαρχημόνων. Pictures and statues representing indecent acts or scenes must evidently have been visible in Greek cities, especially, it would seem, in connexion with the gods in whose worship τωθασμός was used. It is not probably to the familiar Hermae that Aristotle objects, but rather to pictures and statues representing such subjects as the drunkenness of Dionysus: as to these cp. Athen. Deipn. 428 c, οὐ καλῶς δὲ οἱ πλάττοντες καὶ γράφοντες τὸν Διόνυσον, ὅτι δὲ οἱ ἄγοντες ἐπὶ τῆς ἀμέλει δια μέσης τῆς ἀγορᾶς οἰνωμένοι ἐπιδείκνυνται γὰρ τοῖς θεαταῖς ὅτι καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ κρείττω ἐστὶν ὁ οἶνος καίτοι γ' οὐδ' ἄν, ὁμαι, ἄνθρωπος σπουδαῖος τοῦδ' ὑπομείνειεν. Others perhaps represented the amours of Zeus.

16. εἰ μὴ παρὰ τι τοῖς θεοῖς κ.τ.λ. As to this 'consecrated scurrility,' see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 4. 108, note (Part 2, c. 29): C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 29. 3 (who refers to Paus. 7. 27. 10), 2. § 56. 14, and 2. § 57. 20: Toepffler, Attische Genealogie, p. 93 foot. Compare also Athen. Deipn. 622 a—d, and the unfavourable view expressed by Xenocrates, the contemporary head of the Academy, of the gods in whose worship τωθασμός was resorted to (Plut. De Iside et Osiride, c. 26, ὁ δὲ Ξενοκράτης καὶ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὰς ἀποφράδας καὶ τῶν ἑορτῶν ὅσαι πληγὰς τινὰς ἢ κοπετοὺς ἢ ἡσοτείας ἢ δυσφημίας ἢ αἰσχρολογίαν ἔχουσιν, οὔτε θεῶν τιμαῖς οὔτε δαιμόνων οἰεται προσήκειν χρηστῶν, ἀλλὰ εἶναι φύσεις ἐν τῇ περιέχοντι μεγάλαι μὲν καὶ ἰσχυράς, δυστρέπους δὲ καὶ σκυθρωπές, αἱ χαίρουσι τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ τυγχάνουσαι πρὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλο χεῖρον τρέπονται: cp. Plut. De Defect.

Orac. c. 14. 417 C). Among the gods to whom Aristotle here refers are Dionysus, Demeter, and Corê (C. F. Hermann *ibid.*). But other gods also were thus worshipped, for instance Apollo Aeglêtês in Anaphê (Conon, ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 186. p. 141 b 27 sqq. Bekk., ἐν Ἀνίφῃ τῇ νήσῳ . . . ἱερὸν Ἀπολλωνος ἀγλήτου ἱδρυται, ἐν ᾧ σὺν τωθασμῷ οἱ ἐπιχώριοι θύουσι δὲ αἰτίαν τοιαύτην κ.τ.λ.). Here the *τωθασμός* was addressed by the worshippers to each other in commemoration of the jests exchanged between Medea and her attendant women on the one side and the Argonauts on the other, when the Argo was driven by a tempest to Anaphê. Καὶ τὸν τωθασμὸν, 'scurrilous jeering also,' as well as indecent statues and pictures. Ὁ νόμος, probably an unwritten law, like that referred to in c. 12. 1331 a 26 sqq.

17. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις κ.τ.λ., 'and in addition to this the law allows them to do honour to the gods on behalf both of themselves and of their wives and children.' Cp. Cato, *De Re Rustica*, c. 143, *rem divinam (villica) ne faciat, neve mandet qui pro ea faciat, iniussu domini aut dominae. Scito dominum pro tota familia rem divinam facere.* A saying of Pythagoras recorded in Diod. 10. 9. 7 is in a somewhat similar spirit, οἱ δὲ αὐτὸς (i.e. Πυθαγόρας) ἀπεφαίνετο τοῖς θεοῖς εὐχεσθαι δὲ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τοῖς φρονίμοις ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφρόνων τοῖς γὰρ ἀσυνέτοις ἀγορεύει τί ποτὲ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθόν. In Laws 909 D Plato goes farther and confines sacrificing, as distinguished from prayer, to priests and priestesses, οἷς ἀγνεία τούτων ἐπιμελής. Τιμαλφεῖν (a poetical word, 'rare in Prose,' see Liddell and Scott) refers probably especially to sacrifices. For καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν, see critical note on 1330 b 31.

20. τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle goes on to protect the young against λόγους ἀσχήμονας (cp. 14). As to iambi, see Stallbaum's note on Plato, Laws 935 E, ποιητῇ δὴ κωμῳδίας ἢ τυοῖς ἰάμβων κ.τ.λ. Iambi are iambic verses, often abusive and indecent (cp. 35, ἢ μοχθηρίαν ἢ δυσμίμειαν), declaimed by actors at festivals of Dionysus in which the phallus was introduced (Poet. 4. 1449 a 9-13). It was from iambi of this kind that comedy took its rise (Poet. 4. 1448 b 24-1449 a 15, and esp. 24 sqq. and 1449 a 2 sqq.). Iambi, however, did not pass away on the rise of comedy; we hear, in fact, that they were particularly popular at Syracuse (Athen. Deipn. 181 c). Iambi and comedy had this in common that they dealt in ψόγος (cp. Hor. Carm. 1. 16. 2, *criminosis iambis*), hence they are often named together, e.g. in Plato, Laws 935 E.

Whether Aristotle includes under iambi mimes written in iambic verse, like those of Herondas, it is difficult to say. As to comedy, compare Plato's views in *Laws* 816 D sqq. The satyr-play which was added at the close of a tragic trilogy often contained indecent passages, but it does not seem to have been open to as much objection as comedy (Blümner, *Home Life of the Ancient Greeks*, Eng. Trans., p. 447), and it probably savoured less of ψόγος and δυσμίμια. It appears to be certain that boys were present at representations both of tragedy and of comedy at Athens (A. Müller, *Die griech. Bühnenalt.* p. 292. 1). The bigger boys were very fond of comedy and older lads of tragedy (Plato, *Laws* 658 D). As to νομοθετήριον see critical note. If it is the correct reading, οὐδ' ἰάμβων οὐτε κωμῳδίας θεατὰς νομοθετήριον must apparently mean 'we must not legislate that the young shall be [admissible as] spectators of either iambi or comedy.'

21. πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν κ.τ.λ. See above on 9. For πρὶν ἢ with the aor. subj. without ἄν, cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 19 sqq. and other passages collected by Bonitz, *Ind.* 633 a 2 sqq. Kaissling (*Tempora und Modi in des Aristoteles Politica und in der Atheniensium Politia*, p. 54) points out that πρὶν ἢ with the aorist subjunctive is not here preceded by οὐ πρότερον, as it is in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 19 sqq. and 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 17 sqq.

22. τῶν τοιούτων, i. e. iambi and comedy.

24. The *Index Aristotelicus* (608 b 30) gives no other instance of ποιῆσθαι τὸν λόγον followed by a genitive (we expect περὶ τούτων, but compare for the absence of περὶ c. 10. 1330 a 22, 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 33 sq., and 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 36, αἱ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενόν εἰσι τῶν κοινῶν), nor does it give any other instance of παραδρομή or ἐν παραδρομῇ (245 b 36). Ἐν παραδρομῇ seems to be a rare expression.

25. εἴτε μὴ δεῖ κ.τ.λ., sc. νομοθετεῖν τοὺς νεωτέρους εἶναι θεατὰς ἰάμβων καὶ κωμῳδίας. Διαπορήσαντας here = διελθόντας τὰς ἀπορίας, like διαπορούντας in 3. 4. 1276 b 36 (Bon. *Ind.* 187 b 11). Πῶς δέ, sc. τοῦτο νομοθετεῖν, i. e. by what provisions of law the exclusion of the νεώτεροι will best be effected.

26. κατὰ δὲ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν κ.τ.λ., 'but in relation to the present occasion we have touched on it only in the way in which it was necessary to touch on it.' For the suppression of 'only,' see note on 1282 a 36. Compare also *Meteor.* 3. 4. 374 b 17, οὗν δ' ὅσον ἀνάγκη, τοσούτον περὶ αὐτῶν λέγωμεν, and for κατὰ τὸν παρόντα

καιρόν, Rhet. ad Alex. I. 1421 a 24, ταυτὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοῖς οὖτοις ὅμοια παραλείπειν νομίζω καλῶς ἡμῖν ἔχειν κατὰ τὸν ὑπάρχοντα καιρόν.

27. ἴσως γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for perhaps Theodorus, the actor of tragedy, said not ill that which has just been said.' Γάρ introduces an explanation why it is not necessary for Aristotle to say more; Theodorus, in fact, had by his remark done much to solve the problem and to indicate the true course. Camerarius, however, asks, not without reason (Interp. p. 332), 'Quod vero hoc dictum est? Factum enim magis exponitur histrionis. Nisi aliquis conjecturam de eo capere dicto posse videatur. Aut libeat suspicari ista esse mutila.' Coray's note is, 'ἔλεγε τὸ παραπλήσιον τούτῳ τῷ περὶ τῶν παιδῶν. τί δὲ ἔλεγε; τὸ οἰκτιροῦσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς ταῖς πρώταις ἀκοαῖς, ὥς φαίνονται ἐκ τῶν ἐξῆς.' If ἔλεγε is to be retained, the passage should probably be explained as Coray explains it, but, as Sus.³ says, 'ἔλεγε haud sine causa offendit Camerarium.' The only substitute for it which has occurred to me is ἔλω ('gave not ill a practical solution of the question which has just been mentioned'). For ὁ τῆς τραγῳδίας ὑποκριτής, which is added to distinguish this Theodorus from others of the same name, cp. Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 417, ὑποκριτής τραγ[ωδίας], Athen. Deipn. 407 d, Τιμοκλῆς ὁ τῆς κωμῳδίας ποιητής (ἦν δὲ καὶ τραγῳδίας), and Aelian, Var. Hist. 14. 40, Θεοδώρου τοῦ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποιητοῦ ὑποκρινομένου τὴν Ἀερόπην. As to Theodorus, see Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 523, and Sus.³, Note 968 (Sus.⁴, I. p. 558), and cp. Rhet. 3. 2. 1404 b 22 sqq., where the naturalness and charm of his voice are dwelt upon. He was one of the best tragic actors of the time immediately before that of Aristotle. How could Theodorus avoid being preceded by other actors on the stage, if he did not always take the part, perhaps an insignificant one, to which the first speech of the tragedy was assigned? Richards asks, 'Did he insist, when plays were competing, on being protagonist in the first, so that no other *protagonist* might win over the audience before him? Or does the statement about him refer to occasions when actors only (not plays or choruses) were competing, and when perhaps only scenes or single speeches were recited? See Haigh's Attic Theatre, p. 58.' Demosthenes acted in much the same way as Theodorus did, when he insisted on being heard by Philip of Macedon first of the Athenian envoys (Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 108, φάσκων γὰρ νεώτατος εἶναι πάντων τὴν τάξιν τοῦ πρώτος λέγειν οὐκ ἂν ἔφη παραλείπειν, οὐδ' ἐπιτρέψαι τῷ (αἰτιτούμενος εἰς ἐμέ) προκαταλαβόντα

φιλίππου ὅτα τοῖς ἄλλοις λόγον μὴ καταλείψιν). Cp. also (with Richards) Demosth. Prooem. 34. p. 1443, εἴγε δ' ὅσπερ τὰ θέατρα ἐν προκαταλαμβάνουσιν.

29. οὐδενὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Εἰσάγειν is commonly used of the poet or chorēgus bringing the chorus on the stage (as in Aristoph. Acharn. 1, εἰσαγ', ὁ Θίογγι, τὸν χορὸν), but here προεισάγειν is used with some freedom of the actors bringing on the stage the parts represented by them (W. Christ, Gesch. der griech. Litteratur, p. 171. 2).

30. ὥς οικειομένων κ.τ.λ., 'holding that the audience is made friendly to' (or 'won to the side of') 'what it hears first.' Liddell and Scott compare Thuc. 1. 36, ὁ μετὰ μεγίστων κειρῶν οικειοῦνται τε καὶ πολεμοῦνται. Οἰκειομένων is interpreted by στέργουμεν, 33.

31. συμβαίνει δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and this same thing happens both in relation to dealings with men, [which is what Theodorus had in view,] and in relation to dealings with things.' For πρῶτε, cp. 38, and 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 3. For τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐμυλίας, cp. Eurip. Iphoen. 1329 Bothe (1408 Dindorf), ἐμυλίᾳ χθονός.

33. πάντα γὰρ στέργουμεν τὰ πρῶτα μᾶλλον, 'for whatever we first have to do with, we like better than anything else,' so that if iambic and comedy are witnessed in youth, they will be among the things liked best. Aristotle has before him Plato, Rep. 378 D, ὁ γὰρ νόος ἕχ' οἷός τε κρίνειν ὃ τί τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μή, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν τηλικούτοις ἂν λάβῃ τὰς δόξαις, δυστέκμηνα τε καὶ ἀμετάστατα φιλεῖ γίνεσθαι. ἂν δὲ ἴσως καὶ περὶ παντὸς ποιητῶν ὃ πρῶτα ἀκούουσιν ὃ τι καλλίστα μεμβολογημένα ῥοι ἀρετῇ ἀκούειν. Compare Hor. Epist. 1. 2. 69 and familiar sayings like 'on revient toujours à ses premiers amours' and 'the child is father of the man.' 'The Jesuits used to say, "Give me a child till he is seven years old, and I will make him what no one will unmake"' (Miss E. Welldon in the *Cheltenham Ladies' College Magazine*, No. 18, p. 179). We may also explain in this way the tendency of men, as they grow old, to become 'laudatores temporis acti.' On the other hand, there is truth in Hom. Odys. 1. 351,

τὴν γὰρ δοιδὴν μᾶλλον ἐπιλείουσ' ἄνθρωποι,
ἵητις ἀκούοντεςσι νεωτέρῃ ἀμφιπέληται.

34. δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Ποιεῖν ξένα, 'to make strange and unknown,' in opposition to οικειομένων, 30. Pythagoras (ap. Aristox. Fragm. 20: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 279) shows a similar desire to keep the young from all knowledge of evil. It was in a somewhat different sense that Antisthenes said (Diog. Laert. 6. 12), τὰ πομπὰ πάντα κόμει ξενικά.

34. μάλιστα δ' αὐτῶν ὅσα ἔχει ἡ μοχθηρία ἢ δυσμένεια. As αὐτῶν = τῶν φαύλων, it is clear that in Aristotle's view a thing might be φαῦλον without possessing μοχθηρία. Cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1148 b 2, μοχθηρία μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἰρετῶν ἕκαστον ἐστὶ δι' αὐτὸ φαῦλαι δὲ καὶ φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν αἱ ὑπερβολαί. We see from Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 a 34, διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ διαφθείδυσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς, what a strong term μοχθηρία is. Aristotle probably regards iambi and comedy as not free from elements of depravity and malignity. Δυσμένειαν, the reading of Π Bekk. (as to the rendering of Vet. Int. see critical note on 1336 b 35), seems to be perfectly right, though Sus. would read δυσγένειαν in place of it. Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Laws 934 D-936 A, where iambi and comedy are connected with ἔχθρα, βλασφημία, and κατηγορία, and Phileb. 48 A-50 A, where envy is implied to be an ingredient in comedy, for envy is nearly related to δυσμία, the words φθόνος and δυσμία being conjoined in Plato, Rep. 500 C, Phaedr. 253 B, and Protag. 316 D. Compare also Rep. 395 E, κατηγοροῦντάς τε καὶ κομμοδοῦντας ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀσχρολογοῦντας, and Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 22, ὀργὴ δὲ χάριτος καὶ χάρις εὐμενίας καὶ τοῦ φιλανθρώπου καὶ φιλέφρονος τὸ δυσμενὲς καὶ παρακτικὸν ἀπωτάτω τῇ φύσει τέτακται· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ δυνάμειος, τὰ δ' ἀσθενείας ἐστὶ καὶ φαυλότητος. Plato does his best in the Laws (792 B, D, E) to secure that the child shall be εὐθυμοε, ὁλοε, and εὐμενῆς, and it is in the same mood (Rep. 496 E) that he wishes men to close their life. This is the mood of the Olympian Gods (see above on 1332 a 9), and according to Plutarch (Pericl. c. 39) it was the εὐμενὲς ἦθος of Pericles that justified the application to him of the epithet 'Olympian.'

35. διελθόντων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Θεωροῦς means 'spectators,' not 'auditores,' as Sus.³ explains the word in this passage (Ind. s.v.). Aristotle gets the hint of what he here suggests from Plato, Rep. 466 E, ὅτι κομῇ στρατεύουσιν, καὶ πρὸς γε ἄξουνσι τῶν παίδων εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἔσσι ἄνθρωποι, ὧς ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν θεῶνται ταῦτα, ἀτελεωθέντας δέησει δημιουργεῖν . . . ἢ οἶκα ἥσθησαι τὰ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, οἷον τοὺς τῶν κεραμείων παῖδας, ὥς πολὺν χρόνον διακονοῦντες θεωροῦσι, πρὶν ἀπτεσθαι τοῦ κεραμεύειν; Plato, however, is speaking here of older boys than those whom Aristotle has in view, and war would of course not be one of the μαθήσεις to which Aristotle refers. These μαθήσεις include probably gymnastic and music, especially the former. Plato in the Laws (794 C) had sent boys of six to

teachers of riding and of the use of the bow, the javelin, and the sling; Aristotle sends boys at seven to the gymnastic trainer and the *μαθητὴς* (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 6 sqq.); of riding he says nothing.

37. *ἔκτο δ' αὖτε φιλίας κ.τ.λ.* At this point we pass from *μαθή*, or rearing, to *μαθεῖα*, or education strictly so called, which is evidently conceived as beginning at seven years of age. We shall find in the sequel that, in accordance with the announcement made here, puberty forms a turning-point in the educational course, for till puberty no studies find a place in it but gymnastic, and that of the less laborious type (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 40), whereas after puberty other studies are to be taken in hand for three years, and then the severe kind of gymnastic is to be commenced (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.). That the age of twenty-one, like puberty, marks a crisis in the physiological development of the human being, we see from *Hist. An.* 7. 1. 582 a 16—33. The meaning of *παύ* in 38, 39, is by no means clear, yet the commentators say nothing about it. Is Aristotle's meaning this, that a break is to occur in the education at two epochs—at the close of the period from seven years of age to puberty and at the close of the period from puberty to twenty-one, or in other words at puberty and at twenty-one? If this is so, it is manifest that Aristotle did not intend his education to cease at twenty-one, a conclusion to which other considerations also point (see vol. i. p. 370 and p. 358, note 2, and note on 1333 b 3). He apparently devotes the years intervening between three years after puberty and twenty-one to the severer kind of gymnastic training (5 (8). 4. 1339 a 4 sqq.). At Athens things were arranged quite differently. Young Athenians were enrolled in the *λειτουργικὴν γραμματεῖαν* and became citizens on the completion of the eighteenth year (*Ad. Hel.* c. 42: the seventeenth according to Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., pp. 197, 310, but see Mr. R. W. Macan in *Class. Rev.* 10. 199 sq.), though they spent the two following years in military training, garrison-duty, and field-service as *παύροις*, and therefore did not discharge any strictly political functions till two years later. Aristotle does not arrange for the performance of any military service before the age of twenty-one. For *πρὸς δε*, 'in relation to which,' cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 11, *δεῖναι μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τούτων τὸν τρόπον*. In 4 (7). 12. 1331 a 37, on the other hand, we have *πρέπει γὰρ δεῖναι κατὰ τὰς φιλικὰς καὶ τούτων τὸν λόγον*, and in 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 20, *ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὁμορμία τοῖς φιλικαῖς*.

40. οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἑβδομάσι κ.τ.λ. See above on 1335 b 33.
- 1337 a. 1. δεῖ δὲ τῇ διαίρσει τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν. Cp. De Caelo I. 1. 268 a 19, ταῦτα δ', ὥσπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν οὕτως ἐπάγειν ἀκολουθεῖν, and Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 36. The phrase ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ φύσει occurs in Plato, Laws 836 C. Plato in the Laws (809 E sq.) had arranged his curriculum of study without reference to puberty by periods of three years from ten to sixteen. Aristotle follows the Lacedaemonian practice: cp. Phot. συνέφησος (quoted by Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 63), Σπαρτιᾶται δὲ σιδεύουσιν (sc. τοὺς ἐφήβους καλοῦσι) δίκρινον δὲ αὐτοὺς ἄρα (ἄμα?) τῇ ἡβῃ, τουτίστιν περὶ πεντεκαίδεκα καὶ ἑκαταίδεκα ἔτη γεγονότας, τῶν νεωτέρων παιδων, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἤσκηον ἀνδρουσθαι.

πᾶσα γὰρ τέχνη καὶ παιδεία κ.τ.λ. As art and education seek to complete nature, they should follow nature as far as she goes. Art seeks to complete nature because she takes the raw material furnished by nature—wool, or bricks, or human beings—and by completing what is deficient produces a garment, or a house, or a State: see Prof. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 118 sq., and compare (with Eaton) Phys. 2. 8. 199 a 15, ὅσῃ τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἢ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάζεσθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμνῆσθαι, and (with Congreve) Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1097 a 5 sq. The same thing is true of education, for education starts with that which is furnished by nature (c. 13. 1332 a 40 sqq.: 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 27 sq.), and completes it. Τέχνη and παιδεία go together here, as τέχνη and μάθησις in 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 9, where see note. For πᾶσα παιδεία, 'every kind of education,' compare the use of παιδεία in the plural in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 7 sq., Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 a 26 sq., and Thuc. 2. 39. 2. The word προσλείπειν appears to be a rare one: Liddell and Scott compare C. I. G. 3935, τὰ προσλείψαντα τοῦ ἔργου.

3. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has now reached the subject—that of education—to reach which he has been hastening forward so fast, postponing the full consideration of not a few questions, and he here resumes the use of the aporetic method, which he had laid aside since the commencement of the Fourth Book (vol. i. p. 352). The first two of the questions here raised are easily answered, the first in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 11–21, and the second in 1337 a 21–33, but the third question requires far fuller treatment; the consideration of it is not completed in what we possess of the Fifth Book.

4. κοινῇ . . . ἢ κατ' ἴδιον τρόπον, 'on a public footing or individually' (cp. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 24 sqq.). Aristotle has already said in *Eth. Nic.* 10. 10. 1180 a 29, *κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινῇ ἐπιμέλειαν* (sc. *τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων*) *καὶ ὀρθῇ*. For *ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν αὐτῶν*, cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12 sq. and 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 21 sq.

6. καὶ νῦν, 'even now' (cp. c. 16. 1335 b 5). Even in Aristotle's day not many Greek States made the superintendence of education the concern of the State.

7. ποῶν τιὰ δαὶ ταύτην, sc. *τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι*. This is explained by 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 34, *τίς ὁ ἐστὶν ἡ παιδεία, καὶ πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, δαὶ μὴ λανθάνειν*.

BOOK V (VIII).

11. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Two reasons are given for this conclusion—(1) attention to the education of youth is demanded in the ^{C. 1.} interest of the constitution (12–18), and (2) it is demanded because ^{1387 a.} some training is required before men can act virtuously (18–21).

12. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12–36 and 1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq.

14. δαὶ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκδοτὴν παιδεύεσθαι. See critical note.

τὸ γὰρ ἥθος κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle probably has before him Plato, *Rep.* 544 D, *οἷός οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων εὖ καὶ ἄνευ νόμων εἶναι ὅσπερ καὶ πολιτείαν; ἢ οἷα ἐκ δρυὸς ποθεῖν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἡθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἀλλ' ὅσπερ ῥέψαντα τὰλλα ἐφελκύσθαι*; Aristotle insists in 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq. that the safety of constitutions is not secured by the mere making of laws, however excellent they may be; it is necessary to produce in the citizens the type of character which is favourable to the maintenance of the particular constitution. We read in *Rhet.* 1. 8. 1366 a 12 of *τὰ ἥθη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκδοτῆς*: cp. also *Pol.* 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 39. As to the *δημοκρατικὸν ἥθος* see *Demosth. Ol.* 3. 25 sq., where it is implied that one feature of it is a willingness on the part of the leading men of the State to be content with a mode of life not more splendid than that of their neighbours and a desire that not private buildings, but public should be magnificent. Aristotle, however, would probably find the *δημοκρατικόν* and *ἐλιγάρχειον ἥθος* in the kind of character which makes

in favour of the existence and continuance of a democracy and an oligarchy: cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 2 sqq. and see note on 1310 a 12.

17. δὲ δὲ κ.τ.λ., so that not only does the presence in the citizens of the type of character appropriate to a constitution generate that constitution, but a superior quality in the type generates a superior quality of constitution. For the form of the sentence cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 25 sq. and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 28 sq. For βέλτιστον see critical note on 1337 a 18.

18. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Euripides had placed a different sentiment in the mouth of one of the characters of his Augē: cp. Diog. Laert. 2. 33, Εὐριπίδου δ' ἐν τῇ Αἰδῇ εἰπόμενος περὶ ἀρετῆς,

κράτιστον εἰκὴ ταύτ' εἶναι ἀρεμῆνα,

ἀναστὰς ἐξῆλθε (Ζευκράτης), φήσας γελοῖον εἶναι ἀνδράποδον μὲν μὴ εὐρισκόμενον δέξιν ζῆναι, ἀρετὴν δ' οὕτω εἶναι ἀκαλλέναι. See also Plut. Virtutem doceri posse, c. 3. Not only is it necessary in the interest of the constitution that training likely to produce the required *ἕδος* should be given in youth, but training in youth is also necessary with a view to the practice of virtue. For previous training is desirable with a view to the practice of all *δυνάμεις καὶ τέχναι*, and virtue is a *δύναμις* (Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 a 36 sqq.: contrast Eth. Nic. 2. 4. 1106 a 6 sqq.). Or the argument may be an *a fortiori* one. If previous training is necessary for the practice of an art, *a fortiori* it is necessary for action in accordance with virtue, for the successful practice of an art implies the fulfilment of fewer conditions than action in accordance with virtue (Eth. Nic. 2. 3. 1105 a 26 sqq.). For *δυνάμεις καὶ τέχναι* see note on 1268 b 36 and Bon. Ind. 207 b 4 sqq., where Metaph. Θ. 2. 1046 b 2, διὰ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ [καὶ] ἐπιστήμαι δυνάμεις εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαὶ εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλῃ ἢ ἄλλο, is quoted, and reference is made to Rhet. 1. 2. 1358 a 6 and other passages. For *προπαιδεύεσθαι καὶ προεθίζεσθαι*, cp. Pol. 3. 18. 1288 b 1, καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθῃ, and. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 16, εἰδισμένοι καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι. In 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10 sq., on the other hand, *παιδεία* seems to include τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι. For *πρὸς τὰς ἐκάστην ἐργασίαν*, 'with a view to the operations of each of them,' cp. Plato, Symp. 205 B, ὅστε καὶ αἱ ἐπὶ πάσαι ταῖς τέχναις ἐργασίαι ποιήσεις εἰσὶ, and Gorg. 450 C.

21. τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς πράξεις. Cp. c. 2. 1337 b 9, τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς.

ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle passes to the second question, whether education should be in the hands of the State or in those

of the private individual (i.e. the father, cp. 25, τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων). Two reasons are given why it should be in the hands of the State : (1) as the whole State (i.e. all the citizens) has one and the same end before it, the education given will be the same for all, hence its management should be in the hands of the State, and not in the hands of parents, as at present, training their children privately and in whatever subjects they please; (2) the individual should regard himself as part of the State, and the management of the part should be adjusted to the management of the whole [so that it should be in the hands which manage the whole, i.e. the hands of the State]. The first of these two arguments is hardly conclusive. The education given to all might be identical without being placed in the hands of the State. Against the second it may be urged that the welfare of the whole might be kept in view in the training of the part, even if education were not placed in the hands of the State. Compare with Aristotle's view that of Plutarch in Lycurg. et Num. inter se comp. c. 4. We learn from 2. 5. 1263 b 36 sq. that Aristotle looks to education to make the State one, and this is another reason why the State should take the charge of it into its own hands.

23. καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps has before him Plato, Laws 804 C-D and 810 A. Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq., and Plut. Camill. c. 10, κοινῇ γὰρ ἐχρῶντο τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ, ὥσπερ Ἕλληνες, οἱ Φαλέραιοι, βουλόμενοι συντρέφεσθαι καὶ συναγαλῆζεσθαι μετ' ἀλλήλων εὐδὲς ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῖς παιδῶν. Κατ' ἰδίαν recurs in Hist. An. 1. 11. 492 b 15 (Eucken, Beobachtungen über die Praepositionen, p. 45).

26. δεῖ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν κοινὴν ποιείσθαι καὶ τὴν ἀσκησιν. Cp. Plato, Laws 942 B sq. τῶν κοινῶν, education for instance. τὴν ἀσκησιν as well as the things themselves. Aristotle's language recalls the contention of the Lacedaemonians in Diod. 11. 55. 4, καὶ δεῖν ἴφασαν τῶν κοινῶν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀδικημάτων εἶναι τὴν κρίσιν οὐκ ἰδίᾳ παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ συνεδρίου τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

27. ἅμα δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and at the same time [so far from its being right to think that the individual citizen can justly claim to educate his children as he pleases], it is not even right to think that he belongs to himself; the true creed is that all the citizens belong to the State.' Aristotle inherits this view from others. Thus we read of the Spartans in Plut. Lycurg. c. 24, ὅλως νομίζοντες οὐχ αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ τῆς πατρίδος εἶναι διεύλουν, and in c. 25, τὸ δὲ ὅλον εἶδεν (δ' Αὑκείργου)

τοὺς πολίτας μὴ βούλεισθαι μηδὲ ἐπίστασθαι κατ' ἰδίαν (ἤν, ἀλλ' . . . διὸν εἶναι τῆς πατρίδος, and of the Athenians of the time of the Persian War in Demosth. De Cor. c. 205, ἡγίετο γὰρ αὐτῶν ἕκαστος οὐχὶ τῇ πατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ μόνον γεγενῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ πατρίδι. Much the same thing, indeed, is said by the Corinthian envoys in Thuc. i. 70. 6 of the Athenians at the outset of the Peloponnesian War. But what Aristotle has especially before him is the language of Plato in Laws 923 A, *ἔγωγ' οὐκ νομοθέτης ὢν οὐδ' ὑμᾶς ὑμῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι τίθημι οὐτε τὴν οὐσίαν ταύτην, ἔξμπαντος δὲ τοῦ γένους ὑμῶν τοῦ τε ἔμπροσθεν καὶ τοῦ ἔπειτα ἐσομένου, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τῆς πόλεως εἶναι τὸ τε γένος πᾶν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν.* Cp. Cic. De Fin. 2. 14. 45, ut ad Archytam scripsit Plato, non sibi se soli natum meminerit, sed patriae, sed suis, ut perexigua pars ipsi relinquatur, and De Offic. 1. 25. 85. To none of these authorities does it occur for a moment that the Greek citizen belonged to Hellas as well as to his own State. Isocrates may perhaps have remembered this (Jebb, Attic Orators 2. 44). Aristotle does not consider how far the citizen should carry his sense of belonging to his πόλις. Clearly he thinks that the citizen should subordinate his private preferences to those of his πόλις, but should he suppress conscientious convictions and sink his conscience in the will of the πόλις? Suppose the πόλις is under a tyranny or extreme oligarchy or extreme democracy? If the virtue of a citizen is relative to the preservation of the constitution (3. 4. 1276 b 27 sqq.), a good citizen must apparently do what tends to preserve the constitution, however bad the constitution may be, but what would Aristotle say that a good man ought to do in such a case? Subordinate his conscience to the maintenance of the constitution? If so, contrast the view of the Platonic Socrates in Plato, Gorg. 512 E sq.

29. μέρος γὰρ ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως, and that which is a part of the State belongs to the State: cp. 1. 4. 1254 a 9, τὸ τε γὰρ μέρος οὐ μόνον ἄλλον ἐστὶ μέρος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλος ἄλλος.

ἡ δ' ἐπιμέλεια κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1. 13. 1260 b 14, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου δεῖ βλέπειν ἀρετὴν. Aristotle has here before him Plato, Laws 903 B, *πείθωμεν τὸν νεανίαν τοῖς λόγοις, ὥς τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπιμελουμένην πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῦ ὅλου πάντ' ἐστὶ συντεταγμένα . . . ὡς ἐν καὶ τὸ σὸν, ὃ σφέτῳ, μέρος εἰς τὸ πᾶν συντείνεται βλέπον δέ, καίπερ πάνσμι κρον ὢν, and Charmides 156 E, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον εἶναι τοῦ διαφεύγειν τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι λατροῦς τὰ πολλὰ νοσήματα, ἔτι τὸ ὅλος ἄγνοοιεν, οὐ δέοι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιῆσθαι, οὐ μὴ καλῶς ἔχοντας ἀδύνατον*

εἰ τὸ μέρος εἶδεν: compare the teaching of Hippocrates referred to in Phaedrus 270 C, and see Stewart on Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 7.

81. καὶ τοῦτο, 'in this matter also,' i.e. for attending to the education of youth and making it a matter of State-concern: cp. c. 4. 1338 b 9 sqq. The Lacedaemonians were praised for many other things (6 (4). 1. 1288 b 40 sqq.). It will be noticed that nothing is here said of the Cretans, and that the compliment paid to the Lacedaemonians is not extended to them: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq. and contrast Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 10 sqq., where the Cretan lawgiver, no less than the Lacedaemonian, is said to seek to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws.

84. πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, 'how one should have them taught,' C. 2. cp. c. 3. 1338 a 38, and for πῶς c. 3. 1338 a 33, c. 4. 1338 b 38, *ὅτι μὲν οὖν χρηστὸν τῇ γυμναστικῇ, καὶ πῶς χρηστὸν, ἀμολογούμενον ἔστω*, and c. 6. 1340 b 20, *πότερον δὲ δεῖ μαθάνειν αὐτοὺς ἔδωκας τε καὶ χειροῦντας ἢ μὴ . . . νῦν λατύνειν*.

86. περὶ τῶν ἔργων, 'sc. τῆς παιδείας, i.e. de iis rebus quas doceri iuvenes oporteat, opp. πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι' (Bon. Ind. 186 a 33). For τῶν ἔργων in this sense cp. 1337 b 5 sqq. Π¹ Sus. read *διὰ τῶν ἔργων*, which Sus.² translates 'thatsächlich' (does this mean 'practically'?), but it is difficult to believe that *διὰ* is the true reading.

87. οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν ἀριστον. For the distinction, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 1. 1172 a 24, *πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ τὸν εὐδαιμονα βίον*, and Top. 3. 1. 116 b 23, *καὶ ὅπως τὸ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος αἰρετέτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο τι, οἷον τὸ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίᾳ σπουτεῖν ἢ τὸ πρὸς φρόνησιν*. The study of music, we learn in the sequel, is of value both with a view to virtue and with a view to τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγὴν, or in other words τὸν βίον τὸν ἀριστον, but the two ends are not to be confounded. Education in the 'best State' will naturally be adjusted to both, and hence the mention of them here. Aristotle points out that there was no agreement as to the training conducive to either. The Spartans, for instance, would say that gymnastic training was the road both to virtue (c. 3. 1337 b 26 sq.) and to the life of empire, which they regarded as the best life (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 20 sqq.), but others would think differently.

88. οὐδὲ φανερόν κ.τ.λ. As to this see vol. i. p. 354, note 2. For the distinction of διάνοια and τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕθος, Bonitz (Ind. 185 b 61) compares 3. 11. 1281 b 7, *οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὸ ἕθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν*: cp. also 1337 b 11, *ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν*, and Plato, Laws

798 A, καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διατάξεις τε ἅμα καὶ τὰς τῶν ψυχῶν φύσεις. For τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, cp. c. 5. 1340 a 11, b 11, De Part. An. 4. 11. 692 a 22, τὸ ἦθος τοῦ ζῴου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, and Plato, Lysis 222 A, ἡ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡ κατὰ τὴν ψυχῆς ἦθος ἡ τρόπος ἡ εἶδος, and Laws 793 E, ἐξέτει ἥθει ψυχῆς. Τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος is the disposition or character of the soul; the phrase is used not only by Plato, but also by Xenophon (Mem. 3. 10. 3), and there is nothing technical about it. Sus.¹ (Ind. s. v. ψυχῆ) explains it as synonymous with τὸ δρεκτικόν, but does it not rather mean the diathesis of τὸ δρεκτικόν?

89. Ἐκ τε τῆς ἐμποδῶν παιδείας κ.τ.λ., 'and if we take as the starting-point of our inquiry the education with which we are daily in contact, the inquiry proves perplexing.' For ἐκ, cp. De Part. An. 1. 5. 644 b 25, καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ὧν ὧν τις σκέψαστο περὶ αὐτῶν . . . παταλῶς ἐστὶν ὁλίστα, and for ἐμποδῶν, cp. De Gen. et Corr. 1. 6. 323 a 26, καὶ γὰρ κινεῖ κινούμενα πάντα σχεδὸν τὰ ἐμποδῶν (referred to by Bonitz, Ind. 243 a 61, who explains τὰ ἐμποδῶν as=τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν). Light is thrown on Aristotle's meaning by 1337 b 21 sqq. Actual education had four branches—reading and writing, gymnastic, music, and drawing—and of these reading, writing, and drawing were studied for their utility, and gymnastic as contributing to virtue (c. 3. 1337 b 25 sqq.), while the study of music included the practice of τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περιττὰ τῶν ἔργων (c. 6. 1341 a 11 sqq.), and was commonly pursued with a view to pleasure (1337 b 28). Some authorities favoured studies useful for life, others those contributing to virtue, and others those of an out-of-the-way kind. Aristotle's own aim in planning the education of his 'best State' is to make his citizens men of complete virtue, fit in body, mind, and character to live in the practice of all the virtues and to rule and be ruled with a view to the most desirable life, the life in which work is crowned with leisure. Others had solved the question otherwise. Isocrates is on the whole in favour of useful studies, though he has something to say in defence of Eristic and Geometry and Astronomy, studies belonging to the out-of-the-way class (De Antid. § 261 sqq.: Hel. § 5). Of the Cynic Diogenes we read (Diog. Laert. 6. 73), μουσικῆς τε καὶ γεωμετρικῆς καὶ ἀστρολογίας καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀμελεῖν, ὥς ἀχρήστων καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαίων. For the views of Polybius see Polyb. 9. 20. 6 sqq. On the other hand, Lacedaemonian education was designed to develop virtue, though no doubt a one-sided kind of virtue (c. 4. 1338 b 11 sqq.: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 16, γράμματα μὲν οὐκ ἔνεκα τῆς χρείας

εμάνθανον, ἡ δ' ἄλλη πᾶσα παιδεία πρὸς τὸ ἀρχεῖσθαι καλῶς ἐγένετο καὶ καρτερεῖν ποιοῦντα καὶ καὶ μαχόμενον). As to the studies falling under the head of τὰ περιττά, see vol. i. p. 354, note 3. To the studies there enumerated should be added the wonderful feats of horsemanship which Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, learnt by his father's wish to perform (Plato, Meno 93 D). Aristotle, however, probably refers especially to the study of Geometry, Astronomy, and Eristic Argument, subjects which had found their way in Isocrates' day into the curriculum at Athens (Isocr. Panath. § 26: cp. Plato, Protag. 318 E, where Protagoras is made to sneer at λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν as studies which Hippias of Elis taught and he himself did not, the wisdom which he taught being εἰσουλία περὶ τε τῶν αἰκίων καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως). Both τὰ περιττά and τὰ χρήσιμα are here distinguished from τὰ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν, but many advocates of the study of τὰ περιττά at any rate would claim that it aided the development of virtue. Cp. Isocr. Busir. § 23, τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους ἀμελήσαντας τῶν ἡδυνῶν ἐπ' ἀστρολογίᾳ καὶ λογισμοῖς καὶ γεωμετρίᾳ διατρίβειν ἔπεισαν, ὥς τὰς δυνάμεις οἱ μὲν ὥς πρὸς ἑτέρα χρήσιμους ἐπαυοῦσιν, οἱ δ' ὥς πλείστα πρὸς ἀρετὴν συμβαλλομένας ἀποφαίνειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν. Pericles had studied τὰ περιττά under Anaxagoras and is thought by Plato and Plutarch to have owed much of his greatness of soul to these studies (Plato, Phaedr. 269 E sq.: Plut. Pericl. cc. 4—8). The virtuous Epaminondas had had a περιττὴ παιδεία (Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 3). It is with a view to virtue that Plato recommends the study of Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy (Rep. 525—530: Laws 818—822), and at a later age of Dialectic (Rep. 531 sqq.: Laws 965). For the contrast between τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον and τὰ περιττά, cp. Rhet. 2. 13. 1389 b 25, οὐδενὸς γὰρ μεγάλου οὐδὲ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, and for the phrase τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον, Diog. Laert. 2. 25, καὶ συνεχὲς ἐκείνα ἀνεφθόγγετο (ὁ Σωκράτης) τὰ λαμβάνει,

τὰ δ' ἀργυρέματ' ἐστὶν ἢ τε πορφύρα
εἰς τοὺς τραγηδοὺς χρήσιμ', οὐκ εἰς τὸν βίον,

3. 98, χρημάτων καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον χρησίμων, and Hyperid. Or. Fun. 3. 10. For δῆλον οὐδέν ('nothing is clear'), cp. Plato, Theaet. 201 A, μένουσι δὲ δῆλον οὐδέν ('manentibus vero—nec amplius quaerentibus—nihil erit perspicuum,' Stallbaum).

42. πάντα γὰρ εἴληφε ταῦτα κριτὰς τινας. Cp. Metaph. A. 7. 989 a 6, τῶν δὲ τριῶν στοιχείων ἕκαστον εἴληφε κριτὴν τινα, and De An.

1. 2. 405 b 8, πάντα γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα κριτὴν εἴληφε, πλὴν τῆς γῆς. 'Quid significet his locis formula εἰληφέναι κριτὴν apertum est, quomodo eam vim possit habere dubium videtur . . . Equidem nomine κριτής, quoniam coniunctum est cum λαμβάνειν, significari putaverim suffragium iudicis: unumquodque ex tribus illis elementis unius tulit iudicis suffragium' (Bonitz on Metaph. A. 8. 988 b 22—989 a 19). See also Bon. Ind. s.v. κριτής.

1337 b. 2. καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν κ.τ.λ. Thus the Spartans identified virtue with military virtue, which is only a part of it (2. 9. 1271 b 2 sqq.), and naturally erred in their ἀσκησις of virtue (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 40). Aristotle's remark is perhaps suggested by that of Socrates in Plato, Laches 190 B, ἀρ' οὖν τοῦτό γ' ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὸ εἰδέναι δ τί ποτ' ἔσται ἀρετή; εἰ γάρ που μηδ' ἀρετὴν εἰδείμεν τὸ παράπαν δ τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὢν, τίνα τρόπον τούτου σύμβουλοι γεινοίμεθα δογούν, ὅπως ἂν αὐτὸ κάλλιστα κτήσαστο;

3. πρὸς, cp. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 31 and 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 33.

4. ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 818 A, τῷ πλήθει δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν (i. e. Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy) ἀναγκαῖα . . . μὴ ἐπίσταςθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχροὺς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably refers to reading and writing and a certain amount of arithmetic and geometry as necessary. At Sparta these necessary subjects were evidently insufficiently studied (c. 4. 1338 b 33).

5. ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα κ.τ.λ. Πάντα, sc. τὰ χρῆσιμα, not τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. For instance, cookery should not be studied (c. 5. 1339 a 39 sqq.). The parenthetic clause, *δηρημένον—ἀνελευθέρων*, causes Aristotle to forget that he has begun his sentence with *ὅτι δὲ οὐ πάντα*, and he proceeds in 6, *φανερὸν ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*, as if these words had not preceded. Bonitz (Ind. 538 b 38) compares De Interp. 14. 24 a 6 sqq., referring to Waitz' note on this passage. In De Interp. 14, however, we have merely a pleonasm of *ὅτι*, whereas in the passage before us there is a surplussage of an entire clause introduced by *ὅτι*. Still irregularities in connexion with *ὅτι* are common in Aristotle's writings (see Bon. Ind. s.v.), and I think, on the whole, that Bekker, Bonitz, Sus., and the rest are right in leaving this awkward sentence as it stands. But a suggestion of Mr. Richards deserves mention, that *καί* should be added after *φανερὸν*.

6. τῶν τοιούτων, sc. ἔργων. Here *ὁ τοιοῦτος* does not, as it usually does (Bernays, Zwei Abhandlungen über die Aristotel. Theorie des Drama, p. 27), refer back to something preceding; on the contrary it refers forward to *ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων κ.τ.λ.* Compare its use in 12,

in c. 6. 1341 a 22 sq., in 3. 17. 1288 a 8, in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 18, and in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 19 sqq.

8. βάνανσον δ' ἔργον κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 6. 1341 a 5 sqq. and see vol. i. p. 111 sqq. Here and in c. 7. 1342 a 22, εἰσι δ' ὥσπερ αὐτῶν (i. e. βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν) αἱ ψυχὰι παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 495 D, οὐδ' ἀφ' ἐφ' ἡμεῖς πολλοὶ ἀτελείς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημιουργῶν ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα λαμβάνονται, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνγκεκλασμέναι τε καὶ ἀποσθρυμμέναι διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν: cp. Laws 831 C, and Xen. Oecon. 4. 2 and 6. 5. As the term *μισθαρχικαὶ ἐργασίαι* (13) must include the work of the *θῆς* or day-labourer (cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 25 sqq., where he is classed among αἱ *μισθαροῦντες*), his work is here described as βάναντος in addition to that of δ' βάναντος τεχνίτης, to which the epithet is more commonly applied. In general, however, the *θῆς* and the βάναντος are distinguished (cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 12, βάναντοι καὶ θῆτες: 17, τὸν βάναντον καὶ τὸν θῆτη: 21, βίον βάναντον ἢ θητικόν: 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 25: 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 27 sq.: and 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 29, where we have τὸ τῶν βαναύσων καὶ μισθαροῦντων πλῆθος). Indeed, notwithstanding what is said in the passage before us, the distinction reappears in this very Book, for in 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 20 we have βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν (cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 13, διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν, ἀλλὰ θητικωτέρων καὶ βαναύσους δὲ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι, where a difference is implied between *θητικός* and βάναντος). Aristotle's feeling probably was that though the work of αἱ *μισθαροῦντες* deserved to be called βάναντος on account of its effect on the mind, the work of the βάναντος τεχνίτης merited the epithet still better, because it injured the body (cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 37, βαναυσόταται δ' (εἰσὶ τῶν ἐργασίῶν) ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λαβάνοντα μάλιστα). Καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν i. e. καὶ βάναντον τέχνην καὶ μάθησιν εἶναι ταύτην. For τέχνην καὶ μάθησιν, cp. 18, πρᾶττι τις ἢ μαθάνει, and 4 (7). 17. 1337 a 1, πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ παιδεία. Μάθησις is the wider term, for though in one kind of μάθησις the aim is the acquisition of an art (Metaph. Θ. 3. 1046 b 36), in another it is the acquisition of an extent of knowledge falling short of that possessed by the master of an art (c. 5. 1339 a 36—38: Plato, Protag. 312 B). For τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς (where τὰς χρήσεις = τὰς ἐνεργείας, as in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 38), cp. De An. 2. 4. 415 a 18, πρότερον γὰρ εἰσι τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ ἐνέργειαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις κατὰ τὸν λόγον, and Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1197 a 8, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν οἷα ἔστιν ἄλλο οἰδὲν τέλος παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν πρᾶξιν,

οἷον παρὰ τὸ καθαρίζων οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο τέλος οὐδὲν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τέλος, ἢ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ πράξις. The χρήσεις καὶ πράξεις τῆς ἀρετῆς to which Aristotle refers are probably those of the soldier and citizen (cp. c. 6. 1341 a 7). For τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς cp. c. 1. 1337 a 21.

12. τὰς τοιαύτας τέχνας. See note on 6.

13. τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας. Ἔργασία is a wider term than τέχνη: it is used, for instance, of such occupations as brothel-keeping in Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 33. It is not certain what occupations in addition to that of the day-labourer Aristotle intends to include under αἱ μισθαρνικαὶ ἐργασίαι. Does he include the work of a teacher of rhetoric like Isocrates, when done for hire? In Pol. 1. 11. 1258 b 25 sqq. μισθαρνία is made to comprise both the μισθαρνία of the βάνανσοι τέχναι and the μισθαρνία of the unskilled θῆς: here, however, the phrase αἱ μισθαρνικαὶ ἐργασίαι is used in a sense exclusive of the βάνανσοι τέχναι. The form μισθαρνικὸς occurs also in Eth. Eud. 1. 4. 1215 a 31 and Oecon. 1. 2. 1343 a 29, but Plato uses the form μισθαρνητικὸς in Rep. 346 B, D, and (if the MSS. are right) μισθαρνητικὸς in Soph. 222 D. See critical note on 1255 b 26.

14. ἀσχολῶν καὶ ταπεινῇ. Leisure was held to give self-confidence (c. 6. 1341 a 28 sqq.), and its absence to make men poor-spirited, because it made them like slaves, who have no leisure (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 20). The epithets θητικὸς and ταπεινός are interchangeable in Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1125 a 1 sq.

15. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλευθερίων ἐπιστημῶν κ.τ.λ., 'and as to some liberal sciences also, while it is not illiberal to study them up to a certain point, to devote oneself to the study of them in an over-accurate way is bound up with the injurious results already mentioned,' i.e. unfits the body for the pursuits of a soldier and citizen and makes the mind abject. For ἐνοχός in this sense see Liddell and Scott. For the view that there is something illiberal in too close a study of a subject compare the passage from the Erastae ascribed to Plato quoted on 1338 b 32. The study of music has an ill effect when carried too far (c. 6. 1340 b 40 sqq. and 1341 b 10 sqq.: compare Plut. Pericl. c. 1, ὃ δὲ Φθιωπὸς πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἐπιτεριπῶς ἐν τινι πύτῃ ψήλαντα καὶ τεχνικῶς εἶπεν, οὐκ ἀσχύνη καλῶς οὕτω ψάλλον;), and also that of gymnastic (c. 4. 1338 b 32 sqq.). Socrates had said that the study of geometry, astronomy, arithmetic, and medicine should not be carried beyond a certain

point by the ordinary citizen (Xen. Mem. 4. 7), and Isocrates says the same thing of astronomy and geometry (De Antid. § 264: cp. [Demosth.] Erot. c. 44), and Plato of *γράμματα* (Laws 810 B). There were those who said this of philosophy (Plato, Gorg. 487 C), but Aristotle would hardly agree. The Cynics probably inherited the feeling of Socrates on this subject: see as to the Cynic Onesicritus vol. i. p. 112, note 1. Plato, on the other hand, had recommended in the case of a few the advanced study of arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy (Laws 818 A: cp. 967 D); it is not clear whether Aristotle would object to this. The term *λευθέριοι ἐπιστήμαι* in its Latin rendering 'liberales artes' had a long subsequent history (see Mr. H. Parker in *Eng. Hist. Rev.* vol. v. p. 417 sqq.). The Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of its occurrence in Aristotle's writings.

17. ἔχει δὲ κ.τ.λ. This repeats with added details 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 6 sqq. Aristotle is preparing the way for his recommendation that boys shall be taught to sing and play: many regarded playing as *χειροῦργια* (c. 6. 1340 b 20) and as fraught with *βασανισία* (1340 b 40 sqq.: cp. Plato, Symp. 203 A). But the singing and playing which Aristotle enjoins will be *αὐτῶν χάριν* and *δ' ἀρετῆν* (c. 6. 1341 b 8 sqq. and 1340 b 42).

19. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χάριν ἢ φίλων ἢ δ' ἀρετῆν οὐκ ἀνελεῖσθαι. As to *αὐτοῦ χάριν* see note on 1277 b 5, and cp. Rhet. 3. 18. 1419 b 7 sqq., and Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 25, *ὥσπερ ἀνθρώποις φανερόν ἐλεύθεροι δ' αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὄν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτῇ μόνῃ ἐλευθέρῳ οὖσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μόνῃ γὰρ αὐτῇ ἐνεκὴν ἔστιν*. When Odysseus builds a ship (Hom. Odys. 5. 243 sqq.), it is for himself. As to *φίλων*, cp. Plato, Laws 919 D, *Μαγνήτων . . . μήτε κίπλους ἰκθὺς μηδ' ἄνους μηδεὶς γενέσθω μήτ' ἔμπορος μήτε διακονίαν μηδ' ἄρματα κακῶν ἰδιώταις τοῖς μὴ ἐξ ἴσου ἑαυτῶν, πλὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρὶ καὶ τοῖς ἑτεροῦς εἰς τὸ δοῦν γένεσι καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς αὐτοῦ πρεσβυτέροις, ὅσοι ἐλεύθεροι ἐλευθέρους*, and Symp. 184 B—C: cp. also Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 b 31, καὶ (*μεγαλοψύχων*) *πρὸς ἄλλων μὴ δύνασθαι* (ἦν ἄλλ' ἢ *πρὸς φίλων δουλεύειν γάρ*). See also the story told by Plutarch of Favonius and Pompey (quoted above on 1333 a 6). For *δ' ἀρετῆν*, cp. c. 6. 1341 b 10 sqq. (which also illustrates *δ' ἄλλους*, 20), and Plato, Symp. 185 A sq.

20. As to *αὐτὸ τοῦτο* and as to the displacement of *πολλάκις*, which belongs to *δόξαιεν ἄν*, see critical note, and cp. Plato, Rep. 358 D, *περὶ γὰρ τίνας ἄν μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις τοῦν ἔχων χαίρει λέγων καὶ*

ἀκούων; where *πολλὰς* belongs to *λέγω καὶ ἀκούω*. For the conjunction of *θητικόν* and *δουλικόν*, cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1125 a 1 sq.

21. αἱ μὲν οὖν καταβεβλημένα τῶν μαθήσεως κ.τ.λ., 'the studies now commonly known and in use' (literally 'made public property'), 'as has been said before' (in c. 2. 1337 a 39), 'point in two directions,' i.e. they may be used in support of the view that useful subjects should be studied, or in support of the view that subjects tending to promote virtue should be studied (see note on 1337 a 39). For αἱ καταβεβλημένα τῶν μαθήσεως, cp. c. 3. 1338 a 36 and Plato, Soph. 232 D, *τά γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην τέχνην, ἀ δὲ πρὸς ἑκάστου αἰτίᾳ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἐντεταίει, δεδημοσιωμένα που καταβέβληται γεγραμμένα τῇ βουλευμένῃ μαθεῖν* ('publice deposita sunt,' Stallbaum, who adds 'verbum καταβέβλην proprie dicitur de iis quae deponuntur in tabulario publico, veluti leges, testimonia, alia monumenta litteris consignata'). For *ἐπαφοτερρίζουσιν*, see note on 1332 a 42.

- C. 3. 23. ἔστι δὲ τέτταρα σχεδόν κ.τ.λ. 'Usually three, *γραφικὴ* being omitted,' as Eaton remarks, who refers to Plato, Protag. 325 D-326 C (where children are described as going successively to teachers of *γράμματα*, teachers of harp-playing, and *παιδογρίβαι*), and Theag. 122 E. We see from Protag. 325 E sqq. that in learning *γράμματα* children learnt passages of epic poetry by heart, and that in learning harp-playing they learnt to sing to the harp passages of lyrical poetry, so that the study of poetry entered into the study both of *γράμματα* and of harp-playing. That the study of *γράμματα* included learning to write, we see from Laws 810 B. It is remarkable that arithmetic is not mentioned: Sus.⁴ takes the elements of arithmetic to be included under *γράμματα*, but does not give any passage in support of this view. According to Blümner (Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 111), arithmetical instruction at Athens was given at home, not at school; this may possibly be the reason why nothing is said about it.

24. καὶ τέταρτον ἔστι γραφικόν. Plato had learnt drawing (Diog. Laert. 3. 5) long before Pamphilus of Amphipolis (the teacher of Apelles, who was a contemporary of Philip and Alexander) had made the study fashionable first at Sicyon and then throughout Greece (Plin. Nat. Hist. 35. 76 sq.: see Overbeck, Ant. Schriftquellen, p. 330, and Brunn, Gesch. der griech. Künstler 2. 134 sqq.). *Γραφικὴ* probably includes painting as well as drawing. Aristotle says nothing of sculpture.

25. τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν κ.τ.λ. Charondas had insisted on the many uses served by γραμματική: cp. Diod. 12. 13. 1, τὴν γὰρ γραμματικὴν παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας μαθήσεις προέκρινεν ὁ νομοθέτης, καὶ μάλιστα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιτελεῖσθαι, ψῆφους, ἐπιστολάς, διαθήκας, νόμους, τὰλλα τὰ τὸν βίον μάλιστα ἐκπεπονημένα, and Eurip. Fragm. 582, which is so similar in effect to the passage of Diodorus that one is inclined to ask whether Euripides had the words of Charondas before him. Cp. also 1338 a 15 sqq.

26. τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν κ.τ.λ. So thought the Lacedaemonians (c. 4. 1338 b 11 sqq.), and also Aristippus (Diog. Laert. 2. 91).

27. τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἥδη διαπορέσειεν ἐν τῇ, i. e. as to the object with which it is taught. Here διαπορεῖν takes an acc. of the thing which causes perplexity, as ἀπορεῖν does in Meteor. 1. 1. 339 a 2, ἐν οἷς τὰ μὲν ἀποροῦμεν, τῶν δ' ἐφαπτόμεθα τινα τρόπον. That Plato gives a wider meaning to μουσική than Aristotle does, we have seen in vol. i. p. 405. Both agree that μουσική is concerned with μελοποιία (c. 7. 1341 b 23 sqq.: Gorg. 449 D), but while to Plato (Rep. 398 D) a μέλος consists of λόγος ἁρμονία and ῥυθμός, Aristotle distinguishes μελοποιία and λείψ (Poet. 6. 1449 b 33 sqq., 1450 a 13 sqq.).

28. ὅς ἡδονῆς χάριν, sc. εὖσε: cp. 1338 a 13, ὡς ἀπολαύσεως καὶ χάριν ἄλλων (sc. εὖσε). For the fact cp. Plato, Laws 655 C, καίτοι λέγουσι γὰρ οἱ πλείους μουσικῆς ἀρδύτητα εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς περιζουσαν δύναμιν, and Tim. 47 D, ἡ δὲ ἁρμονία . . . τῇ μετὰ τοῦ προσηχημένου Μούσους οἷα ἐφ' ἡδονὴν ἀδονῶν, καθάπερ εἶναι, εἶναι δεκάς χρόνους κ.τ.λ.

29. μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς, 'learn it,' cp. c. 2. 1337 b 6 sqq., and see note on 1339 a 14.

οἱ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, cp. 1338 a 14, οἱ πρότερον, and Probl. 30. 11. 956 b 16, διὰ τὸ οἱ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τῆς μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐγνωσίας ἀλλὰ πῃ προεβίβαν, σοφίας δὲ οὐδὲν ἔδωκεν;

ἔταξαν ἐν παιδείᾳ, cp. 1338 a 14, οἱ παιδείαν ἔταξαν.

30. τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν κ.τ.λ. For the phrase cp. Hist. An. 9. 12. 615 a 25, ἡ γὰρ φύσις αὐτὴ ζητεῖ τὸ πρόσφορον, and Eth. Nic. 8. 6. 1157 b 16. Aristotle has not said before that Nature aims at this, but he has implied it in 2. 9. 1271 a 41 sqq. and 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 2 sqq., passages in which he points out the disastrous consequences to the Lacedaemonian State of a forgetfulness of this.

31. For the place of δύνασθαι cp. c. 5. 1339 b 1, and see note on 1281 a 26.

32. αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων, Lamb. 'hoc enim omnium rerum agendarum principium est.' With Sus. I take Aristotle to refer in αὕτη to σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς, not to Nature (as Vict., Schn., and others). For the attraction of the pronoun into the gender of the predicate, cp. (with Sus.) 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 41. For the phrase, cp. Plato, Phaedr. 237 B, περὶ πάντες, ὁ καὶ, μία ἀρχὴ τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς βουλεύεσθαι εἰδέναι δεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἡ βουλὴ, ἢ πάντες ἀμαρτάνουσιν ἀνάγκη.

πάνω, for the lesson has already been taught in 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 2 sqq.

33. εἰ γὰρ ἄμφω μὲν δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Γάρ introduces a justification of ὥστε καὶ πάλιν εἰπαμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. With δεῖ supply ἔχειν. For the thought cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 16 sqq. The answer which is gradually given to the question in what activities leisure should be spent is, as we shall see, 'in activities desirable for their own sake.'

34. καὶ τέλος, 'and is its end': cp. 4. (7). 15. 1334 a 14 sqq. Mr. Weldon has anticipated me in retaining τέλος and placing a comma after it.

35. οὐ γὰρ δὴ παίζοντας, 'for surely not in playing.' Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 27 sqq. Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Laws 803 D, τίς οὖν ὀρθότης; παίζοντα ἐστὶ διαβωτίον; τίνας δὲ παιδείας; θύοντα καὶ φθοντα καὶ ὀρχούμενον.

τέλος γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for then, [as leisure is the end of life,] play would necessarily be to us the end of life.' Sus. would read in place of ἀναγκαῖον either ἂν ἀναγκαῖον (Schn. had proposed ἂν ἦν ἀναγκαῖον, vol. II. p. 452) or ἀναγκαῖον ἦν (with Spengel), but perhaps ἂν εἴη may be supplied with ἀναγκαῖον: cp. Xen. Oecon. 3. 13 and 4. 15. It seems to me more natural to supply ἂν εἴη than ἐσσι. Many made play the end of life: cp. c. 5. 1339 b 31 sqq., and Ephor. Fragm. 82 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. I. 259), "Ἐφορος ἐν πέμπτῃ φησὶν ὅτι Τιβαρηνοὶ καὶ τὸ παιζέω καὶ τὸ γελᾶν εἰσιν ἐξηλεκότες καὶ μεγίστην εὐδαιμονίαν τοῦτο νομίζουσιν. A *graffito* on a pavement-slab of the forum of Thannayas or Timegad in Algeria runs 'venari lavari ludere ridere—oc est vivere' (Prof. Sayce, Algerian Notes, *Academy*, No. 780, April 16, 1887, p. 279).

38. ἢ δὲ παιδιὰ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Phileb. 30 E, ἀνάπαυλα γάρ, ὁ Πρώταρχε, τῆς σπουδῆς γίγνεται ἐνίοτε ἢ παιδιὰ.

39. τὸ δ' ἀσχολεῖν συμβαίνει μετὰ πόνου καὶ συντονίας. Cp. Rhet. 1. 11. 1370a 11, τὰς δ' ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντονίας λυπηράς.

41. καιροφυλακοῦντας τὴν χρῆσιν. Pastime should be used *in* τὰς ἀσχαλίαις, as a relief after toil (cp. 37).

ὅς προσάγοντας φαρμακείας χάριν. A drug differs from an article of daily food, in that it is only for occasional use: cp. Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 b 10, προσθεαροῦντας ὅτι ἡ τροφή οὐ φάρμακον διὰ τὸ συνεχές, and Top. 2. 11. 115 b 26, πάλιν ποτὶ μὲν συμφέροι φαρμακεύεσθαι, εἰς δὲ τὸν νοσῆ, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ. For the medical use of the word προσάγειν cp. Plut. De Adulatore et Amico, c. 28, ὁ δὲ παρηγσίαν καὶ δηγμὸν ἀνθρώπων δυστυχοῦντι προσάγων, ὥσπερ ἰξυδορκικὸν ἔμμεστι παρασσομένη καὶ φλεγμαίνονται, θεραπεύει μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖ τοῦ λυπούντος, ὁργὴν δὲ τῇ λύτῃ προστίθῃσι καὶ παροξύνει τὸν ἀνέμμετον.

42. ἀνεσις γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for the movement of the soul to which we have referred' (that involved in play) 'is [remedial in character, for it is] a relaxation of strain and a remission because of the pleasure which accompanies it, [and only in place at times when there is strain].' For κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς, cp. Rhet. 1. 11. 1369 b 33, ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς κ.τ.λ. and Plato, Laws 896 E sq.

1. τὸ δὲ σχολάζειν κ.τ.λ., 'but taking leisure [unlike working] is 1338 a thought to have in itself pleasure and happiness and blissful life, [so that it does not need to be helped out with play, and we should not spend leisure in play].'

3. τοῦτο δ' οὐ κ.τ.λ., 'and this' (i.e. happiness) 'does not belong to those who work, but [only] to those who are at leisure, for he who works works for the sake of some end as having it not, but happiness is an end, inasmuch as all think that it is conjoined not with pain but with pleasure, [and therefore, as he has not the end, he has not happiness].' That things conjoined with pleasure were commonly regarded as ends, we see from Rhet. 1. 7. 1364 b 23-26. Aristotle's object in adding this remark is to point out that not only does leisure bring happiness with it, but that work does not; he thus prepares the way for the distinction which he proceeds to draw in 11 sqq. between studies which are preparatory for work and studies which are preparatory for leisure, the former being, like work, a means to an end, and the latter, like leisure, desirable for their own sake and an end in themselves. Sus. reads τοῦτο γὰρ in place of τοῦτο δέ, but in this Mr. Welldon does not follow him, and rightly, for τοῦτο δ' οὐ κ.τ.λ. does not contain the proof that leisure is thought to have in it pleasure and happiness, but an added

statement carrying matters further. For $\delta \mu\epsilon\nu \gamma\alpha\rho \delta\sigma\chi\alpha\lambda\acute{\omega}\nu \epsilon\iota\kappa\acute{\alpha}$
 $\tau\iota\upsilon\sigma \delta\sigma\chi\alpha\lambda\acute{\epsilon} \tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \acute{\omega}\varsigma \omicron\chi \upsilon\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 17,
 $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota \delta'$ (i. e. $\alpha\iota \pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\iota\kappa\alpha\iota \kappa\alpha\iota \pi\omicron\lambda\epsilon\mu\iota\kappa\alpha\iota \pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\xi\epsilon\iota\varsigma$) $\delta\sigma\chi\alpha\lambda\omicron\iota \kappa\alpha\iota \tau\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \tau\iota\omega\delta\epsilon$
 $\acute{\epsilon}\phi\lambda\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha\iota \kappa\alpha\iota \omicron\upsilon \delta\epsilon' \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota \epsilon\iota\sigma\omega$.

7. $\tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\eta\nu \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\omicron\iota \tau\eta\nu \eta\delta\omicron\eta\nu$ κ.τ.λ., 'but [here their agreement
ceases, for] all do not find the pleasure which accompanies happi-
ness in the same pleasure.' Cp. Plato, Laws 658 E (quoted below
on 1339 b 33), and Gorg. 448 C, $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\omega\nu \delta\epsilon \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omega\nu \mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\lambda\alpha\mu\beta\acute{\alpha}\nu\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu$
 $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\iota \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\nu \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\tau\epsilon$, $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu \delta\epsilon \acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omega\nu \omicron\iota \acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\iota$.

8. For $\kappa\alpha\theta' \acute{\epsilon}\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma \kappa\alpha\iota \tau\eta\nu \xi\iota\nu \tau\eta\nu \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$, where we expect
 $\acute{\epsilon}\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}\nu$ and $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$, cp. Plato, Gorg. 503 E, $\acute{\omega}\sigma\pi\epsilon\rho \kappa\alpha\iota \omicron\iota \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron\iota \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$
 $\delta\eta\mu\omicron\upsilon\rho\gamma\omicron\iota \beta\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon\varsigma \pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma \tau\acute{\omicron} \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omega}\nu \acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\omicron\nu \acute{\epsilon}\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\varsigma \omicron\upsilon\kappa \epsilon\iota\kappa\eta \acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\gamma\acute{\omicron}\mu\epsilon\iota\omicron\varsigma$
 $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\iota \delta \pi\rho\omicron\sigma\phi\acute{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\iota \pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma \tau\acute{\omicron} \acute{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\omicron\nu \tau\acute{\omicron} \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ κ.τ.λ.

9. $\acute{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon \phi\alpha\upsilon\epsilon\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu$ κ.τ.λ., 'and so, [as leisure is the end], it is
evident,' etc. $\kappa\alpha\iota \pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma \tau\eta\nu \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\eta \delta\iota\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta \sigma\chi\alpha\lambda\acute{\eta}\nu$, 'with a view to
leisure spent in noble enjoyment also,' as well as with a view
to work. For $\tau\eta\nu \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\eta \delta\iota\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta \sigma\chi\alpha\lambda\acute{\eta}\nu$, cp. c. 7. 1342 a 31, $\tau\eta\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\nu$
 $\phi\iota\lambda\omicron\sigma\phi\omicron\phi\iota\alpha \delta\iota\alpha\tau\rho\iota\beta\eta\varsigma$. It is obviously strange that we should have
 $\tau\eta\nu \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\eta \delta\iota\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta \sigma\chi\alpha\lambda\acute{\eta}\nu$ here and $\tau\eta\nu \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\eta \sigma\chi\alpha\lambda\eta \delta\iota\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta\nu$ in 21, and
it is possible that $\tau\eta\nu \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\eta \delta\iota\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta \sigma\chi\alpha\lambda\acute{\eta}\nu$ is a simple blunder, and
that we should read $\tau\eta\nu \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\eta \sigma\chi\alpha\lambda\eta \delta\iota\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta\nu$ (with Cor.) in place of
it. But Sus., following Prof. Postgate (Notes, p. 15), leaves the
text as it stands, and I incline on the whole to do so too, though
Bonitz adds a query to the words (Ind. 741 a 40) and Jackson
would omit $\sigma\chi\alpha\lambda\acute{\eta}\nu$ as an interpolation and understand $\eta\delta\omicron\eta\nu$
(Sus.⁴ *ad loc.*). For looking to 1337 b 31, $\sigma\chi\alpha\lambda\acute{\alpha}\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu \delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\sigma\theta\alpha\iota \kappa\alpha\lambda\acute{\omega}\varsigma$,
and 1338 a 1, $\tau\acute{\omicron} \sigma\chi\alpha\lambda\acute{\alpha}\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu$ (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 9), we expect
that the conclusion drawn in 1338 a 9 sqq. will be that it is well to
study with a view to taking leisure, or taking leisure nobly, and $\tau\eta\nu$
 $\acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\eta \delta\iota\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta \sigma\chi\alpha\lambda\acute{\eta}\nu$, 'leisure spent nobly in diagogē,' comes nearer to
this than $\tau\eta\nu \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\eta \sigma\chi\alpha\lambda\eta \delta\iota\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta\nu$. Not leisure spent anyhow, but leisure
spent in diagogē is the end with a view to which Aristotle claims
that study should be especially pursued. The words $\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \delta\epsilon \pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma \tau\eta\nu$
 $\delta\sigma\chi\alpha\lambda\acute{\iota\alpha\nu}$ (12) also, as Postgate points out, require $\pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma \tau\eta\nu \sigma\chi\alpha\lambda\acute{\eta}\nu$, and
not $\pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma \tau\eta\nu \delta\iota\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\eta\nu$, as their antithesis. For $\mu\alpha\theta\acute{\omega}\nu\epsilon\iota\nu \acute{\alpha}\pi\tau\alpha \kappa\alpha\iota \pi\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\upsilon$
 $\epsilon\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$, cp. Theophil. Κιθαρωδός Fragm. (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 628),

μέγας

θησαυρός ἐστι καὶ βίβλιος μουσική

ἅπανι τοῖς μαθοῦσι παιδευθεῖσι γε.

$\mu\alpha\theta\acute{\omega}\nu\epsilon\iota\nu$ is to learn, $\pi\alpha\iota\delta\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ to be trained by another.

11. For the repetition of the pronoun in ταῦτα . . . ταύτας see note on 1317 b 5.

12. τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν δοχολίαν κ.τ.λ., 'and that studies preparatory for work are pursued as necessary and as being for the sake of other things.'

13. διὰ, 'hence,' i.e. because it is right that studies which contribute to the enjoyment of leisure should find a place in education.

15. ὥπερ τὰ γράμματα κ.τ.λ. See note on 1337 b 25.

16. καὶ πρὸς μάθησιν, 'and for the acquisition of knowledge': cp. 39 sq. and Isocr. Panath. § 209, ὅτ' εἰδὲ γράμματα μαθήσων, ἃ τηλικαύτην ἔχει δύναμιν ὥστε τοὺς ἐπισταμένους καὶ χρημένους αὐτοῖς μὴ μόνον ἐμπείρους γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἡλικίας τῆς αὐτῶν πραχέμενων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πρότετε γενομένων.

17. δοκεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Learning to draw was evidently held by many to make men skilful in the purchase of works of art, furniture, and equipments of all kinds (1338 a 40 sqq.).

19. πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ ἀλκήν, 'for health and prowess in battle.' Not every one would agree with Aristotle that learning music does not produce military prowess in the learner: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 21, μουσικωτέρους γὰρ ἄμα καὶ πολεμικωτέρους ἀποφαίνουσιν αὐτοὺς κ.τ.λ.: Athen. Deipn. 626f, τὸ δ' ἀρχαίων ἢ μουσικῇ ἐκ' ἀνδρείαν προτροπὴ ἦν κ.τ.λ.: Plut. De Musica c. 26. And if the study of music does not produce health, listening to music was thought by Theophrastus to cure some diseases (Athen. Deipn. 624 a); indeed, a plague was thought to have been stayed at one time at Sparta by the Cretan musician Thaletas (Plut. De Mus. c. 42).

21. λείπεται τοίνυν κ.τ.λ., 'it remains therefore that music is useful for rational enjoyment in leisure.' Aristotle has shown that the study of music is not useful for purposes connected with work, like learning to read and write and to draw, nor productive of bodily advantages useful for work, like gymnastic; hence he concludes that it is useful for leisure. He omits to inquire at present whether it is not productive of moral and intellectual virtues useful for work; we shall find later on that it is (c. 5. 1340 a 18 sqq.). This somewhat invalidates the conclusion which he arrives at here.

22. εἰς ὅπερ κ.τ.λ., 'into which they do in fact evidently introduce it.' Καὶ φαίνονται, i.e. not only may be inferred to introduce it, but manifestly do so: cp. καὶ συμβαίνειν in 2. 3. 1262 a 18 sq.

For *δπερ*, not *ἡπερ*, see Bon. Ind. 484 b 5, where Hist. An. 2. 17. 508 b 13, ἀναδέλωσιν ἔχει, ὃ ἀναλύεται eis *ἐν*, is referred to, and Vahlen on Poet. 3. 1448 a 24 ('Aristotelem nemo nescit usum neutrius valde adamasse') and 4. 1449 a 7. Aristotle takes no notice of the use of music in the worship of the gods.

ἦν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for they give it a place in that which they think is the form of rational enjoyment appropriate to the free' (i.e. feasting), and therefore appropriate to those who are at leisure, for leisure belongs to freemen: cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 20, οἱ σχολῇ δούλοισι. Aristotle would hardly agree with their view that banqueting is ἡ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγὴ (see note on 1333 a 35). In c. 5. 1339 a 16 sqq. he treats conviviality (μῖθῃ) as a means of relaxation, not as διαγωγή.

24. διόπερ Ὅμηρος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has before him Hom. Odys. 17. 382,

τίς γάρ δὴ ξείνων καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν
ἄλλον γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν οἱ δῆμοιργοι ἴασι,
μάντιν ἢ ἰγνήρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων,
ἢ καὶ θέσπιν ἀοιδόν, ὃ κεν τέρασιν ἀείδων;

but the line first quoted by him, ἀλλ' οἷον κ.τ.λ., finds no place in our text, any more than it does, as Sus.⁴ points out, in Plato, Rep. 389 D. 'Αείδων also takes the place of ἔπαιστος in our texts (Sus.³, Note 997). Probably we should read μόνον in place of μὲν in ἀλλ' οἷον κ.τ.λ. I take Aristotle's text to have been—

τίς γάρ δὴ ξείνων καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν,
ἀλλ' οἷον μόνον ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλείην,
μάντιν ἢ ἰγνήρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων,
οἱ καλίουσιν ἀοιδόν, ὃ κεν τέρασιν ἔπαιστος;

It is just possible that οἱ in 26 is a false reading for καί, but there is no absolute necessity for any change. Spengel, followed by Sus., reads οὗτε καλοῦσιν or οἱ καλοῦνται in place of οἱ καλίουσιν, and regards these words as not forming part of the quotation, but the form of the word καλίουσιν seems to show that it is quoted from Homer. As to the differences between our text of Homer and Aristotle's quotations, see note on 1285 a 12. For the use of music at banquets, cp. Hom. Odys. 1. 152. Aristoxenus gave a fanciful reason for it, quite different to that given here (Plut. De Musica, c. 43: Aristox. Fragm. 91 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 291: cp. Plato, Tim. 47 D).

27. καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὲ κ.τ.λ. Hom. Odyss. 9. 5 sqq. For (δ) Ὀδυσσεύς see critical note.

32. πότερον δὲ κ.τ.λ. This promise is not fulfilled in the Politics as we have it: see vol. ii. p. xxviii sq.

33. καὶ πῶς, 'and how they are to be studied': cp. c. 2. 1337 a 34 sq.

34. For the needless addition of περὶ αὐτῶν, cp. περὶ αὐτῆς, c. 5. 1339 a 15.

τῶν δὲ τοσούτων ἡμῖν εἶναι πρὸ ὁδοῦ γέγονεν. Two different views have been taken of the construction of this sentence. Some have regarded τοσούτων εἶναι πρὸ ὁδοῦ as an accusative and infinitive dependent on γέγονεν, as in Luke 16. 22, ἐγένετο δὲ ἀποθανεῖν τὸν πτωχόν, and Acts 21. 1 and 22. 17 (referred to by Hermann ad Viger. p. 231 note, cp. p. 749); the translation will then be, 'but now it has happened that thus much profit has accrued to us.' Others have taken τοσούτων εἶναι together in the sense of 'to this extent at least,' εἶναι being used as in such phrases as κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι (Plato, Protag. 317 A, where Stallbaum renders 'quantum quidem ad hoc attinet': see his note and Ast, Lex. Platon. 1. 625). Götting, who refers to Lobeck, Phryn. p. 275, Stahr in his edition of the Politics, and Sus.⁴ appear to understand the passage thus. The translation will then be, 'but now to this extent at least we have profited.' I should prefer the second of these two interpretations if εἶναι followed τοσούτων immediately without the interposition of ἡμῖν. In support of the first interpretation it may be noted that in Plato, Rep. 397 B we have γίγνεται λέγειν (Richards), and in Xen. Oecon. 17. 3, γίγνεται δεικνύειν (sc. πάντας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους): see also Xen. Cyrop. 5. 2. 12. There is a further difference as to the meaning of πρὸ ὁδοῦ, Sus.² translating the sentence 'für jetzt steht uns vorläufig nur so viel fest,' and Welldon, 'at present however we have advanced so far as to see that,' etc., where 'vorläufig' and 'advanced' seem to represent πρὸ ὁδοῦ. My own rendering has been suggested by the meaning assigned to the word by Liddell and Scott.

35. οὗτοι καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων κ.τ.λ., 'that from the ancients also' (cp. 1337 b 29, οἱ ἐξ ἀρχῆς) 'we have a testimony derived from the established studies [that there are subjects which should be taught the young not as necessary but as liberal and noble].' The ancients are regarded by Aristotle as the authors of the established curriculum.

37. τοῦτο, 'this fact,' i.e. that we have the testimony of the ancients to this effect.

ἐτι δὲ καὶ τῶν χρησίμων ἐτι κ.τ.λ. Supply again τοσούτων ἡμῶν εἶναι πρὸ ὁδοῦ γέγονεν. Οἷον τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησιν is added in illustration of τῶν χρησίμων τινά. Παιδεύεσθαι is middle, as in c. 2. 1337 a 35. Τὸ χρήσιμον πρὸς τὸν βίον is contrasted with τὸ πρὸς μάθησιν συντεῖνον: compare the contrast in Plato, Rep. 527 A between studies pursued πράξεις ἕνεκα and γνώσεις ἕνεκα. As to ἡ τῶν γραμμάτων μάθησις cp. Menand. Monost. 657,

διπλοῦν δρῶσιν οἱ μαθόντες γράμματα.

40. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν γραφικὴν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 525 B, ἐπὶ λογιστικῇ ἵεναι καὶ ἀνθάπτεσθαι αὐτῆς μὴ ἰδιωτικῶς, ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν ἐπὶ βίῳ τῆς τῶν ἀρθμῶν φύσεως ἀφίκωνται τῇ νοήσει αὐτῇ, οὐκ ὧνς οὐδὲ πράξεως χάριν ὥς ἐμπόρους ἢ καπήλους μελετῶντας, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα πολέμου τε κ.τ.λ. For the contemptuous reference to σκεῖη, cp. Plato, Rep. 428 C, οὐκ ἄρα διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν φυλῶν σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην βουλευομένην ὥς ἂν ἔχῃ βέλτεστα, σοφὴ κλητέα πόλις. Buying σκεῖη was work for women (Pollux 10. 18, γυναικίαν ἀγοράν, τὸν τόπον οὐ τὰ σκεῖη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πιπράσκουσιν).

1338 b. 1. We expect ἀλλά or ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον in place of ἢ μᾶλλον, but ἢ μᾶλλον is substituted as less dogmatic, and partly also perhaps because ἀλλά has been used in the preceding line. "H 'modeste affirmantis est' (Bon. Ind. 312 b 57 sqq.: cp. Trendelenburg on De An. 1. 1. 403 b 8). In 3. 1. 1275 a 25 and 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 28 ἢ takes the place of δέ.

ποιεῖ θεωρητικόν, cp. c. 7. 1342 b 26, βαρυντικόν γὰρ ἢ γε μίθη ποιεῖ μᾶλλον. We expect θεωρητικούς rather than θεωρητικόν, but compare the change from the singular to the plural in c. 6. 1341 b 10-15 (ὁ πράττων, βαναύσους). Θεωρητικόν, 'a scientific observer' (Welldon).

τοῦ περὶ τὰ σώματα κάλλους. Cp. Plato, Symp. 210 B, τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασι κάλλος, and Critias 112 E, οὔτοι μὲν οὖν δὴ . . . ἐπὶ πᾶσιν Εὐρώπῃν καὶ Ἀσίαν κατὰ τε σωμάτων κάλλη καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ψυχῶν παντοίαν ἀρετὴν ἐλλόγιμοι τε ἦσαν καὶ ὀνομαστότατοι πάντων τῶν τότε. Aristotle probably would not go so far as Diotima in Plato, Symp. 210 sq., as to the results of studying τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασι κάλλος, but he apparently holds that the study of drawing helps to make men capable of diagogē. We note that he says nothing of landscape beauty, or of the use of drawing in cultivating a perception of it. In τὰ σώματα he no doubt refers mainly to the bodies of animals,

and especially of human beings (cp. τῶν σαρμάτων in c. 4. 1338 b 11). As to Aristotle's value for beauty, cp. Lucian, *De Saltat.* c. 70, πολλοὺς δὲ πρῶτον καὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἄρχαῖσιν εὐμορφίας, τί ἄλλο δὲ τὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐπιληθῆναι, τὸ πολλὰς ἐκτιμῶντες καὶ κίρος τρίτον ἡγουμένους τῶν κατὰ καὶ τοῖντο εἶναι; (I do not notice that this dictum is included in Rose's collection of the *Fragments of Aristotle*, ed. 2, 1886.) For the phrase τὸ περὶ τὰ σώματα πολλοὺς, cp. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 34, τῆς περὶ τὴν εὐσίαν εὐμορφίας, and 1327 a 8, τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὡς, and see note in *Sus.*⁴

3. τοῖς μεγαλόφθοις καὶ τοῖς λευθέροις. Cp. *Plut. De Amicorum Multitudine*, c. 6 *sub fin.*, τοῖς λευθέροις καὶ γενναίοις, and *Isocr. Areop.* § 43, τοῖς λευθέροις τεθραμμένοις καὶ μεγαλόφρονεῖν εἰδωμένοις. These passages show that there is no occasion to change *λευθέροις* into *λευθερίους*, as *Sus.* is half inclined to do. As to the *μεγαλόφθοις*, cp. (with Eaton and Congreve) *Eth. Nic.* 4. 8. 1125 a 11 sq.

4. ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερόν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 8—28.

6. ὁκτὼν ἐκ τούτων κ.τ.λ. In beginning the study of *γυμναστική* and *παιδοκριτική* at seven, Aristotle follows with some variation in the track of Plato, *Laws* 794 C, πρὶς δὲ τὰ μαθήματα τρίτεσθαι χρόνῳ ἑκατέρου (after the completion of the sixth year), τοὺς μὲν ἄρρενας ἐφ' ἵππων διδασκάλους καὶ τέξων καὶ ἀκροῦν καὶ σφενδαμίστους κ.τ.λ. In the *Republic*, on the other hand, *μουσική* seems to precede *γυμναστική* (403 C, μετὰ δὲ μουσικῇ γυμναστικῇ θεωρεῖται αἱ νεανίαι: see Stallbaum on *Protag.* 326 B). At Athens boys began their studies by learning to read and write (aet. 7—11); at about eleven they were sent to a harp-player to learn the harp; how early their gymnastic studies began is uncertain (*Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks*, Eng. Trans. pp. 111—115). Aristotle postpones learning to read and write and learning to sing and play till puberty (c. 4. 1339 a 4 sq.) and puts the boys in charge of gymnastic trainers and *παιδοκρίβας* from seven till puberty. Till puberty they are to receive no literary training. His scheme of training resembles the Lacedaemonian more than the Athenian, but it avoids imposing on boys the severe physical toil imposed on them at Sparta, and it gives up three years after puberty to the exclusive study of subjects other than gymnastic. We may be quite sure that no young Spartan was permitted to drop gymnastic for three years.

7. τούτων γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 16 sqq., where it is implied that *γυμναστική* imparts a certain bodily *ἔξως* and that *παιδοκριτική* imparts *ἐπιστήμην τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγωνίαν*. Cp. also *Eth. Nic.* 5.

15. 1138 a 31, *ἐντεκνὼν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ*, and Isocr. De Antid. § 183, *οἱ μὲν παιδοτρίβει τὰ σχήματα τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀγωνίαν εὐρημένα τοὺς φοιτῶντας διδάσκουσιν*: also Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 42, *χειρο[τονεῖ] δὲ (ὁ δῆμος) καὶ παιδοτρίβας αὐτοῖς δύο καὶ διδασκαίλους [οἱ] τινες ὀπλομαχεῖν καὶ τοξεῖν καὶ ἀκοντίζειν κ[αὶ] καταπέλτην ἀφίειναι διδάσκουσιν*, and Plato, Gorg. 456 E, *τοὺς παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις διδάσκοντας μάχεσθαι*. But of course the *παιδοτρίβης* would teach boys of seven only easy accomplishments, such as shooting with the bow and throwing the dart. In Plato, Gorg. 451 E sq. and 452 B, however (cp. 504 A), the business of the *παιδοτρίβης* is said to be to produce physical beauty and strength.

C. 4. 9. *Νῦν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* *Μὲν οὖν* has apparently nothing to answer to it in the sequel; the answering clause would have run, if it had not been suppressed, 'but we must take quite a different course.' Little is said by Aristotle in confutation of the first of the two errors here referred to, probably because it was generally felt to be an error, but the second is dealt with at some length, because the Lacedaemonian training still stood high in common opinion. Phocion, for instance, sent his son to Sparta to undergo the training (Plut. Phoc. c. 20). The late Mr. Mark Pattison notes in his copy of Stahr's edition of the Politics on 1338 b 9-19, 'Respicit hic locus ad Plat. Rep. libr. iii. et speciatim ad pag. 410 D.'

10. *αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἔξιν ἐμποιοῦσι*. The Thebans are referred to (vol. i. p. 357, note 2: cp. also Plut. Sympos. 2. 5. 2, *ὥθισμοις τε χρῆσθαι καὶ περιτροπαῖς ἀλλήλων, ᾧ δὲ μάλιστα φασιν ἐν Δεύκτροις τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων παλαιστρικῶν ζῶτων καταβιβασθῆναι*), and also probably the Argives: cp. Aristophon, *Ἰατροίς* (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 357),

δεῖ τιν' ἀρᾶσθαι μῖσεν

τῶν παρουνόντων, παλαιστὴν νόμισεν Ἀργεῖον μ' ἑρᾶν,

and see Meineke's note. The Cynic Diogenes agreed with Aristotle in objecting to this kind of training (Diog. Laert. 6. 30, *ἐπειτα ἐν τῇ παλαίστρᾳ οὐκ ἐπέτρεπε τῇ παιδοτρίβῃ ἀθλητικῶς ἄγειν (τοὺς παῖδας τοῦ Κριτιάδου), ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ ἐρυθήματος χάριν καὶ ἐνέξιας*). Cp. also Julian, Or. 1. 10 D sq. It is to the habit of body characteristic of athletes that Aristotle objects, not to the practice of athletic exercises; the Spartan training included the latter, for instance boxing (cp. Plato, Protag. 342 B sq.), but it did not produce ἡ ἀθλητικὴ ἔξις. In 4 (7). 17. 1336 a 6 we have *τὴν πολυμυκὴν ἔξιν*. *Ἀθλητικὴν*, being placed before *ἔξιν*, is emphatic.

λαμβάνεται τὰ τε εἶδη καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν σωμάτων. Cp. De Gen. An. 4. 3. 768 b 29, ὅταν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀθλητῶν συμβαίνει διὰ τὴν πολυφαγίαν. διὰ πλῆθος γὰρ τροφῆς εὖ δυναμένης τῆς φύσεως κρατεῖν, δοτ' ἀνέλογον αἰξίν καὶ διαμῖνεν ὁμοίαν τῇ μορφῇ, ἄλλοια γίνεται τὰ μέρη, καὶ σχεδὸν ἐνίοθ' οὕτως δοτε μὲν ἐοικέναι τῷ πρότερον, and Plutarch's language about Aratus, ἐπιφαίνεται δ' ἀμείλει καὶ ταῖς εἰκόσιν ἀθλητικῇ τις ἰδέα, καὶ τὸ συνετὸν τοῦ προσώπου καὶ βασιλικὸν οὐ παντάπασι ἀρτεῖται τὴν ἀδρκαγίαν καὶ τὸ σκαφεῖον (Arat. c. 3). The excessive labour exacted from athletes would also tell on their physical growth, no less than the excessive amount of food they took: cp. Isocr. Ad Demon. § 12, τὰ μὲν γὰρ σώματα τοῖς συμμέτροις πόνοις, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ τοῖς σπουδαίοις λόγοις αἰξισθαι πέφυκε.

12. θηριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίαν μάλιστα συμφέρον. Τοῦτο = τὸ θηριώδεις ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοῖς πόνοις. So Pericles says of the Spartans (Thuc. 2. 39. 2), καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις αἱ μὲν ἐπιστῆς ἀσκήσει εὐδὲς ποίει ὅστες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετρίχωνται, and Ephorus of the Cretans (Fragm. 64 Müller, ap. Strab. p. 480), πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ δειλίαν ἀλλ' ἀνδρείαν κρατεῖν, ἐκ παιδὸν ὅπλοις καὶ πόνοις συστρέφειν: cp. Eurip. Suppl. 858 Bothe (884 Dindorf),

ἀγροῦς δὲ ταῖς σκληρὰ τῇ φύσει διδοῖς

ἔχεις πρὸς τ' ἀνδρείαν.

Hippocrates shared the view that hard physical labour produces courage (De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 565 Kühn), καὶ ἀπὸ μὲν ἡσυχίης καὶ ῥηθυμίας ἡ δειλίη αἴζεται, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ταλαιπωρίας καὶ τῶν πόνων αἱ ἀνδρείαι, and p. 566, ἐνταῦθα εἰκὸς εἶδεν μεγάλα εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ταλαιπωρον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον εὖ πεφυκότα καὶ τὸ τε ἀγριοῦ καὶ τὸ θηριώδεις αἱ τοιαῦται φύσεις οὐχ ἥμισυ ἔχουσιν. Ephorus regarded the Spartans as the reverse of θηριώδεις, for he says of Dercyllidas (Fragm. 130 Müller), ἦν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ τρόπῳ Λακωνικὸν οὐδὲ ἀπλοῦν ἔχων, ἀλλὰ πολὺ τὸ πανοῦργον καὶ τὸ θηριώδες. Διὸ καὶ Σκύθον αὐτὸν αἱ Λακωνιστάται προσηγόρευον.

14. καίτοι κ.τ.λ. Here we have ὅτε taken up by ὅτε and in 16 by τε ('nay more'): see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 536. 3 a, and note on 1272 b 19.

πολλάκις, in 2. 9. 1271 a 41—b 6: 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 5 sqq., and 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 40 sqq.

15. πρὸς μίαν, sc. ταύτην (Ridgeway). 'The extraordinary position of μάλιστα is probably due to the position of μίαν' (Richards). The sentence, if completed, would run, ὅτε πρὸς μίαν ταύτην ὅτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην. See Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 452. 1 a.

16. τοῦτο, i.e. τὰ πρὸς ταύτην.

17. οὕτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It has not been noticed, so far as I am aware, that Aristotle here tacitly corrects a saying ascribed to Anacharsis in Diod. 9. 26. 3, ὃ δὲ Κροΐσος . . . ἠρώτησεν Ἀνάχαρσιν . . . τίνα νομίζει τῶν ὄντων ἀνδρείωτατον; ὃ δὲ τὰ ἀγριώτατα τῶν ζῴων ἔφησεν, μόνα γὰρ προθύμως ἀποθνήσκουσιν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας. Does Aeschylus refer to this view of Anacharsis in Suppl. 760,

ἀλλ' ἔστι φήμη τοὺς λύκους κρείσσους κυνῶν
εἶναι βύβλου δὲ καρπὸς οὐ κρατεῖ στάχυν?

Plato had already said in Rep. 430 B, δοκεῖς γάρ μοι τὴν ὀρθὴν δόξαν περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τοῦτων ἀνεν παιδείας γεγονῆναι, τὴν τε θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραποδόδη, ὅτε πάνυ νόμμον ἡγεῖσθαι, ἄλλο τί τι ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖν. Brave and formidable men, however, were commonly likened to wild animals (Deinon ap. Athen. Deipn. 633 d sq.: Plut. Aristid. c. 18).

19. τοῖς ἡμερωτέροις καὶ λεοντώδεσιν ἦθεσιν. Heracles is called by Homer θυμολίῳν in Il. 5. 639 and Odys. 11. 267 (cp. Hymn. Homer. 15, εἰς Ἡρακλῆα λεοντόθυμον, and see Liddell and Scott, s. v. θυμολίῳν). Among the lower animals the dog is probably referred to: cp. Plato, Soph. 231 A, καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατος ἡμερωτάτη. For the gentleness ascribed to the lion cp. Hist. An. 9. 44. 629 b 8, καὶ γὰρ ὁ λέων ἐν τῇ βρώσει μὲν χαλεπώτατός ἐστι, μὴ πεινῶν δὲ καὶ βεβρωκὸς πραΰτατος: Anal. Pr. 2. 27. 70 b 26, ὁ λέων ἀνδρείον καὶ μεταδοτικόν: and Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 b 16, τὰ δὲ ἐλευθέρια καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ εὐγενή, οἷον λέων. Plato also has a favourable opinion of the lion (Rep. 589 B). Yet Homer says of Achilles (Il. 24. 41),
λέων δ' ἄε θῆρυα ὀδεν.

The authorities followed by Pliny ascribed clemency to the lion (Nat. Hist. 8. 48, leoni tantum ex feris clementia in supplices: prostratis parcit et, ubi saevit, in viros potius quam in feminas premit, in infantes non nisi magna fame).

πολλὰ δ' ἔστι κ.τ.λ. The sense is—and, so far from courage being the offspring of savageness, there are many very savage races which are wholly devoid of courage. The Achæi and Heniochi dwelt on the East coast of the Euxine. The Heniochi were believed to be an offshoot of the Lacedæmonians (Strabo, p. 496, Λάκωνας δὲ (οἰκίσαι) τὴν Ἡνιοχίαν, ὃν ἤρχον Κρίκας καὶ Ἀμφίστρατος οἱ τῶν Διοσκυρίων ἠνιοχοὶ, καὶ τοὺς Ἡνιόχους ἀπὸ τούτων εἰκὸς ὠνομάσθαι); there is therefore some appropriateness in the reference to them here in an argument directed against Lacedæmonian customs. The wild races on the Euxine are described as θηριώδεις in Eth.

Nic. 7. 6. 1148 b 21 sqq. also. Cannibalism is a sign of ἀργάνη (Ephor. Fragm. 76, τοῖς μὲν γὰρ εἶναι χαλεποῖς, ὥστε καὶ ἀνθρωποφαγεῖν: Aristot. Hist. An. 2. 1. 501 b 1, ἄγριον καὶ ἀνθρωποφάγον).

22. τῶν ἡπειρωτικῶν ἔθνῶν, 'continental nations,' as distinguished from nations inhabiting islands (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 12, μὴ εἰς νησίδας ἀποβλέποντας, ἀλλ' ἡπειρωτικὰ ἔθνη καταπορεύουσιν). Asiatic nations are probably especially referred to: cp. Isocr. Paneg. § 187, εἰ τὸν μὲν πόλεμον τὸν νῦν ὄντα περὶ ἡμῶς πρὸς τοῖς ἡπειρώταις ποιησάμεθα, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν τὴν ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην διαπορίσασμεν, and Philip. § 119, where we read of Jason of Pherae, ἐποιεῖτο γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις ὡς εἰς τὴν ἡπείρου διαβησόμενος καὶ βασιλεῖ πολέμῳ. Continental races were perhaps regarded as wilder than island races; they were less in the way of intercourse with others.

23. ληστρικὰ. Aristotle will not allow that these nations are πολεμικά: he slips in the word ληστρικὰ instead: cp. Demosth. Phil. 1. 23, ἀλλὰ ληστεύειν ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ γένει τοῦ πολέμου χρῆσθαι τὴν πρώτην, and Strabo, p. 833, where we read of Masinissa, ἀπὸ τοῦ ληστεύειν διδάξας (τοὺς νομάδας) στρατεύειν. In Strabo, p. 508, certain ἔθνη are described as ληστρικὰ καὶ μάχηρα.

ὅστιν—μετελλήψουσιν. For the use in the same passage of a singular and a plural verb after a neut. plur. nominative see Bon. Ind. 490 a 56 sqq.

24. ἔτι δ' αὐτοὺς τοὺς Λάκωνας κ.τ.λ. The sense is—besides, we need not go so far afield as to the races of the Euxine to prove that the Lacedaemonian system of gymnastic training is not the true means of producing courage, for the experience of the Lacedaemonian State has proved this.

25. ὥς μὲν αὐτοὶ κ.τ.λ. Αὐτοί, 'alone': see notes on 1252 a 14 and 1278 b 24, and cp. De Gen. An. 2. 8. 748 b 5. That the Spartans were thought to be φιλέπαιστοι, we see from Isocr. Archid. § 56, where Archidamus says, ὃ δὲ πάντων σχετλιάστερον, εἰ φιλοπορεύεται δοκοῦντες εἶναι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ῥαθυμότερον τῶν ἄλλων βουλευσόμεθα περὶ τούτων.

26. νῦν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle no doubt has before him in his reference to athletic contests the story told of Epaminondas by Plutarch, Pelop. c. 7, Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ τοῖς νέοις πάσαις φροσύμασι ἦν ἐμπειλημένος ἐκέλευε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ παλαίων, εἰτα ὁρῶν ἐπὶ τῇ κρατεῖν καὶ περιένειν γυμνουμένους ἐπέκληττε, ὡς ἀσχύνησθαι μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς προσῆκον, εἰ δουλεύουσι δι' ἀναδρίαν ὡς τοσούτων ταῖς ῥώμαις διαφέρουσιν. As to the superiority of the Thebans in battle, cp. Diod. 15. 87. 1. For the absence of ὁ

before τοῖς γυμνακοῖς ἀγῶσι καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, cp. Ἄθ. Πολ. c. 33, ἡγηθέντες τῇ περὶ Ἑρετρίαν ναυμαχίᾳ, and c. 34. l. 4.

27. οὐ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Lord Macaulay says the same thing in his note, History of England, c. 23 (Cabinet Edition, vol. viii. p. 13), though he does not refer to the Politics. That at Athens there was no public training for war, we see from Xen. Mem. 3. 12. 5. Τῷ μόνον μὴ πρὸς ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν = τῷ μόνον πρὸς μὴ ἀσκοῦντας ἀσκεῖν, according to Bonitz (Ind. 539 a 42), who remarks, 'interdum negatio universo enunciato vel enunciati membro praeponitur, cum pertineat ad unum quoddam eius vocabulum,' and gives many other instances.

28. For τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον see note on 1281 a 21.

30. οὐδὲ γὰρ λέκος κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 357, note 3, and cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1229 a 25, διὸ καὶ οἱ ἀγριοὶ θῆρες ἀνδρείοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οὐκ ὅτι οὕτως ὅταν γὰρ ἐκστῶσι, τοιοῦτοι εἰσὶν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνόμαλοι, ὥσπερ οἱ θρασυεῖς. It would seem from Plato, Laches 196 E sq. that everybody regarded wild animals as courageous (cp. Laws 963 E). Gryllus is made to argue to this effect in Plut. Gryllus, c. 4. 988 C sq.

οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων. For the gen. see note on 1259 b 24.

31. ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός. Cp. Plato, Laws 641 B, γενόμενοι δὲ τοιοῦτοι (i.e. ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί) τά τε ἄλλα πράττουσιν καλῶς, ὅτι δὲ κἂν κερῶν τοὺς πολεμίους μαχόμενοι.

32. οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but those who throw boys too much into these hard physical exercises and leave them untrained in necessary things make them in truth [not good men, but] sordid, for they make them useful to political science only for one task, and for this, as our inquiry tells us' (cp. 27, λειπομένους ἐτέρων), 'less well than others do.' Cp. [Plato,] Erastae 136 A, καλῶς γέ μοι, ἰφθί, ὃ Σώκρατες, φαίνει ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰ περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, ἀπεικάζας αὐτὸν τῷ πεντάθλῳ· ἔστι γὰρ ἡτεχνῶς τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ δουλείῃν μηδὲν πράγματι μᾶρ εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μᾶρ δὲν διαπεποιηκῆναι, ὥστε διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐνὸς τοῦτου ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἀπολελειφθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ δημιουργοί, ἀλλὰ πάντων μετρίως ἐφῆφθαι. Cp. also Plato, Laws 644 A, τὴν δὲ εἰς χρήματα τείνουσαν (παιδείαν) ἢ τινα πρὸς ἰσχὺν ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην τιὰ σοφίαν ἂνεν νοῦ καὶ δικῆς βάνουσόν τ' εἶναι καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐκ ἀξίαν τὸ παράπαν παιδείαν καλεῖσθαι. In τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαιδαγύγους ποιήσαντες Aristotle appears to imply that the Lacedaemonian State did not oblige the young Spartan to learn to read and write (see Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., p. 100 sq.). Has

he in his mind the language used by Archidamus (Thuc. i. 84) not without reference to his own countrymen, πολὺ τε διαφέρειν οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπων, κρείσσω δὲ εἶναι δοτῆς ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαυτάτοις παιδεύεται? For εἰς ταῦτα ἀνίσταται cp. Hdt. 2. 165, ἀνίσταται ἐς τὸ μάχων, and 167, τοὺς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ἀειμένους.

35. ὡς φησὶν ὁ λόγος, cp. Plato, Phaedr. 274 A, ὡς ὁ λόγος φησὶν, and Soph. 259 C, ὡς οἱ νῦν λόγοι φασί. 'Formula ὁ λόγος σημαίνει apud Platonem creberrimi usus est' (see Stallbaum on Plato, Polit. 275 E). In Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 21 we have σημαίνει ὁ λόγος οὗτος: cp. also Pol. 3. 8. 1279 b 34, ζοικε τοῖσιν ὁ λόγος ποιῶν δῆλον κ.τ.λ.

36. δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and we ought to judge [whether they train them worse than others do]' etc. This remark may probably have reference to a reply of the Lacedaemonians to the Thebans, when the latter bade them fight or acknowledge their inferiority to the Thebans; the Lacedaemonians answered, περὶ μὲν τοῦ πότεροι βελτίους τὰς πράξεις κρίνειν τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἑκατέρους πεπραγμένας κ.τ.λ. (Aristid. Or. in Platon. 4. ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 248. 425 a 21 sqq. Bekker).

37. ἀνταγωνιστὰς τῆς παιδείας, 'rivals in gymnastic education' (Sepulv. 'concertatores et aemulos disciplinae').

40. μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἡβῆς κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσοιστέον κ.τ.λ. Aristotle would no doubt exclude at this age the pancration and the pentathlon, which were among the βαρύτερα δόξα (Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 179: Paus. 6. 24. 1), and would probably desire that contests even in running and leaping should be made as little exacting as possible. In the Panathenaea at one time boys contended in the pentathlon, but later on this was dropped (Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans. p. 373). See vol. i. p. 358, note 1, and cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 24 sq. In Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 26 *sub fin.* it is implied that ἀναγκαῖα δόξα are not suitable for a boy of fifteen.

τὴν βίαιον τροφήν, 'the constrained diet of athletes': see Liddell and Scott s.v. ἀναγκοτροφία, and cp. Hippocr. De Diet. i. vol. i. p. 664 Kühn, γυμνασίων τῶν ἀπὸ βίης γενομένων.

41. τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους. Cp. Rhet. i. 11. 1370 a 16, οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην τοῦτω.

1. δύναται, sc. ἡ βίαιος τροφή καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνοι. If with 1339 a. p^{1.3.4} Bekk. we read δύναται, we must supply τὰ ἀναγκαῖα γυμνάσια (cp. 4).

ἐν γὰρ τοῖς Ὀλυμπιονίκαις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle would seem to have had a list of Olympic victors before him, and possibly not merely the list inscribed on stone at Olympia, but a list in the form of a book. 'With the year a.c. 776 began the list of Olympic victors used by the Alexandrian writers on chronology. A list of this kind was first published by the sophist Hippias of Elis, a contemporary of Socrates (Plut. Numa, c. 1: cp. Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 2. 61 and Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* 1. 958. 1). The list was later dealt with by Aristotle and others' (Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ed. 2, 1. 585). See on this subject Zeller, *Gr. Ph.* 2. 2. 109. 1 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, *Eng. Trans.*, 1. 104. 1): V. Rose, *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus*, p. 545 sqq.: Heitz, *Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles*, p. 254. Milo of Crotona was one of the exceptions; he won in the wrestling-match for boys at Olympia, and also won in the wrestling-match for men at six Olympic festivals between a.c. 532 and 512 (Holm, *Gr. Gesch.* 1. 439). In Herondas 1. 50 sqq. Gryllus, the hero of the piece, is said to have achieved almost as much.

3. ἀφαιρῆσθαι τὴν δύναμιν. Cp. *Eth. Nic.* 2. 2. 1104 a 15, τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν.

4. ὅταν δ' ἀφ' ἡβῆς κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 358, note 2. The 'other studies' are reading and writing, music and drawing. Plato, on the other hand (*Laws* 809 E sqq.), allots three years (aet. 10-13) to reading and writing, and three more (aet. 13-16) to lessons on the harp. Aristotle evidently thinks it better to postpone these studies till after the attainment of puberty. His view is that mental work is not favourable to the body (1339 a 7 sqq.), and he desires that the important physical change involved in the attainment of puberty should have been safely and well achieved before any mental training begins. By ἡβῆ Aristotle evidently means (cp. 4 (7). 17. 1337 a 1, τῇ διαίρειται τῆς φύσεως) not the attainment of the age at which youths arrived at ἡβῆ in the eye of the law, but the advent of physical puberty, which seems to be placed in the fourteenth year in Hippocr. *Coacae Praenotiones*, vol. i. p. 321 Kühn. Aristotle appears to devote to the more exacting kind of gymnastic training all the years intervening between three years after puberty and twenty-one. He makes no provision for the military duties which occupied the young Athenian during his nineteenth and twentieth years (see note on

1336 b 37). We do not learn when the youth of Aristotle's 'best State' were to begin their military training, but they would not do so apparently till after twenty-one. Plato in the Laws (833 D, 834 A) abolishes the heavier kind of gymnastic contests at festivals, such as wrestling and the pancration, but this is perhaps in part because he is legislating for Cretans.

7. *ἄμα γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* See vol. i. p. 359, note 1. This rule does not seem to be observed among ourselves. Much hard work is done on the river and in the football-field by youths who are preparing for difficult examinations. In a lecture before the Sanitary Congress at Brighton in 1890 the late Sir B. Richardson pointed out that in those occupations in which 'mental and bodily work was combined, the strain was most intense, and that those sorts of work should never be carried into weariness' (*Times*, Sept. 1. 1890).

12. *καὶ πρότερον*, in c. 3. 1337 b 27 sqq.

C. 5.

13. For *ἐνδύσιμον* see Bon. Ind. a. v., where the passage before us is grouped with Rhet. 3. 14. 1415 a 5 sqq., in which passage *ἐνδύσιμον* = *προσέσιμον*.

14. *οὕτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* *Μερίχειν αὐτῆς*, 16, is a vague expression, but probably means 'study it' (cp. *παιδεύειν*, 27, and see note on 1337 b 29). This question must be settled in order that we may ascertain how music is to be studied, for if it is to be studied for the sake of recreation, the tunes and rhythms to be practised by the pupil will be quite other than those which will be practised by him if it is to be studied for the sake of virtue or intellectual enjoyment. A classification of studies into *αἱ ἡθροῦσαι*, *αἱ πρὸς ἡδονὴν* *τινα καὶ χάριν ἐλευθέριον σπουδάζονται*, and *αἱ εἰς σύνεσιν ἢ πρᾶξιν λεγόμεναι* is implied in Plut. Themist. c. 2—a classification which recalls to some extent that in the passage before us. Compare also the witticism of Dorion, a musician and *bon vivant* of Aristotle's day, about a kind of lobster, *τοὺς δὲ καράθους ἴφη τρία ἔχειν, διατρίβην καὶ εὐωχίαν καὶ θεωρίαν* (Athen. Deipn. 337 e).

17. *καθάπερ ὕπνου καὶ μέθης*. As to sleep, cp. Rhet. I. 11. 1370 a 11, *τὰς δ' ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντοκίας λυπηρὰς . . . τὰ δ' ἐναγρία ἡδία· διὸ αἱ ῥηθυμίαι καὶ αἱ ἀπορίαι καὶ αἱ ἀμέλειαι καὶ αἱ παιδαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀναπαύσεις καὶ ὁ ὕπνος τῶν ἡδίων*, and De Somno et Vigilia 2. 455 b 20 sqq.

ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for these things are not in themselves connected with virtue, but are pleasurable and at the same time "bid care to

cease," as Euripides says, [and therefore they are used with a view to relaxation]. For τῶν σπουδαίων, cp. Theogn. 115,

πολλοὶ τοι πόσιος καὶ βρώσιος εἰσιν ἐταῖροι,
ἐν δὲ σπουδαίῳ πρήγματι πανυρότεροι,

and Plato, Symp. 181 A, ὅσον δ' ὦν ἡμεῖς ποιούμεν, ἢ πίνειν ἢ ᾄδειν ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, οὐκ ἔστι τούτων αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καλὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ πράξει, ὡς ἂν πραχθῇ, τοιοῦτον ἀπίβη, and see vol. i. p. 359, note 2. For οὔτε followed by ἀλλά, cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 11 sqq., Magn. Mor. 2. 6. 1203 b 10, 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 16. l. 8, and with Kaibel (Stil und Text der Πολιτεία 'Αθηναίων, p. 158), Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 b 7 sqq. and 2. 21. 1394 a 22, where Roemer reads οὐ μέντοι οὔτε περὶ κ.τ.λ. In Metaph. Θ. 3. 1046 b 33-36 οὔτε is taken up by ὁμοίως δέ (see Bonitz' note on the passage in his edition of the Metaphysics). Aristotle has Eurip. Bacch. 332 Bothe (377 Dindorf) before him, where we read of Bromius,

ὅς τ' αὖδ' ἔχει

θιασεύειν τε χοροῖς, μετὰ τ' αἰλοῦ γελάσαι
ἀποπαῦσαι τε μερίμνας, ἐπύταν βότρυος ἔλθῃ
γάνος ἐν δαιτὶ θεῶν, κισσοφόροις δ' ἐν θαλάσῃ
ἀνδράσι κρατὴρ ὕπνου ἀμφεβάλλῃ.

Here, as he says in 19-21, ὕπνος μίθῃ μουσικῇ and ὄρχησις are all grouped together. The same is the case in Hom. Il. 13. 636 (cp. Lucian, De Saltat. c. 23),

πάντων μὲν κόρος ἐστί, καὶ ὕπνου καὶ φιλότῃτος
μολπῆς τε γλυκερῆς καὶ ἀμύμονος ὄρχηθμοῖο,

and Odys. 8. 248,

αἰεὶ δ' ἡμῖν δαῖς τε φίλη κίθαρις τε χοροὶ τε
εἵματά τ' ἐξημοιβὰ λοετρὰ τε θερμὰ καὶ εὐναί.

Cp. also Athen. Deipn. 40 a.

10. διδὲ καὶ τάττουσιν κ.τ.λ. Supply μετὰ πάντων τούτων from what follows. Cp. 1339 b 14, εἰλόγως δ' εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν (sc. πάντων), c. 7. 1342 a 14, where πάντας must be supplied with κομφίζεσθαι, 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 37, καὶ περὶ ὧν δ' νόμος ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κινῶσιν ἀλλ' ἀκολουθῶσι (sc. τῷ νόμῳ), and 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 31, where εἰς τὴν σύνοδον ταύτην is suppressed after ἀπαντῶσι.

21. τιθέασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄρχησιν ἐν τούτοις. This view implied that dancing is a cure for care. The sight of dancing must apparently be meant. Lucian says (De Saltat. c. 79), οὕτω δὲ θέλγει ὄρχησις, ὥστε . . . λύπη ἐχόμενός (τις) ἐξίρχεται τοῦ θεάτρον φαειρότερος ὥσπερ τι φάρμακον ληθεδανὺν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν νηπενθέος τε καὶ ἀχολοῦ

πῶς. He goes further in c. 81, and claims that it has a good ethical effect on the spectator.

ἢ μᾶλλον εὐφρέων πρὸς ἀρετὴν τι τείνει τὴν μουσικὴν κ.τ.λ. This is answered in 1340 b 10 sqq. 'Ἀρετὴν,' 'moral virtue,' is represented by παιδείαν in c. 5. 1339 b 13 (cp. c. 7. 1341 b 38), for education is commonly connected by Aristotle with the production of moral virtue: cp. c. 7. 1342 a 2, πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν τοῖς ἡδοναίοις (ἀρρεσίοις χρηστοῖς).

28. φρόνησιν, 'intellectual culture': see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 772. 3 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., 2. 309. 3), and Sus.², Note 1023 (Sus.⁴, 1. p. 585), who rightly defend the words καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν against those who would expunge them or change φρόνησιν into εὐφροσύνη. That the study of music may contribute to intellectual virtue is implied in c. 6. 1341 b 6 sq., and that intellectual virtue is the ultimate end of education we see from 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 14 sqq. For the use of φρόνησις in this sense, see Bon. Ind. 831 b 4 sqq.

τρίτων τῶν εἰρημένων, 'third among the aims which have been enumerated': see Vahlen on Poet. 3. 1448 a 19.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is answered by ἄλλὰ μὲν, 29. Stallbaum on Plato, Protag. 326 A, compares Xen. Cyrop. 2. 2. 14, εὐαίμασι μὲν γὰρ καὶ πατέρες νόμις συφροσύνην μηχανῶνται καὶ διδάσκαλοι παισὶν ἐγχαθάρματα. Is Aristotle here tacitly correcting Plato, Laws 819 B, πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ περὶ λογισμοῖς ἐπιτελεῖται τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς μαθήμασι, μετὰ παιδείας τε καὶ ἡδονῆς μαθεύονται, and 820 D, ταῦτα τοῖς ἐγὼ μὲν, ὁ Κλεινίας, φημι τοῖς νόμοις δεῖν μαθεύεσθαι καὶ γὰρ οὕτως βλαβερὰ οὕτως χαλεπὰ ἐστί, μετὰ δὲ παιδείας ἅμα μαθητέοντα ἐφελγόντι μὲν, βλάπτει δὲ ἥμῃν τὴν πόλιν οὐδὲν;

29. ἄλλὰ μὲν οὐδὲ διαγωγὴν γὰρ παισὶν κ.τ.λ. For ἄλλὰ μὲν οὐδὲ . . . γὰρ, cp. 3. 13. 1284 b 30, ἄλλὰ μὲν οὐδ' ἔρχων γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου, and 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 7. Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 15) has anticipated me in comparing these passages.

30. οὐδενὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1219 b 7, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελεῖς εὐδαιμον· οὐ γὰρ ὁλόν· Stob. Ecl. 2. 6. 12, καὶ τὸ ἐν βίῃ δι' τελείῃ προσέθεσιν, ἐνδείχασθαι βουλευθέντες ὅτι περὶ τοῖς φθι προήκοις ἄνδρας ἢ εὐδαιμονία γίνεται· τὸ γὰρ μερῶς ἀτελεῖς καὶ ὁ τοῦτο βίος, δι' ὃ οὐκ ἂν γενίσθαι περὶ τοῦτ' εὐδαιμονίαν. Cp. also Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 186, αἰξὺ οὐκ ἔτεκεν, ἔμφορ δ' ἐπὶ δόματι παίζει· ἐπὶ τῶν οὐκ ἔτεκεν ἢ γεγενῆσιν, ἀλλ' ἀτελεῖς ὄντων καὶ τὰ τῶν τελείων θελόντων ποιῶν.

31. ἀλλ' ἴσως κ.τ.λ. The sense is—but perhaps the toils of boyhood in learning to play may, notwithstanding what has been said, be for the sake of pastime, not indeed for the sake of pastime in youth, but for the sake of pastime in manhood. The Lacedaemonian Leotychidas, the first in the royal line to bear this name at Sparta, in answer to the question, τί δέϊ μάλιστα μαθάνειν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους παῖδας; said, Ταῦτα, ὅσ' ἂν αὐτοὺς ὠφελήσῃεν ἄνδρας γενομένους (Plut. Apophth. Lac. Leotych. 3), and Aristippus replied to a similar question, ὅς ἐστιν ἄνδρες γενόμενοι χρήσονται (Diog. Laert. 2. 80).

33. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον κ.τ.λ., i.e. εἰ ἡ τῶν παιδῶν σπουδή ἐστὶ παιδιᾶς χάριν ἄνδράσι γενομένοις καὶ τελειωθείσιν. The supposition is somewhat of a paradox: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 32, σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἥλιθιον φαίνεται καὶ λίαν παιδικόν· παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὁρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ. The Persian kings had μουσουργοὶ attached to their court (Xen. Cyrop. 4. 6. 11). Compare Plut. Pericl. c. 1, ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἐπιτερεπῶς ἐν τῇ πότι ψῆλαντα καὶ τεχνικῶς εἶπεν, "Οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ καλῶς οὕτω ψάλλον;" ἀρετὴ γάρ, ἂν βασιλεὺς ἀκροῶσθαι ψαλλόντων σχολάζῃ, καὶ πολὺ νέμει ταῖς Μούσαις, ἐτίρων ἀγωνιζομένων τὰ τοιαῦτα θεωτῆς γεγόμενος. Αὐτὰ ποιούντων, i.e. χειρουργούντων, which is implied in μαθάνειν αὐτοῖς (cp. c. 7. 1342 a 3). So we have in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 30, δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι, and in Plato, Rep. 498 A, ἄλλων τοῦτο πραττόντων.

38. ὅσον πρὸς μάθῃσιν μόνον. Cp. Plato, Laws 794 C, ἐὰν δέ πῃ ἐνγχαρῶσι, μέχρι γε μαθήσεως καὶ τὰ θῆλα, and Protag. 312 B, τοῦτων γὰρ σὺ ἐκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχῃ ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργοὶς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει, and Isocr. De Antid. § 264, ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀπικριβομένοις οὐδὲν ἂν εὐεργετήσῃ, πλὴν τοῖς ἐντεύθειν (ἢ προηρημίους, τοὺς δὲ μαθάνοντας δύνῃσι).

39. τὰ τοιαῦτα, 'things such as have been mentioned,' but what things are meant? 'Things which will be a source of pleasure in after-years' (so Vict.), or 'things which afford pleasure' (Sus.⁴), or 'musical performances' (Welldon)? The question is not free from doubt, but I incline to the third interpretation, as ταῦτα in 42 seems to mean 'musical performances,' and not τὰ δυνάμενα τὰ ἕδη βελτίω ποιεῖν.

καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅψων πραγματείαν κ.τ.λ. Richards is probably right in adding τὰ before περὶ (see critical note), though we expect τὰ ὅψα with παρασκευάζειν rather than the cumbrous periphrasis τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅψων πραγματείαν. If the reading of the MSS. is retained, ὅψα or some such word must be supplied with παρασκευάζειν. Bonitz

(Ind. s.v.) explains *προαγματεία* as 'rei alicuius tractatio via ac ratione instituta.' *Παρασκευάζειν* is especially used of cooks: cp. Plato, Gorg. 518 B, οἱ τοὶ θαυμαστοὶ γυγνάσι σωματῶν θεραπευταί, ὁ μὲν ἄρτους θαυμαστοῖς παρασκευάζει, ὁ δὲ ὄψον, ὁ δὲ οἶνον. *Cookery no less than music is a source of refreshment and pleasure to grown-up men.* But it was regarded by the Greeks as work for slaves (1. 7. 1255 b 23—27: Plut. Lycurg. et Num. comp. c. 2, ἀλλ' ἢ ἡ περὶ τὰ χρήματα κατασκευὴ δεδομένη δοῦλοις καὶ ἑλλώσι, ὥσπερ ἡ περὶ τὸ δέικνον καὶ ὄψον διακονία: Pomp. c. 73, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ τούτου περιέπων καὶ θεραπείων ὅσα δεσπότας δοῦλοι μέχρι νύκτας ποδῶν καὶ δείκνον παρασκευῆς). Has Sextus Empiricus this passage of the Politics before him in Adv. Math. 6. 33, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ ποτε, ὅν τρόπον χωρὶς ὀφθαλμικῆς καὶ οἰνογευστικῆς ἡδόμεθα ὄψον ἢ οἶνον γευσάμενοι, ὅδε καὶ χωρὶς μουσικῆς ἡσθηόμεν ἂν τερπνοῦ μέλους ἀκούσαντες?

41. ἔχει, sc. ἡ μουσική.

42. ταῦτα, i.e. musical performances.

1. ὁρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν, i.e. μαθάνειν δύνασθαι 1339 b. ὁρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ ὁρθῶς κρίνειν, or in other words to learn to become better in character: cp. 1340 a 15, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὁρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν. For the place of δύνασθαι cp. c. 3. 1337 b 31, and see note on 1281 a 26.

2. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Athenaeus may have this passage before him in Deipn. 628 b, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δ', εἰ μὲν ἐμάθανον τὴν μουσικὴν, οὐδὲν λέγουσιν ὅτι δὲ κρίνειν δύναται καλῶς τὴν τέχνην ὁμολογεῖται παρ' αὐτῶν, καὶ φασὶ τρις ἡδὴ σεσωκέναι διαφθειρομένην αὐτήν. The Spartans learnt to sing (Plut. Lycurg. c. 21), and we read in c. 6. 1341 a 33 of one Spartan at any rate who had learned to play on the αἰλὴς—indeed, the Peripatetic Chamaeleon, a pupil of Aristotle, asserted that at one time they commonly learnt to play on the αἰλὴς (Athen. Deipn. 184 d)—but it would seem that in Aristotle's day they did not commonly learn to play on any instrument.

7. οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς κ.τ.λ. It is Apollo, not Zeus, whom the poets represent as singing and playing on the harp (Eurip. Ion 827 Bothe, 905 Dindorf, οὐ δὲ κιθάρῃ κλέζειν παιᾶνας μέλπων). In the older poetic descriptions, however, according to Preller, Griech. Mythologie 1. 215, Apollo does not sing but only plays, while the Muses sing to his playing (e.g. in Hesiod, Scut. Herc. 201 sqq.). For τοῖς ποιηταῖς, see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 423. 3, where Plato, Rep. 389 E, Ὀμήρῳ, and Laws 706 D, αἰτῶ, are compared. Vahlen (Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 4. 417) compares Poet. 18.

1456 a 25, τὸν χορὸν δὲ . . . συναγωνίζεσθαι μὴ ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδῃ ἀλλ' ὥσπερ Σοφοκλεῖ. Aristotle elsewhere uses the form *ᾄδων*: he may possibly use *αἰδῶν* here because he is quoting from a poet.

9. τοὺς τοιούτους, i.e. τοὺς αἰδῶντας καὶ καθαρίζοντας. In Hom. *Odyss.* 17. 382 sqq. the *δοιδός* is counted among *δημουργοί*. Compare Croesus' advice to Cyrus as to the Lydians (*Hdt.* 1. 155), *πρόειπε δ' αὐτοῖσι καθαρίζειν τε καὶ ψάλλειν καὶ καπηλεύειν παιδεύειν τοὺς παῖδας· καὶ ταχέως σφίας, ὃ βασιλεῦ, γυναῖκας ἀντ' ἀνδρῶν ὄψεται γεγονότας, ὥστε οὐδὲν δεινὸν τοι ἴσονται μὴ ἀποστήσει.*

καὶ τὸ πρῶττεν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Hom. *Odyss.* 14. 463,

ὅσοι γὰρ ἀνέγωι

ἤλεός, ὅς τ' ἐφίηκε πολὺφρονά περ μάλ' αἰεὶσαι
καὶ θ' ἀπαλὸν γελᾶσαι καὶ τ' ὀρχήσασθαι ἀνῆκεν,
καὶ τι ἔπος προΐηκεν, ὅπερ τ' ὀρρητὸν ἔμμενον.

13. παιδεῖαν. See above on 1339 a 21. *Παιδεῖαν* corresponds to τὰ ἥθη βελτίω ποιεῖν, 1339 a 41.

14. εἰς πάντα τάττεται. Cp. *Eth. Nic.* 1. 9. 1099 b 7, ὅθεν εἰς ταῦτ' ἵκνουντο ἔστι τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ.

15. μετέχειν, sc. πάντων. See above on 1339 a 19.

ἥ τε γὰρ παιδεία κ.τ.λ., 'for pastime [must be pleasurable, since it] is for the sake of relaxation and relaxation must be pleasurable, for it is a cure for the pain which is produced by toil, [and things are cured by their contraries].' For the famous principle that things are cured by their contraries, cp. *Eth. Nic.* 2. 2. 1104 b 17, *ἰατρείας γὰρ τινὲς εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι* (see Stewart), and 4. 11. 1126 a 21 sq. Aristotle inherits this principle from Hippocrates: cp. *Hippocr. Aphorism.* vol. iii. p. 714 Kühn, ἀπὸ πλησμονῆς δόξα ἀν' νοσήματα γένηται, κένωσις ἴηται, καὶ δόξα ἀπὸ κενώσεως, πλησμονή, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ ὑπεραντίωσις, and *De Natura Hominis*, vol. i. p. 361 Kühn. Compare with τὴν δ' ἀνάπαυσιν κ.τ.λ. Pindar, *Nem.* 4. 1, ἄριστος εὐφροσύνα πόνων κεκρμένον
ἰατρός.

In the passage before us and in c. 3. 1337 b 36 sqq. we get a glimpse of Aristotle's Theory of Relaxation, if he can be said to have one. The essential thing about relaxation is that it must be pleasurable. Toil causes pain and pain is cured by its opposite; hence if the pain of toil is cured by relaxation, relaxation must be pleasurable. Play is a means of relaxation, but there are other means also—sleep and conviviality (1339 a 16 sqq.). Sleep and conviviality heal care as well as the pain of toil (*ibid.*); whether

play does so we are not told. Play, unlike sleep, involves movement (4 (7). 17. 1336 a 26 sqq.); it may even be toilsome, though it is a cure for toil (1336 a 28 sqq.). Unlike sleep, again, it may be of a right or a wrong kind ethically; it may, for instance, be illiberal (1336 a 29: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 14. 1128 a 17 sqq.); hence it may affect the character for good or ill. In infancy no toil is undergone, so that the play of infancy does not come as a relaxation after toil. Aristotle distinguishes *diagogê* from relaxation, for though *diagogê* is pleasurable, it has in it an element of *τὸ καλόν* which relaxation has not (1339 b 17 sqq.). We may probably infer that *diagogê* will not serve as relaxation. Does it need to be followed by relaxation as *ἀσχολία* does? Aristotle does not consider this question, but the answer to it is probably in the negative. It is true that the activities called into play in *diagogê* are activities of so high a kind (see note on 1333 a 35) that they may well cause fatigue needing to be removed by relaxation, but we must remember on the other hand that Aristotle regards them as pleasurable (c. 5. 1339 b 17 sqq.) and desirable for their own sake. *Ἀσχολία* is accompanied by pain (c. 3. 1337 b 39), and hence the need that it should be followed by relaxation.

19. τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν κ.τ.λ., 'for happiness, [which is an accompaniment of *diagogê*,] consists of both these things.' See vol. i. p. 296, note 1, and cp. Stob. Ecl. 2. 6. 12, *ἥδιστον γὰρ τι καὶ πᾶλλιστον εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν*. That happiness is an accompaniment of *diagogê*, we see from c. 3. 1338 a 1 sqq.

20. καὶ ψάλλῃ οἶσαν. Plato (Laws 669 D sqq.) objects to *ψαλλή μουσική*. 'Fuit autem *ψυλοκαθαρστικῆς* auctor Aristonicus, aequalis fere Archilochi' (cp. Athen. Deipn. 637 f), 'atque *ψάλλῃ εἰλησῶν* sub initium Pythiadum exercuit Sacadas' (Stallbaum on Laws 669 D).

21. Μουσαῖος. See note in Sus.⁴

22. καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγὰς. See critical note on 1330 b 31.

24. ὥστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν κ.τ.λ. 'Ἐντεῦθεν, i. e. from the fact of its pleasantness. *Παιδεύεσθαι* is probably middle: cp. 1340 b 13.

25. ὅσα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for things harmlessly pleasant, [of which music is one,] are suitable not only for the end' (i. e. happiness), 'but also for relaxation.' That the pleasure derived from music is harmless had already been said by Plato (Laws 670 D, *ὅτι . . . ἥδοντες αὐτοὶ τε ἡδονὰς τὸ παραχρῆμα δέουσις ἔχονται κ.τ.λ.*). Plato had also connected harmless pleasure with pastime in Laws 667 E

ΚΑ. ἀβλαβῇ λέγεις ἡδονὴν μόρον. ΛΘ. ναί, καὶ παιδιὰν γε εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην λέγω τότε, ὅταν μῆτε τι βλάβῃ μῆτε ὠφελῇ σπουδῆς ἢ λόγου ἀξίον. For ἀρμόττει πρὸς, cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 10, ποῖα μὲν εὖν δημοκρατία πρὸς ποῖαν ἀρμόττει πῶλον, and Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 34.

27. For ἐν τῷ τῷ γίνεσθαι cp. Plato, Laws 635 C, γεγρόμενοι ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ('dum versantur in voluptatibus,' Stallbaum), and 841 C, γεγρότες ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ, and Phileb. 35 E.

29. οὐχ ὅσον ἐπὶ πλεόν, apparently 'not merely with a view to a further end' (Vict. 'non ut plus inde capiant'). I have not happened to meet with a parallel to this use of ἐπὶ πλεόν. For οὐχ ὅσον in the sense of 'not only,' cp. Thuc. 4. 62. 2 (Liddell and Scott).

30. διαναπαύειν, 'to let them rest awhile' (Liddell and Scott).

31. συμβέβηκε δὲ κ.τ.λ. The meaning is—but men are not content with using pastime as a means of obtaining the relaxation and pleasure of which they often stand in need; they fall into the error of confounding it with the end of life, and seek happiness in the pleasures arising from it. Pastime is χρήσιμον (1339 b 30), or in other words a means to the end (Eth. Nic. 8. 2. 1155 b 19 sq.: cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 3. 1096 a 7, χρήσιμον καὶ ἄλλον χάριν), but instead of regarding it thus, they take it to be the end of life.

33. ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχούσαν, 'but not any chance kind of pleasure.' Prof. Butcher (Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 211), compares Poet. 14. 1453 b 10, οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν δεῖ ζητεῖν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας, ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκίαν, and 26. 1462 b 13, δεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὴν τυχούσαν ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν αὐτὰς (i.e. tragedy and epic poetry) ἀλλὰ τὴν εἰρημίτην. Aristotle perhaps has before him Plato, Laws 658 E, συγχωρῶ δὲ τὸ γε τοσούτων καὶ ἐγὼ τοῖς πολλοῖς, δεῖν τὴν μουσικὴν ἡδονὴν κρίνεσθαι, μὴ μίνοι τῶν γε ἐπιτυχόντων, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐκείνην εἶναι Μοῦσαν καλλίστην, ἥτις τοῖς βελτίστοις καὶ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένοις τίρπει.

ζητοῦντες δὲ ταύτην κ.τ.λ., 'and seeking this' (i.e. the pleasure of the end) 'they take the other' (i.e. the pleasure of pastime) 'as being this.' Cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 2, οἱ δ' εὐθὺς οὐκ ὁρθῶς ζητοῦσι τὴν αὐδαιμονίαν, ἔξουσίας ὑπαρχούσης, and see note on that passage.

36. αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν ἡδονῶν, 'the pleasures we have mentioned,' i.e. the pleasures of pastime. Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 6. 1176 b 9, καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδίσται (sc. καθ' αὐτὰς εἰσιν αἰρεταί): οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα αὐτὰς αἰροῦνται, and 34, ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἵκειν ἢ παιδιᾷ, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς ποιεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. See note in Sus.⁴

38. For the needless addition of αἰρίαν in the relative sentence,

cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 3, *ὁπόσαι μὲν σωτηρίαν φέρουσι τῶν ἀρχῶν, χρησταὶ οὖσαι καὶ μὴ χρησταί, ἡ κίνδυνον τῇ δῆμῳ ἄπαντι, τούτων μὲν τῶν ἀρχῶν οὐδὲν δείται ὁ δῆμος μετεῖναι*: Aristot. Hist. An. 2. 11. 503 a 13 sqq.: Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 23 sqq. and 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 7 sqq.: 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 32–34: 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 10: 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 19 sqq.

40. *περὶ δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεῖν κ.τ.λ.* Compare the similarly anacoluthic sentence, 3. 16. 1287 a 8, *περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἄρχει πάντα κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεὺς—δοκεῖ δὲ τισιν οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν*. Sus.⁴ would supply (after *δοκεῖν*) *εἰκότως ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι ζητεῖσθαι* (or *γίνεσθαι*). Perhaps, however, it is simpler to supply *ζητητέον*, which comes to the surface, as it were, in the next sentence. *Κοινωνεῖν τῆς μουσικῆς*, 'have recourse to music': cp. c. 6. 1341 a 1, *ποιῶν μελῶν καὶ ποίων ἡθυμῶν κοινωνητέον*. Οὐ διὰ ταύτην μέσην, 9c. τῆς αἰτίας.

42. *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Probl. 10. 42. 895 a 33, *ἡ τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκεν, αἴτιον δὲ καὶ ταῖς γυναιξὶν ὅτι ἡ θερμότης κάτω ὀρεμῇ*. A contrast is here drawn between the accidents of a thing and its nature or essence (*φύσις* = *οὐσία*, see Bon. Ind. 545 b 23 sqq., where Metaph. A. 4. 1014 b 35, *ἐπεὶ δ' ἄλλον τρόπον λέγεται ἡ φύσις ἡ τῶν φύσει ὄντων οὐσία*, is referred to among other passages). For the contrast of *οὐσία* and *συμβεβηκός*, see Metaph. Γ. 4. 1007 a 31 sqq.

2. *καὶ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. c. 6. 1341 a 15 sqq. and Probl. 28. 7. 1340 a 950 a 5, *ἡ διὰ τὸ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτων γινόμενας ἡδονὰς κοινὰς εἶναι ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις; ἀπεὶ οὖν οὕτως κοινὰ ἀτιμώτατα εἶσι καὶ μάλιστα ἡ μέση ἐπονεῖδιστοι*. The many know not what true pleasure is (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 15). For *τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς ἥτις ἔχουσι πάντες αἰσθῆσιν*, cp. Metaph. B. 2. 996 b 28, *τὰς κοινὰς δόξας εἰς ἃν ἅπαντες δεικνύουσιν*. Aristotle implies that this *κοινὴ ἡδονή* does not affect the character or the soul; he probably regards it as pleasure of a merely physical kind. For the view that pleasure which comes by nature is common to all, cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 b 8, *τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμῶν αἱ μὲν κοινὰ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἰδίαι καὶ ἐπίθετοι* οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσικὴ πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρὰς ἡ ὑγρὰς τροφῆς, ὅτι δ' ἀμφοῖν, Phys. 8. 7. 261 b 25 sq., and Plato, Laws 963 E. Cp. also Diphilus, Πυλὺπράγμων Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 407),

*τόδε δ', ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ γένος ὡς περ θηρίων
ἐπιβουλὴν ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει καὶ πανταχοῦ.*

5. *ἀλλ' ὅρᾳν κ.τ.λ.* Sepulv. 'sed etiam videre numquid ad mores quoque animamque pertineat.' For *συντρέψαι πρὸς*, cp. Περὶ νεότητος

καὶ γῆρας, 3. 469 a 20, διὰ τί δ' αἱ μὲν τῶν αἰσθήσεων φανερώς συντίθενται πρὸς τὴν καρδίαν, αἱ δ' εἰσὶν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ . . . τὸ αἴτιον τούτων ἐν ἑτέροις εἶσθαι χωρὶς. For πρὸς τὸ ἕθος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν, cp. 11, τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἕθους, and see note on 1337 a 38: cp. also Plato, Symp. 195 E, ἐν γὰρ ἕθεσι καὶ ψυχαῖς θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὴν οἰκισιν ἰδρύεται ("Eros"). For συντίθενται cp. De Part. An. 3. 4. 667 a 11, αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ τῆς καρδίας κατὰ μέγεθος τε καὶ μικρότητα καὶ σκληρότητα καὶ μαλακότητα τείνουσι πρὸς τὸ ἕθος. For the repetition of the preposition see critical note on 1331 b 24. Plato had already said in Rep. 401 D, ἥρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Γλαύκων, τούτων ἕνεκα κυριωτέτῃ ἐν μουσικῇ τροφῇ, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ τε ῥυθμός καὶ ἁρμονία καὶ ἔρρωμαιστότατα ἀπτεται αὐτῇ φέροντα τὴν εὐσηχμοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσηχμόνα, ἴαν τις ὀρθῶς τραφεῖ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τοῖναντίον; (cp. Laws 673 A), and in Tim. 47 D, ἡ δὲ ἁρμονία, συγγενεῖς ἔχουσα φορὰς ταῖς ἐν ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς περιόδους, τῇ μετὰ τοῦ προσχρωμένῃ Μούσῃσι οἶκ' ἐφ' ἡδονῇ ἄλσων, καθάπερ νῦν, εἶναι δοκεῖ χρήσιμος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὴν γεγονυῖαν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνάμνηστον ψυχῆς περίοδον εἰς κατακόσμησιν καὶ συμφωνίαν ἑαυτῇ ξύμμαχος ὑπὸ Μουσῶν δίδεται. Both these passages are probably present to Aristotle's mind here.

9. διὰ τῶν Ὀλύμπου μελῶν. Eaton refers to Plato, Symp. 215 C, τὰ οὖν ἔκείνου (i.e. Ὀλύμπου), ἴαν τις ἀγαθὸς ἀλλήτης αἰλῇ ἴαν τις φαῦλη ἀλλήτης, μόνα κατέχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ δηλοῖ τοῖς τῶν θεῶν τε καὶ τελετῶν θεομένους διὰ τὸ θεία εἶναι. Bernays (Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie, Note 5) uses the passage before us to show that, when in c. 7. 1342 a 8 sqq. Aristotle describes the effect of τὰ ἱερὰ μελῶν, it is to these melodies of Olympus that he mainly refers. See as to them Sus.⁴, I. 621 sq.

11. ὃ δ' ἐνθουσιασμός κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has to prove that music affects τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕθος, therefore he has to prove that the ἐνθουσιασμός which it admittedly produces is an affection of τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕθος. Some may have regarded it as a σωματικὸν πάθος, like the πάθος referred to in Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1173 b 8 sqq., and others as a special condition of the νοῦς (cp. Plato, Ion 534 B, κοῦφον γὰρ χρῆμα ποιητῆς ἐστὶ καὶ πτηνὸν καὶ ἱερὸν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἶός τε ποιῶν, πρὶν ἂν ἐνθεὸς τε γίγνηται καὶ ἑκφρῶν καὶ ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῇ, and Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 66, περὶ δὲ τὸ λογικὸν τὸν ἐνθουσιασμόν ἐάρω), but Aristotle regards it as connected with an impulse to action (Magn. Mor. 2. 8. 1207 b 4, καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ἀνευ λόγου ἔργον ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τι: cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 20. 1190 b 35 sqq.),

and this is perhaps the reason why he here traces it to τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕθε. For other πύθη τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕθε, Bonitz (Ind. 557 b 9) compares Rhet. 2. 9. 1386 b 12, where τὸ δαεῖν and τὸ νεμεσῶν are said to be καὶ ἄμφω τὰ πύθη ἕθευ χρηστοῦ. Some of the external symptoms of ἐθουσιασμός may be gathered from Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 62 R, ταῦτα δὲ ἔλεγεν, οὐχ ὥσπερ εἰ πολλοὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἐθέου ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, δασυμάουσα καὶ περιδυσσοῦσα τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ περσμένη δεινὸν ἐμβλέπειν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἔκπερθε καὶ σφρόνους.

12. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροόμενοι κ.τ.λ. Even mere imitative sounds without the aid of melody or rhythm call forth in every one the feelings which they imitate (see vol. i p. 362, note 3). Thus a single note from the pitch-pipe of a slave was enough to restore calmness and gentleness to the tones of C. Gracchus' oratory when they became harsh and angry (Plut. De Cohib. Ira, c. 6). Aristotle has just been dwelling on the effect of the *melodies* of Olympus, and he now adds this remark in order to guard against the supposition that the effect produced by music on τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕθε is due not to its power of imitating ethical states, but to its accompaniments of melody and rhythm. Plato had spoken in Rep. 401 D (see note on 5) as if this was so. Aristotle appears to imply here that the musical imitation of ethical states is possible without the use of rhythm and melody; hence, when in c. 7. 1341 b 23 he speaks as if music was confined to μελοποιία and ῥυθμός, we must suppose that he refers to music in a somewhat narrower sense.

14. ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν κ.τ.λ., 'but since it happens that music belongs to the class of pleasant things, [so that it calls forth feelings of pleasure, and pleasure may be called forth by the right or the wrong objects,] and virtue is concerned with taking pleasure aright and loving and hating aright, it is evident that we ought to learn and to be habituated to nothing so much as to judging aright and taking pleasure in good characters and noble actions, [because it is thus that men learn virtue].' Aristotle proceeds in what follows to show that music is capable of teaching men to take pleasure in noble characters and actions, or in other words to be virtuous (cp. 1340 b 10 sqq.). Μανθάνειν is distinguished from συνεθίζεσθαι in 16, whereas in 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 10, τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐθιζόμενοι μανθάνουσι, τὰ δ' ἀκούοντες, the word μανθάνειν includes both ἐθίζεσθαι and ἀκούειν.

18. ὥστι δὲ ὁμοιώματα κ.τ.λ., 'and in rhythms and melodies there are images, most nearly approaching the reality, of anger and

gentleness,' etc. It is thus that Sepulveda ('proxime ad veras naturas accedunt'), Vict. ('maxime secundum veras naturas'), Stahr, and Sus. interpret *μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις*: cp. Top. 8. 14. 164 b 19, *ἐκ τῶν παρὰ πόδας*, 'things close to the feet.' Compare Alcidas, De Sophistis, p. 88, *μιμήματα τῶν ἀληθινῶν σωμάτων*, and for *φύσεις* (with Bon. Ind. 838 b 55), Phys. 4. 6. 213 b 24, *ὁ διαρίζει τὰς φύσεις* (i. e. τὰ ὄντα, τὰ σώματα). Aristotle, who here has before him Plato, Rep. 399 A sqq. (where however only *ἀνδρία* and *σωφροσύνη* are referred to, not *πραΐτης*), and Laws 654 E, 655 B, and 798 D, appears to imply that the images of emotions and ethical states conveyed in melody and rhythm approach nearer to the original than those conveyed for instance in poetry, except so far as poetry is associated with melody and rhythm. The question might be asked why the young should not be taught to take pleasure in good characters and good acts by a training concerning itself directly with that subject-matter and not merely with images of it, but Aristotle would probably reply that there would not be the same pleasurable in a training of that kind as there is in a musical training, and that it would not fulfil the end of accustoming the young to take pleasure in the right things.

20. καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις. Aristotle implies that musical imitations not only of cowardice but also of *ἀκολασία*, the opposite of *σωφροσύνη*, are possible. Music can certainly at any rate imitate *ἕβρις*.

21. τῶν ἄλλων ἠθικῶν, sc. παθῶν καὶ ἔξων τοῦ ἥθους (Sus.² Ind. s. v. *ἠθικός*).

22. μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν, i. e. we experience emotional change: cp. (with Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 3. 336) Rhet. 2. 1. 1378 a 20, *ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι' ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις, οἷς ἔπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργή, ἔλεος, φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία*.

23. τοιοῦτων, sc. ῥυθμῶν καὶ μελῶν.

25. οἷον εἴ τις κ.τ.λ. For the thought cp. De Part. An. 1. 5. 645 a 10 sqq.

μηδ' ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μορφήν αὐτὴν is added, because if a man took pleasure in an image (for example) on account of the beauty or costliness of its material, he might not take equal pleasure in the thing of which it is an image. Cp. Poet. 4. 1448 b 15, *διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ἄρᾶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μαθεῖν*

καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστος, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκείνος, ἐπεὶ εἴη μὴ τίς προειραχέας, οὐ δὲ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπειρασίαν ἢ τὴν χροῖαν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν.

27. αὐτὴν ἐκείνην. Bekk.² adopts the emendation of Lambinus and Scaliger, αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου, perhaps rightly. If we retain αὐτὴν ἐκείνην, we must supply τοῦτου as the antecedent to αὐ.

28. συμβέβηκε δὲ κ.τ.λ. Eaton and Prof. Butcher (Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 132 sq.) compare Probl. 19. 27. 919 b 26, διὰ τί τὸ ἀκουστὸν μόνον ἥθος ἔχει τῶν αἰσθητῶν; καὶ γὰρ εἴη ἢ ἀνευ λόγου μέλος, ὅμως ἔχει ἥθος· ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ χρῶμα οὐδὲ ἡ ὀσμὴ οὐδὲ ὁ χυμὸς ἔχει· ἢ ὅτι εἰησιω ἔχει μόνον... αἱ δὲ κυήσεις αἵται πρακτικαί εἰσι, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἥθους σημασία ἐστίν, and Probl. 19. 29. 920 a 3 sqq. Prof. Butcher points out that these passages exaggerate the true Aristotelian view, as they deny all ethical suggestiveness to sight as well as to taste and smell. 'Ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν ('other sensible things than things audible') is taken up not by ἀλλά, 30, but by ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεισι αὐτοῖς, 38.

31. σχήματα γὰρ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα κ.τ.λ., 'for there are forms that have this power' (i.e. the power of imitating emotions and ethical states), 'but only to a small extent, and all, [even children and worthless men,] share in the perception just referred to.' The painter Parrhasius denied in a conversation with Socrates (Xen. Mem. 3. 10. 3) that painting can imitate the character of the soul (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος), but was led on by Socrates to a different conclusion (Xen. Mem. 3. 10. 5, ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές τε καὶ εὐειθέριον καὶ τὸ ταπεινόν τε καὶ ἀνελιγμένον καὶ τὸ σωφρονικόν τε καὶ φρόνιμον καὶ τὸ ὑβριστικόν τε καὶ ἀπειροκαλόν καὶ διὰ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ διὰ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐστύτων καὶ κινουμένων ἀνθρώπων διαφαίνει. Ἀληθῆ λέγει, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα μιμητέ; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη). Plato went further (Rep. 400 E sq.) and found not only painting, but also weaving, embroidery, building, and the forms of vessels and of animals and plants, full of ethical suggestiveness, but Aristotle rates the ethical suggestiveness of forms and colours lower and finds such suggestiveness, it would seem, only in the human body under the influence of emotion (compare the passage of Xenophon quoted above), or in representations of it. See vol. i. p. 363, note 5. As to καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσιν, see note on 1340 a 2, and vol. i. p. 363, note 3. Spengel and Sus. transpose ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρόν to after κοινωνοῦσιν, 32, while E. Müller inserts οὐ before πάντες, 31. If any change in the text is necessary, of which I do not feel certain, I prefer the former change

to the latter, but it would also be possible to add a second *ἐπὶ μικρόν* after *πάντες*, 31. Forms and colours are mentioned as examples of *τὰ ὁρατά*: cp. *Eth. Nic.* 3. 13. 1118 a 3, *τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὀφθαλμοῦ, ὅλον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ*.

32. *ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ.* For the distinction between copies and symbolic representations of an original, see Prof. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, ed. 2, p. 124, who refers to Teichmüller, *Aristotelische Forschungen*, 2. 145-154, where the subject is fully discussed. 'A sign or symbol has no essential resemblance, no natural connexion, with the thing signified.' Aristotle does not say that painting and sculpture can give only symbolic representations of all that they imitate, but that it is only in this way that they can reproduce character. In *τὰ γινόμενα σχήματα καὶ χρώματα* Aristotle seems to refer to forms and colours in pictures and statues (for we read of painters in *Poet.* 1. 1447 a 18 as *μιμούμενοι καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι*, cp. *Plato, Rep.* 373 B), not to attitudes and colours in living men. The words *τὰ γινόμενα σχήματα καὶ χρώματα* are added by an afterthought in explanation of *ταῦτα* very much as *ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφήν* is added in 1. 9. 1258 a 16 sqq.: cp. also [Demosth.] c. *Aristog.* 2. 19, *ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε νῆ τὴν Ἀθηναίων ἐνιδόεσσι ἐστίν, ἄνδρες δικασταί, τὰ γινόμενα τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος*. As to the repetition of *τῶν ἡθῶν* in 33 and 34 see critical notes on 1276 a 21 and 1319 a 33, and explanatory note on 1284 b 28.

34. *καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν*. I now take this to mean, 'and these indications of character occur [only] in the case of the body under the influence of emotions, [so that it is not forms in general, but only a particular kind of forms, that are even indications of character].' I explained this obscure clause otherwise, though with much hesitation, in vol. i. p. 363. For the suppression of 'only,' see note on 1282 a 36. For *ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος* cp. *Plut. Sympos.* 9. 15. 2. 747 C, *ὅταν Ἀπώλωνος ἢ Πανὸς ἢ τινος βέλχεσσι σχῆμα διαθίεντες ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος γραφικῶς τοῖς εἰδῶσιν ἐκμίνωσι*. For the fact, cp. *Eth. Nic.* 7. 5. 1147 a 14, *ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω διατίθενται οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες· θυμοὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἑτα τῶν τοιοῦτων ἐπιδηλοῦσιν καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστάσιν*. To many modern minds, however, there seems to be ethical suggestiveness in architecture.

35. *οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ὅσον διαφέρει κ.τ.λ.*, 'not but that, so far as it makes a difference in relation to the contemplation of these things also [whether we contemplate one thing or another],' etc. By 'these things' Aristotle means forms and colours.

36. δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσανος κ.τ.λ. Cp. Poet. 2. 1448 a 1, ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντες, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαίλους εἶναι . . . ἦτοι βελτίονας ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἢ χείρονας ἢ καὶ τοιούτους, ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς, Πολύγνωτος μὲν γὰρ κρείττους, Παύσανος δὲ χείρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἰκαλεῖν. In this, we learn from what follows, Polygnotus found a parallel in Homer and Pausan in poets far inferior to Homer. In the passage before us it is implied that Pausan was not ἡθικός, and according to Sus.⁴, 1. p. 624, Aristotle means by 'an artist "full of character" (ἡθικός)' one who 'represents noble characters.' The word ἡθικός appears to bear this meaning here and in c. 7. 1342 a 3, 28, but in c. 6. 1341 a 21, ἦτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αἰὼς ἡθικός ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργαστικός, it evidently means simply 'expressive of ethical character' as distinguished from 'emotional.' In Poet. 6. 1450 a 26 we read of Polygnotus, ὡς καὶ τῶν γραφῶν Ζεῦξίς πρὸς Πολύγνωτον πείσασθαι ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πολύγνωτος ἀγαθὸς ἡθογράφος, ἡ δὲ Ζεῦξίς γράφῃ οὐδὲν ἔχει ἥθος. Lysippus may be among the sculptors referred to as ἡθικοί: cp. Plut. De Alex. seu Virtute seu Fortuna 2. 2, διὸ καὶ μόνον Ἀλέξανδρος ἐκίλετο Λύσιππου εἰκόνας αὐτοῦ δημιουργεῖν· μόνος γὰρ οὗτος, ὡς ἔοικε, κατεμήνη τῷ χαλεπῷ τῷ ἥθει αὐτοῦ καὶ συνεξέφερε τῇ μορφῇ τὴν ἀρετήν. As to the skill of Polygnotus in portraying character, see Brunn, Gesch. der gr. Künstler 2. 40. There were paintings by Polygnotus at Athens in the Stoa Poecilē, in the Anaceium, in a chamber of the Propylaea, and elsewhere, so that his work must have been familiar to Aristotle's hearers. As to Pausan, see Brunn 2. 49 sqq. and Overbeck, Schriftquellen, p. 212, both of whom take Aristophanes to refer to him in Acharn. 854, Thesmoph. 948 sq., and Plut. 602. If they are right in this, Pausan would seem to have been a contemporary of Aristophanes.

38. ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς, 'in melodies taken by themselves' apart from anything else, apart from the person of the singer and from the words sung. Forms and colours, on the other hand, are suggestive of character only in the case of the body under the influence of emotion.

40. εὐθὺς γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for, to begin with, the nature of harmonics, [which are elements in melody,] is different.' Aristotle goes on to show in 1340 b 7 sqq. that the same thing holds of rhythms, and probably he regarded a melody as made up of harmony and rhythm, just as Plato, who, unlike Aristotle (c. 5. 1339 b 20), did not approve of ψυλὴ μουσικὴ (Laws 669 D sq.), regarded it as made up of words, harmony, and rhythm (Rep. 398 D). If harmonies

affect the *ἦθος* of the hearer differently, it follows that they differ in *ἦθος* and are *μιμήματα τῶν ἡθῶν*. The word *ἁρμονία* had more meanings than one (Monro, *The Modes of Ancient Greek Music*, p. 56), but it is evidently used here of the Dorian, Phrygian, and other 'modes,' whatever we take their nature to have been. On this disputed question see (in addition to *Sus.*⁴, i. p. 624 sqq.) the work of Mr. Monro just referred to, Mr. H. Stuart Jones' review of it in *Class. Rev.* 8. 448 sqq., and Mr. Monro's reply (*ibid.* 9.79 sqq.).

41. ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον. For the pleonasm cp. *Poet.* i. 1447 a 17, τῷ ἑτέρως καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, and see Vahlen on this passage. For the fact cp. *Sext. Empir. Adv. Math.* 6. 48 (p. 757. 29 sqq. Bekker), οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ὃν τρόπον ἅπαν διάστημα κατὰ μουσικὴν ἐν φθόγγοις ἔχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν, οὕτω καὶ πᾶν ἦθος. τὸ δ' ἔστι τι γένος μελωδίας. καθὰ γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἡθῶν τινα μὲν ἔστι σκυθρωπά καὶ στιβαρώτερα, ὅποια τὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἱστοροῦσιν, τὰ δὲ εὐένδοτα πρὸς ἔρωτα καὶ οἰνοφλυγίας καὶ ὀδυρμοὺς καὶ οἰμωγὰς, οὕτω τις μὲν μελωδία σεμνὰ τινα καὶ δαστεία ἐμποιεῖ τῇ ψυχῇ κινήματα, τις δὲ ταπεινότερα καὶ ἀγενεῆ.

42. ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἑνίας κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has before him Plato, *Rep.* 398 D, ἀλλὰ μίντοι θρήνων τε καὶ ὀδυρμῶν ἔφαμεν ἐν λόγοις οὐδὲν προσδεῖσθαι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Τίνες οὖν θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίαι; λέγε μοι· σὺ γὰρ μουσικός. Μιξολυδιστὶ, ἔφη, καὶ συντονωλυδιστὶ καὶ τοιαῦτα τινές. Οὐκοῦν αὗται, ἦν δ' ἔγω, ἀφαιρετίαι· ἀχρηστοὶ γὰρ καὶ γυναιξίν, ὥς δὲ ἐπικεκίς εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσω (possibly a hit at Sappho, who is credited with the invention of the mixo-Lydia mode by Aristoxenus ap. *Plut. De Mus.* c. 16), and *Laws* 800 D, πᾶσων βλασφημίαν τῶν ἱερῶν καταχέουσι, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ῥυθμοὺς καὶ γωνοειστάτους ἁρμονίας συντίκοντες τὰς τῶν ἀκροαμένων ψυχὰς, καὶ ὥς ἂν δακρύσαι μάλιστα τὴν θύσαναν παραχρῆμα ποιήσῃ πῶλιν, οὗτος τὰ νικητήρια φέρει. He also has before him Pratinas ap. *Athen. Deipn.* 624 f (Pratinas, *Fragm.* 5),

μήτε σύντονον δίωκε μήτε τὸν ἀνεμέναν λαοτὶ μοῦσαν,

ἀλλὰ τὸν μέσαν . . νεῶν ἀρουραν αἰδολίζε τῷ μέλει,

where, as *Sus.*⁴ points out, the Aeolian mode is described as intermediate between 'high-pitched Ionian' and 'low Ionian.' Pratinas, however, declares in favour, not of the Dorian mode, as Aristotle, but of the Aeolian, later called the hypo-Dorian according to *Athen. Deipn.* 625 a.

ὀδυρτικωτέρως καὶ συνεστηκότεως μάλλον. Grief was believed to compress and joy to expand the mind: cp. *Eurip. Alcest.* 771

Bothe (797 Dindorf), τοῦ νῦν σκυθρωπῶ καὶ ξυνοστῶτος φρονεῖν, and Hippol. 937 Bothe (983 Dindorf), μέντοι μὴν ξύστασις τε σὺν φρονεῖν, and Cic. Tusc. Disp. 4. 31. 66, eodem enim vitio est effusio animi in lætitia quo in dolore contractio. So the Stoics defined λήνη as συστολή ἀλογος and explained ἰδουή as ἔπαρσις (Diog. Laert. 7. 111, 114: see Pearson, Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, p. 180). In Laws 800 D (quoted above) Plato had spoken of the ψυχὴ generally, but Aristotle here speaks more particularly of the διάνοια as affected by the various musical modes (cp. 1340 b 2); he regards it as susceptible of compression and relaxation, two extreme states, and also of a mean state of calm. He was led by a false etymology of the Greek word ἐπιστήμη to connect wisdom and knowledge with a calm state of mind (Phys. 7. 3. 247 b 10, τῇ γὰρ ἡρεμήσει καὶ στήναι τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπιστάσθαι καὶ φρονεῖν λέγομεν, and 18 sqq.), and this is perhaps one reason why he selects the composed and collected Dorian mode for use in education. He feels that anything which calms is useful both morally and intellectually. In Aesch. Suppl. 69,

τὰς καὶ ἐγὼ φιλόδορτος Ἰασίοισι πέποιε

δάπτω τὰν ἀπαλὴν νειλοθερῇ παρῆν,

the high-pitched variety of the Ionian mode is probably referred to. This variety, which some identify with the mixo-Lydian (see Suk⁴, 1. 625 sqq.), appears to have been expressive of lamentation.

2. πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακυτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς τὰς ἀσπετρώς. 1340 b. Aristotle probably refers to the softer varieties of the Ionian and Lydian modes: cp. Plato, Rep. 398 E, where these varieties (if we follow Mr. H. Stuart Jones' interpretation of the passage in *Class. Rev.* 8. 449, note) are said to be μαλακαὶ καὶ συγκρατηταί.

3. μέσως καὶ καθιστηκότες, 'in a midway state of collectedness and composure': cp. c. 7. 1342 a 10, καθισταμένους, and Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 32, καθιστηκότες, and for the conjunction of μέσως and καθιστηκότες, Eth. Eud. 7. 5. 1239 b 35, εἰς τὸ μέσων καθίσταται, and 1240 a 2 sq. Καθίστασθαι is conjoined with σφρατίζεσθαι in Hist. An. 7. 1. 582 a 25. As to the Dorian mode, cp. c. 7. 1342 b 12 sqq. Plutarch describes the songs sung by the Spartans as πολὺ τὸ κόσμιον ἔχοντα καὶ καταστατικόν (Lycurg. c. 4), and Heracleides Ponticus (ap. Athen. Deipn. 624 d) says of the Dorian mode, ἡ μὲν οὖν δόριος ἁρμονία τὸ ἀνδράδες ἐμφαίνει καὶ τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ οὐ δεικνυμένον οὐδ' ἁπλόν, ἀλλὰ σκυθρωπὸν καὶ σφοδρὸν, ὅτε δὲ περικλῶν ὅτε πολύτροπον: cp. Plut. De Mus. c. 16, ἡ μὲν (δοριεῖσι) τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ ἀξιοματικὸν ἀποδίδωσιν.

4. ἐνθουσιαστικοὺς δ' ἢ φρυγιστῆς, sc. δοκεῖ ποιεῖν. Cp. 1340 a 1 and c. 7. 1342 b 1 sqq.

5. ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle evidently takes his account of the mental effect of each of the harmonies from *οἱ περὶ τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες*, 'those who had studied musical education'. Some musicians (Damon, for instance, as *Sus.*⁴, 1. p. 596, point out, referring to Plato, *Rep.* 400 B and 424 C) had probably done this, and also some philosophers (cp. c. 7. 1341 b 27 sqq. and 1342 a 30 sqq.). Among the philosophers would be Plato (*Rep.* 398 E-399 A and elsewhere) and some of his disciples (Plut. *De Mus.* c. 3 *init.*), e.g. Heracleides Ponticus, and perhaps, as Eaton says, some Pythagoreans (cp. Plut. *De Vi Mor.* c. 3. 441 E). It has been suggested by Mr. H. Stua Jones (*Class. Rev.* 8. 450) that Aristotle's view of the mental effect of the various modes rests on a verbal basis, the word *ἀνειμένος* meaning both 'loosely strung' (or 'low-pitched') and 'soft, relaxed,' and the word *σύντονος* both 'highly strung' (or 'high-pitched') and the reverse of 'soft' and 'relaxed'; it appears however, from the passage before us that his view comes to him from other authorities, so that the verbal confusion supposed to exist would be theirs rather than his. But indeed the emphatic statement in 6, *λαμβάνουσι τὰ μαρτύρια τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων* suggests that these authorities arrived at their conclusion inductive by watching the effect of the different modes on individual hearers.

6. λαμβάνουσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Thus they adopt the best method of inquiry: cp. *De Gen. An.* 3. 10. 760 b 30, *οὐ μὴν ἐληφται γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἱκανῶς, ἀλλ' ἐάν ποτε ληφθῇ, τότε τῇ αἰσθήσει μᾶλλον τῶν λόγων πιστευτέον, καὶ τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν ὁμολογούμενα δεικνύωσι τοῖς φαινομένοις.*

8. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. *Rhet.* 3. 8. 1408 b 32, *τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἡρῶς σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας διόμενος, ὁ δ' ἱαμβὸς αὐτῇ ἐστὶ ἡ λείψις τῶν πολλῶν. . . ὁ δὲ τροχαῖος κορδακικώτερος* δηλοῖ δὲ τὰ τετράμετρα ἔστι γὰρ τροχειὸς ῥυθμὸς τὰ τετράμετρα' λείπεται δὲ παῖον: *Poet.* 24. 1451 b 34, *τὸ γὰρ ἡρωικὸν στασιμώτατον καὶ ὀγκωδέστατον τῶν μέτρων ἐστίν . . . τὸ δὲ ἱαμβικὸν καὶ τετράμετρον κινητικόν, τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικόν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν.* As the trochee is *κορδακικώτερος*, it is probably regarded by Aristotle as *φορτικώτερος* ἔχων τὰς κινήσεις: cp. *Athen. Deipn.* 631 d, *ὁ μὲν κόρη παρ' Ἑλλήσι φορτικὸς ἢ δ' ἐμμελεια σπουδαία*, and 629 b sq. Compare the striking picture in Plut. *Sympos.* 7. 5. 1 of the effect produced by a skilful αὐλοδότης on the guests at a banquet—*οὐδὲ γὰρ κατακειμένοι ἔτι βοᾶν ἐξέρκεται καὶ κροτεῖν, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶντες ἀνεπήδων οἱ πολλοί,*

συγκαταίοντο καὶ οὖν ἀνελυθέρων, πρεπούσας δὲ τοῖς κρούμασι ἐκείναι καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν. We read in Plato, Rep. 400 B, of ἀνελυθερίας καὶ ὑβρείας ἢ ματίας καὶ ἄλλης κακίας πρέπονται βίαις, and in Laws 669 C of ῥυθμοὺς δοῦλων καὶ ἀνελυθέρων: cp. also 815 E.

10. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle says nothing about the question raised in c. 5. 1339 a 25, whether music contributes to διαγωγή and φρόνησις.

12. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. The reason for which Pythagoras employed music in education, according to Plut. De Virt. Mor. c. 3. 441 E, was akin to this, but not quite the same. Plutarch there says that he ἐπηγάγετο τὴν μουσικὴν τῇ ψυχῇ καλῶς ὅπως ἵσται καὶ παραμυθίας, ὥς αὐτῶν ἔχουσα διδασκαλίᾳ καὶ μαθήμασιν ὑπῆκουσιν, οὐδὲ λόγῳ μεταβλητὴν ἐκ κακίας, ἀλλὰ τινας ἑτέρας πειθοῖς συνεργῶ καὶ πλάσσει καὶ τιθασσεύσας δαίμονας, εἰ μὴ πάντῃσι μέλλοι φιλοσοφίᾳ δυσμεταχειρίστον εἶναι καὶ ἀπειθέας.

15. οἱ μὲν γὰρ νόει κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 15. 1119 b 5 sqq., Plato, Laws 659 E, διὰ δὲ τὸ σπουδῆν μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὰς τῶν νείων ψυχὰς παιδιαί τε καὶ φῶδι καλεῖσθαι (sc. δοκοῦσι) καὶ πρᾶττεσθαι, and Isocr. Areop. § 43, ἰάρων γὰρ . . . τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν (i.e. τῶν νεοτῆρων) μάλιστα παθεσθῆναι δεομένας ἐπιθυμίαις καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ πόντοις ἡδονὰς ἔχουσιν ἐν μένοις γὰρ ἂν τοῖσις ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους τετραμμένους καὶ μεγαλοφρονεῖν εἰθισμένους. Isocrates here (like Plato in Rep. 536 E, ψυχῇ δὲ βίαιον οὐδὲν ἔμμορον μάθημα) adopts the Pythagorean view (Aristox. Fragm. 22: Muller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 279) that study, if it is to come to anything, must be willingly pursued. Aristotle seems to think so too.

16. ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει τῶν ἡδυσμένων ἐστίν. Ἡ μουσικὴ (sc. τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη) is ἡδυσμένη because rhythm and harmony and melody go with it (Poet. 6. 1449 b 28 sqq.). In Poet. 6. 1450 b 15 we read τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πόντοις ἢ μελοποιία μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων, and Prof. Bywater (*Journal of Philology*, xiv. 1885, p. 42) would read ἡδυσμάτων here. Ἀνῆλθοντα, however, finds a better antithesis in ἡδυσμένων than in ἡδυσμάτων.

17. καὶ τις ἵσται συγγένεια κ.τ.λ. Supply πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν (see Vol. ii, p. li., note 4). The sense is—and not only is music τῶν ἡδυσμένων, but it is also akin to the soul (which is not the case with all ἡδυσμένα), and therefore still more congenial to it than those ἡδυσμένα which are not akin to it. I cannot follow Sus. in transposing 17–19 to after ἐλευθεριωτέρας, 10. Cp. Plato, Tim. 47 D, ἡ δὲ ἁρμονία, ἐγγενεὶς ἔχουσα φέρει τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν τῆς ψυχῆς περιόδους, κ.τ.λ.,

and Probl. 19. 38. 920 b 33, *ῥυθμῷ δὲ χαίρομεν διὰ τὸ γινώσκον καὶ τεταγμένον ἀριθμὸν ἔχειν καὶ κινεῖν ἡμᾶς τεταγμένους* οἰκιοτέρα γὰρ ἢ τεταγμένη κίνησις φύσει τῆς ἀτάκτου, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον. That which is akin to the soul is likely to be suitable to it (cp. c. 7. 1342 a 25: Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1178 a 5, τὸ γὰρ οἰκίον ἐκάστω τῇ φύσει κρείσσιον καὶ ῥηστόν ἐστιν ἐκάστω: Plato, Lysis 214 B, 221 E sq.).

18. διὰ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. The Pythagoreans held that the soul is a harmony, and two of Aristotle's disciples, Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus, followed them in this opinion (see Sus.⁴, 1. 597, who refers to Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 444 and 2. 2. 888, 890 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, vol. ii. p. 436 sqq.): cp. De An. 1. 4. 407 b 27 sqq.). The view that the soul has harmony is that of Plato (Phaedo 93: see Sus.⁴, ibid.). For the two views cp. De Caelo 1. 1. 268 a 4, τῶν γὰρ φύσει συνιστάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ σώματα καὶ μεγέθη, τὰ δ' ἔχει σῶμα καὶ μέγεθος, τὰ δ' ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἔχόντων εἰσὶν, and Plut. Camill. c. 20, κίνησις δὲ τις ἢ σύν τινι κινήσει πάστω ἢ γένεσις.

- C. 6. 20. χειρουργοῦντας takes the place of καθαρίζοντας (c. 5. 1339 b 8), partly because Aristotle does not wish to prejudge the question of the *αἰσθε*, partly because the use of the word *χειρουργεῖν* serves to place in a strong light the doubtfulness of the point, the Greeks being prejudiced against *χειρουργία*. We shall find in the sequel that Aristotle seeks to confine *χειρουργία* within as narrow limits as possible (cp. 1340 b 35 sqq. and 1341 b 1). He nowhere considers the possible alternative of teaching the young to sing but not to play. The two things usually went together in ancient Greece, so far at any rate as solo-singers were concerned; the singer was expected to be able to accompany himself on the lyre.

21. πρότερον, in c. 5. 1339 a 33 sqq.

22. οὐκ ἄδηλον κ.τ.λ. This takes up 10 sqq., *ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων κ.τ.λ.* For *ποιεῖς τινας* cp. c. 5. 1339 a 22, *ὥς δυναμένην . . . καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τὸ ἦθος ποιεῖν τι ποιεῖν, ἐδίδουσαν δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὀρθῶς*. To become *ποιός τινας* is to acquire a certain *ἔξω* (Categ. 3. 8 b 25, *ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ' ἣν ποιοί τινας εἶναι λέγονται*· ἔστι δὲ ἡ ποιότης τῶν πλεοναχῶς λεγομένων. ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ποιότητος ἔξω καὶ διάθεσις λεγίσθωσαν), and it is by acquiring the appropriate *δύναμις* or *ἔξω* that we become able to judge of things (De An. 3. 3. 428 a 3). But the *ἔξω* is acquired by practice (Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 31, *τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργίσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν κ.τ.λ.*). Aristotle's language here seems hardly consistent with his language in Pol. 3. 11. 1281 b 7 sqq. He does not speak there as if it was

necessary to have learnt to sing and play in order to judge of music aright. We are told, again, in 3. 11. 1282 a 17 sqq. that there are arts in which the user is a better judge than the master of the art. Are we to infer that music is not one of these? Besides, Aristotle's teaching in the passage before us appears to imply that we ought to practise in youth all kinds of music—not merely the ethical kind, which he alone recommends for use in the education of the young (c. 7. 1342 a 2), but also practical and enthusiastic airs, for otherwise how can we judge of these aright?—and indeed all arts of the products of which we desire to become good judges (e.g. poetry, painting, sculpture, and architecture, to say nothing of the useful arts). This he does not seem to have observed. His experience as to music evidently was that those who did not practise the art up to a certain point were apt to rest content with music possessing merely a physical charm—the music which pleased slaves and children—and did not acquire a liking for noble music. By 'good judges' Aristotle clearly means not good judges of music from a technical point of view, but men capable of taking pleasure in ethically good music (cp. c. 5. 1340 a 17 and 1339 a 24). The difference between γίγνεσθαι, 22, and γινίσκω, 25, may be illustrated by Plato, Theaet. 155 C, *ὅτι γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γινίσκω ἀδύνατον* (sc. *ἐπὶ ἐλάττω*): see also Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 97.

25. *ἀρα δὲ καὶ δεῖ τοὺς παῖδας ἔχειν τὰς διατριβὰς.* The value of education in keeping boys out of mischief is recognized by Isocrates in Panath. § 27 and Areop. § 45: cp. Plato, Protag. 326 A. 'Children are sent to school as much to keep them out of harm's way as to prepare them for after-life,' observes a writer in the *Academy* for Nov. 9, 1895, who probably remembers and extends to all children a remark as to little children which has been pointed out to me in *Spectator*, No. 330 (March 19, 1712), 'as little children are sent to school before they are capable of improvement, only to be out of harm's way.'

26. *τὴν Ἀρχύτου πλαταγὴν.* As to the rattle of Archytas, cp. Plut. Sympos. 7. 10. 1, *εἰ δὲ μή, δορίων ὥσπερ παισὶν ἀγρεμεῖν μὴ δυναμένοις, οὐ δόρυ καὶ ξίφος, ἀλλὰ πλαταγὴν καὶ σφαῖραν* (cp. Anthol. Pal. 6. 309), *ὥσπερ ὁ θεὸς τὸν γάρθηκα τοῖς μεθύουσιν ἐνχειρίσσει κουφέτατον βίλος καὶ μαλακώτατον ἀμυντήριον, ὅπως, ἐπεὶ τάχιστα παύουσιν, ξυστα βλάπτωσι*: Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 213 (where however the invention is ascribed to an Archytas who was a *τίκτω*):

Lucr. 5. 229. Archytas was fond of playing with children (Aelian, Var. Hist. 12. 15: Athen. Deipn. 519 b). Πλαταγαί, however, appear to have existed before the time of Archytas, for they were known to Hellanicus and to Pherecydes of Athens (see Götting's note on the passage before us, and Hellan. Fragm. 61, Pherecyd. Fragm. 32 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 53, 78). As to the form Ἀρχύτου see critical note.

29. οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχάζειν. Sus.⁴ compares Plato, Laws 653 D, φησι δὲ τὸ νέον ἄπαν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπείν, τοῖς τε σώμασι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν οὐ δύνασθαι κ.τ.λ. Cp. also Laws 664 E, Aristot. Phys. 7. 3. 247 b 18, διὸ καὶ τὰ παῖδια οὐτε μαθάνειν δύναται οὐτε κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὁμοίως κρίνειν τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις· πολλὰ γὰρ ἡ ταραχὴ καὶ ἡ κίνησις, and Plut. Sympos. 7. 10. 1, quoted above on 26.

30. ἡ δὲ παιδεία πλαταγὴ τοῖς μετῴσοι τῶν νέων. Are these words present to the mind of the writer of Virg. Catal. 7,

Et vos, Stiloque Tarquitique Varroque,
Scholasticorum natio madens pingui,
Ite hinc, inane cymbalon iuventutis?

33. τὸ δὲ πρέπον καὶ τὸ μὴ πρέπον ταῖς ἡλικίαις κ.τ.λ. Here the difficulty raised in c. 5. 1339 b 8, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαναύσους καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιοῦτους καὶ τὸ πρέπτειν οὐκ ἀνδρὲς μὴ μεθύοντες ἢ παίζοντες, is taken up and answered.

34. λύσαι, sc. τὴν ἐπιτήρησιν: cp. 40 sqq.

35. πρῶτον μὲν γάρ κ.τ.λ., 'for first, since it is [only] for the sake of judging of music that they are to practise playing [and not for the sake of perfect mastery of execution], on account of this they should indeed practise playing in youth, but as they become older, they should be released from playing, and yet be able to distinguish noble airs and to take pleasure in music aright, thanks to the training which they have received in youth.' Though it is provided here that, as men cease to be youthful, they shall be excused playing on an instrument, singing is apparently contemplated even in the case of aged men in c. 7. 1342 b 20 sqq., if this passage is genuine. Aristotle would seem to be less favourable to playing in the case of adult citizens than many were: not a few Pythagoreans played on the harp (Cic. Tusc. Disp. 5. 39. 113: Aelian, Var. Hist. 14. 23), and on the αὐλὴς (Athen. Deipn. 184 e), and so did Epaminondas (Athen. ibid.: Cic. Tusc. Disp. 1. 2. 4). Socrates learnt the harp in old age (Diog. Laert. 2. 32: Val. Max. 8. 7. Ext. 8).

42. μέχρι τε πόσου κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 2. 1337 b 15 sqq., and see note. This question receives an answer in 1341 a 5-17. Τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδευομένοις πολιτικῇ, 'those who are being educated with a view to excellence as citizens,' and not with a view to excellence as musical executants. Πολιτικῇ is emphasized by its position in the sentence. So in *De Part. An.* 1. 1. 642 a 29 sqq. a contrast is implied between ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ (including perhaps ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ and φρόνησις) and ἡ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀρετὴ. Cp. also Isocr. *Panath.* § 183, τοῖς ἀρετῇ ἀντιστοιχομένοις, μὴ τῇ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν ὀνομαζομένη καὶ πολλὰν ἄλλαν, ἀλλὰ τῇ τοῖς καλοῖς καγαθοῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς μετ' εὐσεβείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐγγεγραμμένη, and see note on 1280 b 5.

1. καὶ ποίων μελῶν καὶ ποίων ρυθμῶν κοινωνητέον. The question 1341 a as to the melodies is answered in 1341 a 9 sqq. and in c. 7. 1341 b 19 sqq., but the question as to the rhythms is not answered in what we possess of the *Politics* (see vol. i, p. 367, and vol. ii, p. xxviii sq.). We may probably infer, however, from c. 5. 1340 b 7 sqq. that the rhythms used in education will be οἱ ἔχοντες ἴσους στασιμέτερον.

2. ἔτι δὲ ἐν ποίοις ὄργανοις κ.τ.λ. Answered in 1341 a 17-b 8. 'E' is used here of the 'medium' of instruction, as it is often used in the *Poetics* (e.g. in *Poet.* 1. 1447 b 29) of the medium of imitation (see Eucken, *Praepositionen*, p. 24: Bon. Ind. 245 b 42 sqq.): cp. Plato, *Laches*, 182 A, οἱ ἐν τοῖτοις τοῖς περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ὄργανοις γυμναζόμενοι.

4. τρόποις τινὲς τῆς μουσικῆς, 'some kinds of music' (for the use of *τρόποι* in the sense of *εἶδη* see Bon. Ind. 772 b 30 sqq.). Οἱ τεχνικοὶ τρόποι τῆς μουσικῆς, οἱ πρὸς τοῖς ἀγῶσι (1341 b 10), are referred to: cp. 1341 b 14 sqq.

6. μήτε ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς τὰς ὑστερον πράξεις. It is implied that the study of music might stand in the way of a citizen's work in after-life without harming the body. It might do so if it lowered the character or enfeebled the intelligence (c. 2. 1337 b 8-11), and this result might well follow if music were studied as festival-performers study it.

7. μήτε τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖν βλάυσον καὶ ἄχρηστον πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις, πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις ἤδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ὑστερον. By τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις Aristotle probably means 'military and civic training,' 'training designed to develop military and civic virtue': cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 5, μηδὲ ἡσυχάζειν μηδεμίαν ἀσκησιν ἑτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς, 5 (8). 6. 1340 b 42, τοῖς

πρὸς ἀριτὴν παιδευομένοις πολιτικὴν, and 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 8-11. The words πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις ἤδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ὑστερον appear to be added in explanation and limitation of ἀχρηστον πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς ἀσκήσεις, but their meaning is by no means clear. Coray's note on them is "οὐκ ἔρρωται τὸ χωρίον." Some explain τὰς χρήσεις (in the sense of doing the thing studied) as one form of the military and civic training referred to and τὰς μαθήσεις as another, and regard χρήσεις as preceding μαθήσεις, because in any training designed to produce good soldiers and citizens practice comes first and instruction in the theory afterwards (cp. c. 3. 1338 b 4, *Metaph.* θ. 5. 1047 b 31 sqq., and *Eth. Nic.* 2. 1. 1103 a 31 sqq. and 10. 10. 1179 b 23 sqq.). But what χρήσεις πολεμικαὶ καὶ πολιτικαὶ can the boys to whom Aristotle refers be said to perform? Bojesen, on the other hand, followed by Sus., interchanges χρήσεις and μαθήσεις, reading πρὸς μὲν τὰς μαθήσεις ἤδη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς χρήσεις ὑστερον. Sus.² appears from the translation which he gives of the passage to supply τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀσκήσεων with μαθήσεις and χρήσεις, but the expressions τὰς χρήσεις τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀσκήσεων and τὰς μαθήσεις τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀσκήσεων seem rather strange. And, whether we supply these words or not, the question remains, to what μαθήσεις πολεμικαὶ καὶ πολιτικαὶ pursued in boyhood and youth does Aristotle refer? He must apparently refer to the ordinary education in gymnastic, music, etc., for we know of no other which he provides for the young. I am inclined, however, to suggest a different interpretation of the passage before us. Should we not supply τοῦ σώματος with τὰς χρήσεις (as Schneider appears to do, for he says, 'χρήσεις sunt cum quis corpore vario modo utitur'), and explain the passage thus, 'the study of music in youth must not render the body unfit for military and civic training either by rendering it unfit for such training in a purely physical way' (literally, 'unfit for the uses of the body') 'or by rendering it an unfit assistant for the mind in studies later on'? That the body may be a help or a hindrance to the use of the mind in study we see from Plato, *Rep.* 498 B and 536 B, and *Protag.* 326 B sq.: cp. also *Magn. Mor.* 2. 10. 1208 a 12 sqq., quoted on 1333 a 21. For τὰς τοῦ σώματος χρήσεις cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 38.

10. τὴν μάθησιν, 'the study of music': cp. 6, τὴν μάθησιν αἰήτε.

τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς τεχνικοὺς συντείνοντα. Supply τῶν ἔργων from 12: cp. 1341 b 9, τῆς ἐργασίας. Does Aristotle refer to the same kind of performances which Plato rejects in *Laws* 812 D sq.?

11. τὰ θαυμάσια καὶ περὶ τὰ τῶν ἔργων κ.τ.λ. Compare a fragment of Anaxilas (Athen. Deipn. 623 e, f: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 352),

ἢ μουσικῇ ὅ ὥσπερ Λιβύη πρὸς τῶν θεῶν

δαί τι καὶ κατ' ἐπιαντὸν θηρίων

τίεται,

where Anaxilas has perhaps before him Plato, Laws 660 B, καὶ δὲ ὅτι δαί γιγνόμενα περὶ τε τὰς ἀρχαίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μουσικῶν ζύμψαν κ.τ.λ. These feats of execution in singing and playing are distinguished here from ordinary 'agonistic' performances; the nature of 'agonistic' music may be divined from Probl. 19. 15. 918 b 20 sqq. and Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 22 sqq. Does Aristotle refer to the musical innovations of Timotheus among others, as to which see Pherecr. Χείρων Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 326 sqq.)? Cp. also Plato, Laws 812 D-E.

13. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κ.τ.λ., 'but practise even such music as we have mentioned' (i.e. music that is neither agonistic nor of extraordinary difficulty) 'only to the point at which' etc. For this limitation cp. Plato, Laws 812 B-E.

15. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔτια ἴσων. See vol. i. p. 365, note 1, and cp. Plato, Polit. 268 B, where Plato refers to the effect of music on herds and flocks, and Rep. 620 A, where he speaks of 'swans and other musical animals.' Cp. also Pindar, Fragm. 220, and Athen. Deipn. 328 f. For the conjunction of ζῆα and παιδία, cp. Rhet. 1. 11. 1371 a 14, ὡς τις πολὺ καταφρονεῖ, ὥσπερ παιδίων ἢ θηρίων, Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1224 a 29 and 7. 3. 1236 a 2, and Plato, Theaet. 171 E, πᾶν γένειον καὶ παιδίον καὶ θηρίον δέ, and Clitophon 409 D, τὰς δὲ τῶν παιδῶν φιλίας καὶ τὰς τῶν θηρίων κ.τ.λ.

17. δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ποίοις ὀργάνοις χρηστέον. They must not be instruments which serve for festival-competitions or in wonderful feats of execution (10 sqq.).

18. οὕτε γὰρ ἀλόους κ.τ.λ. Τεχνικὰ ὄργανα are instruments designed for use at festival-competitions (1341 b 10). It is implied here that learning to play on them would tend to make boys ill recipients of musical and other training. Why is this? Probably because learning to play on them trained the hand rather than the mind (1341 b 1, 6 sqq.). The cithara must have come by Aristotle's time to differ a good deal from the lyre; still Plato retains (Rep. 399 D) both lyre and cithara. Αἰτῶν, 20, i.e. τῶν ὀργάνων.

21. ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. This is a second argument against the use of the αἰλᾶς in education. It is not an instrument expressive of

ethical character (see above on 1340 a 36), but rather one for employment in orgiastic rites (compare the use of the word βαρχεία in c. 7. 1342 b 4 in connexion with ὀργιαστικά καὶ παθητικά), one which produces that modification of emotion which orgiastic rites produce. For παθητικός is a wider term than ὀργιαστικός: not all things that are παθητικά are ὀργιαστικά. The use of the αἶλος in the worship of Dionysus (Virg. Aen. 11. 737, ubi curva choros indixit tibia Bacchi) and of Cybele (Hor. Carm. 4. 1. 22, Berecynthiae tibiae) is well known. Cp. also Strabo, pp. 466, 468, and Plato, Crito 54 D. 'One who listens to the remarkable music of the flute and cymbals at the dances of dervishes in Konia or Kara Hissar of Phrygia can understand the intoxicating influence which it had over the devotees and populace of antiquity' (Prof. W. M. Ramsay in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 8. 510). Some light is thrown on the effect of the αἶλος in orgiastic worship by Plut. Sympos. 3. 8. 2, ὅσπερ ἡ θρηνηδία καὶ ὁ ἐπικηδείος αἶλος ἐν ἀρχῇ πάθος κινεῖ καὶ δάκρυον ἐκβάλλει, προάγων δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς οἶκτον, οὕτω κατὰ μικρὸν ἐξαίρει καὶ ἀναλίσκει τὸ λυπητικόν. As to κάθαρσις cp. c. 7. 1342 a 8 sqq. and see note on this passage. Compare also Plut. Pelopid. c. 19 (quoted above on 1274 a 32), where however the αἶλος is regarded, not as a means of stirring, and so carrying off, emotion, but as a means of softening the untempered strength of the spirited element in the Theban character.

22. ὅστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιοῦτους κ.τ.λ. For τοὺς τοιοῦτους καιροὺς ἐν οἷς κ.τ.λ. see note on 1337 b 6. Bonitz (Ind. 329 a 43) appears to give ἡ θεωρία here the sense of 'spectaculum,' to judge by the passages with which he groups the passage before us, as do also Sepulveda and some others, but it probably means much the same thing as ἡ ἀκρόασις (Sus.³ Ind. s.v.); we must, however, remember that αἶλσις was accompanied with certain bodily movements on the part of the performer (1341 b 18), so that there was something to be seen as well as heard. For the contrast between κάθαρσις and μάθησις here compare the contrast between παθεῖν and μαθεῖν in Aristot. Fragm. 15 in Rose's second edition of the Fragments (Fragm. 45. 1483 a 19 in the first), καθάπερ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐξιοῖ τοῖς τελοῦμένοις οὐ μαθεῖν τι δεῖν ἀλλὰ παθεῖν καὶ διατεθῆναι, δηλονότι γενομένοις ἐπιτηδείους (Synes. Dion, c. 10). That μάθησις may be derived by persons of mature age from listening to music (and it is persons of mature age, not boys, that Aristotle has in view here) appears from c. 5. 1339 a 34 sqq.

24. προσθόμεν δι κ.τ.λ. In interfering with the use of language the use of the αἰλός interferes with a means of education, for the air and the words sung exercise an educating influence on the singer. Cp. also De Part. An. 2. 16. 659 b 30, αἱ δ' ἀνθρώποι μαλακὰ καὶ σαρκώδη καὶ δυνάμεια χωρίζεσθαι (sc. τὰ χεῖλη ἔχουσι), φυλακτῆς τε ὅτι τῶν ὀδόντων ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι διὰ τὸ εὖ πρὸς γὰρ τὸ χρῆσθαι τῇ λέγει καὶ ταῦτα.

26. διὸ καλῶς κ.τ.λ. Ἀποδοκιμάζειν τὴν χρῆσιν τοῦ αἰλοῦ ἐκ τῶν νῦν καὶ τῶν Δευθέρων is a rugged expression, and I have not happened to meet with any parallel to it. There is less ruggedness in the language of Plutarch in Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 30, ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ Πλάτων ἀπέειλε τῶν παιδευομένων νῦν τὴν ἁρμονίαν τὴν Λύδιαν καὶ τὴν Φρύγιαν κ.τ.λ.

27. καίπερ χρησάμενοι τὸ πρότερον αὐτῇ. We read of poets at a very early date who were also performers on the αἰλός—Mimnermus of Colophon and Smyrna at the end of the seventh century B.C. (Sirabo, p. 643) and Sacadas of Argos at the beginning of the sixth (Plut. De Musica, c. 9). Compare Athen. Deipn. 184 c, ἔμελε δὲ τοῖς πάλαι πᾶσι Ἕλλησι μουσικῇ ὡς περ καὶ ἡ αἰλητικῇ περισπούδαστος ἦν. Σαμναλίων γοῦν ὁ Ἡρακλεώτης ἐν τῇ ἐπιγραφόμενῃ Προτρεπτικῇ Δακεδαιμονίου φησὶ καὶ Θηβαίους πάντας αἰλεῖν μαθάνειν, Ἡρακλεώτας τε τοὺς ἐν τῇ Πόντῃ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἔτι, Ἀθηναίους τε τοὺς ἐπιφανιστάτους, Καλλιαν τε τὸν Ἰπποκρίτου καὶ Κριτίαν τὸν Καλλιπύχου. Athenaeus shows by quotations from the Δαιτυλεῖς of Aristophanes (Fragm. 17: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 1037) and from the Ephialtes of Phrynichus (Fragm. 3: Meineke 2. 581), that the αἰλός was commonly taught to boys in the days when these plays were performed. A reaction set in at Athens against the study of the αἰλός, aided perhaps by the increased hostility to Thebes which must have resulted from the Athenian defeat at Delium (B.C. 424), and certainly by the influence of Alcibiades (vol. i. p. 365, note 3), but Archytas at Tarentum, among other Pythagoreans, and Epaminondas at Thebes are said to have played on the αἰλός (Athen. Deipn. 184 e: see above on 1340 b 35), and we have already seen that at the Pontic Heracleia, a city in the population of which a Boeotian element was included (Paus. 5. 26. 7), the custom of learning to play on it still prevailed in the time of Chamaeleon (a little later than Aristotle), so that when Aristotle speaks of the study of the αἰλός as 'rejected,' we may take him to refer to the general rule.

28. σχολαστικώτεροι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle appears to be speaking of the Hellenes of Greece Proper, for they alone took part in the repulse of the Persian invasion in B.C. 480 and 479, and it is of this that the expression τὰ Μηδικὰ is commonly used (Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ed. 2, 2. 614. 1). When Aristotle looks back to an increase of wealth and leisure and a consequent widening of study at a date even prior to the invasion of Xerxes, he may be referring to the time of Anacharsis and to the story about him which Herodotus (4. 77) rejects, ὡς . . . ὅπισθε ἀπονουτήσας φαίη πρὸς τὸν ἀποπέμψαντα Ἕλληνας πάντας ἀσχόλους εἶναι ἐς πᾶσαν σοφίην πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων, ταῦτοις δὲ εἶναι μούνοισι σωφρόνους δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον. After the repulse of Xerxes the Greeks of Greece Proper threw themselves with vigour into the study of painting sculpture and architecture; the dramatic art made a great advance, and many States began for the first time to strike coins. Cp. Diod. 12. 1. 4. A similar spirit shows itself, though less happily, in the determination of Themistocles and Thucydides, son of Melesias, that their sons should be made marvellous horsemen and wrestlers (Plato, *Meno* 93-94). Compare with Aristotle's picture of Greece after the Persian Wars what we read of the intellectual and artistic progress of the United Provinces after the War of Independence. M. Lefèvre-Pontalis remarks in his *Life of John de Witt* (Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 12) that 'prosperity and freedom combined had been for the United Provinces the signal for a sudden blossoming of arts, sciences, and letters,' and illustrates his remark by enumerating the painters, jurists, philosophers, scholars, soldiers, and men of science who flourished in the United Provinces at this epoch. That leisure was thought to be favourable to high aims we see from c. 2. 1337 b 14 sq. and 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 1 sqq.

31. οὐδὲν διακρίνοντας ἀλλ' ἐπιζητοῦντες, 'making no distinction between things, but seeking out fresh studies.' Cp. Hdt. 3. 39, ἔφερε δὲ καὶ ἦγε πάντας διακρίνων οὐδένα, Hippocr. *De Aere, Aquis, Locis*, vol. i. p. 535 Kühn, ὅστις μὲν ὑγιαίνει τε καὶ ἔρρωται μὴδὲν διακρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πίνειν αἰεὶ τὸ παρὸν, and Antiphanes, Ἄρχων (Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.* 3. 22), μὴδ' ἑτέρ' ἐπιζητεῖ καλὰ.

32. ἤγαγον πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις. Vict. 'adduxerunt in ordinem eorum quae discerentur.' Cp. 18, εἰς παιδείαν ἀκρίως.

33. καὶ γὰρ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ κ.τ.λ. The ordinary practice was that an aulētēs was allotted to the chorēgus to accompany the chorus, the aulētēs being commonly a man of inferior social

position (cp. Athen. Deipn. 624 b, δὲ καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι αὐλητὰς φρυγίους καὶ δουλοπρεπεῖς τὰς προσηγορίας ἔχειν οἷός ἐστιν ὁ παρὰ Ἀλεμῶν Σάμβας καὶ Ἄδων καὶ Τῆλος, παρὰ δὲ Ἰσπώνου Κίων καὶ Κάδολος καὶ Βάβυς), while the chorēgus was a man of wealth and rank, but in this instance the chorēgus himself acted as aulētēs. We learn from this passage that chorēgi existed in the Lacedaemonian State; their existence at Athens is a familiar fact, and they can be shown to have existed in other States also (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 372. 1). As Sus.⁴ (1. 603) points out, the chorus at Lacedaemon here mentioned was probably not a dramatic but a lyrical chorus.

34. ἐπεχωρίσεν, sc. ἡ αὐλητικὴ.

οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν εὐειθέρων, 'most of the gentlefolks.' Οἱ εὐειθέρες are contrasted with θῆτες in 1341 b 13 sq., and with βάραντες and θῆτες in c. 7. 1342 a 18 sqq., where εὐειθέρες is conjoined with πεπαιδευμένους.

35. θῆλον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Chorēgi sometimes dedicated to Dionysus a tablet recording the victory of the poet whose play they had brought out: so we read of Themistocles in Plut. Themist. c. 5, εἰπάσει δὲ καὶ χορηγῶν τραγῳδοῖς . . . καὶ πίνακα τῆς νίκης ἀνέθηκεν, τοιαύτην ἐπιγραφὴν ἔχοντα, "Θεμιστοκλῆς Φρεάρριος ἐχορήγη, Φρύγιχος ἐδίδασκεν, Ἀδείμαντος ἤρχεν" (cp. Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 108). See A. Müller, Die griech. Bühnenalterth., p. 418, who follows Bergk in comparing Theophrast. Char. 22, ὁ δὲ εὐειθέρος τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος καὶ οὗτος τραγῳδοῖς ταυτίαν ξυλίην ἀναθεῖναι τῷ Διονύσῳ, ἐπιγράψας μὲν (μὲντοι) αὐτοῦ τὸ ὄνομα κ.τ.λ. The tablet mentioned by Aristotle here cannot of course have shown that most Athenians of respectability were able to play on the αὐλός: it can only have recorded the name of one such Athenian as having acted as aulētēs on this particular occasion. As to Ecphantides, one of the earliest comic poets at Athens, see Sus.⁴, and Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr. p. 35 sqq.

37. ὅτερον δ' ἀπεδοκιμάσθη κ.τ.λ. Supply ὁ αὐλός. 'But afterwards it was rejected [as an instrument for the young and for gentlefolks] simply by force of experience.'

39. ὁμοίως δέ, sc. ἀπεδοκιμάσθη. It is evident that at one time not only the αὐλός, but also the five instruments mentioned here, together with others which, like them, required manual dexterity and skill, were used by the young and by gentlefolks, but that they were afterwards discarded, so far as these classes were concerned, because they were thought not to contribute to virtue. They were probably regarded as training the hand rather than the mind or

character, and of three of them—sambucæ and triangular and septangular harps—we read that their strength lay in pleasing the ear of the listener, not in anything ennobling. Music, however, that is merely for pleasure is said to be no better than a 'plaything' by Plato (Polit. 288 C: cp. Gorg. 501 E and Laws 700 D sqq.); the best type of music leads on to the love of τὸ καλόν (Rep. 403 C). As to the instruments here named see Sus⁴, 1. p. 632 sqq., and Blümner, Home Life of the Ancient Greeks, Eng. Trans., pp. 312-314. The sambuca was high-pitched and piercing in tone (Aristid. Quint. De Mus. p. 101, τὴν δὲ σαμβύκην πρὸς θηλύτητα (ἀναλογούσαν), ἀγενῆ τε οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ πολλῆς ὀξύτητος διὰ τῆς μικρότητος τῶν χορδῶν εἰς ἔκλυτον περιώγουσαν: cp. Athen. Deipn. 633 f), whereas the lyre was deeper in tone (Aristid. Quint. ibid). Trigona and pectides (which were a kind of harp) had already been rejected by Plato in Rep. 399 C as being 'many-stringed and many-toned,' but the number of strings in the pectis seems to have varied (Sus⁴, 1. p. 632 sq.), and Aristotle does not name this ground for rejecting them. Opinion at Mytilene was probably favourable to the sambuca, for we read in Euphorion ap. Athen. Deipn. 182 f of a statue of one of the Muses there, who was represented holding a sambuca.

1941 b. 2. εὐλόγως δ' ἔχει κ.τ.λ. For this myth see Ovid, Fasti 6. 695 sqq.: Hygin. Fab. 165 (quoted in *Bull. de Corr. Hellénique* 12. 107): Paus. 1. 24. 1: Aristid. Quint. De Mus. p. 109. As Schneider points out, Aristotle evidently has before him the lines of Melanippides (Fragm. 2 Bergk) and the reply of Telestes (Fragm. 1 Bergk): see for both Athen. Deipn. 616 sq. Some, however, ascribed the invention of the αἰλὴ to Apollo (Plut. De Mus. c. 14). Τῶν αἰλῶν and τοὺς αἰλοῦς, because two pipes and not one were commonly used for playing in Greece.

4. οὐ κακῶς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. According to Melanippides (Fragm. 2) Athena had said, when casting away the αἰλοί,

ἴρρετ' αἰσχαί, σέματι λῆμα,
οὐ με τῆδ' ἐγὼ κακώτατι δίδωμι.

6. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably remembers an old saying (Athen. Deipn. 337 c),

ἄνδρες μὲν αἰλητῆραι θεοὶ νόον οὐκ ἐρέφουσιν,
ἀλλ' ἔρα τῇ φύσιν χά νόον ἐκπέταται.

Cp. Aristid. Quint. De Mus. p. 109, ἀπορρίψαι τὴν θεὸν φασὶ τοὺς αἰλοῦς ὡς οὐ πρόσφορον ἔδωκ' ἐπιφέροντας τοῖς σοφίας ἐπιμενέουσιν: also

Plato, Laws 644 A, τὴν δὲ εἰς χρήματα τείνουσαν ἢ τινα πρὸς ἰσχὺν ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλαν τιὰν σοφίαν ἔχου τοῦ καὶ διὰς βίαντος ἐ' εἶναι καὶ ἀνελύθειρον καὶ οὐκ ἄξιον τὸ παράπαν παιδείαν καλεῖσθαι, and Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b 16, ὅτι ἐμπόδιον τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ ἄρ' ἄλλων χρεῖα, μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ. For πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἢ παιδεία τῆς αἰδέσεως, 'training in flute-playing contributes in no way to the intelligence,' cp. Chrysipp. ap. Plut. De Stoicorum Repugnantia, c. 14, πρῶτον γὰρ ἢ ἀρετῇ ψυχῆς οὐδὲν ἔστι πρὸς τὸ (ᾧ) ἡμῶς, οὗτο δ' οὐδ' ἢ κακία οὐδὲν ἔστι πρὸς τὸ δεῖν ἡμῶς ἀνίστασθαι, and Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 6, τὸ δὲ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν ἔστι πρὸς τὸ θαρρεῖν.

7. τῇ δὲ Ἀθηνᾷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην περιτίθεμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην. 'Science' and 'skill in art' are mentioned together, just as we have in Plato, Ion 536 C, οὐ γὰρ τέχνη οὐδ' ἐπιστήμη περὶ Ὁμήρου λέγειν ἀ λέγειν, ἀλλὰ θεῖα μοῖρα καὶ κατασκευῇ, and in Theaet. 207 C, ἐστὶ δοξαστικὴ τεχνικὴ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη περὶ ἀμείβεσθαι οὐσίας γενομένη. In the passage before us καὶ τὴν τέχνην is probably added in explanation and limitation of τὴν ἐπιστήμην, for it is the less wide term of the two: cp. De Soph. Elench. 6. 168 b 6, αἱ τεχνικαὶ καὶ αἱ εἰς ἐπιστήμους. As to Athens cp. Hom. Odyss. 13. 297,

ἐπεὶ σὺ μὲν ἴσσι βροτῶν ἔχ' ἀριστὸν ἀπάντων
βουλῇ καὶ μύθοισιν, ἐγὼ δ' ἐν πᾶσι θεοῖσιν
μήτις τε κλέομαι καὶ κέρδεσσιν,

where she is the speaker: Il. 5. 60 sq., 9. 390, and 15. 411 sq.: Plato, Polit. 274 C (cp. Plut. De Fortuna, c. 4): and Paus. 8. 36. 6, ἔστι δὲ Ἀθηναῖς ἱερὸν ἐπιλόγιον Μαχαιρίδου, ὅτι βουλευμάτων ἔστιν ἢ θεοὶ πατρίων καὶ ἐπιτεχνημάτων ἐβρόντα. So we read of the Anaxagoreans in Syncell. Chron. p. 149 C (quoted by Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 913. 4), ἑρμηνεύουσι δὲ οἱ Ἀναξαγόρειοι τοὺς μυθώδεις θεοὺς, τοῦ μὲν τὴν Δία, τὴν δὲ Ἀθηνᾶν τέχνην.

8. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The apodosis to this protasis virtually comes in c. 7. 1341 b 19, σκεπτόμενος δ' ὅτι κ.τ.λ., though by the time Aristotle reaches these words he has forgotten the existence of his protasis, owing to the interposition of the long parenthesis (10-18) in which he states his reasons for excluding a professional study of music. Compare 1. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq., where the same thing occurs.

10. τεχνικὴν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας. This is added because the word τεχνικὴς was commonly used in a different sense. Plato had already said of ἡ καθαριστικὴ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι that its only aim is pleasure (Gorg. 501 E), and Aristotle here has before him the whole passage, Gorg. 501 B-502 A.

ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Ἐν ταύτῃ = ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας παιδείᾳ. Γάρ introduces the reason why Aristotle rejects study with a view to festival-competitions, not the reason why he calls this study *τεχνική*: hence the parenthesis which Sus. begins before *τεχνικὴν* should rather begin before *ἐν ταύτῃ*. The object with which an *ελεύθερος* should study is his own improvement in virtue (c. 2. 1337 b 17 sqq.). The *ελεύθερος* is defined in *Metaph. A.* 2. 982 b 25 sqq. as *ὁ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὄν*: it is characteristic of him not to live for the convenience of another (*Rhet. I.* 9. 1367 a 31 sq.). To do things with a view to the virtue of others would be more befitting to him than to contribute merely to their pleasure (cp. Plato, *Gorg.* 500 A sq.). Thus *αὐτοῦ* and *ἀρετῆς* are both of them emphatic, and also *τῶν ἀκούοντων* and *τῆς ἡδονῆς*.

14. For *καὶ . . .* δὴ see note on 1253 a 18. We expect *βάνανσον* rather than *βαναύσου*, but see note on 1338 b 1.

πονηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος, 'for the object is evil with a view to which they select their end' (cp. c. 5. 1339 b 31, *συμβίβηκε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παιδικὰς τέλους*, and *Rhet. 2.* 18. 1391 b 16, *ὥσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς κριτὴν τὸν θεωρὸν ὁ λόγος συνίστηκεν*). Competitors at a festival play, or sing and play, in the way which is most likely to please the less refined among their audience.

17. αὐτοὺς τε ποιούς τινες ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὰς κινήσεις. Ποιούς τινες, i.e. *βαναύσου*. As to the *κινήσεις* of performers on the αἰλός, cp. *Poet.* 26. 1461 b 29, *ὥς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθανομένην, ἂν μὴ αὐτὴ προσθῇ, πολλὴν κίνησιν κινεῖται, ὅσον οἱ φαῦλοι αἰληται κυλιόμενοι, ἂν δίσκον δέῃ μιμῆσθαι, καὶ ἔλκοντες τὸν κορυφαῖον, ἂν Σκύλλαν αἰλῶσιν*: *Athen. Deipn.* 21 f, *Φῶλλις ὁ Δῆλιος μουσικὸς τοῖς ἀρχαίοις φησὶ κιθαριδοὺς κινήσεις ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ προσώπου μικρὰς φέρειν, ἀπὸ ποδῶν δὲ πλείους, ἰμβατημίους καὶ χορευτικάς*, and 22 c, *Θεόφραστος δὲ πρῶτόν φησιν Ἀνδρῶνα τὸν Καταναῖον αἰλητὴν κινήσεις καὶ ῥυθμοὺς ποιῆσαι τῷ σώματι αἰλούντα ὅθεν σικελίζειν τὸ ὀρχεῖσθαι παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς μεθ' ὃν Κλεόλαν τὸν Θηβαῖον* (cp. *Schol. Aeschin.* quoted by *Meineke, Hist. Crit. Com. Gr.* p. 336): and *Paus.* 9. 12. 6, *λέγεται δὲ ὡς καὶ τοῦ προσώπου τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῇ τοῦ παντὸς κινήσει σώματος περισσῶς δὴ τι ἔτερε (Πρόνομος) τὰ θέατρα*. Pronomus was a famous player on the αἰλός. In a bas-relief found at Mantinea (see *Bull. de Corr. Hell.* 12. 105 sqq., esp. p. 110 sq.) the contorted attitude of Marsyas, as he plays on the αἰλός in competition with the cithara of Apollo, is in strong contrast with the calm bearing of the god.

19. Σκεπτόμενος δ' ἔτι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has finished what he had to C. 7. say about *ἔργα* and *ἐργασία*, and now only one of the subjects mentioned in c. 6. 1340 b 41 sqq. remains to be dealt with, and this is *ποιῶν μελῶν καὶ ποιῶν ῥυθμῶν κοινωνητέον* (i.e. τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν παιδευομένοις πολιτικῇ). But in taking up this subject for consideration Aristotle gives a wider extension to it than he had led us to expect that he would, and announces that he will inquire generally *περὶ τε τὰς ἀρμονίας καὶ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς*, as well as with regard to their use in education. And in fact we find in the sequel that he inquires in this chapter not only what harmonies are to be used in education, but also what are to be used for the other purposes served by music. This is quite in accordance with c. 5. 1339 a 11 sqq., where the question proposed for discussion is the broad question, for how many purposes music is useful. We see, therefore, that the Fifth Book of the Politics is not exclusively concerned with questions relating to the education of youth, but occupies itself also with the question for what purposes music is to be used in adult life. As to the state of the text in 19–26 see critical note.

21. τοῖς πρὸς παιδείαν διαπονοῦσι, 'those who are practising music with a view to education': cp. τὰ τοιαῦτα διαπονεῖν, c. 5. 1339 a 39. Cp. also Plut. Pericl. c. 4, 'Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ παρὰ Πυθαγορείῳ μουσικὴν διαπονηθῆναι τὸν ἄνδρα φησὶν, and Plato, Laws 818 A.

23. τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν ὅσον. Sepulv. 'musicam in cantus modulatione et rhythmis consistere,' and so most interpreters, but Vict. explains, 'musicam exerceri colique et per cantus et per numeros,' and perhaps he is right. Cp. 4(7). 2. 1324 a 15, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως (βίος).

24. τούτων δ' ἑκάτερον κ.τ.λ. What the difference is between the educational effect of rhythm and melody, Aristotle does not tell us, for the promise here given of a discussion of the subject is not fulfilled in what we possess of the Politics. We see from Plato, Laws 655 A, that *ῥυθμός* makes men *εὐρυθμοὶ* and *ἀρμονία* makes them *εὐάρμοστοι*, but Aristotle probably has in view some more tangible difference than this. The *εὐρυθμος μουσική* would be the better preparation for war (cp. Polyb. 4. 20. 6). But the key to the question which of the two kinds is the better for education will be found in the question which benefits the character most.

27. νομίσαντες οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1342 a 31 sq. Specialists in music (*μουσικοί*, cp. 1342 b 23, τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τινες) are distinguished here from philosophers who have received a musical training

(cp. 1341 b 33, *τις τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ*, and c. 5. 1340 b 5 sq., and see below on 1342 a 31, and cp. for *ἐκ* Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 232). Works seem to have been in existence written by men belonging to each of these classes, which went into full detail both on the subject of harmonies and rhythms and on that of musical education. As to the persons referred to see note on 1340 b 5.

31. As to the meaning of *νομικῶς* see Sus.⁴, who renders the word 'formally,' and compares Metaph. M. 1. 1076 a 27, *ἐπὶ καὶ ὅσον νόμον χάριν*. But does not the word mean 'after the fashion of a law,' i.e. in a broad and general way, as a law does? Cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 9 sqq., and Plato, Laws 876 D, *οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ἔπερ πολλάκις εἰπομέν τε καὶ ἰδρᾶσμεν ἐν τῇ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν νομοθεσίᾳ νόμον, τὸ περιγραφὴν τε καὶ τοὺς τύπους τῶν τιμωριῶν εἰπόντας δοῦναι τὰ παραδείγματα τοῖσι δικασταῖς τοῦ μὴ ποτε βαίνειν ἔξω τῆς δικῆς κ.τ.λ.*

32. *ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* The classification of melodies here given rests on the familiar distinction of *ἦθη πράξεις* and *πάθη* (cp. Poet. 1. 1447 a 28), for *ἰθουσιαισμός* is a *πάθος* (Pol. 5(8). 5. 1340 a 11). Of the four kinds of tragedy mentioned in Poet. 18. 1455 b 32 sqq. one is *ἡ ἠθική* and another *ἡ παθητική*. Compare also Strabo, p. 15, *τοὐναντίον δ' οἱ παλαιοὶ φιλοσοφίας τινα λέγουσι πρότην τὴν ποιητικὴν, εἰσάγουσαν εἰς τὸν βίον ἡμᾶς ἐκ νόων καὶ διδάσκουσιν ἦθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις μεθ' ἡδονῆς*. 'Ἠθικά μέλη are those which imitate and mould to virtue (see above on 1340 a 36); as to *πρακτικά μέλη*, 'melodies which imitate and stir to action,' cp. Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 12, *ἦθος δὲ ἔχει ἡ μὲν ὑποφρυγιστὶ πρακτικόν, διὸ καὶ ἐν τε τῇ Γηρύνῃ ἡ ἔξοδος καὶ ἡ ἐξέπλευσις ἐν ταύτῃ πεπολιται*, and Poet. 24. 1459 b 37, *τὸ δὲ λαμβικὸν καὶ τετράμετρον κινητικόν, τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικόν, τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν*. So in Aelian, Var. Hist. 2. 44 a trumpeter is described as playing *τὸ παρορμητικὸν μέλος, διάτορον τε καὶ γεγωνὸς ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ ὅσον εἰς τὴν μάχην ἐγερτήριον*. *Πρακτικά μέλη* seem to have been the favourites at Sparta: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 21, and Inst. Lac. § 14, *ἰσπούδαζον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ μέλη καὶ τὰς ψᾶδας οὐδὲν ἦτορ κέντρον δ' εἶχε ταῦτα ἐγερτικὸν θυμοῦ καὶ φρονήματος καὶ παραστατικὸν ὁρμῆς ἰθουσιώδους καὶ πρακτικῆς*. Plutarch, however, gives a somewhat different account of Spartan songs in Lycurg. c. 4, *λόγοι γὰρ ἦσαν αἱ ψᾶδι πρὸς εὐπειθίαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν ἀνακλητικοὶ διὰ μελῶν ἅμα καὶ ῥυθμῶν πολὺ τὸ κόσμιον ἔχοντων καὶ καταστατικόν, ὃν ἀκροόμενοι κατεπραύνοντο λεληθώς τὰ ἦθη καὶ συγκαίοντο τῇ ζῆλϊ τῶν καλῶν*. As to *πρακτικά μέλη*, which were of course not exclusively warlike, see vol. i. p. 367, note 1. Dr. Johnson describes in his Journey to the Western Islands (Works, 8. 279) how the strokes of

the reapers' sickles 'were timed by the modulation of the harvest-song, in which all their voices were united,' and adds that 'they accompany in the Highlands every action which can be done in equal time with an appropriated strain, which has, they say, not much meaning, but its effects are regularity and cheerfulness. The ancient proceleusmatic song, by which the rowers of galleys were animated, may be supposed to have been of this kind.'

33. $\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ is followed in 35 by $\kappa\alpha\iota$. For instances of a similar structure see note on 1313 b 13.

35. $\kappa\alpha\iota$ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν κ.τ.λ., 'and they lay down that musical modes are appropriate in nature to each of these, one mode answering to one kind of melody and another to another.' The Dorian mode was the appropriate harmony for ἰθακὴ μέλη, the Phrygian for ἐνθουσιαστικὰ, and perhaps the hypo-Phrygian (see above on 32) for πρακτικὰ. Μῆρος seems here to be used in the sense of εἶδος (cp. διαίρεσις, 32): for this use of the word see Bon. Ind. 455 b 46 sqq.

36. φάμεν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 5. 1339 b 14. Plato, on the other hand, had spoken in Laws 659 D—660 A as if the ethical use of music was its only use. For $\kappa\alpha\iota$ πλείων see note on 1287 a 34.

38. καθάρσεις—τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν καθάρσιν κ.τ.λ. See below on 1342 a 8. The promise here given of a full explanation of the word καθάρσις is not fulfilled in the Poetics as it has come down to us: see note in Suss.⁴ For other matters known to have found a place in Aristotle's treatise which are wanting in our Poetics, see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 107. 1 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 102. 2). 'We possess Aristotle's treatise,' he remarks, 'only in a text mutilated and in many ways corrupted.' For ἀπλῶς, 'in a general way,' cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 4. 1185 a 38, ἀλλ' ὥστε οἷχ ἱκανὸν οὕτως ἀπλῶς εἰσεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαφέστερον διαρίσαι δεῖ.

40. τρίτον δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν κ.τ.λ. Bernays translates in his Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie, p. 7 (ed. 1880), 'drittens zur Ergötzung, um sich zu erholen und abzuspannen,' but if, as he seems to think, the words πρὸς ἀρεσίν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συνταξίας ἀνάγκην are added in explanation of πρὸς διαγωγὴν, the word διαγωγή must here be used in a different sense from that in which it is used elsewhere in the Fifth Book, e.g. in c. 5. 1339 b 14, where it is distinguished from παιδεία. This is not perhaps impossible, but it is more likely that

διαγωγή is used here in the same sense as in 1339 b 14, and that it is linked with *δαισις* and *τῆς συντροφίας ἀνάπαισις* because it has already been so linked in c. 5. 1339 b 15 sqq. Zeller, indeed, thinks (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 771. 1: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 308. 1) that Aristotle intends *δαισις* and *τῆς συντροφίας ἀνάπαισις* to come in as a fourth end and not as a part of the third, though the word *τέταρτον* is not used. Sus. would read *ταύτης δ' ἢ πρὸς διαγωγήν ἢ πρὸς δαίσειν τε καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντροφίας ἀνάπαισιν* partly for other reasons and partly because he regards it as inconceivable 'that the cathartic enjoyment could possibly be anything else but either that of pure amusement and sensuous delight or the genuine higher aesthetic enjoyment which is a part of the highest intellectual culture and rational satisfaction' (see Sus., 1. p. 638 sqq.), but if any change in the text is necessary, I should be content with the insertion of *ἢ* before *πρὸς δαίσειν*.

1342 a. 1. *φανερὸν ὅτι χρηστὸν μὲν πάσαις ταῖς ἁρμονίαις, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον πάσαις χρηστὸν*. Aristotle probably refers only to the modes which are not *παρεκβάσεις*, yet he finds a use in 22 sqq. even for those which are. For the repetition of *πάσαις* see note on 1283 a 30.

2. *πρὸς μὲν τὴν παιδείαν ταῖς ἠθικωτάταις*. As to the meaning of *ἠθικωτάταις* here and *ἠθικοῖς* in 28 see note on 1340 a 36. Aristotle may use the plural because he is prepared to approve, in addition to the Dorian mode, of the *ὑποδυριστί*, of which we read in Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 14 that it is *μεγαλοπρεπὲς καὶ σπάσιμον*, but perhaps it is more likely that he does not wish to exclude any modes which may be recommended as *ἠθικωτάταις* by *οἱ κοινωτοὶ τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν παιδείας* (cp. 30 sqq.). He rejects without consideration the possible claims of *πρακτικὰ* and *ἐνθουσιαστικὰ μέλη* to a place, however subordinate, in the education of the young, but he might well have considered whether they do not deserve to be occasionally used. Are not boys, or some of them at any rate, *παθητικοί*, and might not *κίθαραις* by music be sometimes useful to such boys even educationally? Might not airs which stir to action also be a useful element in the education of some boys? It is not clear that Aristotle objects to the presence of boys at the performance of *πρακτικὰ καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικὰ μέλη*, any more than he objects to their presence at the performance of tragedies (cp. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 20 sqq.), but he certainly allows no place in education to music of these two kinds.

4. καὶ ταῖς πρακτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐθουσιαστικαῖς. Sus.⁴ is probably right in translating these words 'also the practical and the enthusiastic': cp. 1. a. 1253 a 14, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ ὁρῶν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερὸν, ὅστε καὶ ('also') τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκαιον.

ὁ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See note in Sus.⁴. Aristotle seems to anticipate that his recommendation of the use of the 'enthusiastic' modes, when we listen to music played by others, will excite surprise, and hence in 4-16 he justifies it at some length, though he adds no similar justification of his recommendation of the use of the 'practical' modes under similar circumstances, probably because he does not anticipate that any objection will be made to this.

7. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς κηρύσεως κατακῆχοι τινὲς εἰσιν. Ταύτης τῆς κηρύσεως = τούτου τοῦ πάθους: cp. 5, πάθος, and Plat. De Sanitate Tuenda c. 13, φθὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς κινήματα τὸ εὖμα μῆνιαι πρὸς νόσον ἐπισφαλῶς ἔχειν, λόγοι γὰρ ἰσχυροῦσι ἄθυρμα καὶ φέβου. For κατακῆχοι see critical note on 1269 b 30. Κατήχουσα is the appropriate technical term, cp. Plato, Symp. 215 C, and Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 65, τοῖς δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ὁρμῆς καὶ ἐπιστοίας κατεχομένοις ὑπὸ ἐθουσιασμοῦ. As to the nature of ἐθουσιασμός see note on 1340 a 11. Of this susceptibility to ἐθουσιασμός we have a striking example in Olympias, the mother of Alexander (Plat. Alex. c. 2, ἡ δὲ Ὀλυμπιάς μᾶλλον ἐτίμων ζήλοσασα τὸς κατεχὲς καὶ τοὺς ἐθουσιασμοὺς κ.τ.λ.). Had Aristotle observed in her case the calming effect of sacred melodies?

8. ἐκ τῶν ὁ ἱερῶν μελῶν κ.τ.λ., 'and as an effect of the sacred melodies we see these men, when they have used the melodies which fill the soul with mystic excitement, brought back to a normal state as if having received medical treatment and purgation.' Sus.⁴ points out that χρῆσθαι, like κίνησις, καθίστασθαι, and κομφίζεσθαι, is a medical term. It seems likely that the patient both listened to and sang the maddening melodies (see note in Sus.⁴). Τοὺς ἐξοργίζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεις has been interpreted in many ways. Vict. explains these words 'cantibus expiando animo frangendisque vehementioribus illis motibus aptis,' Lamb. 'cantibus animum furore levantibus ac purgantibus,' and Liddell and Scott 'melodies which purge by mystic rites,' but Sepulveda is probably right in translating 'cantibus animum concitantibus' (cp. 1342 b 3, ἀμφὸς γὰρ ἐργαστοῦναι καὶ παθητικά). Bernays (followed by Sus.) renders the words in a not very dissimilar way, 'Lieder die eben das Gemüth berauschen' ('songs which intoxicate the soul'). Ὅταν—μέλεις is bracketed by

Sus. as a gloss on ἐκ τῶν δ' ἱερῶν μελῶν (see Sus.⁴, I. p. 640), but perhaps not all the ἱερὰ μῆλη were 'intoxicating to the soul': cp. Plato, Ion 536 C, ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες ἐκείνου μόνου αἰσθάνονται τοῦ μελους δξίως, ὃ ἂν ᾖ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ ὅτου ἂν κατέχωνται, καὶ εἰς ἐκείνο τὸ μέρος καὶ σχημάτων καὶ ῥημάτων εὐποροῦσι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐ φροντίζουσιν. There may have been ἱερὰ μῆλη introductory to the melody which produced the decisive effect. Τὴν ψυχὴν is emphatic: if the music does not go to *the soul*, it does nothing. For καθισταμένους see above on 1340 b 3. In ἱατρείας καὶ καθάρσεως the καὶ is explanatory, as in I. 9. 1257 b 9, τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν (see note on 1257 b 7). The action of the sacred melodies on the souls of persons naturally disposed to ἐνθουσιασμός is compared to the action of some cathartic medicine like hellebore, which removes the worst elements and leaves the best (Plato, Rep. 567 C, καλὸν γε, ἔφη, καθαρμὲν. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν ἐναντίον ἢ οἱ ἱατροὶ τὰ σῶματα· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ χεῖριστον ἀφαιροῦντες λείπουνσι τὸ βέλτιστον, ὃ δὲ τοῦναντίον). The following passages may be selected from many others as throwing light on Aristotle's meaning—Plut. Sympos. 6. 7. 2, καὶ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι, ὃ φίλε, φρενετίζον καὶ μαινόμενοι (πλείων ἰσχυέει· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἀλλεβόρῃ χρησάμενοι ἢ διαίτῃ καταστῇ, τὸ μὲν σφοδρὸν ἐκείνο καὶ σύντονον οἰχεται καὶ γέγονεν ἐξίτηλον, ἢ δ' ἀληθινὴ δύναμις καὶ σωφροσύνη παραγίνεται τῇ σῶματι· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ καθάρσις τοῦ οἴνου, τὸ πλεητικὸν ἀφαιρούσα καὶ μακρὸν, εἰς πραΐαν ἔξιν καὶ ὑγιαίνουσαν καθίστησι: Strabo, p. 418, καὶ δὲ φασιν ἐκεῖ (at the Malian Anticyra) τὸν ἀλλέβορον φύεσθαι τὸν δαστείον, ἐνταῦθα δὲ (at the Phocian Anticyra) σκευάζεσθαι βέλτιον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀποδημεῖν δεῦρο (to the latter) πολλοὺς καθάρσεως καὶ θεραπείας χάριν: and Plut. Coriol. c. 12, ἔδοξεν οὖν τοῖς νούν ἔχουσιν εἰς δέον γεγονέναι καὶ κατὰ καιρὸν ἢ χρεῖα τῶν οὐδελιτραπῶν διὰ τε τὴν ἀπορίαν κουφισμοῦ δεομένοις, καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἅμα σκεδάσειν ἡλπιζον, εἰ τὸ βορυβοῦν μάλιστα καὶ συνεπηγμένον τοῖς δημαγωγοῖς ὥσπερ περίττωμα τῆς πόλεως νοσερὸν καὶ παραχῶδες ἀποκαθαρθεῖη. That certain sacred rites produced a similar effect on the soul to that produced by cathartic medicines on the body, we see from Plato, Rep. 560 D, τοῦτων δὲ γέ που κενόσαντες καὶ καθήραντες τὴν τοῦ κατεχομένου τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τελουμένου ψυχὴν μεγάλῃσι τέλεσι, and Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 158, διὰ καὶ τὰς βακχικὰς τελετὰς καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις παραπλήσιαι λόγου τινὸς ἔχουθαί φασιν, ὅπως ἂν ἡ τῶν ἀμαθειστέρων ποιήσις διὰ βίον ἢ τέχνην ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταύταις μελωδιῶν τε καὶ ὀρχήσεων ἅμα παιδαίᾳ ἐκαθαίρηται, where the purging influence of the rites is traced in part to the music by which they were accompanied. On the whole subject of the

kátharsis effected by music and also by tragedy, see Sua.⁴, i. p. 641 sqq., and Prof. Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, c. 6. We are not distinctly told in the passage before us that a *kátharsis* *παθημάτων* occurs under the influence of the sacred melodies, as we are in the famous passage of the *Poetics* about tragedy (*Poet.* 6. 1449 b 27 sq.), but we can hardly be wrong in taking the musical *kátharsis* to be a *kátharsis* of *παθήματα* like the other. It should be noticed that music appears to purge all emotions, not merely, like tragedy, those of pity and fear, and also that the kind of music which produces a cathartic effect is by no means the wailful kind characteristic of such modes as the mixo-Lydian; music of this sort is charged with human feeling and essentially human, whereas cathartic music is full of a divine *afflatus* (*Probl.* 19. 48. 923 b 19, δὲ καὶ ἀρμόζει τῷ χορῷ τὸ γοῦν καὶ ψόγιον ἴδιον καὶ μέλας ἀνθρώπων γὰρ. ταῦτα δ' ἔχουσιν αἱ ἄλλαι ἀρμονίαι, ἥιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἡ ὑποφρυγιστὶ ἐθουσιαστικὴ γὰρ καὶ βασιλική). In Milton's *Paradise Lost*, i. 549 sqq., the 'Dorian mood' is said to inspire 'deliberate valour' 'firm and unmoved With dread of death to flight or foul retreat' (cp. 1342 b 12 sqq.), and is also credited with a cathartic influence which Aristotle does not ascribe to it—

'Nor wanting power to mitigate and swage
 With solemn touches troubled thoughts, and chase
 Anguish and doubt and fear and sorrow and pain
 From mortal or immortal minds.'

Here the passage before us may be present to Milton's mind. Julian perhaps refers to it in *Epist.* 56. 442 B, ὅτι γὰρ πρὸς ἡμῶν αἰνὰι τὰς ψυχὰς ὑπὸ τῆς θείας μουσικῆς καθαρθέντες ἐνίσχυνται, πιστευόντες τοῖς προαποφαινομένοις ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ τούτοις.

11. ταὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. Aristotle seems still to be speaking of the effect of the sacred melodies. They cannot fail, he thinks, to purge others besides those who are specially given to *ἐθουσιασμός*—those who are specially subject to the emotions of fear and pity (two allied emotions, as we learn from *Rhet.* 2. 8), and indeed those who are subject to emotion of any kind, and also those who are not specially emotional, so far as they are accessible to emotion. Philoxenus had represented the Cyclops as 'curing his love with music' (*Philox. Fragm.* 7: *Plut. Amat.* c. 18), and anger also was thought to be soothed by music (*Athen. Deipn.* 623 f sq.). As to the specially emotional persons referred to, cp. *Eth. Eud.* 3. 1. 1228 b 35, οἱ μὲν οὖν τοσούτους καὶ δαθόντες καὶ θαλαῖ

καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν κοινῶν παθημάτων πάσχουσί τι, πλὴν ὁσίων τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοί, and Probl. 19. 48. 922 b 21, *ἕκιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἢ ὑποφρυγαστί· ἐνθουσιαστική γὰρ καὶ βακχική.* κατὰ μὲν οὖν ταύτην πάσχομεν τι· παθητικοὶ δὲ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς μᾶλλον τῶν δυνατῶν εἰσι.

13. καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῶν τοιοῦτων ἑκάστῃ, 'so far as a share in the things mentioned' (i.e. emotions) 'falls to each': cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 22, *καθ' ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἑκάστῃ τοῦ ζῆν καλῶς*, and Plato, Rep. 421 C, *ἐατέων ὅπως ἑκάστοις τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἢ φύσιν ἀποδίδωσι τοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας.*

14. *τινα κάθαρσιν.* Bern. 'irgend eine Katharsis,' and Prof. Butcher (Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, ed. 2, p. 246, note 1) observes, 'τινὰ κάθαρσιν implies that the *katharsis* in all cases is not precisely of the same kind,' and (p. 247) 'it is pretty plainly implied that the *katharsis* of pity and fear in tragedy is analogous to, but not identical with, the *katharsis* of "enthusiasm."' This may be so, but I am not sure that Aristotle means anything more than that all experience some purgation, though the amount of it varies with the amount of emotion by which they are severally possessed: cp. Plut. De Tranq. An. c. 9, *δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κοινὰ* ('things which are shared by men in general') *μὴ παρορᾶν, ἀλλ' ἐν τινι λόγῳ τίθεσθαι.* *Τις*, indeed, is sometimes added to a substantive merely to soften it, as in Xen. Oecon. 8. 3, *καὶ γὰρ χορὸς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων συγκείμενός ἐστιν· ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν ποιῶν δ τι ἂν τύχῃ ἕκαστος, ταραχὴ τις φαίνεται καὶ θεᾶσθαι ἀρεπείς*, but I do not think that this is the case here.

κουφίζεσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς. For *κουφίζεσθαι* cp. Plut. Coriol. c. 12 (quoted above on 8): De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 b 8, *ἀλγος δὲ τισιν ἐν μικρῷ χρόνῳ κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας κουφίζει τοῦτ' ἀπὸν, ὅταν πλεονάσῃ, καθάπερ ἡ πρώτη τροφή, ἂν ὑπερβάλλῃ τῇ πλῆθει· καὶ γὰρ ταύτης ἀπιούσης τὰ σώματ' εὐημερεῖ μᾶλλον*: and Hist. An. 10. 5. 636 b 29 sqq.

15. *ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, 'and similarly the cathartic melodies also' (as well as the sacred melodies) 'are a source to men of harmless pleasure.' So Vict. 'ut cantilenas illas sacras, quas docuit adhiberi solitas sua aetate ad expiandos lymphaticos, praeter furorem quem levant affirmavit gignere voluptatem, ita nunc testatur cantus purgandis animis factos, qui tamen non opitulantur ope divina valde commotis animo, sed concentu vocum sonorumque, apto illis motibus, prosunt, continere in se suavitatis plurimum.' The fact that they are a source of harmless pleasure shows that they are well suited both for diagogē and for relaxation (cp. c. 5. 1339 b 25 sqq.). The cathartic melodies here referred to seem to be the

same as those which are called enthusiastic in 1341 b 34. I understood this passage otherwise when I wrote (in vol. i. p. 366), 'the melodies also which purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure.' I should have written, 'just as the sacred melodies produce this effect, so the melodies which purge emotion are similarly productive of innocent pleasure.' [Since the foregoing note was written, Sus.⁴ (1. p. 611) has rightly disagreed with the view which I took of the sentence in vol. i. p. 366. I then thought that it referred to cathartic melodies as distinguished from cathartic harmonies, whereas I think now that it refers to cathartic melodies as distinguished from the sacred melodies, whose effects I take to be described in *ἐκ τῶν ὁ ιερῶν μελῶν*, 8—ἡδονῆς, 15. I am still of opinion that *καθαρτικὰ* should be retained in 15, and not, as Sus. suggests, discarded in favour of *πρακτικὰ*.]

16. *διὰ κ.τ.λ.* *Μέν* is taken up, not by *δ* in 19, but by *δέ* in 28. With Spengel and Sus. I insert (*χρησθαι*) before *θετίων*: cp. *χρηστίων*, 1342 a 1, 2, *χρησθαι*, 27, and *χρηστίων*, 29. For *θετίων χρησθαι*, cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 15. 1, *ἴθαρ γὰρ θύει μὲν βασιλεία πρὸς τῆς πόλεως τὰ δημόσια πάντα. Διὰ—ἀγνωστὰς* is virtually repeated in 26—28.

18. *ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ θεατῆς διττός κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Poet. 26. 1461 b 28 sqq. For *ἐλευθέρος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος*, see above on 1338 b 3.

19. *ὁ δὲ φορτικὸς ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιοῦτων συγκαίματος.* Sus.⁴ aptly compares Cic. De Fin. 2. 14. 44, cum Epicuro autem hoc plus est negotii, quod e duplici genere voluptatis coniunctus est.

21. *ἀγῶνας καὶ θεωρίας*, 'contests and spectacles.' Cp. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 1, *πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις περὶ ἀγῶνας ἐπιμέλεια γυμναστικῆς καὶ Διονυσιακούς, ἐὰν ᾗ τις ἐτέρας συμβάλει τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι θεωρίας*, whence it appears that a 'contest' was a kind of 'spectacle.' A dramatic or musical performance would also be a 'spectacle.' *θεωρία* is explained by Stallbaum to be used in the wider sense of 'festival' (*ἱορτή*) in Plato, Laws 650 A, *τῆς τοῦ Διονύσου θεωρίας*. Cp. also Isocr. Aeginet. § 10, *οὕτε θυσίαν οὕτε θεωρίαν οὐτ' ἄλλην ἱορτὴν αἰδεμίων*. We infer from the use of *καὶ* in *καὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις* that Aristotle is prepared to provide *ἀγῶνες* and *θεωρίαι* at which music of a higher type is performed for the citizens of his 'best State.' It is remarkable that he should expect day-labourers to care for music of any kind.

22. *εἰσὶ δ' ὅσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχὰς κ.τ.λ.* As to the souls of *βάναννοι* and *θήτες* cp. Plato, Rep. 495 D, quoted above on 1337 b 8. The position of *εἰσὶ* is strange; it seems hardly to belong to

ὥσπερ αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ κ.τ.λ., and yet it can hardly belong to οὗτω καὶ κ.τ.λ., for that clause is already provided with an εἰσι. Did Aristotle originally intend the sentence to run εἰσι δι τῶν ἁρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις and insert ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ. by an afterthought? Perhaps the repetition of εἰσι in 24 is to be compared with the repetition of δῆλον in 3. 13. 1283 b 17 and of ἔργον in 8(6). 5. 1319 b 35.

23. οὗτω καὶ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις εἰσι. Here the relation between the soul and an ἁρμονία dwelt on in c. 5. 1340 b 17 sqq. is again present to Aristotle's mind. The μεζολυδιστί and συντονολυδιστί (Plato, Rep. 398 E) are probably among the modes referred to, and perhaps also the low-pitched Lydian and low-pitched Ionian (see note in Sus.⁴); at any rate both high-pitched and low-pitched modes are treated as παρεκβάσεις τῶν ἁρμονιῶν in 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 24 sqq. The abandonment of the mixo-Lydian mode to βάνανσοι and θῆτες is uncomplimentary to Sappho, its reputed inventress (see above on 1340 a 42).

24. καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα, 'and of melodies those which are highly-strung and unnaturally coloured.' Σύντονα is perhaps used here in opposition both to ἀνεμένα or μαλακά, as in 1342 b 21 and 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 27, and to βαρέα, as in De Gen. An. 5. 7. 786 b 35, καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι τὸ βαρὺ τῶν συντόνων βέλτιον. The Cretans are said by Ephorus to have used in their songs the rhythms which are most σύντονοι (Fragm. 64: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 250). For the meaning of χρῶμα in music see Liddell and Scott, s.v., and Sus.⁴, i. p. 636 sqq. Aristotle probably objected to the musical innovations of Timotheus, of whom we read in Pherecr. Χείρων, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 333),

οὗτος ἅπαντας οὕς λέγω

παρελήλυθ' ἔδωκεν ἑκτραπέλουε μυρμηκίαις,

ἐξαρμονίου ἐπερβολαίου ε' ἀνοσίους,

and also to the music of Agathon: cp. Plut. Sympos. 3. 1. 1, θαυμάζω δὲ καὶ Ἑράτωνα τοῦτον, εἰ τὰ ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι παραχρᾶσις βδελυγτόμενος καὶ κατηγορῶν τοῦ καλοῦ Ἀγάθωνος, ὃν πρῶτον εἰς τραγῳδίαν φασὶν ἐμβάλειν καὶ ὑπομίξει τὸ χρωματικόν, ὅτε τοὺς Μουσικοὺς ἐδίδασκεν, αὐτὸς ἡμῖν, ὡς ὁρᾷτε, ποικίλων χρωμάτων καὶ ἀνθρῶν τὸ συμπόσιον ἐμπέπληκε καὶ τὴν διὰ τῶν ὄτων ἀποκλείει τρυφήν καὶ ἡδονάθειαν κ.τ.λ. Compare also Philoch. Fragm. 66 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 395), where we read of Lysander of Sicyon, καὶ περιελὼν τὴν συντονίαν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐν τοῖς ψαλοῖς κιθαρισταῖς, χρώματά τε εὐχρῶα πρῶτος ἐκιδάρισε κ.τ.λ., and Pratinas, Fragm. 5, quoted above on 1340 a 42.

26. *διότι κ.τ.λ.* So Plato makes over *θῆραι* for famous men to women and worthless persons (Rep. 387 E).

28. *ὥστερ εἰρηται*, in 1342 a 2.

30. *καθότιερ εἶπομεν πρότερον*, in c. 5. 1340 b 3 sqq.

31. *οἱ κοινωνοὶ κ.τ.λ.*, 'those who have shared in philosophical study and in musical education,' as distinguished from mere musicians on the one hand and philosophers who have not studied music on the other (see above on 1341 b 27). For the phrase cp. Plato, Gorg. 487 C, *κοινωνοὺς γεγονότας σοφίας*: Laws 968 A, *παιδείας ὁπόσῃς διαπλύθεμεν κοινωνὸν γενόμενον*: Hipp. Minor 363 A, *οἱ μάλιστα ἂν ἀνταποκρίσασθαι μάλιστα ἡμῖν τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατριβῆς*: Theaet. 172 C, *οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολλὸν χρόνον διατρίψαντες*.

32. *ὁ δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ Σωκράτης κ.τ.λ.* Here begins a similar review of the opinions put in Socrates' mouth by Plato in the Republic to that which we find at the end of the Book on Revolutions (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 1 sqq.). As to these passages see vol. I. p. 519, note 1. The passage in the Republic referred to is Rep. 399 A sqq., where Plato seems to imply that the Dorian and Phrygian modes inspire courage in war and temperance in peace. Aristotle holds, on the contrary, that the Phrygian mode does neither the one thing nor the other. *Φρύγιον* should probably be 'Ionian' in Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 30, *ὥστερ οὖν ὁ Πλάτων ἀφῆκε τῶν παιδευομένων νέων τὴν ἁρμονίαν τὴν Δωρίαν καὶ τὴν Φρύγιαν, τὴν μὲν τὸ θρηνηδὲς καὶ φιλοπονεθῆς ἡμῶν ἐγείρουσαν τῆς ψυχῆς, τὴν δὲ τὸ πρὸς ἡδονῆς διλίσθηρὸς καὶ ἀκόλαστον αἰξουσαν*: cp. Aristid. Quint. De Musica, p. 22. For *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ* cp. 2. 6. 1264 b 28, 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 11, and 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 1, in all which passages the phrase is used in close proximity to a mention of *ὁ Σωκράτης*, and 2. 5. 1264 b 24, *ἡ πολιτεία περὶ ἧς ὁ Σωκράτης εἶρηκεν*. In 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1, on the other hand, we have *ὥστερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις* (perhaps referring to the Eighth and Ninth Books of the Republic), and in 2. 1. 1261 a 6, *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος*.

34. *ἀποδοκιμάσας*, in Rep. 399 D.

2. *αἰλός*. For the absence of the article see note on 1255 b 36. 1342 b.

3. For the difference between *δραμαστικά* and *παθητικά* see above on 1341 a 21.

θηλοὶ δ' ἡ ποίησις πῶσα γὰρ βακχεία κ.τ.λ., 'and poetry makes this clear' (i.e. that the *αἰλός* and the Phrygian mode are similar in effect), 'for every sort of Bacchic frenzy and all Bacchic agitation of mind [when represented in poetry] find their fit expression in

the pipes more than in any other instrument.' In translating *κίνησις* 'agitation of mind' and not 'bodily movement' I have followed Sus., who may probably be right (cp. 3, *παθητικὰ*, and c. 3. 1337 b 42), but I have done so with some hesitation, for *βακχεία* is used of physical movement in Plato, *Laws* 672 B, *τὰς τε βακχείας καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν μανικὴν χορείαν*, 790 E, *καθάπερ αἱ τῶν ἐκφόρων βακχείων λάσεις ταύτῃ τῇ τῆς κινήσεως ἅμα χορεῖα καὶ μούσῃ χρώμεναι*, and 815 B-C. For *ἵσται ἐν* (= 'sitae sunt in'), see above on 1330 b 8, and cp. c. 6. 1341 a 3, and Plato, *Protag.* 354 E, 356 D (where see Stallbaum). It should be noted that in a letter (genuine or not) from Olympias to Alexander quoted in *Athen. Deipn.* 659 f she distinguishes between *τὰ ὀργιαστικὰ ἱερά* and *τὰ βακχικὰ*, though in the passage before us *βακχεία* is evidently connected with *τὰ ὀργιαστικὰ*.

7. *οἷον ὁ διθύραμβος κ.τ.λ.*, 'as for instance the dithyramb, [which is an expression of Bacchic frenzy,] is generally agreed to be a Phrygian melody' (and to require the Phrygian mode).

8. *σύνεστιν*, not far in meaning from *τέχνη*: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 11, *τῆς αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ταύτης*.

9. *διότι Φιλόξενος κ.τ.λ.* Vict. 'est autem molestum hac in parte quod legitur in media sententia accusandi casu *μίσθους*.' Schn. 'Reizius latere nomen dithyrambi Philoxeni suspicatus est; et recte quidem. Equidem non dubito *Μυσοῖς* id fuisse, quo nomine fabulas tragicas ab Aeschilo et Agathone publico in certamine Athenis commissas fuisse novimus.' Sophocles also wrote a tragedy thus entitled (see Nauck, *Trag. Gr. Fragm.*, p. 175). Schneider's conjecture has been adopted by Coray, Stahr, Bekk.², and Sus., and is probably right, if indeed *τοὺς Μυσοῖς* is not an explanatory gloss which has crept from the margin into the text. Bergk accepts the change (*Poet. Lyr. Gr.*, *Philoxenus Fragm.* 20), and adds, 'huc refero *Plut. De Mus.* c. 33, *ὥστε εὐδὲ (ἡτεῖν παρὰ ταύτης τὸ διαγνώσκει δύνασθαι, πότερον οἰκίαις εἰληφέν ὁ ποιητὴς ὡς οἶον [ὅμοιον MSS. in place of ὡς οἶον] εἰπεῖν ἐν μούσοις (corrige Μυσοῖς) τὸν ὑποδάριον τῶνον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἢ τὸν μεζολυδίον τε καὶ δάριον ἐπὶ τὴν ἱκθασιν, ἢ τὸν ὑποφρύγιον τε καὶ φρύγιον ἐπὶ τὴν μέσην (τὸ μέσον ?)*.' If *τοὺς Μυσοῖς* is correct, the dithyramb probably turned, like the tragedies of the same name by Aeschylus and Sophocles, on the story of Telephus. The mention of the title of the dithyramb is made somewhat abruptly, and also without necessity; still the title of a poem by Tyrtæus is given, though less abruptly, in 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 39. As to the subjects in connexion with which the Dorian mode was employed, it should

be noticed that, as Plutarch points out (*De Musica* c. 17), it was sometimes used for τραγικοί οἵκτοι and even for ἐρωτικά, subjects as alien to it, one would have thought, as a dithyramb. We see from Plato, *Laws* 669 C, that composers were not always successful in mating melody and words.

11. ὅπερ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς. Cp. *Poet.* 24. 1460 a 3 sqq.

12. περὶ δὲ τῆς θυριότητος κ.τ.λ. See above on 1340 b 3.

14. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. Is this a reference to *Eth. Nic.* 2. 5. 1106 a 26 sqq., b 26 sq.? Cp. also *Magn. Mor.* 1. 24. 1192 a 6, ὁ ἄρα λευθέριος, ἐπειδὴ ἔστιν ἐπαινετός, μέσος τις ἀντὶ τοῦτον.

15. ἡ δὲ θυριότης κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 5. 1340 b 3 sqq.

16. φανερόν ἐστι τὰ Δόρια μέλη πρέπει παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον τοῖς νεωτέροις. Coray and Sus. read τοῖς νεωτέροις. *Vet. Int.* translates, 'manifestum quod Dorias melodias oportet erudiri magis iuniores,' but whether he found τοῖς νεωτέροις in his Greek text is doubtful. I incline on the whole to retain τοῖς νεωτέροις: cp. *Eth. Nic.* 4. 14. 1128 a 19, ἔστι γάρ τινα πρέπει τῇ τοιούτῃ λέγειν ἐν παιδείᾳ μέρι καὶ ἀκούειν, and Plato, *Laws* 811 D, προσήκοντες τὰ μέλιστα ἀκούειν νέες, and 821 E, τοῦτε τὸ μάθημα, ὃ θαυμαστὸν μὲν λέγεται, προσήκον δ' αὖ μαθεῖν τοῖς νέαις.

17. εἰσὶ δὲ δύο σκοποί—34. τὸ πρέπει. Susemihl brackets this passage as an interpolation, and I incline now to think that he is right: I thought otherwise when I wrote vol. i. p. 366, note 1. It would seem that the writer of it seeks to qualify the decision just arrived at in favour of the use of the midway mode in education by pointing out that for certain ages the relaxed modes are the only possible and becoming ones, and also that there is something to be said for the use in education of such modes as the Lydian. It is hardly likely that Aristotle would do this, unless we suppose a change of mind on his part, for he would scarcely be willing to unsay what he has said against the relaxed modes in c. 5. 1340 b 2, or to allow the boys for whose training he recommends the Dorian mode to be also trained in modes which he regards as soft and effeminate. Besides, as Sus.⁴ remarks (i. p. 616, note), after what has been said in c. 6. 1340 b 35 sqq. we do not expect to hear of old men singing, except perhaps on the occasion of some special festivity (c. 5. 1339 b 9 sq.). The language of the passage recalls that of Plato in *Laws* 785 B, τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ πρέπειν ἐκείνους προστάττει μέχρι τῶν πενήκοντα ἐτῶν, and 670 D, ἵνα καθορῶντες τὰς τε ἀρμονίας καὶ τοὺς ᾠδαίους ἐκλέγασθαι τε τὰ προσήκοντα οἱοί τ' ᾤσιν, ἀ τοῖς τριεκοῖσι τε καὶ

τοιούτοις ᾄδειν πρόπον. We also hear a good deal about τὸ δυνατόν and τὸ πρόπον, or rather τὸ ἀρμόττον, in the opening chapter of the Book which stands next to the Fifth, if we adopt the order of the Books which has been adopted in the present edition and place the old Fourth Book immediately after the old Eighth. It should further be noticed that Plutarch seems to have had 17-29 before him in *An seni sit gerenda Respublica*, c. 18, ὥσπερ γάρ, εἰ καθήκον ἦν ᾄδοντας διατελεῖν, ἴδει, πολλῶν τόνων καὶ τρόπων ὑποκειμένων φωνῆς, οὗτε ἀρμονίας οἱ μουσικοὶ καλοῦσι, μὴ τὸν ὀξὺν ἄμα καὶ σύντονον διέκειν γέροντας γενομένους, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ τὸ ῥάδιον ἔπισσι μετὰ τοῦ πρόποντος ἔθους. It is, however, possible that Plutarch had before him the criticism of the Republic by τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τινας which is reproduced here, and not its reproduction in the passage before us. In addition to the objections to the passage 17-34 to which reference has already been made, it may be noted that, as Sus. has pointed out, looking to the reference to τὸ δυνατόν in 18 sqq., we expect to be told that the young should learn those melodies which are suitable to them and not beyond their powers, and not to be told, as we in fact are, that they should learn those melodies which will be the only ones suitable and practicable for them when they are past a certain age. Perhaps, however, the writer *does* mean that the relaxed modes are suitable both to the young and to the old; this seems to be indicated by his use of καὶ in ὥστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐσομένην ἡλικίαν, 'for the coming age also as well as for that of youth.' If this is his meaning, however, and there is nothing defective in the text, he must be allowed to have expressed it in a very imperfect way.

20. καὶ ταῦτα, i.e. τὰ δυνατόα καὶ τὰ πρόποντα, as well as τὰ μέσα: cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 37, τὸν μέσον ἀναγκαῖον βίον εἶναι βέλτιστον, τῆς ἐκάστοις ἐνδεχομένης τυχεῖν μεσότητος. Τὸ μέσον would not be exactly the same for boys and for men of full age and for old men.

οἷον τοῖς ἀπειρηκόσι διὰ χρόνον κ.τ.λ. Cp. *De Gen. An.* 5. 7. 787 b 10, ἴσσι μὲν οὖν πᾶσιν ἡ ἰσχύς ἐν τοῖς νέοις, διὰ καὶ τὰ ἀκμαζόντα ἰσχύει μᾶλλον ἀναρθρα γὰρ τὰ νέα μᾶλλον καὶ ἀνευρα. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς μὲν νέοις οὕτω ἐπιτίτταται, τοῖς δὲ γηράσκουσιν ἤδη ἀνίεται ἡ συντομία διὰ ἀμφοῖν ἀσθενῆ καὶ ἀδύνατα πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν, and *Plut. An seni sit gerenda Respublica*, c. 18, quoted above on 17-34. Οἱ ἀπειρηκότες διὰ χρόνον (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 33) are distinguished from those who are in the same state from other causes: see Bonitz (*Ind.* 71 b 45), who groups with the passage before us *Hist. An.* 6. 18. 572 a 18, ἀπείκωσι δὲ τὸν πόνον.

24. ὅτι τὰς ἀναιμίας ἀρμονίας κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 398 E, ἀλλὰ μὴν μέθῃ γε φύλαξιν ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ μαλακίαν καὶ ἀργίαν. Πῶς γὰρ οὐδ' ; Τίνες οὖν μαλακαὶ τε καὶ συμποσικαὶ τῶν ἀρμονιῶν ; Ἰαστί, ἦ δ' ὅε, καὶ λυδιστί, αἴτνες χαλαροὶ καλοῦνται. See note on 1340 b 2.

25. ὥς μεθυστικὰς κ.τ.λ., 'taking them as connected with intoxication, not conformably to the influence of intoxication (for intoxication makes men rather frenzied revellers), but as enfeebled and exhausted.'

27. ὥστε καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἰσομέτρην ἡλικίαν κ.τ.λ. This sentence seems to be modelled on 1342 a 28 sq. and to be intended to contradict it. Καί, 27, implies that the study of relaxed modes by the young (for with δαί we must supply τοὺς νέους or τοὺς νεώτερους) will be useful to them at their actual time of life as well as with a view to the coming time of life (see above on 17-34). We expect not τὴν τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, but τὴν τῶν ἀπειρηκότων διὰ χρόνον, and we must not identify οἱ πρεσβύτεροι with οἱ ἀπειρηκότες διὰ χρόνον (cp. 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 29 sqq.), but for some reason the wider term is preferred.

29. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Here we pass from τὸ δυνατὸν to τὸ πρίν (cp. 17 sq.). The apodosis of this sentence is missing in a lacuna after ἀρμονιών, 33. It seems better to adopt this view (with Sus.) than (with Schn. Cor. and Götting) to place a colon instead of a full stop after τοιούτων, 29, and to connect ἐτι δ' εἰ τις, 29-ἀρμονιών, 33, with what precedes. As to the lacuna after ἀρμονιών see critical note.

30. For τοιαύτῃ followed by ἦ, see above on 1266 b 36.

31. κόσμον, probably 'orderliness': cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 7, πρὸς εἰτασίαν καὶ κόσμον, and Plut. Lycurg. c. 4, quoted above on 1341 b 32.

33. τούτους δρους τρεῖς. For the absence of the article see above on 1253 b 11.

APPENDIX A.

Collation of Brit. Mus. MS. Harl. 6874 with the text of the Berlin Academy edition of Aristotle (ed. Bekker, 1831).

I AM indebted to the kindness of Mr. F. G. Kenyon for the following collation of Brit. Mus. MS. Harl. 6874.

The MS. contains the First Book of the Politics with the exception of the latter part of its last chapter, from 1260a 26, τὸ ἀπο-
παραίει, to the end. It also contains 6 (4). 15. 1300a 24-1301a 12, beginning with the words ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ εἰς ἀνάγκην and ending with the word δημοτικῇ, and 7 (5). 1. 1302a 3-1302b 31, beginning with the words φαῖλον. φανερόν δ' and ending with the word Μεγαπύου. 'It is of octavo size, measuring 8½ in. x 5' in. It is on vellum, written in a very neat hand, apparently of the first half of the fifteenth century. There is nothing to show how it came into its present fragmentary condition, as it was rebound when acquired by Lord Oxford' (Letter from Mr. Kenyon).

The MS. does not, as far as I see, contain anything new except in one passage, 1253b 8, where a 'lacuna quasi trium litterarum inter τοῖον et δεῖ' is noted. None of the seventeen MSS. examined by or for Susemihl in 1252-1254a 17 (see his edition of the Politics of 1872, p. xxviii) have any lacuna there. It is possible that τὴ has dropped out. But the MS. belongs to the better type of the second family and is nearly allied to P^{a.2} (especially to P^a), two MSS. which, with M^a Pⁱ, the Vatican Palimpsest Fragments, and the Latin Translation of the Vetus Interpres, stand at the head of the authorities for the text of the Politics. Of course it has many errors of its own, and when it agrees with P^{a.2}, some of the inferior MSS. often do so too, but sometimes it agrees with P^{a.2} where none of the inferior MSS. do so (this is the case in 1252a 15, 1253a 16, 1254b 2, 1257a 13, 16, 1300b 24, 26). I have

noticed only two or three passages in which it sides with inferior MSS. against P².²—in 1252 a 26 it has *συνδιά[εσθαι]* with M^a S^b U^b L^a pr. P^a, and in 1257 b 21 it has *‡* with P^a Q L^a Ald., not *‡* as M^a P².² T^b.

It often stands alone or almost alone in agreement with P^a: thus in

1255 a 31 P^a has *εἶπμεν*, and Harl. *εἴπαμεν* corrected into *εἴπομεν* prima manu,

b 2 *εἰ* is omitted by pr. P^a pr. Harl.,

1256 a 17 *πότερος* Harl. pr. P^a,

b 35 *οὐδὲ μὴν* M^a P^a Harl.,

1258 b 33 *ἔστι* M^a P^a Harl.: *ἔστι* P^a,

1259 b 8 *αἴμασι* Harl.: *αἴμασι* ('ut videtur,' Sum.) pr. P^a,

10 *ἔχει* P^a Harl.

But P^a has many false readings which Harl. has not, and in two passages Harl. shows a striking resemblance to P^a: thus in 1255 a 37 we find *εἰ γόνου* in P^a Q M^b Harl., and in 1302 b 19 Ald. pr. P^a have *ἐν ἰσονται* (*αἰνίσονται* γρ. marg. P^a), while Harl. has *ἐν ἰσονται* (marg. *μὴ αἰνίσονται* prima manu). It is obvious, therefore, that Harl. is not copied from P^a.

The glosses found in Harl. in 1302 a 28 and b 4 are found also in red ink in the margin of P^a and in a later hand than the MS. in the margin of P^a (see Susemihl's edition of 1872 in these passages). Harl. does not seem to have the glosses which are found in P^a but not in P^a.

- 1252 a 9. *λέγουσι*] *λέγουσι*. 14. *ἐφιστήκω*] *ἐφιστήκω*. Ita semper, iota subscripto nunquam adhibito. 15. *κατὰ λέγουσι*] *κατὰ τοὺς λέγουσι*. 16. *ἀληθῆ* om. MS., ins. in marg. alia manu. 19. *μέχρι τῶν δονουμένων* om. MS. 20. *μέρια*] *μέρια*. 26. *συνδιά[εσθαι]* *συνδιά[εσθαι]*. 28. *εἰ* om. MS. 32. *ἔρχον* om. MS.
- b 8. *φασιν*] *φασιν*. 10. *κοινωνίαν*] *κοινωνίαν*. 12. *πέντην ἑστίω*] *πέντην ἑστίω*, et similiter l. 14 *οἶκον ἑστίω*. 18. *παῖδας τε*] *παῖδας δι*. 23. *ἀλέχων*] *ἀλλέχων*. 28. *δι*] *δι*. 32. *ἤν* om. MS.
- 1253 a 1. *τέλος*] *καὶ τέλος*. 4. *φαῖλας ἑστίω*] *φαῖλας ἑστίω*, et ita fere semper. 7. *ἔχ[ε]ν*] lacuna in MS. 9. *‡* om. MS. 12. *ἐλγυθεν*] *ἐλγυθε*. 13. *ἔστι* *αἰσθάνομαι* τοῦ τοῦ *ἔχειν* αἰσθάνω. 19. *ἑστίω*] *ἑστί*. 34.

φρονήσει] φρονήσει. 35. ἔστι] ἐστὶ. 36. ἀφροδίσια]
ἀφροδίσια.

b 2-4. περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν πρότερον κ.τ.λ.] πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται πᾶσι ἐξ οἰκῶν οἰκονομίας δὲ μίρα, ἐξ ἧς πᾶσι οἰκία συνίσταται. 8. ποῖον δὲ εἶναι] lacuna quasi trium litterarum inter ποῖον et δὲ. 11. ἴστωσαν] ἴστωσαν. 25. ἐν om. MS. 28. τὰ δ'] τὰ δὲ. 35. αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ. 36. οὗτε φησιν] οὗτε φησὶν. 37. αὐταὶ] αὐταί, corr., ut videtur, αὐταί.

1254 a 8. δέονται δ'] καὶ δέονται. 15, 16. ἄλλον δ' ἐστὶν om. MS. 16. ἀνθρώποις ὡν] δούλοις ὡν, corr. ἀνθρώποις ὡν in marg. prima manu. 19. παρὰ] περὶ. 22. ἐστὶ] ἐστὶ. 25. ἐστὶν] ἐστὶ. βελτίον] βελτίον. 28. ἐστὶ] ἐστὶ. 32. ἐστὶ τίς] ἐστὶ τίς. 33. ἐξωτερικώτερας] ἐξωτερικώτερας.

b 2. παρὰ] περὶ. 9. πᾶσι] πᾶσι. 12. βάλτω] βάλτωσαν. 17. διάκεινται] διακείμενται. δὲ om. MS. 20. ἔστι] ἐστὶ. 22. ἐστὶν] ἐστὶ. 23. λόγου] λόγου. 28. ποιῶν] ποιῶν. 31. εἰς] εἰς. 37. τοῦτ' ἀληθές] τὰλθές.

1255 a 2-4. καὶ διακάν... τὸ δουλείην om. MS. 5. καὶ post τίς om. MS. 7. φασιν] φασί. 10. κρείττους] κρείττους. 15. εἰ] εἰ. 20. οὗτ'] οὗτε. 24. φασιν] φασί. 26. τίς] τίς. 29. δούλους] δούλους. 31. εἴπαμεν] εἴπαμεν (corr. εἴπαμεν, prima manu). 32. δούλοι] λούλου. 33. αὐτοῖς] αὐτοῖς. 34. νομίζουσιν] νομίζουσιν. 35. καὶ λειψέρον] λειψέρον. 36. ὥστε] ὥστε καὶ φησὶ] φασί (ut videtur : corr. sec. manu). 37. ἔργων] ἐκ γένου.

b 2. ἐκ additur supra lineam prima manu. 7. τὸ ante δεσπόζω om. MS. 13. ἐστὶ τίς] ἐστὶ τίς. 18. ἐστὶν] ἐστὶ. 24. τίς] τίς. 27. ἔτερα] ἔργα. 29. δεσπότης] δεσπότης. 32. τῇ κτῶσθαι] τῶν κτῶσθαι. 33. τίς] τίς, et ita saepe.

1256 a 4. αὐτὴ τῇ] αὐτῇ. 10. ἡ οἰκονομική] οἰκονομική. 13. παρὰ] περὶ. 16. κτήσις] κτήσις. 17. πότερον] πότερον. 28. ἀλλ'] ἀλλὰ. 36. Διείας] Διείας. 41. ἀλλαγῇ] ἀλλαγῇ.

b 5. ληστρικῶν] ληστρικῶν. 6. τοῖς] τοῖς. 9. τελειωθείσιν] τελειωθείσι. 11. μέχρις] μέχρις. 14. αὐτοῖς] αὐτοῖς. 16. τὰλλα] τὰ ἄλλα. 28. ἐστὶ] ἐστὶ. 32. ἐγαθῶν] ἐγαθῶν. 35. οἰδεμῆς] οἰδὲ μῆς. 37. ἔστι] ἐστὶ. 41. χρηματιστικῶν] χρηματιστικῶν.

- 1257 a 13. γέγονεν] γέγονε. 26. ἐπὶ πλείον] ἐπὶ λίον. 27. σίτον] σίτον. 29. ἐστίν] ἔστιν. 35. ἀναγκαίον] ἀναγκαίον
pr. manu, v additum est postea.
- b 10. λήρος] in marg., alia manu, λοιδορ. 12. οὐδέ] οὐτε.
17. γενομένων] γυνομένων. 21. ἡ] ἡ. 23. ἀλλαγῆς]
ἀναγκῆς. ἐστίν] ἐστὶ. 33. ὁρῶμεν συμβαῖνον] ὁρῶ συμ-
βαῖον. 36. χρηματιστικῆς] χρηματικῆς. 37. ἐστὶ] ἔστι.
- 1258 a 8. [ζητοῦσιν] [ζητοῦσι. 15. τίνα om. MS. 18. ἀλλ']
ἀλλὰ. 20. ἐστίν] ἔστιν. 21. ὥσπερ] ὥπερ. 30.
κατὰ τὴν] κατὰ τὰ τὴν. 32. ὑγιείας] ὑγείας. 37. ἔστιν]
ἐστί. χρηματιστικῇ] χρηματικῇ. 39. οἰκονομικῆς] οἰκονο-
μηκῆς.
- b 13. τοῦ] τοῦ. 14. κτήσις] κτήσις. 15. λοιπῶν om. MS.
16. τοῖσι] τοῖσι. 20. ἔστι] ἐστὶ. χρηματιστικῆς]
χρηματοητοικῆς. 30. γυνομένων] γυνομένων. 33. ἐστίν]
ἐστί. 36. τῆς om. MS. 38. σώματος] σώματος.
- 1259 a 3. ἐπιμαλὲς] ἐπιμαλὲς. 18. σπουδάζουσιν] σπουδάζουσι.
25. ἐμπορίων] ἐμπορίων. 26. τοῦτο] τοῦτον. 29. γ']
γ. 35. πόρων om. MS. 37. μέρη om. MS.
- b 8. Ἀμασις] αἰμασις. 10. ἔχει] ἔχει. 12. ὅπερ ἐστὶ om.
MS. 14. τε post ἀνδρῶν om. MS. 25. ἔξω] ἔξω. 26. εἴτε] εἴ τι. 27. ἔστι] ἐστὶ. ἔστιν] ἔστιν. 28. δι']
δι. 36. καθάπαξ] κατάπαξ. 40. εἴθ' ὁ ἀρχόμενος ...
καλῶς om. MS.
- 1260 a 5. δι'] δ'. 9. εὐεύτερον] εὐεύτερον. 11. διαφερόντως]
διαφερόντος. 16. αὐτοῦ] αὐτοῦ. 19. ἀρχιτέκτων] ἀρχι-
τέκτων. 20. ἐστίν] ἔστιν. 25. ἐπισκοποῦσιν] ἐπισκο-
ποῦσι. 26. Post verbum ἀρετῇ deficit MS.

BOOK IV. c. 15.

- 1300 a 24. Incipit κλήρω καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἀπάντων. 25. φυλάς] φύλας.
φρατρίας] φατρίας. 26. πολιτῶν] πολιτικῶν. 28. ἐκ
των] ἐκ τῶν. 29. ἐκ των] ἐκ τῶν. 31. δι. 35.
ἐκ των] ἐκ τῶν. 36. ἐκ των] ἐκ τῶν. 41. ἐκ των]
ἐκ τῶν, et ita 1300 b 2-4, 17, 1301 a 2, 3, 8, 9.
- b 4. τὸ δι' ἐκ των] τότε δι' ἐκ τῶν. 7. οὕτως] οὕτω. 10.
των προσδόντων καὶ τὴν κυρίαν om. MS. 22. ἀμφισβη-
τοῦσιν] ἀμφισβητοῦσι. 30. πάλιν] πάλιν.
- 1301 a 4. δικαστήρια] δικαστηρία. 7. συνδικάζμενα] συνδικάζμενα.
9. δικαστηρίου] δικαστηρίου. 12. Post verbum δημοτικῶς
deficit MS.

BOOK V. c. 1.

- 1302 a 3. Incipit φαῖλον. φανερόν δ'. 10. ἐγγίνονται] ἐγγίγνεται.
 14. ἡ ἐκ τῶν . . . ἡ om. MS. 16. γίγνεται] γίνονται.
 28. Scholium in marg., τῆς ἐσότητος δηλοῦναι καὶ τῆς
 ὑπεροχῆς. 33. αὐτῶν] αὐτῶν.
 b 2. Post ἔβριον iterantur verba δ' ἀδίκως πλεονεκτοῦντας τοῦτων,
 sed ab ipso scriba error notatur. 4. Post τρώων
 inseruntur verba ἐρίθια ἡ φιλονεικία. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἡ
 μισθαρία. 6. πῶς] πῶς. 10. Post ἐπὶ δὲ inseritur
 μὴ. 12. στασιάζουσιν] στασιάζουσι. 19. 'Αθήνησιν]
 'Αθήνησι. ἐπίσονται] ἐν ἴσονται (marg. μὴ ἀντίσονται, prima
 manu). 31. Post verbum Μεγαρίων deficit MS.

APPENDIX B.

On the use of Hyperbaton in the Politics.

HYPERBATON is much used in the Politics—more, I think, than in the Nicomachean Ethics—for the purpose of emphasizing a particular word or words.

Kühner's account of Hyperbaton (Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 607. 1) is as follows—'In Hyperbaton two words forming together a unity are severed by the interposition of one or more less important words. By means of this severance prominence is given, as a rule, to one only of the severed words, that which stands first, but often also to both of them, especially when both are placed in emphatic positions in the sentence, for instance at the beginning or end of it.' In one particular this account is open to amendment. The severed words are not always only two in number; they are more than two, for instance, in Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 38, οὕτε πάντας τοὺς οἰκείους ἐνεχέλειν ἐνδέχεται λόγους.

In the following passages the emphasis appears to fall on the first only of the severed words:—

- 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 39, ἐτέρας γὰρ ἐστὶν ἔργον σχολῆς ταῦτα,
 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 21, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προηγήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκῆψιν,
 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 22, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιοῦτους αὐτῇ καιροῦς χρῆσθαι
 ἐν οἷς κ.τ.λ.
 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 4, ὁ γὰρ περὶ ἐνίας συμβάλει πάθος ψυχῆς ἰσχυρῶς,
 τοῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει.

In the following passages, on the other hand, the emphasis appears to fall on both, or all, the severed words:—

- 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 16, ἀθλόν γὰρ ὅτος τοῦτον καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον
ἀθλόν εἶναι πολιτείας,
5 (8). 6. 1341 b 10, ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ὁ πρῶτων οὐ τῆς αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται
χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουσάντων ἡδονῆς,
8 (6). 4. 1318 b 7, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τούτων ἐλίχθη λόγοις,
37, καὶ ἀρξονται δικαίως διὰ τὸ τῶν εὐθυγῶν εἶναι κυρίους
ἐτέρους,
8 (6). 4. 1319 b 23, φυλαί τε γὰρ ἔτεραι ποιηταί πλείους καὶ φρα-
τρίαί,
8 (6). 5. 1320 a 14, οἷ δὲ καὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ πάντας μάλιστα μὲν εὖνους
εἶναι τοὺς πολίτας,
35, τεχραστῶν οὖν ὥπως ἂν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος.

The following words are among those most often emphasized in this way—οὐδαίς and μηδαίς, πᾶς, πολὺς, ὅτος, ἕκαστος, εἰς, αὐτός and ὁ αὐτός, ἄλλος and ὁ ἄλλος, τοιοῦτος and ὁ τοιοῦτος, τίς and τις, πόσος, and ποῖος.

Occasionally two sets of words are thus emphasized in the same sentence—e. g. in 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 3, ἣ γὰρ ἀριστοκρατία διέστηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας, where both διέστηκεν πολὺ and ταύτης τῆς πολιτείας are emphasized by severance, and in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 10, ἔπαι γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι τοῦτο τῇ τοιούτῃ δῆμῳ μᾶλλον, where both ἔπαι τοῦτο and οὐκ εἶναι μᾶλλον are similarly emphasized.

Groups of words linked by καὶ or ἔ are often emphasized in this way: e. g. in

3. 5. 1278 a 6, ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις παρ' ἐνίοις ἦν δοῦλον
τὸ βάναισον ἢ ξενικόν,
17, ὅστις ἐν μὲν τινι πολιτείᾳ τὸν βάναισον ἀναγκαῖον
εἶναι καὶ τὸν θῆτα πολίτας,
19, ἐν ᾧ κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν,
3. 10. 1281 a 24, ἀλλ' ἄρα τοὺς ἐλάττους δίκαιον ἀρchein καὶ τοὺς
πλουσίους;
8 (6). 3. 1318 a 15, ἔπειτα ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἴσους λαβόντα καὶ ἐκ
τῶν χιλίων.

It should be added that, though in nearly all the cases of the severance of connected words which have been examined by me in the Politics the aim evidently is to throw emphasis on particular words, I have noticed two or three passages in which this cannot

be said to be clearly the case. They are passages in which the relative is severed from its substantive. We have in

- 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 15, ἡνπερ εἰληφε διδασκασιν ὡς φασὶν αὐτὰς εἶναι δια-
θέσεις ταύτας,
6 (4). 4. 1290 b 28, πρὸς δὲ τοῖσι, οἷς κινεῖται μορίοις ἑαυτοῦ αἰνόν,
6 (4). 14. 1298 a 31, ὅνπερ ἡ τελευταία δημοκρατία τῶν διοικεῖται τρόπων
(contrast 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 24, ὡς τρόπων τῶν
ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων κ.τ.λ.).

Is any emphasis intended to be thrown on the severed words in these three passages?

APPENDIX C.

On the variations in the order of words in Π^1 and Π^2 .

A CONSIDERABLE proportion of the variations in the order of words which we observe in Π^1 and Π^2 may be arranged in classes.

1. There are those in which Π^2 sever the adjective or pronoun from the substantive with which it agrees, while Π^1 place them together:—

- 1253 a 7, διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶν Π^2 (ζῶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος Π^1),
b 7, περὶ τριῶν ὡς τοῦτων σκεπτέον εἰς Π^2 (περὶ τριῶν τοῦτων σκεπτέον ὡς εἰς Π^1),
1256 b 26, τοῦτων ὅσα τὸν πόλεμον Π^2 (ὅσα τοῦτων Π^1),
1270 b 28, κρίσεόν εἰσι μεγάλων Π^2 (κρίσεων μεγάλων εἰσι Π^1),
1273 b 36, νομοθέτην γενέσθαι σπουδαίων Π^2 (γενέσθαι νομοθέτην σπου-
δαίων Π^1),
1274 a 17, κύριος ὡς ὁ δῆμος Π^2 (ὡς ὁ δῆμος κύριος $M^s P^1$ and
perhaps Γ),
1276 b 14, εἰς ἑτέραν μεταβάλῃ πολιτείαν Π^2 (πολιτείαν μεταβάλῃ Π^1),
1323 b 15, ὡς φασὶν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας Π^2 (εἶναι αὐτὰς
ταύτας διαθέσεις Π^1),
1330 b 29, τὴν μὲν διην μὴ ποιεῖν πόλιν εὖτομον Π^2 (πόλιν μὴ ποιεῖν
 ΓM^s , πόλιν om. P^1),
1335 a 38, τὴν συναυλίαν ποιέσθαι ταύτην Π^2 (ποιέσθαι τὴν συναυ-
λίαν Π^1),

- { 1339 a 14, τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν Π² (τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει Π¹),
 { 1341 b 25, τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν Π² Π¹ (τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει the rest)¹,
 1340 b 8, ἕβος ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον Π² (ἔχουσι ἕβος Π¹),
 1289 b 29, πάσας ὁρῶμεν τὰς πόλεις Π² (ὁρῶμεν πάσας Π¹),
 1290 b 24, πᾶσαν ἔχων πόλιν Π² (ἔχων πᾶσαν πόλιν Π¹),
 1312 a 40, τῶν ἄλλων ἐκδότῃ πολιτειῶν Π² (πολιτειῶν ἐκδότῃ Π¹),
 1315 b 12, πλείστον γὰρ ἐγένετο χρόνον Π² (χρόνον ἐγένετο Π¹),
 1320 a 31, δ τετρημένους γὰρ ἐστι πίθος Π² (πίθος ἐστὶν Π¹)².

2. There are those in which Π² sever words from the words they govern, while Π¹ group the words together. A substantive, for instance, is often severed from the genitive it governs by Π², where it is not so severed by Π¹. Thus Π² have in

- 1328 b 17, ἐν δέ τι τυγχάνῃ τούτων ἐκλείπον (τι τούτων τυγχάνῃ Π¹),
 1331 b 4, τὸ πλῆθος διαιρείται τῆς πόλεως (τῆς πόλεως διαιρείται Π¹),
 1337 a 2, τὸ προσλείπον βούλεται τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν (τῆς φύσεως βούλεται Π¹),
 1340 b 29, τοῖς νηπίοις ἀρμόττουσα τῶν παιδίων (ἀρμόττουσα τοῖς νηπίοις Π¹),
 1309 b 38, οὐδετέρων μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν (οὐδετέρων γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεται Π¹),
 1321 b 30, αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιμειλῆαι εἰσι τούτων τρεῖς (τούτων εἰσι τρεῖς Π¹).

A similar tendency appears in the following passages, though in a less marked degree :—

- 1341 a 23, κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἢ μάθησιν Π² (δύναται μᾶλλον Μ² Π¹ and possibly Γ¹),
 24, συμβίβηκεν ἐναντίον αὐτῷ πρὸς παιδείαν Π² (αὐτῷ ἐναντίον Π¹),
 1295 b 31, καθάπερ τῆς τῶν πλουσίων οἱ πένητες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν Π² (καθάπερ οἱ πένητες τῆς τῶν πλουσίων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν Π¹),
 1302 b 17, γίνεσθαι γὰρ εἴθε ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων Π² (γίνεσθαι γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων εἴθε Μ² Π¹ and possibly Γ¹),
 1322 a 7, κοινωρεῖν ἀδύνατον ἀλλήλοις Π² (κοινωρεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἀδύνατον Π¹).

3. In all the above passages the order of words adopted in Π² is more broken and more emphatic than that adopted in Π¹, and

¹ In 1302 b 5 all MSS. have τίνα ἔχουσι δύναμιν.

² In 1338 a 25, on the other hand,

Π¹ have ἐπὶ δεῖτα καλεῖν θαλεῖν and Π² καλεῖν ἐπὶ δεῖτα θαλεῖν, where Π² are evidently wrong.

the following passages also show a leaning on the part of Π^2 to a more emphatic order (in the first five the adjective is placed before the substantive by Π^2):—

1276 b 40, οὐκ ἂν εἴη μία ἀρετὴ πολέτεν καὶ ἀνδρὲς ἀγαθοὶ Π^2 (ἀρετὴ μία Π^1),

1280 a 15, φαῖλοι κραταὶ Π^2 (κραταὶ φαῖλοι Π^1),

1290 b 8, πλείονα μέρη Π^2 (μέρη πλείονα Π^1),

1294 a 22, ἀρχαῖος πλούτος καὶ ἀρετὴ Π^2 (ἀρετὴ καὶ πλούτος ἀρχαῖος Π^1),

1320 a 22, δεῖ ποιεῖν ὀλίγας ἐκκλησίας Π^2 (ἐκκλησίας ὀλίγας Π^1),

1277 a 14, φαμέν δὲ τὸν ἀρχοντα τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον Π^2 (εἶναι ἀγαθὸν καὶ φρόνιμον Π^1),

{ 1329 b 2, τὸν τρέπον τοῦτον Π^2 (τοῦτον τὸν τρέπον Π^1),

{ 1301 b 26, ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ Π^2 (ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ Π^1),

1330 b 27, τοῦτων ἀμφοτέρων Π^2 (ἀμφοτέρων τοῦτων Π^1),

1334 b 29, ὅπως βέλτιστα τὰ σώματα γίνηται Π^2 (ὅπως τὰ σώματα βέλτιστα γίνηται Π^1),

1337 b 12, τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χεῖρον διακρίσθαι Π^2 (παρασκευάζουσι τὸ σῶμα χεῖρον διακρίσθαι Π^1).

Yet sometimes Π^1 place words in the more emphatic order. Thus they have in

1259 b 30, δεῖ τὴν γυναῖκα σώφρονα εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν (εἶναι σώφρονα Π^2),

1265 b 15, ἀίσουσι τοὺς κλήρουσι εἶχον $M^2 P^1$, ἀίσουσι εἶχον τοὺς κλήρουσι Γ (τοὺς κλήρουσι ἀίσουσι εἶχον Π^2),

1280 b 30, οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις κοινωρία τόσων (ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι Π^2):
cp. 1341 a 21 (οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αἰὼς $\Gamma\Pi$) and 1286 a 15,

1281 a 27, φαῖλα πάντα (πάντα φαῖλα Π^2),

1282 a 40, τοῦτων πάντων (πάντων τοῦτων Π^2),

1331 a 16, τὰ δὲ ζητεῖν δεῖ καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν (τὰ δὲ δεῖ ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν Π^2),

1339 a 39, εἰ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα δεῖ διακρινεῖν αὐτοὺς (δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα Π^2),

1300 b 27, ὅσα τοῖς φεύγουσιν ἐπὶ καθόδῳ ἐπιφέρεται φόβος (τοῖς φεύγουσι φόβος Π^2),

1307 b 11, ὥστ' ἐξέλθαι συνεχῶς τοὺς αὐτοὺς στρατηγεῖν (τοὺς αὐτοὺς συνεχῶς Π^2),

1322 a 31, ἐν μείζονι δὲ σχήματι (ἐν σχήματι δὲ μείζονι Π^2).

4. In some passages the genitive is differently placed in Π^1 and Π^2 :—

1326 a 20, πόλιός ἐστι μέρη Π^2 , μέρη ἐστὶ πόλιος $M^2 P^1$ and perhaps Γ ,

- 1340 a 1, τιμωτέρα ὅ αὐτῆς ἢ φύσις ἐστὶν Π² (ἢ φύσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶν Π¹,
ἐστὶν ἢ φύσις αὐτῆς Γ Μ²),
1311 b 18, χρώμενος αὐτοῦ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ Π² (τῇ ἡλικίᾳ αὐτοῦ Π¹),
1319 b 17, ὅπερ συνέβη τῆς στάσεως αἰτίον γενέσθαι Π² (αἰτίον τῆς
στάσεως Π¹).

In 1311 a 22, on the other hand, Π² have τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν πολιτῶν and Μ² Π¹ and perhaps Γ τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας, and in 1291 a 33 Π² have ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι μέρος τῆς πόλεως and Μ² Π¹ and perhaps Γ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τῆς πόλεως μέρος.

The variations classified in the foregoing pages amount to nearly half the entire number of variations in the order of words in Π¹ and Π².

APPENDIX D.

Reminiscences in the Politics of passages in the writings of Plato and other Greek authors and of dicta of notable men.

We are concerned in this Appendix not with explicit references, but with reminiscences, or apparent reminiscences, of a tacit kind. I have endeavoured to gather together in it those noticed in the commentary, or most of them, and a few which I have observed since I wrote it, beginning with reminiscences of Plato's writings or dicta. Many reminiscences have no doubt escaped me, but those which are here pointed out may serve in some degree to throw light on the direction and extent of Aristotle's reading in connexion with the Politics.

i. PLATO.

2. 108	1252 b 5 sqq.	Laws 805 D-E
114, 117	16 sqq.	— 776 A, 680 A sqq.
122	1253 a 8	Polit. 267 B sq., 276 A?
162	1255 b 20 sq.	— 259 B
177 sq.	1256 b 23 sqq.	Sophist 222 B-C, Laws 823 B
	1258 a 10 sqq.	Laws 962 A, Rep. 397 E
224	1260 b 5 sq.	— 777 E (cp. 720 B sqq.).
260	1264 a 25	Rep. 422 E
268	1265 a 23	Laws 625 C sq.
270	b 1 sqq.	— 928 E sq.
271	7-10	Rep. 460 A

2. 316	1269 a	34 sqq.	Laws 776 C sqq.
317	b	14 sqq.	— 781 A sq., 806 C
322	1270 a	4 sqq.	— 780-1, esp. 780 B and 781 A
337	b	34 sq.	Rep. 548 B
358	1272 b	9 sqq.	Laws 712 E
3. 163	1277 a	26 sq.	Laws 643 E
169	b	11 sqq.	— 762 E?
172		24 sq.	Meno 71 E
		25 sqq.	Rep. 433 C
189	1279 a	3 sq.	— 341 C-D
196	b	17 sq.	— 550 C
207	1280 b	20 sqq.	— 369 A sqq.
212	1281 a	34 sqq.	Laws 713 E sqq.
222	1282 a	15 sq.	— 701 A
223		20 sqq.	Rep. 601 D, Cratyl. 390
		25 sqq.	Laws 945 B sqq.
225 sq.	b	14 sqq.	— 756 E-758 A, esp. 757 C, Rep. 540 D sq.
227		23 sqq.	Gorg. 490 B sqq.
236	1283 a	40 sqq.	— 488 D
238	b	23 sqq.	— 489 E sqq.
240	1284 a	3 sqq.	Rep. 540 D
285	1286 b	3 sqq.	— 445 D
296 sq.	1287 a	38 sqq.	Polit. 298 A sq., 300 A
303	1288 a	4 sq.	Plato ap. Diog. Laert. 3. 18?
306		41 sqq.	Polit. 292 B, E, 259 B
311	1323 a	36 sqq.	Apol. Socr. 29 D, E
312		40 sqq.	— 30 A sq.
318	b	29 sqq.	Rep. 435 B sq., 441 C sq.
322	1324 a	27 sq.	Theact. 175 D sq., Rep. 476 A sq.
323		32 sqq.	Gorg. 500 C
326	b	9 sqq.	Laws 637 D
331		41 sqq.	— 704 C
338	1325 b	21-23	Polit. 259 C, E
341		40 sqq.	Laws 709 C sqq.
346	1326 b	2 sq.	Rep. 369 D
347		7 sqq.	Same passage
348		14 sqq.	Laws 738 D sq., 751 D, 766 E
350		26 sqq.	— 704 C, Critias 110 E
351		30 sqq.	— 737 D, Critias 112 C
358	1327 a	19 sqq.	— 705 A

3. 361	1327 a 37 sqq.	Laws 952 D sqq.
368	1328 a 6 sq.	Rep. 375 B
	8 sqq.	— 375 D sqq.
375	b 6 sqq.	— 369 C sq., Critias 110 C
391	1330 a 14 sqq.	Laws 745 C
394	26	— 777 C sq.
395	31 sqq.	— 777 C sqq.
406	b 32 sqq.	— 778 D
419	1331 b 13 sqq.	— 848 C sqq., 760 B sqq., 762 B sq.
420	20 sqq.	— 745 B
422	26 sqq.	— 962 A sq.
	39 sq.	Meno 78 A
425	1332 a 11 sqq.	Laws 728 C, 859 D-860 B
431	40 sqq.	Plato ap. Plut. Marius, c. 46
434	b 16 sqq.	Polit. 301 D sq.
436	37 sq.	Laws 690 A, Rep. 412 C
442	1333 a 35	— 628 D sq., 803 D
454	1334 b 9 sq.	— 653 B, 659 D
455	12 sqq.	Phaedr. 245 D
456	22 sqq.	Rep. 441 A sq.
457	27 sq.	— 591 C sq.
	29 sqq.	Laws 721 A
477	1335 b 38 sqq.	— 784 E, 841 C sqq.
480	1336 a 8 sqq.	Theaet. 153 A, B, Laws 789 E
485	30 sqq.	Rep. 376 E sq.
486	33 sq.	Laws 643 B sq.
487	34 sqq.	— 791 E sqq.
489	41 sqq.	— 794
490	b 6 sqq.	— 729 B
495	33	Rep. 378 D sq.
496	35 sqq.	— 466 E sq.
499	1337 a 14 sqq.	— 544 D sq.
501	23 sqq.	Laws 804 C-D, 810 A
502	27 sqq.	— 923 A sq.
	29 sqq.	— 903 B, Charm. 156 E
506	b 2 sq.	Laches 190 B sq.
507	8 sqq. }	Rep. 495 D sq.
	1342 a 22 sq. }	Laws 803 D sq.
512	1337 b 35 sq.	— 794 C
519	1338 b 6 sqq.	

3. 520	1338 b 9 sqq.	Rep. 410 D
529	1339 a 26 sqq.	Laws 819 B, 820 D?
534	b 33	— 658 E sq.
536	1340 a 5 sqq.	Rep. 401 D, Tim. 47 D
538	18 sqq.	— 399 A sqq.
542	42 sqq.	— 398 D sqq.
550	1341 a 10 sq.	Laws 812 D sq.?
557	b 10 sqq.	Gorg. 501 B-502 A
571	1342 b 17 sqq.	Laws 785 B, 670 D
4. 139	1288 b 41	Rep. 501 A, 540 E sq.
158	1290 a 30 sqq.	Polit. 291 D
181	1292 a 31	Rep. 557 C sqq., Laws 712 E
204	1294 b 18 sq.	Laws 712 D sqq.
211	1295 b 4 sqq.	— 679 B sq., 728 D-729 A
212	13 sqq.	— 728 D-729 A, 791 D
213	21 sqq.	Menex. 238 E sq., Laws 756 E sq., 712 E, Rep. 417 A-B
217	1296 a 8 sq.	Laws 744 D
258	1299 a 25 sqq.	Polit. 260 C sqq.
260	38 sqq.	Rep. 370 C, 374 A sqq., Laws 846 D sqq.
286	1301 b 4 sq.	Laws 690 D
290	26 sq.	— 757 A
	29	— 757 A sqq.
291	1302 a 2 sqq.	— 757 E
309	1303 a 25 sq.	— 708 D
322	b 28 sq.	— 792 C
336	1304 b 22 sqq.	Rep. 565 A sqq.
358	1306 a 19-31	— 551 D sq.
371	1307 a 17 sq.	Gorg. 483 C
376	40 sqq.	Phaedr. 262 A, Rep. 424 B-E
379	b 30 sqq.	Rep. 424 B-E
406	1309 b 18 sqq.	Laws 701 E, Rep. 562
	20 sqq.	Rep. 562 B
409	1310 a 12 sqq.	— 552 E, Laws 793, 870 A
	34 sqq.	Laws 715 D
415	b 12 sqq.	Rep. 568 E sq.
438	1312 a 26 sqq.	Symp. 208 C sq.
442	b 19 sq.	Rep. 567 C sq.
446	1313 a 19 sqq.	Laws 690 D-E, 691 D sqq.
447	25 sqq.	— 691 D sqq.

4. 456	1313 b 18 sqq.	Rep. 567 A
459	28 sq.	— 566 E
477	1315 b 8 sqq.	— 580 A
494	1317 a 41 sqq.	— 562 B sq.
507	1318 b 1 sqq.	Laws 663 E
518	1319 a 22 sqq.	— 695 A
539	1320 b 33 sqq.	Rep. 556 E
549	1321 b 14 sqq.	— 371 B
557	1322 a 5 sqq.	Crito 50 B

ii. ISOCRATES.

2. 122 sq.	1253 a 9 sqq.	Nicocl. § 5 sqq., De Antid. §§ 253- 257
155	1255 a 14	Philip. § 15
177 sq.	1256 b 23 sqq.	Panath. § 163
228	1260 b 33 sqq.	De Antid. § 83
375	1274 a 14 sq.	— § 316 sqq.
3. 190	1279 a 10 sqq.	Areop. § 24 sq.
447	1333 b 38 sqq.	Panath. § 219 sq.
448	1334 a 8 sqq.	De Pace § 96
4. 204	1294 b 18 sqq.	Areop. § 61, Nicocl. § 24
334	1304 b 20 sqq.	De Pace §§ 108, 122 sq.
340	1305 a 7 sqq.	— § 54 sq., Philip. § 140
409	1310 a 12 sqq.	Areop. § 40 sqq.
420	b 40 sqq.	Ad Nicocl. § 16
454	1313 b 6 sqq.	Paneg. § 151
460	29 sqq.	Hel. § 33, De Pace § 112
468	1314 b 21 sq.	Ad Nicocl. §§ 11, 24
477	1315 b 8 sqq.	Hel. § 34
512	1319 a 2 sqq.	Ad Nicocl. § 16
535	1320 a 39 sq.	Areop. § 32

iii. XENOPHON.

2. 162, 164	1255 b 20 sqq., 33	Oecon. 13. 5, 21. 10
3. 172	1277 b 24 sq.	— 7. 25
210	1281 a 11 sqq.	Mem. 1. 2. 42 sqq.
300	1287 b 26 sqq.	Cyrop. 8. 2. 10-12
344	1326 a 32 sqq.	— 8. 7. 22
365	1327 b 25 sqq.	— 1. 1. 4
414	1331 a 31 sqq.	— 1. 2. 3 sq.

4. 198	1294 a 3 sq.	Oecon. 9. 14
258	1299 a 25 sqq.	Mem. 3. 9. 11
260	38 sqq.	Cyrop. 2. 1. 21
446	1313 a 21 sqq.	Rep. Lac. 15. 8
460	b 29 sqq.	Cyrop. 8. 7. 13, Hiero 3. 7 sqq., 1. 38
472	1315 a 6 sqq.	Hiero 9. 3
475	37 sq.	— 6. 6
542	1321 a 19 sq.	Cyrop. 2. 1. 8?

iv. HOMER.

The reminiscences of Homer noticed by me are more doubtful, but possible reminiscences of the *Iliad* are pointed out in 2. 257, 3. 214, 273, 295, 301, 343, 379, 436 (compare also 2. 5. 1263 a 11 sqq. with *Il.* 1. 165-168), and of the *Odyssey* in 2. 239, 3. 177.

v. Reminiscences of the writings of the following authors also seem to occur in the *Politics*:—

- Aeschines 4. 198, 255? (see also 4. 214)
- Aeschylus 4. 460
- Aristophanes 4. 179, 510? (see also 3. 214 sq.)
- Democritus 3. 489
- Ephorus 2. 347-350, 4. 219
- Eubulus, the comic poet, 4. 462
- Euripides 2. 358?, 3. 459, 4. 211, 391, 460?, 461
- Herodotus 3. 326, 4. 461 (see also 3. 150 sq., 4. 208)
- Hippias of Elis 4. 297 sq.
- Hippocrates 3. 401, 473, 483, 532 (compare also 1. 8.
1256 a 32 sqq. with Hippocr. *De Aere, Aquis, Locis*,
vol. 1. p. 556 Kühn, foot)
- Melanippides 3. 556
- Pratinas 3. 542
- Solon 3. 169, 228, 350, 4. 139?, 290, 391, 408
- Telestes 3. 556:

and reminiscences of sayings ascribed to

- Alcibiades 2. 337
- Anacharsis 3. 522
- Epaminondas 3. 523
- the Lacedaemonians 3. 525
- Pelopidas 3. 423
- the Pythagoreans 2. 142 sq.:

of other sayings 3. 556, 4. 321, 507: of proverbs 3. 238, 417, 461?, 598, 4. 226?, 290?

Reminiscences may also occur, though this is more doubtful, of the writings of

Anaxandrides 3. 201, 397

Antiphanes 2. 252

Archilochus 4. 465 (quoted 3. 368)

Eupolis 3. 429 sq.

Heraclitus 2. 153 (quoted 4. 474)

Lysias 3. 150, 4. 334

Phrynichus, the comic poet, 2. 120

Pindar 2. 131, 153, 157, 3. 399, 4. 182

Theognis 4. 226, 297, 321, 391

Thucydides 2. 308, 3. 525, 4. 294, 402, 416,

and of sayings ascribed to Aristides 4. 403, Aristippus, 2. 287, Socrates, 3. 217, 431, and Themistocles, 4. 403.

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS TO VOLS. I, II, AND III.

VOL. I.

- P. 15, line 14, *for τῶν πῶλλον read τῶν πολλῶν.*
- P. 20, eleven lines from foot of page, *for* compounds formed *read* things constituted.
- P. 34, line 14. A. Schmekel (*Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa*, p. 375) takes the reference in the words 'docti homines' (Cic. *De Rep.* i. 24. 38) to be to Aristotle, while C. Hinze (*Quos scriptores Graecos Cicero in libris de re publica componendis adhibuerit*, p. 50 sq.) takes it to be to Panaetius.
- P. 148, line 9, *for* Hecuba *read* Helen.
- P. 136, lines 15-17. See as to the two arguments here summarized the explanatory notes on 3. 4. 1276 b 37 and 1277 a 5 (vol. iii. pp. 157-159).
- P. 137, five lines from foot of page, *for* from *read* after, *and dele* first.
- P. 142, line 1 sq. As to this recapitulation, however, see note on 3. 5. 1278 a 34 (vol. iii. p. 182).
- P. 143, line 8 sq. I have given a slightly different translation of this sentence in the explanatory note on 3. 6. 1278 b 8 (vol. iii. p. 184 sq.).
- P. 164, six lines from foot of page, 'his disciple Dicaearchus'. See however below on vol. ii. pp. xiii and xiv.
- P. 170, note 1. In the quotation from 3. 16. 1287 b 6 *for* *these read her* of (see critical note on 1287 b 6).
- P. 172, line 1, *for* compensation *read* return (see vol. iii. p. 182 sq.).
- P. 178, lines 17-20, add a reference to Diod. 16. 92. 5 and 95. 1, and Stob. *Floril.* 98. 70.
- P. 186, note. The term 'mortal god' is borrowed by Hobbes from Aristotle: see Cic. *De Fin.* 2. 13. 40, sic hominem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad intellegendum et ad agendum esse natum quasi mortalem deum (Aristot. *Fragm.* 48. 1483 b 15: Rose², *Fragm.* 61).
- P. 190, line 14, *for* leadership *read* rule.
- P. 197, note 2. Mr. Shute's essay 'On the history of the process by which the Aristotelian writings arrived at their present form' (Clarendon Press, 1888) has been published since my first and second volumes appeared. See p. 164 sqq. of the essay.
- P. 199, note 1, first column, last line but two, *for* 80 *read* 81.
- P. 324, note 1. See critical note on 1331 b 4 (vol. iii. p. 112).

P. 325, in the quotation from Ion of Chios (Fragm. 63 Nauck), *after* *ἐὶς* *add* *ἄν*.

P. 348, note 1, lines 1-2, *read* We find this many-sidedness and versatility more often realized, etc.

P. 363, lines 21-24. See however vol. iii. p. 540.

P. 366, line 1 sqq. See as to the passage here summarized the critical note on 1341 b 19-26 (vol. iii. p. 126 sq.).

P. 366, last line, *for* The melodies also *read* Just as the sacred melodies produce this effect, so the melodies. (See the explanatory note on 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 15 in vol. iii. p. 566 sq.)

P. 366, note 1, and p. 369, note. See the explanatory note on 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 17-34 (vol. iii. p. 571 sq.)

P. 375, line 24, *for* thus composed *read* composed of owners of complete lots.

P. 443, seven lines from foot of page, 'he abandons'. This is true, subject to what is said in p. 435, line 14 sqq.

P. 445, last line but one. See the explanatory note on 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20 (vol. iv. p. 249).

P. 456, note. Add Plato, Polit. 299 B sqq. to the passages referred to.

P. 470, lines 20-22. See the explanatory note on 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 38 sqq.

P. 502, four lines from foot of page, 'the rich encroach', etc. See explanatory note on 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 11 for a closer rendering of this passage.

P. 508, note 2. Perhaps it is better to read $\frac{1}{2}$ πολυτεία in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 8 than $\frac{1}{2}$ πολυτεία. See the critical note on 1298 b 8 and the explanatory note on 1298 b 5.

P. 509, lines 14, 15. This will not be so if I am right in bracketing $\frac{1}{2}$ *ἐκ* *τῶν* with Spengel in 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 35.

P. 513, fourteen lines from foot of page, 'from each tribe or section of the State'. Probably rather 'from the γένεαι and δῆμος': see the explanatory note on 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 21.

P. 519, note, second column, line 4, *add* For other statements in this chapter inconsistent with statements made elsewhere in the Politics, see vol. iv. pp. 441, 485 sq.

P. 541, last line but one, 'worth or' should perhaps be omitted: see the explanatory note on 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 34.

P. 566, seven lines from foot of page, *for* nor again where a wealthy majority rules over a minority of poor *read* nor again an oligarchy where the rich rule, because they are in a majority, over a minority of poor. (See critical note on 1290 b 15 and explanatory note on 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 14.)

P. 573, line 18. 'This agrees sufficiently well with the account of aristocracy in the passage before us'. I have changed my opinion as to this, and now distinguish the aristocracy of the Third Book from that of the Fourth (old Seventh): see above, p. xxxvi, and vol. iv. p. ix.

P. 575, end of Appendix E, *after* Aristotle's? *add* It should not, however, escape notice that if this part of c. 10 (1329 a 40-b 35) is an interpolation, it is an interpolation of old date, for the author of the epitome of the Political Theory of the Peripatetics which is preserved in the Eclogae of Stobaeus

(2. 6. 17) seems to have had it before him when he says of the distribution of functions in the Fourth (old Seventh) Book of the Politics between the young, the elders, and the old, *ταύτην δ' ἀρχαίαν εἶναι πάντι τὴν διέταξιν, Αἰγυπτίῳ πρῶτον καταστραφέντων, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐχ ἔγνω*, which evidently refers, however inaccurately, to the views expressed in this part of c. 10.

P. 577, line 2 sq. Should *τοῦτο οὖν ἔστιν ἡ διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου* be read?

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Pp. xii-xvi. So far as the question has been investigated at present, it seems likely that neither Polybius nor Cicero had a first-hand acquaintance with the Politics, and that any resemblances traceable in their teaching to that of the Politics are due to their use of a work by an authority—probably Panactius—who had a first-hand acquaintance with the Politics. See A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa*, pp. 47-85 and 374-379. C. Hinze, *Quos scriptores Graecos Cicero in libris de re publica componendis adhibuerit*, pp. 11-21 and 29-55, and *Sus.*⁴, vol. 1, p. 660 sq.

P. xiii, last line but two, and p. xiv, note 3. See however as to Dicaearchus C. Hinze, *op. cit.* p. 23 sqq., where a different view is taken as to the probable subject of the *Τριτοκλισίας* of Dicaearchus.

P. xiv, note 1. See Mr. Shute's essay, p. 40 sq.

P. xvii, line 19, *after* the Politics *add* See also the explanatory note on 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 19 as to Stob. *Ecl. Eth.* 2. 6. 12.

P. xviii sq. For a fuller list of apparent reminiscences of passages in the Politics see the heading Politics of Aristotle in the General Index (vol. iv. p. 642).

P. xix, line 10, *after* this passage *add* See, however, the explanatory note on 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 38.

P. xix, line 20, *after* 1333 a 30 *add* (see also explanatory note on 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 38).

P. xx, four lines from foot of page. For the term *σπῆραι λόγοι* cp. *De Part. An.* 4. 5. 682 a 2 sq. and *Isocr. De Antid.* § 71.

P. xxviii, line 8, *after* *επει* *add* *τῆς*.

P. xxix, line 1, *after* 1338 a 32 sqq.: *add* 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 10 sq. 1.

P. xxix, line 2, *after* 8 (6). 1. *add* 1316 b 36 sqq. *and after* 1316 b 39 sqq. *add* 1317 a 13 sqq.

P. xxxix, twelve lines from foot of page, *for* 'disiecta membra' *read* *pieces*.

P. xl, line 5, *after* the Seventh *add* In one MS. of Pliny's Natural History (the Pollingensis) 'the first eighteen Books are wrongly numbered' (*Class. Rev.* 7. 452).

P. xlviii, six lines from end of note 2, *delete* in 4 (7). 17—*inducere*).

P. li, note 4, line 3, *delete* 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 15 and, *and after* 1260 a 24 (line 4) *add* 3. 5. 1278 a 40 and 3. 13. 1283 a 40.

P. lvi, line 21, *after* 1269 a 18 *read* M^o P¹ *add* *vis* before *κρῆσας*: *Π*² are probably right in reading simply *κρῆσας*, which was the reading of *Γ* also (see vol. iii. p. xxv, and critical note on 1340 b 24).

P. lvii, *delete* lines 1-5 (see critical note on 1339 a 29).

P. 15, last line, *for* γὰρ *read* γάρ.

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Q q

P. 26, nine lines from foot of page. Should τοῖς be added before ἀμφότεροι? See vol. iii. p. 315.

P. 28, line 9, for ἔθει read ἔθει (see *Class. Rev.* 7. 307).

P. 54, fourteen lines from foot of page, for γυρίσθαι νομοθέτην read νομοθέτην γυρίσθαι.

P. 61, line 17, after Latin Translation add unless indeed, which is more probable, he copied the annotations from the MS. before him.

P. 76, eighteen lines from foot of page, read ὁρθοπραγεῖν.

P. 76, last line but one, after τοῖς ἀπόροις add In Demosth. Phil. 3. 54 Π has λοιδορίας φόνου (i. φθόνου) σκώμματος where other MSS. have λοιδορίας ἢ φόνου ἢ σκώμματος.

P. 78, eleven lines from foot of page, after 23. add 22. ix om. Π¹.

P. 80, line 19, for ἀποθεν read ἀπαθεν.

P. 80, three lines from foot of page, before Almost add See vol. iii. p. xvii.

P. 81, twenty-one lines from foot of page, delete rightly—note). See above on p. 28.

P. 82, line 19, end of note on 1264 a 8, add Sus.^{2a} reads φραγίας, not φαργίας.

P. 84, twenty lines from foot of page, after rightly add but see explanatory note on 1283 b 4.

P. 85, last line but two, after 35. add ἐκλείπειν Π²: ἐκλείπειν Μ¹ P¹: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *derelinquere* which reading he found in his text. See critical note on 1270 a 21.

P. 86, five lines from foot of page, after § 77 add (ed. 2, § 694 sqq.).

P. 86, last line but one, before 12. add 6. ἢ after ἐπιπροεῖν om. ΓΜ², ἢ ταῦτα om. L² pr. P¹ (corrected in P¹ in paler ink than the MS.). ἐτίθει δὲ νόμον Π² Bekk.: ἐτίθει δὲ νόμον ἐτίθει Π¹ Sus.

P. 87, fourteen lines from foot of page, after render it add 22. γίνεσθαι Π² Bekk. Sus.: γυρίσθαι Μ¹ P¹ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *fiere*).

P. 87, four lines from foot of page, for (perhaps . . . 1340 b 24) read (= ἀνέσας: see above, p. xxv, and critical note on 1340 b 24).

P. 87, last line, read in.

P. 88, line 10, after Vet. Int. add 6. παραβοῖς Π² Bekk.: παραβοῖς Π¹ Sus.: see *Class. Rev.* 7. 307 sq.

P. 92, line 22, after here add It is, however, so used in Eurip. *Fragm.* 795 Nauck (ed. 2).

P. 101, line 5. Τῆς τοιαύτης may possibly refer forward and mean τῆς τελευταίας: see the explanatory note on 1337 b 6.

P. 104, line 16. At the end of the note add For τὰ πράγματα φερόμενα cp. Plato, *Laws* 757 D, τὴν νῦν φεομένην κατοικίῳ πάλιν, and Aristot. *Poet.* 14. 1453 b 5, τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα.

P. 106, 1-st line, after here add As to διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν cp. c. 5. 1254 b 12 and Plut. *Pelop.* c. 24, ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος, ὡς εἶπαι, καὶ κυριότατος νόμος τῷ σώζεσθαι δομένῳ τὸν σώσαν ἀνάμνητον ἀρχόντα κατὰ φύσιν ἀποδίδωσι.

P. 114, thirteen lines from foot of page, before Plato add Παιδὲς τε καὶ παῖδες παῖδες may possibly be added because ἀγορεύοντες standing by itself might be taken to refer only to children, and not to grandchildren also.

P. 114, ten lines from foot of page. It is probably from Panaetius that Cicero derives the views expressed in *De Offic.* 1. 17. 54: see C. Hinze, *Quos scriptores Graecos Cicero in libris de re publica componendis adhibuerit*, p. 50.

P. 115, thirteen lines from foot of page. The passage referred to as 7. 13. 11 is probably 6 (4). 13. 11. 1297 b 24 sqq.

P. 118, line 14, end of note, *add* Cp. also Xenophanes, *Fragm.* 5, 6 (Mullach, *Fragm. Philos. Gr.* 1. 101 sq.).

P. 118, seventeen lines from foot of page, *add* In illustration of *ἐκ πλείων αἰμάτων* cp. Strabo, p. 336 *sub fin.*—337.

P. 123, five lines from foot of page, *add* 12. μέγα γὰρ τούτου κ.τ.λ. For the phrase cp. *Περὶ μακροβιότητος* 6. 467 a 20 and [Plato.] *Epinomis* 978 C.

P. 128, twenty-one lines from foot of page, *after* 29. *add* For ἡ θείων ἡ θεῶν cp. *Plut. Publicola*, c. 6, *εὐδαιμονοῦν δὲ μᾶλλον εὐδ' ἀποθνήσκων, ἀλλ' ἢ θείων ἢ θνητῶν*. See also *Plut. Aristid.* c. 6 *sub fin.* and *De Profect. in Virt.* c. 1 *sub fin.*

P. 131, ten lines from foot of page, *for* The ellipse—*εὖσα μεταλλευτική* *read* Cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 20, *ἵτερον* (sc. *ἐκαστήριον*) *ἔσα εἰς τὴν πελιδνὰν φέρει*, where *περὶ ταῦτα* must apparently be supplied before *ἔσα*.

P. 133, seventeen lines from foot of page, *after* *χρῆσις* *add* and 8 (6). 2. 1321 b 16.

P. 138, twelve lines from foot of page. Prof. Bywater points out (*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, Band II. p. 504), no doubt rightly, that the article is used before Ἡφαίστων because the Hephaestus of Homer's *Iliad* (18. 376) is referred to. It should be noticed, however, that in the *Politics* the article is almost always prefixed to the names of gods and goddesses. The phrase *τῇ Δία* is the only exception I remember.

P. 147, line 17, *after* cp. *add* Plato, *Polit.* 289 B, *τὰ δὲ περὶ ζῴων κτήσις τῶν ἡμέρων, κλῆρον δοῦλων κ.τ.λ.*

P. 159, twelve lines from foot of page, *add* 37 sq. See explanatory note on 1275 b 21, and cp. *Diod.* 17. 77. 3 and *Hippocr. De Morb. Vulgar.* 6 (vol. III. p. 605 Kühn), *ὁὗο δὲ μεγάλων μεγάλα καὶ τὰ ἐλαττω γίνονται*.

P. 164, line 15, end of note, *add* Cp. *Soph. Philoct.* 138 sqq. and *Manil. Astron.* 5. 739 sqq. (where *atque omnia iusta priorum* should perhaps be read).

P. 169, three lines from foot of page, *before* Their *add* and *Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis*, c. 18 *Kuehlewein* (vol. I. p. 556 Kühn), *μένονσι δ' ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ τοσοῦτον χρόνῳ, ὅσον ἂν ἀποχρῇ αὐτοῖσι τοῖς κτήρεσι δ' χόρτοις ἐκείνοι δὲ μάλιστα, ἐς ἑτέραν χόρπον ἔρχονται*.

P. 171, line 5, *before* *Giph.* *add* *Vet. Int.* 'quicunque quidem sponte natus habent elaborationem':

P. 171, line 9, *after* *betreiben* *add* J. C. Wilson, 'the industries of which spring up of themselves', a rendering which resembles that of *Vet. Int.*

P. 171, line 11, *for* *vita read* *ἐργασία*.

P. 171, line 22, end of note, *after* c. 12 *add* I am not disposed to be dogmatic in support of Victorinus' interpretation of the rare word *αὐρόφορος* in the passage before us, but I still incline to think that it is right. See for J. C. Wilson's view *Class. Rev.* 10 (1896), p. 187 and *Archiv für Gesch. der Phil.* 11. 260 sq. The meaning of *αὐρόφορος* may be studied in *Pindar, Pyth.* 3. 47, where

it seems to mean 'self-engendered' ('self-caused', as Liddell and Scott, not 'sponte natus', as Boeckh): cp. Polyb. 11. 25. 2 Hultsch, τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων γινόμενα φέματα καὶ νόσους. Its meaning is still clearer in Dio Cass. 44. 37. 2. Here αὐτόφωτος is contrasted with ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου and explained by ἐκ παρασκευῆς συγγενούς, and it seems to mean 'self-bred', 'self-engendered', i. e. engendered by the stock of which the person comes ('bon chien chasse de race'). Ἐτερόφωτος δένδρον is 'a grafted tree', i. e. a tree not self-engendered (Theophrast. ap. Julian, Epist. 24, referred to by Liddell and Scott). Cp. also the use of αὐτοφυῆς in Plato, Laws 794 A, where it is explained by ἄς ἐπειδὴν ἐνέλιθωσιν αὐτοὶ σχεδὸν ἀνευρίσκουσι. If αὐτόφωτος in the passage before us meant 'springing up of itself', we should expect that exchange (ἀλλαγῇ), if not carried too far, would be described by Aristotle as αὐτόφωτος, for he says in 1. 9. 1257 a 18 sq. that exchange not carried beyond a certain point is necessary. Yet he nowhere describes the necessary kind of exchange as αὐτόφωτος.

P. 172, after line 13, *add* οἱ μὲν νομαδικὸν ἔμα καὶ ληστρικόν. That these lives were often conjoined we see from Strabo, p. 511.

P. 172, nine lines from foot of page, *after* 1216 a 7 *add* Cp. also [Plato,] Axiochus 366 D, οὐ κατὰ μὲν τὴν πρῶτην γένεσιν τὸ εὖ κτεν κλαίει;

P. 172, next line, *add* 10. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἔξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. [Plato,] Menex. 237 E, and [Demosth.] Or. Fun. c. 5, πάντα γὰρ τὰ τίςτοιτα ἔμα καὶ τροφὴν τοῖς γιγνομένοις ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως φέρει.

P. 179, sixteen lines from foot of page, *after* σὺνίστηται *del* and in ... 1253 b 3).

P. 181, line 10, *after* 3. *add* ἔστι δ' οὕτε κ.τ.λ. Cp. Hist. An. 1. 13. 493 a 33, οἱ δ' ὄρχεις οὕτε ταῦτ' ἀραιὸν οὕτε πέρην ἀραιόν, and 2. 12. 504 b 11 sq.

P. 187, end of note on τοῦ πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων, *add* For the account of χρηματιστικῇ here given cp. Plato, Gorg. 452 C, where the χρηματιστής claims to be πλούτου δημιουργός.

P. 188, line 12, *before* Eryxias *add* the saying of Solon to Croesus reported in Diod. 9. 27. 2, of Plato, Rep. 521 A and Laws 742 E, and of.

P. 193, line 8, *add* 12. ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκης τῆς δ' ὀλέων. Aristotle here probably has before him Plato, Laws 962 A.

P. 203, lines 3-5. I prefer to the interpretation of this passage given here that given by Sus., and independently with greater fullness and clearness by J. C. Wilson in *Class. Rev.* 10 (1896), p. 184 sqq. and *Archiv für Gesch. der Phil.* 11. 246 sqq. and 12. 50 sqq. The latter explains *δοα ἀπὸ γῆς* by *δοα μέρη χρηματιστικῆς χρηματίζεται ἀπὸ γῆς*, comparing Oecon. 1. 1343 a 26, κατὰ φύσιν δὲ γεωργικῇ προτέρα καὶ δευτέρα *δοα* ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, οἷον μεταλλευτικῇ καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα τοιαύτη, and translates the whole passage 'all the forms of acquisition (or all the industries) which make their profit from minerals and from things growing from the earth which, though not edible (or fruits), are still useful.' One difficulty in connexion with this rendering should be noticed. In the short phrase *δοα ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γεωμένων* the words *ἀπὸ γῆς* occur twice, and one would expect them to be used in the same sense in both places, but in the first place we have to translate them 'from minerals' (i. e. from rock, metal, soil, sand, etc.) and in the second 'from the earth' (i. e. from soil, but not from rock, metal, or sand). We need not make too much of this difficulty,

but it seems to me to exist. It appears also to be implied, which we hardly expect, that agriculture *οὐ χρηματίζεται ἀπὸ γῆς*, though it obviously derives food from that source (Oecon. 1. 1343 a 30 sqq.: cp. Plut. Numa, c. 16, where *γεωργία* is described as *ὁ ἀπὸ γῆς βίος*), but this is implied in Oecon. 1. 1343 a 26 sqq. also, so that this passage is open to the same objection.

P. 203, line 5, *after* 1256 b 26 *add* and cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 20, *ἑτερον* (sc. *ἀκαταήκων*) *ἔσται* εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φέροι, where we have to supply *περὶ ταῦτα* or something equivalent before *ἔσται*.

P. 203, last line but one. I have here taken *λαβῶνται* in τὰ σῶματα *λαβῶνται* as passive and τὰ σῶματα as the nom. to it, but it is more likely that *λαβῶνται* is middle, and that the words should be construed, 'men injure their bodies'.

P. 206, lines 10-12, *δέλε* ἀλλὰ μὴ—1339 a 29.

P. 209, twenty-two lines from foot of page, *after* τὸν αἰσινόμενον *add* Cp. (with J. C. Wilson) Kühner, *Ausführl. gr. Gramm.*, ed. 2, § 593, Anm. 1.

P. 209, twenty-one lines from foot of page, *after* 1253 b 4 sq. *add* for though, as Sus. has pointed out, it has not been said there or in any preceding passage that the rule of the husband over the wife is a political rule and the rule of the father over the child a kingly rule, it has nevertheless been implied in c. 3. 1253 b 4 sqq. that these two kinds of rule are two and not one. Aristotle perhaps adds ἀλλὰ . . . βασιλικῶς somewhat unguardedly in his eagerness to explain at once *ἕως* the one kind of rule differs from the other. A similar inexactness of reference occurs in 1. 5. 1254 b 3, *ὥστερ* λέγομεν (see also explanatory notes on 1312 b 34 and 1321 b 5), and it is not, I think, necessary to suppose (with Sus.) a lacuna before the words *καὶ γὰρ* α. γ. λ. These words, as Viet. has seen, are closely connected with what precedes. See J. C. Wilson's remarks in *Archiv für Gesch. der Phil.* 12. 52 sqq.

P. 210, lines 16-20. Perhaps it is better (with Sepulveda) to supply τὸ ἔργον καὶ τὸ θῆλον with *συνίστηται* than to take *συνίστηται* as impersonal, as I have here done.

P. 213, line 17, *after* quoted *add* Cp. also 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 3, *ἐκ* ἔσται οἷα ἱλατῶν ἔργον τὸ ἐναντιοῦσθαι πολιτείᾳ καὶ κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, and Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1169 b 10, εἰ τε φίλον μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πείσχειν, and see explanatory note on Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 11.

P. 217, line 11, *after* Cp. *add* Sext. Empir. Adv. Math. 4. 3. p. 722. 12 Bekker, τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀπάντων συντάξεως, οἷον αἰθέρος τοῦ τε σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, and.

P. 219, fourteen lines from foot of page, *after* ἀρχιτέκτονες *add* and Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 12, *ὁ γὰρ* τοῦ ἑργάνου τὸ ἔργον, ἀλλ' *ὁ* καὶ τὸ ἑργαῶν φ' *χρῆται* πρὸς τὸ ἔργον.

P. 223, line 13, *after* with him *add* Cp. Athen. Deipn. 262 b, ταῖτας γὰρ (sc. τὰς λιχνείας) ὑπεροῶσιν (οἱ δοῦλοι) *ὁ μόνον* διὰ φόβον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ διδασκαλίαν, *ὁ τὴν* ἐν δουλοδικασίᾳ *φεισμένους*, ἀλλὰ *ἰδιωτέας*.

P. 223, fourteen lines from foot of page, *after* πείθεσθαι *add* and Xen. De Re Equestri 8. 13. I incline now to follow Stahr, not Bonitz, in his interpretation of λόγος in this passage.

P. 228, lines 3-5. Prof. Robinson Ellis adds other Greek examples to those given by me—Xen. Oecon. 6. 14, τοὺς ἔχοντας τὸ σιμῶν ἔσονται τοῦτο τὸ καλόν

τε ἀγαθός, and 6. 15, προσέειπε τὸ καλὸν τῷ δαδῶ—and supplies me with closer Latin parallels—Ovid, Met. 15. 96,

At vetus illa aetas cui fecimus Aurea nomen,

and Plin. Epist. 3. 2, cum dico princeps ('where J. E. B. Mayor has a learned note'). See Prof. Ellis' commentary on Catull. lxxvii. 3 (ed. 2).

P. 239, ten lines from foot of page, *for* is probably *read* may be.

P. 239, seven lines from foot of page, *after* p. 79) *add* But Hecataeus and others had written γῆς περίοδοι (Bywater).

P. 242, eighteen lines from foot of page, *after* εἰς *dele* 3. 4 . . . ταῦτά, and.

P. 243, eight lines from foot of page, *add* 26. εἰς τοὺς φύλακας and 27. εἰς ἐκείνους. 'We often find εἰς used of movement to persons, for instance in De Caelo 1. 3. 270 b 20 and Pol. 2. 4. 1262 b 26, 27' (Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 33).

P. 248, lines 16–20, *for* but ἔθει . . . χρῶμα read probably rightly: see my remarks on the passage in *Class. Rev.* 7. 307.

P. 254, line 16. I do not feel sure that Sus. intended to render *saf* by 'gerade', and I doubt whether it can bear this meaning here. Perhaps *saf* means simply 'also', and the sense is 'since we see that those also quarrel who own property in common, as well as owners of several property, and indeed that the former quarrel more than the latter', etc.

P. 254, line 25, *after* p. 54. 2 *add* See as to these cases of undivided property Dio Chrys. Or. 38, 2. 151 R. Cp. Lucan, De Bell. Civ. 1. 84,

Tu causa malorum

Facta tribus dominis communis, Roma.

P. 255, line 18, *after* 36. *add* πλῆθος ἐν, not οὖσαν, though τὴν πόλιν is to be supplied: cp. Plato, Cratyl. 418 E and Stallbaum's note, and see Kühner, Ausführh. gr. Gramm., ed. Gerth, § 369. 3.

P. 256, nine lines from foot of page, *add* τοῖς δ' οὐ χράνται γινώσκοντες. Cp. Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 145, πολλὰ γινώσκοντες ὁρῶσι ἡμεῖς οὐδὲ διὰ τίλους αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι.

P. 267, twenty lines from foot of page, end of note on 1265 a 12, *add* This was proverbial: cp. Demosth. Prooem. 42, p. 1450, ἴσως μὲν οὖν, ὥστερ' οὐδ' ἰδίῳ μὲνόν ἐστιν ἅπαντ' ὁρῶσι πράττειν, οὕτως οὐδὲ κοινῇ.

P. 267, line 26. I have here taken τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον πλῆθος as an 'anticipatory accusative', but it may be, as Prof. R. Ellis points out, the direct subject of λαμβάνειν.

P. 269, twenty-three lines from foot of page, *after* using property *add* Cp. also Cic. De Offic. 1. 27. 96, ut in eo moderatio et temperantia appareat cum specie quadam liberali.

P. 269, fourteen lines from foot of page, *after* μετρώτης *add* See *Class. Rev.* 7. 309.

P. 270, line 20, *after* § 41. 4 *add* (ed. 2. § 216).

P. 271, line 4, *after* 1335 b 22 sq. *add* Τέτρα must be supplied with πλείονα from τεκνοποιῶν (see Bon. Ind. 239 a 39 sqq.).

P. 275, last line but four, and p. 277, line 9, 'checked by an approach to the principle of the lot'. See below on p. 335, last line.

this note. Is not *τούτῳ* = τῷ φιλοτίμῳ κατασκευάζειν τοὺς πολίτας? Cp. Demosth. Prooem. 4. p. 1421, οὐτ' εἰσα μακρολογεῖν οὐτ' ἀν . . . νῦν ἐχρησάμεν τούτῳ, and Plut. De Virtute Morali, c. 12, ταῦτα δ' ἀμίλει καὶ οἱ νομοθέται συνεδόντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ (ἤ)λον πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

P. 350, fourteen lines from foot of page, *add* 38. τὰς δ' ᾤκισεν. 'Ceos is called by Bacchylides (2. 8) Εἰξάντις νῆσος, a title hitherto unknown, but evidently implying a claim to have been colonized by the son of Minos' (Kenyon, Poems of Bacchylides, p. xxvii).

P. 355, twelve lines from foot of page, *after* ἐνδεα *add* Hippocr. De Morbis 4 (vol. II. p. 335 Kühn), εἰ ἀνθρώπος ὀλίγα ἐσθίει καὶ ὀλίγα πίνει, οὐδὲμίαν τούτῳ νοῦσον ἐκίγναι.

P. 358, line 4, *for* of *read* ascribed to.

P. 359, line 19, *after* στάσειν *add* Cp. also Plut. Cato Minor, c. 45, where Cato says of Pompey, αὐτὸς δὲ τῇ πόλει παραδόχῃσι στάσεις ἀγνοουμένων ἐν ταῖς παραγγελίαις καὶ δορύβου μηχανώμενος, ἐξ ἧν οὐ λήλθε δι' ἀναρχίας μοναρχίαν ἰαντῷ μνηστεινόμενος, and Justin 16. 4. 6.

P. 361, four lines from foot of page, *dele* c. 12. 1274 a 2.

P. 362, five lines from foot of page, *dele* the parenthesis, 'cp. . . changes', and see critical note on 1299 b 27.

P. 366, nineteen lines from foot of page, *for* all magistracies *read* all magistracies empowered to try cases.

P. 371, note on 1273 b 19. I incline now to adopt the reading τῷ πλουτίσειν.

P. 373, fifteen lines from foot of page, *for* as he found them *read* in existence.

P. 374, nineteen lines from foot of page, note on 1274 a 2. Τὸν δῆμον καταστήσει probably means not 'set up the demos', as I have interpreted it in this note, but 'set up the democracy' (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 22, οἱ τὸν δῆμον καθιστάντες).

P. 375, line 10. As to the meaning of the expression τὰ Μηδικά, see vol. III. p. 554.

P. 376, line 18, *for* The fact . . . 1537 a 20 sqq.) *read* See 'Aθ. Παλ. c. 7, l. 9 sqq.

P. 379, line 4, *after* latter *add* and which represented the Chalcidian Charondas as a disciple of Zaleucus, the lawgiver of the Italian Locri, a not too friendly rival of the Chalcidic colonies of Italy and Sicily.

P. 384, line 3, *after* 155 E *add* 'In inscriptions of the Attic period there is no trace of an exception to this rule' (Prof. Bywater, *Archiv für Gesch. der Phil.* 2. 504). See on this subject Sns.⁴, vol. I, p. 682.

P. 384, thirteen lines from foot of page, *add* 23. ἐγένετο δὲ κ.τ.λ. We notice that one and the same lawgiver gave laws to all the Thraceward Chalcidians—an early indication of the tendency to unity which they afterwards displayed in grouping themselves round Olynthus—and that this lawgiver was a citizen of Rhegium, itself a colony of Chalch.

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P. xix, end of note, *add* and in 1312 a 11, 18 all the MSS. have τοὺς μονάρχους. In 1295 a 13 also M^o P^o have μόναρχοι with Π^o.

P. 11, line 1, colon in place of full stop.

P. 11, line 17, colon in place of full stop.

P. 21, line 9, *for* *τοῦτ* read *τοῦτ'*.

P. 37, line 13, *dele* comma.

P. 89, line 1, *for* *ac si* read *ac si utique*.

P. 91, line 4, after *ἐπελχόμενος* add See on the subject of this note vol. iii. Appendix C.

P. 93, last line, *for* have read sometimes show. See vol. iii. Appendix C.

P. 100, last line, *for* *ἐχθροῖς* read *ἐχθροῖτ*.

P. 101, fourteen lines from foot of page, after Musurus add See critical note on 1311 a 36-39.

P. 104, line 17, after *δέο?* add Yet compare 6 (4). 7. 1293 a 37, where we have *ἀγγεῖναι δὲ τέτταρας*, not *τὰς τέτταρας*.

P. 105, eleven lines from foot of page, after in place of it add (with Madvig, *Adversaria Critica*, i. 468 sq.).

P. 117, line 5, after *ἐνχυρήσεται* add In 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 34, however, Vet. Lat. renders *ἐνχυρήσεται* by *devenit*, if the text is correct.

P. 126, line 20, *for* *ἡλιανοκράτης* read *ἡλιανοκράτης* (see vol. iv. p. 431).

P. 126, line 21, after *-αι* add and *-αι*.

P. 144, seven lines from foot of page, read *εἰσέωτες*.

P. 156, three lines from foot of page. This is one of several passages in which it is doubtful which word in the sentence is the subject and which the predicate. Among these passages are the following—3. 6. 1278 b 11, 3. 7. 1279 a 26 sq., 3. 13. 1283 b 42 sqq. I have followed most of the translators and commentators in the view I have taken on this question in my notes on these passages, but there is much to be said for the opposite view, and I do not feel sure that I am right. In 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 18, *ἀναγνίσκων γὰρ εἰσπρίαν ἀνδρῶν τοῖς πολέταις, πολίταις δὲ οὖτοι*, the word *πολίταις* seems to be the predicate (see also 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 5 sq.); yet in 3. 1. 1275 a 22 sq., where *τὸν ἀλλοῦ πολίτην* is taken up in *πολίτης δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, *πολίτης* is clearly the subject of the sentence (see also 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 7 sq.).

P. 186, line 4, Sm. supplies *πολίταις*, not *πόλει*, with *ταῖς δημοκραטיαῖς*, perhaps rightly (cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 33 sq.).

P. 189, fifteen lines from foot of page, *dele* comma.

P. 191, line 4, after Hdt. 1. 97. 2 add and Plato, Rep. 347 A-D.

P. 191, three lines from foot of page, after *conduct* add (This remark is borrowed from Hobbes, *Leviathan*, c. 19, 'Now in monarchy the private interest is the same with the public. The riches, power, and honour of a monarch arise only from the riches, strength, and reputation of his subjects', etc.).

P. 196, seven lines from foot of page, after *preferred* add The next *ἀπορία* is whether the version of justice put forward by the partisans of oligarchy and democracy is satisfactory. This *ἀπορία* is discussed in c. 9.

P. 199, line 12, after *προστίθεται* add For *ἀφαιρούσι* cp. *Περὶ δυνάμεως* 2. 471 a 6, *πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἕμμεν τοῦ πράγματος ἀφαιρούσι*.

P. 204, line 18, *for* Cl. read Cp.

P. 206, seventeen lines from foot of page, *dele* Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36.

P. 210, line 6, after *force* add comma.

P. 212, twelve lines from foot of page, *before* 40. *add* 39. *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἴστω τις ἕτερος λόγος.* Cp. *Περὶ μακροβιότητος* 2. 465 a 19, *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερος λόγος.*

P. 220, line 10, *after* the true one *add* A distinction is, in fact, drawn in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 8 sqq. *between αἰρετοὶ and ἀληθεῖς ἐκ προκρίτων.*

P. 238, line 15, *after πείσθαι add* Cp. Aristoph. Eq. 384 sq.

P. 258, eight lines from foot of page, *add* In Nymphis, *Fragm.* 15 (Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 3. 15) we read Πανσανίας . . . τὸ τῆς Σπάρτης ἐξελθὼν νόημα.

P. 260, eleven lines from foot of page, *after* Kingship? *add* It would seem from Diod. 15. 60. 5 that the office of the *πρυτάνης* might be so classed.

P. 264, eight lines from foot of page, *see above on* p. 260.

P. 267, seventeen lines from foot of page, *for* Ἐπιμενῆς *read* Ἐπιμένης.

P. 272, line 19, *after* 31 sqq. *add* In this passage Aristotle is speaking of Kingship in both πόλεις and ἔθνη (cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 35), whereas in the passage before us he seems to refer only to Kingships in πόλεις (cp. 1285 b 13, τὰ κατὰ πόλιν, and 16, ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν, and also c. 15. 1286 b 7-10).

P. 272, six lines from foot of page, *for τὸν read* τὴν.

P. 288 (and p. 418), page-heading, *after* NOTES *add* full stop.

P. 301, eleven lines from foot of page, *after* rule) *add* and Polyb. 6. 2. 14 Hultsch.

P. 308, line 2, *for* *υπαρχόντων read* *υπαρχόντων.*

P. 312, line 1, *for* *περὶ read* *περὶ.*

P. 317, twelve lines from foot of page, *after* Protag. 323 D sq. *add* and Seneca, *Epist.* 123, *nemo est casu bonus.*

P. 318, line 11, *before* latter *add* the.

P. 342, line 6. Perhaps it is more likely that Megalopolis was founded in B.C. 370 than in B.C. 369. See Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, 10. 319, note 5 (Part 2, c. 78), and Frazer, *Pausanias* 4. 307.

P. 345, line 8, end of note, *add* Cp. also Plin. *Epist.* 1. 20. 5.

P. 362, eighteen lines from foot of page, *for* *θεμοειδῆς read* *θυμοειδῆς.*

P. 363, twenty-two lines from foot of page, *after* τούτων *add* and *Περὶ αἰσθησεως* 2. 439 a 5, *ἴστω τούτων τὸν τρόπον διαρισμένῃ.*

P. 370, five lines from foot of page, *after* military duties *add* and provides in the Laws (see vol. I. p. 446) that the Nomophylakes are not to remain in office after they have attained seventy years of age.

P. 385, line 5, *for* *διεφελθὼν read* *διεφελθὼν.*

P. 386, seven lines from foot of page, *after* other laws also *add* For τῶν δὲ ἐκείνων τινῶν cp. Plut. Solon, c. 12, τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ Μεγαλίστου.

P. 387, three lines from foot of page, 'all other'. It is possible that τὰ ἄλλα means here 'other things than τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας (30)', and not, as I have taken these words to mean, 'other things than *sysaitia* and the division into classes'.

P. 414, line 17, *after* Greece *add* But Aristotle's main object is to place the gymnasium of the elders in the immediate neighbourhood, and under the eye, of the chief magistrates. It must, therefore, be situated, like the agora, under the hill on which the chief magistrates dwell.

P. 418, eighteen lines from foot of page, *after* contracts *add* at any rate those which were made in the agora.

P. 428, line 3, *after* *δίναν* *add* For the thought cp. Eth. Nic. I. II. 1100 b 35 sqq.

P. 428, line 18, *after* 116 b 8 sqq. *add* and Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 3 sq.

P. 433, thirteen lines from foot of page, *for* *ἀσθενῶν* *read* *ἀσθενῶν*.

P. 434, line 4, *for* *βέλτερον* *read* *βέλτερον*.

P. 475, line 11, *after* I. 254) *add* In *Περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως* I. 467 b 11, *ἀμα δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀνεπρότε ἀναγκασίων ἵσται τὰς αἰτίας ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνίων γὰρ τῶν (ῥῆμα* (cp. *Περὶ ἀνεπρότε* I. 470 b 9 sqq.) *καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνει τὸ (ῥῆμα καὶ τὸ μὴ (ῥῆμα, and 21. 480 b 12, 19 sq., Aristotle seems to make some concessions to this view.*

P. 483, ten lines from foot of page, *after* life *add* Cp. also *Περὶ ὕπνου* 3. 457 a 3 sqq.

P. 487, nineteen lines from foot of page. My rendering of *γίνεσθαι γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* is that of the translators generally, but it would be possible to translate the words, 'for in a way exercise results to the bodies [of the children]'. Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 3, *γίγνεσθαι κατέλυσεν*, and 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 30, *γίγνεσθαι σωτηρία τὰς νεμεσίαν*.

P. 491, nine lines from foot of page, *before* Compare *add* and Fraser, Pausanias 2. 492.

P. 497, twenty lines from foot of page. We need not perhaps interpret *ἀγροφῶς* so strictly as to infer from it, as I have done here, that Aristotle intended the education of his future citizens to be carried on beyond twenty-one, though it is on other grounds not improbable that he did so.

P. 500, line 12, *for* *ἐκείν* *read* *ἐκείν*.

P. 500, line 30, *after* 1366 a 36 sqq. *add* and see explanatory note on 1258 a 10.

P. 505, line 1, *for* *ἐκιδύσαν* *read* *ἐκιδύσαν*.

P. 507, line 2, *after* 1319 b 19 sqq. *add* Cp. also Thuc. 8. 89. 3 (τῷ νεώτερον . . . ἐν ᾧ τῷ).

P. 507, twelve lines from foot of page, *after* *μύθους* *add* comma.

P. 509, fourteen lines from foot of page, *after* himself *add* (cp. Athen. Deipn. 18 a sq.).

P. 509, last line but one, *for* *ἐν* *read* *ἐν*.

P. 524, line 2, *after* c. 34. l. 4 *add* and c. 42. l. 16, *καὶ δ[ὲ] γὰρ* αἴ.

P. 524, line 7, *for* *μη* *read* *μή*.

P. 525, nine lines from foot of page, *after* fifteen *add* As to light and heavy gymnastic exercises see Fraser, Pausanias 4. 103.

P. 535, line 4, *after* 503 a 23 sqq. *add* *Περὶ ὕπνου* I. 454 a 26, *ὕπνος ἐπεμβάλλει τὸν χεῖρον ᾧ δίδεται χεῖρον τι σοῦτον*.

P. 545, seventeen lines from foot of page, *for* Muller *read* Müller.

P. 548, three lines from foot of page, *delete* the first comma.

P. 557, line 11, *for* *τη* *read* *τῇ*.

P. 559, four lines from foot of page, *add* As to rhythm and melody see Abert, Die Lehre vom Ethos in der griechischen Musik, pp. 53-56.

P. 576, nineteen lines from foot of page, *read* 57.

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THE
POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

NEWMAN

VOL. IV.

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THE
POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

*WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TWO PREFATORY ESSAYS
AND NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY*

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VOLUME IV

ESSAY ON CONSTITUTIONS
BOOKS VI-VIII—TEXT AND NOTES

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
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THE CONSTITUTIONS DEALT WITH BY ARISTOTLE IN THE POLITICS.

WE must not expect to find in the last three Books of the Politics a systematic description of the various forms of constitution dealt with in them and a complete estimate of their strength and weakness, their merits and defects. The object of these Books is rather a practical object, to teach statesmen how to frame, amend, and administer each constitution so that it may last. Aristotle is naturally led in the course of his inquiries on this subject to mark off the various forms and sub-forms of constitution from each other, and incidentally to throw much light on their nature and tendencies, but his paramount object is a practical object, to give guidance to statesmen, not to set before us a detailed picture of each constitution and its working. We gather from what he tells us that statesmen were not aware how many sub-forms of each constitution existed, and that consequently they committed errors both in introducing and in amending constitutions. They probably confounded the sub-forms, and gave one of them institutions appropriate to another. We gather also that they often introduced constitutions and sub-forms of constitution where they were out of place; that they often sought rather to make the constitutions they framed pronounced examples of their type than to make them durable; and that they commonly did not attempt to create by education and habituation an *éthos* favourable to the main-

tenance of the constitution. Aristotle seeks to enable statesmen to avoid all these errors. His object is to make the study of constitutions more thorough and detailed and more practically useful than it had been.

It has been said (vol. i. p. 485) that the *Politics* is in part a Statesman's Manual. The last three Books constitute such a Manual in an especial degree. Yet they are not a complete Statesman's Manual. They afford guidance both to the framers of constitutions and to administrators, but the guidance which they afford to administrators is mainly limited to one problem—how to administer the State so as to make the constitution last. Aristotle does not tell administrators in them how to make government efficient; he studies rather how to satisfy all classes of citizens or most of them, for his object is to make the constitution last. His treatment, indeed, even of the question to which he does address himself is incomplete. For instance, he says but little as to the way in which difficulties arising from differences of race among the citizens should be dealt with. He writes with a special view to the particular perils to which the Greek City-State was most exposed—those arising from the jealousies and discords of classes. He writes for States in which the relations between the rich and the poor were bad, and asks how constitutions are to be made durable where that is the case.

The absolute kingship and the best kind of aristocracy.

At the head of Aristotle's list of constitutions stand the two forms—the absolute kingship and the best kind of aristocracy—in which supreme power rests with men of fully equipped virtue, and the aim of the constitution is the realization of the most desirable life, the life which is lived in accordance with virtue—virtue not of one kind only, but of all—and with a full equipment of external and bodily goods. No constitution could fully satisfy Aristotle which stopped short of this aim. Holding as he did that the *polis* existed to guide men to the life of full virtue and happiness, he could not fail to hold that the constitution and laws of the *polis* must place supreme

power in the hands of men able and purposed to rule and be ruled in such a way as to enable the *polis* to discharge this function.

The absolute kingship exists where a man or a family of surpassing virtue and political ability (3. 13. 1284 a 3 sqq. : 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10 sqq.) rules over men capable of being ruled with a view to the most desirable life, who gladly accept his or their rule.

Of the best kind of aristocracy there are, it would seem, two varieties :—

1. There is the variety in which the same men always rule, the ruled being always ruled and never succeeding to rule. Here the rulers must be capable of ruling with a view to the most desirable life, and the ruled must be capable of being ruled as freemen should be ruled with a view to the same end. This is the form described in 3. 17–18. We do not learn whether the rulers in this form are hereditary or elected by the ruled, nor whether they are controlled by law.

2. There is the variety in which the ruled succeed to rule on their attainment of a certain age and after a long period of military service, preceded by a careful education. This is the form described in the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books. Here, as in the first-named variety, the rulers are capable of ruling, and the ruled of being ruled, with a view to the most desirable life. Both rulers and ruled are good men as well as good citizens, though the ruled are not good citizens and good men in the fullest sense till they reach the age at which they acquire moral prudence and become rulers. In this variety, as in the other, the rulers are apparently conceived by Aristotle as not numerous—not a multitude (*πληθος*). When a multitude rules for the common good, a polity exists, not an aristocracy (3. 7. 1279 a 37 sqq.), and though the ruling class rules for the common good, it does not apparently rule with a view to the most desirable life.

Next to these ideal constitutions, but next after a great

interval, come constitutions in which rule is in the hands not indeed of men possessed of transcendent virtue and a full equipment of external and bodily goods and ruling with a view to the most desirable life, but of men of virtue whose rule is based on desert and is exercised for the common advantage of the citizens. Under this head fall (1) the forms of kingship other than the absolute form, and (2) the so-called aristocracies, with the exception of that form of the so-called aristocracy in which the elements mingled are merely wealth and free birth, and virtue is not one of them.

Kingship
other than
the abso-
lute king-
ship.

Kingship other than the absolute kingship is described by Aristotle in the Politics as a form in which one man rules with high and important powers (*μειζόνων κυρία*, 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 5 sq.) and rules for the common good and over willing subjects. It may be either hereditary (*κατὰ γένος*) or not (this is implied by the mention of *αἱ κατὰ γένος βασιλείαι* in 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10 sq.). It need not be for life. An elective sole ruler elected for only a few months is regarded by Aristotle as a king if his powers are large and his rule is willingly accepted by his subjects. In the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (c. 10. 1295 a 7 sqq.) Aristotle denies the name of kingship to monarchies in which the monarch, though he rules in accordance with law and over willing subjects, rules despotically and as he pleases (*κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην*), and classes such monarchies as tyrannies, and even in the Third he does not seem quite certain that they should be called kingships, though he there classes them as such. Yet he classes the absolute kingship as a kingship, though the absolute king rules as he pleases (*κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν*, 3. 16. 1287 a 1). Kingship, we are told in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book, but not, I think, elsewhere in the Politics, is based on desert (*κατ' ἀξίαν*). The king, or in hereditary kingships the founder of the kingship, has won his throne by desert. He has been made king by the people because of his virtue or the virtue of his family, or else in return for benefits conferred, or in return for benefits conferred and the power to confer them. In the Third Book,

however (3. 14. 1285 b 4 sqq.), not all kingships are traced to this origin, but only the kingship of the heroic times. Aristotle was no doubt led to trace kingship, and especially the kingship of the heroic times, to this illustrious origin by the authority of Homer and of Greek historical tradition (see notes on 1285 b 6, 7). The halo with which he invests kingship, however, often did not belong to it. He himself tells us that in hereditary kingships the kings were frequently contemptible men (7 (5). 10. 1313 a 10 sqq.). Elsewhere (2. 11. 1272 b 40 sqq.) he implies that not a few of the Lacedaemonian kings were insignificant men. Stories incidentally told by him of the Persian and Macedonian courts place them in an unfavourable light. Are contemptible or insignificant or vicious kings rulers by virtue of desert, and do they rule for the common good? If not, are they kings? Aristotle does not consider this question.

Aristotle's account of kingship leaves us in the dark about many things. He nowhere even distinguishes between kingship in a City-State and kingship in a nation. Of the kingships of the nations bordering on Greece he tells us little. We do not hear much from him about the Macedonian or Molossian kingships, and he makes no mention of those of Thrace and Illyria. We should have been glad to learn how the Macedonian and Molossian kingships were administered. A kingship which governs through sub-kings, or hereditary chiefs of any kind, is very different from a kingship which governs through non-hereditary officials appointed by itself. We are told (3. 16. 1287 b 30 sq.) that kings made their friends partners in rule, and this statement is probably based both on Homer and on historical fact (see note on 1287 b 30). Were these 'friends' ever hereditary sub-kings? It is not even clear under which of Aristotle's kinds of kingship the Macedonian and Molossian kingships fall.

One reason why Aristotle's account of the actually existing forms of kingship is rather cursory is that he studies them in the Third Book on his way to the study

of absolute kingship, and in the Seventh (old Fifth) on his way to the study of tyranny.

Perhaps the best of his sayings about kingship is that 'the king is ideally a guard set to see that the rich suffer no wrong and the demos no insolence or outrage' (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 40 sqq.).

The so-called aristocracy.

If it is doubtful whether kingship, or at any rate hereditary kingship, was always based on desert and whether it always ruled for the common good, the same doubt arises as to the so-called aristocracies. These so-called aristocracies stand on different levels.

1. In some of them not only was account taken of virtue as well as of free birth in the distribution of political power, but the promotion of virtue was made a matter of public concern (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 12 sqq.). This was the case in the Lacedaemonian aristocracy, though we are told that it cared for only one kind of virtue, military virtue, and that it valued military virtue not for its own sake, but because it was thought to be productive of external goods and of empire (2. 9. 1271 a 41 sqq.: 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 40 sqq.).

2. There were so-called aristocracies in which the promotion of virtue was not made a matter of public concern, but account was taken of virtue in appointments to office, and the constitution had regard to virtue as well as to wealth and free birth. The Carthaginian aristocracy seems to have belonged to this class, though it is said to have honoured virtue less than wealth (2. 11. 1273 a 41 sq.).

3. There were so-called aristocracies in which account was not taken of virtue in the distribution of political power, but only of wealth and free birth (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 20 sq.: 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 10 sqq.). So-called aristocracies of this type differed from politics only in inclining more to oligarchy than politics did.

Even in those so-called aristocracies which belonged to the first of these three classes, much more in those comprised in the second, the kind of virtue for which the State cared was only virtue relative to the constitution, not absolute virtue (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 6 sq.); and we note that the

deviation-forms of constitution are advised by Aristotle to take account of virtue relative to the constitution in elections to office (7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq.). Are the so-called aristocracies, then, merely on the same level as the deviation-forms in this matter? No: virtue relative to the constitution is no doubt of a higher type in them than in the deviation-forms. One defect, however, seems to attach to all forms of the so-called aristocracy. The notables were indulged in them, and were allowed to encroach on the rights of other classes (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 34 sqq.)¹.

Notwithstanding this, Aristotle evidently regards all forms of the so-called aristocracy as normal constitutions, and therefore as existing for the common good of all the citizens. He probably thought that those in which account was taken of virtue in the distribution of political power, and still more those which made the promotion of virtue a matter of public concern, took the best security for government with a view to the common good; while those which took account only of wealth and free birth could at any rate plead that they associated more classes than one in power, and that in them the constitution was not dominated, as it was in the deviation-forms, by a single class ruling in its own interest. The same thing, however, might be said of the polity; and so-called aristocracies of this last type could claim no superiority over the polity. They were, indeed, more insecure than the polity, for they gave a superior share of power to the rich, a class at once weaker than the many and therefore less able to hold its own, and less inclined to rest content with the share awarded to it (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 12 sqq.).

If we ask how the so-called aristocracy is organized, we shall find that the same eclectic methods are to be followed in organizing it as in organizing a polity (6 (4). 9. 1294 b

¹ Aristotle nowhere says that the bitter feuds which often arose within the ruling class in oligarchies, and did so much to weaken

it, arose also in the so-called aristocracy; but he does not explain why they were absent in it, if absent they were.

10 sqq.). It is oligarchical to appoint to magistracies by election, and democratic not to require a property-qualification; hence it is suitable to an aristocracy to combine the two systems, and to appoint by election without requiring a property-qualification (*ibid.*)¹. In democracy, again, all appoint to the magistracies out of all, in oligarchy some out of some; hence in an aristocracy all will appoint out of some, or some out of all (6 (4). 15. 1300 b 4 sq.: cp. 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 2 sqq.)². So again, an aristocracy will award office to men of virtue (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sqq.: 2. 11. 1273 a 25 sqq.: 3. 5. 1278 a 18 sqq.), or at any rate to the notables (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2 sq.), but it will divide deliberative and judicial authority between all and some (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 5 sqq.: 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 13 sqq.)³. Aristotle does not explain why it is characteristic of aristocracy not to appoint to office by lot or to pay office-holders (2. 11. 1273 a 17 sq.), but the reason probably is that to appoint to office by lot runs counter to the principle of appointing to office for virtue, while the payment of office-holders savours of democracy (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 35 sqq.).

Aristocracy shows the same leaning to a midway course in its choice of a site for the city. While oligarchy favours a single lofty acropolis, and democracy a level site, aristocracy avoids both these extremes and favours a site comprising more strong places than one (4 (7). 11. 1330 b 17 sqq.). It is less easy to say why it is more suitable to an aristocracy to give certain magistracies the power

¹ Thus, when in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 6 sqq. and 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 35 sqq. constitutions based on a property-qualification are referred to, polities and oligarchies are mentioned, but nothing is said of aristocracies. Yet that property-qualifications for office existed in some aristocracies appears from the reference to the aristocracy of Thuri in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 27 sqq.

² But though it is suitable to aristocracy that some should appoint the magistrates out of all, it appears from 2. 11. 1273 a 13 sqq.

that to make powerful magistracies like the Pentarchies at Carthage self-elective is suitable to oligarchy, not to aristocracy.

³ It appears, however, from 2. 11. 1273 a 4 sqq. that an aristocracy goes too far in a democratic direction when it gives the assembly not merely the right to have decisions of the magistrates communicated to it, but the right to decide questions, and allows any one who pleases to speak in opposition to the proposals of the magistrates.

to try all lawsuits, as was done at Carthage, than to allow some suits to be tried by one magistracy and others by another, as at Sparta (2. 11. 1273 a 19 sq.).

The polity is described by Aristotle as a mixture of The polity. oligarchy and democracy (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 33 sq.), of wealth and free birth, and of the rich and the poor (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 16 sq., 22 sq.). We naturally ask how it is that the mixture of two deviation-forms, oligarchy and democracy, results in a normal constitution. Would a mixture of all the three deviation-forms, oligarchy democracy and tyranny, result in a normal constitution? Apparently not. The badness of tyranny is said (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 8 sq.) to be due to the fact that it is a mixture of the worst points of extreme oligarchy and extreme democracy. The reason why the mixture of oligarchy and democracy in polity results in a normal form is that it mixes them in a special way. It fuses them in such a manner as to avoid the excesses and the one-sidedness of both, and to hit the mean between them (2. 6. 1265 b 26 sq.): if it borrows an institution from oligarchy, it borrows another from democracy to counterbalance it; if it gives an advantage to the rich with one hand, it gives an advantage to the poor with the other. It makes the moderately well-to-do class the arbitrator between the rich and the poor, and gives this class supremacy. Aristotle regards it as well fitted for rule, seeing that it is more ready to be guided by reason than the very rich and the very poor, and is free from the insolence of the former class and the petty misdoing of the latter; it is capable, unlike them, of both ruling and being ruled as freemen should be ruled.

We have seen that Aristotle describes the polity as a mixture of the rich and the poor. Is it really so? Is it not rather a mixture of two constitutions, oligarchy and democracy, than the association of rich and poor in rule? Does it give any power to the poor? If we press the account of polity which we find in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 1 sq., where we are told that the polity should admit only the

possessors of heavy arms to a share of political power, we shall doubt how far it gave power to any poorer class than the possessors of heavy arms; but then it would seem from 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 36 sqq., that in a polity the poor would share at any rate in judicial functions. It is evident also from 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 38, *προστιθέμενον γὰρ (τὸ μέσον) ποιεῖ ῥοπήν καὶ κωλύει γίνεσθαι τὰς ἐναντίας ὑπερβολάς*, that the poor are conceived by Aristotle to possess considerable power in a polity and to play an active part, the moderately well-to-do class giving its support to them or to the rich as it thinks fit. The extent of the power of the poor in a polity would evidently depend on the amount of the property-qualification on which the possession of political rights was made to depend; and as this would vary (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 2 sqq.), the polity would also vary in character, in some cases being more and in others less democratic. In 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 10 we read of 'aristocratical polities'. A polity in which the ruling class consisted almost entirely of the moderately well-to-do would evidently differ much from one in which it included many poor. One in which the moderately well-to-do class was more numerous than rich and poor put together would also differ from one in which it was only more numerous than one or other of these classes¹. A numerous moderately well-to-do class was a guarantee for the durability of a polity. A polity would be all the better if the many were not only agricultural or pastoral by pursuit, but also lived at a distance from the central city, so that meetings of the assembly would not be frequent (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 32 sqq.).

Aristotle evidently takes it for granted that the moderately well-to-do class in a polity would hold together and act as a body, but is it not likely that it would be torn asunder, one section of it siding with the rich and the other with the poor? If this happened, it would obviously be

¹ The moderately well-to-do citizens may well have been more numerous than the poorer citizens, or even than the rich and the poor put together, in more Greek

States than we might expect, for in ancient Greece a large part of the working class consisted of slaves and metoeci, who formed no part of the citizen-body.

unable to exercise the controlling influence which Aristotle counts on its exercising. Is it certain that, if it held together, it would rule for the common good? Would not the moderately well-to-do class, no less than the rich and the poor, have sectional interests of its own and rule more or less with a view to them? Aristotle himself implies in 2. 7. 1266 b 28 sqq. that the possession of a moderate amount of property is no security for well-controlled desires in the absence of a good system of education. We hear nothing of this in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book, though in the Seventh (old Fifth) we meet with somewhat similar teaching again (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.).

The institutions of a polity have been studied in vol. i. p. 508 sqq. One point should be noticed in connexion with them which has escaped mention there. In a polity the few (Aristotle probably means the magistrates) had a final voice in rejecting measures proposed to them, but not in voting affirmative resolutions. Such resolutions became valid only when they had received the assent of the many, or, in other words, of the assembly (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 38 sqq.).

The so-called aristocracies and the polity are mixed constitutions¹. Aristotle means by a mixed constitution a mixture of two or more constitutions, i. e. of the principles characteristic of each (virtue, wealth, free birth), or of institutions characteristic of each, and therefore a constitution which associates two or more classes in supreme power. Mixed constitutions.

His best constitution in its two forms, the absolute kingship and the true aristocracy, is not a mixed constitution, but his second-best constitutions are so. He appears to hold that if rulers of transcendent virtue are not obtainable, the next best thing is to place supreme power in the hands of the good, the rich, and the free-born

¹ Aristotle nowhere uses the exact phrase 'mixed constitutions', but as he speaks of 'mixing the constitution' and of 'well-mixed aristocracies' and 'well-mixed polities', we shall not be wrong if we use it in giving an account of his views.

(6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sqq.: 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 19 sqq.), and the next best thing to that is to place it in the hands of the rich and the free-born, guided by the midway class. If supreme power is given to the rich and the free-born thus guided, it should be divided fairly between them, so that the advantages of the constitution may not be monopolized by one of the two classes (6 (4). 13. 1297 a 38 sqq.). The constitution will then be a broad and equal constitution (*κοινὴ καὶ ἴση πολιτεία*, 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 29 sq.), and the fairer it is, the more durable it will be (6 (4). 12. 1297 a 6 sq.).

It is not quite clear whether the *συνδυασμοί* described in 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 39 sqq. are regarded by Aristotle as mixed constitutions. They are constitutions in which the three departments of the State, the deliberative, magisterial, and judicial, are not organized harmoniously, one of them, for instance, being aristocratically organized and the other two oligarchically or *vice versa*, or some similar disharmony existing between the three departments. Perhaps they are to be considered mixed constitutions, for they combine institutions characteristic of more forms of constitution than one.

The milder forms of oligarchy are described by Aristotle as 'well-mixed' (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21: 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 35), because they were less narrow than the extreme form, and he would presumably apply the same epithet to the milder forms of democracy, but it is not likely that he regarded these forms of oligarchy and democracy as mixed constitutions.

Aristotle is content with any mixed constitution which gives a fair share of power to the three classes, the good, the rich, and the poor, or to the rich, poor, and *μέσοι*. More than this he does not ask. The inquirers mentioned by him in 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq. had held that the best constitution was a mixture of all constitutions, and Polybius praises (6. 3. 7) a mixture of all normal constitutions, or in other words of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy. Aristotle does not accept either view. He does not insist that his mixed constitution should contain a monarchical

element (see vol. i. p. 264 sq.). Polybius (6. 10), followed by Cicero (De Rep. 1. 45. 69), had held that a constitution composed of his three normal constitutions is free from the tendency to degenerate which besets the three normal constitutions when unmixed. In such a constitution, according to him, the king is checked by the demos and the demos by the few, and the whole fabric escapes degeneracy. Aristotle knows nothing of this. He holds that a well-framed mixed constitution is durable¹ not for the reason assigned by Polybius and Cicero, but because its internal equilibrium is perfect; it contents all classes by giving them a share of power, so that no one of them wishes for another constitution in its place (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 34 sqq.: cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 40 sqq. and 2. 9. 1270 b 21 sqq.).

We now pass on to the deviation-forms. Aristotle seeks The deviation-forms. to make them moderate and durable, or where they cannot be moderate, as little extreme as possible. A constitution might be tolerable even though it gave supremacy to a single class ruling for its own advantage, or to a single individual ruling in the same way. It might be dominated by the rich or the poor, but not so dominated as to deprive the less favoured class of all power and all advantage.

Aristotle evidently regards the deviation-forms as at their best when rule is least monopolized by the ruling class or individual and least exercised for the exclusive advantage of that class or individual. Oligarchy and democracy are according to him at their worst when they most nearly approach monarchy and cast off the rule of law, and this happens in a democracy when the ruling class is so poor as to be supported by State-pay and in an

¹ When he implies in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 3 sqq. that aristocracies are unsafe constitutions, he probably refers to that variety of the so-called aristocracy which differs from the polity only in inclining towards oligarchy. Tacitus denied that the mixed constitution is durable (Ann. 4. 33, cunctas

nationes et urbes populus aut primores aut singuli regunt: delecta ex iis et consociata rei publicae forma laudari facilius quam evenire, vel si evenit, haud diuturna esse potest), but the mixed constitution he has in view is evidently that of Polybius, not that of Aristotle.

oligarchy when the ruling class is especially small and rich. Under such circumstances the ruling class has abundance of leisure, in a democracy because it has no property to distract its attention from politics, and in an oligarchy because the property of its members is so large that they can afford to neglect it. The richer and fewer the oligarchs become in an oligarchy, and the poorer and more numerous and less pure in extraction the demos becomes in a democracy, the more the ruling class claims to have everything its own way and to throw off the control of law.

Thus the more the ruling class in oligarchy and democracy approaches the mean in the amount of its property, the better and the less exacting it is, and the more ready to allow the less favoured class some share of power and advantage. Aristotle has, in fact, in the polity, in which the moderately well-to-do class rules, a standard for estimating the merits of the varieties of oligarchy and democracy (6 (4). 11. 1296 b 4 sqq.). Those varieties are the best which most nearly approach the polity. He has no faith in the rule of the very rich or the very poor; he prefers those oligarchies and democracies in which the ruling class most nearly resembles the moderately well-to-do class. It is evident that Aristotle's confidence in this class influences his estimate of the comparative merits of the varieties of oligarchy and democracy.

The question, however, may be raised, whether the badness of oligarchy and democracy is as closely connected as Aristotle thinks with the pecuniary circumstances of the ruling class. He himself mentions the case of an oligarchy at Erythrae, that of the Basilidae, in which a few, presumably very rich, men ruled well (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 18 sqq.). The rule of a party-club, or of a handful of adventurers, revolutionists (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18 sq.), condottieri (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 24 sq.), or returned exiles, would surely be worse than the rule of a few very rich men. And so again, bad as the rule of a pauper demos may be, the rule of a demos infuriated by oppression and elated by victory is probably worse. Aristotle no doubt would not

claim for his scale of oligarchies and democracies more than a broad and general truth.

OLIGARCHY.

Oligarchy according to the Sixth (old Fourth) Book (6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.) is always the rule of a minority; in 3. 8. 1280 a 1 sq., however, it is said to exist whether the ruling class is a majority or a minority, if only this class rules because of its wealth.

Aristotle was not the first to recognize more kinds than one of oligarchy. The Theban orator in Thuc. 3. 62. 4 had already distinguished between an *ὀλιγαρχία ἰσόνομος* and a *δυναστεία*, and Plato (Polit. 301 A) had already marked off oligarchy controlled by law, which he calls aristocracy, from oligarchy uncontrolled by law. Aristotle goes farther in the same direction. He describes the kinds of oligarchy in the fifth and sixth chapters of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book and elsewhere as follows:—

1. The first kind.

In this kind the property-qualification for office is not high, though high enough to exclude the poor, who are in a majority, from office. A distinction is made between the 'merely necessary' (*ἀναγκαῖαι*) offices and the 'more supreme' ones (*κυριώτεραι*), and the property-qualification for the former is fixed at a lower amount than for the latter (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 22 sqq.)—such an amount as will admit to political rights a sufficient number of persons belonging to the *demos* to make the privileged class stronger than those outside it. The acquisition of this property-qualification entitles to admission to the privileged class, no other condition being imposed, such as abstinence for a certain period from trading or industrial occupations or election by the privileged class. It would seem from 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 35 sqq. that the deliberative in this kind of oligarchy would be an elective body, accessible to all possessing a comparatively moderate property-qualification and no further condition being imposed. But might it not also be a gathering of the whole privileged class, not an

elective body? No information is given us as to the nature of the judicial authority in this kind of oligarchy, but probably all members of the privileged class would have the right to serve on dicasteries. It would seem that in some oligarchies both rich and poor were eligible as members of dicasteries, though the rich were often forced by fines to attend and the poor were not, but stratagems of this nature would hardly be employed in a well-organized oligarchy of the first type.

The merits of this kind of oligarchy are (1) that a large proportion of the privileged class, like the ruling class in a polity, is neither very rich nor very poor, and therefore is free from the defects attaching to the very rich and very poor; (2) that admission to the privileged class is made comparatively easy; (3) that the privileged class is stronger, though less numerous, than those outside it; (4) that it is too numerous and too much occupied with the care of its property to throw off the control of law; (5) that, though the chief offices fall to the richer members of the privileged class, none of its members are without a share of political rights, all of them having access to the less important offices and the right of electing to the principal ones, while membership of the deliberative, and probably of the dicasteries, is open to all. Its main weakness is that the poor, though more numerous than the privileged class, are excluded not only from all offices (which is dangerous: see 3. 11. 1281 b 28 sqq.), but also from deliberative and judicial authority. Aristotle would probably recommend that they should be allowed a share of deliberative authority in one or other of the ways described by him in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 26 sqq. Another of its weaknesses is that it is exposed to the risks to which all oligarchies based on a property-qualification were exposed (see note on 1306 b 6). For other weaknesses attaching to it see notes on 1305 b 30 and 1320 b 19.

The question may be raised, is the first kind of oligarchy oligarchy at all, if oligarchy is the rule of the few and the rich? It is rather the rule of a large well-to-do minority—a

fairly numerous *bourgeoisie*—than the rule of the few and the rich.

2. The second kind.

In this the privileged class is composed of richer men and is less numerous, a high property-qualification being apparently required for all offices, and admission to its ranks being made more difficult in other ways also, election by the privileged class being exacted in addition to the possession of the property-qualification. The privileged class, again, may elect the new members either from all possessing the property-qualification or from a specified section of them. The former plan has something aristocratic about it, the latter is more fully oligarchical.

In this kind of oligarchy supreme power rests with a small and very rich class which does not comprise all the very rich, inasmuch as the mere possession of the high property-qualification does not give admission to it, but election by the privileged class is also required. Its exclusion of a certain number of very rich men cannot fail to make it insecure. The privileged class in it also has the faults of a very rich class and cannot easily be made stronger than those outside it; the difficulty of obtaining access to it is a further defect; yet it is not small and rich enough to rule without law.

Aristotle does not include in his list of oligarchies a kind intermediate between the first and the second, one in which the property-qualification for office is high, but membership of the privileged class is open to any one who acquires it, no further condition being imposed.

3. The third kind.

In this the privileged class is still smaller and richer and more inaccessible, no one being admitted to it from outside, but sons succeeding fathers in their offices when they die. Yet even in this kind the law rules.

4. The fourth kind.

The fourth and last kind of oligarchy has all the characteristics of the third, and this in addition that the law no longer rules.

It should be added that the account given in 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 35 sqq. of the modifications of the deliberative in the various kinds of oligarchy is not quite in harmony with the list of oligarchies given in 6 (4). 5-6.

Other
kinds of
oligarchy.

The four kinds of oligarchy enumerated by Aristotle are rather grades of intensity than kinds. They represent the steps by which in Aristotle's view oligarchy becomes more and more extreme. Incidental notices in the *Politics* enable us to construct a quite different list of the various forms assumed by Greek oligarchy¹.

1. First we have the form of oligarchy in which rule rested with a single gens—usually the royal gens. To this type belong the oligarchies of the Bacchiadae at Corinth and the Basilidae at Erythrae. When kingship fell or was reduced to sacred functions, the change often only meant that an annual magistrate took the place of the king, this magistrate being selected by the royal gens from its own members. Supremacy in the State passed, in fact, from the king to the royal gens.

2. There were oligarchies in which rule rested not with one gens only, but with a plurality of gentes, e.g. that of the Eupatridae at Athens. Compare the rule of the patricians at Rome. Aristotle does not appear to notice this kind of oligarchy.

3. There were oligarchies in which rule rested with the heads of the tribes. The oligarchy at Epidamnus mentioned in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 21 sqq. seems to have been of this type.

4. There were oligarchies of knights (*ἵππεις*) or rearers of horses (*ἵπποτρόφοι*), i.e. of the richest families. In these rule perhaps rested not with all the families belonging to certain gentes or tribes, but with the richest of them. Oligarchies of *γεωμόροι*, or large landowners, may have been somewhat akin to these.

5. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to

¹ Mr. L. Whibley, in his excellent essay on 'Greek Oligarchies, their character and organi-

zation', has anticipated me in distinguishing most of these varieties.

the original settlers and their descendants. In some colonies founded at a specially early date we find a royal gens in possession of supreme power (e.g. at Erythrae the Basilidae), but in colonies founded later (e.g. in Thera and at Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf) office was accessible to all the original settlers and their descendants, not exclusively to the members of a royal gens. The descendants of the original settlers possessed a certain religious prestige, because it was from their ranks that the priests of the oldest worships were taken (*Rhet. ad Alex.* 3. 1423 a 36 sqq.: see note on 1290 b 12). They had done much for the colony in its early and more struggling days, and it is not wonderful that they claimed a monopoly of office, though perhaps they were hardly wise in doing so. Their claim was analogous to that made on behalf of citizens who could count three generations of ancestors, but it went beyond that.

6. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to the descendants of particular individuals, not however to the descendants of the original settlers, but to those of persons who on their return from exile had fought against and conquered the demos (e.g. the oligarchy at Megara referred to in 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 17 sqq.). Oligarchies of this kind rested on a far more invidious basis than those in which the descendants of the original settlers formed the ruling class.

7. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to a fixed number of persons (e.g. 600 or 1000). The fixing of the number of the privileged class prevented these oligarchies from changing into polities or democracies on the one hand, and into narrow oligarchies on the other. Their nature would vary according to the conditions under which access was obtained to the privileged class. If, as will often have happened, the right of co-opting new members rested with the privileged class, it might be allowed to co-opt any one it pleased; or its choice might be confined to certain tribes *gentes* or families, or to those possessed of a given property-qualification, or might be

subject to some other restriction. Oligarchies of this kind had the advantage that an assembly of the privileged class would probably exist in them, in addition to the smaller body which managed the current business of the State. The powers of this assembly would vary; at Massalia the assembly of the 600 timuchi apparently received envoys (Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 200*), and may have had the right of concluding treaties of peace and alliance and of deciding questions of war and peace; but, whatever its powers were, an assembly of this kind must have served to some extent as a check on the governing council and the magistrates.

8. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to persons possessing a certain property-qualification, high or low, though never so low that the privileged class would be more numerous than the non-privileged (6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.). In these oligarchies the possession of the property-qualification might or might not be the sole condition of access to office. Where it was not the sole condition, access to office might be made dependent in part on membership of certain tribes, gentes, or families, or on inclusion in a list framed by the privileged class. Where it was the sole condition, and the property-qualification was not high, or there were two property-qualifications—a high one for the major and a lower one for the minor offices—the first or most moderate kind of oligarchy would exist, nearly approaching polity. This kind of oligarchy has already been described. The fact that oligarchy in Greece sometimes assumed a form so moderate—we should not find many oligarchies of this type in mediaeval or modern Europe—shows that it was not unaffected by influences akin to those which moulded Greek democracy.

9. There were oligarchies in which office was confined to the members of certain clubs. A club was often grouped round a single individual; hence the power of individuals was great in this form of oligarchy. The decadarchies of Lysander were apparently of this type. The right of electing to the magistracies in these oligarchies would probably in

most cases rest with the class which was eligible to them, the members of the clubs (see note on 1305 b 30).

10. There were oligarchies in which eligibility to the magistracies was confined to a small class, to persons possessing a high property-qualification, or to the members of certain clubs, but the demos or the hoplites had the right to elect to them (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq.). Akin to these were oligarchies in which the dicasteries were recruited from a wider class than that which had access to office (1305 b 34 sqq.). As to the special perils to which oligarchies of these two types were exposed, see 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 28 sqq.

11. There were *δυναστεῖαι*, hereditary oligarchies in which the ruling class was very small and ruled uncontrolled by law. It might be composed of very rich men (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 30 sqq.), or of captains of mercenary troops (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 24 sq.), or of the leaders in a successful revolution (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18 sq.), or of the holders of great offices for long terms (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 18 sqq.).

12. There were oligarchies in which an attempt was made to conceal the oligarchical character of the constitution (3. 5. 1278 a 38 sqq.: 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 14 sqq.: 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 37 sqq., cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 17 sqq.).

We do not hear of any oligarchies in Greece in which office was confined to families members of which had held office in the past, oligarchies like that which long existed at Rome. Nor does Aristotle notice the existence of oligarchies based on race, oligarchies in which men of one race ruled over men of another. Oligarchies based on religion did not of course exist in Greece in his day.

We must bear in mind, in reading what Aristotle tells us about Greek oligarchy, that he studied it in its declining days. He fully recognizes that in the early ages of Greece it was more in place than it came to be later on (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 25 sqq.). The reason which he gives for this is that the midway class was then small, and the hoplites were weaker and less well-trained than they afterwards became,

the cavalry being still the most important military force. But many other reasons can be given. The rule of the nobles did much for Greece in its early days. States grew greater and stronger and wealthier under it; commerce discovered new paths, and colonies were founded; temples were built, and music, choric singing, and lyrical poetry found a home in them¹. The nobles of those days had many claims to rule. They had leisure to practise military exercises, and even where the cavalry which they furnished to the State was not its most effective force, they were probably its best and most fully trained soldiers; they lived together in the cities, while the demos lived mostly scattered in country villages; they were supreme in the tribes phratries and gentes, and the priests of the chief public and private worships; they traced their descent from gods and heroes, or at any rate from families long settled in the State; if they called themselves 'the good' and 'the notables', their claims were not unsupported by public opinion, for they were commonly held to be raised by their wealth above many temptations to wrong-doing to which poorer men were exposed (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 38 sqq.). They were at any rate usually more trustworthy as parties to a contract than the poor (3. 13. 1283 a 32 sq.). Many members of the demos owed them money and stood in a dependent relation to them, for in the early days of Greece there were few rich metoeci resident in the State from whom money could be borrowed.

Thus their ascendancy was based on some moral and many material advantages. But even from the outset it was no doubt often abused. The rise of tyrannies in many States as early as the seventh century B.C. was probably to some extent due to misgovernment on the part of the nobles. Aristotle always regards the rich as ready to encroach whenever the constitution gives them a chance of

¹ Plut. De Musica, c. 27, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἤδη θεάτρου παρὰ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐκείνοις κατεσκευασμένου, ἀλλ' ἔτι τῆς μουσικῆς ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς

ἀναστρεφομένης, ἐν οἷς τιμὴν τε τοῦ θεοῦ διὰ ταύτης ἐποιούντο καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐπαίρους.

doing so (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 19 sq., 34 sqq.), and the very rich as unruly and content with nothing short of despotic authority (6 (4). 11. 1295 b 13 sqq.). The less secure oligarchies became, the more timorous and cruel and oppressive they grew. The Peloponnesian War redoubled their fears and their oppressiveness. Oligarchs and democrats came now to regard each other not only as rivals for power, but also as allies of a hated foreign foe. Each side could count on the support of a leading State, and the ruling class both in oligarchies and in democracies must have felt that, however badly it governed, it had protectors who would not allow it to be driven from power. Oligarchy was probably worst where it was most insecure and distrustful. After the close of the Peloponnesian War it was least secure in those regions in which democracy had prevailed under the Athenian empire—on the eastern and northern coasts of the Aegean and in the Aegean islands—and here from the time of the Athenian defeats at Syracuse and Aegospotami to the victory of Alexander on the Granicus in B.C. 334 its history was a history of vicissitudes. Its fortunes were equally varied in Greece Proper after the defeat of the Lacedaemonians at Leuctra in B.C. 371. For about forty years before the *Politics* was written, such oligarchies as existed in Greece Proper must have lived as threatened a life as the more eastern oligarchies had done from a still earlier date. Oligarchies were now often set up after a conflict with the demos and by returned exiles, and such oligarchies were sure to be oppressive.

Aristotle studied Greek oligarchy in its worst days, and its weaknesses, as it existed in his time, were many. Oligarchies were often too narrow; they often did not include even all the rich in the privileged class; they were often so framed that the moderately well-to-do class was not conciliated (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 13 sqq.), much less the demos, and no means were taken to secure that those who wished the constitution well should be stronger than those who did not. Admission to the ranks of the privileged class was often made difficult; sometimes admission was

obtainable only by those who, in addition to possessing a high property-qualification, were elected by the ruling class; sometimes not all those who possessed this high property-qualification were eligible, but only a favoured section of them; and sometimes the privileged class was an hereditary class, sons succeeding their fathers in office, and no one else being admissible to it. Nor was the smallness of the privileged class its only source of weakness. It was commonly unprepared by training for its position, and was often at once luxurious and grasping. It was also often divided against itself by feuds. These sometimes arose from inequalities of privilege, some families having access to the most important offices and others not, so that an oligarchy existed within the oligarchy, or from the fact that offices were tenable for life or for long terms, and that a cumulation or repeated tenure of them was allowed, so that they were practically monopolized by a few. Sometimes these feuds arose from quarrels about marriages, inheritances, or lawsuits, or from a factious persecution of some oligarchs by others, or from a rivalry in courting the hoplites or demos, where the hoplites or demos had the right of electing the holders of great offices. Another source of weakness in oligarchies was that the leading oligarchs often sought to make the oligarchy narrower. Oligarchies, again, no less than democracies, often failed to place the chief offices in the hands of their best and most trustworthy men; they were content if the holders of such offices were friendly to the constitution and skilful in the discharge of their official functions, and did not secure that they should be proof against temptation by requiring them to possess the kind of virtue suited to the constitution.

To these sources of weakness in oligarchies others were occasionally added. The tendency of oligarchies was to rule in a high-handed despotic way (6 (4). 3. 1290 a 27 sq. : 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 3 sqq.). They often also oppressed the demos, and failed to enforce purity of administration on the officials, though nothing angered the demos so much as to see the holders of offices from which it was

excluded plundering public property and taking bribes. The privileged class commonly sought to monopolize, not only office, but also honour and profit. Instead of resting content with claiming the most important offices for its members, and abandoning minor but lucrative offices to the demos, and giving an honorary precedence to the class less favoured by the constitution, it claimed for itself a monopoly of office, honour, and profit. That oligarchs were occasionally guilty of outrages on the poor, is clear from 7 (5). 8. 1309a 22, and such outrages must often have been fatal to oligarchies¹. Narrow oligarchies, in fact, must have been almost as much exposed to overthrow as tyrannies, and yet they do not seem to have taken the elaborate precautions against overthrow which tyrannies did. We are told, indeed, that oligarchies often disarmed the many and expelled them from the central city, but we do not hear of the leading oligarchs being protected by a bodyguard, though they must often have needed one.

Unlike tyranny, oligarchy seldom brought glory or greatness to the States which adopted it, at any rate in the times of which we know most. It did not exist in any of the leading States of Greece. Corinth and Massalia were the greatest of the oligarchical States, and they were only second-rate States. Oligarchies can seldom have been strong from a military point of view, for their choice lay between arming the demos, a course which commonly involved the concession to it of a share of power, or employing mercenary troops and running the risk of their commander making himself tyrant. They were also often weak in light-armed troops. Nor can they have been strong financially, for they could hardly with safety impose heavy taxation on the demos.

And yet, notwithstanding all these weaknesses, there were States in which oligarchy long held its ground. Corinth, Epidaurus, Troezen, Phlius, the Arcadian Orcho-

¹ Students of the Venetian oligarchy will notice how many of the rocks pointed out by Aristotle it succeeded in avoiding (see notes on 1308 a 10, 15, b 20, 28, 1309 a 21, 22, 23, 27).

menus, and Pellene in Achaia remained true to the Lacedaemonians, and probably to oligarchy, after Leuctra (Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, Part 2, c. 78 : vol. 10. 299). The fidelity of some of these States to oligarchy is no doubt attributable to their fear of the democracy of Argos, but we cannot thus account for its survival in those Achaean cities which were too distant from Argos to fear it. Oligarchy, however, was so little unpopular in Achaia that Epaminondas in B.C. 367, though the representative of a democratic State, abstained from overthrowing the Achaean oligarchies (Grote, 10. 365 sq.), and when Thebes later on reversed his policy and overthrew them, they were speedily restored (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 42 sq.). These oligarchies probably held their ground because they did not oppress or interfere with the demos (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 17 sqq.). The oligarchy of Massalia also was long-lived, and if we knew more than we do of the history of this State, we should know more than we do of the circumstances under which oligarchy tended to survive in Greece.

As to one important difference between Greek oligarchies we learn less from Aristotle than we could wish. We gather from what he tells us that there were oligarchies in which the magistracies were everything and the general body of the privileged class nothing, and also oligarchies in which the magistracies acted more or less under the control of the privileged class. In the former no assembly existed, the magistrates possessing not only administrative, but also deliberative and judicial authority (3. 1. 1275 b 7—17), while in the latter an assembly existed composed of the members of the privileged class (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sq.), which must probably have possessed some deliberative authority, and have operated to a certain extent as a check on the magistracies. In some cases we find, in place of an assembly, an elective body chosen by and from the privileged class (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 35 sqq.); and here again some check on the magistracies would exist. A similar distinction is traceable in respect of the judicial authority of the State. There seem to have been oligarchies in which

the magistracies constituted the judicial authority, and others in which dicasteries existed independent of the magistracies. In some cases these dicasteries were probably composed of members taken from the privileged class, while in others they were, nominally at any rate, composed of both rich and poor, though, as the rich were commonly fined for non-attendance, and the poor were not, the poor would seldom be present at their meetings (6 (4). 9. 1294 a 37 sqq. : 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 17 sqq.). It is evident that oligarchies in which the magistracies constituted the judicial authority must have differed much from those in which they did not.

Both in oligarchies in which the magistracies combined deliberative and judicial with administrative authority, and in those in which they did not, the *gerusia* would usually be the most important of the magistracies, but we learn little from Aristotle as to its powers. It may probably have exercised some control over the other magistracies, a control which would be especially needed where no deliberative or judicial authority existed independent of the magistracies.

There is another point in connexion with oligarchy on which Aristotle perhaps hardly lays enough stress. He does not fully bring out how much support Greek oligarchies derived from the ascendancy of the leading families in the tribes *phratres* and *gentes*. Cleisthenes found that he could not uproot oligarchical tendencies at Athens except by substituting wholly new tribes for the old ones. The fact that oligarchy could not be completely uprooted without a sweeping change of this kind must often have delayed or prevented its overthrow.

Aristotle fails to see how deeply rooted oligarchy is in human nature. He sees that men render willing allegiance to pre-eminent virtue (see note on 1284 b 32), but he does not see that they also willingly obey men of pre-eminent wealth and birth. Oligarchy, after all, had its strong points; it did not engender, as democracy often did, a tendency to indiscipline and anarchy, or a jealousy of superiority of all

kinds, or a belief in the equality of unequals, or a love of innovation for its own sake, or a repudiation of parental authority. The State was not ruled in oligarchies by popular assemblies and by demagogues more skilled in oratory than in war, as it was in many democracies, and the men at the head of oligarchical governments were usually men of pure local descent, untainted by alien or servile blood.

Aristotle's
analysis of
the principle of oligarchy.

Aristotle's theory of oligarchy lags somewhat in the rear of the facts as to oligarchy which he incidentally reveals to us in the *Politics*. In oligarchy, according to him, the rich rule because of their wealth (3. 8. 1280 a 1 sq. : cp. *Eth. Nic.* 8. 12. 1160 b 14 sq.), and with a view to their own advantage. The rich may rule in other constitutions also, but not because of their wealth. Not only, however, do the rich rule in oligarchy with a view to their own advantage ; they also rule with a view to their own enrichment, which is not quite the same thing. Oligarchy prizes wealth, not virtue (3. 15. 1286 b 15 sq.) ; it makes wealth its end (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 9 sq.) and its standard in awarding office (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 11). Yet oligarchies, in common with other constitutions, are advised in 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq. to require virtue relative to the constitution, as well as friendliness to the constitution and administrative capacity, in the holders of important offices. Thus even oligarchy, it would seem, cannot safely make wealth alone its standard in awarding office. Then again, does it make wealth its end ? Aristotle inherits this view from Plato (*Rep.* 550 D sqq., 562 B), but he sometimes speaks as if the quest of gain were characteristic of democracy rather than oligarchy (e. g. in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 40 sqq. : cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16 sq., where the many are said to love gain more than honour).

We gather also that oligarchy regards those who are unequal in wealth as absolutely unequal (7 (5). 1. 1301 a 31 sqq. : cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 22 sqq.), and holds that it is not just that those who possess nothing should have an equal share of political power with those who possess much (7 (5). 12.

1316 b 1 sqq.), or that one who has contributed a mina to a common capital of a hundred talents should receive as much of the capital and profits as one who has contributed all the rest (3. 9. 1280 a 27 sqq.). So again in 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 18 sqq. the partisans of oligarchy are represented as claiming that whatever commends itself to those who own a larger amount of property is just, a contention which, as Aristotle points out in 1318 a 21 sqq., exposed them to the retort that it gave any rich man who possessed more than all the rest of the rich put together a right to make himself tyrant. Elsewhere (3. 13. 1283 b 33 sqq.) Aristotle adds a further objection, that the many may be richer than the few rich, if the amount of property held by each of them is added together.

So far Aristotle regards the claims of oligarchy as based entirely on wealth. But he occasionally connects culture as well as wealth with oligarchy (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 36 sqq.), and in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sq.—if that passage is from his pen—he says that ‘oligarchy is defined by birth and wealth and culture’, so that a value for birth and culture, as well as wealth, is recognized as one of its distinguishing characteristics. And, in fact, we have seen that many forms of Greek oligarchy gave supreme power to birth—to the members of a single gens or of several gentes or tribes, or to the descendants of the earliest settlers, or to the sons of the oligarchs in a *δυναστεία*—so that in them wealth alone conferred no title to a share of power. Even in oligarchies based on a property-qualification the possession of the property-qualification was often not the only condition of admission to the privileged class. In oligarchies based on membership of clubs no one, however rich, could be a member of the privileged class without belonging to one of the favoured clubs.

It would seem, indeed, that if the account which Aristotle, following Plato, usually gives of the principle of oligarchy were correct, and oligarchy really looked to wealth alone in awarding political power, it ought not to place all the rich on a level and give them an equal share of power, but

should proportion political power to wealth, giving the richer more and the less rich less. Yet Aristotle praises oligarchies which place the privileged class as much as possible on a level in respect of political power (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 11 sqq.).

DEMOCRACY.

The kinds
of demo-
cracy.

That two kinds of democracy were commonly recognized we see from 2. 12. 1273 b 38, where the mention of ἡ *πάτριος δημοκρατία* implies the existence of another kind of democracy, not *πάτριος*. Plato (Polit. 302 D sq.) distinguishes two kinds of democracy, one in which law is observed and another in which it is not. Isocrates also (Areop. § 60 : Panath. § 131 sqq.) recognizes two kinds.

Aristotle distinguishes in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 20 sq. between *ἐννομοὶ δημοκραταὶ* and *κύριοι δημοκραταὶ*, and in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sq. between ἡ *πατρία δημοκρατία* and ἡ *νεωτέρα*, but in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book he goes farther and recognizes not two, but four, or even five, kinds of democracy—five in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30—1292 a 37, but four only in 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 22—1293 a 10 and in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 6, where the first two of the five are perhaps treated as virtually one.

Thus Aristotle distinguishes more kinds of democracy than Plato. But this is not the only difference between them. Plato had not explained *why* law is observed in one of his two kinds of democracy and not in the other. Aristotle, on the contrary, explains the origin of the differences which exist between his five kinds of democracy. The first four, he tells us, differ from the fifth because law is supreme in them over the resolutions of the assembly, and because the magistracies still retain considerable power, and they differ from each other because the demos which possesses access to office in each of them differs¹. In the first two kinds of democracy the class admissible to office

¹ In 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 22 sqq. he adds another source of difference. In some kinds of democracy more

of the institutions characteristic of democracy are adopted and in others fewer.

and supreme over the constitution is the agricultural and pastoral class and those who possess a moderate amount of property, in the third those whose extraction is unimpeachable, and in the fourth all those who possess citizenship. It is not quite clear whether in each of these four forms only those are admissible to the assembly and dicasteries who are admissible to office, but, at any rate, in each of them the class which is admissible to office is supreme.

We obtain a glimpse of the organization of the first two The first two kinds. forms in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 sqq., where we are told that in the first, or most moderate, kind of democracy all the citizens have the right to act as dicasts, to elect to elective offices, and to review the conduct of office-holders, though the most important offices are filled by election, not by lot, and eligibility to them is confined to those who possess the requisite property-qualification, which increases with the importance of the office, or (without any requirement of a property-qualification) to those who are capable of filling them¹. It would appear from this that even in the first kind of democracy the less important offices would be filled by lot. The assembly does not meet often—it meets only when it must (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 28 sq.)—and the same thing probably holds of the meetings of the dicasteries. Still the powers of the assembly and dicasteries even in this kind of democracy are sufficient to ensure just and pure administration on the part of the richer citizens who hold the most important offices.

The main reason why the first kind of democracy (if we group the first two together) is the best is that the ruling class in it is most like that which rules in the polity and least disposed to make itself sole sovereign. It has property enough to distract its attention from politics. It is too busy with its own affairs, and the rural section of it lives

¹ This does not altogether agree with the account of the first two kinds of democracy given in 6 (4). 4-6, for it would seem from it that

in one of these forms no property-qualification for office exists and in the other only a small one.

too far from the central city, to attend frequent meetings of the assembly, and it cares more for its business pursuits than for a life of politics and office-holding; thus it rules in subordination to the law and leaves a share of power to the magistrates, the chief citizens, and the rich, and does not sacrifice them to demagogues. It does so not only because it has not leisure enough to do otherwise, but because it would not wish to do otherwise if it could.

It may be asked whether a constitution which makes only a part of the demos admissible to office is really a democracy. Aristotle so regards it because the majority is supreme in it (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 37 sq.), and because it admits to office all who acquire a certain property-qualification (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 30 sqq.). But if those who possess a moderate amount of property are supreme in it (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 25 sq.), and democracy is a constitution in which the poor are supreme (3. 8. 1280 a 2 sq.), how can it be a democracy?

The third
and fourth
kinds.

In the third and fourth kinds of democracy a wider and wider class comes to be admissible to office, the care for purity of extraction which still prevails in the third disappearing in the fourth, but Aristotle does not describe how their organization differs from that of the first and second. Evidently, however, the class admissible to office in them includes a larger urban element, and a larger element of traders, artisans, and day-labourers, and this element would desire, and be better able to attend, frequent meetings of the assembly (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 28 sqq.). Yet it would not have time either to hold office or to attend frequent meetings of the assembly in the absence of State-pay, and not much State-pay is forthcoming in these two kinds of democracy. Thus the law is still supreme in them, and the magistrates, the chief citizens, and the rich still enjoy a share of power, though probably a smaller share than in the first two kinds, and a more precarious share also, for they would be deprived of it if the State was large enough and rich enough to supply the ruling class with abundant State-pay.

Already in the fourth kind of democracy we trace the indifference to purity of extraction which was one of the most prominent characteristics of extreme democracy in Greece. Not only did it tend to place the poor man on a level with the rich, but it also often tended to place the semi-slave and the semi-alien on a level with the freeman and the citizen of pure descent.

In the ultimate kind of democracy every citizen was enabled by State-pay to take an active part in deliberative, administrative, and judicial work, and the full programme of Greek democracy was realized. The aim of democracy in Greece was not simply the supremacy of the poor, for the poor might be supreme, and yet their participation in political activity might be very limited. Its aim was rather the full participation of all in all forms of political activity. It was only in the ultimate democracy that this ideal was realized (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 3 sqq.). In it not only was office open to all citizens, whatever their extraction and however small their means, but pay was freely forthcoming, owing to a great increase in the populousness of the State and in its revenues (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq.), and pay was given to the holders of offices and to the members of the assembly and dicasteries. The result was that the assembly and dicasteries met frequently, and an assembly which met frequently was apt to draw all decisions into its own hands (6 (4). 15. 1299 b 38 sqq.: 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 30 sqq.). The demos shook off the control of law; it came to be like a monarch and to wish to play a monarch's part. A monarch, however, needs flatterers, and so demagogues arose, whose interest it was to make the decrees of the assembly supreme over the laws. The authority of the magistracies was overthrown also; persons brought complaints against them, and appealed to the assembly for its decision. Thus under this form of democracy the State was ruled not by the universal principles embodied in the laws, but by successive expressions of the will of the majority of the assembly. The ultimate democracy was, in fact, hardly a democracy, for it was

The ultimate kind.

hardly a constitution; a constitution exists only where laws rule.

Nor were these the only evils connected with it. Not only did decrees of the assembly override the authority of the laws and the magistrates, and demagogues take the place of the leading citizens, but the rich ceased to attend the meetings of the assembly and dicasteries (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 6 sqq.). The care of their property made it impossible for them to attend frequent meetings of either (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 27 sqq.), and thus the work of both the assembly and the dicasteries was less well done than it would otherwise have been (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20 sq. : 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 26 sqq.). The poor, on the other hand, were pauperized by the system of State-pay, and their attention diverted from the trades which gave them the best chance of enriching themselves (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 7 sqq.). Nor was this all. Democracies of this type encouraged every one to live as he pleased (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25 sqq.), so that the control of the law was not only thrown off in them by the assembly, but also by the citizens individually.

We see that Aristotle regards extreme democracy in Greece as the source of some evils which do not result from it in modern States. In our own days, no doubt, under an extreme form of democracy the rich tend to withdraw to some extent from active political life, the magistrates to adopt an attitude of subservience to the popular will, and demagogues to take the place of the natural leaders of the State, but the poor are not pauperized, nor is the control of law thrown off either by the deliberative or by the citizens individually. Aristotle, on the contrary, depicts the ultimate democracy as a mixture of tyranny and anarchy.

How far
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It is an interesting question how far Aristotle obtains his classification of democracies from a study of the history of the Athenian democracy. The first of his kinds of democracy seems to answer in many respects to the Solonian democracy, though it does not appear that in the latter the less important offices were filled by lot—i. e. by selection by

lot out of all—as we gather from 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 30 that they are in the former. On the other hand, the rise of the ultimate form of democracy is connected by Aristotle with the provision of pay for the assembly (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1–10: 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 38—1300 a 4: 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 30–35), but this step does not seem to have been taken at Athens till ‘soon after the archonship of Eucleides’, who was archon in B.C. 403 (Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 290: ‘*Aθ. Πολ.* c. 41). It seems likely, however, from 2. 12. 1274 a 5–15 and 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 20–24 (cp. ‘*Aθ. Πολ.* c. 27. ll. 7–11) that Aristotle held that an ultimate democracy existed at Athens in the latter part of the fifth century B.C., or even earlier. If so, his account of the ultimate democracy does not in this particular closely reproduce the facts of the constitutional development of Athens. His language, again, suggests (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq.: cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq.) that in the ultimate democracy half-aliens were not excluded from citizenship; this may have been the case at Athens at certain times (cp. *Aeschin. De Fals. Leg.* c. 173 and *Isocr. De Pace*, § 88), but at any rate after the restoration of the democracy, citizenship was confined there to the sons of two citizen-parents (vol. i. p. 227). No close relation seems, therefore, to be traceable between the course of constitutional change at Athens and Aristotle’s series of democracies.

These four or five kinds, or perhaps rather grades, of democracy are far from exhausting its possible varieties, or even the varieties the existence of which is implied in the *Politics*. Other kinds of democracy.

Thus a form of democracy which is recognized in 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 26 sqq. does not seem to be included among them. This is the form in which the ruling demos consists of cultivators and artisans, the day-labourers being excluded. This form approaches near to the first of Aristotle’s kinds, but does not fall within it, for artisans do not appear to find a place in the demos which bears rule in that form (8 (6). 4.

1319 a 24 sqq.). Again, a kind of democracy existed in which the ruling demos was composed of owners of land, whether cultivators and herdsmen or not. Phormisius, we know, proposed in B.C. 403 that the restored democracy at Athens should be of this type. Then again, there was the kind of democracy devised by Telecles of Miletus, in which deliberative authority mainly fell not to a numerous assembly, which might be guided by demagogues and might exalt itself above the magistracies and the law, but to successive sections of the citizen-body, each section being comparatively small (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 11 sqq.). In some other democracies (1298 a 13 sqq.) the assembly had little or nothing to do, and the real deliberative consisted of the council of magistrates (*συνάρχαι*), to which all citizens had access in succession. There was also the kind of democracy which at one time existed at Mantinea. In this the assembly possessed deliberative authority, but the right of appointing the magistrates was reserved for persons 'elected by alternation out of all' (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23 sqq.). We see, again, from 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 16 sqq., that in some forms of democracy the poor and the moderately well-to-do outnumbered the rich, but not the poor taken by themselves, while in others the poor greatly outnumbered the rich, without the addition to their side of the moderately well-to-do. Democracies of the latter kind were far more short-lived than democracies of the former. There were democracies, again, in which the demos was largely composed of trireme-oarsmen, and others in which it was largely composed of the crews of merchant-ships or fishermen. The one sort must have differed considerably from the other (see note on 1291 b 18).

Democracies would of course differ also according to the circumstances under which democracy was introduced. It might be introduced suddenly in an extreme form—possibly after some victory, like those of Cnidus, Naxos, or Leuctra, or after some civil conflict—or it might develop gradually. At Athens democracy only gradually became extreme, and time was allowed for the growth of laws and customs

favourable to its maintenance. In the absence of such laws and customs extreme democracy did not commonly last long (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 3 sq.). The position and surroundings of the State, again, would exercise an influence on the character of its democracy. In a State like Argos, constantly in danger of subjugation by powerful neighbours who were champions of oligarchy, democracy would be very different from what it was in States less constantly in peril. Fear of treason on the part of the rich would make it suspicious and sanguinary. Democracies, again, in which a single demagogue stood at the head of affairs would be very different from those in which rival demagogues struggled for supremacy. The best days of the Athenian democracy were those in which it was guided, first by the Council of the Areopagus, and then by Pericles.

Aristotle connects the first appearance of democracy in Greece in one passage (3. 15. 1286 b 17 sqq.) with a reaction against the excessive concentration of power in the tyrannies, but in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22 sqq. he connects it rather with an increase in the populousness of States and in the power of the hoplite force. It is likely enough that many early democracies originated in this way, for we learn from Aristotle (1297 b 24 sq.) that early democracies resembled what were afterwards called *polities*, and in *polities* the hoplites were supreme (2. 6. 1265 b 26 sqq. : 3. 7. 1279 b 2 sqq. : 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 1 sqq.).

The circumstances under which democracy came into existence in Greece.

The *demos* which set up the earliest democracies was commonly an agricultural or pastoral *demos* resident in the country (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sqq.) ; hence the rise of these democracies indicates a tendency on the part of the rural citizens to assert their claims at the expense of the nobles, who dwelt for the most part in the central city. We may gather the aims of those who founded early democracies from the organization they gave them. When Solon, for instance, set up a democracy at Athens, he left the magistracies in the hands of the richer class, but he took pains to secure that this class should govern well by giving the

whole body of citizens the right of electing the magistrates and reviewing their conduct in office and by opening the dicasteries to all, thus placing an efficient check on the magistrates (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27—1319 a 4). It is likely, therefore, that, when the rural hoplites set up one of these early democracies which resembled polities, they did so with the view of controlling and improving the administration of the nobles. They probably, however, had another aim also. They sought to obtain for themselves the right of deciding questions of peace, war, and alliance. They formed the most effective part of the army of the State, and their farms were exposed to the ravages of the enemy in case of war. It was natural, therefore, that they should claim this right, and none of the boons conferred by the early democracy can have been more highly valued by the peasant demos of those days than the right which it conferred on the assembly of deciding questions of peace, war, and alliance.

It is interesting to note that the Lacedaemonian constitution, though it was not a democracy, went further than these early democracies. It opened the ephorate to the whole body of citizens. The poorest citizen might become a member of a powerful magistracy which checked and controlled the other magistracies of the State. The reason why the Lacedaemonian demos succeeded in acquiring this great privilege was probably two-fold. In the first place it was composed of citizens resident in Sparta, and not, like the demos of most States of early Greece, of citizens scattered over the territory, and next it was composed of citizens who were owners of land tilled for them by Helots, and who were not withdrawn by other occupations from political activity.

Not all early democracies, however, were as limited and moderate as the Solonian democracy or the democracies resembling polities to which reference has been made. Democracies introduced after a sudden revolution, especially if that revolution was provoked by oppression or originated in contempt, were probably more extreme. When the

demos at Ambracia, for instance, apparently about B. C. 580, joined in expelling the hateful tyrant Periander, and set up a democracy (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 31 sqq.), the democracy set up will hardly have been as moderate as the Solonian. The same thing may probably be said of the democracy instituted at Erythrae 'in ancient times' (*ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις*), when the demos changed the constitution in its indignation at the narrowness of the ruling class (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 18 sqq.). It is not certain that the Heracleia referred to in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 31 is Heracleia on the Euxine, but, if this is so, as this colony was founded about B.C. 550, the democracy which was introduced there on its foundation was an early one, and yet of a pronounced type. The same thing may be said of the democracy which existed at Syracuse before the tyranny of Gelon. This appears to have been unruly and disorderly (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 31 sq.), and cannot have been moderate.

Aristotle is disappointingly silent as to the organization of the forms of democracy intermediate between the most moderate forms and the extreme form. We should know more than we do about the way in which Greek democracies developed if we knew more than we do of the way in which the powers of the Boulê developed. We know hardly anything on this subject as to other States than Athens, and even as to Athens we know but little.

The development of democracy in Greece.

From the first the Boulê stands in a close relation to the popular assembly. As soon as a popular assembly acquires the right of arriving at political decisions of moment¹, we find it placed in charge of a Boulê, much as a blind man is placed in charge of a dog. We might ask why a separate body was needed for this purpose—why committees of the assembly chosen by it from time to time should not have sufficed. The answer is that a body not intermittently, but permanently in existence was needed, capable of introducing measures into the assembly and of carrying its decisions

¹ It is remarkable that Solon instituted a Boulê at Athens, though the powers which he gave the assembly were very limited (see note on 1281 b 32).

into effect (8 (6). 8. 1322 b 13 sqq.)✓ This duty might no doubt have been assigned to one of the ordinary magistracies, but it was evidently thought better to assign it to a body as little differentiated from the assembly and as accessible to all the citizens as possible. The Boulê must be a numerous body like the assembly and must be annually appointed by lot, and just as the assembly consisted of all the tribes, so all the tribes must have an equal voice in the Boulê. We do not know how soon the rule was introduced at Athens that no one could be more than twice a member of the Boulê ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 62 *sub fin.*); one effect of this rule, however, was that all the citizens came once or twice in their lives to be members of the Boulê, and that it consequently nearly resembled the small deliberative body planned by Telecles the Milesian (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 12 sqq.), of which all the citizens were to be members in succession. Another result of the rule was that none of the members of the Boulê could have more than two years' experience, so that there was no fear of its being a skilled gathering capable of rivalling the assembly and dictating to it. More care was taken at Athens to make the Boulê an institution congenial to democratic feeling, and to prevent its encroaching on the prerogatives of the assembly, than to secure its efficiency. Its powers were probably largely increased when those of the Council of the Areopagus were curtailed; how great they were at one time is shown by the fact that it could sentence Athenian citizens to imprisonment and death ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 45); yet it continued to be appointed by lot, not by election. No doubt, indeed, it was because the Boulê was appointed by lot and was the reverse of a skilled magistracy that so little hesitation was felt in adding to its powers.

Whether there were any democracies in which the Boulê was appointed by election, we do not learn. In that of Rhodes, however, the Boulê so far differed from the Athenian Boulê that it was headed, and perhaps to a great extent guided, by great magistrates, the six prytaneis (Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 178). In that of Thebes (B. C.

366) the Boulê seems to have been joined with the magistrates for purposes of deliberation, and to have had the right to try murderers and to put them to death, or at any rate those whose guilt was evident (Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 5 sqq.).

The Boulê played a great part in the democracies intermediate between the first and the last. But in course of time, at any rate in large and populous States, the revenues became sufficient to provide ample pay for the assembly, dicasteries, and magistracies, and when pay could be provided for the assembly and it came to meet frequently, the power of the Boulê began to decline (6 (4). 15. 1299 b 38 sqq. : 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 30 sqq.). The assembly now reserved all decisions for itself, and democracy assumed its ultimate form. Aristotle dates the decline of the power of the Boulê from the provision of pay for the assembly, and, as has already been pointed out, pay does not appear to have been provided for the assembly at Athens till after B. C. 403.

The rise of
the ultimate
democracy.

The increase in the revenue of the State to which reference has been made is regarded by Aristotle rather as the indispensable condition of the rise of the ultimate democracy than as its cause. He frequently traces in the Politics the way in which a moderate democracy passes into an ultimate democracy (2. 12. 1274 a 5 sqq. : 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 20 sqq. : 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq. : 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 41 sqq. : 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sqq. : 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 18 sqq.), and we gather that, at Athens at any rate, the change was due in part to the elation of the demos after their naval victory at Salamis, which had led to the foundation of the Athenian empire, and in part to the action of demagogues, who kept constantly adding to the power of the demos in the hope of winning its favour, till at last they made the assembly supreme over the law. In 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sqq., where the experience of Athens may or may not be present to Aristotle's mind, the change is traced to the rivalry of competitors for office when the offices are filled by election without the safeguard of a property-qualification, and the demos elects. But perhaps we may infer from 6 (4). 12.

1296 b 29 sq. that the ultimate democracy would hardly come into being unless there was a great excess of artisans and hired labourers in the citizen-body, and that its rise was due in part to a change in the composition of the demos. It is implied in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq. that the admissibility to office of citizens of not unimpeachable extraction was one of the concomitants of its rise. In 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 27 a somewhat different account is given of the circumstances under which democracy became extreme at Athens, though here too 'the elation of the many' is mentioned as one of the causes of the change. The decision of the demos 'to administer the constitution itself', which probably marks the introduction of the ultimate democracy, is there connected not with the provision of pay for the assembly, but with the concentration of the citizens in Athens during the Peloponnesian War and with their receipt of State-pay for service in war¹. This account of the origin of the ultimate democracy at Athens does not quite agree with the account given in the Politics, which connects it with the provision of pay for the assembly.

That a change sometimes occurred in the opposite direction—that the ultimate democracy sometimes passed into the moderate forms—we see from 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 21 and 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 15 sq., but Aristotle nowhere gives us any account of the way in which this change commonly came about.

The special characteristic of the ultimate democracy was, according to Aristotle, that under it the decrees of the assembly became supreme over the law and that the authority of the magistracies was overthrown (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq. : 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sq. : 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sqq.). This would have been a great evil even if the meetings of the assembly had been attended by all the citizens, but, as a matter of fact, more classes than one were unable

¹ 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 27, ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους ἐνέστη πόλεμος, ἐν ᾧ κατακλησθεῖς ὁ δῆμος ἐν τῷ ᾧσται καὶ συνελθισθεῖς ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις

μισθοφορεῖν τὰ μὲν ἐκὼν τὰ δὲ ἄκων προηρείτο τὴν πολιτείαν διοικεῖν αὐτός.

to attend them. The rich were often prevented by the claims of their property from attending the meetings either of the assembly or of the dicasteries (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 7 sqq.) ; they could attend occasional meetings, but not very frequent ones (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 27 sqq.) ; and the rural citizens, some of whom must have lived, in Attica at all events, twenty or thirty miles from the place where the assembly met, were also often unable to be present. The result was that in the ultimate democracy supremacy over the law and the administration was exercised not by the whole citizen-body, but by the poorest class of urban citizens, those whose means were so small that the State-pay was a sufficient inducement to them to attend the assembly. Democracy in Greece, in fact, when fully developed, narrowed the class with which actual supremacy rested ; we might have expected it to do the opposite. It culminated in a form in which the State paid the poorest and most ignorant class of urban citizens to attend the meetings of the assembly and did not enforce the attendance of other classes. Probably, however, other urban classes than the poorest did habitually attend the meetings of the assembly even in this form of democracy, for we read in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 14 sqq. that in democracies the moderately well-to-do class shared in office to a greater extent than in oligarchies, and this suggests that those of them who lived in or near the central city were not absent from the meetings of the assembly in ultimate democracies.

Aristotle makes various suggestions for the mitigation of the evils connected with the ultimate democracy. It was because the assembly met frequently in a democracy of this kind that it came to claim all power for itself (6 (4). 15. 1300 a 3 sqq.). Partly perhaps to check this abuse, as well as to lighten the pecuniary burden on the rich and to make it easier for them to attend, Aristotle recommends that the meetings of the assembly and the dicasteries should be made less frequent (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 22 sqq.). He recommends also that meetings of the assembly should not be held in the absence of the country citizens (8 (6). 4. 1319 a

36 sqq.), and that its pauper members should be provided by States possessing surplus revenues with the means of engaging in agriculture or trade (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 35 sqq.). This would make them less eager for frequent meetings of the assembly. Elsewhere (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.) Aristotle recommends that the rich should be obliged by fines (he says nothing about the country citizens) to attend the meetings of the assembly. He adds other suggestions in 1298 b 21 sqq. He may have been doubtful whether fines, however severe they might be, would suffice to enforce the attendance of the rich in an assembly in which they were greatly out-numbered, or he may have thought that the deliberative body would deliberate better if the numbers of the poor in it were less disproportionate than they usually were to those of the rich. At any rate he adds (1298 b 21)—‘it is advantageous, again, that those who are charged with deliberative functions should be elected or taken by lot in equal numbers from the parts of the State’ (i. e. the notables and the demos), ‘and it is also advantageous, if the members of the demos are greatly superior in number to the men of political capacity’ (i. e. the notables), ‘either not to give pay to all, but only to a number proportionate to the numerical strength of the notables, or to exclude by lot those who are in excess of the proper number’. Aristotle does not make it clear by whom the deliberative body the appointment of which he here suggests is to be elected, if it is elected and not appointed by lot, but his meaning seems to be that half of it is to be elected by the notables and half by the demos. If this is so, his recommendation amounts to a recommendation of a representative deliberative body in which the number of the representatives of the notables and demos should be equal. He omits to arrange for the payment of the representatives of the demos, though this would evidently be necessary. He would not apparently be content with a paid representative body elected in each deme by the members of the deme or appointed in each deme by lot, though the substitution of a representative body of this kind for the popular assembly

would seem to a modern to be the true remedy for the defects of the popular assembly. Such a representative body would have been less likely than the popular assembly to encroach on the province of the law and the magistracies, and it would have been more acceptable to the demos than the kind of representative body which Aristotle suggests, one in which the representatives of the notables are equal in number to those of the demos.

It is evident from Aristotle's language in such passages as 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq. that ultimate democracies were often introduced in Greece. They must have existed in many States besides Athens, though we are not able to point with certainty to any existing elsewhere. Perhaps the democracies at Cos, Rhodes, Heracleia, and Megara mentioned in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 25 sqq. and the democracy at Cyrene mentioned in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 22 sq. were ultimate democracies. Democracy was strong at Byzantium and Tenedos (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 23 sqq.), but whether ultimate democracies existed there we do not know.

Some ultimate democracies were no doubt more tolerable than others. The burden on the rich was less where the State-pay was provided wholly or in part by special revenues derived from dependent allies, or an emporium, or mines, or some exceptional product like silphium, and not exclusively by taxes levied on the rich. An ultimate democracy introduced gradually was less oppressive than one which was suddenly introduced after a victory over the rich won by leaders embittered by exile at the head of a demos infuriated by oppression. An ultimate democracy in which the poor greatly outnumbered the rich without any addition to their numbers from the moderately well-to-do was worse than one in which their numbers were less.

It is evident that the ultimate democracy at Athens in the days before the rich were decimated by defeats on land (7 (5). 3. 1303 a 8 sqq.) and the whole State impoverished by the disastrous latter years of the Peloponnesian War, differed greatly from what it became in the fourth century before Christ. Isocrates tells us (*De Antid.*

§ 159 sq. : cp. § 142) that when he was a boy—he was born in B.C. 436—everybody was eager to be reputed rich, but that at the time at which he was writing (B.C. 353) it was more perilous to be thought rich than to be an open criminal, for criminals were let off with light punishments, whereas absolute ruin befel persons held to be wealthy.

Aristotle's
contribution to our
knowledge
of Greek
democracy.

Aristotle nowhere gives us in the *Politics* a full description in detail of the organization and working of democracy. What he tells us on the subject he tells us incidentally. His aim in the last three Books of the *Politics*, as has already been said, is a practical aim, to guide Greek statesmen and lawgivers in the construction and administration of the various constitutions, and it is from the remarks he makes in the course of pursuing this aim that we obtain his views on the subject of the organization and working of Greek democracy. Perhaps we learn from him more about its structure and institutions than about its life and working.

If we seek pictures of its life and working, we shall find more of them in the pages of Thucydides than in those of the *Politics*. Herodotus had already dwelt on the passionate vehemence of democracy in action (3. 81) and had pointed out how much it did at Athens, at any rate in its earlier days, to stimulate patriotic effort (5. 78). Thucydides tells us far more. His task compelled him to study the behaviour of the Athenian assembly in the many crises with which it had to deal in the course of the Peloponnesian War. We watch its behaviour to Pericles under the stress of cruel suffering. We see its hastiness and impulsiveness, its rapid alternations of severity and clemency, its susceptibility to excitement not only in an angry or vindictive direction, but also in the direction of mercy and sympathy¹, its occasional recklessness and levity in dealing with important affairs, and other weaknesses which affected it.

¹ Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, 9, 377, where Xen. *Hell.* 1. 5. 19 is referred to, and the behaviour of

the Syracusan assembly under similar circumstances (Diod. 11. 92) compared.

We see that in the fifth century before Christ, when the Athenian democracy was at its best, it was a government of action as well as of open discussion, though the famous lines of Ion of Chios in praise of its rival, the Lacedaemonian State (Fragm. 63 Nauck), suggest that he regarded it as even then too much a government of words. The orations of Demosthenes complete the picture by setting before us the weaknesses of the Athenian democracy at a time when it had lost much of its original vigour.

Among the characteristics of democracy which had been already pointed out before Aristotle dealt with the subject the following may be mentioned :—

1. its exercise of rule in the interest of a section of the citizens (Plato, *Laws* 715 A sq., 832 B sq.) and frequent oppression of the rich :
2. its passion for liberty and equality (Plato, *Rep.* 557 B, 558 C, 562 B sq.) and its jealousy of men of superior merit (see note on 1284 b 28):
3. its demand for equality of access to magistracies, and hence for
 - A. appointment to magistracies by lot, i.e. appointment by lot out of all, not out of selected persons (*πρόκριτοι*). This had been dwelt on by many from Herodotus' time onwards :
 - B. a rotation of office (Eurip. *Suppl.* 392 sqq. Bothe, 406 sqq. Dindorf):
 - C. the multiplication of offices and the diminution of their powers, resulting in feebleness of action (Plato, *Polit.* 303 A). Herodotus (3. 80) treats the accountability of magistrates as one of the institutions characteristic of democracy.
4. its practice of referring questions to the whole citizen-body (Hdt. 3. 80 *sub fin.*) and of consulting the opinion of all (Eurip. *Suppl.* 424 sqq. Bothe, 438 sqq. Dindorf):
5. its aggrandizement of flatterers and demagogues (Aristoph. *Eq.*) and especially of some one individual (Plato, *Rep.* 565 C):

6. Plato had hinted (Rep. 565 A) that the many were not eager to attend the meetings of the assembly unless they derived some profit from so doing, but he does not point out, as Aristotle does, the effect of State-pay in making democracies extreme:
7. the favour shown in democracies to low birth, poverty, and want of education (Aristoph. Eq., [Xen.] Rep. Ath.: see note on 1317 b 38-41):
8. the humouring in democracies of women, children, and slaves, and the license allowed to all to live as they please (Plato, Rep. 557 B sqq., 562 E sqq.).

The following, on the other hand, are some of the chief characteristics of democracy to which Aristotle, so far as we know, was the first to call attention :—

1. His classification of the kinds of democracy is more careful and more complete than the received one, which distinguished only between the *πατρία δημοκρατία* and the *νεωτέρα δημοκρατία*. That democracies vary in kind as the demos which bears rule in each varies we had not been told by any one before, nor does it seem that any one had dwelt on the merits of an agricultural and pastoral demos. The effect of abundant State-pay in making the extreme democracy possible is pointed out by him more clearly than by any one before.
2. In his picture of the institutions of an extreme democracy he dwells, as no one before him appears to have done, on its tendency to exalt the power of the assembly at the expense both of the law and of the magistracies, even the Boulé. His view that the extreme democracy resembles tyranny may possibly have been suggested by some lines of Aristophanes (see note on 1292 a 11), but had any one before him asserted the fact with equal clearness?
3. Aristotle was apparently the first to point out the tendency of the extreme democracy to make the citizen-body as large as possible, so that the demos might greatly outnumber the rich, and hence to extend citizenship even to illegitimate sons and the sons of

an alien or slave father or mother (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq.).

4. He was also the first, so far as we know, to dwell on the tendency of democracy to mingle the citizens together and to modify or do away with earlier sectional distinctions and worships.
5. The view that it is the tendency of democracy to assimilate the rearing, education, dress, and mode of life of rich and poor was apparently a common one (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 19 sqq.), but he seems to have been among the first to mention this view.
6. Had any one before him pointed out the tendency of democracy to restrict the term for which magistracies were tenable and to discourage a repeated tenure of magistracies, or drawn attention to the variations in the organization of the deliberative in democracies and in the extent of its powers?
7. Had any one before him pointed out that democracies were more secure and durable than oligarchies, or traced the various causes to which they owed this advantage?
8. We hear from no one else of the existence of democracies not of law, but of custom and training, or of democracies of law, but not of custom and training.

The first account given us in the *Politics* of the principle on which democracy rests is contained in 3. 9. 1280 a 7-25. We are there told that the champions of the democratic view of what is just claimed an equal share—we do not distinctly learn in what, but probably in political power—for those who were equal in free birth (*ἐλευθερία*). But who are equal in free birth? According to 3. 8. 1280 a 5 'all share in free birth', but yet we read in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26 sq. of 'the class which is not free-born by descent from two citizen-parents' (*τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον*), an expression which seems to imply that the sons of only one citizen-parent are not fully free-born, and in 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 17 sqq. it is implied that free birth is not possessed by

Aristotle's
analysis of
the prin-
ciple of
democracy.

all, for it is there distinguished from 'numerical superiority' as falling under the head of 'quality' (τὸ ποιόν), whereas the latter falls under the head of 'quantity' (τὸ ποσόν). So in 3. 15. 1286 a 36 a demos consisting of the free-born is tacitly contrasted with a demos including other elements than the free-born. It seems clear, then, that democracy according to one conception of it claimed an equal share of political power only for those who were equal in free birth, not for any one and every one who might be made a citizen.

But this restriction appears to pass out of sight in other accounts of the principle of democracy, for instance in that contained in 8 (6). 2, where it is implied that democracy claims equality for all, not merely for all who are equal in free birth. Democracy is said to aim at 'freedom and equality' (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 34 sq. : 8 (6). 2. 1318 a 9 sq.), or at 'freedom' in its two kinds, freedom based on equality, which implies an interchange among the citizens of ruling and being ruled and the supremacy of the will of the majority, and freedom in the sense of living as one likes, which implies not being ruled at all, or, if that is impossible, an interchange of ruling and being ruled (8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40—b 17). Elsewhere (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq.) democracy is said to be characterized by two things, the supremacy of the majority and freedom in the sense of living as one likes. Here freedom is distinguished from the supremacy of the majority, though this is regarded as a kind of freedom in 8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40 sqq.

In these accounts of democracy it is implied that freedom and equality are conferred on all, both rich and poor. True, the rich will be in a minority, and as the majority is supreme, the poor will be supreme. But the rich will have a share of authority. It is on this principle that the first form of democracy is organized, that which is especially based on equality (ἡ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30 sqq.). In that form all share in the constitution alike.

But democracy is also the rule of the poor, whether in a majority or not (3. 8. 1280 a 1 sqq.). Then it is not

necessarily the rule of the majority, nor is it based on equality for all. Here we have an account of democracy which conflicts with those previously given. What right on democratic principles have the poor to rule, if they are in a minority? A democracy which gives supremacy to a minority of poor would seem to sin against the principle of arithmetical equality, which is the basis of democracy according to 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 sq.

It will be seen that Aristotle's account of democracy is not free from inconsistencies. Nor are we yet at an end of them. Democracy tends to favour not only the poor, but also bastards, half-aliens, and half-slaves, and to admit them to citizenship (3. 5. 1278 a 26 sqq.: 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6 sqq.: 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26 sq.). Thus democracy is something more than the rule of the poor; it is the rule of a *demos* possibly comprising half-alien and half-servile elements. Now at last we have sounded the depths of the democratic principle. Low birth and *βαναυσία* are as dear to it as poverty (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sqq.).

Another characteristic of democracy is the assimilation of the dress and mode of life of rich and poor, and of the rearing of their children (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 19 sqq.). This is in harmony with the conception of democracy according to which it is based on equality for all.

The inconsistencies which have been noticed in Aristotle's account of democracy perhaps reflect real inconsistencies in democracy itself. It is perhaps true that democracy claims equality for all and the supremacy of the majority and an interchange of rule, but also claims supremacy for the poor and low-born. Its claims are thus not wholly self-consistent, but its paramount claim is supremacy for the poor and the full participation of the poor in all forms of political activity.

Its organization will evidently vary according as one or other of these conceptions of it predominates. Aristotle's first form of democracy is based on the conception according to which democracy implies equality for all; the ultimate democracy on the conception according to which

democracy is the supremacy of the poor and the full participation of the poor in all forms of political activity. But even in the ultimate democracy the principle of the equality of rich and poor was not abandoned; the rich were legally possessed of all the political rights enjoyed by the poor, though they were commonly in too great a minority to exercise them with effect. There was a nominal equality, but a real inequality, in the position of rich and poor.

One characteristic of democracy meets with less notice from Aristotle than we might have expected. If it is the rule of the many and the poor, the many, we are told in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16 sq., seek gain rather than honour, and gain, we might expect, rather than a barren liberty and equality, or even a barren rule of the poor, must be the aim of democracy. And, in fact, Aristotle implies in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 40 sqq. that one of the characteristics of democracy is that those who rule in it seek gain rather than honour. But nothing is said of this characteristic of democracy elsewhere. The aim of democracy is usually represented by Aristotle to be liberty, or liberty and equality, or the rule of the majority or of the poor, or the interchange of rule, not the gain of the ruling class. Yet perhaps his remark in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 40 sqq. is not without an element of truth. The dominant class in a democracy usually seeks not only to rule but to derive material profit from its rule.

Some contrasts of Greek and modern democracy.

Some light will be thrown on the characteristics of Greek democracy if we briefly note a few important points in which it differed from modern democracy.

The *demos* in a Greek State was only a section of the working class, for a large part of the working class consisted of *metoeci* and slaves. Hence the dominant class in a Greek democracy was less numerous and outnumbered the rich and the moderately well-to-do less, than in a modern democracy. Thus in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 23 sq. it is implied that the *demos* *might* not greatly exceed the notables in number. Nor was this all. The poorer class of citizens in a Greek democracy was itself a privileged

class and had classes beneath it on which it looked down, metoeci and slaves. Not so the poor in a modern democracy.

The demos in a Greek State was not too large to be brought together in an open-air meeting for purposes of deliberation and discussion. A meeting composed of all the citizens of a modern city would often be unmanageably large, and a meeting composed of all the citizens of a modern State would be manifestly impossible. Hence a modern democracy cannot be ruled by the demos in person; it must be ruled by representatives, and an assembly of representatives is less likely to be able to make its momentary will supreme over the law and to overthrow the authority of the magistracies than an assembly composed of the citizens themselves. In a Greek democracy, on the other hand, it was comparatively easy for the whole citizen-body gathered in an assembly and headed by its demagogues to administer as well as to rule and to free itself from the restraints of law.

In a Greek democracy, again, the State was ruled from one centre, in modern democracies it is ruled from many centres, which check and balance each other. Its policy is shaped by representative bodies representing a number of widely scattered constituencies, no one of which is dominant over the rest. It is the result of discussion carried on by persons gathered from a very large area, whereas in the assembly of a Greek democracy the disputants would usually be citizens of a single not very large city. A modern democracy consequently stands far more in need of organizers and wire-pullers than a Greek democracy did, and these men play a far greater part in it. They are needed, indeed, not only to keep the various centres working together, but also to guide the many elections of officials and representatives which must necessarily take place. These are far more numerous in a modern than in a Greek democracy, because the lot is not now used in making appointments to offices.

We have seen that the deliberative in a Greek demo-

cracy, consisting as it did of the citizens themselves, not of representatives of them, stood in a different relation to the magistracies from that in which a representative deliberative body stands to the executive in a modern democracy. It was also less checked by the judicial authority than the deliberative in a modern democracy. The judges in a Greek democracy were not trained lawyers marked off by special knowledge from the common herd, but ordinary citizens grouped in large dicasteries, who shared the passions and the prejudices which prevailed in the deliberative assembly. In the ultimate democracy these dicasteries were paid, and consisted to a large extent of poor men, who were often only too ready to become the tools of the demagogues in their schemes of confiscation (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 4 sqq.).

Another difference may be noted between the deliberative assembly in a Greek democracy and the legislature in a modern democracy. It was not a legislative body only, but both a legislative and a deliberative body, having power to decide some important administrative questions, such as those of peace, war, and alliance. Indeed, it had also power to decide some important judicial questions, for it had power to inflict on citizens the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation of property. Its powers, therefore, resembled those of the magistrates more than those of a modern legislative body do, and it was more easy for it to become a jealous rival of the magistrates, and ultimately to weaken their authority.

The poorer citizens in a Greek democracy, again, were more aspiring than the corresponding class in a modern democracy. They sought not merely for substantial gains or for a control of legislation and taxation in their own interest, but also for the gratification of their vanity; they wished to hold office and to act as judges and members of the assembly. They enjoyed having great men before them competing for their votes. In modern democracy this aim is still present, but as the sovereign people does not rule in person and cannot be gathered into one

all-powerful assembly, it is gratified in a less direct way. Modern democracy, though it demands a rotation of office (see note on 1317 b 17), seeks rather to regulate legislation and taxation in the interest of the labouring class than to give a turn of office to every poor man. Even in the ultimate form of Greek democracy, indeed, the poor did not claim to hold offices which demanded special experience and skill.

In ancient Greece, again, democracy, or at any rate extreme democracy, meant the supremacy of classes which were often in part of semi-alien or semi-servile origin. In many Greek cities the urban section of the *demos* contained a large admixture of elements of this kind. Democracy in most modern States brings no such consequences with it, though it is true that in the United States classes which are semi-alien, or even more than semi-alien, play a considerable part in politics.

TYRANNY.

Aristotle does not always define tyranny in the same way. His earliest definition of it in the *Politics* makes it a form of monarchy in which rule is exercised for the advantage of the monarch (3. 7. 1279b 6 sq.), but in the Sixth (old Fourth) Book he treats as forms of tyranny a despotic kind of kingship found in some barbarian nations and the *aesymneteship* of early Greece (6 (4). 10. 1295a 7 sqq.), though he does not appear to hold that either the barbarian king or the *aesymnete* ruled for his own advantage. His reason for classing these two forms of monarchy as tyrannies apparently is that both possessed large powers of arbitrary rule (1295a 16 sq.). Viewed in this light, the name of tyranny may be given to any office exercising despotic authority; thus the *ephorship* was regarded by some as a tyranny (2. 6. 1265 b 40: cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 13 sq.). Thucydides seems to approach this view when he tacitly contrasts tyrannies with 'hereditary kingships with fixed rights' (*ἐπὶ βῆτοῖς γέραςι πατρικαὶ βασιλείαι*, 1. 13).

The definition of tyranny.

Others found the distinctive mark of tyranny not so much in the despotic character of its rule as in its not ruling in accordance with law. Thus Plato says in *Polit.* 301 B, *ὅταν μήτε κατὰ νόμους μήτε κατὰ ἔθνη πράττῃ τις εἰς ἀρχῶν . . . μῶν οὐ τότε τὸν τοιοῦτον ἕκαστον τύραννον κλητέον*; *Cp. Rhet.* 1. 8. 1365 b 37, *μοναρχία δ' ἐστὶ κατὰ τοῦνομα ἐν ᾗ εἰς ἀπάντων κύριός ἐστιν τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν κατὰ τάξιν τινὰ βασιλεῖα, ἡ δ' ἀόριστος τυραννίς*, and *Xen. Mem.* 4. 6. 12, *τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκόντων τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατὰ νόμους τῶν πόλεων ἀρχὴν βασιλείαν ἡγεῖτο (sc. Σωκράτης), τὴν δὲ ἀκόντων τε καὶ μὴ κατὰ νόμους, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὁ ἀρχῶν βούλοιτο, τυραννίδα*. In the passage last quoted we find a further characteristic added that the rule of the tyrant is exercised over unwilling subjects (*cp. Thuc.* 3. 37. 2).

Tyranny is also described as a kind of rule based on deceit or force (*Diog. Laert.* 3. 83, *τυραννὶς δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν ᾗ παρακρουσθέντες ἢ βιασθέντες ὑπὸ τινος ἀρχονται*: *cp. Xen. Mem.* 3. 9. 10 and *Pol.* 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 9 sq., where see note).

Aristotle's prevailing tendency is to define tyranny, or at any rate that kind of tyranny which is thought to be especially tyranny (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 17 sqq.), as a form of monarchy in which the monarch rules irresponsibly over men as good as, or better than, himself for his own advantage, and consequently rules over unwilling subjects (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 19 sqq.)¹. Tyranny is the perversion not merely of kingship (3. 7. 1279 b 4 sqq.), but of absolute kingship (6 (4). 2. 1289 a 39 sqq.), and just as the absolute king is greatly superior to those over whom he rules and rules for the common advantage, so his antithesis the tyrant is the inferior, or at any rate only the equal, of those over whom he rules and rules for his own advantage. It follows that if a man is to possess absolute power and not to be a tyrant, he must not only rule for the common advantage, but also be greatly superior to those over whom he rules

¹ In this kind of tyranny the tyrant possesses unlimited powers, but is there not a kind of tyranny

in which the tyrant possesses only limited powers and uses them for his own advantage?

(4 (7). 3. 1325 b 3 sqq.). When the ruler possesses this transcendent superiority, men willingly accept his rule (3. 13. 1284 b 32 sqq.), and he is not a tyrant. Rule comes to the king by reason of his virtue, to the tyrant by reason of the power which enables him to make himself tyrant, whether that power is possessed by him as a king or as a great official or as a demagogue and general (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 14-31).

The first introduction of tyranny in the Greek world seems to have been due not to demagogues, but to kings or great officials who converted the positions legally held by them into tyrannies, and thus were the first to make the breach through which later on so many soldier-demagogues successfully passed. Tyranny was a legacy from the early incautious days in which kingships existed and great magistracies were held by single individuals. Even the soldier-demagogue, when he arose, commonly held some great military office before he made himself tyrant (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7 sqq.).

The rise of
tyranny.

In later days most tyrants, but not all, won their tyrannies as demagogues. Not all, for some won their tyrannies simply because they possessed an overpowering influence in the State (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 15 sqq.), others because they were the holders of important offices for long terms (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 20 sqq.), others because they belonged to leading families in close oligarchies (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 22 sq.), others because they were captains of mercenaries (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 22 sq.) or 'neutral magistrates' (*ἀρχοντες μεσθιοι*, 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 26 sqq.). Another class of tyrants consisted of nominees of Persia or in later days of Macedon.

The rise of tyranny in ancient Greece was not, as it was in mediaeval Italy, a symptom of exhaustion and weariness of faction. It was often due rather to the difficulty which the demos experienced in overthrowing oligarchies which oppressed it. It could not easily overthrow these oligarchies unless it was headed by a man possessing both military and demagogic skill. In early oligarchies the demos was for the most part a rural demos, while the

oligarchs dwelt in the city. A demagogue at the head of a demos of this kind found himself in a difficult position. He had to defend in the city the rights of supporters scattered over the country, too distant and busy to give him effective support. He had to prosecute in oligarchical lawcourts rich men who had wronged poor men. We can readily imagine that he was almost driven by stress of circumstances to make himself tyrant (Plato, *Rep.* 565 D sqq.). He would obviously stand in great need of a bodyguard. That Cypselus, though the founder of a tyranny at Corinth, never had a bodyguard is mentioned as a remarkable fact (7 (5). 12. 1315 b 27 sq.). This bodyguard he had to ask of the State, and Aristotle thinks (3. 15. 1286 b 35 sqq.) that the citizens would have been wise if they had done what was usually done when an *aesymnete* was elected, and had limited the numbers of the bodyguard, not allowing it to be stronger than the many, but this precaution was commonly neglected, no doubt because, when the bodyguard was granted, the demos felt unbounded confidence in its champion. The bodyguard of a tyrant was usually composed of aliens, notwithstanding that he had the support of the demos, and this was a sinister sign. It meant that he intended to be independent of the demos.

An alien bodyguard would be most easily hired in regions in which mercenary soldiers were easily obtainable. Thus Corinth Sicyon and Megara, the earliest homes of tyranny in Greece Proper, were close to Arcadia, where mercenary soldiers were always to be had. States bordering on regions peopled with warlike barbarians (for instance, States in Caria, Sicily, or Thrace), or near bodies of warlike slaves like the *Penestae*, were similarly circumstanced. It would be especially easy, again, to obtain mercenaries at the close of great wars, when large numbers of men had lost all taste and aptitude for peaceful pursuits. Thus the tyranny of Dionysius the Elder at Syracuse and probably that of Pherae arose at the end of the Peloponnesian War. It was no doubt a fortunate thing for Greece that these tyrannies enlisted so many turbulent

spirits in their service and drew them away to Syracuse and Pherae.

It was not always under oligarchy that the hostility between rich and poor arose from which tyranny usually sprang. It sometimes arose under a democracy. Herodotus (3. 82) describes tyranny as arising under both oligarchy and democracy. Plato, indeed, in the Republic (562 B sqq.) conceives tyranny as always arising under democracy, but that was evidently not the case. In his picture of the tyrant he clearly has Dionysius the Elder especially in view, and the tyranny of Dionysius the Elder arose under a democracy (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. 176 D).

The rise of tyranny seems to have been often connected with other than purely internal difficulties, though neither Plato nor Aristotle draws attention to the fact. Dionysius the Elder acquired his tyranny when Syracuse was fighting for its existence against a Carthaginian invasion of Sicily which had already proved fatal to several of its Greek cities. It is likely enough that the establishment of a tyranny at Corinth by Cypselus in B. C. 657 was connected with the revolt of Corcyra from Corinth and the sea-fight fought by their fleets in B. C. 664. So again the origin of the tyranny at Pherae was probably connected with the struggle of Larissa and Pherae for supremacy, which, beginning at the end of the fifth century B. C., ultimately resulted in the subjection of Thessaly to Philip of Macedon. At times of crisis, when the existence of the State was threatened by external foes, the concentration of civil and military authority in the hands of one able man had its advantages¹. This was especially felt in Sicily, which never forgot that a formidable Carthaginian invasion had been repulsed in B. C. 480 by the tyrant Gelon. If the invasion of Greece Proper by Xerxes had been repulsed under the leadership of tyrants, it is probable that tyranny would have won the prestige there which it enjoyed in

¹ That the value of a single able ruler was recognized we see from Thuc. 6. 72. 3, Xen. Anab. 6. 1.

18, Isocr. Nicocl. § 24 sq., and Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 184 sq.

Sicily. No doubt tyrannies were often successfully set up at times when the State was not menaced by any external perils, and when the only thing that troubled its peace was internal faction. This was the case with the tyranny of Peisistratus among others.

The rule of tyrants.

The mere fact that tyrants needed a bodyguard made a considerable revenue a necessity of their position. Thus it was in wealthy States that tyranny was most at home. This large revenue was raised by taxation which was often oppressive. We gather from 7 (5). II. 1314 b 14 that 'eisphorae and liturgies' were commonly exacted by tyrants from their subjects. We also hear of their receiving a certain proportion of the produce of the soil, often a tenth. The heavy taxes levied by tyrants were a characteristic feature of their rule, and were no doubt partly responsible for its commonly short duration. Free States appear to have intentionally abstained from following their example in this matter. Usually, however, tyrants were not satisfied with possessing a large revenue; they also sought to amass a treasure (7 (5). II. 1314 b 10). The possession of a treasure enabled them to act more promptly in special emergencies than they could otherwise have done. They needed it, or thought that they needed it, to face the perils of their position, but it also added to these perils, for those whom the tyrant left in charge of his treasure, when he was absent from the city, often conspired against him (7 (5). II. 1314 b 10 sqq.). It was easy for tyrants to amass a treasure, for, as their rise to supreme power was commonly opposed by most of the rich, they had abundant opportunities of enriching themselves by confiscation. The more the expenditure of the tyrant increased, the greater would be the temptation to plunder the rich, and his expenditure constantly tended to increase. Partly to keep his mercenaries employed, partly to win glory and popularity, partly to make himself indispensable to the State, the tyrant often made war. He would easily find excuses for war, for the great resources, political military and financial, which were at his disposal and the concentration of authority in his hands must have made all

neighbouring States distrustful of him and anxious, if not actually hostile. His own subjects were not sorry when he made war, for they knew that he would be obliged to arm them, and they hoped, when he had done so, to find some opportunity of dethroning him (Diod. 14. 45. 5, 14. 64. 4 : Isocr. Hel. § 32).

The extent to which tyrants altered the laws and constitution of the State which they ruled seems to have varied. Mr. Freeman is probably right in saying (Sicily, 2. 53): 'It does not appear that the tyrant, as a rule, swept away the laws and constitution of the city. The forms of law might go on; it was enough if magistrates and assemblies practically did their master's bidding. Whenever either silent influence or express command failed to secure obedience, the spearmen were ready to step in'. Still Herodotus (3. 80) says of the tyrant, 'he changes traditional customs' (*νόμους κινεῖ πάτρια*), and it is clear from Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 17 sq. that the tyrants of Salamis in Cyprus at any rate, besides issuing their edicts (Isocr. *loc. cit.*: cp. Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 20), also revised the laws and tried and decided lawsuits in person.

Aristotle recommends the tyrant to win, if possible, the support both of the rich and of the poor, or, if not, the support of whichever of these classes was the stronger (7 (5). 11. 1315 a 31 sqq.). He implies that it was always open to him to win the support of the rich, but this it must have commonly been difficult for him to do. His taxation fell with especial severity on the rich. He dreaded those of them who ranked as notables, for conspiracies against him were for the most part their work, and he especially dreaded those who overtopped the rest (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 40). It cannot have been easy for him to employ the notables in the work of government, and yet, if they had no share in it, they were discontented. The tyrants seem to have brought into the administration of the State the methods by which the generals in command of besieged cities controlled them (see note on 1313 a 41), and these methods would be especially odious to the leisured class, the class

which set most store by freedom in social intercourse. Greek cities were commonly pervaded by a hum of discussion and talk, but a silence fell on them under a tyranny of the worse kind; the tyrant's spies made social intercourse dangerous; the citizens came not only to distrust each other, but to be unacquainted with each other. The poor suffered less under a government of this kind than the rich. The tax on the produce of the soil no doubt fell in part upon them, and the impoverishment of the rich must have cost them dear. Tyrants were also sometimes led by their fear of plots to discourage the residence of the poor in the central city and to keep them hard at work. Still they occasionally helped the poor with gifts or loans of money, and were often great builders, and therefore great employers of labour. The tyrants of Corinth and probably of Miletus¹ founded colonies which must have given many poor men a chance of enriching themselves, and so did Dionysius the Elder. The luxurious court of the tyrant was partly supplied by alien handicraftsmen, but it was also a source of profit to the native poor, and many new arts were introduced and old ones developed under his rule.

Plato's sketch of the tyrant's career (Rep. 568 E), however, implies that a time often came in the course of it when he found that he had run through the property of the rich. He had now only poor men to tax, and his heavy expenditure had to be maintained at the cost of his early friends, the *demos*. He thus lost their good will, and it sometimes became necessary for him to disarm them and to win fresh supporters by emancipating slaves.

Even a short period of tyranny must have been injurious to a State. Many of its natural leaders would be put to death or exiled or stripped of their property, and however short a time a tyranny might last, it would be difficult, when it fell, to replace them in their position. A long continuance of tyranny, however, must have been far more ruinous. In the early days of a tyrant's rule the citizens would at any rate know what freedom meant, for they would

¹ See as to the latter E. Meyer, *Gesch. des Alterthums*, 2. 447.

have lived at one time under more or less free institutions ; but as time went on and a generation grew up which had never known any government but tyranny, a visible deterioration of character must have set in. The best elements of the citizen-body would long have been weeded out and their place taken by the tyrant's mercenaries, some of them probably not even of Hellenic extraction, and only those would have been left from whom the tyrant had nothing to fear. A general mediocrity would prevail. The citizens would not be as well acquainted with each other as they were in a free State, and would often lack confidence in themselves and in each other. A State thus morally enfeebled was fit for nothing but tyranny, and tyranny would find a more or less permanent home in it. This, at any rate, was the fate of Syracuse. Yet it was not the fate of all States long ruled by tyrants. At Heracleia on the Euxine, on the extinction of a tyranny which lasted for nearly eighty years, a democracy was set up which would seem to have been sufficiently well-ordered to last for more than two centuries, and which came to an end only when the city received its death-blow.

In the later years of Greek tyranny the tyrant was often not even a native of the State he ruled. He was frequently merely a captain of mercenaries unconnected with the State.

As in mediæval Italy, so in ancient Greece tyrants do not all stand on the same level. Not only were some far better rulers than others, but some could point to public services which made amends to a certain extent for their usurpation of power. Gelon and Dionysius the Elder humbled Carthage and added to the greatness of Syracuse, while others could claim to have overthrown oppressive oligarchies.

Tyranny was less widespread in ancient Greece than in mediæval Italy, and held its ground with more difficulty. In mediæval Italy its rise often meant that the citizens were weary of the struggles of the factions which had torn the State asunder and had made material prosperity

Some points of contrast between tyranny in ancient Greece and

tyranny
in medi-
aeval Italy.

impossible, or that they saw that the days of citizen armies were over and that the mercenary troops which had taken their place needed a strong hand to rule them. Its rise was often a symptom of exhaustion and decline. This was less the case in ancient Greece. The rise of tyranny there did not commonly betoken a diminution of political ardour in the minds of the citizens or a disinclination for military service. Citizen armies did not fall into the background in ancient Greece as much as they did in mediaeval Italy. Tyranny was less dictated by circumstances and was more reluctantly endured. One indication of this may be found in the short duration of most dynasties of tyrants in ancient Greece, and the long continuance of many such dynasties in mediaeval Italy. The establishment of a tyranny in ancient Greece often meant no more than this, that some clever and unscrupulous soldier-demagogue had succeeded in using for his own aggrandizement a moment of disunion or of internal or external crisis.

ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Ζ' (Δ').

Ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμας ταῖς 1288 b 10
 μὴ κατὰ μόριον γινομέναις, ἀλλὰ περὶ γένος ἓν τι τελείαις
 οὖσαις, μιᾶς ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἀρμόττον,
 οἷον ἄσκησις σώματι ποῖα τε ποῖω συμφέροι καὶ τίς ἀρίστη
 (τῷ γὰρ κάλλιστα πεφυκῶτι καὶ κεχορηγημένῳ τὴν ἀρίστην
 ἀναγκαῖον ἀρμόττειν), καὶ τίς τοῖς πλείστοις μία πᾶσιν (καὶ 15
 2 γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς γυμναστικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν)· ἔτι δ' ἂν τις μὴ τῆς
 ἰκνουμένης ἐπιθυμῇ μὴθ' ἕξεως μὴτ' ἐπιστήμης τῶν περὶ τὴν
 ἀγωνίαν, †μηδὲν ἦττον τοῦ παιδοτρίβου καὶ τοῦ γυμναστικοῦ
 παρασκευάσαι τε καὶ ταύτην ἐστὶ τὴν δύναμιν†. ὁμοίως δὲ
 τοῦτο καὶ περὶ ἰατρικὴν καὶ περὶ ναυπηγίαν καὶ ἐσθῆτα καὶ 20
 3 περὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην τέχνην ὁρῶμεν συμβαῖνον. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι
 καὶ πολιτείαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης τὴν ἀρίστην θεωρῆσαι
 τίς ἐστὶ, καὶ ποῖα τις ἂν οὖσα μάλιστ' εἴη κατ' εὐχὴν, μηδε-
 νὸς ἐμποδίζοντος τῶν ἐκτός, καὶ τίς τίσιν ἀρμόττουσα· πολ-
 λοῖς γὰρ τῆς ἀρίστης τυχεῖν ἴσως ἀδύνατον, ὥστε τὴν κρατί- 25
 στην τε ἀπλῶς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην οὐ δεῖ
 λεληθῆναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικόν·
 4 ἔτι δὲ τρίτην τὴν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὴν δοθεῖσαν δύ-
 νασθαι θεωρεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε πῶς ἂν γένοιτο, καὶ γενομένη
 τίνα τρόπον ἂν σώζοιτο πλείστον χρόνον· λέγω δὲ οἷον εἴ τι 30
 πῶλε συμβέβηκε μῆτε τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτεύεσθαι πολιτείαν
 ἀχორήγητόν τε εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, μῆτε τὴν ἐνδε-
 5 χομένην ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, ἀλλὰ τίνα φαυλοτέραν. παρὰ
 πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τὴν μάλιστα πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀρμότ-

35 τουσαν δεῖ γνωρίζειν, ὥς οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀποφαινομένων περὶ
 πολιτείας, καὶ εἰ τᾶλλα λέγουσι καλῶς, τῶν γε χρησίμων
 διαμαρτάνουσιν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὴν ἀρίστην δεῖ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ 6
 καὶ τὴν δυνατὴν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ῥᾶν καὶ κοινοτέραν
 ἀπάσαις νῦν δ' οἱ μὲν τὴν ἀκροτάτην καὶ δεομένην πολ-
 40 λῆς χορηγίας ζητοῦσι μόνον, οἱ δὲ μᾶλλον κοινήν. τινα λέ-
 γοντες τὰς ὑπαρχούσας ἀναιροῦντες πολιτείας τὴν Λακωνικὴν
 1289 a ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἐπαινοῦσιν· χρὴ δὲ τοιαύτην εἰσηγεῖσθαι τάξιν 7
 ἣν ῥαδίως ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν καὶ πεισθῆσονται καὶ δινῆ-
 σονται κοινωνεῖν, ὥς ἔστιν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔργον τὸ ἐπανορθῶσαι
 πολιτείαν ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μετα-
 5 μανθάνειν τοῦ μανθάνειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς. διδὲ πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις
 καὶ ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις πολιτείαις δεῖ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν τὸν
 πολιτικόν, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον. τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον 8
 ἀγνοοῦντα πόσα πολιτείας ἐστὶν εἶδη. νῦν δὲ μίαν δημοκρα-
 τίαν οἶονταί τινες εἶναι καὶ μίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
 10 τοῦτ' ἀληθές. ὥστε δεῖ τὰς διαφορὰς μὴ λανθάνειν τὰς τῶν
 πολιτειῶν, πόσαι, καὶ συντίθενται ποσαχῶς. μετὰ δὲ τῆς 9
 αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ταύτης καὶ νόμους τοὺς ἀρίστους ἰδεῖν καὶ
 τοὺς ἐκάστη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀρμόττοντας· πρὸς γὰρ τὰς πολι-
 τείας τοὺς νόμους δεῖ τίθεσθαι καὶ τίθενται πάντες, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς
 15 πολιτείας πρὸς τοὺς νόμους. πολιτεία μὲν γάρ ἐστι τάξις ταῖς 10
 πόλεσιν ἢ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, τίνα τρόπον νενέμηνται, καὶ τί
 τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τί τὸ τέλος ἐκάστοις τῆς κοινω-
 νίας ἐστίν· νόμοι δὲ κεχωρισμένοι τῶν δηλούντων τὴν πολι-
 τείαν, καθ' οὓς δεῖ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἀρχειν καὶ φυλάττειν τοὺς
 20 παραβαίνοντας αὐτοὺς. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὰς διαφορὰς ἀναγ- 11
 καῖον καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχειν τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης καὶ πρὸς
 τὰς τῶν νόμων θέσεις· οὐ γὰρ οἶδον τε τοὺς αὐτοὺς νόμους συμ-
 φέρειν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐδὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις πάσαις,
 εἴπερ δὴ πλείους καὶ μὴ μία δημοκρατία μηδὲ ὀλιγαρχία
 25 μόνον ἐστίν.

2. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μεθόδῳ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν διει-

λόμεθα τρεῖς μὲν τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας, βασιλείαν ἀριστο-
 κρατίαν πολιτείαν, τρεῖς δὲ τὰς τούτων παρεκβάσεις, τυραν-
 νίδα μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας, δημοκρα-
 τίαν δὲ πολιτείας, καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας 30
 εἴρηται (τὸ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας θεωρῆσαι ταὐτὸ
 καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν τῶν ὀνομάτων· βούλεται γὰρ
 ἑκατέρω κατ' ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχωρηγημένην), ἔτι δὲ τί
 διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων ἀριστοκρατία καὶ βασιλεία, καὶ πότε
 δεῖ βασιλείαν νομίζειν, διώριστα πρότερον, λοιπὸν περὶ πο- 35
 λιτείας διελθεῖν τῆς τῷ κοινῷ προσαγορευομένης ὀνόματι,
 καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν, ὀλιγαρχίας τε καὶ δημο-
 2 κρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος. φανερὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τῶν
 παρεκβάσεων τῆς χειρίστη καὶ δευτέρα τίς. ἀνάγκη γὰρ
 τὴν μὲν τῆς πρώτης καὶ θειοτάτης παρέκβασιν εἶναι χειρί- 40
 στην· τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ τοῦνομα μόνον ἔχειν οὐκ
 οὔσαν, ἢ διὰ πολλὴν ὑπεροχὴν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ βασιλεύοντος· 1289 b
 ὥστε τὴν τυραννίδα χειρίστην οὔσαν πλείστον ἀπέχειν πολι-
 τείας, δευτερον δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν (ἡ γὰρ ἀριστοκρατία διέ-
 στηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας), μετριωτάτην δὲ
 3 τὴν δημοκρατίαν. ἤδη μὲν οὖν τις ἀπεφάνετο καὶ τῶν πρό- 5
 τερον οὕτως, οὐ μὴν εἰς ταὐτὸ βλέψας ἡμῖν. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ
 ἔκρινε πασῶν μὲν οὐσῶν ἐπιεικῶν, οἷον ὀλιγαρχίας τε χρη-
 στῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, χειρίστην δημοκρατίαν, φαύλων δὲ
 ἀρίστην· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅλως ταύτας ἐξημαρτημένας εἶναι φαμεν,
 καὶ βελτίω μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐ καλῶς ἔχει 10
 4 λέγειν, ἥττον δὲ φαύλην. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης κρί-
 σεως ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν· ἡμῖν δὲ πρῶτον μὲν διαιρετέον πόσαι
 διαφοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴπερ ἔστιν εἶδη πλείονα τῆς τε δη-
 μοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, ἔπειτα τίς κοινοτάτη καὶ
 τίς αἰρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, κὰν εἴ τις ἄλλη 15
 τετύχηκεν ἀριστοκρατικὴ καὶ συνεστῶσα καλῶς, ἀλλὰ ταῖς
 5 πλείσταῖς ἀρμόττουσα πόλεσι, τίς ἐστὶν ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλ-
 λων τίς τίσιν αἰρετὴ (τάχα γὰρ τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαῖα δημο-

κρατία μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχίας, τοῖς δ' αὕτη μᾶλλον ἐκείνης)·
 20 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τίνα τρόπον δεῖ καθιστάναι τὸν βουλόμενον
 ταύτας τὰς πολιτείας, λέγω δὲ δημοκρατίας τε καθ' ἕκα-
 στον εἶδος καὶ πάλιν ὀλιγαρχίας· τέλος δέ, πάντων τούτων 6
 ὅταν ποιησώμεθα συντόμως τὴν ἐνδεχομένην μνείαν, πειρα-
 τέον ἐπελθεῖν τίνες φθοραὶ καὶ τίνες σωτηρίαι τῶν πολιτειῶν
 25 καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστης, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας ταῦτα
 μάλιστα γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν.

3 Τοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶναι πλείους πολιτείας αἴτιον ὅτι πάσης ἐστὶ
 μέρη πλείω πόλεως τὸν ἀριθμὸν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐξ οἰκῶν
 συγκειμένας πάσας ὀρώμεν τὰς πόλεις, ἔπειτα πάλιν τούτου
 30 τοῦ πλήθους τοὺς μὲν εὐπόρους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς δ' ἀπόρους
 τοὺς δὲ μέσους, καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων τὸ μὲν
 ὀπλιτικὸν τὸ δὲ ἀνοπλον. καὶ τὸν μὲν γεωργικὸν δῆμον ὀρῶ 2
 μὲν ὄντα, τὸν δ' ἀγοραῖον, τὸν δὲ βάνανυσον. καὶ τῶν γνω-
 ρίμων εἰσὶ διαφοραὶ καὶ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ μεγέθη
 35 τῆς οὐσίας, οἷον ἵπποτροφίας (τούτο γὰρ οὐ ῥάδιον μὴ πλου-
 τούντας ποιεῖν· διόπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων ὅσαις πόλε- 3
 σιν ἐν τοῖς ἵπποις ἡ δύναμις ἦν, ὀλιγαρχαίαι παρὰ τούτοις
 ἦσαν· ἐχρῶντο δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους ἵπποις πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυ-
 γείτονας, οἷον Ἑρετριεῖς καὶ Χαλκιδεῖς καὶ Μάγνητες οἱ ἐπὶ
 40 Μαιάνδρῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολλοὶ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν)· ἔτι πρὸς 4
 ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον διαφοραῖς ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἡ δὲ
 1290 a κατ' ἀρετὴν, κἀν εἴ τι δὴ τοιοῦτον ἕτερον εἴρηται πόλεως εἶναι
 μέρος ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν· ἐκεῖ γὰρ διελλομεν
 ἐκ πόσων μερῶν ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ πᾶσα πόλις. τούτων γὰρ
 τῶν μερῶν ὅτε μὲν πάντα μετέχει τῆς πολιτείας, ὅτε δ'
 5 ἐλάττω, ὅτε δὲ πλείω. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείους ἀναγκαῖον 5
 εἶναι πολιτείας, εἶδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτ'
 εἶδει διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῶν αὐτῶν. πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἡ
 τῶν ἀρχῶν τάξις ἐστί, ταύτην δὲ διανέμονται πάντες ἡ κατὰ
 τὴν δύναμιν τῶν μετεχόντων ἡ κατὰ τιν' αὐτῶν ἰσότητα
 10 κοινὴν (λέγω δ' οἷον τῶν ἀπόρων ἢ τῶν εὐπόρων), ἡ κοινὴν

6 τιν' ἀμφοῖν. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα πολιτείας εἶναι τοσαύτας ὅσαι
 περ τάξεις κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχάς εἰσι καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφο-
 ρὰς τῶν μορίων. μάλιστα δὲ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι δύο, καθάπερ
 ἐπὶ τῶν πνευμάτων λέγεται τὰ μὲν βόρεια τὰ δὲ νότια, τὰ
 8 ὅ' ἄλλα τούτων παρεκβάσεις, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν δύο, 15
 7 δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. τὴν γὰρ ἀριστοκρατίαν τῆς ὀλιγαρ-
 χίας εἶδος τιθέασιν ὥς οὖσαν ὀλιγαρχίαν τινά, καὶ τὴν κα-
 λουμένην πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πνεύμασι
 τὸν μὲν ζέφυρον τοῦ βορέου, τοῦ δὲ νότου τὸν εὖρον. ὁμοίως
 8' ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἁρμονίας, ὥς φασί τινες· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ 20
 τίθενται εἶδη δύο, τὴν ὁριστὶ καὶ φρυγιστί, τὰ δ' ἄλλα
 8 συντάγματα τὰ μὲν Δώρια τὰ δὲ Φρύγια καλοῦσιν. μά-
 λιστα μὲν οὖν εἰώθασιν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνειν περὶ τῶν πολι-
 τειῶν· ἀληθέστερον δὲ καὶ βέλτιον ὥς ἡμεῖς διείλομεν, δυοῖν
 ἢ μιᾶς οὐσης τῆς καλῶς συνεστηκυίας τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι 25
 παρεκβάσεις, τὰς μὲν τῆς εὐ κεκραμένης ἁρμονίας, τὰς δὲ
 τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, ὀλιγαρχικὰς μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας
 καὶ δεσποτικωτέρας, τὰς δ' ἀνειμένας καὶ μαλακὰς δημο-
 τικὰς.

Οὐ δεῖ δὲ τιθέναι δημοκρατίαν, καθάπερ εἰώθασί τινες 4
 νῦν, ἀπλῶς οὕτως, ὅπου κύριον τὸ πλῆθος (καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς
 ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ πλεόν μέρος κύριον), οὐδ' ὀλι-
 2 γαρχίαν, ὅπου κύριοι ὀλίγοι τῆς πολιτείας. εἰ γὰρ εἶησαν
 οἱ πάντες χίλιοι καὶ τριακόσιοι, καὶ τούτων οἱ χίλιοι πλού-
 σιοι, καὶ μὴ μεταδιδοῖεν ἀρχῆς τοῖς τριακοσίοις καὶ πένησιν 35
 ἐλευθέρους οὖσι καὶ τὰλλα ὁμοίοις, οὐδεῖς ἂν φαίη δημοκρα-
 3 τεῖσθαι τούτους· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ πένητες μὲν ὀλίγοι εἶεν,
 κρεῖττους δὲ τῶν εὐπόρων πλειόνων ὄντων, οὐδεῖς ἂν ὀλιγαρ-
 χίαν προσαγορεύσειεν οὐδὲ τὴν τοιαύτην, εἰ τοῖς ἄλλοις οὖσι
 πλουσίοις μὴ μετείη τῶν τιμῶν. μᾶλλον τοίνυν λεκτέον ὅτι 40
 δῆμος μὲν ἐστίν ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι κύριοι ᾖσιν, ὀλιγαρχία 1290 b
 4 δ' ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι· ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς εἶναι
 τοὺς δ' ὀλίγους· ἐλεύθεροι μὲν γὰρ πολλοί, πλούσιοι δ' ὀλίγοι.

καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἰ κατὰ μέγεθος διενέμοντο τὰς ἀρχάς, ὥσπερ
 5 ἐν Αἰθιοπία φασί τινες, ἢ κατὰ κάλλος, ὀλιγαρχία ἦν ἂν·
 ὀλίγον γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ τῶν καλῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν με-
 γάλων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τούτοις μόνον ἱκανῶς ἔχει διωρίσθαι 5
 τὰς πολιτείας ταύτας· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πλείονα μόρια καὶ τοῦ
 δήμου καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας εἰσὶν, ἔτι διαληπτέον ὥς οὗτ' ἂν οἱ
 10 ἐλεύθεροι ὀλίγοι ὄντες πλείονων καὶ μὴ ἐλευθέρων ἀρχωσι,
 δῆμος, οἷον ἐν Ἀπολλωνίᾳ τῇ ἐν τῷ Ἴονίῳ καὶ ἐν Θήρᾳ (ἐν
 τούτων γὰρ ἑκατέρᾳ τῶν πόλεων ἐν ταῖς τιμαῖς ἦσαν οἱ
 διαφέροντες κατ' εὐγένειαν καὶ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς
 ἀποικίας, ὀλίγοι ὄντες πολλῶν), οὔτε ἂν οἱ πλούσιοι διὰ τὸ
 15 κατὰ πλῆθος ὑπερέχειν, ὀλιγαρχία, οἷον ἐν Κολοφῶνι τὸ πα-
 λαιόν (ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἐκέκτηντο μακρὰν οὐσίαν οἱ πλείους πρὶν
 γενέσθαι τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λυδούς), ἀλλ' ἔστι δημοκρα- 6
 τία μὲν ὅταν οἱ ἐλεύθεροι καὶ ἄποροι πλείους ὄντες κύριοι
 τῆς ἀρχῆς ᾧσιν, ὀλιγαρχία δ' ὅταν οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ εὐγενέ-
 20 στεροι ὀλίγοι ὄντες.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίαν, εἴρη- 7
 ται· διότι δὲ πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τί,
 λέγωμεν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρότερον. ὁμολο-
 γοῦμεν γὰρ οὐχ ἐν μέρος ἀλλὰ πλείω πᾶσαν ἔχειν πόλιν.
 25 ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ζῶον προηρούμεθα λαβεῖν εἶδη, πρῶτον μὲν ἂν 8
 ἀποδιωρίζομεν ὅπερ ἀναγκαῖον πᾶν ἔχειν ζῶον, ὅσον ἐνιά τε
 τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τὸ τῆς τροφῆς ἐργαστικὸν καὶ δεκτικόν,
 οἷον στόμα καὶ κοιλίαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οἷς κινεῖται μορίοις
 ἕκαστον αὐτῶν· εἰ δὴ τοσαῦτα [εἶδη] μόνον, τούτων δ' εἷεν
 30 διαφοραί, λέγω δ' οἷον στόματός τινα πλείω γένη καὶ κοι-
 λίας καὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν κινητικῶν μορίων,
 ὃ τῆς συζεύξεως τῆς τούτων ἀριθμὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ποιήσῃ
 πλείω γένη ζῶων (οὐ γὰρ οἷον τε ταῦτ' οὖν ζῶον ἔχειν πλείους
 στόματος διαφοράς, ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ' ὥτων), ὥσθ' ὅταν λη-
 35 φθῶσι τούτων πάντες οἱ ἐνδεχόμενοι συνδυασμοί, ποιήσουσιν
 εἶδη ζῶου, καὶ τοσαῦτ' εἶδη τοῦ ζῶου ὅσαιπερ αἱ συζεύξεις

9 τῶν ἀναγκαίων μορίων εἰσίν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τῶν
 εἰρημένων πολιτειῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ πόλεις οὐκ ἐξ ἑνὸς ἀλλ'
 ἐκ πολλῶν σύγκεινται μερῶν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις. ἐν
 μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφήν πλῆθος, οἱ καλούμενοι γεωρ- 40
 γοί, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καλούμενον βάναισον (ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ 1291 a
 τὰς τέχνας ὧν ἄνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι· τούτων δὲ
 τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὰς δὲ εἰς
 10 τρυφήν ἢ τὸ καλῶς ζῆν), τρίτον δ' ἀγοραῖον (λέγω δ' ἀγο-
 ραῖον τὸ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ὥνας καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας καὶ 5
 καπηλείας διατρίβον), τέταρτον δὲ τὸ θητικόν, πέμπτον δὲ
 γένος τὸ προπολεμήσον, ὃ τούτων οὐδὲν ἡττόν ἐστιν ἀναγκαῖον
 11 ὑπάρχειν, εἰ μέλλουσι μὴ δουλεύσειν τοῖς ἐπιοῦσιν. μὴ γὰρ ἐν
 τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἢ πόλιν ἄξιον εἶναι καλεῖν τὴν φύσει δουλῆν·
 αὐτάρκης γὰρ ἡ πόλις, τὸ δὲ δοῦλον οὐκ αὐταρκες. διόπερ 10
 12 ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κομψῶς τοῦτο, οὐχ ἱκανῶς δὲ εἴρηται. φησὶ
 γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐκ τεττάρων τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων πόλιν
 συγκεῖσθαι, λέγει δὲ τούτους ὑφάντην καὶ γεωργὸν καὶ σκυ-
 τοτόμον καὶ οἰκοδόμον· πάλιν δὲ προστίθῃσιν, ὥς οὐχ αὐτάρ-
 κων τούτων, χαλκέα καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις βοσκήμα- 15
 σιν, ἔτι δ' ἐμπορόν τε καὶ κάπηλον· καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γί-
 νεται πλήρωμα τῆς πρώτης πόλεως, ὥς τῶν ἀναγκαίων τε
 χάριν πᾶσαν πόλιν συνεστηκυῖαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ μᾶλλον,
 13 ἴσον τε δεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν. τὸ δὲ προπολε-
 μούν οὐ πρότερον ἀποδίδωσι μέρος πρὶν ἢ τῆς χώρας αὐξο- 20
 μένης καὶ τῆς τῶν πλησίων ἀπτομένης εἰς πόλεμον κατα-
 στῶσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τέτταρσι καὶ τοῖς ὅποσοῖσιν
 κοινωνοῖς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τινα τὸν ἀποδώσοντα καὶ κρινούντα
 14 τὸ δίκαιον. εἴπερ οὖν καὶ ψυχὴν ἂν τις θεΐη ζῶον μῦριον
 μᾶλλον ἢ σῶμα, καὶ πόλεων τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον θετέον 25
 τῶν εἰς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν συντεινόντων, τὸ πολεμικὸν
 καὶ τὸ μετέχον δικαιοσύνης δικαστικῆς, πρὸς δὲ ταῦτοις τὸ
 15 βούλευόμενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ συνέσεως πολιτικῆς ἔργον. καὶ ταῦτ'
 εἴτε κεχωρισμένως ὑπάρχει τισὶν εἴτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲν δια-

30 φέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον καὶ γὰρ ὀπλιτεύειν καὶ γεωργεῖν
 συμβαίνει τοῖς αὐτοῖς πολλάκις· ὥστε εἶπερ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ
 ἐκεῖνα θετέα μόρια τῆς πόλεως, φανερόν ἐστι τό γε ὀπλιτι-
 κὸν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι μόριον τῆς πόλεως. ἔβδομον δὲ τὸ ταῖς
 οὐσίαις λειτουργοῦν, ὃ καλοῦμεν εὐπόρους. ὀγδοὺν δὲ τὸ δημιουρ- 16
 35 γικὸν καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς λειτουργοῦν, εἶπερ ἀνευ ἀρχόν-
 των ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν εἶναι τινὰς τοὺς
 δυναμένους ἀρχειν καὶ λειτουργοῦντας ἢ συνεχῶς ἢ κατὰ
 μέρος τῇ πόλει ταύτην τὴν λειτουργίαν. λοιπὰ δὲ περὶ ὧν 17
 τυγχάνομεν διωρικότες ἀρτίως, τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ κρίνον
 40 περὶ τῶν δικαίων τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν. εἶπερ οὖν ταῦτα δεῖ
 γενέσθαι ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ καλῶς γενέσθαι καὶ δικαίως,
 1291 b ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μετέχοντας εἶναι τινὰς ἀρετῆς τῶν πολιτι-
 κῶν. τὰς μὲν οὖν ἄλλας δυνάμεις τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν 18
 ἐνδέχασθαι δοκεῖ πολλοῖς, οἷον τοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς προπολε-
 μούντας καὶ γεωργοῦντας καὶ τεχνίτας, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς βουλευο-
 5 μένους τε καὶ κρίνοντας· ἀντιποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς
 πάντες, καὶ τὰς πλείστας ἀρχὰς ἀρχειν οἴονται δύνασθαι·
 ἀλλὰ πένεσθαι καὶ πλουτεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀδύνατον. διὰ ταῦτα 19
 μέρη μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ πόλεως, οἱ εὐποροὶ καὶ οἱ ἄποροι.
 ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ
 10 πολλούς, ταῦτα ἐναντία μέρη φαίνεται τῶν τῆς πόλεως
 μορίων. ὥστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τούτων
 καθιστάσι, καὶ δύο πολιτεῖαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, δημοκρατία καὶ
 ὀλιγαρχία.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνες 20
 15 αἰτίας, εἶρηται πρότερον· ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ καὶ δημοκρατίας εἶδη
 πλείω καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας, λέγωμεν. φανερόν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ
 τῶν εἰρημένων. εἶδη γὰρ πλείω τοῦ τε δήμου καὶ τῶν λεγο- 21
 μένων γνωρίμων ἐστίν, οἷον δήμου μὲν εἶδη ἔν μὲν οἱ γεωργοί,
 ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἀγοραῖον τὸ περὶ
 20 ὦνῃν καὶ πρᾶσιν διατρίβον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, καὶ
 τούτου τὸ μὲν πολεμικόν, τὸ δὲ χρηματιστικόν, τὸ δὲ πορ-

θμευτικὸν, τὸ δ' ἀλιευτικὸν (πολλαχοῦ γὰρ ἕκαστα τούτων
 πολύοχλα, οἷον ἀλιεῖς μὲν ἐν Τάραντι καὶ Βυζαντίῳ, τριη-
 ρικὸν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν, ἐμπορικὸν δὲ ἐν Δίγινι καὶ Χίῳ, πορ-
 θμευτικὸν ἐν Τενέδῳ), πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ χειρνητικὸν καὶ τὸ 25
 μικρὰν ἔχον οὐσίαν ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι σχολάζειν, ἔτι τὸ
 μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον, κὰν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον
 22 ἕτερον πλήθους εἶδος· τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια,
 ἀρετή, παιδεία, καὶ τὰ τούτοις λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν
 διαφοράν. δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πρώτη μὲν ἡ λεγομένη 30
 μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον. ἴσον γάρ φησιν ὁ νόμος ὁ τῆς
 τοιαύτης δημοκρατίας τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν τοὺς
 ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μηδὲ κυρίους εἶναι ὅποτερουσούν, ἀλλ'
 23 ὁμοίους ἀμφοτέρους. εἴπερ γὰρ ἐλευθερία μάλιστα ἐστὶν ἐν δη-
 μοκρατίᾳ, καθάπερ ὑπολαμβάνουσί τινες, καὶ ἰσότης, οὕτως 35
 ἀν εἴη μάλιστα, κοινωνούντων ἀπάντων μάλιστα τῆς πολι-
 τείας ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείων ὁ δῆμος, κύριον δὲ τὸ δόξαν
 24 τοῖς πλείοσιν, ἀνάγκη δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ταύτην. ἐν μὲν οὖν
 εἶδος δημοκρατίας τοῦτο, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τιμη-
 μάτων εἶναι, βραχέων δὲ τούτων ὄντων, δεῖ δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ 40
 ἐξουσίαν εἶναι μετέχειν, καὶ τὸν ἀποβάλλοντα μὴ μετέχειν
 ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν ἅπαντας τοὺς πολίτας 1292 a
 25 ὅσοι ἀνυπεύθυνοι, ἀρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δη-
 μοκρατίας τὸ πᾶσι μετεῖναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐὰν μόνον ἢ πολί-
 της, ἀρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον· ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τᾶλλα
 μὲν εἶναι ταῦτά, κύριον δ' εἶναι τὸ πλήθος καὶ μὴ τὸν νό- 5
 μον· τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἢ ἀλλὰ
 26 μὴ ὁ νόμος. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς. ἐν
 μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημοκρατουμέναις οὐ γίνεται δη-
 μαγωγός, ἀλλ' οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσὶν ἐν προεδρίᾳ·
 οὗτοι δ' οἱ νόμοι μὴ εἰσι κύριοι, ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγω- 10
 γοί. μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἰς ἐκ πολ-
 λῶν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοί εἰσιν οὐχ ὥς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάν-
 27 τες. Ὁμηρος δὲ ποίαν λέγει οὐκ ἀγαθὴν εἶναι πολυκοιρανίην,

πότερον ταύτην ἢ ὅταν πλείους ὦσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες ὡς ἕκαστος,
 15 ἀδελον. ὁ δ' οὖν τοιοῦτος δῆμος, ἅτε μόναρχος ὢν, ζητεῖ μοναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμου, καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός, ὥστε οἱ κόλακες ἔντιμοι· καὶ ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος δῆμος ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχιῶν τῇ τυραννίδι. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἦθος τὸ 28 αὐτό, καὶ ἄμφω δεσποτικὰ τῶν βελτιόνων, καὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὰ ἐπιτάγματα, καὶ ὁ δημαγωγὸς καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον. καὶ μάλιστα δ' ἑκάτεροι (παρ') ἑκατέροις ἰσχύουσιν, οἱ μὲν κόλακες παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις, οἱ δὲ δημαγωγοὶ τοῖς δῆμοις τοῖς τοιούτοις. αἵτιοι 29 δὲ εἰσι τοῦ εἶναι τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς νόμους οὗτοι, πάντα ἀνάγοντες εἰς τὸν δῆμον· συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτοῖς γίνεσθαι μεγάλοις διὰ τὸ τὸν μὲν δῆμον πάντων εἶναι κύριον, τῆς δὲ τοῦ δῆμου δόξης τούτους· πείθεται γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος τούτοις. ἔτι δ' οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸν δῆμόν φασι 30 δεῖν κρίνειν, ὁ δὲ ἀσμένως δέχεται τὴν πρόκλησιν ὥστε καταλύνονται πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαί. εὐλόγως δὲ ἂν δόξειεν ἐπιτιμᾶν ὁ φάσκων τὴν τοιαύτην εἶναι δημοκρατίαν οὐ πολιτείαν· ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἀρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία. δεῖ γὰρ τὸν 31 μὲν νόμον ἀρχεῖν πάντων, τῶν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν κρίνειν. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐστὶ δημοκρατία μία 35 τῶν πολιτειῶν, φανερόν ὡς ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις, ἐν ᾗ ψηφίσμασι πάντα διοικεῖται, οὐδὲ δημοκρατία κυρίως· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψήφισμα εἶναι καθόλου. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατίας εἶδη διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον·

5 Ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ εἶδη, ἐν μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι 40 τὰς ἀρχὰς τηλικούτων ὥστε τοὺς ἀπόρους μὴ μετέχειν πλείους ὄντας, ἐξεῖναι δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας· ἄλλο 1292 b δέ, ὅταν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μακρῶν ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἰρῶνται αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας (ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ πάντων τούτων τοῦτο ποιῶσι, δοκεῖ τοῦτ' εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατικόν, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων, ὀλιγαρχικόν)· ἕτερον εἶδος ὀλιγα- 2 5 χίας, ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσῇ· τέταρτον δ', ὅταν

ὑπάρχῃ τό τε νῦν λεχθὲν καὶ ἀρχῇ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλ' οἱ ἀρχοντες. καὶ ἔστιν ἀντίστροφος αὕτη ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὥσπερ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις καὶ περὶ τῆς τελευταίας εἰπομεν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις· καὶ καλοῦσι δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν δυναστείαν. 10

3 Ὀλιγαρχίας μὲν οὖν εἶδη τοσαῦτα καὶ δημοκρατίας· οὐ δεῖ δὲ λανθάνειν ὅτι πολλαχοῦ συμβέβηκεν ὥστε τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους μὴ δημοτικὴν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἔθος καὶ τὴν ἀγωγὴν πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικῶς, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν παρ' ἄλλοις τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι πολι- 15 τείαν δημοτικωτέραν, τῇ δ' ἀγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι μᾶλλον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο μάλιστα μετὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν· οὐ γὰρ εὐθὺς μεταβαίνουνσιν, ἀλλὰ ἀγαπῶσι τὰ πρῶτα μικρὰ πλεονεκτοῦντες παρ' ἀλλήλων, ὥσθ' οἱ μὲν νόμοι διαμένουσιν οἱ προϋπάρχοντες, κρα- 20 τοῦσι δ' οἱ μεταβάλλοντες τὴν πολιτείαν.

Ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ τοσαῦτα εἶδη δημοκρατίας καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν ἐστιν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ πάντα τὰ εἰρημένα μέρη τοῦ δήμου κοινωνεῖν τῆς πολιτείας, 2 ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ δὲ μὴ. ὅταν μὲν οὖν τὸ γεωργικὸν καὶ τὸ κε- 25 κτημένον μετρίαν οὐσίαν κύριον ᾖ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύονται κατὰ νόμους· ἔχουσι γὰρ ἐργαζόμενοι ζῆν, οὐ δύνανται δὲ σχολάζειν, ὥστε τὸν νόμον ἐπιστήσαντες ἐκκλησιάζουσι τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκκλησίας· τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις μετέχειν ἔξεστιν, ὅταν 3 κτήσωνται τὸ τίμημα τὸ διωρισμένον ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. ὅλως 30 μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ὀλιγαρχικόν, τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐξεῖναι (πᾶσι δημοκρατικόν)· διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτησαμένοις ἔξεστι μετέχειν· σχολάζειν (δ') ἀδύνατον μὴ προσόδων οὐσῶν. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν εἶδος ἐν δημοκρατίας διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος διὰ τὴν ἐχομένην διαίρεσιν, ἔστι γὰρ καὶ πᾶσιν ἐξεῖναι 35 τοῖς ἀνυπευθύνοις κατὰ τὸ γένος, μετέχειν μέντοι δυναμένους 4 σχολάζειν. διόπερ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ δημοκρατίᾳ οἱ νόμοι ἀρχοῦσι, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι πρόσδοον· τρίτον δ' εἶδος τὸ πᾶσιν ἐξεῖναι,

ὅσοι ἂν ἐλεύθεροι ᾖσι, μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας, μὴ μέντοι
 40 μετέχειν διὰ τὴν προειρημένην αἰτίαν, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ
 ἐν ταύτῃ ἄρχειν τὸν νόμον· τέταρτον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας 5
 1293 a ἡ τελευταία τοῖς χρόνοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γεγενημένη. διὰ
 γὰρ τὸ μείζους γεγονέναι πολὺ τὰς πόλεις τῶν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς
 καὶ προσδῶν ὑπάρχειν εὐπορίας, μετέχουσι μὲν πάντες τῆς
 πολιτείας διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλήθους, κοινωνοῦσι δὲ καὶ
 5 πολιτεύονται διὰ τὸ δύνασθαι σχολάζειν καὶ τοὺς ἀπόρους
 λαμβάνοντας μισθόν. καὶ μάλιστα δὲ σχολάζει τὸ τοιοῦτον 6
 πλήθος· οὐ γὰρ ἐμποδίζει αὐτοὺς οὐδὲν ἢ τῶν ἰδίων ἐπιμέ-
 λεια, τοὺς δὲ πλουσίους ἐμποδίζει, ὥστε πολλάκις οὐ κοινωνοῦσι
 τῆς ἐκκλησίας οὔτε τοῦ δικάζειν. διὸ γίνεται τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων
 10 πλήθος κύριον τῆς πολιτείας, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ νόμοι. τὰ μὲν οὖν 7
 τῆς δημοκρατίας εἶδη τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταύτας τὰς
 ἀνάγκας ἐστίν· τὰ δὲ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, ὅταν μὲν πλείους
 ἔχωσιν οὐσίαν, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ μὴ πολλὴν λίαν, τὸ τῆς
 πρώτης ὀλιγαρχίας εἶδος ἐστίν· ποιοῦσι γὰρ ἐξουσίαν μετέχειν
 15 τῷ κτωμένῳ, καὶ διὰ τὸ πλήθος εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ 8
 πολιτεύματος ἀνάγκη μὴ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ τὸν νόμον
 εἶναι κύριον· ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλείον ἀπέχωσι τῆς μοναρχίας,
 καὶ μήτε τοσαύτην ἔχωσιν οὐσίαν ὥστε σχολάζειν ἀμελοῦν-
 τες, μήθ' οὕτως ὀλίγην ὥστε τρέφεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως,
 20 ἀνάγκη τὸν νόμον ἀξιοῦν αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτούς.
 ἐὰν δὲ δὴ ἐλάττους ᾖσιν οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες ἢ οἱ τὸ πρό- 9
 τερον, πλείω δέ, τὸ τῆς δευτέρας ὀλιγαρχίας γίνεται εἶδος,
 μᾶλλον γὰρ ἰσχύοντες πλεονεκτεῖν ἀξιοῦσιν· διὸ αὐτοὶ μὲν
 αἰροῦνται ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα βαδίζοντας,
 25 διὰ δὲ τὸ μήπω οὕτως ἰσχυροὶ εἶναι ὥστ' ἀνευ νόμου ἄρχειν,
 τὸν νόμον τίθενται τοιοῦτον. ἐὰν δ' ἐπιτείνωσι τῷ ἐλάττονες 10
 ὄντες μείζονας οὐσίας ἔχειν, ἡ τρίτη ἐπίδοσις γίνεται τῆς
 ὀλιγαρχίας, τὸ δὲ αὐτῶν μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔχειν, κατὰ νό-
 μον δὲ τὸν κελεύοντα τῶν τελευτώντων διαδέχεσθαι τοὺς
 30 υἱεῖς. ὅταν δὲ ἤδη πολὺ ὑπερτείνωσι ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς 11

πολυφιλίαις, ἐγγὺς ἡ τοιαύτη δυναστεία μοναρχίας ἐστίν, καὶ κύριοι γίνονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ νόμος· καὶ τὸ τέταρτον εἶδος τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ἀντίστροφον τῇ τελευταίῳ τῆς δημοκρατίας.

Ἔτι δ' εἰσὶ δύο πολιτεῖαι παρὰ δημοκρατίαν τε καὶ 7 ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν λέγουσιν τε πάντες καὶ εἰρη-
ται τῶν τεττάρων πολιτειῶν εἶδος ἓν· λέγουσι δὲ τέτταρας
μοναρχίαν, ὀλιγαρχίαν, δημοκρατίαν, τέταρτον δὲ τὴν κα-
λουμένην ἀριστοκρατίαν· πέμπτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ προσαγορεύεται
τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν (πολιτεῖαν γὰρ καλοῦσιν), ἀλλὰ διὰ 40
τὸ μὴ πολλάκις γίνεσθαι λανθάνει τοὺς πειρωμένους ἀριθμεῖν
τὰ τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶδη, καὶ χρῶνται ταῖς τέτταρσι μόνον,
2 ὥσπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις. ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν 1293 b
καλῶς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ἧς διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λό-
γοις (τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτεῖαν,
καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, μόνην δίκαιον
προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν· ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ὁ αὐτὸς 5
ἀνὴρ καὶ πολίτης ἀγαθὸς ἐστίν, οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀγα-
3 θοὶ πρὸς τὴν πολιτεῖαν εἰσὶ τὴν αὐτῶν)· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰσὶ
τινες αἱ πρὸς τε τὰς ὀλιγαρχουμένας ἔχουσι διαφοράς, καὶ
καλοῦνται ἀριστοκραταί, καὶ πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην πολιτεῖαν,
ὅπου γε μὴ μόνον πλουτίνδην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀριστίνδην αἰροῦνται 10
τὰς ἀρχάς. αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία διαφέρει τε ἀμφοῖν καὶ ἀρι-
4 στοκρατικῇ καλεῖται· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιουμέναις κοινὴν
ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς εἰσὶν ὅμως τινὲς οἱ εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ δο-
κοῦντες εἶναι ἐπιεικεῖς. ὅπου οὖν ἡ πολιτεία βλέπει εἰς τε
πλοῦτον καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ δῆμον, οἷον ἐν Κερκυραίωνι, αὕτη ἀρι- 15
στοκρατικὴ ἐστίν, καὶ ἐν αἷς εἰς τὰ δύο μόνον, οἷον ἡ Λακε-
δαιμονίων, εἰς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ δῆμον, καὶ ἔστι μίξις τῶν δύο
5 τούτων, δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς. ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν οὖν
παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτεῖαν ταῦτα δύο εἶδη·
καὶ τρίτον ὅσαι τῆς καλουμένης πολιτείας ῥέπουσι πρὸς τὴν 20
ὀλιγαρχίαν μᾶλλον·

8 Δοκῶν δ' ἐστὶν ἡμῖν περὶ τε τῆς ὀνομαζομένης πολιτείας
 εἰπεῖν καὶ περὶ τυραννίδος· ἐτάξαμεν δ' οὕτως οὐκ οὖσαν οὔτε
 ταύτην παρέκβασιν οὔτε τὰς ἀρτί ρηθείσας ἀριστοκρατίας, ὅτι
 25 τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς πᾶσαι διημαρτήκασι τῆς ὀρθοτάτης πολι-
 τείας, ἔπειτα καταριθμοῦνται μετὰ τούτων, εἰσὶ τ' αὐτῶν
 αὐταὶ παρεκβάσεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχὴν εἶπομεν. τε- 2
 λευταῖον δὲ περὶ τυραννίδος εὐλογὸν ἐστὶ ποιήσασθαι μνείαν
 διὰ τὸ πᾶσων ἥκιστα ταύτην εἶναι πολιτείαν, ἡμῖν δὲ τὴν
 30 μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας. δι' ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν τέτακται
 τὸν τρόπον τούτον, εἴρηται· νῦν δὲ δεικτέον ἡμῖν περὶ πολι-
 τείας. φανερωτέρα γὰρ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς διωρισμένων τῶν
 περὶ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ὥς 3
 ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν μίξις ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας, εἰώθασι
 35 δὲ καλεῖν τὰς μὲν ἀποκλινοῦσας ὥς πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν
 πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρα-
 τίας διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν παιδείαν καὶ εὐγένειαν τοῖς
 εὐπορωτέροις. ἔτι δὲ δοκοῦσιν ἔχειν οἱ εὐποροὶ ὧν ἕκεν οἱ 4
 ἀδικοῦντες ἀδικοῦσιν· ὅθεν καὶ καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς καὶ γνωρίμους
 40 τούτους προσεγορεύουσιν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ ἀριστοκρατία βούλεται
 τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἀπονέμειν τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τὰς
 ὀλιγαρχίας εἶναι φασιν ἐκ τῶν καλῶν κάγαθων μᾶλλον. δο- 5
 1294 α καὶ δ' εἶναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ ἀριστοκρα-
 τουμένην πάλιν ἀλλὰ πονηροκρατουμένην, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀρι-
 στοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ εὐνομουμένην. οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ εὐνομία τὸ εὖ
 κείσθαι τοὺς νόμους, μὴ πείθεσθαι δέ. διὸ μίαν μὲν εὐνομίαν 6
 5 ὑποληπτέον εἶναι τὸ πείθεσθαι ταῖς κειμένοις νόμοις, ἑτέραν
 δὲ τὸ καλῶς κείσθαι τοὺς νόμους οἷς ἐρμηνεύουσιν (ἐστὶ γὰρ πεί-
 θεσθαι καὶ κακῶς κειμένους). τοῦτο δὲ ἐνδέχεται διχῶς· ἢ
 γὰρ τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν ἐνδεχομένων αὐτοῖς, ἢ τοῖς ἀπλῶς
 ἀρίστοις. δοκεῖ δὲ ἀριστοκρατία μὲν εἶναι μέλιστα τὸ τὰς 7
 10 τιμὰς νεμεῖσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν· ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ ὅρος
 ἀρετῆ, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, δήμου δ' ἐλευθερία· τὸ δ' ὅ τι
 ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσιν, ἐν πάσαις ὑπέρχει· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀλι-

γαρχία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατία καὶ ἐν δήμοις, ὅτι ἂν δόξη τῷ
 πλείονι μέρει τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς πολιτείας, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ κύριον.
 8 ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος κα- 15
 λείται (μόνον γὰρ ἢ μίξις στοχάζεται τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ
 τῶν ἀπόρων, πλούτου καὶ ἐλευθερίας· σχεδὸν γὰρ παρὰ τοῖς
 πλείστοις οἱ εὐποροὶ τῶν καλῶν κάγαθων δοκοῦσι κατέχειν
 9 χώραν)· ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἐστὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητοῦντα τῆς ἰσότητος
 τῆς πολιτείας, ἐλευθερία πλούτος ἀρετή (τὸ γὰρ τέταρτον, ὃ 20
 καλοῦσιν εὐγένειαν, ἀκολουθεῖ τοῖς δυσίν· ἡ γὰρ εὐγένεια ἐστὶν
 ἀρχαῖος πλούτος καὶ ἀρετή), φανερόν ὅτι τὴν μὲν τοῖν δυοῖν
 μίξιν, τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πολιτείαν λεκτέον, τὴν
 δὲ τῶν τριῶν ἀριστοκρατίαν μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων παρὰ τὴν
 10 ἀληθινὴν καὶ πρώτην. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἕτερα πολιτείας 25
 εἶδη παρὰ μοναρχίαν τε καὶ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν,
 εἴρηται, καὶ ποῖα ταῦτα, καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων αἱ τ'
 ἀριστοκραταὶ καὶ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας, καὶ ὅτι οὐ
 πόρρω αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων, φανερόν·

Τίνα δὲ τρόπον γίνεται παρὰ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλι- 30
 γαρχίαν ἡ καλουμένη πολιτεία, καὶ πῶς αὐτὴν δεῖ καθιστά-
 ναι, λέγωμεν ἐφεξῆς τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἅμα δὲ δῆλον ἔσται
 καὶ οἷς ὀρίζονται τὴν δημοκρατίαν καὶ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν· λη-
 πτέον γὰρ τὴν τούτων διαίρεσιν, εἴτα ἐκ τούτων ἀφ' ἐκατέρας
 2 ὥσπερ σύμβολον λαμβάνοντας συνθετέον. εἰσὶ δὲ ὅροι τρεῖς 35
 τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ μίξεως. ἡ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρα ληπτέον ἃ
 ἐκάτεραι νομοθετοῦσιν, οἷον περὶ τοῦ δικάζειν· ἐν μὲν γὰρ
 ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τοῖς εὐπόροις ζημίαν τάττουσιν, ἂν μὴ δι-
 κάζωσι, τοῖς δ' ἀπόροις οὐδένα μισθόν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρα-
 τίαις τοῖς μὲν ἀπόροις μισθόν, τοῖς δ' εὐπόροις οὐδεμίαν ζη- 40
 3 μίαν· κοινὸν δὲ καὶ μέσον τούτων ἀμφοτέρα ταῦτα· διὸ καὶ
 πολιτικόν, μέμικται γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. εἰς μὲν οὖν οὗτος τοῦ 1294 b
 συνδυασμοῦ τρόπος, ἕτερος δὲ τὸ μέσον λαμβάνειν ὧν ἐκά-
 τεροὶ τάττουσιν, οἷον ἐκκλησιάζειν οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τιμῆματος
 οὐδενὸς ἢ μικροῦ πάμπαν, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ μακροῦ τιμῆματος· κοι-

5 νὸν δέ γε οὐδέτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέσον ἐκατέρου τιμήματος τού-
 των. τρίτον δ' ἐκ δυοῖν ταγματίων, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ὀλιγαρχ- 4
 χικοῦ νόμου, τὰ δ' ἐκ τοῦ δημοκρατικοῦ. λέγω δ' οἷον δοκεῖ
 δημοκρατικὸν μὲν εἶναι κληρωτὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, τὸ
 δ' αἰρετὰς ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ δημοκρατικὸν μὲν τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ
 10 τιμήματος, ὀλιγαρχικὸν δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τιμήματος· ἀριστοκρα- 5
 τικὸν τοίνυν καὶ πολιτικὸν τὸ ἐξ ἐκατέρας ἐκάτερον λαβεῖν,
 ἐκ μὲν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τὸ αἰρετὰς ποιεῖν τὰς ἀρχάς, ἐκ δὲ
 τῆς δημοκρατίας τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τιμήματος. ὁ μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς 6
 μίξεως οὗτος, τοῦ δ' εὖ μεμῖχθαι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν
 15 ὅρος, ὅταν ἐνδέχεται λέγειν τὴν αὐτὴν πολιτείαν δημοκρα-
 τίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν· δηλὸν γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο πάσχουσιν οἱ λέ-
 γοντες διὰ τὸ μεμῖχθαι καλῶς. πέπονθε δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ
 μέσον· ἐμφαίνεται γὰρ ἐκάτερον ἐν αὐτῷ τῶν ἄκρων. ὅπερ 7
 συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν. πολλοὶ γὰρ
 20 ἐγχειροῦσι λέγειν ὡς δημοκρατίας οὔσης διὰ τὸ δημοκρατικὰ
 πολλὰ τὴν τάξιν ἔχειν, οἷον πρῶτον τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφήν τῶν
 παίδων· ὁμοίως γὰρ οἱ τῶν πλουσίων τρέφονται τοῖς τῶν
 πενήτων, καὶ παιδεύονται τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὃν ἂν δύναιντο
 καὶ τῶν πενήτων οἱ παῖδες· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐχομέ- 8
 25 νης ἡλικίας, καὶ ὅταν ἄνδρες γένωνται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον·
 οὐδὲν γὰρ διάδηλος ὁ πλούσιος καὶ ὁ πέννης· οὕτω τὰ περὶ τὴν
 τροφήν ταῦτ' αἰσιν ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις, καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα οἱ
 πλούσιοι τοιαύτην οἷαν ἂν τις παρασκευάσαι δύναιτο καὶ
 τῶν πενήτων ὅστισούν. ἔτι τῷ δύο τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς τὴν 9
 30 μὲν αἰρεῖσθαι τὸν δῆμον, τῆς δὲ μετέχειν· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ
 γέροντας αἰροῦνται, τῆς δ' ἐφορείας μετέχουσιν. οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαν
 διὰ τὸ πολλὰ ἔχειν ὀλιγαρχικά, οἷον τὸ πάσας αἰρε-
 τὰς εἶναι καὶ μηδεμίαν κληρωτήν, καὶ ὀλίγους εἶναι κυρίους
 θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά. δεῖ δ' ἐν 10
 35 τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ μεμιγμένῃ καλῶς ἀμφοτέρα δοκεῖν εἶναι
 καὶ μηδέτερον, καὶ σώζεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς καὶ μὴ ἔξωθεν, καὶ
 δι' αὐτῆς μὴ τῷ πλείους [ἔξωθεν] εἶναι τοὺς βουλομένους (εἴη

γὰρ ἂν καὶ πονηρᾷ πολιτείᾳ τοῦθ' ὑπάρχον) ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴδ' ἂν
βούλεσθαι πολιτεῖαν ἑτέραν μὴδὲν τῶν τῆς πόλεως μορίων
δλως. τίνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον δεῖ καθιστάναι πολιτεῖαν, ὁμοίως 40
δὲ καὶ τὰς ὀνομαζόμενας ἀριστοκρατίας, νῦν εἴρηται·

Περὶ δὲ τυραννίδος ἦν ἡμῖν λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ὥς ἐνού- 1295 a. 10
σης πολυλογίας περὶ αὐτήν, ἀλλ' ὅπως λάβῃ τῆς μεθόδου
τὸ μέρος, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτην τίθεμεν τῶν πολιτειῶν τι μέ-
ρος. περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας διωρίσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λό-
γοις, ἐν οἷς περὶ τῆς μάλιστα λεγομένης βασιλείας ἐποιοῦ- 5
μεθα τὴν σκέψιν, πότερον ἀσύμφορος ἢ συμφέρει ταῖς πό-
2 λεσιν, καὶ τίνα καὶ πόθεν δεῖ καθιστάναι, καὶ πῶς· τυραν-
νίδος δ' εἶδη δύο μὲν διείλομεν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπε-
σκοποῦμεν, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πῶς αὐτῶν καὶ
πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν, διὰ τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι ἀμφοτέρας 10
ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς (ἐν τε γὰρ τῶν βαρβάρων τισὶν αἰροῦν-
ται αὐτοκράτορας μονάρχους, καὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀρ-
χαίοις Ἕλλησιν ἐγίνοντο τινες μόναρχοι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον,
3 οὗς ἐκάλουον αἰσυμνήτας), ἔχουσι δὲ τινες πρὸς ἀλλήλας αὐται
διαφοράς, ἦσαν δὲ διὰ μὲν τὸ κατὰ νόμον βασιλικαὶ καὶ 15
διὰ τὸ μοναρχεῖν ἐκόντων, τυραννικαὶ δὲ διὰ τὸ δεσποτικῶς
ἄρχειν κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γνώμην· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος τυραννίδος,
ἥπερ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ τυραννίς, ἀντίστροφος οὖσα τῇ παμ-
4 βασιλείᾳ. τοιαύτην δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τυραννίδα τὴν μο-
ναρχίαν, ἥτις ἀνυπεύθυνος ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ βελτιόνων 20
πάντων πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῆς συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς
τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. διόπερ ἀκούσιος· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐκὼν ὑπομέ-
νει τῶν ἐλευθέρων τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχήν. τυραννίδος μὲν οὖν
εἶδη ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας·

Τίς δ' ἀρίστη πολιτεία καὶ τίς ἀριστος βίος ταῖς πλεί- 11
σταῖς πόλεσι καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, μήτε πρὸς
ἀρετὴν συγκρίνουσι τὴν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, μήτε πρὸς παιδείαν
ἢ φύσεως δεῖται καὶ χορηγίας τυχηρᾶς, μήτε πρὸς πολι-
τείαν τὴν κατ' εὐχὴν γινομένην, ἀλλὰ βίον τε τὸν τοῖς

30 πλείστοις κοινωνήσαι δυνατόν καὶ πολιτείαν ἥς τὰς πλείστας
 πόλεις ἐνδέχεται μετασχεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἂς καλοῦσιν ἀριστο- 2
 κρατίας, περὶ ὧν νῦν εἵπομεν, τὰ μὲν ἐξωτέρῳ πίπτουσι ταῖς
 πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων, τὰ δὲ γειννῶσι τῇ καλουμένῃ πολι-
 τείᾳ· διὸ περὶ ἀμφοῖν ὥς μιᾶς λεκτέον. ἡ δὲ δὴ κρίσις περὶ
 35 ἀπάντων τούτων ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ καλῶς 3
 ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται τὸ τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον εἶναι τὸν κατ'
 ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον, μεσότητα δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν, τὸν μέσον
 ἀναγκαῖον βίον εἶναι βέλτιστον, τῆς ἐκάστοις ἐνδεχομένης
 τυχεῖν μεσότητος· τοὺς δὲ αὐτοὺς τούτους ὅρους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
 40 καὶ πόλεως ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καὶ πολιτείας· ἡ γὰρ πολι-
 1295 b τεία βίος τίς ἐστὶ πόλεως. ἐν ἀπάσαις δὴ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐστὶ 4
 τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως, οἱ μὲν εὐποροὶ σφόδρα, οἱ δὲ ἀπο-
 ροὶ σφόδρα, οἱ δὲ τρίτοι οἱ μέσοι τούτων. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὁμολο-
 γεῖται τὸ μέτριον ἀριστον καὶ τὸ μέσον, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ τῶν
 5 εὐτυχημάτων ἡ κτήσις ἡ μέση βελτίστη πάντων· ῥάστη γὰρ
 τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχεῖν· ὑπέρκαλον δὲ ἢ ὑπερίσχυρον ἢ ὑπερ- 5
 ευγενῆ ἢ ὑπερπλούσιον, ἢ τάναντία τούτοις, ὑπέρπτωχον ἢ
 ὑπερασθενῆ καὶ σφόδρα ἀτιμον, χαλεπὸν τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολου-
 θεῖν. γίνονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὕβρισταὶ καὶ μεγαλοπύνηροι
 10 μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοῦργοι καὶ μικροπύνηροι λίαν· τῶν δ' ἀδι-
 κημάτων τὰ μὲν γίνεταί δι' ὕβριν, τὰ δὲ διὰ κακουργίαν.
 ἔτι δ' ἤκισθ' οὗτοι φυλαρχοῦσι καὶ βουλαρχοῦσιν· ταῦτα δ'
 ἀμφότερα βλαβερά ταῖς πόλεσιν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ μὲν ἐν 6
 ὑπεροχαῖς εὐτυχημάτων ὄντες, ἰσχύος καὶ πλούτου καὶ φί-
 15 λων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων, ἀρχεσθαι οὔτε βούλονται
 οὔτε ἐπίστανται (καὶ τοῦτ' εὐθὺς οἴκοθεν ὑπάρχει παισὶν οὖσιν
 διὰ γὰρ τὴν τρυφὴν οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς διδασκαλείοις ἀρχεσθαι
 σύνθητες αὐτοῖς), οἱ δὲ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἐν ἐνδείᾳ τούτων ταπει-
 νοὶ λίαν. ὥσθ' οἱ μὲν ἀρχεῖν οὐκ ἐπίστανται ἀλλ' ἀρχεσθαι 7
 20 δουλικὴν ἀρχήν, οἱ δ' ἀρχεσθαι μὲν οὐδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ, ἀρχεῖν
 δὲ δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν. γίνεται οὖν [καὶ] δούλων καὶ δεσποτῶν
 πόλις, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐλευθέρων, καὶ τῶν μὲν φθονούντων τῶν δὲ

- καταφρονούντων. ἃ πλείστον ἀπέχει φιλίας καὶ κοινωνίας πολιτικῆς· ἡ γὰρ κοινωνία φιλικόν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁδοῦ βούλονται
8 κοινωνεῖν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. βούλεται δέ γε ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἴσων εἶναι 25
καὶ ὁμοίων ὅτι μάλιστα, τοῦτο δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστα τοῖς μέ-
σοις· ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον ἄριστα πολιτεύεσθαι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν
ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν φαμέν φύσει τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς πόλεως. καὶ
9 σώζονται δ' ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὗτοι μάλιστα τῶν πολιτῶν. οὔτε
γὰρ αὐτοὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὥσπερ οἱ πένητες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, οὔτε 30
τῆς τούτων ἕτεροι, καθάπερ τῆς τῶν πλουσίων οἱ πένητες ἐπι-
θυμοῦσιν καὶ διὰ τὸ μήτ' ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι μήτ' ἐπιβουλεύειν
ἀκινδύνως διάγουσιν. διὰ τοῦτο καλῶς ἠΐξαστο Φωκυλίδης
10 “πολλὰ μέσοισιν ἄριστα· μέσος θέλω ἐν πόλει εἶναι.” δῆλον
ἄρα ὅτι καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀρίστη ἢ διὰ τῶν μέσων, 35
καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐνδέχεται εὖ πολιτεύεσθαι πόλεις, ἐν αἷς
δὴ πολὺ τὸ μέσον καὶ κρεῖττον μάλιστα μὲν ἀμφοῖν, εἰ
δὲ μή, θατέρου μέρους· προστιθέμενον γὰρ ποιεῖ ῥοπήν καὶ
11 κωλύει γίνεσθαι τὰς ἐναντίας ὑπερβολάς. διόπερ εὐτυχία
μεγίστη τοὺς πολιτευομένους οὐσίαν ἔχειν μέσῃν καὶ ἱκανήν, 40
ὥς ὅπου οἱ μὲν πολλὰ σφόδρα κέκτηνται οἱ δὲ μηδέν, ἢ δὴ- 1296 a
μος ἔσχατος γίγνεται ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἄκρατος ἢ τυραννὶς δι'
ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπερβολάς· καὶ γὰρ ἐκ δημοκρατίας τῆς
νεανικωτάτης καὶ ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας γίγνεται τυραννὶς, ἐκ δὲ
12 τῶν μέσων καὶ τῶν σύγγενος πολὺ ἦττον. τὴν δ' αἰτίαν 5
ὑστερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐροῦμεν.
ὅτι δ' ἡ μέση βελτίστη, φανερόν· μόνῃ γὰρ ἀστασίαστος·
ὅπου γὰρ πολὺ τὸ διὰ μέσου, ἤκιστα στάσεις καὶ διαστάσεις
13 γίνονται τῶν πολιτῶν. καὶ αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις ἀστασια-
στότεραι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι πολὺ τὸ μέσον· ἐν δὲ 10
ταῖς μικραῖς ῥάδιόν τε διαλαβεῖν εἰς δύο πάντας, ὥστε μη-
δὲν καταλιπεῖν μέσον, καὶ πάντες σχεδὸν ἀποροὶ ἢ εὐποροὶ
14 εἰσιν. καὶ αἱ δημοκρατίαι δὲ ἀσφαλέστεραι τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν
εἰσὶ καὶ πολυχρονιώτεραι διὰ τοὺς μέσους (πλείους τε γάρ
εἰσι καὶ μᾶλλον μετέχουσι τῶν τιμῶν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις 15

ἢ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις), ἐπεὶ ὅταν ἀνευ τούτων τῷ πλήθει ὑπερ-
 τείνωσιν οἱ ἄποροι, κακοπραγία γίνεται καὶ ἀπόλλυνται
 ταχέως. σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τὸ τοὺς βελτίστους νομο- 15
 θέτας εἶναι τῶν μέσων πολιτῶν· Σόλων τε γὰρ ἦν τούτων
 20 (δηλοῖ δ' ἐκ τῆς ποιήσεως) καὶ Λυκούργος (οὐ γὰρ ἦν βασι-
 λεύς) καὶ Χαρώνδας καὶ σχεδὸν οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἄλλων.
 φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ διότι αἱ πλείεσται πολιτεῖαι αἱ μὲν 16
 δημοκρατικαὶ εἰσιν αἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικαί· διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐν ταύ-
 ταις πολλάκις ὀλίγον εἶναι τὸ μέσον, αἰεὶ ὀπότεροι ἂν ὑπερέ-
 25 χωσιν, εἴθ' οἱ τὰς αὐσίας ἔχοντες εἴθ' ὁ δῆμος, οἱ τὸ μέσον
 ἐκβαίνοντες καθ' αὐτοὺς ἀγούσι τὴν πολιτείαν, ὥστε ἡ δῆμος
 γίγνεται ἡ ὀλιγαρχία. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις διὰ τὸ στάσεις γίγνε- 17
 σθαι καὶ μάχας πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τοῖς εὐπόροις,
 ὀπότεροι ἂν μᾶλλον συμβῇ κρατῆσαι τῶν ἐναντίων, οὐ κα-
 30 θιστάσι κοινὴν πολιτείαν οὐδ' ἴσην, ἀλλὰ τῆς νίκης ἄθλον τὴν
 ὑπεροχὴν τῆς πολιτείας λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ οἱ μὲν δημοκρα-
 τίαν οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαν ποιοῦσιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ 18
 γενομένων τῆς Ἑλλάδος πρὸς τὴν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐκάτεροι πο-
 λιτείαν ἀποβλέποντες οἱ μὲν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
 35 καθίστασαν οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίας, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πόλεων συμ-
 φέρον σκοποῦντες ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν. ὥστε διὰ 19
 ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἡ μηδέποτε τὴν μέσσην γίνεσθαι πολι-
 τείαν ἡ ὀλιγάκις καὶ παρ' ὀλίγοις· εἷς γὰρ ἀνὴρ συνεπεί-
 σθη μόνος τῶν πρότερον ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων ταύτην
 40 ἀποδοῦναι τὴν τάξιν. ἤδη δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἔθος
 1296 b καθέστηκε μὴδὲ βούλεσθαι τὸ ἴσον, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀρχεῖν ζητεῖν ἡ
 κρατουμένους ὑπομένειν. τίς μὲν οὖν ἀρίστη πολιτεία, καὶ διὰ 20
 τίν' αἰτίαν, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν· τῶν δ' ἄλλων πολιτειῶν,
 ἐπειδὴ πλείους δημοκρατίας καὶ πλείους ὀλιγαρχίας φανέν
 5 εἶναι, ποίαν πρώτην θετέον καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν
 τρόπον ἐχομένην τῷ τὴν μὲν εἶναι βελτίω τὴν δὲ χείρω,
 διαρισμένης τῆς ἀρίστης οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. αἰεὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον 21
 εἶναι βελτίω τὴν ἐγγύτατα ταύτης, χείρω δὲ τὴν ἀφεστη-

κυῖαν τοῦ μέσου πλεῖον, ἂν μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν κρίνη τις. λέγω δὲ τὸ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν, ὅτι πολλάκις οὐσης ἄλλης πολιτείας 10 αἰρετωτέρας ἐνίοις οὐδὲν κωλύει συμφέρειν ἑτέραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν.

Τίς δὲ πολιτεία τίσι καὶ ποία συμφέρει ποίοις, ἐχό- 12 μενόν ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων διελθεῖν. ληπτέον δὴ πρῶτον περὶ πασῶν καθόλου ταύτων· δεῖ γὰρ κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ βουλομένοι 15 μέρος τῆς πόλεως τοῦ μὴ βουλομένου μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν, ἔστι δὲ πᾶσα πόλις ἔκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ. λέγω δὲ ποιὸν μὲν ἐλευθερίαν πλοῦτον παιδείαν εὐγένειαν, ποσὸν 2 δὲ τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχὴν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιὸν ὑπάρχειν ἑτέρῳ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε μερῶν 20 ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ δὲ μέρει τὸ ποσόν, οἷον πλείους τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν γενναίων τοὺς ἀγεννεῖς ἢ τῶν πλουσίων τοὺς ἀπόρους, μὴ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχειν τῷ ποσῷ ὅσον λεί- 3 πεσθαι τῷ ποιῷ. διὸ ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα συγκριτέον. ὅπου μὲν οὖν ὑπερέχει τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος τὴν εἰρημένην ἀνα- 25 λογίαν, ἐνταῦθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν, καὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος δημοκρατίας κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ δήμου ἑκάστου, οἷον ἂν μὲν τὸ τῶν γεωργῶν ὑπερτείνῃ πλῆθος, τὴν πρῶ- τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἂν δὲ τὸ τῶν βαναύσων καὶ μισθα- ρούντων, τὴν τελευταίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς 30 μεταξὺ τούτων· ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ γνωρίμων μᾶλλον ὑπερτείνει τῷ ποιῷ ἢ λείπεται τῷ ποσῷ, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὀλιγαρχίαν, καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἕκαστον 4 εἶδος κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ πλῆθους. δεῖ δ' αἰετὸν τὸν νομοθέτην ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ προσλαμβάνειν τοὺς μέ- 35 σους· ἂν τε γὰρ ὀλιγαρχικοὺς τοὺς νόμους τιθῇ, στοχάζεσθαι χρὴ τῶν μέσων, ἂν τε δημοκρατικούς, προσάγεσθαι τοῖς νόμοις τούτους. ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν μέσων ὑπερτείνει πλῆθος ἢ συναμφοτέρων τῶν ἄκρων ἢ καὶ θατέρου μόνον, ἐνταῦθ' ἐν- 5 δέχεται πολιτείαν εἶναι μόνιμον. οὐδὲν γὰρ φοβερὸν μή 40 ποτε συμφωνήσωσιν οἱ πλούσιοι τοῖς πένησιν ἐπὶ τοῖτούς· 1297 a

- οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἄτεροι βουλήσονται δουλεύειν τοῖς ἐτέροις, κοι-
 νοτέραν δ' ἂν ζητῶσιν, οὐδεμίαν εὐρήσουσιν ἄλλην ταύτης
 ἐν μέρει γὰρ ἄρχειν οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείνειαν διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν
 5 τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους· πανταχοῦ δὲ πιστότατος ὁ διαιτητής,
 διαιτητῆς δ' ὁ μέσος. ὅσῳ δ' ἂν ἄμεινον ἡ πολιτεία μι- 6
 χθῇ, τοσούτῳ μονιμωτέρα. διαμαρτάνουσι δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ
 τῶν τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς βουλομένων ποιεῖν πολιτείας, οὐ
 μόνον ἐν τῇ πλείον νέμειν τοῖς εὐπόροις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ
 10 παρακρούεσθαι τὸν δῆμον. ἀνάγκη γὰρ χρόνῳ ποτὲ ἐκ τῶν
 ψευδῶς ἀγαθῶν ἀληθὲς συμβῆναι κακόν· αἱ γὰρ πλεονε-
 ξίαι τῶν πλουσίων ἀπολλύουσι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν ἢ αἱ
 τοῦ δήμου.
- 13 Ἔστι δ' ὅσα προφάσεως χάριν ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις σο-
 15 φίζονται πρὸς τὸν δῆμον πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν, περὶ ἐκκλη-
 σίαν, περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, περὶ δικαστήρια, περὶ ὄπλισιν, περὶ
 γυμνασίαν· περὶ ἐκκλησίαν μὲν τὸ ἐξεῖναι ἐκκλησιάζειν
 πᾶσι, ζημίαν δὲ ἐπικεῖσθαι τοῖς εὐπόροις, ἂν μὴ ἐκκλη-
 σιάζωσιν, ἢ μόνοις ἢ μείζῳ πολλῷ, περὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς 2
 20 τὸ τοῖς μὲν ἔχουσι τίμημα μὴ ἐξεῖναι ἐξόμνυσθαι, τοῖς δ'
 ἀπόροις ἐξεῖναι, καὶ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια τοῖς μὲν εὐπόροις
 εἶναι ζημίαν, ἂν μὴ δικάζωσι, τοῖς δ' ἀπόροις ἄδειαν, ἢ
 τοῖς μὲν μεγάλην τοῖς δὲ μικράν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς Χαρών-
 δου νόμοις· ἐνιαχοῦ δ' ἔξεστι μὲν πᾶσιν ἀπογραψαμένοις 3
 25 ἐκκλησιάζειν καὶ δικάζειν, ἂν δὲ ἀπογραψάμενοι μὴτ'
 ἐκκλησιάζωσι μῆτε δικάζωσιν, ἐπικεῖνται μεγάλαι ζημίαι
 τούτοις, ἵνα διὰ μὲν τὴν ζημίαν φεύγωσι τὸ ἀπογράφεσθαι,
 διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀπογράφεσθαι μὴ δικάζωσι μὴδ' ἐκκλησιάζ-
 ωσιν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄπλα κεκτῆσθαι 4
 30 καὶ τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι νομοθετοῦσιν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀπόροις
 ἔξεστι μὴ κεκτῆσθαι, τοῖς δ' εὐπόροις ἐπιζήμιον μὴ κεκτα-
 μένοις· κἂν μὴ γυμνάζωνται, τοῖς μὲν οὐδεμία ζημία, τοῖς
 δ' εὐπόροις ἐπιζήμιον, ὅπως οἱ μὲν διὰ τὴν ζημίαν μετέ-
 χωσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι μὴ μετέχωσιν. ταῦτα 5

μὲν οὖν ὀλιγαρχικὰ τὰ σοφίσματα τῆς νομοθεσίας, ἐν δὲ ταῖς 35
 δημοκρατίαις πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀντισοφίζονται· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ
 ἀπόροις μισθὸν πορίζουσιν ἐκκλησιάζουσι καὶ δικάζουσιν, τοῖς
 6 δ' εὐπόροις οὐδεμίαν τάττουσι ζημίαν. ὥστε φανερόν ἐστι εἴ
 τις βούλεται μιγνύναι δικαίως, δεῖ τὰ παρ' ἐκατέροις συνά-
 γειν καὶ τοῖς μὲν μισθὸν πορίζειν τοῖς δὲ ζημίαν οὕτω 40
 γὰρ ἂν κοινωνοῖεν ἅπαντες, ἐκείνως δ' ἡ πολιτεία γίγνεται
 7 τῶν ἐτέρων μόνον. δεῖ δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι μὲν ἐκ τῶν 1297 b
 τὰ ὅπλα ἐχόντων μόνον· τοῦ δὲ τιμήματος τὸ πλῆθος
 ἀπλῶς μὲν ὀρισαμένους οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν τοσοῦτον ὑπάρχειν,
 ἀλλὰ σκεψαμένους τὸ ποῖον ἐπιβάλλει μακρότατον ὥστε
 τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς πολιτείας εἶναι πλείους τῶν μὴ μετε- 5
 8 χόντων, τοῦτο τάττειν. ἐθέλουσι γὰρ οἱ πένητες καὶ μὴ μετέ-
 χοντες τῶν τιμῶν ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν, ἐὰν μήτε ὑβρίζη τις
 αὐτοὺς μήτε ἀφαιρῇται μηδὲν τῆς οὐσίας. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐ
 ῥᾶδιον οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ συμβαίνει χαρίεντας εἶναι τοὺς μετέχον-
 9 τας τοῦ πολιτεύματος. καὶ εἰώθασι δέ, ὅταν πόλεμος ᾖ, 10
 ὀκνεῖν, ἂν μὴ λαμβάνωσι τροφήν, ἀποροὶ δὲ ὥσιν· ἐὰν
 δὲ πορίζῃ τις τροφήν, βούλονται πολεμεῖν. ἔστι δ' ἡ
 πολιτεία παρ' ἐνόις οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῶν ὀπλιτευόντων ἀλλὰ
 καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὀπλιτευκόντων· ἐν Μαλιεῦσι δὲ ἡ μὲν πολι-
 τεία ἦν ἐκ τούτων, τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς ἤρουντο ἐκ τῶν στρατευο- 15
 10 μένων. καὶ ἡ πρώτη δὲ πολιτεία ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐγένετο
 μετὰ τὰς βασιλείας ἐκ τῶν πολεμούντων, ἡ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
 ἐκ τῶν ἱππέων (τὴν γὰρ ἰσχὺν καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἐν τοῖς
 ἱππεύσιν ὁ πόλεμος εἶχεν· ἀνευ μὲν γὰρ συντάξεως ἀχρη-
 στον τὸ ὀπλιτικόν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐμπειρίαι καὶ 20
 τάξεις ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις οὐχ ὑπῆρχον, ὥστ' ἐν τοῖς ἱππεύσιν
 εἶναι τὴν ἰσχύν), αὐξανομένων δὲ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν ἐν
 τοῖς ὅπλοις ἰσχυσάντων μᾶλλον πλείους μετεῖχον τῆς πο-
 11 λιτείας. διόπερ ἂς νῦν καλοῦμεν πολιτείας, οἱ πρότερον ἐκά-
 λουν δημοκρατίας. ἦσαν δὲ αἱ ἀρχαῖαι πολιτεῖαι εὐλόγως 25
 ὀλιγαρχικαὶ καὶ βασιλικαί· δι' ὀλιγανθρωπίαν γὰρ οὐκ

- εἶχον πολὺ τὸ μέσον, ὥστ' ὀλίγοι τε ὄντες τὸ πλῆθος καὶ
κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν μᾶλλον ὑπέμενον τὸ ἀρχεσθαι. διὰ 12
τίνα μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἰτίαν αἱ πολιτεῖαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τί
30 παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας ἕτεραι (δημοκρατία τε γὰρ οὐ μία
τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔστι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως), ἔτι δὲ τίνες αἱ
διαφοραὶ καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν συμβαίνει, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις
τίς ἀρίστη τῶν πολιτειῶν ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον εἰπεῖν, καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων ποία ποίοις ἀρμόττει τῶν πολιτειῶν, εἴρηται·
- 14 Πάλιν δὲ καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς περὶ ἐκάστης λέγωμεν
περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς, λαβόντες ἀρχὴν τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῶν.
ἔστι δὴ τρία μέρη τῶν πολιτειῶν πασῶν, περὶ ὧν δεῖ θεω-
ρεῖν τὸν σπουδαῖον νομοθέτην ἐκάστη τὸ συμφέρον· ὧν ἐχόν-
των καλῶς ἀνάγκη τὴν πολιτείαν ἔχειν καλῶς, καὶ τὰς
40 πολιτείας ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν ἐν τῷ διαφέρειν ἕκαστον τού-
των. ἔστι δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων ἐν μὲν τί τὸ βουλευόμενον 2
1298 a περὶ τῶν κοινῶν, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς (τοῦτο δ'
ἔστιν ἃς δεῖ καὶ τίνων εἶναι κυρίας, καὶ ποῖαν τινὰ δεῖ γίγνε-
σθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν), τρίτον δὲ τί τὸ δικάζον. κύριον δ' ἐστὶ 3
τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ συμμαχίας καὶ
5 διαλύσεως, καὶ περὶ νόμων, καὶ περὶ θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς καὶ
δημεύσεως, καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν αἵρέσεως καὶ τῶν εὐθυνῶν. ἀναγ-
καῖον δ' ἦτοι πᾶσι τοῖς πολίταις ἀποδεδοσθαι πάσας ταύτας
τὰς κρίσεις ἢ τισὶ πάσας (οἶον ἀρχῇ τινὶ μῖψ ἢ πλείοσιν, ἢ
ἐτέραις ἐτέρας) ἢ τινὰς μὲν αὐτῶν πᾶσι τινὰς δὲ τισίν. τὸ 4
10 μὲν οὖν πάντας καὶ περὶ ἀπάντων δημοτικόν· τὴν τοιαύτην
γὰρ ἰσότητα ζητεῖ ὁ δῆμος· εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ τρόποι τοῦ πάντας
πλείους, εἷς μὲν τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντας ἀθρόους,
ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Τηλεκλέους ἐστὶ τοῦ Μιλησίου (καὶ
ἐν ἄλλαις δὲ πολιτείαις βουλευόνται αἱ συναρχαίαι συνιοῦ-
15 σαι, εἷς δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζουσι πάντες κατὰ μέρος ἐκ
τῶν φυλῶν καὶ τῶν μορίων τῶν ἐλαχίστων παντελῶς, ὥς
ἂν διέλθῃ διὰ πάντων), συνιέναι δὲ μόνον περὶ τε νόμων
θέσεως καὶ τῶν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰ παραγγελλό-

5 μενα ἀκουσομένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων· ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος τὸ
 πάντας ἀθρόους, συνιέναι δὲ μόνον πρὸς τε τὰς ἀρχαιρε- 20
 σίας [αἵρησομένους] καὶ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας καὶ περὶ πο-
 λέμου καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ πρὸς εὐθύνας, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰς ἀρ-
 χὰς βουλευέσθαι τὰς ἐφ' ἐκάστοις τεταγμένας, αἵρετὰς
 6 οὖσας ἐξ ἀπάντων ἢ κληρωτάς· ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος τὸ περὶ
 τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας ἀπαντᾶν τοὺς πολίτας, καὶ 25
 περὶ πολέμου βουλευσομένους καὶ συμμαχίας, τὰ δ' ἄλλα
 τὰς ἀρχὰς διοικεῖν αἵρετὰς οὖσας, ὅσας ἐνδέχεται, τοιαῦ-
 7 ται δ' εἰσὶν ὅσας ἀρχεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς ἐπισταμένους· τέ-
 τартος δὲ τρόπος τὸ πάντας περὶ πάντων βουλευέσθαι
 συνιόντας, τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς περὶ μηδενὸς κρίνειν ἀλλὰ μόνον 30
 προανακρίνειν, ὅνπερ ἡ τελευταία δημοκρατία νῦν διοικεῖ-
 ται τρόπον, ἣν ἀνάλογόν φαμεν εἶναι ὀλιγαρχία τε δυ-
 ναστευτικῇ καὶ μοναρχίᾳ τυραννικῇ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οἱ τρόποι
 δημοκρατικοὶ πάντες, τὸ δὲ τινὰς περὶ πάντων ὀλιγαρχι-
 8 κόν. ἔχει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο διαφορὰς πλείους. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ 35
 ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μετριωτέρων αἵρετοί τε ὥσι καὶ πλείους
 διὰ τὴν μετριότητα τοῦ τιμήματος, καὶ περὶ ὧν ὁ νόμος
 ἀπαγορεύει μὴ κινῶσιν ἀλλ' ἀκολουθῶσι, καὶ ἐξῆ κτωμένῳ
 τὸ τίμημα μετέχειν, ὀλιγαρχία μὲν πολιτικὴ δ' ἐστὶν ἢ
 τοιαύτη διὰ τὸ μετριάζειν· ὅταν δὲ μὴ πάντες τοῦ βουλευέ- 40
 σθαι μετέχωσιν ἀλλ' αἵρετοί, κατὰ νόμον δ' ἀρχῶσιν ὥσ- 1298 b
 9 περ καὶ πρότερον, ὀλιγαρχικόν· ὅταν δὲ καὶ αἰρῶνται
 αὐτοὶ αὐτοὺς οἱ κύριοι τοῦ βουλευέσθαι, καὶ ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ
 πατρὸς εἰσὶ καὶ κύριοι τῶν νόμων ὥσιν, ὀλιγαρχικὴν ἀναγ-
 10 καῖον εἶναι τὴν τάξιν ταύτην. ὅταν δὲ τινῶν τινές, οἷον 5
 πολέμου μὲν καὶ ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης καὶ εὐθυνῶν πάντες, τῶν δὲ ἄλ-
 λων ἀρχοντες, καὶ οὗτοι αἵρετοί [ἢ κληρωτοί], ἀριστοκρατία
 ἢ πολιτεία· ἐὰν δ' ἐνίων μὲν αἵρετοί ἐνίων δὲ κληρωτοί,
 καὶ κληρωτοὶ ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκ προκρίτων, ἢ κοινῇ αἵρετοὶ
 καὶ κληρωτοί, τὰ μὲν πολιτείας ἀριστοκρατικῆς ἐστὶ τούτων, 10
 11 τὰ δὲ πολιτείας αὐτῆς. διήρηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον

- πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, καὶ διοικεῖται ἐκάστη πολιτεία κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν· συμφέρεi δὲ δη- 12
μοκρατία τε τῇ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκούση δημοκρατία νῦν (λέγω
15 δὲ τοιαύτην ἐν ᾗ κύριος ὁ δῆμος καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐστίν) πρὸς
τὸ βουλευέσθαι βέλτιον τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖν ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν δικα-
στηρίων ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις (τάττουσι γὰρ ζημίαν τοῦτοις
οὓς βούλονται δικάζειν, ἵνα δικάζωσιν, οἱ δὲ δημοτικοὶ μι-
σθὸν τοῖς ἀπborois), τοῦτο δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας ποιεῖν·
20 βουλευσονται γὰρ βέλτιον κοινῇ βουλευόμενοι πάντες, ὁ μὲν
δῆμος μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων, οὗτοι δὲ μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους· συμ- 13
φέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰρετοὺς εἶναι τοὺς βουλευομένους ἢ κληρωτοὺς
ἴσως ἐκ τῶν μορίων· συμφέρεi δὲ καὶ ὑπερβάλλωσι πολὺ
κατὰ τὸ πλήθος οἱ δημοτικοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, ἢ μὴ πᾶσι
25 διδόναι μισθόν, ἀλλ' ὅσοι σύμμετροι πρὸς τὸ τῶν γνωρί-
μων πλήθος, ἢ ἀποκληροῦν τοὺς πλείους· ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχ- 14
αῖς ἢ προσαιρεῖσθαι τινὰς ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους, ἢ κατασκευά-
σαντας ἀρχεῖον οἷον ἐν ἐνιαῖς πολιτείαις ἐστὶν οὓς καλοῦσι
προβούλους καὶ νομοφύλακας, [καὶ] περὶ τούτων χρηματίζειν
30 περὶ ὧν ἂν οὗτοι προβουλευσῶσιν (οὕτω γὰρ μεθέξει ὁ δῆμος
τοῦ βουλευέσθαι, καὶ λύειν οὐδὲν δυνήσεται τῶν περὶ τὴν πο-
λιτείαν)· ἔτι ἢ ταῦτα ψηφίζεσθαι τὸν δῆμον ἢ μηδὲν ἐν- 15
αντίον τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις, ἢ τῆς συμβουλῆς μὲν μεταδιδό-
ναι πᾶσι, βουλευέσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας. καὶ τὸ ἀντικεί-
35 μενον δὲ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις γιγνομένου δεῖ ποιεῖν· ἀπο-
ψηφισόμενον μὲν γὰρ κύριον [εἶναι] δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλήθος, κατα-
ψηφισόμενον δὲ μὴ κύριον, ἀλλ' ἐπαναγέσθω πάλιν ἐπὶ
τοὺς ἄρχοντας. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀνεστραμμένως 16
ποιοῦσιν· οἱ γὰρ ὀλίγοι ἀποψηφισάμενοι μὲν κύριοι, κα-
40 ταψηφισάμενοι δὲ οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ἐπανάγεται εἰς τοὺς
1299 a πλείους αἰεῖ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ βουλευομένου καὶ τοῦ κυρίου
δὴ τῆς πολιτείας τοῦτον διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον·
15 Ἐχομένη δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς διαίρεσις·
ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς πολιτείας πολλὰς δια-

φοράς, πόσαι τε ἀρχαί, καὶ κύριαι τίνων, καὶ περὶ χρόνου, 5
 πόσος ἐκάστης ἀρχῆς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐξαμήνους, οἱ δὲ δι'
 ἐλάττονος, οἱ δ' ἐνιαυσίας, οἱ δὲ πολυχρονιωτέρας ποιούσι
 τὰς ἀρχάς), καὶ πότερον εἶναι δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰδίους ἢ
 πολυχρονίους ἢ μηδέτερον ἀλλὰ πλεονάκεις τοὺς αὐτοὺς, ἢ
 μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν δις ἀλλ' ἅπαξ μόνον ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὴν κα- 10
 τάστασιν τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐκ τίνων δεῖ γίνεσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ τίνων
 2 καὶ πῶς. περὶ πάντων γὰρ τούτων δεῖ δύνασθαι διελεῖν
 κατὰ πόσους ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι τρόπους, καπειτα προσαρ-
 μόσαι, ποίαις ποῖαι πολιτεῖαις συμφέρουσιν. ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο
 διορίσαι βῆδιν, ποίας δεῖ καλεῖν ἀρχάς· πολλῶν γὰρ ἐπι- 15
 στατῶν ἢ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ δεῖται, διόπερ πάντας ὅσους τοὺς
 αἰρετοὺς οὔτε τοὺς κληρωτοὺς ἀρχοντας θετέον, οἷον τοὺς ἱερεῖς
 πρῶτον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς
 3 θετέον. ἔτι δὲ χορηγοὶ καὶ κήρυκες· αἰροῦνται δὲ καὶ πρεσ-
 βευταί. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν πολιτικαὶ τῶν ἐπιμελειῶν, ἢ πάν- 20
 των τῶν πολιτῶν πρὸς τινα πρᾶξιν, οἷον στρατηγὸς στρα-
 τευομένων, ἢ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ὁ γυναικονόμος ἢ παιδονό-
 μος· αἱ δ' οἰκονομικαὶ (πολλάκις γὰρ αἰροῦνται σιτομέτρας)·
 αἱ δ' ὑπηρετικαὶ καὶ πρὸς ἄς, ἂν εὐπορῶσι, τάττουσι δούλους.
 4 μάλιστα δ' ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀρχὰς λεκτέον ταύτας, ὅσαις 25
 ἀποδέδοται βουλευσασθαι τε περὶ τινῶν καὶ κρίναι καὶ
 ἐπιτάξαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιτάττειν ἀρχικώτερόν
 ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διαφέρει πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις οὐδὲν
 ὡς εἰπεῖν (οὐ γάρ πω κρίσις γέγονεν ἀμφισβητούντων περὶ
 τοῦ ὀνόματος), ἔχει δὲ τιν' ἄλλην διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν. 30
 5 ποῖαι δ' ἀρχαί καὶ πόσαι ἀναγκαῖαι εἰ ἔσται πόλις, καὶ
 ποῖαι ἀναγκαῖαι μὲν οὐ χρήσιμοι δὲ πρὸς σπουδαίαν πολι-
 τείαν, μᾶλλον ἂν τις ἀπορήσειε πρὸς ἅπασάν τε δὴ πο-
 6 λιτείαν καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς μικρὰς πόλεις. ἐν μὲν γὰρ δὴ
 ταῖς μεγάλαις ἐνδέχεται τε καὶ δεῖ μίαν τετάχθαι πρὸς 35
 ἓν ἔργον (πολλοὺς τε γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἀρχεῖα ἐνδέχεται βαδί-
 ζειν διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς πολίτας, ὥστε τὰς μὲν δια-

λείπειν πολὺν χρόνον τὰς δ' ἀπαξ ἀρχειν, καὶ βέλτιον
 ἕκαστον ἔργον τυγχάνει τῆς ἐπιμελείας μονοπαραματούσης
 1299 b ἢ πολυπραγματούσης). ἐν δὲ ταῖς μικραῖς ἀνάγκῃ συνάγειν 7
 εἰς ὀλίγους πολλὰς ἀρχάς· διὰ γὰρ ὀλιγανθρωπίαν οὐ
 ῥάδιόν ἐστι πολλοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς εἶναι· τίνες γὰρ οἱ
 τούτους ἔσονται διαδεξόμενοι πάλιν; δέονται δ' ἐνίοτε τῶν
 5 αὐτῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ νόμων αἱ μικραὶ ταῖς μεγάλαις· πλὴν
 αἱ μὲν δέονται πολλάκις τῶν αὐτῶν, ταῖς δ' ἐν πολλῷ
 χρόνῳ τοῦτο συμβαίνει. διόπερ οὐδὲν καλῶς πολλὰς ἐπι- 8
 μελείας ἅμα προστάττειν (οὐ γὰρ ἐμποδιοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις),
 καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν ἀναγκαῖον τὰ ἀρχεῖα οἷον
 10 ὀβελισκολύχνια ποιεῖν. ἐὰν οὖν ἔχωμεν λέγειν πόσας
 ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν πάσῃ πόλει, καὶ πόσας οὐκ ἀναγ-
 καῖον μὲν δεῖ δ' ὑπάρχειν, ῥᾶον ἂν τις εἰδῶς ταῦτα συνά-
 γοι ποίας ἀρμόττει συνάγειν ἀρχὰς εἰς μίαν ἀρχὴν.
 ἀρμόττει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο μὴ λεληθέναι, ποίων δεῖ κατὰ τὸπον 9
 15 ἀρχεῖα πολλὰ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ποίων πανταχοῦ μίαν
 ἀρχὴν εἶναι κυρίαν, οἷον εὐκοσμίας πότερον ἐν ἀγορᾷ μὲν
 ἀγορανόμον, ἄλλον δὲ κατ' ἄλλον τῶπον, ἢ πανταχοῦ τὸν
 αὐτόν· καὶ πότερον κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα δεῖ διαιρεῖν ἢ κατὰ
 τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, λέγω δ' οἷον ἓνα τῆς εὐκοσμίας, ἢ παίδων
 20 ἄλλον καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας δέ, πότερον 10
 διαφέρει καθ' ἐκάστην καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν γένος ἢ οὐδέν, οἷον
 ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ καὶ μο-
 ναρχίᾳ πότερον αἱ αὐταὶ μὲν εἰσιν ἀρχαὶ κύριαι, οὐκ ἐξ
 ἴσων δ' οὐδ' ἐξ ὁμοίων, ἀλλ' ἐτέρων ἐν ἐτέραις, οἷον ἐν μὲν
 25 ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρ-
 χίαις ἐκ τῶν πλουσίων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκ τῶν
 ἐλευθέρων, ἢ τυγχάνουσι μὲν τινες οὖσαι καὶ κατ' αὐτὰς
 διαφοραὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔστι δ' ὅπου συμφέρουσιν αἱ αὐταὶ
 καὶ ὅπου διαφέρουσιν (ἐνθα μὲν γὰρ ἀρμόττει μεγάλας,
 30 ἐνθα δ' εἶναι μικρὰς τὰς αὐτάς). οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰδιαί 11
 τινές εἰσιν, οἷον ἢ τῶν προβούλων· αὕτη γὰρ οὐ δημοκρα-

- τική, βουλή δὲ δημοτικόν. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναί τι τοιοῦτον φ
ἐπιμελὲς ἔσται τοῦ δήμου προβουλεύειν, ὅπως ἀσχολῶν ἔσται·
τοῦτο δ', ἐὰν ὀλίγοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχικόν· τοὺς
δὲ προβούλους ὀλίγους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος, ὥστ' ὀλι- 35
12 γαρχικόν. ἀλλ' ὅπου ἀμφω αὐται αἱ ἀρχαί, οἱ πρόβουλοι
καθεστᾶσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς βουλευταῖς· ὁ μὲν γὰρ βουλευτῆς δη-
μοτικόν, ὁ δὲ πρόβουλος ὀλιγαρχικόν. καταλύεται δὲ καὶ
τῆς βουλῆς ἡ δύναμις ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δημοκρατίαις ἐν
13 αἷς αὐτὸς συνιὼν ὁ δῆμος χρηματίζει περὶ πάντων. τοῦτο 1300 a
δὲ συμβαίνειν εἶωθεν, ὅταν εὐπορία τις ᾗ μισθοῦ τοῖς
ἐκκλησιάζουσιν· σχολάζοντες γὰρ συλλέγονταί τε πολλάκις
καὶ ἅπαντα αὐτοὶ κρίνουσιν. παιδονόμος δὲ καὶ γυναικονό-
μος, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος ἀρχὼν κύριός ἐστι τοιαύτης ἐπιμε- 5
λείας, ἀριστοκρατικόν, δημοκρατικὸν δ' οὐ (πῶς γὰρ οἶον τε
καλῶν ἐξίεναι τὰς τῶν ἀπόρων;) οὐδ' ὀλιγαρχικόν (τρυ-
14 φῶσι γὰρ αἱ τῶν ὀλιγαρχούντων). ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων
ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω νῦν, περὶ δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν κατα-
στάσεις πειρατέον ἐξ ἀρχῆς διελθεῖν. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ διαφοραὶ 10
ἐν τρισὶν ὁροῖς, ὧν συντιθεμένων ἀναγκαῖον πάντας εἰλη-
φθαι τοὺς τρόπους. ἔστι δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων ἐν μὲν τίνες οἱ
καθιστάντες τὰς ἀρχάς, δεύτερον δ' ἐκ τίνων, λοιπὸν δὲ
15 τίνα τρόπον. ἐκάστου δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων διαφοραὶ τρεῖς
εἰσὶν· ἡ γὰρ πάντες οἱ πολῖται καθιστᾶσιν ἢ τινές, καὶ ἡ 15
ἐκ πάντων ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων, οἷον ἡ τιμήματι ἢ
γένει ἢ ἀρετῇ ἢ τινι τοιούτῳ ἄλλῳ, ὥσπερ ἐν Μεγάρῳ ἐκ
τῶν συγκατελθόντων καὶ συμμαχεσαμένων πρὸς τὸν δη-
16 μον, καὶ ταῦτα ἡ αἰρέσει ἢ κλήρῳ· πάλιν ταῦτα συν-
δυαζόμενα, λέγω δὲ τὰς μὲν τινές τὰς δὲ πάντες, καὶ 20
τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν αἰρέσει
τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ. τούτων δ' ἐκάστης ἔσονται τῆς διαφορᾶς
17 τρόποι τέτταρες. †ἡ γὰρ¹ πάντες ἐκ πάντων αἰρέσει, ἡ πάν-

¹ In the following attempt to frame a text of 1300 a 23-b 5 the similar attempts of C. Thurot, Spengel, and Susemihl (see the critical

25 *τες ἐκ πάντων κλήρω (καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἀπάντων ἡ ὡς ἀνὰ μέ-
 ρος, οἷον κατὰ φυλὰς καὶ δήμους καὶ φρατρίας, ἕως ἂν
 διέλθῃ διὰ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν, ἡ αἰὶ ἐξ ἀπάντων), καὶ
 ἡ τὰ μὲν οὕτω τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως· πάλιν εἰ τινὲς οἱ καθιστάντες, 18
 ἡ ἐκ πάντων αἰρέσει ἡ ἐκ πάντων κλήρω, ἡ ἐκ τινῶν αἰρέ-
 σει ἡ ἐκ τινῶν κλήρω, ἡ τὰ μὲν οὕτω τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως, λέγω
 30 δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ πάντων αἰρέσει τὰ δὲ κλήρω. ὥστε δώδεκα
 οἱ τρόποι γίνονται χωρὶς τῶν δύο συνδυασμῶν. τούτων δ' 19
 αἱ μὲν δύο καταστάσεις δημοτικαί, τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων
 αἰρέσει ἡ κλήρω γίνεσθαι ἡ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρω τὰς
 δ' αἰρέσει τῶν ἀρχῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ πάντας ἅμα μὲν καθι-
 35 στάναι, ἐξ ἀπάντων δ' ἡ ἐκ τινῶν, ἡ κλήρω ἡ αἰρέσει ἡ
 ἀμφοῖν, ἡ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν
 (τὸ δὲ ἀμφοῖν λέγω τὰς μὲν κλήρω τὰς δ' αἰρέσει), πο-*

notes on this passage) have been kept in view. Added words are
 printed in thicker type, and omitted words are placed within square
 brackets :—

ἡ γὰρ πάντες ἐκ πάντων αἰρέσει ἡ πάντες ἐκ πάντων κλήρω (καὶ [ἡ] ἐξ
 ἀπάντων ἡ ὡς ἀνὰ μέρος, οἷον κατὰ φυλὰς καὶ δήμους καὶ φρατρίας, ἕως ἂν
 διέλθῃ διὰ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν, ἡ αἰὶ ἐξ ἀπάντων), [καὶ] ἡ πάντες ἐκ τινῶν
 αἰρέσει ἡ πάντες ἐκ τινῶν κλήρω ἡ τὰ μὲν οὕτω τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως· πάλιν εἰ
 τινὲς οἱ καθιστάντες, ἡ ἐκ πάντων αἰρέσει ἡ ἐκ πάντων κλήρω, ἡ ἐκ τινῶν
 αἰρέσει ἡ ἐκ τινῶν κλήρω, ἡ τὰ μὲν οὕτω τὰ δὲ ἐκείνως, λέγω δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ
 πάντων αἰρέσει τὰ δὲ κλήρω καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τινῶν αἰρέσει τὰ δὲ κλήρω.
 ὥστε δώδεκα οἱ τρόποι γίνονται χωρὶς τῶν δύο συνδυασμῶν. τούτων δ' αἱ
 μὲν δύο καταστάσεις δημοτικαί, τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων αἰρέσει ἡ κλήρω [γίνε-
 σθαι] ἡ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρω τὰς δ' αἰρέσει τῶν ἀρχῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ πάντας
 ἅμα μὲν καθιστάναι, ἐξ ἀπάντων δ' [ἡ ἐκ τινῶν], ἡ κλήρω ἡ αἰρέσει ἡ ἀμφοῖν,
 ἡ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν ἡ κλήρω ἡ αἰρέσει ἡ ἀμφοῖν (τὸ δὲ
 ἀμφοῖν λέγω τὰς μὲν κλήρω τὰς δ' αἰρέσει), πολιτικόν καὶ τὸ τινας ἐκ πάντων
 αἰρέσει, ὀλιγαρχικόν, ὀλιγαρχικώτερον δέ, καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τὸ δὲ τὰς μὲν
 ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν πολιτικὸν ἀριστοκρατικῶς, ἡ αἰρέσει ἡ κλήρω ἡ
 τὰς μὲν αἰρέσει τὰς δὲ κλήρω· τὸ δὲ τινας ἐκ τινῶν αἰρέσει ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ
 τὸ τινας ἐκ τινῶν κλήρω, [μὴ γινόμενον δ' ὁμοίως,] καὶ τὸ τινας ἐκ τινῶν
 ἀμφοῖν. τὸ δὲ τινας ἐξ ἀπάντων τό τε ἐκ τινῶν πάντας αἰρέσει ἀριστοκρατικόν.

20 λιτικόν. καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἰρέσει καθιστά-
 ναι τὰς δὲ κλήρω ἢ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρω τὰς δ' αἰρέ-
 σει, ὀλιγαρχικόν· ὀλιγαρχικώτερον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. 40
 τὸ δὲ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν πολιτικὸν ἀρι-
 21 στοκρατικῶς, ἢ τὰς μὲν αἰρέσει τὰς δὲ κλήρω. τὸ δὲ τι- 1300 b
 νὰς ἐκ τινῶν ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρω,
 μὴ γινόμενον δ' ὁμοίως, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν.
 τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐξ ἀπάντων, τό τε ἐκ τινῶν αἰρέσει πάντας
 22 ἀριστοκρατικόν†. οἱ μὲν οὖν τρόποι τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς το- 5
 σοῦτοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἰσι, καὶ διήρηνται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας
 οὕτως· τίνα δὲ τίσι συμφέρει καὶ πῶς δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὰς κα-
 ταστάσεις, ἅμα ταῖς δυνάμεσι τῶν ἀρχῶν, [καὶ] τίνες εἰσίν,
 ἔσται φανερόν. λέγω δὲ δύνάμιν ἀρχῆς, οἶον τὴν κυρίαν
 τῶν προσδόων καὶ τὴν κυρίαν τῆς φυλακῆς· ἄλλο γὰρ 10
 εἶδος δυνάμεως οἶον στρατηγίας καὶ τῆς τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγο-
 ρὰν συμβολαίων κυρίας.

Λοιπὸν δὲ τῶν τριῶν περὶ δικαστηρίων εἰπεῖν. ληπτέον 16
 δὲ καὶ τούτων τοὺς τρόπους κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν. ἔστι
 δὲ διαφορὰ τῶν δικαστηρίων ἐν τρισὶν ὁροῖς, ἐξ ὧν τε καὶ 15
 περὶ ὧν καὶ πῶς. λέγω δὲ ἐξ ὧν μὲν, πότερον ἐκ πάν-
 των ἢ ἐκ τινῶν· περὶ ὧν δέ, πόσα εἶδη δικαστηρίων· τὸ δὲ
 2 πῶς, πότερον κλήρω ἢ αἰρέσει. πρῶτον οὖν διαιρείσθω πόσα
 εἶδη δικαστηρίων. ἔστι δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὀκτώ, ἔν μὲν εὐθυ-
 νικόν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴ τίς τι τῶν κοινῶν ἀδικεῖ, ἕτερον ὅσα εἰς 20
 τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει, τέταρτον καὶ ἀρχουσι καὶ ιδιώταις ὅσα
 περὶ ζημιώσεων ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, πέμπτον τὸ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων
 συναλλαγμάτων καὶ ἐχόντων μέγεθος, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα
 3 τό τε φονικὸν καὶ τὸ ξενικόν. φονικοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶδη, ἂν τ'
 ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δικασταῖς ἂν τ' ἐν ἄλλοις, περί τε τῶν ἐκ 25
 προνοίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκουσίων, καὶ ὅσα ὁμολογεῖται μὲν,
 ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου, τέταρτον δὲ ὅσα τοῖς
 φεύγουσι φόνου ἐπὶ καθόδῳ ἐπιφέρεται, οἶον Ἀθήνησι λέγε-
 ται καὶ τὸ ἐν Φρεαττοῖ δικαστήριον, συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα

30 ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ ὀλίγα καὶ ἐν ταῖς μεγάλοις πόλεσιν
 τοῦ δὲ ξενικοῦ ἐν μὲν ξένοις πρὸς ξένους, ἄλλοι ξένοις πρὸς 4
 ἄστούς. ἔτι δὲ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα περὶ τῶν μικρῶν συναλ-
 λαγμάτων, ὅσα δραχμιαῖα καὶ πεντάδραχμα καὶ μικρῶ
 πλείονος· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτων γίνεσθαι κρίσιν, οὐκ
 35 ἐμπίπτει δὲ εἰς δικαστῶν πλῆθος. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων 5
 ἀφείσθω καὶ τῶν φονικῶν καὶ τῶν ξενικῶν, περὶ δὲ τῶν
 πολιτικῶν λέγωμεν, περὶ ὧν μὴ γινομένων καλῶς διαστά-
 σεις γίνονται καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ κινήσεις. ἀνάγκη δ'
 ἦτοι πάντας περὶ πάντων κρίνειν τῶν διηρημένων αἰρέσει
 40 ἢ κλήρῳ, ἢ πάντας περὶ πάντων τὰ μὲν κλήρῳ τὰ δ'
 αἰρέσει, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων τῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν κλήρῳ τοὺς δ'
 1301 a αἰρετούς. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οἱ τρόποι τέτταρες τὸν ἀριθμόν, το- 6
 σοῦτοι δ' ἕτεροι καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος· πάλιν γὰρ ἐκ τινῶν
 καὶ οἱ δικάζοντες περὶ πάντων αἰρέσει, ἢ ἐκ τινῶν περὶ
 πάντων κλήρῳ, ἢ τὰ μὲν κλήρῳ τὰ δὲ αἰρέσει, ἢ ἕνια δι-
 5 καστήρια περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκ κληρωτῶν καὶ αἰρετῶν. οὗτοι
 μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθησαν, οἱ τρόποι . . . τοῖς εἰρημένοις·
 ἔτι δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ συνδυαζόμενα, λέγω δ' οἷον τὰ μὲν ἐκ πάν- 7
 των τὰ δ' ἐκ τινῶν τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, οἷον εἰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
 δικαστηρίου εἶεν οἱ μὲν ἐκ πάντων οἱ δ' ἐκ τινῶν, καὶ ἢ
 10 κλήρῳ ἢ αἰρέσει ἢ ἀμφοῖν. ὅσους μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται τρόπους 8
 εἶναι τὰ δικαστήρια, εἴρηται· τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα δη-
 μοτικά, ὅσα ἐκ πάντων [ἢ] περὶ πάντων, τὰ δὲ δεύτερα
 ὀλιγαρχικά, ὅσα ἐκ τινῶν περὶ πάντων, τὰ δὲ τρίτα ἀρι-
 στοκρατικά καὶ πολιτικά, ὅσα τὰ μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰ δ'
 15 ἐκ τινῶν.

Η' (Ε').

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ὧν προειλόμεθα σχεδὸν
 20 εἴρηται περὶ πάντων· ἐκ τίνων δὲ μεταβάλλουσιν αἱ πολι-
 τεῖαι καὶ πόσων καὶ ποίων, καὶ τίνες ἐκάστης πολιτείας

φθοραί, καὶ ἐκ ποίων εἰς ποίας μάλιστα μεθίστανται, ἔτι
 δὲ σωτηρίαι τίνες καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστης εἰσίν, ἔτι δὲ
 διὰ τίνων ἂν μάλιστα σώζοιτο τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκάστη, σκε-
 2 πτέον ἐφεξῆς τοῖς εἰρημένοις. δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν ²⁵
 τὴν ἀρχήν, ὅτι πολλαὶ γεγένηται πολιτεῖαι πάντων μὲν
 ὁμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον, τούτου
 3 δ' ἁμαρτανόντων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. δῆμος μὲν
 γὰρ ἐγένετο ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ὅτι οὖν ὄντας οἷσθαι ἀπλῶς ἴσους
 εἶναι (ὅτι γὰρ ἐλεύθεροι πάντες ὁμοίως, ἀπλῶς ἴσοι εἶναι ³⁰
 νομίζουσιν), ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνίσους ἐν τι ὄντας δλωσ
 εἶναι ἀνίσους ὑπολαμβάνειν (κατ' οὐσίαν γὰρ ἄνισοι ὄντες
 4 ἀπλῶς ἄνισοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι). εἴτα οἱ μὲν ὥς ἴσοι
 ὄντες πάντων τῶν ἴσων ἀξιούσι μετέχειν, οἱ δ' ὥς ἄνισοι
 5 ὄντες πλεονεκτεῖν ζητοῦσιν· τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον ἄνισον. ἔχουσι ³⁵
 μὲν οὖν τι πᾶσαι δίκαιον, ἡμαρτημέναι δ' ἀπλῶς εἰσίν·
 καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν
 ἦν ἐκάτεροι τυγχάνουσιν ἔχοντες μετέχωσι τῆς πολιτείας,
 6 στασιάζουσιν¹. . . πάντων δὲ δικαϊότατα μὲν ἂν στασιάζοιεν,
 ἥκιστα δὲ τοῦτο πράττουσιν οἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν διαφέροντες· μά- ⁴⁰
 7 λιστα γὰρ εὐλογον ἀνίσους ἀπλῶς εἶναι τούτους μόνον. εἰσὶ ^{1301 b}
 δέ τινες οἱ κατὰ γένος ὑπερέχοντες οὐκ ἀξιούσι τῶν ἴσων
 αὐτοὺς διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα ταύτην· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ εἶναι δο-
 κοῦσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος. ἀρχαὶ
 μὲν οὖν ὥς εἰπεῖν αὐταὶ καὶ πηγαὶ τῶν στάσεων εἰσιν, ὅθεν ⁵
 8 στασιάζουσιν (διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται διχῶς· ὅτε
 μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ὅπως ἐκ τῆς καθεστηκυίας
 ἄλλην μεταστήσωσιν, οἷον ἐκ δημοκρατίας ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ
 δημοκρατίαν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἢ πολιτείαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν
 ἐκ τούτων, ἢ ταύτας ἐξ ἐκείνων· ὅτε δ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν καθε- ¹⁰
 στηκυῖαν πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν προαιροῦνται
 τὴν αὐτήν, δι' αὐτῶν δ' εἶναι βούλονται ταύτην, οἷον τὴν

¹ The insertion here of c. 3. 1303 b 3, στασιάζουσι δὲ . . . 7, ὄντες is suggested in the critical note on 1301 a 39.

ὀλιγαρχίαν ἢ τὴν μοναρχίαν· ἔτι περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ 9
 ἦττον, οἷον ἢ ὀλιγαρχίαν οὔσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχεῖ-
 15 σθαι ἢ εἰς τὸ ἦττον, ἢ δημοκρατίαν οὔσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον
 δημοκρατεῖσθαι ἢ εἰς τὸ ἦττον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν, ἢ ἵνα ἐπιταθῶσιν ἢ ἀνεθῶσιν· ἔτι πρὸς 10
 τὸ μέρος τι κινῆσαι τῆς πολιτείας, οἷον ἀρχὴν τινα κατα-
 στήσαι ἢ ἀνελεῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ φασι Λύσανδρον
 20 τινες ἐπιχειρῆσαι καταλῦσαι τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ Πανσα-
 νίαν τὸν βασιλέα τὴν ἐφορείαν· καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδαμνῳ δὲ με-
 τέβαλεν ἡ πολιτεία κατὰ μόριον, ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν φυλάρ-
 χων βουλήν ἐποίησαν, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἡλιαίαν ἐπάναγκές ἐστιν 11
 ἔτι τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι βαδίζειν τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν
 25 ἐπιψηφίζεται ἀρχή τις, ὀλιγαρχικὸν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀρχῶν ὁ
 εἰς ἦν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ· πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀνισον
 ἢ στάσις· οὐ μὴν (εἰ) τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὑπάρχει ἀνάλογον (ἀίδιος
 γὰρ βασιλεία ἀνισος, ἐὰν ᾗ ἐν ἴσοις)· ὅλως γὰρ τὸ ἶσον
 ζητοῦντες στασιάζουσιν. ἔστι δὲ διττὸν τὸ ἶσον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ 12
 30 ἀριθμῷ τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐστίν. λέγω δὲ ἀριθμῷ μὲν τὸ
 πλήθει ἢ μεγέθει ταῦτ' ὅσον, κατ' ἀξίαν δὲ τὸ τῷ
 λόγῳ, οἷον ὑπερέχει κατ' ἀριθμὸν μὲν ἴσῳ τὰ τρία τοῖν
 δυοῖν καὶ ταῦτα τοῦ ἐνός, λόγῳ δὲ τὰ τέτταρα τοῖν δυοῖν καὶ
 ταῦτα τοῦ ἐνός· ἴσον γὰρ μέρος τὰ δύο τῶν τεττάρων καὶ
 35 τὸ ἐν τῶν δυοῖν· ἄμφω γὰρ ἡμίση. ὁμολογοῦντες δὲ τὸ 13
 ἀπλῶς εἶναι δίκαιον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, διαφέρονται, καθάπερ
 ἐλέχθη πρότερον, οἳ μὲν ὅτι, ἐὰν κατὰ τι ἴσοι ᾖσιν, ὅλως
 ἴσοι νομίζουσιν εἶναι, οἳ δ' ὅτι, ἐὰν κατὰ τι ἀνισοί, πάν-
 των ἀνίσων ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς. διὸ καὶ μάλιστα δύο γίνονται 14
 40 πολιτεῖαι, δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία· εὐγένεια γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ
 1302 α ἐν ὀλίγοις, ταῦτα δ' ἐν πλείοσιν· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ καὶ ἀγα-
 θοὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἑκατόν, εὐποροὶ δὲ πολλαχοῦ. τὸ δὲ
 ἀπλῶς πάντῃ καθ' ἑκατέραν τετάχθαι τὴν ἰσότητα φαῦ-
 λον. φανερόν δ' ἐκ τοῦ συμβαίνοντος· οὐδεμία γὰρ μόνιμος
 5 ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν. τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἀπὸ 15

τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἡμαρτημένου μὴ ἀπαντᾶν εἰς τὸ τέλος κακόν τι. διὸ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ἀριθμητικῇ ἰσότητι χρῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ τῇ κατ' ἀξίαν. ὁμως δὲ ἀσφαλεστέρα καὶ
 16 ἀσταςίαστος μᾶλλον ἢ δημοκρατία τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ἐγγίγνονται δύο, ἣ τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους 10 στάσις καὶ ἔτι ἢ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἢ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μόνον, αὐτῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτόν, ὃ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται τῷ δήμῳ στάσις· ἔτι δὲ ἢ ἐκ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ δήμου ἢ [ἡ] τῶν ὀλιγῶν, ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἀσφαλεστάτη τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν. 15

Ἐπεὶ δὲ σκοποῦμεν ἐκ τίνων αἱ τε στάσεις γίνονται 2 καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, ληπτέον καθόλου πρῶτον τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν. εἰσὶ δὴ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν τρεῖς τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἃς διοριστέον καθ' αὐτὰς τύπῳ πρῶτον. δεῖ γὰρ λαβεῖν πῶς τε ἔχοντες στασιάζουσι καὶ 20 τίνων ἕνεκεν, καὶ τρίτον τίνες ἀρχαὶ γίνονται τῶν πολιτικῶν παραχῶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους στάσεων. τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς ἔχειν πῶς πρὸς τὴν μεταβολὴν αἰτίαν καθόλου μάλιστα θετέον περὶ ἧς ἤδη τυγχάνομεν εἰρηκότες. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἰσότητος ἐφίεμενοι στασιάζουσιν, ἂν νομίζωσιν ἔλαττον 25 ἔχειν ὄντες ἴσοι τοῖς πλεονεκτοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ τῆς ἀνισότητος καὶ τῆς ὑπεροχῆς, ἂν ὑπολαμβάνωσιν ὄντες ἄνισοι μὴ 3 πλεόν ἔχειν ἀλλ' ἴσον ἢ ἔλαττον (τούτων δ' ἐστὶ μὲν ὀρέγεσθαι δικαίως, ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἀδίκως)· ἐλάττους τε γὰρ ὄντες ὅπως ἴσοι ὥσι στασιάζουσι, καὶ ἴσοι ὄντες ὅπως μεί- 30 ζους. πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες στασιάζουσιν, εἴρηται· περὶ ὧν δὲ στασιάζουσιν, ἐστὶ κέρδος καὶ τιμὴ καὶ τάναντία τούτοις· καὶ γὰρ ἀτιμίαν φεύγοντες καὶ ζημίαν, ἢ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν 4 φίλων, στασιάζουσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· αἱ δ' αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν κινήσεων, ὅθεν αὐτοὶ τε διατίθενται τὸν εἰρημένον 35 τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων, ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς τὸν ἀριθμόν 5 ἐπὶ ταῖς τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι, ἐστὶ δ' ὡς πλείους. ὧν δύο μὲν ἐστὶ ταῦτα τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡσαύτως· διὰ κέρδος γὰρ

καὶ διὰ τιμὴν παροξύνονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐχ ἵνα κτή-
 40 σωνται σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀλλ' ἐτέ-
 1302 b ρους ὁρῶντες τοὺς μὲν δικαίως τοὺς δ' ἀδίκως πλεονεκτοῦντας
 τούτων ἔτι διὰ ὕβριν, διὰ φόβον, διὰ ὑπεροχὴν, διὰ κα- 6
 ταφρόνησιν, διὰ αὔξησιν τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον· ἔτι δὲ
 ἄλλον τρόπον δι' ἐριθείαν, δι' ὀλιγωρίαν, διὰ μικρότητα,
 3 δι' ἀνομοιότητα. τούτων δὲ ὕβρις μὲν καὶ κέρδος τίνα ἔχουσι
 δύναμιν καὶ πῶς αἴτια, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ φανερόν· ὕβριζόντων
 τε γὰρ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ πλεονεκτοῦντων στασιάζουσι
 καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τὰς διδούσας
 τὴν ἐξουσίαν· ἡ δὲ πλεονεξία γίνεται ὅτε μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν
 10 ἰδίων, ὅτε δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ, καὶ 2
 τί δύναται καὶ πῶς αἰτία στάσεως· καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἀτιμα-
 ζόμενοι καὶ ἄλλους ὁρῶντες τιμωμένους στασιάζουσιν· ταῦτα
 δὲ ἀδίκως μὲν γίνεται, ὅταν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἡ τιμῶνται
 τινες ἢ ἀτιμάζονται, δικαίως δέ, ὅταν κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν.
 15 δι' ὑπεροχὴν δέ, ὅταν τις ἢ τῇ δυνάμει μείζων, ἢ εἰς ἡ 3
 πλείους, ἢ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ πολιτεύ-
 ματος· γίνεσθαι γὰρ εἶωθεν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων μοναρχία ἢ
 δυναστεία. διὸ ἐνιαχοῦ εἰώθασιν ὀστρακίζειν, οἷον ἐν Ἀργεῖ
 καὶ Ἀθήνησιν· καίτοι βέλτιον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁρᾶν ὅπως μὴ ἐνέ-
 20 σονται τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχοντες, ἢ ἑάσαντας γενέσθαι ἰᾶσθαι
 ὕστερον. διὰ δὲ φόβον στασιάζουσιν οἱ τε ἡδίκηκότες, δεδιό- 4
 τες μὴ δῶσι δίκην, καὶ οἱ μέλλοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι, βουλόμε-
 νοι φθάσαι πρὶν ἀδικηθῆναι, ὥσπερ ἐν Ῥόδῳ συνέστησαν
 οἱ γνώριμοι ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας.
 25 διὰ καταφρόνησιν δὲ καὶ στασιάζουσι καὶ ἐπιτίθενται, οἷον 5
 ἐν τε ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, ὅταν πλείους ᾧσιν οἱ μὴ μετέχον-
 τες τῆς πολιτείας (κρείττους γὰρ οἶονται εἶναι), καὶ ἐν ταῖς
 δημοκρατίαις οἱ εὐποροὶ καταφρονήσαντες τῆς ἀταξίας καὶ
 ἀναρχίας, οἷον καὶ ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις
 30 μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένων ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη, καὶ
 ἡ Μεγαρέων δι' ἀταξίαν καὶ ἀναρχίαν ἡττηθέντων, καὶ ἐν

Συρακούσαις πρὸ τῆς Γέλωνος τυραννίδος, καὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ δὲ
 6 δῆμος πρὸ τῆς ἐπαναστάσεως. γίνονται δὲ καὶ δι' αὐξήσιν
 τὴν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον μεταβολαὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. ὥσπερ
 γὰρ σῶμα ἐκ μερῶν σύγκειται καὶ δεῖ αὐξάνεσθαι ἀνά- 35
 λογον, ἵνα μένῃ ἡ συμμετρία, εἰ δὲ μή, φθείρεται, ὅταν ὁ
 μὲν πρὸς τεττάρων πηχῶν ἢ τὸ δ' ἄλλο σῶμα δυοῖν σπι-
 θαμαῖν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ εἰς ἄλλου ζώου μεταβάλλοι μορφήν,
 εἰ μὴ μόνον κατὰ ποσὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ποιοῦν αὐξά-
 νοιτο παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, οὕτω καὶ πόλις σύγκειται ἐκ 40
 μερῶν, ὧν πολλάκις λανθάνει τι αὐξανόμενον, οἷον τὸ 1303 a
 τῶν ἀπύρων πλῆθος ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις καὶ πολιτείαις.
 7 συμβαίνει δ' ἐνίοτε τοῦτο καὶ διὰ τύχας, οἷον ἐν Τάραντι
 ἡττηθέντων καὶ ἀπολομένων πολλῶν γνωρίμων ὑπὸ τῶν
 Ἰαπύγων μικρὸν ὕστερον τῶν Μηδικῶν δημοκρατία ἐγένετο 5
 ἐκ πολιτείας, καὶ ἐν Ἀργεὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἐβδόμῃ ἀπολομέ-
 νων ὑπὸ Κλεομένους τοῦ Λάκωνος ἠναγκάσθησαν παραδέ-
 ξασθαι τῶν περιοίκων τινάς, καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις ἀτυχούντων
 περὶ οἱ γνώριμοι ἐλάττους ἐγένοντο διὰ τὸ ἐκ καταλόγου
 8 στρατεῦσθαι ὑπὸ τὸν Λακωνικὸν πόλεμον. συμβαίνει δὲ 10
 τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις, ἦττον δέ· πλειόνων γὰρ
 τῶν εὐπόρων γινομένων ἢ τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐξανόμενων μετα-
 9 βάλλουσιν εἰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δυναστείας. μεταβάλλουσι
 δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι καὶ ἀνευ στάσεως διὰ τε τὰς ἐριθείας, ὥσ-
 περ ἐν Ἑραίᾳ (ἐξ αἰρετῶν γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο ἐποίησαν κληρω- 15
 τὰς, ὅτι ἤρουντο τοὺς ἐριθευομένους), καὶ δι' ὀλιγορίαν, ὅταν
 ἐάσωσιν εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς κυρίας παρίεναι τοὺς μὴ τῆς
 πολιτείας φίλους, ὥσπερ ἐν Ὠρεῷ κατελύθη ἡ ὀλιγαρχία
 τῶν ἀρχόντων γενομένου Ἡρακλεοδώρου, ὃς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας
 10 πολιτείαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν κατεσκεύασεν· ἔτι διὰ τὸ παρὰ 20
 μικρὸν· λέγω δὲ παρὰ μικρὸν, ὅτι πολλάκις λανθάνει με-
 γάλῃ γινομένη μετέβασις τῶν νομίμων, ὅταν παρορῶσι
 τὸ μικρὸν, ὥσπερ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ μικρὸν ἦν τὸ τίμημα, τέ-
 λος δ' (ἀπ') οὐδενὸς ἤρχον, ὡς ἐγγὺς ὦν ἡ μηδὲν διαφέρων τοῦ

25 μηδὲν τὸ μικρόν. στασιωτικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον, ἕως 11
 ἂν συμπνεύσῃ (ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος πλήθους πόλις
 γίγνεται, οὕτως οὐδ' ἐν τῷ τυχόντι χρόνῳ). διὸ ὅσοι ἤδη
 συνοίκους ἐδέξαντο ἢ ἐποίκους, οἱ πλείστοι διεστασίασαν, οἷον
 Τροϊζηνίους Ἀχαιοὶ συνώκησαν Σύβαριν, εἴτα πλείους οἱ
 30 Ἀχαιοὶ γενόμενοι ἐξέβαλον τοὺς Τροϊζηνίους, ὅθεν τὸ ἄγος
 συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις· καὶ ἐν Θουρίοις Συβαρίταις τοῖς 12
 συνοικήσασιν (πλεονεκτεῖν γὰρ ἀξιοῦντες ὡς σφετέρας τῆς
 χώρας ἐξέπεσον). καὶ Βυζαντίοις οἱ ἔποικοι ἐπιβουλεύοντες
 φωραθέντες ἐξέπεσον διὰ μάχης· καὶ Ἀντισσαῖοι τοὺς Χίων
 35 φυγάδας εἰσδεξάμενοι διὰ μάχης ἐξέβαλον, Ζαγκλαῖοι
 δὲ Σαμίους ὑποδεξάμενοι ἐξέπεσον αὐτοί· καὶ Ἀπολ- 13
 λωνιάται οἱ ἐν τῷ Εὐξείνῳ πόντῳ ἐποίκους ἐπαγαγόμενοι
 ἐστασίασαν· καὶ Συρακούσιοι μετὰ τὰ τυραννικὰ τοὺς ξένους
 1303 b καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους πολίτας ποιησάμενοι ἐστασίασαν καὶ
 εἰς μάχην ἦλθον· καὶ Ἀμφιπολίται δεξάμενοι Χαλκιδέων
 ἀποίκους ἐξέπεσον ὑπὸ τούτων οἱ πλείστοι αὐτῶν. [στασιάζουσι 14
 δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἀδικοῦμενοι, ὅτι
 5 οὐ μετέχουσι τῶν ἴσων, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἴσοι ὄντες,
 ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ γνώριμοι, ὅτι μετέχουσι τῶν
 ἴσων οὐκ ἴσοι ὄντες.] στασιάζουσι δὲ ἐνίοτε αἱ πόλεις καὶ διὰ 15
 τοὺς τόπους, ὅταν μὴ εὐφυῶς ἔχῃ ἡ χώρα πρὸς τὸ μίαν
 εἶναι πόλιν, οἷον ἐν Κλαζομεναῖς οἱ ἐπὶ Χύτρῳ πρὸς τοὺς
 10 ἐν νήσῳ, καὶ Κολοφώνιοι καὶ Νοτιεῖς· καὶ Ἀθήνησιν οὐχ
 ὁμοίως εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δημοτικοὶ οἱ τὸν Πειραιᾶ οἰκοῦν-
 τες τῶν τὸ ἄστυ. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις αἱ διαβά- 16
 σεις τῶν ὀχετῶν, καὶ τῶν πάνυ σμικρῶν, διασπῶσι τὰς
 φάλαγγας, οὕτως ἔοικε πᾶσα διαφορὰ ποιεῖν διάσταςιν.
 15 μεγίστη μὲν οὖν ἴσως διάστασις ἀρετῇ καὶ μοχθηρίᾳ, εἴτα
 πλοῦτος καὶ πενία, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἑτέρα ἑτέρας μᾶλλον· ὦν
 4 μία καὶ ἡ εἰρημένη ἐστίν. γίνονται μὲν οὖν αἱ στάσεις οὐ
 περὶ μικρῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ μικρῶν, στασιάζουσι δὲ περὶ μεγάλων.
 μάλιστα δὲ καὶ αἱ μικραὶ ἰσχύουσιν, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις

γένωνται, ὅον συνέβη καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις 20
 χρόνοις· μετέβαλε γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ἐκ δύο νεανίσκων στα-
 σιασάντων, ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὄντων, περὶ ἐρωτικὴν αἰτίαν.
 2 θατέρου γὰρ ἀποδημοῦντος ἐταῖρος ὢν τις τὸν ἐρώμενον αὐτοῦ
 ὑπεποιήσατο, πάλιν δ' ἐκείνος τούτῳ χαλεπήνας τὴν γυ-
 ναῖκα αὐτοῦ ἀνέπεισεν ὥς αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν· ὅθεν προσλαμβά- 25
 3 νοντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι διεστασίασαν πάντας. διόπερ
 ἀρχομένων εὐλαβεῖσθαι δεῖ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ διαλύειν τὰς
 τῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ δυναμένων στάσεις· ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ γίγνε-
 ται τὸ ἀμάρτημα, ἢ δ' ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἡμῖς εἶναι παντός,
 ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ μικρὸν ἀμάρτημα ἀνάλογόν ἐστι πρὸς 30
 4 τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν. ὅλως δὲ αἱ τῶν γνωρίμων στά-
 σεις συναπολαύειν ποιοῦσι καὶ τὴν ὅλην πόλιν, οἷον ἐν
 Ἑστιάᾳ συνέβη μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά, δύο ἀδελφῶν περὶ τῆς
 τῶν πατρῶν νομῆς διενεχθέντων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπορώτερος,
 ὥς οὐκ ἀποφαίνοντος [θατέρου] τὴν οὐσίαν οὐδὲ τὸν θησαυρὸν 35
 5 οὐσίαν πολλὴν τοὺς εὐπόρους. καὶ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐκ κηδείας γε-
 νομένης διαφορᾶς ἀρχὴ πασῶν ἐγένετο τῶν στάσεων τῶν
 ὑστερον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ οἰωνισάμενός τι σύμπτωμα, ὥς ἦλθεν 1304 a
 ἐπὶ τὴν νύμφην, οὐ λαβὼν ἀπῆλθεν, οἱ δ' ὥς ὑβρισθέντες
 ἐνέβαλον τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων θύοντος, κᾶπειτα ὥς ἱερό-
 6 συλον ἀπέκτειναν. καὶ περὶ Μιτυλήνην δὲ ἐξ ἐπικλήρων
 στάσεως γενομένης πολλῶν ἐγένετο ἀρχὴ κακῶν καὶ τοῦ 5
 πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐν ᾧ Πάχης ἔλαβε τὴν πόλιν
 αὐτῶν· Τιμοφάνους γὰρ τῶν εὐπόρων τινὸς καταλιπόντος
 δύο θυγατέρας, ὁ περιωσθεὶς καὶ οὐ λαβὼν τοῖς υἱέσιν αὐτοῦ
 Δέξανδρος ἤρξε τῆς στάσεως καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους παρώξυνε,
 7 πρόξενος ὢν τῆς πόλεως. καὶ ἐν Φωκεῦσιν ἐξ ἐπικλήρου 10
 στάσεως γενομένης περὶ Μνασίαν τὸν Μνάσωνος πατέρα καὶ
 Εὐθυκράτη τὸν Ὀνομάρχου, ἡ στάσις αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἱεροῦ
 πολέμου κατέστη τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν. μετέβαλε δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἐπι-
 δάμνῳ ἡ πολιτεία ἐκ γαμικῶν· ὑπομηστευσάμενος γάρ

15 τις [θυγατέρα], ὥς ἐξημίωσεν αὐτὸν ὁ τοῦ ὑπομνηστευθέντος
 πατήρ γενόμενος τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἄτερος συμπαρέλαβε τοὺς
 ἐκτὸς τῆς πολιτείας ὥς ἐπηρασθεῖς. μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ 8
 εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ εἰς δῆμον καὶ εἰς πολιτείαν ἐκ τοῦ
 εὐδοκιμῆσαι τι ἢ αὐξηθῆναι ἢ ἀρχεῖον ἢ μῦριον τῆς πό-
 20 λεως, οἷον ἢ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλή εὐδοκίμησασα ἐν τοῖς
 Μηδικοῖς ἔδοξε συντονωτέραν ποιῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ
 πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος γενόμενος αἷτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλα-
 μῖνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ
 θάλατταν δύναμιν τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν,
 25 καὶ ἐν Ἀργεὶ οἱ γνώριμοι εὐδοκίμησαντες περὶ τὴν ἐν 9
 Μαντινείᾳ μάχην τὴν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπεχείρησαν
 καταλύειν τὸν δῆμον, καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δῆμος αἷτιος
 γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐκ πο-
 λιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλεν, καὶ ἐν Χαλκίδι Φόξον
 30 τὸν τύραννον μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων ὁ δῆμος ἀνελὼν εὐθὺς
 εἵχετο τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ πάλιν ὡσαύτως
 Περιανδρὸν συνεκβαλὼν τοῖς ἐπιθεμένοις ὁ δῆμος τὸν τύ-
 ραννον εἰς ἑαυτὸν περιέστησε τὴν πολιτείαν. καὶ ὅλως δὴ 10
 δεῖ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνειν, ὥς οἱ δυνάμεως αἷτιοι γενόμενοι,
 35 καὶ ἰδιῶται καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ φυλαὶ καὶ ὅλως μέρος καὶ
 ὅποιοι οὖν πλῆθος, στάσιν κινουσιν· ἢ γὰρ οἱ τοῦτοις φθονοῦν-
 τες τιμωμένοις ἀρχουσι τῆς στάσεως, ἢ οὗτοι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν
 οὐ θέλουσι μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἴσων. κινούνται δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι 11
 καὶ ὅταν τάναντία εἶναι δοκοῦντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἰσάζῃ
 1304 b ἀλλήλοις, οἷον οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ ὁ δῆμος, μέσον δ' ἢ μὴδὲν
 ἢ μικρὸν ἀάμπαν· ἂν γὰρ πολὺν ὑπερέχῃ ὅποτερον οὖν τῶν
 μερῶν, πρὸς τὸ φανερώς κρείττον τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ θέλει κινδυ-
 νεύειν. διὸ καὶ οἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν διαφέροντες οὐ ποιοῦσι στάσιν 12
 5 ὥς εἰπεῖν· ὀλίγοι γὰρ γίνονται πρὸς πολλούς. καθόλου μὲν
 οὖν περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἰτίαι τῶν
 στάσεων καὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν τοῦτον ἔχουσι τὸν τρόπον· κι-
 νοῦσι δὲ τὰς πολιτείας ὅτε μὲν διὰ βίας ὅτε δὲ δι' ἀπάτης,

διὰ βίας μὲν ἢ εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἢ ὕστερον ἀναγκάζοντες.
 13 καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπάτη διττή· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐξαπατήσαντες τὸ 10
 πρῶτον ἐκόντων μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν, εἴθ' ὕστερον
 βία κατέχουσιν ἀκόντων, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων τὸν δῆ-
 μον ἐξηπάτησαν, φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλέα χρήματα παρέ-
 ξειν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, ψευδά-
 μενοι δὲ κατέχειν ἐπειρῶντο τὴν πολιτείαν· ὅτε δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς 15
 τε πείσαντες καὶ ὕστερον πάλιν πεισθέντων ἐκόντων ἀρχου-
 σιν αὐτῶν. ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν περὶ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας ἐκ
 τῶν εἰρημένων συμβέβηκε γίγνεσθαι τὰς μεταβολάς·

Καθ' ἕκαστον δ' εἶδος πολιτείας ἐκ τούτων μερίζοντας 5
 τὰ συμβαίνοντα δεῖ θεωρεῖν. αἱ μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίαι μά- 20
 λιστα μεταβάλλουσι διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν·
 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἰδίᾳ συκοφαντοῦντες τοὺς τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντας
 συστρέφουσιν αὐτούς (συνάγει γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐχθίστους ὁ κοινὸς
 φόβος), τὰ δὲ κοινῇ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπάγοντες. καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ
 2 πολλῶν ἂν τις ἴδοι γιγνόμενον οὕτως. καὶ γὰρ ἐν Κῷ ἡ 25
 δημοκρατία μετέβαλε πονηρῶν ἐγγενομένων δημαγωγῶν
 (οἱ γὰρ γνωρίμοι συνέστησαν) καὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ· μισθοφοράν
 τε γὰρ οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἐπόριζον, καὶ ἐκώλυνον ἀποδιδόναι
 τὰ ὀφειλόμενα τοῖς τριηράρχοις, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερο-
 μένας δίκας ἠναγκάσθησαν συστάντες καταλύσαι τὸν δῆ- 30
 3 μον. κατελύθη δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ ὁ δῆμος μετὰ τὸν
 ἀποικισμὸν εὐθὺς διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς· ἀδικούμενοι γὰρ
 ὑπ' αὐτῶν οἱ γνωρίμοι ἐξέπιπτον, ἔπειτα ἀθροισθέντες οἱ
 4 ἐκπίπτοντες καὶ κατελθόντες κατέλυσαν τὸν δῆμον. παρα-
 πλησίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν Μεγάροις κατελύθη δημοκρατία· οἱ 35
 γὰρ δημαγωγοί, ἵνα χρήματα ἔχωσι δημεύειν, ἐξέβαλλον
 πολλοὺς τῶν γνωρίμων, ἕως πολλοὺς ἐποίησαν τοὺς φεύγον-
 τας, οἱ δὲ κατιόντες ἐνίκησαν μαχόμενοι τὸν δῆμον καὶ
 κατέστησαν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. συνέβη δὲ ταῦτόν καὶ περὶ
 Κύμην ἐπὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας ἣν κατέλυσε Θρασύμαχος. 1305 a
 5 σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἂν τις ἴδοι θεωρῶν τὰς με-

ταβολὰς τοῦτον ἐχούσας τὸν τρόπον. ὅτε μὲν γάρ, ἵνα
 χαρίζωνται, ἀδικούντες τοὺς γνωρίμους συνιστᾶσιν, ἢ τὰς οὐσίας
 5 ἀναδάστους ποιοῦντες ἢ τὰς προσόδους ταῖς λειτουργίαις, ὅτε
 δὲ διαβάλλοντες, ἵν' ἔχωσι δημεύειν τὰ κτήματα τῶν πλου-
 σίων. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχαίων, ὅτε γένοιτο ὁ αὐτὸς δημαγω- 6
 γὸς καὶ στρατηγός, εἰς τυραννίδα μετέβαλλον· σχεδὸν γὰρ
 οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀρχαίων τυράννων ἐκ δημαγωγῶν γεγόνα-
 10 σιν. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ τότε μὲν γίγνεσθαι νῦν δὲ μὴ, ὅτι τότε 7
 μὲν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἦσαν ἐκ τῶν στρατηγούντων (οὐ γάρ
 πω δεινοὶ ἦσαν λέγειν), νῦν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἡύξημένης οἱ
 δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγωγοῦσι μὲν, δι' ἀπειρίαν δὲ τῶν
 πολεμικῶν οὐκ ἐπιτίθενται, πλὴν εἴ που βραχύ τι γέγονε
 15 τοιοῦτον. ἐγίνοντο δὲ τυραννίδες πρότερον μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν 8
 καὶ διὰ τὸ μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἐγχειρίζεσθαί τισιν, ὥσπερ
 ἐν Μιλήτῳ ἐκ τῆς πρυτανείας· πολλῶν γὰρ ἦν καὶ με-
 γάλων κύριος ὁ πρύτανις. ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ μεγάλας
 εἶναι τότε τὰς πόλεις, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἰκεῖν τὸν
 20 δῆμον ἀσχολὸν ὄντα πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις, οἱ προστάται τοῦ
 δήμου, ὅτε πολεμικοὶ γένοιτο, τυραννίδι ἐπετίθεντο. πάντες 9
 δὲ τοῦτο ἔδρων ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πιστευθέντες, ἢ δὲ πίστις ἦν ἢ
 ἀπέχθεια ἢ πρὸς τοὺς πλουσίους, οἷον Ἀθήνησιν τε Πεισίστρα-
 τος στασιάσας πρὸς τοὺς πεδιακοὺς, καὶ Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγά-
 25 ροῖς τῶν εὐπόρων τὰ κτήνη ἀποσφάξας, λαβὼν παρὰ τὸν
 ποταμὸν ἐπινέμοντας, καὶ Διονύσιος κατηγορῶν Δαφναίου 10
 καὶ τῶν πλουσίων ἡξιώθη τῆς τυραννίδος, διὰ τὴν ἐχθραν
 πιστευθεὶς ὡς δημοτικὸς ὢν. μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς
 πατρίας δημοκρατίας εἰς τὴν νεωτάτην· ὅπου γὰρ αἱρεταιὶ
 30 μὲν αἱ ἀρχαί, μὴ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων δέ, αἱρεῖται δὲ ὁ δῆ-
 μος, δημαγωγοῦντες οἱ σπουδαρχιῶντες εἰς τοῦτο καθιστᾶσιν
 ὡς κύριον εἶναι τὸν δῆμον καὶ τῶν νόμων. ἄκος δὲ τοῦ ἢ 11
 μὴ γίνεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἤττον τὸ τὰς φυλὰς φέρειν τοὺς
 ἄρχοντας, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντα τὸν δῆμον. τῶν μὲν οὖν δη-
 35 μοκρατιῶν αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται πᾶσαι σχεδὸν διὰ ταύ-
 τας τὰς αἰτίας·

Αἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι διὰ δύο μάλιστα τρό- 6
 πους τοὺς φανερωτάτους· ἓνα μὲν ἐὰν ἀδικῶσι τὸ πλῆθος
 (πᾶς γὰρ ἱκανὸς γίνεται προστάτης, μάλιστα δ' ὅταν ἐξ
 αὐτῆς συμβῇ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας γίνεσθαι τὸν ἡγεμόνα, κα- 40
 θάπερ ἐν Νάξῳ Λύγδαμις, ὃς καὶ ἐτυράννησεν ὕστερον τῶν
 2 Ναξίων)· ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀρχῇ στάσεως διαφο- 1305 b
 ράς· ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν εὐπόρων, οὐ τῶν ὄντων
 δ' ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, γίγνεται κατάλυσις, ὅταν ὀλίγοι σφό-
 δρα ὦσιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς τιμαῖς, οἷον ἐν Μασσαλία καὶ ἐν
 Ἰστροῦ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πόλεσι συμβέβη- 5
 3 κεν· οἱ γὰρ μὴ μετέχοντες τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐκίνουν, ἕως μετέ-
 λαβον οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πρότερον τῶν ἀδελφῶν, ὕστερον δ'
 οἱ νεώτεροι πάλιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀρχουσιν ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν ἅμα πα-
 τήρ τε καὶ υἱός, ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ ὁ πρεσβύτερος καὶ ὁ νεώτερος
 ἀδελφός· καὶ ἔνθα μὲν πολιτικώτερα ἐγένετο ἡ ὀλιγαρχία, 10
 ἐν Ἰστροῦ δ' εἰς δῆμον ἀπετελεύτησεν, ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ δ' ἐξ
 4 ἐλαττόνων εἰς ἑξακοσίους ἦλθεν· μετέβαλε δὲ καὶ ἐν Κνίδῳ
 ἡ ὀλιγαρχία στασιασάντων τῶν γνωρίμων αὐτῶν πρὸς αὐτοὺς
 διὰ τὸ ὀλίγους μετέχειν καί, καθάπερ εἴρηται, εἰ πατήρ,
 υἱὸν μὴ μετέχειν, μηδ' εἰ πλείους ἀδελφοί, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν 15
 πρεσβύτατον, ἐπιλαβόμενος γὰρ στασιαζόντων ὁ δῆμος, καὶ
 λαβὼν προστάτην ἐκ τῶν γνωρίμων, ἐπιθέμενος ἐκράτησεν,
 5 ἀσθενὲς γὰρ τὸ στασιάζον. καὶ ἐν Ἐρυθραῖς δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς
 τῶν Βασιλιδῶν ὀλιγαρχίας ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις, καί-
 περ καλῶς ἐπιμελομένων τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, ὅμως διὰ 20
 τὸ ὑπ' ὀλίγων ἀρχεσθαι ἀγανακτῶν ὁ δῆμος μετέβαλε
 τὴν πολιτείαν. κινεῦνται δ' αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξ αὐτῶν καὶ
 6 διὰ φιλονεικίαν δημαγωγούντων· ἡ δημαγωγία δὲ διττή,
 ἡ μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀλίγοις (ἐγγίγνεται γὰρ δημαγωγὸς
 κἂν πάννυ ὀλίγοι ὦσιν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς τριάκοντα Ἀθήνησιν οἱ 25
 περὶ Χαρικλέα ἰσχυσαν τοὺς τριάκοντα δημαγωγοῦντες, καὶ
 ἐν τοῖς τετρακοσίοις οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον),
 ἡ ὅταν τὸν ὄχλον δημαγωγῶσιν οἱ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ὄντες,

οἷον ἐν Λαρίσῃ οἱ πολιτοφύλακες διὰ τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς
 30 τὸν ὄχλον ἐδημαγῶγουν, καὶ ἐν ὅσαις ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐχ οὗτοι
 αἰροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἄρχοντες εἰσιν, ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν
 ἀρχαὶ ἐκ τιμημάτων μεγάλων εἰσιν ἢ ἐταιριῶν, αἰροῦνται
 δ' οἱ ὀπλῖται ἢ ὁ δῆμος, ὅπερ ἐν Ἀβύδῳ συνέβαιεν, καὶ 7
 ὅπου τὰ δικαστήρια μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἐστίν· δημαγω-
 35 γοῦντες γὰρ πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν,
 ὅπερ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ ἐγένετο τῇ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ· ἔτι δ'
 ὅταν ἔνιοι εἰς ἐλάττους ἔλκωσι τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν· οἱ γὰρ τὸ
 ἴσον ζητοῦντες ἀναγκάζονται βοηθὸν ἐπαγαγέσθαι τὸν δῆ-
 40 μον. γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ ὅταν 8
 ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ἴδια ζῶντες ἀσελγῶς· καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι
 καινοτομεῖν ζητοῦσι, καὶ ἡ τυραννίδι ἐπιτίθενται αὐτοὶ ἢ
 1306 a κατασκευάζουσιν ἕτερον, ὥσπερ Ἰππαρίνος Διονύσιον ἐν Συ-
 ρακούσαις, καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει, ᾧ ὄνομα ἦν Κλεότιμος, τοὺς
 ἐποίκους τοὺς Χαλκιδέων ἤγαγε, καὶ ἐλθόντων διεστasiaσεν
 αὐτοὺς πρὸς τοὺς εὐπόρους, καὶ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ὁ τὴν πρᾶξιν τὴν 9
 5 πρὸς Χάρητα πράξας ἐνεχείρησε μεταβαλεῖν τὴν πολιτείαν
 διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν· ὅτε μὲν οὖν εὐθὺς ἐπιχειροῦσί τι κινεῖν,
 ὅτε δὲ κλέπτουσι τὰ κοινά, ὅθεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς στασιάζουσιν
 ἢ οὗτοι ἢ οἱ πρὸς τούτους μαχόμενοι κλέπτοντας, ὅπερ ἐν
 Ἀπολλωνίᾳ συνέβη τῇ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ. ὁμονοοῦσα δὲ ὀλι- 10
 10 γαρχία οὐκ εὐδιάφθορος ἐξ αὐτῆς. σημεῖον δὲ ἡ ἐν Φαρ-
 σάλῃ πολιτεία· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ὀλίγοι ὄντες πολλῶν κύριοί εἰσι
 διὰ τὸ χρῆσθαι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καλῶς. καταλύονται δὲ
 καὶ ὅταν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ἐτέραν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐμποιῶσιν,
 τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν τοῦ παντὸς πολιτεύματος ὀλίγου ὄντος τῶν 11
 15 μεγίστων ἀρχῶν μὴ μετέχωσιν οἱ ὀλίγοι πάντες, ὅπερ ἐν
 Ἡλιδι συνέβη ποτέ· τῆς πολιτείας γὰρ δι' ὀλίγων οὔσης
 τῶν γερόντων ὀλίγοι πάνπαν ἐγίνοντο διὰ τὸ αἰδιόους εἶναι
 ἐνενήκοντα ὄντας, τὴν δ' αἵρεσιν δυναστευτικὴν εἶναι καὶ
 ὁμοίαν τῇ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι γερόντων. γήματα δὲ με 12
 20 ταβολὴ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ

- ἐν μὲν πολέμῳ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ἀπιστίαν στρατιώ-
ταις ἀναγκαζομένων χρησθαι (φῶ γὰρ ἂν ἐγχειρίσωσιν,
οὗτος πολλάκις γίγνεται τύραννος, ὥσπερ ἐν Κορίνθῳ Τι-
μοφάνης· ἂν δὲ πλείους, οὗτοι αὐτοῖς περιποιούνται δυνα-
στείαν), ὅτε δὲ ταῦτα δεδιότες μεταδιδόασι τῷ πλήθει τῆς 25
- 13 πολιτείας διὰ τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ χρῆσθαι· ἐν δὲ
τῇ εἰρήνῃ διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐγχειρί-
ζουσι τὴν φυλακὴν στρατιώταις καὶ ἀρχοντι μεσιδίῳ, ὃς
ἐνίοτε γίνεται κύριος ἀμφοτέρων, ὅπερ συνέβη ἐν Λαρίσῃ
ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀλευαδῶν ἀρχῆς τῶν περὶ Σίμον καὶ ἐν 30
- 14 Ἀβύδῳ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐταιριῶν ὧν ἦν μία ἡ Ἰφιάδου. γίνονται
δὲ στάσεις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ περιωθεῖσθαι ἐτέρους ὑφ' ἐτέρων τῶν
ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ αὐτῶν καὶ καταστασιάζεσθαι κατὰ γά-
μους ἢ δίκας, οἷον ἐκ γαμικῆς μὲν αἰτίας αἱ εἰρημέναι
πρότερον, καὶ τὴν ἐν Ἑρετρίᾳ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαν τὴν τῶν ἱπ- 35
- 15 πέων Διαγόρας κατέλυσεν ἀδικηθεῖς περὶ γάμον, ἐκ δὲ
δικαστηρίου κρίσεως ἡ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ στάσις ἐγένετο καὶ ἐν
Θήβαις, ἐπ' αἰτία μοιχείας δικαίως μὲν στασιωτικῶς δὲ
ποιησαμένων τὴν κόλασιν τῶν μὲν ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ κατ' Εὐρυ-
τίωνος, τῶν δ' ἐν Θήβαις κατ' Ἀρχίου· ἐφιλονέικησαν γὰρ 1306 b
αὐτοὺς οἱ ἐχθροὶ ὥστε δεθῆναι ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐν τῷ κύφῳι.
- 16 πολλὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ ἄγαν δεσποτικὰς εἶναι τὰς ὀλιγαρ-
χίας ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τινῶν δυσχερανάντων κατε-
λύθησαν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Κνίδῳ καὶ ἡ ἐν Χίῳ ὀλιγαρχία. 5
γίνονται δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος μεταβολαὶ καὶ τῆς
καλουμένης πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν ἐν ὅσαις ἀπὸ
τιμήματος βουλευοῦσι καὶ δικάζουσι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς
- 17 ἀρχοῦσιν. πολλάκις γὰρ τὸ ταχθὲν πρῶτον τίμημα πρὸς
τοὺς παρόντας καιροῦς, ὥστε μετέχειν ἐν μὲν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ 10
ὀλίγους ἐν δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοὺς μέσους, εὐετηρίας γιγνομένης
δι' εἰρήνην ἢ δι' ἄλλην τιν' εὐτυχίαν συμβαίνει πολλαπλα-
σίου γίνεσθαι τιμήματος ἀξίας τὰς αὐτὰς κτήσεις, ὥστε
πάντας πάντων μετέχειν, ὅτε μὲν ἐκ προσαγωγῆς καὶ

15 κατὰ μικρὸν γινομένης τῆς μεταβολῆς καὶ λανθανούσης,
 ὅτε δὲ καὶ θάττον. αἱ μὲν οὖν ὀλιγαρχίαι μεταβάλλουσι 18
 καὶ στασιάζουσι διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας (ὅλως δὲ καὶ αἱ δη-
 μοκρατίαι καὶ αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξίστανται ἐνίοτε οὐκ εἰς τὰς
 ἐναντίας πολιτείας ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, οἷον
 20 ἐκ τῶν ἐννόμων δημοκρατιῶν καὶ ὀλιγαρχιῶν εἰς τὰς κυ-
 ρίους καὶ ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκείνας)·

7 Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις γίνονται αἱ στάσεις αἱ μὲν
 διὰ τὸ ὀλίγους τῶν τιμῶν μετέχειν, ὅπερ εἴρηται κινεῖν καὶ
 τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας διὰ τὸ καὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν
 25 εἶναι πῶς· ἐν ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ ὀλίγοι οἱ ἄρχοντες, οὐ μέν-
 τοι διὰ ταῦτ' ὀλίγοι, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γε διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ
 ἀριστοκρατία ὀλιγαρχία εἶναι. μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν 2
 ἀναγκαῖον, ὅταν ᾗ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πεφρονηματισμένων ὡς
 ὁμοιον κατ' ἀρετὴν, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι οἱ λεγόμενοι Παρ-
 30 θενίαι (ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων γὰρ ἦσαν), οὓς φωράσαντες ἐπιβου-
 λεύσαντας ἀπέστειλαν Τάραντος οἰκιστάς, ἡ ὅταν τινὲς ἀτι-
 μάζωνται μεγάλοι ὄντες καὶ μηδενὸς ἥττους κατ' ἀρετὴν
 ὑπὸ τινῶν ἐντιμωτέρων, οἷον Λύσανδρος ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων,
 ἡ ὅταν ἀνδρώδης τις ᾖ μὴ μετέχῃ τῶν τιμῶν, οἷον Κι- 3
 35 νάδων ὁ τὴν ἐπ' Ἀγησιλάου συστήσας ἐπίθεσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς
 Σπαρτιάτας, ἔτι ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἀπορῶσι λίαν οἱ δ' εὐπο-
 ρῶσιν (καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις τοῦτο γίνεται· συνέβη
 δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ὑπὸ τὸν Μεσσηνιακὸν πόλε-
 μον· δῆλον δὲ [καὶ τοῦτο] ἐκ τῆς Τυρταίου ποιήσεως τῆς κα- 4
 1307 a λουμένης Εὐνομίας· θλιβόμενοι γὰρ τινες διὰ τὸν πόλεμον
 ἡξίουσαν ἀνάδαστον ποιεῖν τὴν χώραν). ἔτι ἂν τις μέγας ᾗ
 καὶ δυνάμενος ἔτι μείζων εἶναι, ἵνα μοναρχῇ, ὥσπερ ἐν
 Λακεδαίμονι δοκεῖ Πausanias ὁ στρατηγῆσας κατὰ τὸν Μη-
 5 δικὸν πόλεμον καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι Ἄνων. λύνονται δὲ μά- 5
 λιστα αἷ τε πολιτεῖαι καὶ αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ
 τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦ δικαίου παρέκβασιν. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ μὴ με-
 μίχθαι καλῶς ἐν μὲν τῇ πολιτείᾳ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλι-

γαρχίαν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν,
 μάλιστα δὲ τὰ δύο· λέγω δὲ τὰ δύο δῆμον καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν· 10
 ταῦτα γὰρ αἱ πολιτεῖαι τε πειρῶνται μιγνύναι καὶ
 6 αἱ πολλαὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἀριστοκρατιῶν. διαφέρουσι γὰρ
 τῶν ὀνομαζομένων πολιτειῶν αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι τούτῳ, καὶ
 διὰ τοῦτ' εἰσὶν αἱ μὲν ἡττον αἱ δὲ μᾶλλον μόνιμοι αὐτῶν·
 τὰς γὰρ ἀποκλινούσας μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἀρι- 15
 στοκρατίας καλοῦσιν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος πολιτείας· διό-
 περ ἀσφαλέστεραι αἱ τοιαῦται τῶν ἐτέρων εἰσὶν· κρεῖττόν
 τε γὰρ τὸ πλεῖον, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσιν ἴσον ἔχοντες,
 7 οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐπορίαις, ἂν ἡ πολιτεία διδῷ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν,
 ὑβρίζειν ζητοῦσι καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν. ὅλως δ' ἐφ' ὁπότερον ἂν 20
 ἐγκλίῃ ἡ πολιτεία, ἐπὶ ταῦτα μεθίσταται ἐκατέρων τὸ
 σφέτερον αὐξανόντων, οἷον ἡ μὲν πολιτεία εἰς δῆμον, ἀρι-
 8 στοκρατία δ' εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν· ἡ εἰς τάναντία, οἷον ἡ μὲν
 ἀριστοκρατία εἰς δῆμον (ὥς ἀδικούμενοι γὰρ περισπῶσιν εἰς
 τούναντίον οἱ ἀπορώτεροι), αἱ δὲ πολιτεῖαι εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν 25
 (μόνον γὰρ μόνιμον τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον καὶ τὸ ἔχειν τὰ
 9 αὐτῶν). συνέβη δὲ τὸ εἰρημένον ἐν Θουρίοις· διὰ μὲν γὰρ
 τὸ ἀπὸ πλείονος τιμήματος εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς ἑλαττον
 μετέβη καὶ εἰς ἀρχεῖα πλείω, διὰ δὲ τὸ τὴν χώραν ὅλην
 τοὺς γνωρίμους συγκτήσασθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον (ἡ γὰρ πο- 30
 λιτεία ὀλιγαρχικωτέρα ἦν, ὥστε ἐδύναντο πλεονεκτεῖν) . . .
 ὁ δὲ δῆμος γυμνασθεὶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῶν φρουρῶν ἐγένετο
 κρεῖττων, ἕως ἀφείσαν τῆς χώρας ὅσοι πλείω ἦσαν ἔχοντες.
 10 ἔτι διὰ τὸ πάσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας ὀλιγαρχι-
 κὰς εἶναι μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν οἱ γνώριμοι, οἷον καὶ ἐν 35
 Λακεδαιμόνι εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσαὶ ἔρχονται· καὶ ἔξεστι ποιεῖν
 ὃ τι ἂν θέλωσι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μᾶλλον, καὶ κηδεύειν ὅτῳ
 θέλουσιν, διὸ καὶ ἡ Λοκρῶν πόλις ἀπώλετο ἐκ τῆς πρὸς
 Διονύσιον κηδείας, ὃ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὐδ' ἂν
 11 ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμιγμένη. μάλιστα δὲ λανθάνουσιν αἱ 40
 ἀριστοκρατίαι μεταβάλλουσαι τῷ λύεσθαι κατὰ μικρόν, 1307 b

ὅπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καθόλου κατὰ πασῶν τῶν
 πολιτειῶν, ὅτι αἵτιον τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ἐστίν
 ὅταν γάρ τι προῶνται τῶν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, μετὰ τοῦτο
 5 καὶ ἄλλο μικρῷ μείζον εὐχερέστερον κινουσιν, ἕως ἂν πάντα
 κινήσωσι τὸν κόσμον. συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Θουρίων 12
 πολιτείας. νόμου γὰρ ὄντος διὰ πέντε ἐτῶν στρατηγεῖν, γε-
 νόμενοί τινες πολεμικοὶ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ παρὰ τῷ πλήθει
 τῶν φρουρῶν εὐδοκιμοῦντες, καταφρονήσαντες τῶν ἐν τοῖς
 10 πράγμασι καὶ νομίζοντες ῥαδίως κατασχῆσαι, τοῦτον τὸν
 νόμον λύειν ἐπεχείρησαν πρῶτον, ὥστ' ἐξεῖναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς
 συνεχῶς στρατηγεῖν, ὀρῶντες τὸν δῆμον αὐτοὺς χειροτονή-
 σοντα προθύμως. οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι τῶν ἀρχόν- 13
 των, οἱ καλούμενοι σύμβουλοι, ὀρμήσαντες τὸ πρῶτον ἐναν-
 15 τιούσθαι συνεπέισθησαν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τοῦτον κινήσαντας
 τὸν νόμον ἐάσειν τὴν ἑλλην πολιτείαν, ὑπερὸν δὲ βουλόμε-
 νοι κωλύειν ἄλλων κινουμένων οὐκέτι πλέον ἐποιοῦν οὐδέν,
 ἀλλὰ μετέβαλεν ἡ τάξις πᾶσα τῆς πολιτείας εἰς δυνα-
 στείαν τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν. πᾶσαι δ' αἱ πολι- 14
 20 τεῖαι λύονται ὅτε μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν ὅτε δ' ἐξωθεν, ὅταν ἐναν-
 τία πολιτεία ἢ ἡ πλησίον ἢ πόρρω μὲν ἔχουσα δὲ δύναμιν.
 ὅπερ συνέβαιεν ἐπ' Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων· οἱ μὲν
 γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι πανταχοῦ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες
 τοὺς δῆμους κατέλυνον. ὅθεν μὲν οὖν αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται
 25 τῶν πολιτειῶν καὶ αἱ στάσεις, εἴρηται σχεδόν·
 8 Περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστης πολι-
 τείας ἔχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δῆλον ὅτι, εἴπερ
 ἔχομεν δι' ὧν φθείρονται αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἔχομεν καὶ δι' ὧν
 σώζονται· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τάναντία ποιητικά, φθορὰ δὲ
 30 σωτηρία ἐναντίον. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς εὐ κεκραμέναις πολι-
 τεῖαις ὥσπερ ἄλλο τι δεῖ τηρεῖν ὅπως μὴδὲν παρανομῶσι,
 καὶ μάλιστα τὸ μικρὸν φυλάττειν· λανθάνει γὰρ παραδυο-
 μένη ἡ παρανομία, ὥσπερ τὰς οὐσίας τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα
 ἀναιρεῖ πολλάκις γινόμενον. λανθάνει δὲ ἡ δαπάνη 3

διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀθρόα γίνεσθαι· παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ διά- 35
 νοια ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος· εἰ ἕκαστον μι-
 κρόν, καὶ πάντα. τοῦτο δ' ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δ' ὥς οὐ· τὸ
 γὰρ ὅλον καὶ τὰ πάντα οὐ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ σύγκειται ἐκ
 4 μικρῶν. μίαν μὲν οὖν φυλακὴν πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν
 δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι, ἔπειτα μὴ πιστεύειν τοῖς σοφίσματος χάριν 40
 πρὸς τὸ πλήθος συγκειμένοις, ἐξελέγχεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν 1308 a
 ἔργων (ποῖα δὲ λέγομεν τῶν πολιτειῶν σοφίσματα, πρό-
 5 τερον εἴρηται). ἔτι δ' ὁρᾶν ὅτι ἐναι μένουσιν οὐ μόνον ἀρι-
 στοκρατίαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι οὐ διὰ τὸ ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι
 τὰς πολιτείας, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ εὖ χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρ- 5
 χαῖς γινομένους καὶ τοῖς ἔξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῇ
 πολιτεύματι, τοὺς μὲν μὴ μετέχοντας τῇ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ
 τῇ τοὺς ἡγεμονικοὺς αὐτῶν εἰσάγειν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ
 τοὺς μὲν φιλοτίμους μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἰς ἀτιμίαν τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς
 εἰς κέρδος, πρὸς αὐτοὺς δὲ καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας τῇ χρῆσθαι 10
 6 ἀλλήλοις δημοτικῶς. ὃ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πλήθους ζητοῦσιν οἱ
 δημοτικοὶ τὸ ἴσον, τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων οὐ μόνον δίκαιον
 ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστίν. διὸ ἐὰν πλείους ὦσιν ἐν τῇ
 πολιτεύματι, πολλὰ συμφέροι τῶν δημοτικῶν νομοθετημά-
 των, ὅσον τὸ ἐξαμήνους τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, ἵνα πάντες οἱ 15
 ὅμοιοι μετέχωσιν· ἔστι γὰρ ὥσπερ δῆμος ἡδὴ οἱ ὅμοιοι
 (διὸ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐγγίγνονται δημαγωγοὶ πολλάκις, ὥσπερ
 7 εἴρηται πρότερον)· ἔπειθ' ἦττον εἰς δυναστείας ἐμπίπτουσιν αἱ
 ὀλιγαρχίαι καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαι (οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ῥάδιον κα-
 κουργῆσαι ὀλίγον χρόνον ἀρχοντας καὶ πολὺν, ἐπεὶ διὰ 20
 τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ δημοκρατίαις γίνονται τυ-
 ραννίδες· ἡ γὰρ οἱ μέγιστοι ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ ἐπιτίθενται τυραν-
 νίδι, ἔνθα μὲν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἔνθα δ' οἱ δυνάσται, ἡ οἱ τὰς
 8 μεγίστας ἔχοντες ἀρχάς, ὅταν πολὺν χρόνον ἀρχωσιν). σώ-
 ζονται δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ πόρρω εἶναι τῶν 25
 διαφθειρόντων, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐγγύς· φοβούμενοι
 γὰρ διὰ χειρῶν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν· ὥστε δεῖ

τοὺς τῆς πολιτείας φροντίζοντας φόβους παρασκευάζειν, ἵνα
 φυλάττωσι καὶ μὴ καταλύωσιν ὥσπερ νυκτερινὴν φυλα-
 30 κὴν τὴν τῆς πολιτείας τήρησιν, καὶ τὸ πόρρω ἐγγὺς ποιεῖν.
 ἔτι τὰς τῶν γνωρίμων φιλονεικίας καὶ στάσεις καὶ διὰ τῶν 9
 νόμων πειρᾶσθαι δεῖ φυλάττειν, καὶ τοὺς ἔξω τῆς φιλο-
 νεικίας ὄντας, πρὶν παρειληφέναι καὶ αὐτοὺς, ὥς τὸ ἐν
 ἀρχῇ γινόμενον κακὸν γινῶναι οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀλλὰ πολι-
 35 τικοῦ ἀνδρός. πρὸς δὲ τὴν διὰ τὰ τιμήματα γιγνομένην 10
 μεταβολὴν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ πολιτείας, ὅταν συμβαίῃ
 τοῦτο μενόντων μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν τιμημάτων εὐπορίας δὲ
 νομίσματος γιγνομένης, συμφέρει τοῦ τιμήματος ἐπισκο-
 πεῖν τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ παρελθόν, ἐν ὅσαις μὲν
 40 πόλεσι τιμῶνται κατ' ἐνιαυτόν, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον,
 1308 b ἐν δὲ ταῖς μείζουσι διὰ τριετηρίδος ἢ πενταετηρίδος, κὰν ἢ
 πολλαπλάσιον ἢ πολλοστημόριον τοῦ πρότερον, ἐν ᾧ αἱ τι-
 μῆσεις κατέστησαν τῆς πολιτείας, νόμον εἶναι καὶ τὰ τιμή-
 ματα ἐπιτείνειν ἢ ἀνιέναι, ἐὰν μὲν ὑπερβάλλῃ, ἐπιτείνον-
 5 τας κατὰ τὴν πολλαπλασίωσιν, ἐὰν δ' ἑλλείπῃ, ἀνιέντας
 καὶ ἐλάττω ποιοῦντας τὴν τίμησιν. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλι- 11
 γαρχίαις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις μὴ ποιοῦντων μὲν οὕτως ἔνθα
 μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἔνθα δὲ δυναστείαν γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει,
 ἐκείνως δὲ ἐκ μὲν πολιτείας δημοκρατίαν, ἐκ δ' ὀλιγαρ-
 10 χίας πολιτείαν ἢ δῆμον. κοινὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν δῆμῳ καὶ ὀλι- 12
 γαρχίᾳ [καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ] καὶ πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ μήτ' αὐξάνειν
 λίαν μηδένα παρὰ τὴν συμμετρίαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πει-
 ρᾶσθαι μικρὰς καὶ πολυχρονίους διδόναι τιμὰς ἢ ταχὺ
 μεγάλας (διαφθείρονται γάρ, καὶ φέρειν οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρός
 15 εὐτυχίαν), εἰ δὲ μή, μή τοί γ' ἀθρόας δόντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι
 πάλιν ἀθρόας, ἀλλ' ἐκ προσαγωγῆς καὶ μάλιστα μὲν
 πειρᾶσθαι τοῖς νόμοις οὕτως ἄγειν ὥστε μηδένα ἐγγίγνεσθαι
 πολὺ ὑπερέχοντα δυνάμει μήτε φίλων μήτε χρημάτων,
 εἰ δὲ μή, ἀποδημητικὰς ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παραστάσεις αὐτῶν.
 20 ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τοὺς ἰδίους βίους νεωτερίζουσιν, δεῖ ἐμποιεῖν 13

ἀρχὴν τινα τὴν ἐποψομένην τοὺς ζῶντας ἀσυμφόρως πρὸς
 τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐν μὲν δημοκρατία πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν,
 ἐν δὲ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων πολιτειῶν ἐκάστη. καὶ τὸ εὐήμερον δὲ τῆς πόλεως
 14 ἀνὰ μέρος φυλάττεσθαι διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας· τοῦτου δ' 25
 ἄκος τὸ αἰεὶ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις μορίοις ἐγχειρίζειν τὰς
 πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς (λέγω δ' ἀντικεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐπιει-
 κεῖς τῷ πλήθει καὶ τοὺς ἀπόρους τοῖς εὐπόροις) καὶ τὸ πει-
 ρᾶσθαι ἢ συμμιγνύναι τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλήθος καὶ τὸ τῶν
 εὐπόρων ἢ τὸ μέσον αὖξιν· τοῦτο γὰρ διαλύει τὰς διὰ 30
 15 τὴν ἀνισότητά στάσεις. μέγιστον δὲ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ τὸ
 καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ οἰκονομίᾳ οὕτω τετάχθαι ὥστε
 μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς κερδαίνειν. τοῦτο δὲ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς
 16 ὀλιγαρχικαῖς δεῖ τηρεῖν. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἀγανακτοῦσιν εἰργό-
 μενοι τοῦ ἀρχεῖν οἱ πολλοί, ἀλλὰ καὶ χαίρουσιν ἐὰν τις 35
 ἐᾷ πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις σχολάζειν, ὥς ἐὰν οἴωνται τὰ κοινὰ
 κλέπτειν τοὺς ἀρχοντας, τότε δ' ἀμφοτέρω λαυπεῖ, τὸ τε
 17 τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχειν καὶ τὸ τῶν κερδῶν. μοναχῶς δὲ
 καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα εἶναι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν,
 εἰ τοῦτο κατασκευάσειέ τις· ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοὺς 40
 γνωρίμους καὶ τὸ πλήθος ἔχειν ἃ βούλονται ἀμφοτέρους. 1309 a
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ἀρχεῖν δημοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ τοὺς
 18 γνωρίμους εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀριστοκρατικόν, τοῦτο δ'
 ἔσται ὅταν μὴ ἢ κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν· οἱ γὰρ ἀπο-
 ροὶ οὐ βουλήσονται ἀρχεῖν τῷ μηδὲν κερδαίνειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς 5
 τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι μάλλον, οἱ δὲ εὐποροὶ δυνήσονται διὰ τὸ
 μηδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι τῶν κοινῶν· ὥστε συμβήσεται τοῖς μὲν
 ἀπόροις γίγνεσθαι εὐπόροις διὰ τὸ διατρίβειν πρὸς τοῖς
 ἔργοις, τοῖς δὲ γνωρίμοις μὴ ἀρχεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων.
 19 τοῦ μὲν οὖν μὴ κλέπτεσθαι τὰ κοινὰ ἢ παράδοσις γιγνέσθαι 10
 τῶν χρημάτων παρόντων πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ ἀντί-
 γραφα κατὰ φρατρίας καὶ λόχους καὶ φυλὰς τιθέσθωσαν·
 τοῦ δὲ ἀκερδῶς ἀρχεῖν τιμὰς εἶναι δεῖ νενομοθετημένας

τοὺς ἀδικουμένους. δὲ δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις τῶν 20
 15 εὐπόρων φείδεσθαι, μὴ μόνον τῷ τὰς ἐτήσεις μὴ ποιῶν ἀνα-
 δέστωις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κατεστῶτες, ὃ ἐν ὁμίαις τῶν πολιτικῶν
 λαοφάνει γιγνόμενον βέλτιον δὲ καὶ βιωλερότερον καλεῖται
 λειτουργεῖν τὰς διαπενηρὰς μὲν μὴ χρησίμους δὲ λειτουργίας,
 ὅλον χορηγίας καὶ λαμπαραρχίας καὶ ὅσαι ἔλαι ποιεῖ-
 20 ται· ἐν δ' ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τῶν εὐπόρων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιῆσθαι
 πολλήν, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀφ' ὧν λήμματα τοῖς ἀποτέ-
 μιν, κἂν τις ὑβρίσῃ τῶν εὐπόρων εἰς τοῦτους, μείζω τὰ
 ἐπιτίμια εἶναι ἢ ἂν σφῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰς κληρονομίας μὴ
 κατὰ δόξιν εἶναι ἀλλὰ κατὰ γένος, καὶ πλείονων ἢ μιᾶς
 25 τὸν αὐτὸν κληρονομεῖν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὁμαλότεραι αἱ οὐσίαι
 εἶεν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς εὐπορίαν ἂν καθίσταντο πλείους.
 συμφέρεται δὲ καὶ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τῶν 21
 ἄλλων ἡ ἰσότης ἢ προεδρίαν νέμειν τοῖς ἡττον κοινωνοῦσι
 τῆς πολιτείας, ἐν μὲν δῆμος τοῖς εὐπόροις, ἐν δ' ὀλιγα-
 30 ρίᾳ τοῖς ἀπόροις, πλὴν ὅσαι ἀρχαὶ κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας,
 ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας ἐγχειρίζειν μόνοις ἢ
 πλείοσιν.

9 Τρία δὲ τινα χρὴ ἔχειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀρξέειν τὰς
 κυρίας ἀρχὰς, πρῶτον μὲν φιλίαν πρὸς τὴν καθεστῶσαν
 35 πολιτείαν, ἔπειτα δύναμιν μεγίστην τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς,
 τρίτον δ' ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ἐκάστη πολιτείᾳ τὴν
 πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταῦτ' ἐν τῷ δίκαιον κατὰ
 πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶναι
 διαφορὰς. ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν, ὅταν μὴ συμβαίῃ ταῦτα 2
 40 πάντα περὶ τὸν αὐτόν, πῶς χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν·
 1309 b ὅσον εἰ στρατηγικὸς μὲν τις εἴη, πονηρὸς δὲ καὶ μὴ τῇ πο-
 λιτείᾳ φίλος, ὃ δὲ δίκαιος καὶ φίλος, πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι
 τὴν αἵρεσιν; ἔοικε δὲ δεῖν βλέπειν εἰς δύο, τίνος πλείον
 μετέχουσι πάντες καὶ τίνος ἔλαττον. διὸ ἐν στρατηγίᾳ μὲν 3
 5 εἰς τὴν ἐμπειρίαν μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς· ἔλαττον γὰρ στρα-
 τηγίας μετέχουσι, τῆς δ' ἐπιεικείας πλείον· ἐν δὲ φυλακῇ

καὶ ταμεία τάναντία· πλείονος γὰρ ἀρετῆς δεῖται ἢ ὅσην
 4 οἱ πολλοὶ ἔχουσιν, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη κοινὴ πᾶσιν. ἀπορήσκει
 δ' ἂν τις κὰν δύναμις ὑπάρχῃ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας φιλία,
 τί δεῖ τῆς ἀρετῆς; ποιήσῃ γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ δύο. 10
 ἢ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τοὺς τὰ δύο ταῦτα ἔχοντας ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι,
 ὥστε καθάπερ καὶ αὐτοῖς οὐχ ὑπηρετοῦσιν εἰδότες καὶ φι-
 λούντες αὐτούς, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἔχειν
 5 ἐνίους; ἀπλῶς δέ, ὅσα ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὡς συμφέροντα λέ-
 γομεν ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἅπαντα ταῦτα σώζει τὰς πολιτείας, 15
 καὶ τὸ πολλάκις εἰρημένον μέγιστον στοιχείον, τὸ τηρεῖν
 ὅπως κρεῖττον ἔσται τὸ βουλομένον τὴν πολιτείαν πλῆθος τοῦ
 6 μὴ βουλομένου. παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν,
 ὃ νῦν λανθάνει τὰς παρεκβεβηκυίας πολιτείας, τὸ μέσον·
 πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν δοκούντων δημοτικῶν λύει τὰς δημοκρα- 20
 7 τίας καὶ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας. οἱ δ' οἰόμενοι
 ταύτην εἶναι μίαν ἀρετὴν ἔλκουσιν εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν,
 ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι καθάπερ ρῖς ἐστὶ παρεκβεβηκυῖα μὲν τὴν
 εὐθύτητα τὴν καλλίστην πρὸς τὸ γρυπὸν ἢ τὸ σιμόν, ἀλλ'
 ὅμως ἔτι καλὴ καὶ χάριν ἔχουσα πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν, οὐ μὴν 25
 ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐπιτείνῃ τις ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν, πρῶ-
 τον μὲν ἀποβαλεῖ τὴν μετριότητα τοῦ μορίου, τέλος δ' οὕτως
 ὥστε μηδὲ ρῖνα ποιήσῃ φαίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ
 τὴν ἔλλειψιν τῶν ἐναντίων, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ
 8 περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μορίων, συμβαίνει δὴ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς 30
 ἄλλας πολιτείας. καὶ γὰρ ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν
 ἔστιν ὥστ' ἔχειν ἱκανῶς, καίπερ ἐξεστηκυίας τῆς βελτίστης
 τάξεως· ἐὰν δέ τις ἐπιτείνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκατέραν αὐτῶν, πρῶ-
 τον μὲν χεῖρω ποιήσῃ τὴν πολιτείαν, τέλος δ' οὐδὲ πολι-
 9 τεῖαν. διὸ δεῖ τοῦτο μὴ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν πο- 35
 λιτικόν, ποῖα σώζει τῶν δημοτικῶν καὶ ποῖα φθείρει τὴν
 δημοκρατίαν, καὶ ποῖα τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.
 οὐδετέραν μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν
 ἀνευ τῶν εὐπύρων καὶ τοῦ πλῆθους, ἀλλ' ὅταν ὁμαλότῃς

40 γένηται τῆς οὐσίας, ἄλλην ἀνάγκη εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πολι-
 1310 α τείαν, ὥστε φθείροντες τοῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν νόμοις φθείρουσι
 τὰς πολιτείας. ἀμαρτάνουσι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις 10
 καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ δη-
 μαγωγοί, ὅπου τὸ πλῆθος κύριον τῶν νόμων· δύο γὰρ
 5 ποιοῦσιν αἰεὶ τὴν πόλιν, μαχόμενοι τοῖς εὐπόροις, δεῖ δὲ
 τούναντίον αἰεὶ δοκεῖν λέγειν ὑπὲρ εὐπόρων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλι-
 γαρχίαις ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου τοὺς ὀλιγαρχικούς, καὶ τοὺς ὄρκους
 ἐναντίους ἢ νῦν ὁμνῦναι τοὺς ὀλιγαρχικούς· νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐν 11
 ἐνίαις ὁμνῶσι “καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι καὶ βουλεύσω
 10 ὃ τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν,” χρῆ δὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ὑπο-
 κρίνεσθαι τούναντίον, ἐπισημαινομένους ἐν τοῖς ὄρκοις ὅτι
 “οὐκ ἀδικήσω τὸν δῆμον.” μέγιστον δὲ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων
 πρὸς τὸ διαμένειν τὰς πολιτείας, οὗ νῦν ὀλιγωροῦσι πάντες,
 τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας. ὄφελος γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν 12
 15 ὠφελιμωτάτων νόμων καὶ συνδεδοξασμένων ὑπὸ πάντων
 τῶν πολιτευομένων, εἰ μὴ ἔσονται εἰθισμένοι καὶ πεπαι-
 δευμένοι ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, εἰ μὲν οἱ νόμοι δημοτικοί, δημο-
 τικῶς, εἰ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοί, ὀλιγαρχικῶς. εἴπερ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐφ'
 ἐνὸς ἀκρασία, ἔστι καὶ ἐπὶ πόλεως. ἔστι δὲ τὸ πεπαιδευ- 13
 20 σθαι πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ τοῦτο, τὸ ποιεῖν οἷς χαίρουσιν οἱ
 ὀλιγαρχοῦντες ἢ οἱ δημοκρατίαν βουλόμενοι, ἀλλ' οἷς δυνή-
 σονται οἱ μὲν ὀλιγαρχεῖν οἱ δὲ δημοκρατεῖσθαι. νῦν δ' ἐν
 μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οἱ τῶν ἀρχόντων υἱοὶ τρυφῶσιν, οἱ
 δὲ τῶν ἀπόρων γίγονται γεγυμνασμένοι καὶ πεπονηκότες,
 25 ὥστε καὶ βούλονται μᾶλλον καὶ δύνανται νεωτερίζειν· ἐν δὲ 14
 ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῖς μάλιστα εἶναι δοκούσαις δημοκρα-
 τικαῖς τούναντίον τοῦ συμφέροντος καθέστηκεν· αἴτιον δὲ τού-
 του ὅτι κακῶς ὀρίζονται τὸ ἐλεύθερον. δύο γὰρ ἐστὶν οἷς ἡ δη-
 μοκρατία δοκεῖ ὀρίσθαι, τῷ τὸ πλεῖον εἶναι κύριον καὶ τῇ
 30 ἐλευθερίᾳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον ἶσον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἶσον δ' ὃ τι 15
 ἂν δόξῃ τῷ πλήθει, τοῦτ' εἶναι κύριον, ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ
 ἶσον τὸ ὃ τι ἂν βούληται τις ποιεῖν· ὥστε ζῆν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύ-

ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται, καὶ εἰς δ' χρήζων,
 16 ὡς φησὶν Εὐριπίδης· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ φαῦλον· οὐ γὰρ δεῖ
 οἶεσθαι δουλείαν εἶναι τὸ ζῆν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἀλλὰ 35
 σωτηρίαν. ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν αἱ πολιτεῖαι μεταβάλλουσι καὶ
 φθείρονται, καὶ διὰ τίνων σώζονται καὶ διαμένουσιν, ὡς
 ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν τοσαῦτά ἐστιν·

Λίπεται δ' ἐπελθεῖν καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας, ἐξ ὧν τε 10
 φθίρεται καὶ δι' ὧν σώζεσθαι πέφυκεν. σχεδὸν δὲ παρα- 40
 πλῆσια τοῖς εἰρημένοις περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ συμ- 1310 b
 2 βαίνοντα περὶ τὰς βασιλείας καὶ τὰς τυραννίδας. ἡ μὲν
 γὰρ βασιλεία κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς
 ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ὑστάτης σύγκειται καὶ δημοκρατίας·
 διὸ δὴ καὶ βλαβερωτάτῃ τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ἐστίν, ἅτε ἐκ δυοῖν 5
 συγκειμένη κακῶν καὶ τὰς παρεκβάσεις καὶ τὰς ἀμαρ-
 3 τίας ἔχουσα τὰς παρ' ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πολιτειῶν. ὑπάρχει
 δ' ἡ γένεσις εὐθύς ἐξ ἐναντίων ἐκατέρα τῶν μοναρχιῶν·
 ἡ μὲν γὰρ βασιλεία πρὸς βοήθειαν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον τοῖς
 ἐπιεικέσι γέγονεν, καὶ καθίσταται βασιλεὺς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν 10
 καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς ἢ πράξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἡ
 καθ' ὑπεροχὴν τοιούτου γένους, ὁ δὲ τύραννος ἐκ τοῦ δήμου καὶ
 τοῦ πλήθους ἐπὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους, ὅπως ὁ δῆμος ἀδικῆται μη-
 4 δὲν ὑπ' αὐτῶν. φανερόν δ' ἐκ τῶν συμβεβηκότων· σχεδὸν
 γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν 15
 5 ὡς εἰπεῖν, πιστευθέντες ἐκ τοῦ διαβάλλειν τοὺς γνωρίμους. αἱ
 μὲν γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κατέστησαν τῶν τυραννίδων, ἥδη
 τῶν πόλεων ἠϋξήμενων, αἱ δὲ πρὸ τούτων ἔκ τε τῶν βασι-
 λέων παρεκβαινόντων τὰ πάτρια καὶ δεσποτικωτέρας ἀρχῆς
 ὀρεγομένων, αἱ δὲ ἐκ τῶν αἰρετῶν ἐπὶ τὰς κυρίας ἀρχάς 20
 (τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαῖον οἱ δῆμοι καθίστασαν πολυχρονίους τὰς
 δημιουργίας καὶ τὰς θεωρίας), αἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν
 6 αἰρουμένων ἕνα τινὰ κύριον ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς. πᾶσι
 γὰρ ὑπῆρχε τοῖς τρόποις τούτοις τὸ κατεργάζεσθαι ῥαδίως,
 εἰ μόνον βουληθεῖεν, διὰ τὸ δύναμιν προϋπάρχειν τοῖς μὲν 25

βασιλικῆς ἀρχῆς, τοῖς δὲ τὴν τῆς τιμῆς, οἷον Φεῖδων μὲν
 περὶ Ἄργος καὶ ἕτεροι τύραννοι κατέστησαν βασιλείας
 ὑπαρχούσης, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ Φάλαρις ἐκ τῶν
 τιμῶν, Παναίτιος δ' ἐν Λεοντίνοις καὶ Κύψελος ἐν Κορίνθῳ
 30 καὶ Πεισίστρατος Ἀθήνησι καὶ Διονύσιος ἐν Συρακούσαις
 καὶ ἕτεροι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐκ δημαγωγίας. καθάπερ οὖν 7
 εἴπομεν, ἡ βασιλεία τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν.
 κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ κατ' ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν ἢ κατὰ γένους,
 ἡ κατ' εὐεργεσίας, ἡ κατὰ ταῦτά τε καὶ δύναμιν. ἅπαν- 8
 35 τες γὰρ εὐεργετήσαντες ἢ δυνάμενοι τὰς πόλεις ἢ τὰ ἔθνη
 εὐεργετεῖν ἐτύγχανον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης, οἱ μὲν κατὰ πῶ-
 λεμον κωλύσαντες δουλεύειν, ὥσπερ Κόδρος, οἱ δ' ἐλευθε-
 ρώσαντες, ὥσπερ Κῦρος, ἢ κτίσαντες ἢ κτησάμενοι χώραν,
 ὥσπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ
 40 Μολοττῶν. βούλεται δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς εἶναι φύλαξ, ὅπως οἱ 9
 1311 α μὲν κεκτημένοι τὰς οὐσίας μὴδὲν ἀδικον πάσχωσιν, ὁ δὲ
 δῆμος μὴ ὑβρίζηται μὴδὲν· ἡ δὲ τυραννίς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται
 πολλάκις, πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπει κοινόν, εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας
 ὠφελείας χάριν. ἔστι δὲ σκοπὸς τυραννικὸς μὲν τὸ ἡδύ,
 5 βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καλόν. διδὼ καὶ τῶν πλεονεκτημάτων τὰ 10
 μὲν χρήματα τυραννικά, τὰ δ' εἰς τιμὴν βασιλικά μᾶλ-
 λον· καὶ φυλακὴ βασιλικὴ μὲν πολιτικὴ, τυραννικὴ δὲ
 διὰ ξένων. ὅτι δ' ἡ τυραννὶς ἔχει κακὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς δη- 11
 μοκρατίας καὶ τὰ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, φανερόν, ἐκ μὲν ὀλι-
 10 γαρχίας τὸ τὸ τέλος εἶναι πλοῦτον (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ διαμέ-
 νειν ἀναγκαῖον μόνως τὴν τε φυλακὴν καὶ τὴν τρυφήν)
 καὶ τὸ τῷ πλήθει μὴδὲν πιστεύειν, διδὼ καὶ τὴν παραίρεσιν
 ποιοῦνται τῶν ὀπλων· καὶ τὸ κακοῦν τὸν ὄχλον καὶ τὸ ἐκ
 τοῦ ἀστεος ἀπελαύνειν καὶ διοικίζειν ἀμφοτέρων κοινόν, καὶ
 15 τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος· ἐκ δημοκρατίας δὲ τὸ 12
 πολεμεῖν τοῖς γνωρίμοις καὶ διαφθεῖρειν λάθρᾳ καὶ φα-
 νερώς καὶ φυγαδεύειν ὡς ἀντιτέχνους καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν
 ἐμποδίου· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς

- ἐπιβουλὰς, τῶν μὲν ἀρχεῖν αὐτῶν βουλομένων, τῶν δὲ μὴ
 13 δουλεύειν. ὁθεν καὶ τὸ Περιάνδρου πρὸς Θρασύβουλον συμ- 20
 βούλευμά ἐστιν, ἡ τῶν ὑπερέχοντων σταχῶν κλόουσιν, ὥς
 δεῖον αἰεὶ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν πολιτῶν ἀναιρεῖν. καθάπερ
 οὖν σχεδὸν ἐλέχθη, τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρχὰς δεῖ νομίζειν περὶ τε
 τὰς πολιτείας εἶναι τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ περὶ τὰς μοναρ-
 χίας· διὰ τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ διὰ φόβον καὶ διὰ κατα- 25
 φρόνησιν ἐπιτίθενται πολλοὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων ταῖς μοναρ-
 χίαις, τῆς δὲ ἀδικίας μάλιστα δι' ὕβριν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ διὰ
 14 τὴν τῶν ἰδίων στέρησιν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τέλη ταυτά, καθά-
 περ κάκει, καὶ περὶ τὰς τυραννίδας καὶ τὰς βασιλείας·
 μέγεθος γὰρ ὑπάρχει πλούτου καὶ τιμῆς τοῖς μονάρχοις, 30
 ὧν ἐφίενται πάντες. τῶν δ' ἐπιθέσεων αἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα
 γίνονται τῶν ἀρχόντων, αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. αἱ μὲν οὖν
 15 δι' ὕβριν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα. τῆς δ' ὕβρεως οὐσης πολυμεροῦς,
 ἕκαστον αὐτῶν αἷτιον γίνεσθαι τῆς ὀργῆς· τῶν δ' ὀργιζο-
 μένων σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι τιμωρίας χάριν ἐπιτίθενται, ἀλλ' 35
 οὐχ ὑπεροχῆς, οἷον ἡ μὲν τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν διὰ τὸ προ-
 πηλακίσαι μὲν τὴν Ἀρμοδίου ἀδελφὴν, ἐπηρεάσαι δ' Ἀρ-
 μόδιον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀρμόδιος διὰ τὴν ἀδελφὴν, ὁ δ' Ἀρι-
 16 στογείτων διὰ τὸν Ἀρμόδιον· ἐπεβούλευσαν δὲ καὶ Περιάν-
 δρου τῷ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ τυράννῳ διὰ τὸ συμπίνοντα μετὰ 40
 τῶν παιδικῶν ἐρωτῆσαι αὐτὸν εἰ ἤδη ἐξ αὐτοῦ κύει· ἡ δὲ 1311 b
 Φιλίππου ὑπὸ Πausανίου διὰ τὸ ἐᾶσαι ὕβρισθῆναι αὐτὸν
 ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἀτταλον, καὶ ἡ Ἀμύντου τοῦ μικροῦ ὑπὸ
 Δέρδα διὰ τὸ καυχῆσασθαι εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ
 τοῦ εὐνοῦχου Εὐαγόρα τῷ Κυπρίῳ· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα 5
 17 παρελέσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἀπέκτεινεν ὥς ὕβρισμένος. πολ-
 λαὶ δ' ἐπιθέσεις γεγέννηται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχυ-
 ναι τῶν μονάρχων τινάς, οἷον καὶ ἡ Κραταίου εἰς Ἀρχέ-
 λαον· αἰεὶ γὰρ βαρέως εἶχε πρὸς τὴν ὀμιλίαν, ὥστε ἰκανὴ
 καὶ ἐλάττων ἐγένετο πρόφασιν, ἡ διότι τῶν θυγατέρων οὐδε 10
 μίαν ἔδωκεν ὁμολογήσας αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν προτέραν,

βασιλικῆς ἀρχῆς, τοῖς δὲ τὴν τῆς τιμῆς, οἷον Φεῖδων μὲν
 περὶ Ἄργος καὶ ἕτεροι τύραννοι κατέστησαν βασιλείας
 ὑπαρχούσης, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ Φάλαρις ἐκ τῶν
 τιμῶν, Παναίτιος δ' ἐν Λεοντίνοις καὶ Κύψελος ἐν Κορίνθῳ
 30 καὶ Πεισίστρατος Ἀθήνησι καὶ Διονύσιος ἐν Συρακούσαις
 καὶ ἕτεροι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐκ δημαγωγίας. καθάπερ οὖν 7
 εἴπομεν, ἡ βασιλεία τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν.
 κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ κατ' ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν ἢ κατὰ γένους,
 ἡ κατ' εὐεργεσίας, ἡ κατὰ ταῦτά τε καὶ δύναμιν. ἀπαν- 8
 35 τες γὰρ εὐεργετήσαντες ἡ δυνάμενοι τὰς πόλεις ἢ τὰ ἔθνη
 εὐεργετεῖν ἐτύγχανον τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης, οἱ μὲν κατὰ πό-
 λεμον κωλύσαντες δουλεύειν, ὥσπερ Κόδρος, οἱ δ' ἐλευθε-
 ρώσαντες, ὥσπερ Κῦρος, ἢ κτίσαντες ἢ κτησάμενοι χώραν,
 ὥσπερ οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ
 40 Μολοττῶν. βούλεται δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς εἶναι φύλαξ, ὅπως οἱ 9
 1311 α μὲν κεκτημένοι τὰς οὐσίας μηδὲν ἀδικον πάσχωσιν, ὁ δὲ
 δῆμος μὴ ὑβρίζηται μηδέν· ἡ δὲ τυραννίς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται
 πολλάκις, πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπει κοινόν, εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας
 ὠφελείας χάριν. ἔστι δὲ σκοπὸς τυραννικὸς μὲν τὸ ἡδύ,
 5 βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καλόν. διδὲ καὶ τῶν πλεονεκτημάτων τὰ 10
 μὲν χρήματα τυραννικά, τὰ δ' εἰς τιμὴν βασιλικά μάλ-
 λον· καὶ φυλακὴ βασιλικὴ μὲν πολιτικὴ, τυραννικὴ δὲ
 διὰ ξένων. ὅτι δ' ἡ τυραννίς ἔχει κακὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς δη- 11
 μοκρατίας καὶ τὰ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, φανερόν, ἐκ μὲν ὀλι-
 10 γαρχίας τὸ τὸ τέλος εἶναι πλοῦτον (οὕτω γὰρ καὶ διαμέ-
 νειν ἀναγκαῖον μόνως τὴν τε φυλακὴν καὶ τὴν τρυφήν)
 καὶ τὸ τῷ πλήθει μηδὲν πιστεύειν, διδὲ καὶ τὴν παραίρεσιν
 ποιοῦνται τῶν ὅπλων· καὶ τὸ κακοῦν τὸν ὄχλον καὶ τὸ ἐκ
 τοῦ ἄστεος ἀπελαύνειν καὶ διοικίζειν ἀμφοτέρων κοινόν, καὶ
 15 τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος· ἐκ δημοκρατίας δὲ τὸ 12
 πολεμεῖν τοῖς γνωρίμοις καὶ διαφθείρειν λάθρα καὶ φα-
 νερώς καὶ φυγαδεύειν ὡς ἀντιτέχνους καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν
 ἐμποδίου· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς

- ἐπιβουλὰς, τῶν μὲν ἀρχεῖν αὐτῶν βουλομένων, τῶν δὲ μὴ
 13 δουλεύειν. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Περιάνδρου πρὸς Θρασύβουλον συμ- 20
 βούλευμά ἐστιν, ἡ τῶν ὑπερέχόντων σταχύων κόλουσις, ὥς
 δέον αἰεὶ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας τῶν πολιτῶν ἀναιρεῖν. καθάπερ
 οὖν σχεδὸν ἐλέχθη, τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρχὰς δεῖ νομίζειν περὶ τε
 τὰς πολιτείας εἶναι τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ περὶ τὰς μοναρ-
 χίας· διὰ τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ διὰ φόβον καὶ διὰ κατα- 25
 φρόνησιν ἐπιτίθενται πολλοὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων ταῖς μοναρ-
 χίαις, τῆς δὲ ἀδικίας μάλιστα δι' ὕβριν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ διὰ
 14 τὴν τῶν ἰδίων στέρησιν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τέλη ταυτά, καθά-
 περ κάκει, καὶ περὶ τὰς τυραννίδας καὶ τὰς βασιλείας·
 μέγεθος γὰρ ὑπάρχει πλούτου καὶ τιμῆς τοῖς μονάρχοις, 30
 ὧν ἐφίενται πάντες. τῶν δ' ἐπιθέσεων αἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα
 γίνονται τῶν ἀρχόντων, αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. αἱ μὲν οὖν
 15 δι' ὕβριν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα. τῆς δ' ὕβρεως οὕσης πολυμεροῦς,
 ἕκαστον αὐτῶν αἷτιον γίγνεται τῆς ὀργῆς· τῶν δ' ὀργιζο-
 μένων σχεδὸν οἱ πλείστοι τιμωρίας χάριν ἐπιτίθενται, ἀλλ' 35
 οὐχ ὑπεροχῆς, ὅσον ἡ μὲν τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν διὰ τὸ προ-
 πηλακίσαι μὲν τὴν Ἀρμοδίου ἀδελφὴν, ἐπηρέασαι δ' Ἀρ-
 μόδιον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀρμόδιος διὰ τὴν ἀδελφὴν, ὁ δ' Ἀρι-
 16 στογείτων διὰ τὸν Ἀρμόδιον· ἐπεβούλευσαν δὲ καὶ Περιάν-
 δρῳ τῷ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ τυράννῳ διὰ τὸ συμπίνοντα μετὰ 40
 τῶν παιδικῶν ἐρωτῆσαι αὐτὸν εἰ ἤδη ἐξ αὐτοῦ κύει· ἡ δὲ 1311 b
 Φιλίππου ὑπὸ Πausανίου διὰ τὸ ἐᾶσαι ὕβρισθῆναι αὐτὸν
 ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἄτταλον, καὶ ἡ Ἀμύντου τοῦ μικροῦ ὑπὸ
 Δέρδα διὰ τὸ καυχῆσασθαι εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ
 τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρα τῷ Κυπρίῳ· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα 5
 17 παρελῆσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἀπέκτεινεν ὥς ὕβρισμένος. πολ-
 λαὶ δ' ἐπιθέσεις γεγέννηται καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχυ-
 ναι τῶν μονάρχων τινάς, ὅσον καὶ ἡ Κραταίου εἰς Ἀρχέ-
 λαον· αἰεὶ γὰρ βαρέως εἶχε πρὸς τὴν ὀμίλιαν, ὥστε ἱκανῇ
 καὶ ἐλάττων ἐγένετο πρόφασις, ἡ δὲ τῶν θυγατέρων οὐδε 10
 μίαν ἔδωκεν ὁμολογήσας αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν προτέραν,

κατεχόμενος ὑπὸ πολέμου πρὸς Σίρραν καὶ Ἀρράβαιον,
 ἔδωκε τῷ βασιλεῖ τῷ τῆς Ἑλιμείας, τὴν δὲ νεωτέραν τῷ
 υἱεῖ Ἀμύντῃ, οἰόμενος οὕτως ἂν ἐκείνον ἤκιστα διαφέρεισθαι
 15 καὶ τὸν ἐκ τῆς Κλεοπάτρας· ἀλλὰ τῆς γε ἀλλοτριότητος
 ὑπῆρχεν ἀρχὴ τὸ βαρέως φέρειν πρὸς τὴν ἀφροδισιαστικὴν
 χάριν. συνεπέθετο δὲ καὶ Ἑλλανοκράτης ὁ Λαρισαῖος διὰ 18
 τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· ὥς γὰρ χρώμενος αὐτοῦ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ σὺ
 κατῆγεν ὑποσχόμενος, δι' ὕβριν καὶ οὐ δι' ἐρωτικὴν ἐπι-
 20 θυμίαν ᾤετο εἶναι τὴν γεγεννημένην ὁμιλίαν. Πάρρων δὲ
 καὶ Ἡρακλείδης οἱ Αἰνιοὶ Κότυν διέφθειραν τῷ πατρὶ τι-
 μωρούντες, Ἀδάμας δ' ἀπέστη Κότυος διὰ τὸ ἐκτμηθῆναι
 παῖς ὢν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὥς ὕβρισμένος. πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ 19
 εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰκισθῆναι πληγαῖς ὀργισθέντες οἱ μὲν διέ-
 25 φθειραν οἱ δ' ἐνεχείρησαν ὥς ὕβρισθέντες, καὶ τῶν περὶ
 τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ βασιλικὰς δυναστείας, οἷον ἐν Μιτυλήνῃ
 τοὺς Πενθιλίδας Μεγακλῆς περιμόντας καὶ τύποντας ταῖς
 κορύναις ἐπιθέμενος μετὰ τῶν φίλων ἀνεῖλεν, καὶ ὕστερον
 Σμέρδης Πενθίλον πληγὰς λαβὼν καὶ παρὰ τῆς γυναικὸς
 30 ἐξέλκυσθεὶς διέφθειρεν. καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δ' ἐπιθέσεως Δε- 20
 κάμνιχος ἡγεμὼν ἐγένετο, παροξύνων τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους πρῶ-
 τος· αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς ὅτι αὐτὸν ἐξέδωκε μαστιγῶσαι
 Εὐριπίδῃ τῷ ποιητῇ· ὁ δ' Εὐριπίδης ἐχαλέπαινε ἐίπόντος
 τι αὐτοῦ εἰς δυσωδίαν τοῦ στόματος. καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ
 35 διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας οἱ μὲν ἀνῆρέθησαν οἱ δ' ἐπεβουλεύθη-
 σαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διὰ φόβον· ἐν γάρ τι τοῦτο τῶν αἰτίων 21
 ἦν, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὰς μοναρχίας· οἷον
 Ξέρξην Ἀρταπάνης φοβούμενος τὴν διαβολὴν τὴν περὶ Δα-
 ρεῖον, ὅτι ἐκρέμασεν οὐ κελεύσαντος Ξέρξου, ἀλλ' οἰόμενος
 40 συγγνώσεσθαι ὥς ἀμνημονοῦντα διὰ τὸ δειπνεῖν. αἱ δὲ διὰ 22
 1312 α καταφρόνησιν, ὥσπερ Σαρδανάπαλλον ἰδὼν τις ξαίνοντα
 μετὰ τῶν γυναικῶν (εἰ ἀληθῆ ταῦτα οἱ μυθολογοῦντες
 λέγουσιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἄλλου γε ἂν γένοιτο
 τοῦτο ἀληθές), καὶ Διονυσίῳ τῷ ὑστέρῳ Δίῳ ἐπέθετο διὰ τὸ 23

καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶν τοὺς τε πολίτας οὕτως ἔχοντας καὶ 5
αὐτὸν αἰεὶ μεθύοντα¹. . . . καὶ τῶν φίλων δέ τινες ἐπιτίθενται
διὰ καταφρόνησιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πιστεῦσθαι καταφρονοῦσιν
24 ὥς λήσונτες. καὶ οἱ οἰόμενοι δύνασθαι κατασχεῖν τὴν
ἀρχὴν τρόπον τινὰ διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν ἐπιτίθενται· ὥς
δυνάμενοι γὰρ καὶ καταφρονοῦντες τοῦ κινδύνου διὰ τὴν δύ- 10
ναμιν ἐπιχειροῦσι ῥαδίως, ὥσπερ οἱ στρατηγοῦντες τοῖς μο-
νάρχοις, οἷον Κῦρος Ἀστυάγει καὶ τοῦ βίου καταφρονῶν καὶ
τῆς δυνάμεως διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν ἐξηγηκέσθαι, αὐτὸν
δὲ τρυφᾶν, καὶ Σεύθης ὁ Θρᾷξ Ἀμαδόκφ στρατηγὸς ὢν.
25 οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ πλείω τούτων ἐπιτίθενται, οἷον καὶ καταφρο- 15
νοῦντες καὶ διὰ κέρδος, ὥσπερ Ἀριοβαρζάνη Μιθριδάτης.
[μάλιστα δὲ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἐγχειροῦσιν οἱ τὴν φύσιν
μὲν θρασεῖς, τιμὴν δ' ἔχοντες πολεμικὴν παρὰ τοῖς μο-
νάρχοις· ἀνδρία γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχουσα θράσος ἐστίν, δι' ἧς
ἀμφοτέρας, ὥς ῥαδίως κρατήσοντας, ποιοῦνται τὰς ἐπιθέσεις.] 20
τῶν δὲ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἐπιτιθεμένων ἕτερος τρόπος ἐστὶ τῆς
26 αἰτίας παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους πρότερον. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἔνιοι
τοῖς τυράννοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν ὁρῶντες κέρδη τε μεγάλα καὶ
τιμὰς μεγάλας οὐσας αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ τῶν διὰ φιλο-
τιμίαν ἐπιτιθεμένων ἕκαστος προαιρεῖται κινδυνεύειν· ἀλλ' 25
ἐκεῖνοι μὲν διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν, οὗτοι δ' ὥσπερ κὰν
ἄλλης τινὸς γενομένης πράξεως περιττῆς, καὶ δι' ἣν ὄνο-
μαστοὶ γίνονται καὶ γνώριμοι τοῖς ἄλλοις, οὕτω καὶ
τοῖς μονάρχοις ἐγχειροῦσιν, οὐ κτήσασθαι βουλόμενοι
27 μοναρχίαν ἀλλὰ δόξαν. οὐ μὲν ἀλλ' ἐλάχιστοί γε τὸν 30
ἀριθμὸν εἰσιν οἱ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὁρμῶντες· ὑποκεῖ-
σθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τοῦ σωθῆναι μηδὲν φροντίζειν, ἂν μὴ
28 μέλλῃ κατασχήσειν τὴν πράξιν. οἷς ἀκολουθεῖν μὲν δεῖ
τὴν Δίωκος ὑπόληψιν, οὐ ῥάδιον δ' αὐτὴν ἐγγενέσθαι πολ-
λοῖς· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ μετ' ὀλίγων ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ Διονύσιον 35

¹ The insertion here of 17, μάλιστα δὲ . . . 20, ἐπιθέσεις is suggested in the critical note on 1312 a 6.

οὕτως ἔχειν φάσκων ὥς, ὅπου περ ἂν δύνηται προελθεῖν, ἱκανὸν αὐτῷ τοσούτον μετασχεῖν τῆς πράξεως, οἷον εἰ μικρὸν ἐπιβάντα τῆς γῆς εὐθὺς συμβαλεῖ τελευτῆσαι, τοῦτον καλῶς ἔχειν αὐτῷ τὸν θάνατον. φθείρεται δὲ τυραννὶς ἔνα 29
 40 μὲν τρόπον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη πολιτειῶν, ἔξω-
 1312 b θεν, ἐὰν ἐναντία τις ᾗ πολιτεία κρείττων (τὸ μὲν γὰρ βούλεσθαι δῆλον ὥς ὑπάρξει διὰ τὴν ἐναντιότητα τῆς προαιρέσεως· ἃ δὲ βούλονται, δυνάμενοι πράττουσι πάντες), ἐναντία δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι, δῆμος μὲν τυραννίδι καθ' Ἡσίο- 30
 5 δον ὥς κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ δημοκρατία ἡ τελευταία τυραννὶς ἐστίν), βασιλεία δὲ καὶ ἀριστοκρατία διὰ τὴν ἐναντιότητα τῆς πολιτείας (διὸ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πλείστας κατέλυσαν τυραννίδας καὶ Συρακούσιοι κατὰ τὸν χρόνον ὃν ἐπολιτεύοντο καλῶς)· ἔνα δ' ἐξ αὐτῆς, ὅταν οἱ μετέχοντες 31
 10 στασιάσωσιν, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν περὶ Γέλωνα καὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν περὶ Διονύσιον, ἡ μὲν Γέλωνος Θρασυβούλου τοῦ Ἰέρωνος ἀδελφοῦ τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Γέλωνος δημαγωγούντος καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὰς ὀρμῶντος, ἢν' αὐτὸς ἄρχῃ, τῶν δὲ οἰκείων συστησάντων, ἵνα μὴ τυραννὶς ὅλως καταλυθῇ ἀλλὰ Θρασύβουλος, οἱ
 15 δὲ συστάντες αὐτῶν, ὥς καιρὸν ἔχοντες, ἐξέβαλον ἅπαντας αὐτούς· Διονύσιον δὲ Δίων στρατεύσας, κηδεστὴς ὢν, καὶ 32
 20 τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ μῖσος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ καταφρονεῖσθαι πολλὰ γίνονται τῶν καταλύσεων. σημεῖον δέ· τῶν μὲν γὰρ κτη- 33
 30 σαμένων οἱ πλείστοι καὶ διεφύλαξαν τὰς ἀρχάς, οἱ δὲ παραλαβόντες εὐθὺς ὥς εἰπεῖν ἀπολλύουσι πάντες· ἀπολαυστικῶς γὰρ ζῶντες εὐκαταφρόνητοί τε γίνονται καὶ
 25 πολλοὺς καιροὺς παραδιδόασιν τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. μόριον δέ τι τοῦ μίσους καὶ τὴν ὀργὴν δεῖ τιθέναι· τρόπον γάρ τινα τῶν αὐτῶν αἰτία γίνεται πράξεων. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πρα- 34
 30 κτικώτερον τοῦ μίσους· συντονώτερον γὰρ ἐπιτίθενται διὰ τὸ

μὴ χρῆσθαι λογισμῷ τὸ πάθος (μάλιστα δὲ συμβαίνει
 τοῖς θυμοῖς ἀκολουθεῖν διὰ τὴν ὕβριν, δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἡ τε 30
 τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν κατελύθη τυραννὶς καὶ πολλὰ τῶν
 35 ἄλλων). ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ μῖσος· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀργὴ μετὰ
 λύπης πάρεστιν, ὥστε οὐ ῥάδιον λογίζεσθαι, ἡ δ' ἔχθρα ἀνευ
 λύπης. ὥς δὲ ἐν κεφαλαίοις εἰπεῖν, ὅσας αἰτίας εἰρήκαμεν
 τῆς τε ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ἀκράτου καὶ τελευταίας καὶ τῆς 35
 δημοκρατίας τῆς ἐσχάτης, τοσαύτας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος
 θετέον· καὶ γὰρ αὐταὶ τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι διαιρεταὶ τυραν-
 36 νίδες. βασιλεία δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν ἔξωθεν ἥκιστα φθείρεται,
 διὸ καὶ πολυχρόνιός ἐστιν· ἐξ αὐτῆς δ' αἱ πλείσται φθοραὶ
 συμβαίνουσιν. φθείρεται δὲ κατὰ δύο τρόπους, ἓνα μὲν 40
 στασιασάντων τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς βασιλείας, ἄλλον δὲ 1313 a
 τρόπον τυραννικώτερον πειρωμένων διοικεῖν, ὅταν εἶναι κύριοι
 37 πλειόνων ἀξιώσι καὶ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. οὐ γίνονται δ' ἔτι
 βασιλεῖαι νῦν, ἀλλ' ἂν περ γίνωνται, μοναρχίαι καὶ τυ-
 ραννίδες μᾶλλον, διὰ τὸ τὴν βασιλείαν ἐκούσιον μὲν ἀρχὴν 5
 εἶναι, μειζόνων δὲ κυρίαν, πολλοὺς δ' εἶναι τοὺς ὁμοίους, καὶ
 μηδένα διαφέροντα τοσοῦτον ὥστε ἀπαρτίζειν πρὸς τὸ μέ-
 γεθος καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς. ὥστε διὰ μὲν τοῦτο ἐκόν-
 τες οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν· ἂν δὲ δι' ἀπάτης ἄρξῃ τις ἡ βίαις,
 38 ἥδη δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι τυραννίς. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ γένος βα- 10
 σιλείαις τιθέναί δεῖ τῆς φθορᾶς αἰτίαν πρὸς ταῖς εἰρημέ-
 ναις καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι πολλοὺς εὐκαταφρονήτους, καὶ τὸ δύ-
 ναμιν μὴ κεκτημένους τυραννικὴν ἀλλὰ βασιλικὴν τιμὴν
 ὑβρίζειν· ῥαδίᾳ γὰρ ἐγένετο ἡ κατάλυσις· μὴ βουλομένων
 γὰρ εὐθὺς οὐκ ἔσται βασιλεύς, ἀλλ' ὁ τύραννος καὶ μὴ 15
 βουλομένων. φθεῖρονται μὲν οὖν αἱ μοναρχίαι διὰ ταύτας
 καὶ τοιαύτας ἐτέρας αἰτίας·

Σώζονται δὲ δῆλον ὥς ἀπλῶς μὲν εἰπεῖν ἐκ τῶν 11
 ἐναντίων, ὥς δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον τῷ τὰς μὲν βασιλείας ἀγειν
 ἐπὶ τὸ μετριώτερον. ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν ἐλαττόνων ᾧσι κύριοι, 20
 πλείῳ χρόνον ἀναγκαῖον μένειν πᾶσαν τὴν ἀρχήν· αὐτοῖ

τε γὰρ ἦττον γίνονται δεσποτικοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἡθεσιν ἴσοι μᾶλ-
 λον, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων φθονοῦνται ἦττον. διὰ γὰρ 2
 τοῦτο καὶ ἡ περὶ Μολοττοὺς πολὺν χρόνον βασιλεία διέμεινεν,
 25 καὶ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε εἰς δύο μέρη
 διαιρεθῆναι τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ πάλιν Θεοπόμπου μετριάσαντος
 τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴν ἐπικαταστήσαν-
 τος· τῆς γὰρ δυνάμεως ἀφελὼν ἡύξησε τῷ χρόνῳ τὴν
 βασιλείαν, ὥστε τρόπον τινὰ ἐποίησεν οὐκ ἐλάττωνα ἀλλὰ
 30 μείζονα αὐτήν. ὑπερ καὶ πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα ἀποκρίνασθαι 3
 φασιν αὐτόν, εἰποῦσαν εἰ μηδὲν αἰσχύνεται τὴν βασιλείαν
 ἐλάττω παραδίδους τοῖς υἱέσιν ἢ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παρέλα-
 βεν· “οὐ δῆτα” φάναι· “παραδίδωμι γὰρ πολυχρονιωτέραν.”
 αἱ δὲ τυραννίδες σώζονται κατὰ δύο τρόπους τοὺς ἐναντιω- 4
 35 τάτους, ὧν ἑτερός ἐστίν ὁ παραδεδομένος καὶ καθ’ ὃν διοι-
 κοῦσιν οἱ πλείστοι τῶν τυράννων τὴν ἀρχήν. τούτων δὲ τὰ
 πολλὰ φασὶ καταστήσαι Περὶανδρον τὸν Κορίνθιον· πολλὰ
 δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῆς Περσῶν ἀρχῆς ἔστι τοιαῦτα λαβεῖν.
 ἔστι δὲ τὰ τε πάλαι λεχθέντα πρὸς σωτηρίαν, ὥς οἶδόν τε, 5
 40 τῆς τυραννίδος, τὸ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας κολουεῖν καὶ τοὺς φρονη-
 ματίας ἀναιρεῖν, καὶ μήτε συσσίτια ἔαν μήτε ἐταιρίαν
 1313 b μήτε παιδείαν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν τοιοῦτον, ἀλλὰ πάντα
 φυλάττειν ὅθεν εἴωθε γίγνεσθαι δύο, φρόνημά τε καὶ πίστις,
 καὶ μήτε σχολὰς μήτε ἄλλους συλλόγους ἐπιτρέπειν γίνε-
 σθαι σχολαστικούς, καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν ἐξ ὧν ὅτι μάλιστα
 5 ἀγνώτες ἀλλήλοις ἔσονται πάντες (ἢ γὰρ γνώσις πίστιν
 ποιεῖ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους)· καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας αἰεὶ 6
 φανεροὺς εἶναι καὶ διατρίβειν περὶ θύρας (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν
 ἥκιστα λανθάνοιεν τί πράττουσι, καὶ φρονεῖν ἂν ἐθίζοιτο
 μικρὸν αἰεὶ δουλεύοντες)· καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα Περσικὰ
 10 καὶ βάρβαρα τυραννικὰ ἐστίν (πάντα γὰρ ταῦτ’ ὀνόματα)
 καὶ τὸ μὴ λανθάνειν πειρᾶσθαι ὅσα τυγχάνει τις λέγων 7
 ἢ πράττων τῶν ἀρχομένων, ἀλλ’ εἶναι κατασκόπους, οἶον
 περὶ Συρακούσας αἱ ποταγωγίδες καλούμεναι, καὶ τοὺς

ὠτακουστὰς ἐξέπεμπεν Ἱέρων, ὅπου τις εἴη συνουσία καὶ σύλ-
 λογος (παρρησιάζονται τε γὰρ ἦττον, φοβούμενοι τοὺς τοιοῦ- 15
 8 τούς, καὶ παρρησιάζονται, λανθάνουσιν ἦττον). καὶ τὸ δια-
 βάλλειν ἀλλήλοις καὶ συγκρούειν καὶ φίλους φίλοις καὶ
 τὸν δῆμον τοῖς γνωρίμοις καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους ἑαυτοῖς· καὶ τὸ
 πένητας ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους τυραννικόν, ὅπως μήτε φυ-
 λακὴ τρέφεται καὶ πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ὄντες ἀσχολοί 20
 9 ὦσιν ἐπιβουλεύειν. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτου αἱ τε πυραμίδες
 αἱ περὶ Αἴγυπτον καὶ τὰ ἀναθήματα τῶν Κυψελιδῶν
 καὶ τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου ἡ οἰκοδόμησις ὑπὸ τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν,
 καὶ τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργα Πολυκράτεια (πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα
 10 δύναται ταύτῳ, ἀσχολίαν καὶ πενίαν τῶν ἀρχομένων). καὶ 25
 ἡ εἰσφορά τῶν τελῶν, οἷον ἐν Συρακούσαις· ἐν πέντε γὰρ
 ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν εἰσηνεγοχέαι συνέ-
 βαιεν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ πολεμοποῖς ὁ τύραννος, ὅπως δὴ ἀσχολοί
 τε ὦσι καὶ ἡγεμόνος ἐν χρεῖα διατελῶσιν ὄντες. καὶ ἡ
 μὲν βασιλεία σώζεται διὰ τῶν φίλων, τυραννικὸν δὲ τὸ 30
 μάλιστ' ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς φίλοις, ὥς· βουλομένων μὲν πάντων,
 11 δυναμένων δὲ μάλιστα τούτων. καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν δημοκρα-
 τίαν δὲ γιγνόμενα τὴν τελευταίαν τυραννικὰ πάντα, γυ-
 ναικοκρατία τε περὶ τὰς οἰκίας, ἵν' ἐξαγγέλλωσι κατὰ τῶν
 ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων ἀνεσις διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν· οὔτε γὰρ 35
 ἐπιβουλεύουσιν οἱ δοῦλοι καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τοῖς τυράννοις,
 εὐημεροῦντάς τε ἀναγκαῖον εὖνους εἶναι καὶ ταῖς τυραννίσιν
 καὶ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ δῆμος εἶναι βούλεται
 12 μόναρχος. διὸ καὶ ὁ κόλαξ παρ' ἀμφοτέροις ἔντιμος, παρὰ
 μὲν τοῖς δῆμοις ὁ δημαγωγός (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ δημαγωγός τοῦ 40
 δήμου κόλαξ), παρὰ δὲ τοῖς τυράννοις οἱ ταπεινῶς ὁμιλοῦντες,
 ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔργον κολακείας. καὶ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο πονηρόφιλον 1314 a
 ἡ τυραννίς· κολακευόμενοι γὰρ χαίρουσιν, τοῦτο δ' οὐδ' ἂν εἰς
 ποιήσῃε φρόνημα ἔχων ἐλευθέρων, ἀλλὰ φιλοῦσιν οἱ ἐπει-
 13 κείς ἢ οὐ κολακεύουσιν. καὶ χρήσιμοι οἱ πονηροὶ εἰς τὰ πο-
 νηρά· ἤλω γὰρ ὁ ἥλος, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία. καὶ τὸ μη- 5

δενὶ χαίρειν σεμνῷ μὴδ' ἐλευθέρῳ τυραννικόν· αὐτὸν γὰρ
 εἶναι μόνον ἀξιοῖ τοιοῦτον ὁ τύραννος, ὁ δ' ἀντισεμνυνόμενος
 καὶ ἐλευθεριάζων ἀφαιρεῖται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ δεσπο-
 τικὸν τῆς τυραννίδος· μισοῦσιν οὖν ὥσπερ καταλύοντας τὴν
 10 ἀρχήν. καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι συσσίτοις καὶ συνημερευταῖς ξενι- 14
 κοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικοῖς τυραννικόν, ὥς τοὺς μὲν πολε-
 μίους τοὺς δ' οὐκ ἀντιποιοιμένους. ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τυ-
 ραννικὰ μὲν καὶ σωτήρια τῆς ἀρχῆς, οὐδὲν δ' ἐλλείπει
 μοχθηρίας. ἔστι δ' ὥς εἰπεῖν πάντα ταῦτα περιειλημμένα
 15 τρισὶν εἴδεσιν. στοχάζεται γὰρ ἡ τυραννὶς τριῶν, ἐνὸς μὲν 15
 τοῦ μικρὰ φρονεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους (οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἂν μικρόψυ-
 χος ἐπιβουλεύσειεν), δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ διαπιστεῖν ἀλλήλοις· οὐ
 καταλύεται γὰρ πρότερον τυραννὶς πρὶν ἢ πιστεύσωσί τινες
 ἐαυτοῖς· διδὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι πολεμοῦσιν ὥς βλαβεροῖς
 20 πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἀρχεσθαι δε-
 σποτικῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ πιστοὺς καὶ ἐαυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς
 ἄλλοις εἶναι καὶ μὴ καταγορεύειν μήτε ἐαυτῶν μήτε τῶν
 ἄλλων. τρίτον δ' ἀδυναμία τῶν πραγμάτων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ 16
 ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις, ὥστε οὐδὲ τυραννίδα καταλύειν μὴ
 25 δυνάμεως ὑπαρχούσης. εἰς οὗς μὲν οὖν ὄρους ἀνάγεται τὰ
 βουλήματα τῶν τυράννων, οὗτοι τρεῖς τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες·
 πάντα γὰρ ἀναγάγοι τις ἂν τὰ τυραννικὰ πρὸς ταύτας
 τὰς ὑποθέσεις, τὰ μὲν ὅπως μὴ πιστεύωσιν ἀλλήλοις, τὰ
 δ' ὅπως μὴ δύνωνται, τὰ δ' ὅπως μικρὸν φρονῶσιν. ὁ μὲν 17
 30 οὖν εἰς τρόπον δι' οὗ γίνεταί σωτηρία ταῖς τυραννίσιν τοιοῦτός
 ἐστίν, ὁ δ' ἕτερος σχεδὸν ἐξ ἐναντίας ἔχει τοῖς εἰρημένοις
 τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. ἔστι δὲ λαβεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς φθορᾶς τῆς 18
 τῶν βασιλειῶν· ὥσπερ γὰρ τῆς βασιλείας εἰς τρόπον τῆς
 φθορᾶς τὸ ποιεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν τυραννικωτέραν, οὕτω τῆς τυ-
 35 ραννίδος σωτηρία ποιεῖν αὐτὴν βασιλικωτέραν, ἐν φυλάτ-
 τουντα μόνον, τὴν δύναμιν, ὅπως ἀρχὴ μὴ μόνον βουλομέ-
 νων ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ βουλομένων· προῖέμενος γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο
 προῖεται καὶ τὸ τυραννεῖν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ὥσπερ ὑπόθε- 19

σιν δεῖ μένειν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ δοκεῖν
 ὑποκρινόμενον τὸν βασιλικὸν καλῶς, πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ δοκεῖν 40
 φροντίζειν τῶν κοινῶν, μήτε δαπανῶντα (εἰς) δωρεὰς τοιαύτας 1314 b
 ἐφ' αἷς τὰ πλήθη χαλεπαίνουσιν, ὅταν ἀπ' αὐτῶν μὲν
 λαμβάνωσιν ἐργαζομένων καὶ πονούντων γλίσχρως, διδῶσι
 δ' ἐταίραις καὶ ξένοις καὶ τεχνίταις ἀφθόνως, λόγον τε
 ἀποδιδόντα τῶν λαμβανομένων καὶ δαπανωμένων, ὅπερ 5
 ἤδη πεποιήκασί τινες τῶν τυράννων (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν τις διοι-
 20 κῶν οἰκονόμος ἀλλ' οὐ τύραννος εἶναι δόξειεν· οὐ δεῖ δὲ φο-
 βεῖσθαι μή ποτε ἀπορήσῃ χρημάτων κύριος ὢν τῆς πό-
 λεως· ἀλλὰ τοῖς γ' ἐκτοπίζουσι τυράννοις ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας
 καὶ συμφέρει τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἢ καταλιπεῖν ἀθροίσαντας· 10
 ἦττον γὰρ ἂν οἱ φυλάττοντες ἐπιτιθεῖντο τοῖς πράγμασιν,
 εἰσὶ δὲ φοβερώτεροι τῶν τυράννων τοῖς ἀποδημοῦσιν οἱ
 φυλάττοντες τῶν πολιτῶν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συναποδημοῦσιν, οἱ
 21 δὲ ὑπομένουσιν). ἔπειτα τὰς εἰσφορὰς καὶ τὰς λειτουργίας
 δεῖ φαίνεσθαι τῆς τε οἰκονομίας ἕνεκα συνάγοντα, κἂν 15
 ποτε δεηθῇ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς καιροὺς, ὅπως τε
 αὐτὸν παρασκευάζειν φύλακα καὶ ταμίαν ὥς κοινῶν ἀλλὰ
 μὴ ὥς ιδίων· καὶ φαίνεσθαι μὴ χαλεπὸν ἀλλὰ σεμνόν,
 ἔτι δὲ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας
 22 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον αἰδεῖσθαι· τούτου μέντοι τυγχάνειν οὐ ῥάδιον 20
 ὄντα εὐκαταφρόνητον, διὸ δεῖ κἂν μὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν
 ἐπιμέλειαν ποιῇται, ἀλλὰ τῆς πολεμικῆς, καὶ δόξαν ἐμ-
 ποιεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην· ἔτι δὲ μὴ μόνον αὐτὸν φαί-
 νεσθαι μηδένα τῶν ἀρχομένων ὑβρίζοντα, μήτε νέον μήτε
 23 νέαν, ἀλλὰ μηδ' ἄλλον μηδένα τῶν περὶ αὐτόν, ὁμοίως 25
 δὲ καὶ τὰς οἰκείας ἔχειν γυναῖκας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας, ὥς
 καὶ διὰ γυναικῶν ὕβρεις πολλὰι τυραννίδες ἀπολώλασιν·
 περὶ τε τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς τούναντίον ποιεῖν
 ἢ νῦν τινὲς τῶν τυράννων ποιοῦσιν (οὐ γὰρ μόνον εὐθὺς
 ἔωθεν τοῦτο δρῶσιν, καὶ συνεχῶς πολλὰς ἡμέρας, ἀλλὰ 30
 καὶ φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις βούλονται τοῦτο πράττοντες, ἵν'

ὡς εὐδαίμονας καὶ μακαρίους θαυμάσωσιν), ἀλλὰ μάλιστα 24
 μὲν μετριάξιν τοῖς τοιούτοις, εἰ δὲ μή, τό γε φαίνεσθαι
 τοῖς ἄλλοις διαφεύγειν (οὔτε γὰρ εὐεπίθετος οὐτ' εὐκατα-
 35 φρόνητος ὁ νήφων, ἀλλ' ὁ μεθύων, οὐδ' ὁ ἀγρυπνος, ἀλλ'
 ὁ καθεύδων). τούναντίον τε ποιητέον τῶν πάλαι λεχθέντων
 σχεδὸν πάντων· κατασκευάζειν γὰρ δεῖ καὶ κοσμεῖν τὴν
 πόλιν ὡς ἐπίτροπον ὄντα καὶ μὴ τύραννον· ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς 25
 τοὺς θεοὺς φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ σπουδάζοντα διαφερόντως (ἡττόν τε
 40 γὰρ φοβούνται τὸ παθεῖν τι παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων,
 1315 a ἐὰν δεισιδαίμονα νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ φρον-
 τίζειν τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἡττον ὡς συμμάχους
 ἔχοντι καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς), δεῖ δὲ ἀνευ ἀβελτερίας φαίνεσθαι 26
 τοιούτον· τοὺς τε ἀγαθοὺς περὶ τι γιγνομένους τιμᾶν οὕτως
 5 ὥστε μὴ νομίζειν ἂν ποτε τιμηθῆναι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν πο-
 λιτῶν αὐτονόμων ὄντων, καὶ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας τιμὰς ἀπο-
 νέμειν αὐτόν, τὰς δὲ κολάσεις δι' ἑτέρων, ἀρχόντων καὶ δι-
 καστηρίων. κοινὴ δὲ φυλακὴ πάσης μοναρχίας τὸ μὴδένα 27
 ποιεῖν ἓνα μέγαν, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, πλείους (τηρήσουσι γὰρ ἀλλή-
 10 λους)· ἐὰν δ' ἄρα τινὰ δέῃ ποιῆσαι μέγαν, μή τοι τό γε
 ἦθος θρασύν (ἐπιθετικώτατον γὰρ τὸ τοιούτον ἦθος περὶ
 πάσας τὰς πράξεις), κἂν τῆς δυνάμεώς τινα δοκῇ παρα-
 λύειν, ἐκ προσαγωγῆς τοῦτο δρᾶν καὶ μὴ πᾶσαν ἀθρόον
 ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν ἐξουσίαν. ἔτι δὲ πάσης μὲν ὕβρεως εἵργε- 28
 15 σθαι, παρὰ πάσας δὲ δεῖν, τῆς τε εἰς τὰ σώματα [κο-
 λάσεως] καὶ τῆς εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν. μάλιστα δὲ ταύτην ποιη-
 τέον τὴν εὐλάβειαν περὶ τοὺς φιλοτίμους· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εἰς
 τὰ χρήματα ὀλιγωρίαν οἱ φιλοχρήματοι φέρουσι βαρέως,
 τὴν δ' εἰς ἀτιμίαν οἱ τε φιλότιμοι καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν
 20 ἀνθρώπων. διόπερ ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι δεῖ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἢ τὰς
 μὲν κολάσεις πατρικῶς φαίνεσθαι ποιούμενον καὶ μὴ δι'
 ὀλιγωρίαν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἡλικίαν ὀμιλίας δι' ἔρωτικὰς
 αἰτίας ἀλλὰ μὴ δι' ἐξουσίαν, ὅλως δὲ τὰς δοκούσας ἀτι-
 μίας ἐξωνεῖσθαι μείζοσι τιμαῖς. τῶν δ' ἐπιχειρούντων ἐπὶ 30

τὴν τοῦ σώματος διαφθορὰν οὗτοι φοβερώτατοι καὶ δέονται 25
 πλείστης φυλακῆς, ὅσοι μὴ προαιροῦνται περιποιεῖσθαι τὸ
 31 ζῆν διαφθείραντες. διδὲ μάλιστα εὐλαβεῖσθαι δεῖ τοὺς ὑβρί-
 ζεσθαι νομίζοντας ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ ὧν κηδόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν·
 ἀφειδῶς γὰρ ἑαυτῶν ἔχουσιν οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ἐπιχειροῦντες,
 καθάπερ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος εἶπε, χαλεπὸν φάσκων εἶναι 30
 32 θυμῷ μάχεσθαι· ψυχῆς γὰρ ὠνεῖσθαι. ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ πόλεις
 ἐκ δύο συνεστήκασιν μορίων, ἐκ τε τῶν ἀπόρων ἀνθρώπων
 καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων, μάλιστα μὲν ἀμφοτέρους ὑπολαμβάνειν
 δεῖ σῶζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ τοὺς ἐτέρους ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτέ-
 ρων ἀδικεῖσθαι μηδέν, ὁπότεροι δ' ἂν ὥσι κρείττους, τούτους 35
 ἰδίους μάλιστα ποιεῖσθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὥς, ἂν ὑπάρξῃ τοῦτο
 τοῖς πράγμασιν, οὔτε δούλων ἐλευθέρωσιν ἀνάγκη ποιεῖσθαι
 τὸν τύραννον οὔτε ὀπλων παραίρεσιν· ἱκανὸν γὰρ θάτερον
 μέρος πρὸς τῇ δυνάμει προστιθέμενον, ὥστε κρείττους εἶναι
 33 τῶν ἐπιτιθεμένων. περίεργον δὲ τὸ λέγειν καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν 40
 τοιούτων· ὁ γὰρ σκοπὸς φανερός, ὅτι δεῖ μὴ τυραννικὸν
 ἀλλ' οἰκονόμον καὶ βασιλικὸν εἶναι φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀρχο- 1315 b
 μένοις καὶ μὴ σφετεριστὴν ἀλλ' ἐπίτροπον, καὶ τὰς μετρί-
 τητας τοῦ βίου διώκειν, μὴ τὰς υπερβολάς, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς μὲν
 34 γνωρίμους καθομιλεῖν, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς δημαγωγεῖν. ἐκ γὰρ
 τούτων ἀναγκαῖον οὐ μόνον τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι καλλίω καὶ 5
 ζηλωτοτέρα τῷ βελτιόνων ἀρχεῖν καὶ μὴ τεταπεινωμένων
 μηδὲ μισούμενον καὶ φοβούμενον διατελεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν
 ἀρχὴν εἶναι πολυχρονιωτέρα, ἔτι δ' αὐτὸν διακείσθαι
 κατὰ τὸ ἦθος ἥτοι καλῶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ ἡμίχρηστον ὄντα,
 καὶ μὴ πονηρὸν ἀλλ' ἡμιπύνηρον. 10

[Καίτοι πασῶν ὀλιγοχρονιώτεραι τῶν πολιτειῶν εἰσὶν 12
 ὀλιγαρχία καὶ τυραννίς. πλείστον γὰρ ἐγένετο χρόνον ἢ
 περὶ Σικυῶνα τυραννίς, ἢ τῶν Ὀρθαγόρου παίδων καὶ αὐτοῦ
 Ὀρθαγόρου· ἔτη δ' αὕτη διέμεινεν ἑκατὸν. τούτου δ' αἴτιον
 15 ὅτι τοῖς ἀρχομένοις ἐχρῶντο μετρίως καὶ πολλὰ τοῖς νό-
 μοις ἐδούλευον, καὶ διὰ τὸ πολεμικὸς γενέσθαι Κλεισθένης

οὐκ ἦν εὐκαταφρόνητος, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις
 ἔδημαγωγουν. λέγεται γοῦν Κλεισθένης τὸν ἀποκρίναντα 2
 τῆς νίκης αὐτὸν ὥς ἐστεφάνωσεν ἔνιοι δ' εἰκόνα φασὶν
 20 εἶναι τοῦ κρίναντος οὕτω τὸν ἀνδριάντα τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ
 καθήμενον. φασὶ δὲ καὶ Πεισίστρατον ὑπομεῖναι ποτε προσ-
 κληθέντα δίκην εἰς Ἀρειον πάγον. δευτέρα δὲ περὶ Κόριν- 3
 θον ἢ τῶν Κυψελιδῶν· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη διετέλεσεν ἔτη τρία
 καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα καὶ ἕξ μῆνας· Κύψελος μὲν γὰρ ἐτυ-
 25 ράννησεν ἔτη τριάκοντα, Περίανδρος δὲ τετταράκοντα καὶ
 τέτταρα, Φαμίτιχος δ' ὁ Γορδίου τρία ἔτη. τὰ δ' αἷτια 4
 ταῦτα καὶ ταύτης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κύψελος δημαγωγὸς ἦν
 καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν διετέλεσεν ἀδορυφόρητος, Περίανδρος
 δ' ἐγένετο μὲν τυραννικὸς, ἀλλὰ πολεμικὸς. τρίτη δ' ἡ 5
 30 τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν Ἀθήνησιν, οὐκ ἐγένετο δὲ συνεχὴς· δις
 γὰρ ἔφυγε Πεισίστρατος τυραννῶν, ὥστ' ἐν ἔτεσι τριάκοντα
 καὶ τρισὶν ἑπτακαίδεκα ἔτη τούτων ἐτυράννευσεν, ὀκτωκαί-
 δεκα δὲ οἱ παῖδες, ὥστε τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο ἔτη τριάκοντα
 καὶ πέντε. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἢ περὶ Ἰέρωνα καὶ Γέλωνα περὶ
 35 Συρακοῦσας. ἔτη δ' οὐδ' αὕτη πολλὰ διέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ 6
 σύμπαντα δυοῖν δέοντα εἴκοσι· Γέλων μὲν γὰρ ἑπτὰ τυ-
 ραννεύσας τῷ ὀγδόῳ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησεν, δέκα δ' Ἰέρων,
 Θρασύβουλος δὲ τῷ ἑνδεκάτῳ μηνὶ ἐξέπεσεν. αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ
 τῶν τυραννίδων ὀλιγοχρόνιαι πᾶσαι γεγόνασιν παντελῶς.]
 40 Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς μο- 7
 ναρχίας, ἐξ ὧν τε φθείρονται καὶ πάλιν σώζονται, σχεδὸν
 1316 a εἴρηται περὶ πάντων· ἐν δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ λέγεται μὲν περὶ
 τῶν μεταβολῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους, οὐ μέντοι λέγεται κα-
 λῶς τῆς τε γὰρ ἀρίστης πολιτείας καὶ πρώτης οὐσης οὐ
 λέγει τὴν μεταβολὴν ἰδίως. φησὶ γὰρ αἷτιον εἶναι τὸ μὴ 8
 5 μένειν μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἐν τινι περιόδῳ μεταβάλλειν, ἀρχὴν δ'
 εἶναι τούτων ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεῖς δύο
 ἀρμονίας παρέχεται, λέγων ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος
 ἀριθμὸς τούτου γένηται στερεός, ὥς τῆς φύσεώς ποτε φύουσης

φαύλους καὶ κρείττους τῆς παιδείας, τοῦτο μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ
 λέγων ἴσως οὐ κακῶς· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ εἶναι τινας οὓς παι- 10
 9 δευθῆναι καὶ γενέσθαι σπουδαίους ἀνδρας ἀδύνατον· ἀλλ'
 αὕτη τί ἂν ἴδιος εἴη μεταβολὴ τῆς ὑπ' ἐκείνου λεγομένης
 ἀρίστης πολιτείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἄλλων πασῶν καὶ τῶν
 γιγνομένων πάντων; καὶ διὰ γε τοῦ χρόνου, δι' ὃν λέγει
 πάντα μεταβάλλειν, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἅμα ἀρξάμενα γίνεσθαι 15
 ἅμα μεταβάλλει, οἷον εἰ τῇ προτέρᾳ ἡμέρᾳ ἐγένετο τῆς
 10 τροπῆς, ἅμα ἅρα μεταβάλλει; πρὸς δὲ τούτοις διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν
 ἐκ ταύτης εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν μεταβάλλει; πλεονάκεις γὰρ
 εἰς τὴν ἐναντίαν μεταβάλλουσι πᾶσαι αἱ πολιτεῖαι ἢ τὴν
 σύνεγγυς. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μετα- 20
 βολῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς Λακωνικῆς, φησί, μεταβάλλει εἰς τὴν
 ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης εἰς δημοκρατίαν, εἰς τυραννίδα
 11 δὲ ἐκ δημοκρατίας. καίτοι καὶ ἀνάπαλιν μεταβάλλουσιν,
 οἷον ἐκ δῆμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς μοναρχίαν.
 ἔτι δὲ τυραννίδος οὐ λέγει οὗτ' εἰ ἔσται μεταβολὴ οὗτ' εἰ μὴ 25
 ἔσται, (οὗτ', εἰ ἔσται,) διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν καὶ εἰς ποίαν πολιτείαν.
 τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι οὐ βραδίως ἂν εἶχε λέγειν· ἀδριστον γάρ,
 ἐπεὶ κατ' ἐκείνον δεῖ εἰς τὴν πρώτην καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην οὕτω
 12 γὰρ ἂν ἐγίνετο συνεχὲς καὶ κύκλος. ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει καὶ
 εἰς τυραννίδα τυραννίς, ὥσπερ ἡ Σικυῶνος ἐκ τῆς Μύρωνος 30
 εἰς τὴν Κλεισθένους, καὶ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Χαλ-
 κίδι ἢ Ἀντιλέοντος, καὶ εἰς δημοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν
 Γέλωνος ἐν Συρακούσαις, καὶ εἰς ἀριστοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ
 13 Χαριλάου ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ . . . ἐν Καρχηδόνι. καὶ εἰς τυ-
 ραννίδα μεταβάλλει ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ 35
 σχεδὸν αἱ πλείους τῶν ἀρχαίων, ἐν Λεοντίνοις εἰς τὴν
 Παναιτίου τυραννίδα καὶ ἐν Γέλᾳ εἰς τὴν Κλεάνδρου καὶ ἐν
 Ῥηγίῳ εἰς τὴν Ἀναξιλάου καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς πόλεσιν
 14 ὡσαύτως. ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν διὰ
 τοῦτο μεταβάλλειν ὅτι φιλοχρήματοι καὶ χρηματισταὶ οἱ 40
 ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι οἱ πολὺ ὑπερέχοντες ταῖς 1316 b

οὐσίαις οὐ δίκαιον οἶονται εἶναι ἴσον μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως
 τοὺς κεκτημένους μηδὲν τοῖς κεκτημένοις· ἐν πολλαῖς τε
 ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐκ ἔξεστι χρηματίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ νόμοι εἰσὶν οἱ
 5 κωλύοντες, ἐν Καραχιδόνι δὲ δημοκρατουμένη χρηματίζον-
 ται καὶ οὕτω μεταβεβλήκασιν. ἀποπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι 15
 δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ὀλιγαρχικὴν, πλουσίων καὶ πενήτων.
 τί γὰρ αὕτη μᾶλλον τῆς Λακωνικῆς πέπονθεν ἢ ὁποιασοῦν
 ἄλλης, οὐ μὴ πάντες κέκτηνται ἴσα ἢ μὴ πάντες ὁμοίως
 10 εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες; οὐδενὸς δὲ πενεστέρου γενομένου ἢ πρότε- 16
 ρον οὐδὲν ἦττον μεταβάλλουσιν εἰς δῆμον ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ἂν
 γένωνται πλείους οἱ ἄποροι, καὶ ἐκ δήμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν,
 ἂν κρεῖττον ἢ τοῦ πλήθους τὸ εὖπορον καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀμελῶ-
 σιν οἱ δὲ προσέχῃσι τὸν νοῦν. πολλῶν τε οὐσῶν αἰτιῶν δι' 17
 15 ὧν γίνονται αἱ μεταβολαί, οὐ λέγει ἀλλὰ μίαν, ὅτι ἀσω-
 τευόμενοι κατατοκιζόμενοι γίνονται πένητες, ὥς ἐξ ἀρχῆς
 πλουσίων ὄντων πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ψευ-
 δος, ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν τῶν ἡγεμόνων τινὲς ἀπολέσῃσι τὰς
 οὐσίας, καινοτομοῦσιν, ὅταν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδὲν γίγνεται
 20 δεινόν, καὶ μεταβάλλουσιν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδὲ τότε εἰς δῆμον 18
 ἢ εἰς ἄλλην πολιτείαν. ἔτι δὲ κἂν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχῃσιν,
 κἂν ἀδικῶνται ἢ ὑβρίζωνται, στασιάζουσι καὶ μεταβάλλουσι
 τὰς πολιτείας, κἂν μὴ καταδαπανήσῃσι τὴν οὐσίαν διὰ τὸ
 ἐξεῖναι ὃ τι ἂν βούλωνται ποιεῖν· οὐ αἰτίαν τὴν ἄγαν ἐλευ-
 25 θερίαν εἶναι φησιν. πλείονων δ' οὐσῶν ὀλιγαρχίων καὶ δη-
 μοκρατιῶν, ὥς μιᾶς οὐσης ἐκατέρας λέγει τὰς μεταβολὰς
 ὁ Σωκράτης. . . .

Θ' (Ζ').

Πόσαι μὲν οὖν διαφοραὶ καὶ τίνες τοῦ τε βουλευτικοῦ
 καὶ κυρίου τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τάξεως,
 καὶ περὶ δικαστηρίων, καὶ ποία πρὸς ποίαν συντέτακται
 πολιτείαν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φθορᾶς τε καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν πολι-

τειῶν, ἐκ ποίων τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται 35
 2 πρότερον· ἐπεὶ δὲ τετύχηκεν εἶδη πλείω δημοκρατίας ὄντα
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως πολιτειῶν, ἅμα τε περὶ ἐκείνων εἴ
 τι λοιπόν, οὐ χεῖρον ἐπισκέψασθαι, καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸν
 3 συμφέροντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς ἐκάστην. ἔτι δὲ καὶ
 τὰς συναγωγὰς αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπισκεπτέον πάντων 40
 τῶν τρόπων· ταῦτα γὰρ συνδυαζόμενα ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας 1317 a
 ἐπαλλάττειν, ὥστε ἀριστοκρατίας τε ὀλιγαρχικὰς εἶναι καὶ
 4 πολιτείας δημοκρατικώτερας. λέγω δὲ τοὺς συνδυασμούς,
 οὓς δεῖ μὲν ἐπισκοπεῖν, οὐκ ἐσκεμμένοι δ' εἰσὶ νῦν, οἷον ἂν
 τὸ μὲν βουλευόμενον καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας ὀλιγα- 5
 ρχικῶς ἢ συντεταγμένον, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια ἀριστο-
 κρατικῶς, ἢ ταῦτα μὲν καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον ὀλι-
 γαρχικῶς, ἀριστοκρατικῶς δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας, ἢ
 κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον μὴ πάντα συντεθῇ τὰ τῆς πολι-
 5 τείας οἰκεία. ποία μὲν οὖν δημοκρατία πρὸς ποῖαν ἀρμότ- 10
 τει πόλιν, ὥσαύτως δὲ καὶ ποία τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν ποίῳ
 πλήθει, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δὲ πολιτειῶν τίς συμφέρει τίσιν,
 6 εἴρηται πρότερον. ὁμῶς δέ, (ἐπεὶ) δεῖ γενέσθαι δῆλον μὴ μόνον
 ποία τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀρίστη ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
 πῶς δεῖ κατασκευάζειν καὶ ταύτας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας, ἐπέλ- 15
 θωμεν συντόμως. καὶ πρῶτον περὶ δημοκρατίας εἵπωμεν·
 ἅμα γὰρ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀντικειμένης πολιτείας φανερόν,
 7 αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἣν καλοῦσιν οἱ ὀλιγαρχίαν. ληπτέον δὲ
 πρὸς ταύτην τὴν μέθοδον πάντα τὰ δημοτικά καὶ τὰ δο-
 κοῦντα ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθεῖν· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συντι- 20
 θεμένων τὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας εἶδη γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει, καὶ
 8 πλείους δημοκρατίας μιᾶς εἶναι καὶ διαφόρους. δύο γάρ
 εἰσιν αἰτίαι δι' ἃς περ αἱ δημοκρατίαι πλείους εἰσὶ, πρῶτον
 μὲν ἡ λεχθεῖσα πρότερον, ὅτι διάφοροι οἱ δῆμοι (γίνεται
 γὰρ τὸ μὲν γεωργικὸν πλῆθος, τὸ δὲ βάνανυσον καὶ θητι- 25
 κόν· ὧν τοῦ πρώτου τῷ δευτέρῳ προσλαμβανομένου, καὶ τοῦ
 τρίτου πάλιν τοῖς ἀμφοτέροις, οὐ μόνον διαφέρει τῷ βελτίῳ

καὶ χεῖρω γίνεσθαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μὴ
τὴν αὐτήν)· δευτέρα δὲ περὶ ἧς νῦν λέγομεν· τὰ γὰρ ταῖς 9
30 δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ δοκοῦντα εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας
οἰκεία ταύτης ποιεῖ συντιθέμενα τὰς δημοκρατίας ἐτέρας·
τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἐλάττω, τῇ δ' ἀκολουθήσει πλείονα, τῇ δ'
ἅπαντα ταῦτα. χρήσιμον δ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν γνωρίζειν πρὸς
τε τὸ κατασκευάζειν ἢν ἂν τις αὐτῶν τύχη βουλόμενος,
35 καὶ πρὸς τὰς διορθώσεις. ζητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ τὰς πολιτείας 10
καθιστάντες ἅπαντα τὰ οἰκεία συναγαγεῖν πρὸς τὴν ὑπό-
θεσιν, ἀμαρτάνουσι δὲ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς περὶ
τὰς φθορὰς καὶ τὰς σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν εἴρηται πρότερον.
νυνὶ δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ τὰ ἥθη καὶ ὧν ἐφλένται λέγωμεν.
2 Ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐλευ-
θερία (τοῦτο γὰρ λέγειν εἰώθασιν, ὥς ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ
1317 b ταύτῃ μετέχοντας ἐλευθερίας· τούτου γὰρ στοχάζεσθαι φασι
πᾶσαν δημοκρατίαν)· ἐλευθερίας δὲ ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐν μέρει ἀρ-
χεσθαι καὶ ἀρχειν. καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικὸν τὸ 2
ἴσον ἔχειν ἐστὶ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν, τούτου δ'
5 ὄντος τοῦ δικαίου τὸ πλῆθος ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κύριον, καὶ ὃ τι
ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι, τοῦτ' εἶναι [καὶ] τέλος καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι
τὸ δίκαιον· φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν·
ὥστε ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις συμβαίνει κυριωτέρους εἶναι τοὺς
ἀπόρους τῶν εὐπόρων· πλείους γὰρ εἰσι, κύριον δὲ τὸ τοῖς
10 πλείοσι δόξαν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐλευθερίας σημεῖον τοῦτο, ὃν 3
τίθενται πάντες οἱ δημοτικοὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὅρον, ἐν δὲ τὸ
ζῆν ὥς βούλεται τις· τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἔργον εἶναι
φασιν, εἴπερ τοῦ δουλεύοντος τὸ ζῆν μὴ ὥς βούλεται. τῆς 4
μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας ὅρος οὗτος δεύτερος, ἐντεῦθεν δ' ἐλή-
15 λυθε τὸ μὴ ἀρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ μηδενός, εἰ δὲ
μὴ, κατὰ μέρος. καὶ συμβάλλεται ταύτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευ-
θερίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἴσον. τούτων δ' ὑποκειμένων καὶ τοιαύ- 5
της οὐσης τῆς ἀρχῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα δημοτικά, τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι
τὰς ἀρχὰς πάντας ἐκ πάντων, τὸ ἀρχειν πάντας μὲν

ἑκάστου ἕκαστον δ' ἐν μέρει πάντων, τὸ κληρωτὰς εἶναι τὰς 20
 ἀρχὰς ἢ πάσας ἢ ὅσαι μὴ ἐμπειρίας δέονται καὶ τέχνης,
 τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τιμήματος μηδενὸς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ ὅτι μι-
 κροτάτου, τὸ μὴ δις τὸν αὐτὸν ἀρχειν μηδεμίαν ἢ ὀλιγάκις ἢ
 ὀλίγας ἔξω τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον, τὸ ὀλιγοχρονίους εἶναι τὰς
 ἀρχὰς ἢ πάσας ἢ ὅσας ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δικάζειν πάντας 25
 καὶ ἐκ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ
 τῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων, οἷον περὶ εὐθυνῶν καὶ
 πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων, τὸ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν
 κυρίαν εἶναι πάντων (ἢ τῶν μεγίστων), ἀρχὴν δὲ μηδεμίαν
 6 μηδενὸς ἢ ὅτι ὀλιγίστων [ἢ τῶν μεγίστων] κυρίαν (τῶν δ' 30
 ἀρχῶν δημοτικώτατον βουλή, ὅπου μὴ μισθοῦ εὐπορία πᾶσιν·
 ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς τὴν δύναμιν
 εἰς αὐτὸν γὰρ ἀνάγει τὰς κρίσεις πάσας ὁ δῆμος εὐπορῶν
 μισθοῦ, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τῇ μεθόδῳ τῇ πρὸ
 7 ταύτης), ἔπειτα τὸ μισθοφορεῖν, μάλιστα μὲν πάντας, ἐκ- 35
 κλησίαν δικαστήρια ἀρχὰς, εἰ δὲ μή, τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ
 δικαστήρια καὶ βουλήν καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας τὰς κυρίας, ἢ
 τῶν ἀρχῶν ὡς ἀνάγκη συσσιτεῖν μετ' ἀλλήλων [ἔτι ἐπειδὴ
 ὀλιγαρχία καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ παιδείᾳ ὀρίζεται,
 τὰ δημοτικὰ δοκεῖ τάναντία τούτων εἶναι, ἀγένεια πενία 40
 8 βαναυσία] ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ μηδεμίαν αἰδίδιον εἶναι,
 εἰδὲν δὲ τις καταλειφθῇ ἐξ ἀρχαίας μεταβολῆς, τό γε πε- 1318 a
 ραιρεῖσθαι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς καὶ ἐξ αἰρετῶν κληρωτοὺς
 9 ποιεῖν. τὰ μὲν οὖν κοινὰ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῦτ' ἐστὶ, συμ-
 βαίνει δ' ἐκ τοῦ δικαίου τοῦ ὁμολογουμένου εἶναι δημοκρατικοῦ
 (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἅπαντας κατ' ἀριθμόν) ἢ μά- 5
 λιστ' εἶναι δοκοῦσα δημοκρατία καὶ δῆμος· ἴσον γὰρ τὸ
 μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἀρχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μηδὲ
 κυρίους εἶναι μόνους ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐξ ἴσου κατ' ἀριθμόν·
 οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὑπάρχειν νομίζοιεν τὴν τ' ἰσότητα τῇ πολι-
 τείᾳ καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.

- 3 Τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀπορείται πῶς ἔξουσι τὸ ἴσον, πότερον δὲ τὰ τιμήματα διελεῖν χιλίαις τὰ τῶν πεντακοσίῳ καὶ τοὺς χιλίους ἴσον δύνασθαι τοῖς πεντακοσίοις, ἢ οὐχ αὐτῷ δὲ τιθέναι τὴν κατὰ τοῦτο ἰσότητα, ἀλλὰ διελεῖν
- 15 μὲν οὕτως, ἔπειτα ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἴσους λαβόντα καὶ ἐκ τῶν χιλίων, τούτους κυρίους εἶναι τῶν αἰρέσεων καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων. πότερον οὖν αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία δικαιοτάτη κατὰ 2 τὸ δημοτικὸν δίκαιον, ἢ μᾶλλον ἡ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος; φασὶ γὰρ οἱ δημοτικοὶ τοῦτο δίκαιον ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι,
- 20 οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τῇ πλείονι οὐσίᾳ· κατὰ πλῆθος γὰρ οὐσίας φασὶ κρίνεσθαι δεῖν. ἔχει δ' ἀμφότερα 3 ἀνισότητα καὶ ἀδικίαν· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὅ τι ἂν οἱ ὀλῆγοι, τυραννίς (καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν εἰς ἕχῃ πλείω τῶν ἄλλων εὐπόρων, κατὰ τὸ ὀλιγαρχικὸν δίκαιον ἀρχεῖν δίκαιος μόνος), εἰ
- 25 δ' ὅ τι ἂν οἱ πλείους κατ' ἀριθμὸν, ἀδικήσουσι δημεύοντες τὰ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ἐλαττόνων, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον. τίς ἂν οὖν εἴη ἰσότης ἣν ὁμολογήσουσιν ἀμφότεροι, σκεπτέον 4 ἐξ ὧν ὀρίζονται δικαίων ἀμφότεροι. λέγουσι γὰρ ὡς ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι τῶν πολιτῶν, τοῦτ' εἶναι δεῖ κύριον.
- 30 ἔστω δὴ τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι πάντως, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ δύο μέρη τετύχηκεν ἐξ ὧν ἡ πόλις, πλούσιοι καὶ πένητες, ὅ τι ἂν ἀμφότεροις δόξῃ ἢ τοῖς πλείοσι, τοῦτο κύριον ἔστω, ἐὰν δὲ τἀναντία δόξῃ, ὅ τι ἂν οἱ πλείους καὶ ὧν τὸ τίμημα πλείον. οἷον εἰ οἱ μὲν δέκα οἱ δὲ εἴκοσιν, ἔδοξε δὲ τῶν μὲν πλουσίων 5
- 35 τοῖς ἕξι, τῶν δ' ἀπορωτέρων τοῖς πεντεκαίδεκα, προσγεγνηνται τοῖς μὲν πένησι τέτταρες τῶν πλουσίων, τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις πέντε τῶν πενήτων· ὁποτέρων οὖν τὸ τίμημα ὑπερτείνει συναριθμουμένων ἀμφοτέρων ἑκατέροις, τοῦτο κύριον. ἐὰν δὲ 6 ἴσοι συμπέσωσι, κοινὴν εἶναι ταύτην νομιστέον ἀπορίαν ὥσπερ
- 40 νῦν, ἐὰν δίχα ἡ ἐκκλησία γένηται ἢ τὸ δικαστήριον· ἢ
- 1318 b γὰρ ἀποκληρωτέον ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον ποιητέον. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου, κἀν ἧ πάνυ χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅμως ῥᾶον τυχεῖν ἢ συμπεῖσαι

τοὺς δυναμένους πλεονεκτεῖν· αἰὲ γὰρ ζητοῦσι τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ
δίκαιον οἱ ἥττους, οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν· 5

Δημοκρατιῶν δ' οὐσῶν τεττάρων βελτίστη μὲν ἡ πρώτη 4
τάξει, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἐλέχθη λόγοις· ἔστι δὲ
καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν αὕτη. λέγω δὲ πρώτην ὥσπερ ἂν
τις διέλοι τοὺς δῆμους· βέλτιστος γὰρ δῆμος ὁ γεωργικός
ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ ποιεῖν ἐνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν, ὅπου ζῇ τὸ 10
2 πλῆθος ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἢ νομῆς. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ πολ-
λὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειν ἀσχολος, ὥστε μὴ πολλάκις ἐκκλησιάζειν·
διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τἀναγκαῖα πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις διατρέ-
βουσι καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἥδιον αὐτοῖς
τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι τοῦ πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ ἀρχειν, ὅπου ἂν μὴ ἦ 15
3 λήμματα μεγάλα ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ μᾶλ-
λον ὀρέγονται τοῦ κέρδους ἢ τῆς τιμῆς. σημεῖον δέ· καὶ
γὰρ τὰς ἀρχαίας τυραννίδας ὑπέμενον καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας
ὑπομένουσιν, ἐάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐργάζεσθαι μὴ κωλύῃ μηδ'
ἀφαιρῇται μηδέν· ταχέως γὰρ οἱ μὲν πλουτοῦσιν αὐτῶν, 20
4 οἱ δ' οὐκ ἀποροῦσιν. ἔτι δὲ τὸ κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ ἐλέσθαι καὶ
εὐθύνειν ἀναπληροῖ τὴν ἔνδειαν, εἴ τι φιλοτιμίας ἔχουσιν,
ἐπεὶ παρ' ἐνίοις δῆμοις, κὰν μὴ μετέχῃσι τῆς αἰρέσεως
τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀλλὰ τινες αἰρετοὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐκ πάντων,
ὥσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ, τοῦ δὲ βουλευέσθαι κύριοι ὦσιν, ἱκανῶς 25
5 ἔχει τοῖς πολλοῖς. καὶ δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι σχῆμά
τι δημοκρατίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ποτ' ἦν. διὸ δὴ καὶ
συμφέρον ἐστὶ τῇ πρότερον ρηθείᾳ δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ὑπάρ-
χειν εἴωθεν, αἰρεῖσθαι μὲν τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ εὐθύνειν καὶ
δικάζειν πάντας, ἀρχειν δὲ τὰς μεγίστας αἰρετοὺς καὶ ἀπὸ 30
τιμημάτων, τὰς μείζους ἀπὸ μειζόνων, ἢ καὶ ἀπὸ τιμη-
6 μάτων μὲν μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς δυναμένους. ἀνάγκη δὲ
πολιτευομένους οὕτω πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς (αἱ τε γὰρ ἀρχαὶ
αἰεὶ διὰ τῶν βελτίστων ἔσονται τοῦ δήμου βουλομένου καὶ τοῖς
ἐπιεικέσιν οὐ φθονοῦντος) καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι καὶ γνωρίμοις 35
ἀρκοῦσαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν τάξιν· ἀρξονται γὰρ οὐχ ὑπ'

ἄλλων χειρόνων, καὶ ἄρξουσι δικαίως διὰ τὸ τῶν εὐθυνῶν
 εἶναι κυρίους ἐτέρους. τὸ γὰρ ἐπανακρέμασθαι, καὶ μὴ πᾶν 7
 ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν ὃ τι ἂν δόξῃ, συμφέρον ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἐξουσία
 40 τοῦ πράττειν ὃ τι ἂν ἐθέλῃ τις οὐ δύναται φυλάττειν τὸ ἐν
 1319 α ἐκάστῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φαῦλον. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον συμβαί-
 νειν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὠφελιμώτατον ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἄρχειν
 τοὺς ἐπικεικὲς ἀναμαρτήτους ὄντας, μηδὲν ἐλαττουμένου τοῦ
 πλήθους. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὕτη τῶν δημοκρατιῶν ἀρίστη, φανε- 8
 5 ρόν, καὶ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ποιοῦν τινα εἶναι τὸν
 δῆμον· πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν γεωργὸν τὸν δῆμον τῶν
 τε νόμων τινὲς τῶν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς κειμένων τὸ ἀρ-
 χαῖον χρήσιμοι πάντες, ἢ τὸ ὅλως μὴ ἐξεῖναι κεκτηθῆσαι
 πλείω γῆν μέτρου τινὸς ἢ ἀπὸ τινος τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ
 10 καὶ τὴν πόλιν· ἣν δὲ τό γε ἀρχαῖον ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεσι 9
 νενομοθετημένον μὴδὲ πωλεῖν ἐξεῖναι τοὺς πρώτους κλήρους,
 ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὃν λέγουσιν Ὁξύλου νόμον εἶναι τοιοῦτόν τι δυ-
 νάμενος, τὸ μὴ δανείζειν εἰς τι μέρος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης
 ἐκάστῳ γῆς· νῦν δὲ δεῖ διορθοῦν καὶ τῷ Ἀφυταίων νόμῳ
 15 πρὸς γὰρ ὃ λέγομέν ἐστι χρήσιμος. ἐκείνοι γάρ, καίπερ 10
 ὄντες πολλοὶ κεκτημένοι δὲ γῆν ὀλίγην, ὅμως πάντες γεωρ-
 γοῦσιν· τιμῶνται γὰρ οὐχ ὅλας τὰς κτήσεις, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
 τηλικαῦτα μόρια διαιροῦντες ὥστ' ἔχειν ὑπερβάλλειν ταῖς
 τιμήσεσι καὶ τοὺς πένητας. μετὰ δὲ τὸ γεωργικὸν πλήθος 11
 20 βέλτιστος δῆμός ἐστιν ὅπου νομεῖς εἰσὶ καὶ ζῶσιν ἀπὸ βο-
 σκημάτων· πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει τῇ γεωργίᾳ παραπλησίως,
 καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις μάλισθ' οὗτοι γεγυ-
 μνασμένοι τὰς ξεῖς καὶ χρήσιμοι τὰ σώματα καὶ δυ-
 νάμενοι θυραυλεῖν. τὰ δ' ἄλλα πλήθη πάντα σχεδόν, ἐξ 12
 25 ὧν αἱ λοιπαὶ δημοκρατίαι συνεστᾶσι, πολλῷ φαυλότερα
 τούτων· ὁ γὰρ βίος φαῦλος, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔργον μετ' ἀρετῆς
 ὧν μεταχειρίζεται τὸ πλήθος τό τε τῶν βαναύσων καὶ
 τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὸ θητικόν. ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ 13
 περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ τὸ ἄστυ κυλίσθαι πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον

- γένος ὡς εἰπεῖν ῥαδίως ἐκκλησιάζει· οἱ δὲ γεωργοῦντες διὰ 30
τὸ διεσπάρθαι κατὰ τὴν χώραν οὐτ' ἀπαντῶσιν οὐθ' ὁμοίως
14 δέονται τῆς συνόδου ταύτης. ὅπου δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει τὴν
χώραν τὴν θέσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην ὥστε τὴν χώραν πολὺ τῆς
πόλεως ἀπηρτῆσθαι, ῥάδιον καὶ δημοκρατίαν ποιεῖσθαι χρη-
στην καὶ πολιτείαν· ἀναγκάζεται γὰρ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπὶ τῶν 35
ἀγρῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἀποικίας, ὥστε δεῖ, κὰν ἀγοραῖος
ὄχλος ᾗ, μὴ ποιεῖν ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἐκκλησίας ἀνευ
15 τοῦ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλήθους. πῶς μὲν οὖν δεῖ κατασκευά-
ζειν τὴν βελτίστην καὶ πρώτην δημοκρατίαν, εἴρηται· φα-
νερὸν δὲ καὶ πῶς τὰς ἄλλας· ἐπομένως γὰρ δεῖ παρεκ- 40
βαίνειν καὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἀεὶ πλῆθος χωρίζειν. τὴν δὲ τελευ- 1319 b
ταίαν, διὰ τὸ πάντας κοινωνεῖν, οὔτε πάσης ἐστὶ πόλεως
φέρειν, οὔτε ῥάδιον διαμένειν μὴ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τοῖς ἔθε-
σιν εὖ συγκειμένην· ἃ δὲ φθείρειν συμβαίνει καὶ ταύτην
καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, εἴρηται πρότερον τὰ πλείστα 5
16 σχεδόν. πρὸς δὲ τὸ καθιστάναι ταύτην τὴν δημοκρατίαν,
καὶ τὸν δῆμον ποιεῖν ἰσχυρὸν εἰώθασιν οἱ προεστῶτες τῷ
προσλαμβάνειν ὡς πλείστους καὶ ποιεῖν πολίτας μὴ μόνον
τοὺς γνησίους ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς νόθους καὶ τοὺς ἐξ ὀποτερουοῦν
πολίτου, λέγω δὲ οἷον πατρὸς ἢ μητρός· ἅπαν γὰρ οἰκείον 10
17 τοῦτο τῷ τοιούτῳ δῆμῳ μᾶλλον. εἰώθασι μὲν οὖν οἱ δημα-
γωγοὶ κατασκευάζειν οὕτως, δεῖ μέντοι προσλαμβάνειν μέ-
χρι ἂν ὑπερτείνῃ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν μέ-
σων, καὶ τούτου μὴ πέρα προβαίνειν· ὑπερβάλλοντες γὰρ
ἀτακτοτέρα τε ποιοῦσι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους 15
πρὸς τὸ χαλεπῶς ὑπομένειν τὴν δημοκρατίαν παροξύνουσι
μᾶλλον, ὅπερ συνέβη τῆς στάσεως αἷτιον γενέσθαι περὶ
Κυρήνην· ὀλίγον μὲν γὰρ πονηρὸν παροράται, πολὺ δὲ
18 γινόμενον ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς μᾶλλον ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ
τοιαῦτα κατασκευάσματα χρήσιμα πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν 20
τὴν τοιαύτην, οἷς Κλεισθένης τε Ἀθήνησιν ἐχρήσατο βουλό-
μενος αὐξήσαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν, καὶ περὶ Κυρήνην οἱ τὸν

δῆμον καθιστάντες. φυλαί τε γὰρ ἕτεραι ποιητέαι πλείους 19
 καὶ φρατρίαι, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἱερῶν συνακτέον εἰς ὀλίγα
 25 καὶ κοινά, καὶ πάντα σοφιστέον ὅπως ἂν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀνα-
 μιχθῶσι πάντες ἀλλήλοις, αἱ δὲ συνήθειαι διαφευχθῶσιν
 αἱ πρότερον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ τυραννικὰ κατασκευάσματα 20
 δημοτικά δοκεῖ πάντα, λέγω δ' οἶον ἀναρχία τε δούλων
 (αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη μέχρι τοῦ συμφέρουσα) καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ
 30 παίδων, καὶ τὸ ζῆν ὅπως τις βούλεται παρορᾶν (πολὺ γὰρ
 ἔσται τὸ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ βοηθοῦν· ἡδίων γὰρ τοῖς πολ-
 .λοῖς τὸ ζῆν ἀτάκτως ἢ τὸ σωφρόνως).
 5 Ἔστι δ' ἔργον τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ τῶν βουλομένων συν-
 ιστάναι τινὰ τοιαύτην πολιτείαν οὐ τὸ καταστήσαι μέγιστον
 35 ἔργον οὐδὲ μόνον, ἀλλ' ὅπως σώζεται μᾶλλον· μίαν γὰρ
 ἢ δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἡμέρας οὐ χαλεπὸν μείναι πολιτευομένους
 ὅπως οὖν. διδὲ δεῖ, περὶ ὧν τεθεώρηται πρότερον, τίνες σωτη- 2
 ρίαι καὶ φθοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ τούτων πειρᾶσθαι κατα-
 σκευάζειν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, εὐλαβουμένους μὲν τὰ φθείροντα,
 40 τιθεμένους δὲ τοιοῦτους νόμους καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς
 1320 α γεγραμμένους οἱ περιλήψονται μάλιστα τὰ σώζοντα τὰς
 πολιτείας, καὶ μὴ νομίζειν τοῦτ' εἶναι δημοτικὸν μηδ' ὀλι-
 γαρχικὸν δ ποιήσει τὴν πόλιν ὅτι μάλιστα δημοκρατεῖσθαι
 ἢ ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ὃ πλείστον χρόνον. οἱ δὲ νῦν δη- 3
 5 μαγωγοὶ χαριζόμενοι τοῖς δῆμοις πολλὰ δημεύουσι διὰ
 τῶν δικαστηρίων. διδὲ δεῖ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντιπράττειν τοὺς κη-
 δομένους τῆς πολιτείας, νομοθετοῦντας μηδὲν εἶναι δημόσιον
 τῶν καταδικαζομένων καὶ φερόμενον πρὸς τὸ κοινόν, ἀλλ'
 ἱερὸν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικοῦντες οὐδὲν ἦττον εὐλαβεῖς ἔσονται
 10 (ζημιώσονται γὰρ ὁμοίως), ὃ δ' ὄχλος ἦττον καταψηφιεῖ-
 ται τῶν κρινομένων, λήψεσθαι μηδὲν μέλλον. ἔτι δὲ τὰς 4
 γινομένας δημοσίας δίκας ὡς ὀλιγίστας αἰεὶ ποιεῖν, μεγά-
 λοις ἐπιτιμίαις τοὺς εἰκῇ γραφομένους καλύοντας· οὐ γὰρ
 τοὺς δημοτικούς ἀλλὰ τοὺς γνωρίμους εἰώθασιν εἰσάγειν, δεῖ
 15 δὲ καὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ πάντας μάλιστα μὲν εὖνους εἶναι τοὺς

πολίτας, εἰ δὲ μή, μή τοί γε ὥς πολεμίους νομίζειν τοὺς
 5 κυρίους. ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ τελευταῖαι δημοκραταὶ πολυάνθρωποί
 τέ εἰσι καὶ χαλεπὸν ἐκκλησιάζειν ἀμίσθους, τοῦτο δ' ὅπου
 πρόσοδοι μὴ τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι πολέμιον τοῖς γνωρίμοις
 (ἀπὸ τε γὰρ εἰσφορᾶς καὶ δημεύσεως ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι 20
 καὶ δικαστηρίων φαύλων, ἃ πολλὰς ἤδη δημοκρατίας ἀνέ-
 τρεψεν), ὅπου μὲν οὖν πρόσοδοι μὴ τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι, δεῖ
 ποιεῖν ὀλίγας ἐκκλησίας, καὶ δικαστήρια πολλῶν μὲν ὀλί-
 6 γαις δ' ἡμέραις (τοῦτο γὰρ φέρει μὲν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ φο-
 βεῖσθαι τοὺς πλουσίους τὰς δαπάνας, ἐὰν οἱ μὲν εὐποροὶ μὴ 25
 λαμβάνωσι δικαστικόν, οἱ δ' ἄποροι, φέρει δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ
 κρίνεσθαι τὰς δίκας πολὺ βέλτιον· οἱ γὰρ εὐποροὶ πολ-
 λὰς μὲν ἡμέρας οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ἀπέιναι, βρα-
 7 χύν δὲ χρόνον ἐθέλουσιν), ὅπου δ' εἰσὶ πρόσοδοι, μὴ ποιεῖν δ'
 νῦν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ποιοῦσιν (τὰ γὰρ περιόντα νέμουσιν· λαμ- 30
 βάνουσι δὲ ἅμα, καὶ πάλιν δέονται τῶν αὐτῶν· ὁ τετρημέ-
 νος γάρ ἐστι πίθος ἢ τοιαύτη βοήθεια τοῖς ἀπόροις). ἀλλὰ
 δεῖ τὸν ἀληθινῶς δημοτικὸν ὁρᾶν ὅπως τὸ πλῆθος μὴ λίαν
 ἄπορον ᾗ· τοῦτο γὰρ αἷτιον τοῦ μοχθηρὰν εἶναι τὴν δημοκρα-
 8 τίαν. τεχναστέον οὖν ὅπως ἂν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος. ἐπεὶ 35
 δὲ συμφέρει τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐπόροις, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν προσ-
 ὄδων γινόμενα συναθροίζοντας ἀθρόα χρή διανέμειν τοῖς
 ἀπόροις, μάλιστα μὲν εἰ τις δύναται τοσοῦτον συναθροίζειν ὅσον
 εἰς γηδίου κτῆσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, πρὸς ἀφορμὴν ἐμπορίας καὶ
 9 γεωργίας, καὶ εἰ μὴ πᾶσι δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φυλὰς ἢ 1320 b
 τι μέρος ἕτερον ἐν μέρει διανέμειν, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ πρὸς τὰς
 ἀναγκαίας συνόδους τοὺς εὐπόρους εἰσφέρειν τὸν μισθόν, ἀφιε-
 μένους τῶν ματαίων λειτουργιῶν. τοιοῦτον δὲ τίνα τρόπον
 Καρχηδόνιοι πολιτευόμενοι φίλον κέκτηνται τὸν δῆμον. δεῖ 5
 γάρ τινας ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιοικίδας ποιοῦσιν
 10 εὐπόρους. χαριέντων δ' ἐστὶ καὶ νῦν ἐχόντων γνωρίμων καὶ
 διαλαμβάνοντας τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀφορμὰς διδόντας τρέπειν
 ἐπ' ἐργασίας. καλῶς δ' ἔχει μιμῆσθαι καὶ τὰ Ταραντίνων·

10 ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ κοινὰ ποιοῦντες τὰ κτήματα τοῖς ἀπύροις ἐπὶ τὴν
 χρῆσιν εὖνουν παρασκευάζουσι τὸ πλῆθος· ἔτι δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς 11
 πάσας ἐποίησαν διττάς, τὰς μὲν αἰρετάς τὰς δὲ κληρωτάς,
 τὰς μὲν κληρωτάς ὅπως ὁ δῆμος αὐτῶν μετέχῃ, τὰς δ'
 αἰρετάς ἵνα πολιτεύωνται βέλτιον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι καὶ
 15 τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς μερίζοντας τοὺς μὲν κληρωτοὺς τοὺς δ'
 αἰρετούς. πῶς μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὰς δημοκρατίας κατασκευάζειν,
 εἴρηται·

6 Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας πῶς δεῖ, φανερόν
 ἐκ τούτων. ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων γὰρ δεῖ συνάγειν ἐκάστην ὀλι-
 20 γαρχίαν πρὸς τὴν ἐναντίαν δημοκρατίαν ἀναλογιζόμενον,
 τὴν μὲν εὐκρατον μάλιστα τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ πρώτην—
 αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ σύνεγγυς τῇ καλουμένῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἣ δὲ τὰ 2
 τιμήματα διαιρεῖν, τὰ μὲν ἐλάττω τὰ δὲ μείζω ποιοῦντας,
 ἐλάττω μὲν ἀφ' ὧν τῶν ἀναγκαίων μετέξουσιν ἀρχῶν,
 25 μείζω δ' ἀφ' ὧν τῶν κυριωτέρων· τῷ τε κτωμένῳ τὸ τί-
 μημα μετέχειν ἐξεῖναι τῆς πολιτείας, τοσοῦτον εἰσαγομένους
 τοῦ δήμου πλῆθος διὰ τοῦ τιμήματος, μεθ' οὗ κρείττονες ἔσον-
 ται τῶν μὴ μετεχόντων· αἰεὶ δὲ δεῖ παραλαμβάνειν ἐκ τοῦ 3
 βελτίονος δήμου τοὺς κοινωνούς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐχομένην
 30 ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐπιτείνοντας δεῖ μικρὸν κατασκευάζειν. τῇ δ'
 ἀντικειμένη τῇ τελευταίᾳ δημοκρατίᾳ, τῇ δυναστικωτάτῃ
 καὶ τυραννικωτάτῃ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν, ὅσῳ περ χειρίστη, το-
 σοῦτ'φ δεῖ πλείονος φυλακῆς. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ μὲν εὖ σώματα 4
 διακείμενα πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῖα τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν
 35 καλῶς ἔχοντα . . . τοῖς πλωτήρσιν ἐπιδέχεται πλείους ἀμαρτίας
 ὥστε μὴ φθείρεσθαι δι' αὐτάς, τὰ δὲ νοσερῶς ἔχοντα τῶν
 σωμάτων καὶ τὰ τῶν πλοίων ἐκλελυμένα καὶ πλωτήρων
 τετυχηκότα φαύλων οὐδὲ τὰς μικρὰς δύνανται φέρειν ἀμαρ-
 τίας, οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ χεῖρισται πλείστης δέονται
 1321 a φυλακῆς. τὰς μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας ὅλως ἡ πολυανθρωπία 5
 σώζει· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀντίκειται πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ τὴν
 ἀξίαν· τὴν δ' ὀλιγαρχίαν δῆλον ὅτι τούναντίον ὑπὸ τῆς
 εὐταξίας δεῖ τυγχάνειν τῆς σωτηρίας.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα μὲν ἐστὶ μέρη μάλιστα τοῦ πλήθους, 7
γεωργικὸν βαναυσικὸν ἀγοραῖον θητικόν, τέτταρα δὲ τὰ χρή-
σιμα πρὸς πόλεμον, ἵππικὸν ὀπλιτικὸν ψιλὸν ναυτικόν,
ὅπου μὲν συμβέβηκε τὴν χώραν εἶναι ἱππάσιμον, ἐνταῦθα
μὲν εὐφυνῶς ἔχει κατασκευάζειν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσχυράν
(ἡ γὰρ σωτηρία τοῖς οἰκοῦσι διὰ ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, 10
αἱ δ' ἱπποτροφίαι τῶν μακρὰς οὐσίας κεκτημένων εἰσὶν),
ὅπου δ' ὀπλιτικὴν, τὴν ἐχομένην ὀλιγαρχίαν (τὸ γὰρ ὀπλι-
2 τικὸν τῶν εὐπόρων ἐστὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἀπόρων)· ἡ δὲ ψιλὴ
δύναμις καὶ ναυτικὴ δημοτικὴ πάμπαν. νῦν μὲν οὖν
ὅπου τοιοῦτον πολὺ πλήθος ἐστίν, ὅταν διαστώσι, πολλάκις 15
ἀγωνίζονται χεীরω δεῖ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο φάρμακον παρὰ τῶν
πολεμικῶν λαμβάνειν στρατηγῶν, οἱ συνδύζουσι πρὸς τὴν
ἱππικὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ὀπλιτικὴν τὴν ἀρμόττουσαν τῶν
3 ψιλῶν. ταύτῃ δ' ἐπικρατοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς διαστάσεσιν οἱ δῆμοι
τῶν εὐπόρων· ψιλοὶ γὰρ ὄντες πρὸς ἱππικὴν καὶ ὀπλιτικὴν 20
ἀγωνίζονται ῥαδίως. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων καθιστάναι ταύ-
την τὴν δύναμιν ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς ἐστὶ καθιστάναι, δεῖ δὲ διηρη-
μένης τῆς ἡλικίας, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄντων πρεσβυτέρων τῶν
δὲ νέων, ἔτι μὲν ὄντας νέους τοὺς αὐτῶν υἱεῖς διδάσκεισθαι
τὰς κούφας καὶ τὰς ψιλὰς ἐργασίας, ἐκκεκριμένους δὲ ἐκ 25
4 παίδων ἀθλητὰς εἶναι αὐτοὺς τῶν ἔργων. τὴν δὲ μετάδοσιν
γίνεσθαι τῷ πλήθει τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἥτοι, καθάπερ εἴρηται
πρότερον, τοῖς τὸ τίμημα κτωμένοις, ἢ, καθάπερ Θηβαίοις,
ἀποσχομένοις χρόνον τινὰ τῶν βαναύσων ἔργων, ἢ, καθά-
περ ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ, κρίσιν ποιουμένους τῶν ἀξίων τῶν ἐν τῷ 30
5 πολιτεύματι καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς
κυριωτάταις, ἃς δεῖ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κατέχειν, δεῖ
προσκεῖσθαι λειτουργίας, ἵν' ἐκὼν ὁ δῆμος μὴ μετέχῃ καὶ
συγγνώμην ἔχῃ τοῖς ἀρχουσιν ὡς μισθὸν πολὺν διδοῦσι τῆς
6 ἀρχῆς. ἀρμόττει δὲ θυσίας τε εἰσιόντας ποιεῖσθαι μεγα- 35
λοπρεπεῖς καὶ κατασκευάζειν τι τῶν κοινῶν, ἵνα τῶν περὶ
τὰς ἐστιάσεις μετέχων ὁ δῆμος καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὁρῶν κοσμου-

μένην τὰ μὲν ἀναθήμασι τὰ δὲ οἰκοδομήμασιν ἄσμενος
 ὄρᾳ μένουσαν τὴν πολιτείαν· συμβήσεται δὲ καὶ τοῖς γνω-
 40 ρίμοις εἶναι μνημεῖα τῆς δαπάνης. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο νῦν οἱ περὶ 7
 τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας οὐ ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον· τὰ λήμματα
 γὰρ ζητοῦσιν οὐχ ἦττον ἢ τὴν τιμὴν, διόπερ εὖ ἔχει λέγειν
 1321 b ταύτας εἶναι δημοκρατίας μικράς. πῶς μὲν οὖν χρή κα-
 θιστάναι τὰς δημοκρατίας καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, διωρίσθω
 τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον·

8 Ἀκόλουθον δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐστὶ τὸ διηρησθαι καλῶς
 5 τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, πόσαι καὶ τίνες καὶ τίνων, καθάπερ
 εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀρχῶν χω-
 ρίς ἀδύνατον εἶναι πόλιν, τῶν δὲ πρὸς εὐταξίαν καὶ κό-
 σμον ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι καλῶς. ἔτι δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐν μὲν 2
 ταῖς μικραῖς ἐλάττους εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἐν δὲ ταῖς μεγά-
 10 λαις πλείους, ὥσπερ τυγχάνει πρότερον εἰρημένον· ποίας
 οὖν ἀρμόττει συνάγειν καὶ ποίας χωρίζειν, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν.
 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἢ περὶ τὴν 3
 ἀγοράν, ἐφ' ἧ δεῖ τινὰ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὴν ἐφορῶσαν περὶ τε
 τὰ συμβόλαια καὶ τὴν εὐκοσμίαν· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον
 15 πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ μὲν ὠνεῖσθαι τὰ δὲ πωλεῖν πρὸς
 τὴν ἀλλήλων ἀναγκαίαν χρεῖαν, καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὑπογυϊότα-
 τον πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν, δι' ἣν δοκοῦσιν εἰς μίαν πολιτείαν
 συνελθεῖν. ἑτέρα δὲ ἐπιμέλεια ταύτης ἐχομένη καὶ 4
 σύνεγγυς ἢ τῶν περὶ τὸ ἄστυ δημοσίων καὶ ιδίων, ὅπως
 20 εὐκοσμία ἦ, καὶ τῶν πιπτόντων οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ ὁδῶν
 σωτηρία καὶ διόρθωσις, καὶ τῶν ὀρίων τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
 ὅπως ἀνεγκλήτως ἔχωσιν, καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ἄλλα τῆς ἐπι-
 μελείας ὁμοιότροπα. καλοῦσι δ' ἀστυνομίαν οἱ πλείστοι τὴν 5
 τοιαύτην ἀρχήν, ἔχει δὲ μύρια πλείω τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὧν
 25 ἑτέρους ἐφ' ἑτέρα καθιστᾶσιν ἐν ταῖς πολυανθρωποτέραις
 πόλεσιν, οἷον τειχοποιούς καὶ κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητὰς καὶ λιμένων
 φύλακας. ἄλλη δ' ἀναγκαία τε καὶ παραπλησία ταύτῃ 6
 περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μὲν γάρ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν ἐστὶ καὶ [τὰ]
 περὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ ἄστεος· καλοῦσι δὲ τοὺς ἀρχοντας τούτους

οἱ μὲν ἀγορνόμους οἱ δ' ὕλωρους. αὐται μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλειαί 30
 εἰσι τούτων τρεῖς, ἄλλη δ' ἀρχὴ πρὸς ἣν αἱ πρόσοδοι τῶν
 κοινῶν ἀναφέρονται, παρ' ὧν φυλαττόντων μερίζονται πρὸς
 ἐκάστην διοίκησιν· καλοῦσι δ' ἀποδέκτας τούτους καὶ ταμίας.
 7 ἑτέρα δ' ἀρχὴ πρὸς ἣν ἀναγράφεσθαι δεῖ τά τε ἴδια συμ-
 βόλαια καὶ τὰς κρίσεις ἐκ τῶν δικαστηρίων· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς 35
 αὐτοῖς τούτοις καὶ τὰς γραφὰς τῶν δικῶν γίνεσθαι δεῖ καὶ
 τὰς εἰσαγωγὰς. ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν οὖν μερίζουσι καὶ ταύτην εἰς
 πλείους, ἔστι δὲ μία κυρία τούτων πάντων· καλοῦνται δὲ ἱερο-
 μνήμονες καὶ ἐπιστάται καὶ μνήμονες καὶ τούτοις ἄλλα ὀνό-
 8 ματα σύνεγγυς. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἐχομένη μὲν ἀναγκαῖο 40
 τάτῃ δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ χαλεπωτάτῃ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ
 τὰς πράξεις τῶν καταδικασθέντων καὶ τῶν προτιθεμένων
 κατὰ τὰς ἐγγραφὰς καὶ περὶ τὰς φυλακὰς τῶν σωμάτων. 1322 a
 9 χαλεπὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ πολλὴν ἔχειν ἀπέχθειαν, ὥστε
 ὅπου μὴ μεγάλα ἔστι κερδαίνειν, οὐτ' ἀρχειν ὑπομένουσιν
 αὐτὴν οὐθ' ὑπομείναντες ἐθέλουσι πράττειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους·
 ἀναγκαῖα δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄφελος γίνεσθαι μὲν δίκας περὶ 5
 τῶν δικαίων, ταύτας δὲ μὴ λαμβάνειν τέλος, ὥστ' εἰ μὴ
 γιγνομένων κοινωνεῖν ἀδύνατον ἀλλήλοις, καὶ πράξεων μὴ
 10 γιγνομένων. διὸ βέλτιον μὴ μίαν εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν,
 ἀλλ' ἄλλους ἐξ ἄλλων δικαστηρίων, καὶ περὶ τὰς προθέσεις
 τῶν ἀναγεγραμμένων ὡσαύτως πειρᾶσθαι διαιρεῖν, ἔτι δ' 10
 ἑνία πράττεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς τε ἄλλας καὶ τὰς
 τῶν ἔνων μᾶλλον τὰς νέας, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνεστῶτων ἑτέρας
 καταδικασάσης ἑτέραν εἶναι τὴν πραττομένην, οἷον ἀστυνό-
 μους τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀγορανόμων, τὰς δὲ παρὰ τούτων ἑτέ-
 11 ρους. ὅσφ' γὰρ ἂν ἐλάττων ἀπέχθεια ἐνῇ τοῖς πραττομένοις, 15
 τοσοῦτ' μᾶλλον λήψονται τέλος αἱ πράξεις· τὸ μὲν οὖν τοὺς
 αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς καταδικάσαντας καὶ πραττομένους ἀπέχθειαν
 ἔχει διπλὴν, τὸ δὲ περὶ πάντων τοὺς αὐτοὺς πολεμίους πᾶσιν.
 πολλαχοῦ δὲ διήρηται καὶ ἡ φυλάττουσα πρὸς τὴν πραττο-
 12 μένην, οἷον Ἀθήνησιν (ἡ) τῶν ἑνδεκα καλουμένων. διὸ βέλτιον 20
 καὶ ταύτην χωρίζειν, καὶ τὸ σόφισμα ζητεῖν καὶ περὶ ταύ-

την. ἀναγκαία μὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὐχ ἥττον τῆς εἰρημένης, συμβαίνει δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐπικεικίς φεύγειν μάλιστα ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, τοὺς δὲ μοχθηροὺς οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς ποιεῖν κυρίους· αὐτοὶ
 25 γὰρ δέονται φυλακῆς μᾶλλον ἢ φυλάττειν ἄλλους δύνανται. διὸ δεῖ μὴ μίαν ἀποτεταγμένην ἀρχὴν εἶναι πρὸς 13 αὐτοῖς, μηδὲ συνεχῶς τὴν αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ τῶν τε νέων, ὅπου τις ἐφήβων ἢ φρουρῶν ἐστὶ τάξις, καὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν δεῖ κατὰ μέρη ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἑτέρους. ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς
 30 ἀρχὰς ὡς ἀναγκαιοτάτας θετέον εἶναι πρώτας, μετὰ δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἀναγκαίας μὲν οὐδὲν ἥττον, ἐν σχήματι δὲ μείζονι τεταγμένας· καὶ γὰρ ἐμπειρίας καὶ πίστεως δέονται πολλῆς. τοιαῦται δ' εἶεν ἂν αἱ τε περὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς πό- 14 λεως, καὶ ὅσαι τάττονται πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας. δεῖ
 35 δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ πυλῶν τε καὶ τειχῶν φυλακῆς ὁμοίως ἐπιμελητὰς εἶναι καὶ ἐξετάσεως καὶ συντάξεως τῶν πολιτῶν. ἔνθα μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ἀρχαὶ πλείους εἰσὶν, ἔνθα δ' ἐλάττους, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μικραῖς πόλεσι μία περὶ πάντων. καλοῦσι δὲ στρατηγούς καὶ πολεμάρχους 15
 1322 b τοὺς τοιούτους. ἔτι δὲ κἂν ὥσιν ἱππεῖς ἢ ψιλοὶ ἢ τοξόται ἢ ναυτικόν, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ἐκάστων ἐνίοτε καθίστανται ἀρχαί, αἱ καλοῦνται ναυαρχαί καὶ ἱππαρχαί καὶ ταξιαρχαί, καὶ κατὰ μέρος δὲ αἱ ὑπὸ ταύτας τριηραρχαί καὶ λοχαγαί
 5 καὶ φυλαρχαί καὶ ὅσα τούτων μόρια· τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἐν τι τούτων ἐστὶν εἶδος, ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν. περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτην 16 τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τούτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔναια τῶν ἀρχῶν, εἰ καὶ μὴ πᾶσαι, διαχειρίζουσι πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν, ἀναγκαῖον ἑτέραν εἶναι τὴν ληψομένην λογισμὸν καὶ προσευθυ-
 10 νοῦσαν, αὐτὴν μὴδὲν διαχειρίζουσαν ἕτερον· καλοῦσι δὲ τούτους οἱ μὲν εὐθύνους, οἱ δὲ λογιστάς, οἱ δ' ἐξεταστάς, οἱ δὲ συνηγόρους. παρὰ πάσας δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ μάλιστα 17 κυρία πάντων ἐστὶν· ἡ γὰρ αὕτη πολλάκις ἔχει τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν εἰσφορὰν ἢ προκάθεται τοῦ πλήθους, ὅπου κύριός ἐστιν ὁ
 15 δῆμος· δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ συνάγον τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας. καλεῖται δὲ ἔνθα μὲν πρόβουλοι διὰ τὸ προβουλεύειν, ὅπου

18 δὲ πλῆθος ἐστὶ, βουλὴ μᾶλλον. αἱ μὲν οὖν πολιτικαὶ τῶν
 ἀρχῶν σχεδὸν τοσαῦταί τινές εἰσιν, ἄλλο δ' εἶδος ἐπιμε-
 λείας ἢ περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς, οἷον ἱερεῖς τε καὶ ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν
 περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τοῦ σώζεσθαί τε τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἀνορθοῦσθαι 20
 τὰ πίπτοντα τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τέτα-
 19 κται πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς. συμβαίνει δὲ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ταύτην
 ἐνιαχοῦ μὲν εἶναι μίαν, οἷον ἐν ταῖς μικραῖς πόλεσιν, ἐνια-
 χοῦ δὲ πολλὰς καὶ κεχωρισμένας τῆς ἱεροσύνης, οἷον ἱερο-
 ποιούς καὶ ναοφύλακας καὶ ταμίας τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων. 25
 20 ἔχομένη δὲ ταύτης ἢ πρὸς τὰς θυσίας ἀφωρισμένη τὰς κοι-
 νὰς πάσας, ὅσας μὴ τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος, ἀλλ'
 ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἐστίας ἔχουσι τὴν τιμὴν· καλοῦσι δ' οἱ μὲν
 21 ἀρχοντας τούτους, οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς, οἱ δὲ πρυτάνεις. αἱ μὲν
 οὖν ἀναγκαῖαι ἐπιμέλειαί εἰσι περὶ τούτων, ὥς εἰπεῖν συγκε- 30
 φαλαιοσαμένους, περὶ τε τὰ δαιμόνια καὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ
 καὶ περὶ τὰς προσδόους καὶ περὶ τὰ ἀναλίσκόμενα, καὶ περὶ
 ἀγορὰν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ καὶ λιμένας καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἔτι
 τὰ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ συναλλαγμάτων ἀναγραφὰς
 καὶ πράξεις καὶ φυλακὰς καὶ ἐπιλογισμούς τε καὶ ἐξε- 35
 τάσεις καὶ προσευθύνas τῶν ἀρχόντων, καὶ τέλος αἱ περὶ
 22 τὸ βουλευόμενόν εἰσι τῶν κοινῶν· ἴδιαι δὲ ταῖς σχολαστικω-
 τέραις καὶ μᾶλλον εὐημερούσαις πόλεσιν, ἔτι δὲ φροντισού-
 σαις εὐκοσμίαις, γυναικονομία νομοφυλακία παιδονομία
 γυμνασιαρχία, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περὶ ἀγῶνας ἐπιμέλεια γυ- 1323 a
 μνικοὺς καὶ Διονυσιακοὺς, κὰν εἴ τις ἐτέρας συμβαίνει
 23 τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι θεωρίας. τούτων δ' ἔναι φανερώs εἰσὶν οὐ
 δημοτικαὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, οἷον γυναικονομία καὶ παιδονομία·
 τοῖς γὰρ ἀπύροις ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ παισὶν 5
 24 ὥσπερ ἀκολούθους διὰ τὴν ἀδουλίαν. τριῶν δ' οὐσῶν ἀρχῶν
 καθ' ἃς αἰροῦνται τινες ἀρχὰς τὰς κυρίους, νομοφυλάκων προ-
 βούλων βουλῆς, οἱ μὲν νομοφύλακες ἀριστοκρατικόν, ὀλιγαρ-
 χικόν δ' οἱ πρόβουλοι, βουλὴ δὲ δημοτικόν. περὶ μὲν οὖν
 τῶν ἀρχῶν, ὥς ἐν τύπῳ, σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πασῶν . . . 10

CRITICAL NOTES.

BOOK VI (IV).

1288 b 10. ἔργον Π¹ Vat. Pal. marg. P⁴ Sus.: om. Π² Bekk. **18.** †μηδὲν ἦττον . . . **19.** δύναμιν†] There can be little doubt that these words have come down to us in a corrupt and probably imperfect form. Bekk.² reads οὐδὲν in place of μηδὲν. Τε can hardly be right. Π¹ marg. P⁴ have ἔτι in place of ἐστὶ (Vat. Pal. εστιν). Possibly we should read οὐδὲν ἦττον τοῦ παιδοτρίβου τε καὶ τοῦ γυμναστικοῦ παρασκευάσαι καὶ ταύτην ἐστὶ τὴν δύναμιν, but it is difficult to be certain how the text originally stood. **24.** ἀρμόττουσα Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk.: ἀρμόζουσα M^a P¹ Sus. and possibly Γ. See critical note on 1338 b 3. **27.** ἀγαθὸν Π¹ Vat. Pal. marg. P⁴ Sus.: om. Π² Bekk. **29.** ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε πῶς ἂν γένοιτο] ‘γίνοιτο?’ Sus., but cp. Xen. Cyrop. 4. 3. 8, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο ἴσως ἐννοεῖτε πῶς ἂν τοῦτο γένοιτο. **32.** τε] See explanatory note on 1288 b 30 sqq. **33.** παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα] See critical note on 1282 a 40. **36.** Vet. Int. adds *tamen* before his equivalent for τῶν γε χρησίμων.

1289 a 1. ἐπαινοῦσιν Bekk. Sus., ἐπαινοῦσι Π² corr. P¹: ἐπαινούμεν Γ M^a pr. P¹. **3.** κοινωνεῖν Π² Bekk. Sus.: κινεῖν M^a pr. P¹: Vet. Int. has *prosequi*, and I am not certain what this represents. **5.** τοῦ Π² Bekk.: ἡ Π¹ Sus. A word is sometimes displaced in Π¹ by another word wrongly repeated from a neighbouring line, and here ἡ from the preceding line has probably displaced τοῦ. **8.** δὲ Π² Bekk.: γὰρ Γ M^a Sus., γὰρ δὲ Π¹. **11.** μετὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.] See explanatory note. **17.** ἐκάστοις Γ P¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. *singulis*): ἐκάστης M^a Π² Ar. Bekk. less well. τῆς κοινωνίας] z has *communicationis*, which sometimes represents *κοινωνίας* in the *Vetus Versio* (e.g. in 1252 a 7) and may possibly be right: the other MSS. have *communio*nis. **24.** Vet. Int. does not translate δὲ after εἴπερ: did Γ omit it? πλείους Π¹ corr. P² Bekk. Sus.: πλείω P³ C¹ Π² pr. P²: see explanatory note on 1289 a 24. **26.** περὶ om. Π¹. **33.** κεχορηγημένην] Vet. Int. *diffusam*, which might suggest that he

misread the word as *κεχυμένην*, were it not that he has *distributores* for *χορηγοί* in 1299 a 19.

1289 b 1. τοῦ βασιλεύοντος] Vet. Int. *regis*, but we must not infer any difference of reading in Γ, for in 1291 b 4 Vet. Int. has *agricolas* for γεωργούντας, in 1298 b 22 *consiliarios* for τοὺς βουλευομένους, in 1304 a 3 *sacrificialorem* for θύοντος, in 1305 a 31 *demagogi* for δημαγωγούντες, in 1306 a 8 *fures* for κλέπτοντας, and in 1319 a 30 *terrae cultores* for οἱ γεωργούντες. The reverse inexactness also occurs: thus in 1320 b 29 we have *communicantes* for τοὺς κοινωνοὺς.

13. Π¹ Sus. add εἰσὶν or εἰσιν after πολιτειῶν. 25. ἐκάστης M^s P¹ Bekk. Sus.: ἐκάστου Π²: Vet. Int. *uniuscuiusque* leaves it uncertain which reading he found in Γ. ταῦτα Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: ταύτας Π² Ar.

32. δὲ ἄνοπλον Π² Bekk.: δ' ἄοπλον M^s P¹ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *autem sine armis* which reading he found in Γ. "Ἀνοπλος 'seems to be a later and less correct form, v. Dind. Steph. Thes. s.v.' (Liddell and Scott s.v. ἄοπλος): still it may be right here, for in Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1116 b 12 all MSS. have the form ἄνοπλος. The form ἄνοπλον occurs in Plato, Euthyd. 299 B, though we find the form ἄοπλον in Protag. 320 E and 321 C, where the word is used in a wider sense than in the Euthydemus. 38. πολέμους Γ Bekk.² Sus. (Vet. Int. *bella*): πολεμίους Π Bekk.¹ As to the second πρὸς see explanatory note. 39. ἐπὶ Μαϊάνδρῳ] Vet. Int. *sub Maeandro* probably represents ἐπὶ Μαϊάνδρῳ, for in 1306 b 35 ἐπ' Ἀγησιλάῳ is rendered *sub Agesilao*, and in 1271 a 39 ἐπὶ τοῖς βασιλεῦσι *sub regibus*.

1290 a 1. κἀν εἴ Π² Bekk. Sus.: καὶ εἴ M^s P¹ and possibly Γ, for Vet. Int. has *et si*, but *et si* seems sometimes to represent κἀν εἰ in Vet. Int. (see critical note on 1278 b 7). δὴ Γ P¹ Bekk. Sus.: δεῖ M^s Π² (corrected in P⁴ and in ink which may or may not be that of the MS. in P²). 2. διελόμεθα P¹ Bekk.: Vet. Int. *divisimus*, which represents διειλομεν in 1290 a 24 and 1295 a 8, but διελόμεθα in 1289 a 26, so that we cannot be certain which reading Vet. Int. found in his text: διειλόμεν over an erasure P⁴: διελόμην M^s P² 3 etc. Perhaps the chances are in favour of διειλομεν, the reading of Götting and Sus., as Γ Π have διειλομεν in 1290 a 24. See critical note on 1257 b 33. 18. δημοκρατίαν Γ Π Bekk. Sus.: δημοκρατίας Lamb. Schn. Cor., but not, I think, rightly. 21. Q^b, a MS. of little authority, followed by Bekk., adds τὴν before φρυγισί. 32. οὐδ' . . . 33, ὀλίγοι τῆς πολιτείας is placed after 37, τοὺτους, in P² 6 Q^b U^b V^b L^s Ald., marg. rec. P³, and pr. P⁴, and

after 39, *προσαγορεύσειεν*, over an erasure in pr. P³, so that only Π¹ and marg. P⁴, and probably Vat. Pal., place these words in their right place. We may infer this as to Vat. Pal., for, though the fragment preserved by it begins only with 36, *ομοίους* (see vol. i. p. viii), we note that it does not give the words either in 37 or in 39: therefore it probably placed them rightly in 32. Γ M³ and marg. P¹ place *ὄλγοι* after *τῆς πολιτείας*.

1290 b 2. πολλοὺς Π³ Vat. Pal. Bekk.: *πλείους* Π¹ Sus. 15. *ἀλιγαρχία* Bojesen, Sus., Welldon: *δημος* Γ Π Vat. Pal. Bekk. *ἀν* is added after *οἶον* in Π³ Vat. Pal., but is omitted by Π¹ Bekk. Sus. and expunged by corr. P⁴. It probably comes from the preceding line. 19. *ἀλιγαρχία* Π¹ Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus., but *χ* is over an erasure in P¹: *ἀλιγαρχία* Π². 22. Vet. Int. has *et plures* for *πλείους*, but he sometimes adds *et* where no *καί* existed in his Greek text (see critical notes on 1252 a 25, 1262 a 29, 1264 a 9, and 1284 b 32). 25. *προηρούμεθα* Π³ Vat. Pal. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *vellemus*): *προηρήμεθα* M³ and perhaps pr. P¹, for in P¹ *ηρου* is over an erasure. *πρῶτον μὲν* Π¹ Sus.: *πρῶτον* Π³ Vat. Pal. Bekk. 26. *ὅπερ* Γ Π Bekk. Sus. Richards would read *ὅσαπερ* or *ἀπερ*. 29. *εἶδη* Γ Π Vat. Pal. is probably a repetition of *εἰ δὴ*, unless it is repeated erroneously from *τοσαῦτ' εἶδη*, 36 (see critical notes on 1298 b 35 and 1309 a 29). Or should *εἴη* be read in place of it? Supply *μέρια* with *τοσαῦτα* from *μορίους*, 28. As to *εἰ δὴ* see explanatory note. 33. *ταὐτὸν* P³ Vat. Pal. etc.: *ταὐτὸ* M³, *ταυτό* P¹: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. 'Forma generis neutrius *ταὐτόν* saepe legitur non solum ante vocales, verum etiam ante consonantes' (Bon. Ind. 125 b 16). So in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 39 all MSS. have *ταὐτόν* before *καί*. 39. *μερῶν* Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk.: *μορίων* M³ P¹ Sus.: Vet. Int. *partibus* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. *Μορίων* is perhaps here repeated from two lines above, for this kind of error occurs occasionally in Π¹.

1291 a 1. *τὸ* after *τοῦτο* is omitted in Π³ Bekk., but Π³ often omit the article, e.g. in 1291 b 3, where these MSS. omit *τοὺς* before *προπολεμούντας*, in 1292 a 22, 1297 a 35, and 1305 b 10. 4. *τρίτον* δ' *ἀγοραίων* Π Vat. Pal.: Γ probably read *τρίτον δὲ τὸ ἀγοραίων* (Vet. Int. *tertium autem quae circa forum*). But the article is often expressed and omitted irregularly in enumerations: see critical note on 1317 b 37, Riddell, *Apology of Plato*, p. 211 (§ 237 F), and Holden, *Oeconomicus of Xenophon*, critical note on c. 1. § 1. 7. *τὸ προπολεμήσον*] Vet. Int. *quod propugnans*, but we must not

infer a difference of reading in Γ, for in 1291 a 23 Vet. Int. has *reddentem et iudicantem* for τὸν ἀποδώσοντα καὶ κρινόντα and in 1298 a 19 *audientes* for ἀκουσομένους, though he renders the future participle correctly in 1298 a 21, 26. 8. Vet. Int. has *si debeant non servire invadentibus*, which probably stands for εἰ μέλλουσι μὴ δουλεύσειν τοῖς ἐπιούσιν, for in 1283 a 6 we have *si differat* for εἰ διαφέρει and in 1331 b 25 *civitatem quae debet esse beata* stands for τὴν μέλλουσαν ἔσεσθαι πόλιν μακαρίαν. μὴ γὰρ ἐν τῶν ἀδυνάτων ᾗ] Vet. Int. *nihil enim minus impossibilem quam*: it is difficult to guess what he found in his Greek text. 11. κομψῶς] Vet. Int. *leviter*: he probably misread κομψῶς as κούφως. 14. αὐτάρκων] Vet. Int. *necessariis*, which probably comes from *necessaria* a little further on. Whether the error is that of Vet. Int. or of his Greek text, it is impossible to say. See critical note on 1330 b 7. 17. τε P²³ Vat. Pal. Bekk.² Sus., τὲ P¹, τὸ M⁸, γε Π³ Bekk.¹ Vet. Int., as usual, does not render τε. 21. τῆς is not rendered by Vet. Int. and may have been omitted in Γ, but see critical note on 1306 a 30. ἀπτομένης Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: ἀπτομένων Π² Vat. Pal. 29. Vat. Pal. agrees with Π¹ in adding γὰρ after οὐδὲν, but probably wrongly. For other passages in which the MSS. differ as to the insertion or omission of γὰρ, see critical notes on 1272 b 36 and 1324 a 22. 34. δ Π² Vat. Pal.: ὅπερ M⁸ P¹: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *quam* which reading he found in Γ, for he often fails to render περ. 35. τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς λειτουργῶν] z has here rightly *quae circa principatus administrat*: other MSS. *aministrat* or *amministrat*. 39. ἀρτίως] Vet. Int. *perfecte*. Did he misread ἀρτίως as ἀκριβῶς? βουλευόμενον Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk.: βουλευσόμενον Π¹ Sus. κρίνον Π³ Bekk., κρίνον P²³: κρινούν Π¹ Vat. Pal. Sus., κινούν M⁸, κοινωνούν Γ (Vet. Int. *communicat*). 41. γενέσθαι] Vet. Int. *fieri*, which often stands for γενέσθαι (e.g. in 1340 b 25). καλῶς γενέσθαι Schn. Bekk.² Sus. probably rightly: καλῶς γίνεσθαι Π Vat. Pal. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *fieri*).

1291 b 1. ἀρετῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν] Richards would add τῆς after ἀρετῆς. 3. τοὺς before προπολεμούντας om. Π², but see critical note on 1291 a 1. 6. ἀρχὰς om. Π² (P²³ however has τὰς πλείστας ἀρχὰς over an erasure), but not Π¹ or Vat. Pal. 8. οἱ before ἄποροι is omitted in pr. P¹², but it is inserted in both these MSS. in the same ink as the MS. 12. καθιστάσι P¹²³ etc. Bekk. Sus., καθιστασιν Vat. Pal., καθιστάσι P⁴, καθιστᾶσθαι M⁸. Vet. Int. has *consistant*, which probably represents καθιστάσι, for *consistere* stands for καταστήσαι in 1287 b 11 and for καθιστάναι in 1321 a 21. I do not think with

Sus. that *consistant* here necessarily represents καθίστασθαι. 16. τοῦτο καὶ Γ Π² Bekk.: τοῦτο Μ² P¹: καὶ τοῦτο Sus. *Et* is absent in z and in the edition of the Vetus Versio contained in the Works of Albertus Magnus, ed. Lyons, 1651. 24. πορθμευτικὸν Camerarius (Interp. p. 150), Bekk., Sus.: πορθμικὸν Π: Vet. Int. *transvectivum* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. All MSS. of Vet. Int. have *transvectivum aulem*, but whether he found δὲ in Γ is doubtful (see critical notes on 1308 b 28 and 1318 a 35). 27. μὴ Π² corr. P¹: μὲν Γ Μ² pr. P¹ (for the ῆ of μὴ in P¹ is over an erasure). 28. ἕτερον Ar. Bekk.² Sus.: ἑτέρου Γ Π Vat. Pal. Bekk.¹ (Vet. Int. *alterius*). 29. τὰ τοῖτοις λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαφορὰν] Vet. Int. *his similia dicta secundum eandem differentiam*, where *similia* probably represents a gloss ὁμοια which the translator renders as part of the text. The same thing happens in 1318 a 17: see also 1287 a 10. 32. τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους] Vet. Int. *nil magis existere egenis vel divitibus* (τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἀπόροις ἢ τοῖς εὐπόροις Γ?). As to ὑπάρχειν see explanatory note. 40. βραχείων δὲ] Vet. Int. *et brevisius*, but see critical notes on 1274 b 40 and 1311 a 37.

1292 a 8. τὸ πᾶσι μετεῖναι] ταλλαμεν εἶναι Vat. Pal., and probably τᾶλλα μὲν εἶναι pr. P¹, for τὸ πᾶσι is over an erasure and εἶναι is corrected from εἶναι: Vet. Int. has *alia quidem esse*, if we follow bgk l m z, or *alia quidem esse eadem*, if we follow a c h, so that Γ will have had either τᾶλλα μὲν εἶναι or τᾶλλα μὲν εἶναι ταῦτα. This erroneous reading evidently arises from the substitution of words from 4-5 for the true reading. 4. δὲ is added after ἕτερον in Γ P⁴ L² Ald. 6. τοῦτο] z has *hoc*, the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *haec*. 13. ἀγαθὴν Μ² pr. P^{2,3} and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *bonam*), followed by Sus., ἀγαθὴν P¹, ἀγαθὴν Vat. Pal.: ἀγαθὸν Π² Bekk. and corr.¹ P^{2,3} (i. e. a correction in these MSS. in the ink of the MS.). 17. Vet. Int. has *quare et* for ὥστε, but see critical note on 1290 b 22. ὁ τοιοῦτος δῆμος Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk.: ὁ δῆμος οὗτος Π¹ Sus. Compare the readings in 1332 b 40. 22. (παρ') ἐκατέροις] ἐκατέροις Π Vat. Pal.: Vet. Int. *apud utrosque* (παρ' ἐκατέροις Γ?). Παρ' is added by Vict. Bekk. Sus., probably rightly, for all MSS. have παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις or παρὰ τυράννοις: the dative without παρά, however, is not perhaps impossible, cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 28, Θηβαίοις, and Περὶ ἀναπνοῆς 17. 478 b 27 sq. and 18. 479 b 3 sq. (compare with the two latter passages Plato, Rep. 546 A). It is not certain that Vet. Int. found παρ' in Γ, for he has *apud populos tales* in 23 for τοῖς δῆμοις τοῖς

τοιούτοις, where no MS. has *παρὰ* and where it may well be dispensed with. τοῖς is omitted before τυράννοις in Q^b V^b Ald. Bekk. and pr. P⁴, but see critical note on 1291 a 1. 29. πρόκλησιν Π² Bekk.: προσκλησιν Vat. Pal., πρόσκλησιν Π¹ Sus. (P¹ however has a dot under the first σ of πρόσκλησιν to expunge it: see Sus.¹). See explanatory note. 33. εκαστα or εκαστον Vat. Pal.

35. ἐν ᾗ ψηφίσμασι πάντα διοικείται] Γ P¹ perhaps had ψηφίσματα in place of ψηφίσμασι, for Vet. Int. has *in qua sententiae omnia dispensant*, and in P¹ the σι of ψηφίσμασι is over an erasure.

1292 b 1. μακρῶν Π¹ Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. *immensis*): μακρῶν Π², but ι in P⁴ is over an erasure. 5. εἰσὶν Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk. Sus.: εἰς εἷν Π¹ (corrected in the margin of P¹ in the ink of the MS.). 9. εἶπομεν M² P¹ Sus.: εἴπαμεν Π² Vat. Pal. Bekk. The reading of Γ is of course uncertain. See Bon. Ind. 222 a 16 sqq. K^b has εἴπαμεν in Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1100 b 9 and 1. 12. 1101 b 21, but εἴπομεν is probably the correct reading. In Pol. 2. 11. 1273 b 14 and 3. 16. 1287 a 4 all MSS. have εἴπομεν. 10. δὴ] Vet. Int. *etiam*, as in 1275 b 21, 1277 b 16, and 1304 a 33. 13. Vat. Pal. leaves room for three letters after *κατα*. 14. ἥθος Π¹ Vat. Pal. Sus. (Vet. Int. *assuetudinem*): ἥθος Π² Bekk. πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικῶς] All MSS. of Vet. Int. except z have *politizet et democratice*: z rightly omits *et*. Vat. Pal. adds *δε* after *πολιτενεσθαι*. 15. τοὺς νόμους P² 3 Vat. Pal. Ald. Bekk.: νόμους P¹ 4 Q^b V^b L² Sus., νόμων M²: Vet. Int. *leges* may stand for either τοὺς νόμους or νόμους. 19. μικρά] Vet. Int. *paulatim*, which stands for *κατὰ μικρόν* in 1278 a 32 and 1307 b 1. In 1314 a 16 μικρά is rendered *modica*. 29. ἀναγκαίως] Vet. Int. *necessariissimas*, but he is not always exact in rendering degrees of comparison. 30–33. I follow Rassow and Sus. in their reconstitution of the text. Π² omit *διὸ πᾶσι τοῖς κτησαμένοις ἔξεστι μετέχειν*, and Π¹ place these words after νόμων, 30, but Rassow and Sus. are probably right in adding δημοκρατικόν after ἐξεῖναι (I prefer to add πᾶσι δημοκρατικόν), and in inserting διὸ . . . μετέχειν after δημοκρατικόν. It then becomes necessary to add δ' after σχολάζειν, 33. I prefer this reconstitution of the text to any other which has been suggested, but it is less doubtful that a lacuna exists after the second ἐξεῖναι than that no more has dropped out than δημοκρατικόν or πᾶσι δημοκρατικόν, and it must also be admitted that it is not easy to see why it is a democratic course to give access to office to all who possess a certain property-qualification, seeing that the first form of oligarchy goes as far as that (1293 a

14 sq.). *Κτησαμένους* in 32 is the reading of all the MSS. which do not omit *δὲ . . . μετέχων* (Vet. Int. has *possidentibus*, which probably represents it): *κτωμένους* Vict. Bekk. 31. *μὲν* after *τὸ* is omitted in Π¹, but Bekk. and Sus. retain it. *δὲ δὴ*] Vet. Int. *autem*: see critical note on 1286 a 38. 35. *διαίρεσιν*] See explanatory note. 36. *δυναμένους*] *δυναμένοις* Π¹ L^a Ald. corr. P⁴ Bekk.: *δυναμένους* the rest followed by Sus. 39. *ὅσοι ἄν*] Vet. Int. *quicunque*: so we have *quicunque excesserint* (without any *utique* to represent *ἄν*) for *ἐπότεροι ἄν ὑπερέχῃσι* in 1296 a 24 (cp. 29). Sus.¹ adds *utique* here without necessity.

1293 a 3. *προσόδων*] *πρόσοδον* M^a, *προσόδον* apparently pr. P¹, corrected to *προσόδων* in the ink of the MS. *καὶ* is added before *εὐπορίας* in Γ M^a pr. P¹. 7. *οὐ γὰρ* Π² Bekk.: *οὐδὲ γὰρ* Π¹ Sus. 9. *ὅτι* Π: *οὐδὲ* Bekk. Sus. Stahr retains *ὅτε* (see his note in his edition of the Politics). See critical note on 1257 b 12, and compare, in addition to the passages there referred to, 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 15 sq.: Demosth. De Fals. Leg. cc. 159, 160: see also Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 536. 2 b, where reference is made, among other passages, to Lys. Or. 16. pro Mantith. c. 3, *οὐχ ἵππευον οὐτ' ἐπεδήμουν ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα*, Isaeus 8. 1 (*οὐκ . . . ὅτε*), and Plato, Rep. 398A. 12. *τὰ δὲ* Γ Π Bekk.: *τάδε δὲ* Bojesen, Sus. 18. *ἀμελοῦντες* Spengel, Sus. (Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 863, Obs. 9): *ἀμελοῦντας* Π Bekk. 21. *ἡ οἱ* Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: *εἰ μὲν* P²³ pr. P⁴ etc. *τὸ* om. M^a P¹ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *quam qui prius*). 24. *ἄλλων* Π² Bekk.: *πολλῶν* Π¹ Sus. 25. *δὲ* om. P²³⁴ etc. 26. *τῷ* Π², *τῷ* Bekk.: *τὸ* Π¹ Sus. 28. *αὐτῶν* Γ P¹, *αὐτῶν* M^a P²³⁴ Ald. Γ P¹ make a similar correction in 1274 a 23, 1302 a 33, 1308 a 10, 1312 b 9, and 1314 b 17, 23, and P¹ in 1293 b 7, 1303 b 25, 1305 b 22, and 1315 a 28. See also Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* in 1301 b 3 and 1312 b 39. In 1252 b 28 Γ P¹ have *ἥδη* rightly, all the other MSS. *ἡ δὴ* or *ἡ δέ*. *μὲν* om. Γ M^a pr. P¹: it is supplied in P¹ in the ink of the MS. 37. *τέτταρας* Π² Bekk. Sus.: *τέτταρα* M^a P¹: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain.

1293 b 8. *καὶ καλοῦνται ἀριστοκραταί*] See explanatory note. 10. *γὰρ* M^a, but no weight attaches to the unsupported testimony of M^a. Vet. Int. has *vero*, which probably represents *δὲ* here, as it does in 1299 b 26 and 1323 a 9, though *δέ* is usually rendered *autem*. In 1286 b 22 *vero* stands for *δὲ δὴ*: it frequently stands for *μάντοι*. 11. *αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία*] See explanatory note. 17. *εἰς ἀρετὴν τε* Π² Bekk.: *εἰς τε ἀρετὴν* M^a P¹ Sus. We cannot tell from Vet. Int. *ad virtutem* which reading he found in Γ. See critical note

on 1277 b 29. 22. *ὀνομαζομένης* Π¹ and corr. P⁴, followed by Bekk.² Sus.: *νομιζομένης* P^{2 3} etc. Bekk.¹ and pr. P⁴. 24. *ἀρετὴ ῥηθείσας* Π² Bekk. Sus.: *ἀποδοθείσας* Π¹. 32. *φανερωτέρα* Π² Bekk. Sus.: *φανερωτάτη* Π¹. See critical notes on 1299 a 27 and 1315 b 11. 39. *κάγαθούς* Γ Π² Bekk. Sus.: *καὶ ἀγαθούς* M² P¹.

1294 a 1. τὸ εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ ἀριστοκρατουμένην] See explanatory note on 1293 b 42. 7. *κακῶς* Π² Bekk. Sus.: *καλῶς* Π¹ (corrected in P¹ in the ink of the MS.). 11. *δ τι ἂν δόξῃ*] Vet. Int. *quodcumque videatur* (see critical note on 1287 a 27). 18. As to the absence of τὴν before τῶν καλῶν κάγαθῶν see explanatory note on 1294 a 17. 22. *ἀρχαῖος πλούτος καὶ ἀρετή* Π² Bekk. (except that P⁴ omits *καὶ*): *ἀρετὴ καὶ πλούτος ἀρχαῖος* Π¹ Sus. There is this to be said for the order of Π⁴ that in 1301 b 3 we have *εὐγενεῖς γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλούτος*, where *ἀρετὴ* precedes *πλούτος*: on the other hand, *προγόνων*, which answers to *ἀρχαῖος*, is placed first, and *ἀρχαῖος* is probably rightly placed by Π² before the substantives which it accompanies, for it thus acquires emphasis (see explanatory note on 1275 a 32). 36. *δ* M² P¹ Sus. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *quae*): *δν* Π² Bekk. 37. *ἐκάτεραι* Π² Bekk.: *ἐκάτεροι* Π¹ Sus. In 34 we have *ἀφ' ἐκατέρας*, though it is true that in 1294 b 2 all MSS. have *ἐκάτεροι*, not *ἐκάτεραι*.

1294 b 2. *ἕτερος*] Vet. Int. *alterum* (ἕτερον Γ?). 5. *τιμήματος* M² Π² Bekk. Sus.: *τίμημα* Γ Π¹ Q^b. 8. P¹ Bekk.¹ add τὸ before *κληρωτὰς*, and we cannot be certain that Γ did not do so too, but in the absence of evidence as to Γ it would be rash to follow P¹. 26. *διάδηλος* Π¹ (Vet. Int. *distinctus*): *ἄδηλος* Π², though this is corrected in P^{2 3 4} (in P² in the ink of the MS.). 29. τῷ Γ Π¹, τῷ Bekk. Sus.: τῶν M² Π². 37. *ἔξωθεν* is rightly bracketed by Thurot and Sus.: it may have found its way into this line by repetition from the preceding one. z has *ab extrinsecus* for *ἔξωθεν* possibly rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *extrinsecus*. In 1312 a 40 all MSS. have *ab extrinseco* for *ἔξωθεν*. In 1294 b 36 *ἔξωθεν* is rendered *ab extra*. 38. τῷ Π¹, τῷ Bekk. Sus.: τὸ Π². 39. *πόλεως* Π² Bekk. Sus.: *πολιτείας* Π¹. See critical note on 1318 a 9. 40. *δεῖ καθιστάναι πολιτείαν*] Vet. Int. *videtur consistere politia*. Γ no doubt had *δοκεῖ* with M² in place of *δεῖ*, but whether it had *καθιστάναι πολιτείου* in place of *καθιστάναι πολιτείαν*, which is the reading of all the extant MSS., may well be doubted. Vet. Int. may have emended his Greek text to suit the false reading *δοκεῖ* (see vol. ii. p. lxiv). It is not, indeed, quite certain that *consistere* represents

καθιστάται here, for it represents *καταστήσαι* in 1287 b 11 and *καθιστάται* in 1321 a 21. See critical note on 1291 b 12.

1295 a 6. *ἀσύμφορος* M^s P¹ 2³ Sus.: *ἀσύμφορον* Π³ Bekk.: Vet. Int. *inexpediens* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. Compare the various readings in 1301 b 28. 12. *μονάρχους* Π³ Bekk. and also Γ, for all MSS. of Vet. Int. (including Z) have *monarchos*, though in the next line Vet. Int. has *monarchae*. 13. *μόναρχοι* M^s P¹ 4 Ald. Bekk. and pr. P² 3: *μονίρχαι* Γ corr. P² 3 Sus. 15. *διὰ μὲν τὸ κ.τ.λ.*] Sus.¹ queries whether *propterea quidem quod* in Vet. Int. should not be *propter quidem quod*, but see critical note on 1328 b 4. 20. *ἀρχι* P² 4 Q^b Ald. Bekk. Sus. and rec. P³, *ἀρχη* V^b and pr. P³, *ἀρχή* Γ M^s, *ἀρχή* P¹. 27. *τῇ*] Vet. Int. *esse* (εἶναι Γ?). 28. *ῥ*] Δ Γ Π, except L^s and a MS. mentioned by Camerarius (Interp. p. 163), which have *ῥ*. Bekker and Sus. are probably right in reading *ῥ*, for the antecedent appears to be *παιδείαν*, not *ἀρετὴν* and *παιδείαν*. 38. Chandler and Richards would add *τὸν* after *βελτιστον*. Π¹ add *δι*, and marg. P⁴ δ', after *τῆς*, possibly repeating it from *μεσότητα δι* in the preceding line.

1295 b 7. *ὑπέρπρωτον*] Spengel would insert *ὑπέραισχρον ῥ* before *ὑπέρπρωτον* to make the correspondence exact, but not rightly: see explanatory note on 1323 b 35. 8. *καὶ* Π Bekk. Sus.: Vet. Int. *αὐ*, but he has *αὐ* or *vel* in 1262 a 8, 1298 b 29, and 1317 b 26, where Π have *καὶ*. 12. *ἔτι . . .* 13. *πόλεσιν*] See explanatory note. *φιλαρχοῦσι* P¹ Ald. Bekk. and corrections in P² 3 4 in the ink of the MSS., *φιλαρχοῦσι* Γ M^s Q^b V^b L^s pr. P² 3 4 Sus. 17. *οὐδ' ἐν* P² 4 L^s Ald. Bekk. and a correction in P³ in the ink of the MS., *οὐδὲν* Q^b V^b pr. P³: *οὐδέ* Π¹ Sus. *τοῖς διδασκαλείοις* P³ 4 Ald. Bekk., *τοῖς διδασκαλείοις* P² and the margin of L^s, *ταῖς διδασκαλείαις* pr. L^s: *τοῖς διδασκαλοῖς* Π¹ Sus. See critical note on 1259 a 13. 20. *οὐδεμίᾳ ἀρχῇ*] *οὐδεμίαν ἀρχήν* Spengel, Sus. 21. *καὶ* before *δούλων* om. Π¹: I follow Sus. in bracketing it, though not without hesitation. See critical note on 1282 a 17. 31. *τῆς τούτων*] Vet. Int. *substantiam hominum*, but we must not suppose that he found *οὐσίας* added in Γ, for in 1317 b 23 he translates *τὸ μὴ δις τὸν αὐτὸν ἄρχειν μηδεμίαν non bis eundem principari nullo principatu*, where he adds *principatu*. 34. *θῶν* Γ P¹ Bekk. Sus.: *θῶν* M^s P² 4 V^b Ald. pr. P³. 39. *εὐτυχία μεγίστη*] Vet. Int. *eufortunium maximum*. Had Γ *εὐτύχημα μέγιστον*? *Eufortunium* stands for *εὐτύχημα* in 1333 b 18 and 1295 b 14, whereas *εὐτυχία* is always, I think, in the Politics rendered by *bona fortuna*. 40. *τούς* om. M^s P¹ and possibly Γ.

1296 a 8. στάσεις] See explanatory note. **9.** τῶν πολιτῶν Ar. Bekk.² Sus.: τῶν πολιτειῶν Γ Π Bekk.¹ **28.** τὰς is added before μάχας in M^s P¹: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *pugnās* whether it was added in Γ. **32.** ἔτι Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: ἔστι P³ P³ and pr. P³, where it is corrected in the ink of the MS. **34.** δημοκρατίας, and **35.** ὀλιγαρχίας] Vet. Int. *democratiam* and *oligarchiam*, but he sometimes renders the plural by the singular: thus in 1338 b 11 he has *speciem* for τὰ εἶδη, in 1303 a 14 *verecundiam* for τὰς ἐριθείας, and in 1310 b 34 *beneficium* for εὐεργεσίας. **35.** καθίστασαν Γ P² Ald. rec. P³ Bekk. Sus., καθιστᾶσιν P¹, καθιστάσι P⁶, καθίστασιν P⁴ Q^b V^b L^s and pr. P³, καθιστῶσιν M^s.

1296 b 4. φαμέν P^{2 3} etc. Bekk.: ἔφαμεν Π¹ P⁴ Sus. **7.** αἰ Spengel Bekk.² Sus., δέ Γ Π Bekk.¹ **10.** τὸ om. P¹ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *dico autem ad hypothesim*), but cp. 1300 b 17, τὸ δὲ πῶς (sc. λέγω), which Vet. Int. translates *quomodo autem*. **11.** κωλύει] κωλύσει Π³ Bekk. **26.** ἐνταῦθα om. M^s P⁶ L^s and pr. P⁴ (it is supplied in the margin of P⁴). **29.** μισθαροούντων] z has *mercedem agentium*, the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *mercede agentium*: z may be right, for in 1303 b 1 τοὺς μισθοφόρους is translated *merces portantes*. **31.** μᾶλλον P^{4 6} L^s U^b Ar. Bekk.: om. Π¹ P^{2 3} Q^b V^b Ald. Sus. inserts it in angular brackets. **32.** δὲ om. Π¹ Ar. **34—38.** See explanatory note. **36.** τοὺς om. M^s P¹: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *leges* whether he found it in Γ or not. **38.** πλῆθος Π Ar. Bekk.: Vet. Int. *multitudine*, whence Sus. reads πλήθει, but does not Vet. Int. take πλῆθος wrongly with ὑπερτείνει as in the acc., and translate it as if it were τὸ πλῆθος? **40.** μόνιμον Π² Bekk. Sus., except that P⁴ has μόνιμον: νόμιμον Γ M^s and probably pr. P¹ (corrected into μόνιμον in text and margin).

1297 a 1. τούτους] τούτω P¹, τοῦ with τ superscribed over ὅ M^s: Vet. Int. *super hoc*, which stands for ἐπὶ τοῖτω in 1307 b 13. **2.** βουλήσονται] z has *volent* rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *volunt*. τοῖς ἑτέροις om. Π¹. **6—b 28.** See explanatory note on 1296 b 34. **9.** The second ἐν is omitted in M^s P¹ and possibly Γ, for Vet. Int. *in praeteraudiendo populum* may stand for τῷ παρακροῦεσθαι (παρακρούεσθαι Γ M^s) τὸν δῆμον, just as in 1309 a 15 *in non faciendo possessiones aequae partiales* stands for τῷ τὰς κτήσεις μὴ ποιῆν ἀναδάστους. See also critical note on 1253 a 36. **11.** ψευδῶς] ψευδῶν Vict. Bekk. and possibly Ar. **14.** τε is added after ὅσα in M^s P¹ and may have been added in Γ, for Vet. Int. seldom translates τε. **17.** γυμνασίαν Π² Ar. Bekk.: γυμνάσια P¹

Sus., τὰ γυμνάσια M^a and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *exercitia*). 24. δ' ἔξεστιν is added after ἀπογραφεμένοις in Π¹ and δι in P⁴: δ' ἔξεστιν is evidently repeated in Π¹ from δ' ἔξεστι just before, an error into which these MSS. occasionally fall, as we have already seen. 28. Vet. Int. has *neque* for μὴ before δικάζουσι. 35. τὰ om. Π² Bekk., but see critical note on 1291 a 1. 40. μὴ is added before ζημίαν in Π¹, but expunged in P¹ by a corrector. 41. ἂν om. Π¹.

1297 b 1. μόνον P¹ Π² Bekk. Sus.: μόνων Γ M^a. 2. μόνον Π² Bekk.: μόνων Π¹ Sus. 3. ὀρισσάμενους P¹ Π² Bekk. Sus. (see explanatory note on 1297 b 1): ὀρισσάμενου M^a: Vet. Int. *determinata* (in agreement with *honorabilitate*), which perhaps represents ὀρισμένον. 4. ποῖον Γ Π Bekk.: πόσον Lindau, Sus. 7. ἐν Π² Bekk., but there is an erasure in P³ between εἰ and α, and the accents and breathings are corrected (see Sus.¹): ἄν M^a P¹ Sus.: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *si* what reading he found in Γ. μῆτε Π¹ Sus.: μὴ Π² Bekk. (corrected to μῆτε in P⁴), which *may* be right (see critical notes on 1257 b 12, 1330 b 16, and 1293 a 9). 11. ὁκνεῖν Π² Bekk. Sus.: κινεῖν Γ M^a pr. P¹. 18. ἐν] z has *in*: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *ex*: Sus.¹ 'in?' 19. ὁ πόλεμος] Vet. Int. *proelium*, as in 1330 a 22. 25. καὶ is added after δι in Π¹, but P¹ omits αἱ, so that καὶ in Γ M^a may be a repetition of αἱ. 27 sq. See explanatory note. 35. Vet. Int. adds *cum dixerimus* after his equivalent for Πάλιν δι, but whether these words represent anything in his Greek text is very doubtful. He may possibly have found a gloss λέγοντες or εἰπόντες in the margin of his MS. λέγωμεν Γ Ald. Ar. Bekk. Sus. and pr. P²: λέγομεν M^a P¹ 3⁴ Q^b V^b and a correction in P³ in the ink of the MS. 41. μὲν τί Congreve, Sus. (cp. c. 15. 1300 a 12, ἔστι δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων ἐν μὲν τίνες οἱ καθιστάντες τὰς ἀρχάς κ.τ.λ.): μὲν τι Π¹ Ald. Bekk. and a correction in P³ in the ink of the MS., μὲν τοι P³ 4 Q^b V^b and pr. P².

1298 a 2. γίγνεσθαι Π² Bekk.¹, γίνεσθαι Bekk.² Sus.: γενέσθαι M^a, and perhaps P¹ (for γίνε in P¹ is over an erasure) and Γ (for Vet. Int. *fieri* often stands for γενέσθαι). 3. τι M^a P¹ Bekk. Sus., τι P⁴, τι Γ P² 3. 6. καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν αἰρέσεως om. Π² Bekk. (the words are added in P⁴ by a corrector). 7. ἀποδιδόσθαι P¹ Π² Bekk. Sus.: ἀποδίδοσθαι M^a and possibly Γ, for Vet. Int. has *dare*, though this might also stand for ἀποδεδόσθαι, for he has *determinare* for διωρίσθαι in 1290 b 7. 8. οἶον Π¹ P² 3 Bekk. Sus.: ἢ P⁴ 6 Q^b V^b L^a and a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp. p. 167). 17. δαλθι Π²,

διέλθῃ Bekk. (in P³ however ἐλ is written in darker ink over an erasure) and probably Γ, for Vet. Int. *pertranseat* may well represent διέλθῃ, as in 1300 a 26: ἐξέλθῃ M^a, διεξέλθῃ P¹, διεξέλθῃ Sus. (apparently an amalgamation of the two other readings). 21. αἰησομένους is bracketed by Sus. probably rightly. 31. προανακρίνειν Π³ Bekk. Sus. (cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 3. l. 32): ανακρίνειν M^a, ανακρίνειν pr. P¹ (προανακρίνειν marg. P¹): Vet. Int. *referre* (ἀναφέρειν Γ?), for *referuntur* stands for ἀναφέρονται in 1321 b 32: it stands, however, for ἐπαγάγειν in 1298 b 37).

1298 b 4. ὀλιγαρχικὴν Γ Π: ὀλιγαρχικωτάτην or ὀλιγαρχί(αν δι-
ναστευτι)κὴν Coray, Sus.: ὀλιγαρχικωτάτην Welldon. 5. All the
MSS. of Vet. Int. except a z, which have *quidem* wrongly for
quidam, fail to give an equivalent for τινίς. 6. καὶ ὑπὲρ P^{1 3} Π³,
ὑπὲρ P², καὶ ὥσπερ M^a, ὥσπερ καὶ Γ (Vet. Int. *sicut et*), καὶ Vict.
Bekk. 7. [ἡ κληρωτοί] I follow Brandis Sus. and Welldon in
bracketing: see explanatory note on 1298 b 5. Possibly, how-
ever, μὴ should be read in place of ἡ. 8. ἡ Π¹ Sus. probably
rightly: ἡ Π²: μὲν ἡ Bekk. following two MSS. of little authority.
See explanatory note on 1298 b 5. 12. διοικεῖται possibly Γ (Vet.
Int. *disponitur*), but Vet. Int. occasionally renders an active by a
passive verb (see vol. ii. p. lxiii, note 6): διοικεῖ Π Bekk. Sus. Διοικεῖται
is probably right, cp. 1298 a 31, and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 27. l. 11, προηρείτο
τὴν πολιτείαν διοικεῖν αὐτός. 13. διορισμός] τρόπον Γ M^a and after
δημοκρατία pr. P¹ (corrected in the margin in paler ink). Τρόπον has
evidently crept in from the preceding line and displaced διορισμός:
blunders of this kind occasionally occur in Π¹, as has been already
pointed out. 14. τε] See explanatory note on 1298 b 13. Π¹
add ἡ before νῦν: see explanatory note on 1298 b 13. 15. καὶ
τῶν νόμων] z has *etiam legum*: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *et legum*.
16. τε αὐτὸ Γ Π (Vet. Int. *meliusque ipsum facere*): Ar. Schn. Bekk.
read τὸ αὐτὸ. Sus. brackets τε and adds τὸ before αὐτὸ. 19.
τοῦτο δι] Richards would read τοῦτο δὴ. See explanatory note.
20. βουλευσονται Π³ Bekk. Sus.: βουλευόνται Π¹. 23. ἴσως Π³
Bekk.: ἴσους Γ M^a pr. P¹ Sus. κἂν] Vet. Int. *si*, but see critical
notes on 1282 b 8 and 1309 b 9. 27. προσαιρεῖσθαι] See ex-
planatory note. 28. ἐν om. Π²: see critical note on 1275 b 7.
29. καὶ νομοφύλακας] Vet. Int. *vel legis servatores*, but see critical
note on 1295 b 8. [καὶ] περὶ τούτων] I follow Coray and Sus. in
bracketing this καὶ. 32. ἡ before ταῦτα is omitted in Π¹: these
MSS. omit ἡ before ταῦτα in 1268 a 6, and they are apt to omit

the first η where one η follows another (see critical note on 1282 a 17). 33. τῆς συμβουλῆς] τοῖς συμβούλοις Γ (Vet. Int. *consiliariis*), τοῖς συμβουλῆς L^a Ald. 35. τὸ πλῆθος is added after δεῖ ποιεῖν in P³, evidently because δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος occurs in the next line (see critical notes on 1290 b 29 and 1309 a 29). ἀποψηφίζόμενον . . . 36, ποιεῖν is omitted in P⁴ etc. and pr. P³ Q^b: P² has ἀποψηφίζόμενον μὲν γὰρ δεῖ κύριον εἶναι ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος, and Π¹ Bekk. ἀποψηφίζόμενον μὲν γὰρ κύριον δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος. Sus. follows Π¹, and brackets εἶναι, placing it between κύριον and δεῖ. In P³ two alternative readings, εἶναι and ποιεῖν, seem to have found their way into the text together. 38. ἀνεστραμμένως] See explanatory note.

1299 a 1. πλείους Γ M^a Sus.: πλείστους P¹ Π^a Bekk. 2. δὴ Γ P⁴ L^a Bekk. Sus. and a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp. p. 169): δεῖ M^a P¹ 2³ 6 etc. διωρίσθω Γ P⁴ Ar. Bekk. Sus., διωρίσθαι P¹ 2³ 6 etc. M^a omits τοῦτον, 2 . . . πολιτείας, 4. 8. καὶ πρότερον εἶναι δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς om. Γ M^a pr. P¹ (the words are supplied in P¹ by a corrector in the margin). 9. πλεονάκεις] Vet. Int. *sæpe* (πολλάκις Γ?). 14. πολιτεῖαι Γ Π Bekk., except a correction in P¹ probably in the ink of the MS.: πολιτείας corr. P¹ Ar. Sus. probably rightly. 16. οὐ is added before πάντας by Rasso and Sus., but see Bonitz, Ind. 539 a 59, who remarks on the passage before us, 'negatio simplex, quae ad universum enunciatum pertineat, omissa est propter negationes singulorum membrorum,' and compares Hist. An. 2. 12. 503 b 34, χεῖρας δ' οὐδὲ πόδας προσθίους ἔχει. Cp. also Pol. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 20, τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους οὐτ' ἰάμβων οὔτε κωμωδίας θεατὰς νομοθετητίων κ.τ.λ. The following sentence occurs in a letter addressed by the United States Venezuelan Boundary Commission to Mr. Olney, the Secretary of State—'The present Commission neither by the mode of its appointment nor by the nature of its duties may be said to belong to tribunals of this character' (*Times*, Jan. 22, 1896). 19. δὲ χορηγοὶ Π^a Bekk.: δὲ καὶ χορηγοὶ M^a P¹ Sus.: καὶ χορηγοὶ Γ? (Vet. Int. *adhuc et distributores*). πρεσβευταὶ Γ Π: πρεσβευτάς Congreve probably rightly, if αἰροῦνται in a passive sense is not to be supplied with ἔτι δὲ χορηγοὶ καὶ κήρυκες. Four lines lower we have αἰροῦνται σιτομίτρας. In Lex. Rhet. Cant. p. 672. 20 (quoted by Sandys on 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 54. § 2) we read 'Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ 'Αθηναίων πολιτείᾳ οὕτως λέγει' λογισται δὲ αἰροῦνται δέκα, but Sandys suggests that κληροῦνται should be read in place of αἰροῦνται. However, in Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. lii (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 250) we have τὸν

πολιτῶν προστατεῖν αἰρούμενον. It is possible therefore that *πρεσβευταί* may be right. See Liddell and Scott s. v. *αἰρέω* C. ii. 24. καὶ Γ Π Sus., om. Vict. Bekk.: but cp. 2. 7. 1266 a 32, τῶν καθεστηκυῶν καὶ καθ' ὧς πολιτεύονται νῦν. 26. ἀποδέδοται Π: Vet. Int. *attribuitur*. See critical note on 1275 b 16. 27. ἀρχικώτερόν ἐστιν Γ Π Bekk.¹: ἀρχικώτατον ἐστίν Bekk.², ἀρχικώτατόν ἐστιν Sus. A similar doubt arises in 1256 b 3, where all the MSS. and Γ have ἐνδεέστατον, but Bernays and Susemihl read ἐνδεέστερον: see also critical notes on 1293 b 32 and 1315 b 11. 29. οὐ γάρ πο] Vet. Int. *non enim unquam*, which stands for οὐ γάρ πο, for *nulli enim unquam* stands for οὐδενὶ γάρ πώποτε in 1336 b 29, and *nihil unquam tale* for οὐδέν πο τοιοῦτον in 1269 a 40. 31. αὶ is added after δ' in P²: om. M² P¹ Π² Bekk. Sus.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. 33. Vet. Int. does not translate τε δὴ. 37. τὰς μὲν, and 38. τὰς δ' Π Bekk.¹: τοὺς μὲν and τοὺς δ' Vict. Bekk.² Sus. The reading of Γ is uncertain.

1299 b 6. τῶν αὐτῶν Γ Π Bekk.: αὐτῶν F. Thurot, Sus. 12. δεῖ is questioned by Susemihl (see Sus.³ and Jahresbericht für Altertumswissenschaft, lxxix. 1894, p. 273, where he commends Norden's suggestion of ἐνδέχεται in place of it), and others. I am not satisfied with any of the substitutes which have been suggested. συνάγοι] συνίδοι Bojesen, Sus., probably rightly. 14. ἀρμόττει . . . δεῖ Γ Π. Sus., following Aretinus' translation, interchanges the position of these two words, but in 18 we have δεῖ διαρεῖν, not ἀρμόττει διαρεῖν. Camerarius (Interp. p. 171) would read in 13 εἰς μίαν ἀρχήν, ἢ μὴ ἀρμόττει. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. 'Αρμόττει may be repeated from the preceding line, and may have taken the place of some other word, such as δεῖ or χρή. ποίων, and 15, πολλὰ Thurot (Études sur Aristote, p. 74), Sus., probably rightly: ποία, and 15, πολλῶν Γ Π Bekk. 22. I bracket καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ in 1308 b 11, and it might be asked whether καὶ μοναρχία should not be bracketed here. There is no reference to μοναρχία in 24 sqq., but only to aristocracy, oligarchy, and democracy; still I think that it would be hypercritical to bracket καὶ μοναρχία. 24. δ' om. Γ M² L². οὐδ' Γ M² P⁴ L² Ar. Bekk., οὐδὲ P¹, οὐκ P² Q^b V^b Ald. ἐτέρων pr. P¹ Sus.: ἑτέραι the other MSS. and Γ Bekk. 27. καὶ κατὰ ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν Γ M² pr. P¹, καὶ κατ' αὐτὰς τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν Π² Bekk.¹, καὶ κατ' αὐτὰς διαφοραὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν Vict. Bekk.², whom I now incline to follow, though in vol. ii. p. 362 I favoured the reading καὶ κατὰ ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς διαφοραὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν. Thurot (Études sur Aristote,

p. 75) would read κατ' αὐτὰς τὰς πολιτείας διαφοραὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, and this reading also is a possible one. 29. διαφέρουσιν is queried by Bonitz (Ind. 191 a 60). After διαφέρουσιν M^a P¹ add διὰ ταύτας and Γ διὰ ταῦτα or διὰ τοῦτο, for some MSS. of Vet. Int. have *propter haec* and others *propter hoc*. Is not διὰ ταύτας an alternative reading for κατὰ ταύτας, 27, which has crept from the margin into the text of these MSS.? 33. ἀσχολῶν P² etc. Bekk. Sus., ἀσχόλων P⁴: ἀσχολον M^a, ἀσχολον P¹: Vet. Int. *non vacans*, which probably stands for ἀσχολον here as elsewhere. 34. δ' ἐὰν P² Q^b V^b Bekk. and corr. P⁴: δὲ δ' P¹ Ald. and perhaps pr. P⁴ (for δ' ἐὰν is over an erasure in P⁴): δέ, δ' Sus.: δὲ ἐπὶ γ' M^a (Vet. Int. *autem cum*). 36. αἶται αἱ Ar. Vict. Bekk. Sus., αἶται αἱ Π² and a correction in pale ink in the margin of P¹: αἱ αἶται γ' M^a pr. P¹.

1300 a 2. μισθοῦ Spengel, Bekk.²: ἡ μισθός γ' Π Ar. Bekk.¹: [ἡ] μισθοῦ Sus. Cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 31, ὅπου μὴ μισθοῦ εἰπορία πᾶσιν, and 33, ὁ δῆμος εἰπορῶν μισθοῦ. 23. τέτταρες M^a P¹ Sus.: τέσσαρες Π² Bekk.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain, but the form τέτταρες is the form which is usually found in Aristotle's writings. M^a P¹ have τέσσαρα and Π² τέτταρα in 1315 b 26. 23. ἡ γὰρ πάντες . . . 1300 b 5, ἀριστοκρατικόν] As to the text of this passage, see Sus.¹²²: Spengel, *Aristotelische Studien*, 3. 53 sqq.: Thurot, *Études sur Aristote*, p. 75 sqq.: H. Rabe in *Jahrbücher für class. Philol.* 1894, pp. 450–453. 24. Either we must bracket ἡ before ἐξ ἀπάντων (with Schn., Thurot, Spengel, and Sus.) or we must read εἰ in place of it with a corrector in pale ink in the margin of P¹ and with Coray. The former course is probably the better (see Thurot, *Études sur Aristote*, p. 75). Vet. Int. does not translate ὥς in ὥς ἀνὰ μέρος: he has simply *divisim*. 26. πολιτῶν Ar. Lamb. Bekk. Sus.: πολιτικῶν γ' Π (Vet. Int. *civiles*). I follow Conring and Spengel in bracketing καὶ after ἀπάντων and inserting ἡ πάντες ἐκ τινῶν αἰρέσει ἢ πάντες ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ. 27. ἡ before τὰ μὲν om. Π² wrongly. Γ Π Bekk. have τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δὲ here and in 29 and 30: Spengel, followed by Sus., substitutes τὰς for τὰ in all the six places, but perhaps Rabe is right in thinking this change unnecessary; he considers τὰ . . . τὰ to be used adverbially as in c. 16. 1300 b 40, 1301 a 4, 7 (5). 1. 1302 a 7 sq., 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 22 sqq., and 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 38, and adds, 'the fact that in 1300 a 33 we have τὰς . . . τὰς does not make in favour of the change, since τῶν ἀρχῶν is added in that passage.' 30. After κλήρῳ I insert καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τινῶν αἰρέσει τὰ δὲ κλήρῳ, following Sus., who however has τὰς μὲν

and τὰς δὲ in place of τὰ μὲν and τὰ δέ. 31. See explanatory note. 32. πάντας Π² Bekk. Sus.: πάντα Γ Μ^a pr. P¹ (corrected in pale ink). 33. I bracket γίνεσθαι with Thurot, Spengel, and Sus. It may be an alternative reading for γίνονται, 31, which has found its way into the text in a wrong place. 35. δ' om. Γ Μ^a pr. P¹ (corrected in pale ink). I bracket ἢ ἐκ τινῶν with Spengel. 36. I add ἢ κλήρω ἢ αἰρέσει ἢ after τινῶν with Spengel. 37. πολιτικόν . . . 40. ὀλιγαρχικόν om. pr. P¹, but in the margin is added in pale ink ἄλλως πολιτικόν. καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἰρέσει καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρω ἢ ἀμφοῖν ὀλιγαρχικόν (where τὰς μὲν κλήρω τὰς δ' αἰρέσει is omitted before ὀλιγαρχικόν), and also τῆς καλουμένης ἐστὶ πολιτείας· τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων καθιστάναι τοὺς μὲν αἰρέσει τοὺς δὲ κλήρω ὀλιγαρχικόν (where τῆς καλουμένης ἐστὶ πολιτείας takes the place of πολιτικόν and, among other variations, the words ἢ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρω τὰς δ' αἰρέσει are omitted). This latter reading is the one translated by Ar. 38. καὶ τὸ . . . 1300 b 3, ἀμφοῖν] Spengel reconstructs this passage as follows—καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἰρέσει καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρω· τὸ δὲ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν πολιτικὸν ἀριστοκρατικῶς (ἢ κλήρω ἢ αἰρέσει) ἢ τὰς μὲν αἰρέσει τὰς δὲ κλήρω· τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν (αἰρέσει) ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρω, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν ὀλιγαρχικόν, ὀλιγαρχικώτερον δὲ τὸ αἰρέσει ἢ τὸ ἀμφοῖν. Thurot reconstructs it thus—καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἰρέσει καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρω πολιτικὸν ἀριστοκρατικῶς· καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν, τὰς μὲν κλήρω τὰς δ' αἰρέσει, πολιτικόν, ὀλιγαρχικώτερον δέ. τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρω, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν αἰρέσει, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν: and Susemihl thus—καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἰρέσει καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρω πολιτικὸν ἀριστοκρατικῶς, καὶ τὸ (τινὰς) ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν, ὀλιγαρχικώτερον (ἢ κλήρω) ἢ τὰς μὲν αἰρέσει τὰς δὲ κλήρω· τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν (αἰρέσει) ὀλιγαρχικόν καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρω, μὴ γενόμενον δ' ὁμοίως, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν. I incline to suggest the following text—καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ πάντων τὰς μὲν αἰρέσει καθιστάναι τὰς δὲ κλήρω, ὀλιγαρχικώτερον δέ, καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, τὸ δὲ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν πολιτικὸν ἀριστοκρατικῶς ἢ αἰρέσει ἢ κλήρω ἢ τὰς μὲν αἰρέσει τὰς δὲ κλήρω. τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν (αἰρέσει) ὀλιγαρχικόν, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κλήρω, καὶ τὸ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ἀμφοῖν. 'Εξ ἀμφοῖν, 40, means 'from a combination of some and all': cp. c. 16. 1301 a 8 sq. With τὸ δὲ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων τὰς δ' ἐκ τινῶν I supply τινὰς καθιστάναι from what precedes. I omit ἢ ἀμφοῖν, τὰς μὲν κλήρω τὰς δ' αἰρέσει (39), because I regard these words as

a various reading for τὰς μὲν αἰρέσει καθιστάται τὰς δὲ κλήρω which has been noted in the margin and has crept into the text. I omit ὀλιγαρχικόν, 40, because it may well be an alternative reading for ὀλιγαρχικότερον: Γ M^s omit it. In 1300 b 3 I omit μὴ γινόμενον δ' ὁμοίως (Π²) or μὴ γινόμενον δ' ὁμοίως (M^s P¹ and possibly Γ: Vet. Int. *non factum autem similiter*) for a different reason. I think that this clause is out of place where it stands, and venture to suggest the possibility that μὴ γινόμενων δ' ὁμοίως should be read, and that these words should be transposed to after κινήσεις in c. 16. 1300 b 38. They may have been omitted in 1300 b 38 in the archetype and wrongly inserted in the margin opposite to 1300 b 3 instead of 1300 b 38. Compare the error by which εὐθὺς is inserted in the margin of P⁴ in 1305 b 41 instead of 1306 a 6 (see critical note on the latter passage). For μὴ γινόμενων cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 6 sqq. 39. τὰς δὲ κλήρω] τε ἢ κλήρω M^s and probably Γ, for Vet. Int. has *aut sorte*. 40. Vet. Int. does not translate δὲ after ὀλιγαρχικότερον. 41. τὸ δὲ om. Γ M^s pr. P¹ (the words are added in P¹ in pale ink).

1300 b 1. τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν ὀλιγαρχικόν] Lamb. translates, 'at quosdam ex quibusdam electione fieri oligarchiae convenit': thus he adds αἰρέσει before ὀλιγαρχικόν. In this he is followed by Conring, Spengel, and Sus., probably rightly. 'Fieri' in Lambinus' rendering should have been 'facere' or some such word. 4. Vet. Int. has *quosdam autem ex simul omnibus non oligarchicum*. He probably found οὐκ ὀλιγαρχικόν added as a gloss in the margin of Γ and translated these words as part of the text, for they appear as a red-ink gloss in P². τό τε Ar.: τό τε [δὲ] Sus., τὸ τέ δὲ a pale-ink correction in P¹, τό τε δὲ a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp. p. 172): τὸ δὲ Γ M^s Ald. Bekk. and pr. P¹: τότε δὲ P² 3⁴ Q^b V^b L^s. In several MSS., it will be seen, the two alternative readings τε and δὲ have found their way into the text together. Thurot and Spengel would read καὶ τὸ. πάντας αἰρέσει Spengel, Sus., probably rightly: αἰρέσει πάντας Γ Π. 8. καὶ om. Γ M^s pr. P¹ (it is added in P¹ in pale ink). Sus. omits it also: I bracket it, though not without doubt, for the authority of these MSS. is weak in omissions, and especially in omissions of small words. 13. Π¹ have λοιπὸν δὲ τῶν τριῶν τὸ δικαστικὸν εἰπεῖν: Π¹ λοιπὸν δὲ τῶν τριῶν εἰπεῖν τὸ δικαστικὸν περὶ δικαστηρίων, except that P¹ has δικαστηρίας. In Π¹ two alternative readings have evidently together found their way into the text. Τούτων, 14, suggests that περὶ δικαστηρίων

has preceded and should be substituted for τὸ δικαστικόν, which is itself an unusual expression in the sense in which it is used here. In the recapitulation contained in 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 33 we have καὶ περὶ δικαστηρίων. Welldon reads περὶ δικαστηρίων and brackets τὸ δικαστικόν: Sus.⁹ takes the reverse course. 17. M^s pr. P¹ have περὶ δὲ ὧν δέ: Π³ Bekk. Sus. περὶ ὧν δέ. Vet. Int. has *de quibus autem*, which might stand for either περὶ ὧν δέ or περὶ δὲ ὧν. See critical note on 1277 b 29. 27. ἀμφισβητεῖται] Vet. Int. *altercantur*: the translator's eye has probably wandered to ἀμφισβητούσιν, 22. 28. ἐπιφέρεται Π³ Bekk. Sus.: φέρεται Π¹. οἶον . . . δικαστήριον is bracketed by Chandler perhaps rightly (cp. 1322 a 20). 29. ἐν φρεατοῖ P¹ Π³ Bekk. Sus.: ἐν φρεατοῖ M^s: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *quod in puteum compulsi iudex* what reading he found in Γ. The reading of M^s may be correct: see Sandys' critical note on Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 57. l. 22, ἐν Φρεάτου. 30. παντὶ Π³ Bekk.: παρόντι Π¹ Sus. See explanatory note on 1300 b 29. 32. ἀστούς Π³ Bekk. Sus.: αὐτούς Γ M^s pr. P¹, for στ is over an erasure in P¹. 38. After κινήσεις should possibly be inserted μὴ γινόμενων δ' ὁμοίως from 1300 b 3 (see critical note on 1300 a 38-b 3). Translate, 'and similarly if they are not instituted at all.' For ὁμοίως cp. c. 13. 1297 b 31, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. For the contrast of γενέσθαι and καλῶς γενέσθαι cp. c. 4. 1291 a 41. δ'] δὴ Γ (Vet. Int. *itaque*). 41. κλήρω Γ Π Bekk.¹: κληρωτοὺς Lamb. Bekk.² Sus.

1801 a 8. See explanatory note. 6. See explanatory note on 1301 a 5. 8. αὐτοῦ om. Π¹. 12. Sus. appears to be right in thinking that ἦ, the reading of Γ Π, must either be bracketed or replaced by καὶ.

BOOK VII (V).

1801 a 22. εἰς ποίας Π³ Bekk. Sus.: ἐφ' ὁποίας M^s P¹ and possibly Γ, for Vet. Int. has *ad quales*, and he often renders ἐπὶ by *ad* (e. g. in 1280 b 27, 1287 a 41, and 1304 a 2), while *qualis* is his ordinary equivalent for ὁποῖος. 23. ἔτι δὲ . . . 24, ἐκάστη] See explanatory note on 1301 a 22. 27. τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον] See explanatory note on 1301 a 26. τούτου δ' ἀμαρτανόντων] Most MSS. of Vet. Int. have *ad hoc autem peccantibus*, but a z have *ab* in place of *ad* and are probably right: cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 25, where διημαρτήκασι τῆς ὀρθοτάτης πολιτείας is rendered *sumi vitiatas a rectis-*

nima politica. 30. *ὅτι* . . . *εἶναι* om. P² V^b Ald., *ὅτι* . . . *νομίζουσιν* om. P⁴ L^a Ar., *εἶναι* . . . *εἶναι* om. pr. Q^b. 31. *ἐν* *τι* Π² Bekk. Sus.: *ἐν* M^a, *εἰ* followed by a space sufficient for one letter and then *τι* pr. P¹ (corrected into *ἐν* *τι* in pale ink): Vet. Int. *in quocunque*, which is his equivalent for *ὅτιοῦν* in 29; perhaps his eye wandered from *ἐκ τοῦ ἀνίσους ἐν* *τι* *ὄντας*, 31, to the similar phrase *ἐκ τοῦ ἴσους ὅτιοῦν ὄντας*, 29, unless indeed Busse (*De praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi*, p. 15) is right in regarding *ὅτιοῦν*, 31, as a conjecture of Vet. Int. 36. Γ M^a add *αἱ πολιτεῖαι* before *πᾶσαι* and M^a omits *τι*, but *αἱ πολιτεῖαι* is a gloss which has crept into the text; *αἱ πολιτεῖαι* *δηλονότι* appears as a red-ink gloss in P². 38. *ἢ* om. P³ Π² and pr. P² (where it is supplied in darker ink than that of the MS.): it is placed after *ἐκάτεροι* in M^a P¹, but Vet. Int. has *quam forte habent utrique*, so that it probably stood before *ἐκάτεροι* in Γ. *τυγχάνουσιν* Π¹ Bekk. Sus., *τυγχάνωσιν* P³ Π³ pr. P² (corrected in darker ink than that of the MS.). 39. *στασιάζουσιν*] After this word I propose to insert c. 3. 1303 b 3, *στασιάζουσι δὲ* . . . 7, *ὄντες*, as to which see explanatory note on 1303 b 3.

1301 b 3. Γ P¹ 4 and perhaps P³ (Sus.¹) have the correct reading *αὐτοῖς*, while M^a P² Ald. have *αὐτοὺς*. See critical note on 1293 a 28. 6. *δικαίως* Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: *δικαίως* Π². 8. *μεταστήσωσιν*] *καταστήσωσιν* is the reading of two MSS. of little weight (R^b V^b) and, Sus.² thinks, perhaps of Γ. Vet. Int. has *ex instituta aliam constituent*, and *constituere* undoubtedly often represents *καθιστάναι*, whereas *μεθιστάναι* is usually rendered by *transfere*: still *constituit* stands for *περιέστησε* in 1304 a 33, and it is possible that *constituant* may stand for *μεταστήσωσιν* here. 10. οὐ P¹ Π² Bekk. Sus.: οὐδὲ Γ M^a. 17. *ἡ ἴσα*] Vet. Int. *ut aut* (*ἴσα ἢ* Γ¹). 26. *ἦν* om. Π¹, but see explanatory note on 1301 b 25. *πανταχοῦ* Π¹ P² Bekk. Sus.: *πάντων* P³ 4 V^b Ald. and pr. Q^b according to Sus.¹ 2: Sus.² probably errs in ascribing the reading *πάντων* to Π², for St. Hilaire (*Politique d'Aristote*, ed. 1837, vol. ii. p. 344) finds *πανταχοῦ* in P². 27. οὐ μὴν M^a Π² Bekk., οὐ μὴν δὲ P¹: Vet. Int. *non solum*, which probably stands for οὐ μὴν, for, though he usually renders οὐ μὴν *non tamen*, a frequent equivalent for οὐ μὴν *ἀλλὰ* is *non solum sed*. I add *εἰ* after οὐ μὴν: see as to the whole passage explanatory note on 1301 b 26. 28. *ἀνισος* Π² Bekk.¹ (corrected into *ἀνισον* in P² 3): *ἀνισον* Π¹ Bekk.² Sus. Compare the various readings in 1295 a 6. 32. *ἴσω* Γ M^a pr. P¹, *ἴσφ* Sus.: *ἴσων* Π² Bekk. 33. *λόγω δὲ τὰ* M^a corr. P¹ Bekk.² Sus. and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *ratione autem quatuor*): *λόγω δὲ* P² Bekk.¹

and corr. P³: λέγω δὲ R^b Ar. Ald. pr. P², λέγω δὲ τὰ perhaps pr. P¹: κατ' ἀξίαν δὲ λέγω ἴσον ὑπερέχειν τὰ P⁴ L⁵ and a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp. p. 177). τοῖν δυοῖν M⁵ P¹ corr. P² Bekk. Sus.: τῶν δύο P⁴ L⁵ pr. P² (corrected in the ink of the MS.): the reading of Γ is uncertain. 35. τῶν δυοῖν pr. P¹ (corrected into τοῖν δυοῖν by Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of the MS., perhaps rightly), τῶν δύο M⁵, τῶν δυεῖν P² 3: the reading of Γ is uncertain. In c. 3. 1302 b 37 M⁵ P¹ Sus. have δυοῖν σπιθαμῶν (the reading of Γ is of course uncertain). In c. 10. 1310 b 5 all MSS. have δυοῖν (or δυεῖν) κακῶν. In Hippocr. ap. Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 17 *sub fin.*, we have δυοῖν πόνων. ἡμίση Π, though Vet. Int. has *dimidium* (ἡμισυ Γ?). The earlier Attic form is ἡμίσηα, and this is the form which is used in Attic inscriptions of the fourth century B.C., though ἡμίση appears in an inscription of B.C. 180 or thereabouts (Meisterhans, Grammatik der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 118). However, ἡμίση occurs in several passages of Demosthenes Cod. Σ and in Hyperid. c. Demosth. col. 10. 28 (Kühner, Ausführl. Gramm. der gr. Sprache, ed. Blass, 1. 443). The only instance of ἡμίσηα in Aristotle's writings given in the Index Aristotelicus is Phys. 8. 8. 263 b 8, to which 263 a 30 should be added. Immediately above in 263 a 23, 26, 28 we have ἡμίση. τὸ ἀπλῶς] Vet. Int. does not translate τὸ.

1302 a 2. εὐποροι M⁵ P¹ 4 etc. Sus. and pr. P³: ἄποροι Γ Bekk. Εὐποροι is probably right, though Aristotle speaks otherwise in 3. 8. 1280 a 4 sq. πολλοὶ is added before πολλαχοῦ in P⁴ L⁵ Ald. Bekk., but πολλοὶ and πολλαχοῦ are probably two alternative readings which in these MSS. have together found their way into the text. 10. ἐγγίνονται Π² Harl.: ἐγγίνονται M⁵ P¹ Bekk. Sus. 14. ἐγγυτέρω] Vet. Int. *propinquior* (ἐγγυτέρα Γ?). For the confusion of α and ω compare 1305 b 10. The second ἡ is omitted by P⁴ L⁵ V^b Bojesen Sus. probably rightly. 15. τοιούτων om. P¹ L⁵. 18. εἰσι Γ Π² Bekk.: ἔστι M⁵ P¹. δὴ P² 3 4 V^b Ald. Bekk.: δὲ Π¹ R^b Ar.: γὰρ Sus. 31. περὶ ὧν δὲ Π² Bekk.: περὶ δὲ ὧν M⁵ P¹ Sus.: Vet. Int. *de quibus autem* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. See critical notes on 1277 b 29 and 1300 b 17. 33. αὐτῶν Γ P¹ Bekk. Sus.: the rest αὐτῶν. See critical note on 1293 a 28.

1302 b 4. διὰ μικρότητα Π² Bekk. Sus.: διὰ σμικρότητα M⁵ P¹: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. The forms μικρός, μικρότης are far more common in Aristotle's writings than σμικρός, σμικρότης. Still in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 1 all MSS. but M⁵ have διὰ σμικρότητα. 6. πῶς

Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: πόσ' Π² (πόσα R^b). 28. τῆς ἀταξίας καὶ ἀναρχίας] Vet. Int. *eos qui sine ordine et sine principatu* (τῶν ἀτάκτων καὶ ἀνάρχων Γ?). But see critical note on 1326 b 19. 29. οἷον καὶ ἐν Θήβαις] z has *velut et in thebis*, the other MSS. *velut in thebis*. 30. πολιτευομένων Π² Bekk. and a correction in pale ink in Π¹: πολιτευομένων M² Π¹ Sus. and probably Γ (though Vet. Int. *politisantibus* may represent either of the two readings). 36. ἡ om. Π² Bekk. before συμμετρία: whether Γ added it, is of course uncertain. It dropped out easily after μένη, just as in 1305 b 24 ἡ drops out after διττή in Π² ³ R^b V^b. 37. ἡ om. Π¹. δυνὸν σπιθαμῶν Π² ³ ⁴ etc. Bekk.: δυνὸν σπιθαμῶν M² Π¹ Sus. The reading of Γ is uncertain (Vet. Int. *dimisum palmorum*). See critical note on 1301 b 35. 38. μεταβάλλοι Γ M² Π² Bekk. Sus.: μεταβάλλη with οἱ written above the last letter Π¹: μεταβαλοῖ Π² ⁴. 39. τὸ is added before ποσὸν by only one MS. and that of little importance. Its absence is amply justified by the passages collected by Vahlen on Poet. 4. 1449 a 1.

1303 a 2. ταῖς om. M² Π¹: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. 5. μικρὸν] Vet. Int. *paulo*, which usually represents μικρῶ. He has *paulo posterius a Medicis* for μικρὸν ὕστερον τῶν Μηδικῶν: a is perhaps repeated from a before Ιαπυγίς. 11. γὰρ Π² Bekk.: γὰρ δὲ M² Π¹ Sus. and possibly Γ, for Vet. Int. has *enim*, and this represents γὰρ δὲ in 1284 b 29 and 1328 a 5. 13. See explanatory note. 14. τὰς ἐριθείας] Vet. Int. *verecundiam*, but see critical note on 1296 a 34–35. 22. γινομένη Π¹ Π² Bekk. Sus.: γενομένη M²: Vet. Int. *facta* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. 24. (ἀπ') οὐδενὸς ἤρχον, ὡς ἐγγὺς δὲ] ἀπ' om. Γ Π (Vet. Int. *nullius*): it is added by Schn., Bekk.², Sus., and probably they are right. In place of ἐγγὺς δὲ all MSS. have ἔγγιον, except possibly Γ, which may have had ἐγγὺς δὲ, for Vet. Int. has *tanquam propinquum sit*, and in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 13 Vet. Int. has *tanquam hoc ad fortitudinem maxime sit conferens* for ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρίαν μάλιστα συμφέρον. However in 2. 2. 1261 a 15 he renders ὡς ἀριστων δὲ *tanquam optimum ens*: therefore it is not certain that he found ὡς ἐγγὺς δὲ in Γ. *Propinquum* might stand for ἔγγιον (see critical note on 1271 b 6 and compare the renderings of Vet. Int. in 1283 a 35 and 1287 b 9, to mention no others), and the auxiliary verb is often added without support from MSS. (vol. ii. p. lxii, note 2). 28. διστασίασαν Π¹ Π² ³ Sus., δ' ἐστασίασαν V^b: ἐστασίασαν Π² L² Ald. Bekk., ἐστασίασαν Π⁴. 35. Ζαγκλαῖοι] ἀγλαῖοι Π¹, ζακχαῖοι Π⁴. 36. καὶ is added before αὐτοῖς in Π⁴ V^b L² Ald. Bekk.

Ἀπολλωνιάται] ἀπολλωνιάται M^s, ἀπολλωνειάται P² ^s R^b V^b Ald., ἀπολλωνειάται P⁴. 38. συρακούσιοι Π Bekk. Sus.: see critical note on 1286 b 40.

1303 b 3. ἀποίκους Γ Π Bekk. (Vet. Int. *expulsos*): ἐποίους Spengel, Sus., possibly rightly (cp. 1306 a 3, where all MSS. have ἐποίους: Coray, however, would read ἀποίους there as well as here). In 1319 a 36, where Π have ἀποικίας (Vet. Int. *habillacula*), Coray, followed by Sus., would read ἐποικίας. στασιάζουσι δὲ . . . γ, ὄντες] See critical note on 1301 a 39. 9. Χύτρη] See explanatory note. 11. τὸν Πειραιᾶ] Vet. Int. *suburbium*. 12. αἱ διαβάσεις τῶν ὀχετῶν] Vet. Int. *penetrationes aperturarum* (is ὀχετῶν connected by Vet. Int. with οἷγειν?). 31. τὰ R^b and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *ex quae in aliis partibus*): τὰς M^s P¹ ² ³ ⁴ etc. 33. μυδικὰ M^s P¹ ⁴ ⁶ etc.: δημοτικά P² ³ etc.: μυδικὰ probably Γ, for Vet. Int. has *midica* (z *nudica*). 34. τῶν πατρῶν] Π² πατρώων (τῶν add. Vict. Bekk.): Π¹ πατρώας (Vet. Int. *de paterna hereditate*), Sus. πατρώας. 35. θατέρου is added after ἀποφαίνοντος in P⁴ ⁶ U^b L^s Ald. Bekk. See critical notes on 1255 b 12, 1304 a 15, 1309 b 2, and 1313 b 32.

1304 a 3. θύοντες] θύοντες P¹: Vet. Int. *sacrificatorem*, which may perhaps represent θύοντα. See critical note on 1289 b 1. 4. Μυτιλήνη] μυτιλήνη pr. P³. See critical note on 1285 a 35. ἐξ ἐπικληρῶν] Vet. Int. *ex hereditatibus*. See critical note on 1274 b 25. 8. ὁ περιωσθεῖς P¹ ² ³ Bekk. Sus.: ὁ περιωθεῖς R^b: ὁ περιωρσθεῖς M^s P⁴ etc. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *coarctatus*). 9. δέξανδρος Π¹ P² Sus.: δόξανδρος P³ Π³ Bekk. 11. μνασίαν Π² Bekk.: μνασίαν Π¹ Sus. The Phocian whom Aristotle mentions here is probably the same man as the Mnaseas of Diod. 16. 38. For the forms Mnaseas, Mnasias, and Mnesias see Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch der gr. Eigennamen. Both Mnaseas and Mnasias seem to have been forms used in Phocis. Μνάσωνος] μνήσωνος P¹ Π² Bekk.: μνήσωνος Γ M^s: the translation of Vet. Int., however, in the form in which it appears in the works of Thomas Aquinas and Albertus Magnus has *Mnasonis* (Sus.), and Schäfer (Demosthenes, 1. 445. 3), whom Susemihl follows, adopts the reading Μνάσωνος. 15. θυγατέρα is added after τις in P¹ ⁶ L^s U^b Ald. Bekk. See critical note on 1303 b 35. 17. πολιτείας] πολ followed by a lacuna pr. M^s, πόλεως P¹, which shows that the archetype of these two MSS. contained ambiguous contractions. 18. καὶ is added before ἐκ in Π¹ Sus.: om. Π² Bekk. 29. μετέβαλεν] Vet. Int. *transmutatio facta est*, but he will have found μετέβαλεν in Γ: cp. 1305 a 8, where

μετίβαλλον is rendered *iebat transmutatio*, 1316 a 18, where μεταβαλλει is rendered *fit transmutatio*, and 1309 a 5, where τῷ μηδὲν κερδαίνειν is rendered *eo quod nullum sit lucrum*.

33. εἰς ἐαυτὸν περιέστησε] Vet. Int. *in se ipso constituit*. δὴ γ Π (Vet. Int. *etiam*, which stands for δὴ in 1275 b 21, 1277 b 16, and 1292 b 10).

1304 b 1. ἦ] ἦ Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: ἦ Π². μηδὲν ἢ μικρὸν Π¹ Sus.: μικρὸν ἢ μηδὲν Π² Bekk. For μικρὸν πάνπαν cp. 1270 a 17, 1294 b 4. 6. αἰτίαι Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: αἰ Π². Π² should probably have had αἰ αἰτίαι in place of αἰτίαι, the reading of Π¹, but omitted αἰτίαι after αἰ. It is doubtful whether the right reading is αἰτίαι or αἰ αἰτίαι, for while in 1302 a 18 we have τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν, in 1302 a 34 we have αἰ δ' αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν κινήσεων.

12. οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων τὸν δῆμον ἐξηπάτησαν] Vet. Int. *velut in trecentis qui populum deciperunt*, whence it would seem that οἱ was added in Γ before τὸν δῆμον. τετρακοσίων Π² Bekk. Sus.: τριακοσίων Π¹. In 1305 b 27 Π¹ have τριακοσίοις in place of τετρακοσίοις wrongly. The two words are often confused in the MSS. See critical note on 1286 a 13.

23. αὐτοὺς is not translated by Vet. Int. τοὺς ἐχθίστους] Vet. Int. *separatissimos*.

25. οὕτω Π², οὕτως Bekk.: om. Π¹. 27. μισθοφορὰν] μισθοφορᾶν M^a and probably Γ, for Vet. Int. has *tractare stipendia*.

28. τε γάρ om. Π¹ P⁴ L², γάρ om. pr. P² (it is supplied by a correction in pale ink, and in the margin is added in the same pale ink ἐν ἄλλῳ μισθοφορὰν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ καὶ ἐξῆς). Sus. brackets τε γάρ. 30. δίκας] Vet. Int. *iniurias*, probably an error for *vindictas*.

34. κατελθόντες] Vet. Int. *superuenientes* (ἐπελθόντες Γ?, for ἐπέρχεσθαι is rendered *superuenire* in 1289 b 24 and 1310 a 39).

35. ἢ ἐν Μεγάροις] Vet. Int. does not render ἢ, but neither does he render ἢ in 1313 a 24, ἢ περὶ Μολοττοῦς. See critical note on 1306 a 30.

36. ἐξίβαλλον M^a Π² (except Ald.) Bekk. Sus.: ἐξίβαλον P¹ P² Ald.: Vet. Int. *eiicerunt*, which probably represents ἐξίβαλον.

1305 a 3. ὅτε γ Π² Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. *quandoque*): τότε Π¹, τότε M^a. 13. δημαγωγῶσι μὲν] Vet. Int. *fiunt demagogi*.

24. στασιώσας] Vet. Int. *seditionem mouit*, but see critical note on 1286 b 10.

32. καὶ τῶν νόμων] z has *etiam legum*; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. wrongly *legum*. τοῦ ἦ] ἦ om. Π¹: see critical note on 1282 a 17.

1305 b 4. ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ] M^a has the form Μασαλία here and M^a P¹ in 1321 a 30 (where see critical note), but Head (Hist. Num. p. 7) does not mention the occurrence of this form on the coins, some of which have the inscription ΜΑΣΣΑ. In both passages

z has *massalia*, though most MSS. of Vet. Int. have *masalia* in the passage before us and some of them in 1321 a 30. 6. μεταλαβον Π² Bekk. Sus.: μετέβαλον pr. P¹ (corrected in pale ink), μετέβαλλον M^s V^b, μετέβαλον or μετέβαλλον Γ (Vet. Int. *donec transmutarent*). 8. οἱ νεώτεροι] z has *iuniores*, the usual equivalent; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. less well *minores*, though it is possible that, as δ νεώτερος occurs in the next line and is rendered *iunior*, Vet. Int. may have preferred, as he sometimes does, to render it otherwise in 8. 10. ἔνθα] Vet. Int. *in cho* (b g h k l m) or *in tho* (a c s: z has *in tho*). He probably misread ἔνθα as ἐν θῶ: see critical note on 1302 a 14. ἡ is omitted in P⁴ L^s V^b Ald. Bekk.², but as to the omission of the article in these MSS. see critical notes on 1291 a 1, b 3, and 1292 a 22. 11. ἀπετελεύτησεν] Vet. Int. *remissa fuit*. 16. ἐπιλαβόμενος] Vet. Int. *insurgens*. His translation of ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν in Rhet. 3. 16. 1417 b 6 (*deprehenduntur in oculis*) is equally wide of the mark, but *insurgere* is a frequent equivalent for ἐπιτίθεσθαι in Vet. Int., and it is possible that Γ had ἐπιθέμενος in 16 as well as in 17. 17. ἐπιβίμενος] Vet. Int. *invascens* should probably be *invadens* (for *invadere* represents ἐπιτίθεσθαι in 1272 b 16, 1327 a 23, 1330 b 27, and 1331 a 17). 20. ἐπιμελομένων Π, except M^s Ald., which have ἐπιμελουμένων. The form used elsewhere in the Politics is ἐπιμελείσθαι, and in 1339 a 38 Π have ἐπιμελουμένων. The word does not occur again in the present Book. The form ἐπιμελείσθαι is always used in the Ἀθ. Πολ., except in one passage (c. 50. l. 10), where the papyrus has ἐπιμέλονται. In Attic inscriptions between B.C. 380 and 30 ἐπιμελείσθαι is found far more often than ἐπιμέλεισθαι (Meisterhans, Gramm. d. att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 139). 24. ἡ om. P² R^b V^b. See critical note on 1302 b 36. ἐγγίγνεται P² 34: ἐγγίνεται M^s P¹ etc. 25. πάνυ] Vet. Int. *omnino*, which represents a variety of words, among them *πίμπαν*, but may possibly stand for *πάνυ* here, though *πάνυ* is rendered *valde* in 1318 b 2. 26. ἰσχυσαν] Vet. Int. *habuerunt* should probably be *valuerunt*, as Sus.¹ suggests. In 1292 a 22 ἰσχύουσιν is rendered *valent*. 27. τετρακοσίοις Π² Bekk. Sus.: τριακοσίοις Π¹. See critical notes on 1304 b 12 and 1286 a 13. 34. ἐστὶ Π², ἐστι Ald., ἐστω Bekk.¹, ἐστὶν Bekk.²: εἰς M^s, εἰς P¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. *sunt* or *sint* after *praetoria* leaves the reading in Γ uncertain).

1306 a 3. ἐποίκους Γ Π: see critical note on 1303 b 3. τοὺς Π² Bekk.: τῶν M^s P¹ Sus.: Vet. Int. *advenas Chalcideorum* leaves the

reading of Γ uncertain. 6. Π¹ add εὐθὺς after μὲν οὖν, probably rightly, for Π² sometimes omit single words, e. g. in 1288 b 16, 27, 1259 a 37, and 1276 a 33. In the margin of P⁴ εὐθὺς is added not here, but after καὶ in 1305 b 41, probably, as Sus. suggests, by an oversight. See critical note on 1300 a 38. ἐπιχειροῦσι] z has *conantur*; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *conatur* wrongly. 8. κλέπτοντας] Vet. Int. *fures*, but see critical note on 1289 b 1. 13. ἐμποῶσιν] Vet. Int. *inducunt*, which might represent εἰσάγειν. Ἐμποῶν is rendered *efficere* or *facere* elsewhere in the Politics and mostly in the Rhetoric, but it is rendered *insinuare* in Rhet. 3. 14. 1415 b 2, and *inducunt* may possibly stand for ἐμποῶσιν here. 21. ἐν μὲν πολέμῳ] See explanatory note. 22. ἐγχειρίσωσιν] Vet. Int. *manus iniicerint* probably stands for ἐγχειρίσωσιν and not ἐγχειρήσωσιν, the reading of M^a, for ἐγχειρεῖν is always rendered *conari* or *invadere*. In 27 ἐγχειρίζουσι is rendered *muniant* or *minuant* (so z): should *manuant* be read, or *mandant*? In 1314 a 24 ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις is rendered *manum militi ad impossibilia*. 24. αὐτοῖς] z has *ipsis* (αὐτοῖς Γ); the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *amplius* wrongly. 30. Ἀλεσδῶν ἀλωαδῶν Γ M^a pr. P¹ (corrected in P¹ in the ink of the MS.). τῶν περὶ Σίμων] Vet. Int. *circa Samum*: thus he does not translate τῶν, but whether (as Sus.³ thinks) τῶν was omitted in Γ is doubtful (see critical notes on 1304 b 35 and 1313 a 24). Σίμων Schlosser (Aristoteles Politik, 2. 188, note 84): σάμων Γ Π. 'Corruptelam primus suspicatus est Camerarius' (Sus.³): see Camerarius, Interp. p. 201. 31. ἐταιριῶν P¹ Ald. Bekk. Sus.: ἐταιρειῶν the rest. In 1272 b 34 all MSS. have ἐταιριῶν, but in 1305 b 32 pr. M^a P¹³ have ἐταιρειῶν, and in 1313 a 41 pr. P³ has ἐταιρειάν. In Ἀθ. Πολ. the form ἐταιρεία is always used. 36. δὲ is added after Διαγόρας in Π² except in P⁴, which omits it in a lacuna: it is bracketed in Bekk.¹². 37. καὶ ἐν] Should ἡ be added between καὶ and ἐν (cp. 1306 b 5)? 38. στασιωτικῶς Π² Bekk.: στασιαστικῶς M^a P¹: Vet. Int. *seditionaliter* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. 39. Εὐρυτίωνος P⁶ R^b and a MS. known to Camerarius (Interp. p. 202), Vict. Bekk.: εὐριτίωνος P²⁴ V^b and probably pr. P³ (for P³ has εὐαιτίωνος with εὐαι over an erasure), εὐεκτίωνος Γ, εὐατίωνος M^a P¹. Perhaps the name of Eurytion is the more likely to be right. Eurytion was one of the Argonauts (Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography s. v.: Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch der gr. Eigennamen, s. vv. Εὐρυτίων and Εὐρυτος), and it was claimed that the Argonauts on their way to Colchis landed on the coast where

Heracleia was afterwards founded (Preller, Gr. Mythol. 2. 332). The tomb of the prophet Idmon, an Argonaut, was to be seen in the marketplace of Heracleia (Preller, p. 333, note).

1306 b 2. αὐτοῦς] See explanatory note on 1306 b 1. 4. τινῶν is left untranslated by Vet. Int. 8. ἄλλας Π² Ar. Bekk.: om. Π¹. Sus. brackets it. 9 sqq. See explanatory note. 18. αἱ is added before ἀλιγαρχίαι in M^s P¹ Sus.: om. Π² Bekk.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. 20. ἐννόμων] νόμων Γ M^s (Vet. Int. *ex legibus democraticis et oligarchicis in eas quae dominae*). τὰς P² R^b Ald. pr. P¹ Bekk. Sus.: τοὺς M^s P⁴ etc. and probably Γ, τοὺς a correction in P¹ in pale ink. 28. Congreve's conjecture of τ for τὸ deserves to be mentioned, though I do not adopt it. See explanatory note. 35. Ἀγησιλάου Schn. Cor. Bekk.² Sus.: ἀγησιλάω Γ Π Bekk.¹, for Vet. Int. *sub Agesilao* stands for ἐπ' Ἀγησιλάω (see critical note on 1289 b 39 and cp. 1271 a 39). 38. καὶ τοῦτο Π Bekk. Sus.: Vet. Int. *hoc et* (τοῦτο καὶ Γ?). μεσσηνιακὸν P² etc. Bekk.: μεσσηνιακὸν Π¹ P⁴ V^b Sus.³ Π Sus.² have μεσήνιοι in 1269 b 4 and M^s P¹ ² ³ ⁴ Sus.² μεσηνίου in 1270 a 3. Thus in the Politics the MSS. are divided. But in Rhet. 2. 23. 1397 a 11 and 3. 17. 1418 b 11 the best MSS. have μεσσηνιακῶ and μεσσηνιακῇ, and in Rhet. 1. 13. 1373 b 18 all the MSS. have μεσσηνιακῶ. On coins we find the form Μεσσανίων, and the form with one sigma is of rare occurrence in inscriptions (see for an instance of it Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 181, where both forms occur). 39. δῆλον δὲ [καὶ τοῦτο] κ.τ.λ.] I bracket καὶ τοῦτο, suspecting (as I see since writing this note that Mr. A. W. Verrall in *Class. Rev.* 10. 273, note, also does) that it has found its way into the text by repetition from the preceding line. This error is of frequent occurrence in Π¹, but it probably now and then affects all the MSS.

1307 a 5. ἄνων Π Bekk. The MSS. of Vet. Int. have various corruptions of the word all beginning with h, whence Sus. reads Ἄνων. But Herodotus (7. 165), Polybius, Plutarch (Timol. c. 19), Diodorus, and Justin all give the name without the aspirate. 22. αὐξανόντων] z has *augmentantibus*, which is perhaps the reading of a: the other MSS. have *agentibus*. In 1303 a 12 αὐξανόμενων is rendered *augmentatis*. 31. ἐδύναντο Π² Bekk.: ἡδύναντο M^s P¹ Sus. (Γ uncertain). See critical note on 1253 b 33. Schneider, followed by Sus., believes, probably rightly, that a lacuna exists before ὁ δὲ δῆμος. It is difficult to say what has dropped out: possibly ἐστασίαζον or some such word or words. 32. τῶν φρουρῶν om. Π¹. 33. τῆς

χώρας] τὴν χώραν M^s P² Vb. 38. θέλουσιν M^s P¹ Sus. and possibly Γ: θέλωσι Π², θέλωσιν Bekk.

1307 b 1. All the MSS. of Vet. Int. add *quod* after *aristocratiae*. This is probably repeated by anticipation from *eo quod solvantur* or *quod quidem dictum est* in the following line. In much the same way in 1308 a 38 Vet. Int. has *honorabilitatis* for νομίματος, repeating it from *honorabilitatis communis* immediately after. 12. χειροτονήσαντα Π² Bekk. Sus.: χειροτονήσαντας P¹, χειροτονησαν with τ superscribed over α M^s (=probably χειροτονήσαντα): Vet. Int. *ordinantes* (z *ordinantes*), which may stand either for χειροτονήσαντα or for χειροτονήσαντα, for βλέψας is rendered *aspiciens* in 1289 b 6 and ἀκουσόμενους *audientes* in 1298 a 19. 18. μετέβαλεν Γ P¹ corr. M^s etc. Bekk. Sus. (for Vet. Int. *transmutatus est* stands for μετέβαλεν, as *transmutata fuit* does in 1301 b 21, 1303 b 21, 1304 b 26, and 1305 b 12): μετέβαλλον P⁴ pr. M^s: μετέβαλλον P² etc. 30. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς εὐ κεκραμέναις πολιτείαις] z has *in bene temperatis quidem igitur politis*; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. wrongly add *autem* after *bene*. 31. παρανομῶσι] z has *praevaricentur* rightly; a *praevaricetur*, and the other MSS. *privarentur*. 32. παραδνομένη . . . 34, δι om. Π² Ar. pr. P² (no doubt owing to the recurrence of λανθάνει in 34), so that we are dependent for these words on Γ M^s P¹. M^s P¹, followed by Götting, have λανθάνει γὰρ παραδνομένη ἡ παρανομία, ὥσπερ τὰς οὐσίας τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα ἀναιρεῖ πολλάκις γινόμενον (i of γινόμενον in P¹ over an erasure). λανθάνει δὲ (γὰρ P¹ Götting in place of δι), and this reading I have adopted. Vet. Int. has *latet enim subintrans praevaricatio, sicut substantias parvae expensae consumunt saepe factae. latet autem*, so that he may have found in his Greek text αἱ μικραὶ δαπάναι ἀναιροῦσι πολλάκις γινόμεναι, but I do not think this very likely, for he renders δαπάνη (sing.) by *expensae* (plur.) in 1330 a 13 and 1321 a 40. *Praevaricatio* stands for παρανομία, for *praevaricentur* represents παρανομῶσι in 31. That Victorius' conjecture of ἐπεισδύονσα for παραδνομένη (in which Bekker follows him) and of παράβασις or παρέκβασις for παρανομία is wrong (he probably obtained his version of the passage by retranslation from Vet. Int.) is evident from Plato, Rep. 424 D (quoted in explanatory note on 1307 b 30), from which passage the sentence is repeated, a fact which seems hitherto to have escaped notice. [Since the foregoing note was written, Sus.² has called attention to this and adopted the reading of M^s P¹.] 34. ἡ δαπάνη P¹ Π² (bracketed by Sus.): ἡ ἀπάνη M^s and probably Γ, for Vet. Int. has *seductio* and

seductis stands for *ἐξαπατηθέντων* in Rhet. 1. 15. 1376 b 23: ἡ μετά-
βασις Vict. Bekk. 36. ὁ om. M^s P¹ (it is supplied in P¹ in the
ink of the MS.) and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *sicut sophistica oratio*).

1308 a 3. ἔτι Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: ἔστι Π². 10. αὐτοὺς Γ and, as it
would seem, P¹ (see critical note on 1293 a 28): αὐτοὺς M^s Π².
17. ἐγγίγνονται] Vet. Int. *fiunt*, as in 1288 a 13, 1302 a 10, 13, and
1304 b 26. 33. παρεληφέναι] Vet. Int. *comprehendantur*, but he
often renders the active by the passive. 35. διὰ τὰ τιμήματα] διὰ
τιμήματα P⁴: διὰ τιμήματος Γ M^s V^b (Vet. Int. *per honorabilitatem*).
39. κοινοῦ Γ Π Bekk.: καινοῦ Coray, Sus. 40. κατὰ τοῦτων τὸν
χρόνον is placed in Π² before ἐν ὅσαις, 39, and Bekker places these
words there between brackets: Π¹ Sus. rightly place them after
ἐνιαυτόν. Bekk.¹ had already remarked in his note on 1308 a 39
that the Vet. Int. did so.

1308 b 6. See explanatory note. 10. ἐν is added before δι-
γαρχίᾳ in Π¹ Sus. 11. καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ is added in Π¹, but crossed
through with red ink in P¹: om. Π² Bekk.²: καὶ μοναρχίᾳ Vict.
Casaubon Bekk.¹, but Casaubon and Bekk.¹ bracket the words,
and καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ is bracketed by Sus. I bracket καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ,
though not without hesitation, for in 1301 b 13 we have a refer-
ence to μοναρχία. See also critical note on 1299 b 22. 13.
ταχὺ μεγάλας Π Bekk. Sus.: Vet. Int. *breviter magnos* (so z with
all MSS. of Vet. Int. except a, which has *breviter et magnos*): did
he find βραχὺ in place of ταχὺ in Γ? 14. παντός] z has *omnis*
rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. (except a recent hand in b and
m) have *omnes*. 15. μή τοί γ' Bekk. Sus.: μήτοι γ' P⁴ Ald., μή τοί
γ' P^s L^s: μή τι γ' P² etc.: μήτ' Γ M^s, μή τ' P¹. In c. 11. 1315 a 10
all MSS. have μή τοί τό γε ἥθος θρασύν. In 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 16 P⁴ L^s
Ald. have μή τοί γε, and all the other MSS. μή τι γε. In Metaph.
Z. 10. 1035 a 29 we have ἡ ὅλως ἡ οὕτοι οὕτω γε. See Eucken, De
Partic. Usu, p. 70, and cp. Xen. Cyrop. 2. 3. 24. 16. καὶ om.
Π² (it is supplied in P⁴ by a corrector). 17. οὕτως ἄγειν Π² Bekk.,
but in P³ is added in the ink of the MS. ἐν ἄλλω· οὕτω ῥυθμίζειν and
in the margin in pale ink οὕτω ῥυθμίζειν: οὕτω ῥυθμίζειν M^s P¹: Vet.
Int. has *sic ordinare*, which may stand here for οὕτω ῥυθμίζειν, but
ordinare in Vet. Int. commonly stands for τάττειν. 22. M^s P¹
omit the second τῇ: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. But
these MSS. have little authority in questions as to the omission of
small words. 25. τούτου Π² Bekk. Sus.: τοῦτο Π¹. 26. τὸ om.
M^s P¹: the reading of Γ is uncertain, for Vet. Int. *firmare* might

stand either for ἐγχειρίζειν or for τὸ ἐγχειρίζειν (cp. 1314 a 10, where *uti* stands for τὸ χρῆσθαι, and 1315 a 8, where *nullum unum facere magnum* stands for τὸ μηδὲνα ποιεῖν ἓνα μέγαν). 28. Π¹ may possibly be right in omitting the first καὶ (see critical notes on 1254 b 14 and 1260 a 26), but no great weight attaches to the omission of καὶ by these MSS. Vet. Int. adds *autem* after his equivalent for τοὺς ἐπόρους, but see critical note on 1318 a 35. 34. ὀλιγαρχικαῖς Π Bekk. Sus.: Vet. Int. *in oligarchiis*. 37. Vet. Int. does not translate δ'.

1309 a 5. βουλῆσονται] z has *volent*; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *volunt* or *valent*. 10. τοῦ μὲν οὖν μὴ κλέπτεσθαι] Vet. Int. *et ut non furentur*. Had Γ καὶ τοῦ μὴ κλέπτεσθαι? M^s omits οὖν. 12. λόγους Γ P⁴ Ald. Ar. and a correction in pale ink in P¹ (Vet. Int. *contubernia*): λόγους M^s P² etc. and pr. P¹. τιθέσθωσαν] Vet. Int. *reponantur*, which stands for τιθέσθωσαν here as *reposito* does for τεθέντος in 1259 a 23. 15. τῷ Γ M^s Lamb. Cor. Sus., τοῦ P¹: om. Π² Bekk. In 1319 b 7 Π¹ omit τῷ. 29. Π¹ add ταύτης after τῆς πολιτείας, probably owing to the occurrence of τῆς πολιτείας ταύτας (or ταῦτα) a line below. Sus.³ brackets ταύτης. See critical notes on 1290 b 29 and 1298 b 35. 31. ταύτας Π² (except P³, which omits ταύτας δι τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας) Bekk. Sus.: ταῦτα Π¹. 35. δύναμιν μεγίστην τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς] Vet. Int. *potentiam maximorum operum principatus*, but *maximorum* is probably a clerical error for *maximam*. 40. αἵρεσιν corr. P⁴ Sus. and other editors: διαίρεσιν all other MSS. and Bekker. Αἵρεσιν is probably right: cp. 1309 b 2 sq.

1309 b 2. μὴ στρατηγικὸς δὲ is added in P⁴ L^s after φίλος, but see critical notes on 1255 b 12, 1303 b 35, and 1304 a 15. 7. τάναντία P¹ Π² Bekk.: τοῦναντίον Γ M^s Sus. 9. κἂν δύναμις ὑπάρχη καὶ τῆς πολιτείας φιλία Stahr, Sus., while Eucken would place τῆς πολιτείας after φιλία. All the MSS. and Vet. Int. place τῆς πολιτείας before καὶ. They are probably wrong, as Π¹ are probably wrong in 1312 a 27, where Π¹ read δι' ἣν ὀνομαστοὶ γίνονται τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ γνῶριμοι in place of δι' ἣν ὀνομαστοὶ γίγνονται καὶ γνῶριμοι τοῖς ἄλλοις, which is the reading of Π². Vet. Int. has *si* for κἂν, but he probably found κἂν in Γ (see critical notes on 1282 b 8 and 1298 b 23). 10. καὶ τὰ Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: κατὰ P² etc. and pr. P⁴: τὰ corr. P⁴. For a similar error see 1319 b 24. 14. ἐπίους Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: ἐνίους Π². 19. οὖν P¹ Π² Bekk. Sus.: δὲ Γ M^s. 25. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ] Vet. Int. *non iamēn*, which stands for οὐ

μὴν in 1275 b 6 and 1289 b 6 and for οὐ μέτοι in 1306 b 25, but may possibly stand for οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ here, for in 1312 a 30 *sed tamen* stands for οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ. Should *sed tamen* be read here in place of *non tamen*?

27. ἀποβαλεῖ Π¹ Bekk. Sus., ἀποβάλει Ald.: ἀποβάλῃ Π² and pr. Π²: ἀποβάλλει Ar. and a correction in Π² in the ink of the MS., ἀποβάλλῃ Π⁴ V^b L², ὑπερβαλεῖ R^b.

28. ποιήσει] ποιήσῃ M² pr. Π² (corrected in Π² in the ink of the MS.), ποιῇ with σ super-
scribed over η Π²: ποιήσει the rest and Γ.

30. τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας] See explanatory note.

37. ποῖα Π¹ R^b Ald. Bekk. Sus.: ποῖαι Π² ³ 4 Q^b V^b.

38. μὲν γὰρ Π² Bekk. (γὰρ μὲν γὰρ corr. Π⁴): γὰρ Π¹. Sus. brackets μὲν.

1810 a 18. ἔπερ Π² Bekk. Sus.: ἤπερ Π¹. 19. ἔστι δὲ τὸ πεπαι-
δεύσθαι πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν οὐ τοῦτο, τὸ ποιεῖν οἷς χαίρουσιν] Vet. Int. *est aulem erudiri ad faciendum non hoc quibus gaudent* (so z with the other MSS., except that the symbol in z may stand for either *hoc* or *haec*). The words should probably run—*est aulem erudiri ad politiam non hoc, facere quibus gaudent*.

21. ἡ M² Π² Bekk.: καὶ Γ Π¹ Sus.

22. Vet. Int. *democratizare* stands for δημοκρατεῖσθαι as in 1290 a 36 (cp. 1292 a 8).

33. εἰς ὃ χρήζων] εἰς ὃ χρήζειν Π⁴ L². Vet. Int. *ad quod abundat*. Perhaps he misread χρήζων as χορηγῶν (cp. 1325 b 38, where *abundantia* stands for χορηγίας).

39. καὶ om. Π¹.

1810 b 5. δυοῖν] δύνει Π² pr. Π². z (with b alone) has *duobus* rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *duabus*.

9. τὴν ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον] See explanatory note.

10. ἐκ om. Π¹. 15. δημαγωγῶν] δημα-
γωγῶ Π² ³.

17. τῶν τυραννίδων Π² ³ 4 etc. Bekk. Sus.: αἱ τυραννίδες Π¹.

21. τὰς δημιουργίας καὶ τὰς θεωρίας] Vet. Int. *conditores populi et prospectores*. See critical notes on 1326 b 19 and 1302 b 28.

24. τοῦτοις Π² Bekk.¹ Sus. and corr. Π¹: τοῦτο εἰς Γ M² pr. Π¹: Bekk.² omits τούτοις.

29. Κύψελος] κύψελλος Π¹ ⁴. So in 1315 b 24 M² and perhaps Γ have κύψελλος and in 1315 b 27 Π¹ V^b and perhaps Γ, and in 1315 b 23 Π⁴ has κυψελιδῶν. In 1313 b 22 all MSS. have κυψελιδῶν or κυψελίδων, and we find κυψελιδων in 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 17.

l. 14. In Plut. De Pyth. Orac. c. 13 the form Κύψελλος occurs. In Hist. An. 9. 30. 618 a 31 there is a various reading κυψέλλους for κυψέλους ('swifts'), and in 34 a various reading κυψελίσιν for κυψε-
λίσιν.

33. γένους Π² Bekk. Sus.: γένος Π¹.

37. Κόδρος] κείδρος Π² ³ V^b and perhaps Γ.

40. Μολοττῶν] z has *molothorum*; all the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have some corruption or other. δέ] Vet. Int. *enim*, but whether Γ had γάρ is doubtful.

1311 a 6. χρήματα Π Bekk.: Vet. Int. *pecuniarum* (χρημάτων Γ?). βασιλικὰ] z has *regales* (agreeing with *supergressiones*); the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *regalis*. 10. τὸ τὸ Ar. corr. P⁵ Bekk. Sus.: τῷ τὸ Γ M⁵ Π² pr. P⁵: τῷ P¹. 11. τρυφήν Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: τροφήν Π². 13. κακοῦν τὸν ὄχλον] Vet. Int. *suspectam habere turbam*; *suspectam* is probably corrupt, for *κάκωσις* is rendered *anxietas* in Rhet. 2. 7. 1385 a 24 and *afflictio* in Rhet. 2. 8. 1386 a 8 (κακοῦν does not occur again in the Politics or at all, it would seem, in the Rhetoric). Should *subiectam* be read in place of *suspectam*? 15. καὶ is added after δι in Γ M⁵; two MSS. of Vet. Int., however (a z), omit *et*. 21. ἐστὶν] Vet. Int. *fuil*. See critical note on 1316 b 10. 22. καθάπερ οὖν σχεδὸν ἐλέχθη, τὰς αὐτὰς κ.τ.λ.] Σχεδόν is often used with εἶρηται and similar words to soften the statement that such and such a topic has been dealt with (Bon. Ind. s.v. *σχεδόν*), but there seems to be less reason for its use here in the simple repetition of an assertion, and in 1310 a 40 (the passage referred to) we have σχεδὸν δὲ παραπλήσια τοῖς εἰρημένοις περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τὰς βασιλείας καὶ τὰς τυραννίδας, so that Spengel may well be right in reading καθάπερ οὖν ἐλέχθη, σχεδὸν τὰς αὐτὰς κ.τ.λ. 28. ταῦτά Γ M⁵ Bekk. Sus., ταυτά P¹: ταῦτα Π². 30. μονάρχους Π² Bekk.: μονάρχεις M⁵ P¹ Sus.: Vet. Int. *monarchis* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. 36. διὰ . . . 39. Ἀρμόδιον is cited, as Sus. points out, in Schol. Aristoph. Acharn. 980, but the passage occurs only in the Aldine edition. Dindorf's note is 'Omittunt Ravennas et Suidas. Videntur eiusdem esse auctoris qui Aristotelis locum inseruit scholio v. 92.' See critical note on 1287 b 31. 37. Vet. Int. renders δι by *et*, as in 1291 b 40 and 1312 a 18. Ἀρμόδιον] ἁρμόδιον M⁵ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *illusisse Harmodio*). 38. z has *aristogiton*; of the other MSS. of Vet. Int. a has *aristogilton* and the rest *aristoginton*.

1311 b 5. διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα παρεῖσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ] Vet. Int. *quia enim mulier recusavit filium ipsius*, where παρεῖσθαι has probably been misread or misunderstood by the translator. 7. αἰσχύναι Sus.: αἰσχύναι M⁵ P¹ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *verecundiam fecerunt*: αἰσχύνεσθαι is rendered *verecundari* in 1324 b 34 and 1313 a 31): αἰσχύνεσθαι Π² Bekk., accepting which reading Vict., followed by Bonitz (Ind. 22 a 30), would insert ὑπὸ before τῶν μονάρχων. 8. μονάρχων Π Bekk.: μοναρχῶν Γ Sus. (Vet. Int. *monarcharum*). κραταίου Π² Bekk. Sus.: κραταιῷ M⁵ P¹: Vet. Int. *Cratæi*, which leaves the reading of Γ uncertain: Κρατείου Scaliger,

comparing Ael. Var. Hist. 8. 9. 10. ἡ Π² Sus.: ἡ Μ² P¹ and probably Γ, for Vet. Int. gives no equivalent for it, and he often gives no equivalent for the article: om. Vict. Giph. Bekk. 12. Should τοῦ be added before πρὸς? 13. ἐλβείας Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: ἐλβείας Π² Ar., but a mark resembling a colon (:) is placed in P⁴ over λ (see Sus.¹). The letters μ and β are interchanged in some words, e.g. in Σερμυλιῆς, which appears also in Attic inscriptions as Σερβυλιῆς (Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, pp. 59–60). But ἐλβείας is probably merely the mistake of a copyist for ἐλμείας, the letters μ and β having been for a considerable period very similar in form in minuscule writing. 14. νιῆ Π² Bekk.: νιῆ Μ² P¹ Sus.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. In 1304 a 8 and 1313 a 32 all MSS. have νιέσιν, in 1277 a 18 of νιέις, in 1293 a 29 τοὺς νιέις, but on the other hand all have νιοί in 1261 b 39 and νιοὺς in 1270 b 4. The Index Aristotelicus records no instance of the occurrence of the forms νιοῖς and νιέος in Aristotle's writings: νιοῦ occurs in Eth. Nic. 7. 7. 1149 b 11. In the 'Αθ. Παλ. the forms νιέις (nom. and acc.), νιέων are exclusively found. As to the use of these various forms see Meisterhans, Gramm. der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 113, who remarks that after B.C. 350 the forms of the word used in Attic inscriptions are generally those of the second declension, and Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. Blass, 1. 506 sqq. ἡμιστά] Vet. Int. νιήιλ. 20. πάρων Π² Bekk. and a correction in P¹ in the ink of the MS.: πύρων Γ Μ² pr. P¹ (Vet. Int. *pirron* or *pyrron*: z has *pirron*): Πύθων Fabius Benevolentius ap. Vict. *ad locum*, followed by Sus. The murderer of Cotys is usually called Πύθων: thus the best MS. of Diogenes Laertius, the Burbonicus, has Πύθων (so Prof. Bywater informs me) in 3. 46, and Demosthenes has Πύθων in c. Aristocr. cc. 119, 127, 163, and so has Plutarch in Adv. Colot. c. 32, De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando, c. 11, Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 20, and elsewhere. In Diog. Laert. 9. 65, indeed, it is implied that Diocles called the murderer of Cotys Πύρρων, but the passage is thought by Casaubon and Menage to be a gloss on ἐν τῷ Πύθωνι a dozen lines above which has crept from the margin into the text and has been severed in the process from the words on which it was a comment. There is much, therefore, to be said for the reading Πύθων in the passage before us. I hesitate, however, to depart from the reading of the MSS., as Aristotle may have written Πάρρων or Πύρρων, though he may have been in error in doing so. Zeller (Plato, Eng. Tr., p. 30, note 64) apparently

accepts the reading Πάρρων, for he distinguishes between Parrhon and Pytho. 25. καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς] Vet. Int. *et ea quae circa principatus*. He takes τῶν to be neuter and appears to make τῶν

περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς κ.τ.λ. dependent on διέφθειραν and ἐνεχείρισαν. 27. πενθαλίδας Γ Π Bekk., except that pr. M^a has πενθαλήδας and R^b

πενταλίδας: Πενθιλίδας Schn. Sus. Almost all MSS. have πένθιλον or πενθίλον in 29. We find the form Πενθίλος in Strabo, p. 582,

and Paus. 3. 2. 1. περιόντας P¹⁴ R^b Ar. Bekk. Sus.: περιόντας M^a P²³ V^b Ald. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *circumstantes*: he renders

περιουσία in 1329 b 28 by *circumstantia*). 29. Σμέρδης Camotius (editor of the Aldina minor in 1552), Sylburg, Bekk. Sus. etc.: σμέρδης Γ Π Ar. See explanatory note. 30. καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δ' ἐπιθέσεις]

Vet. Int. does not translate δέ, but this he fails to do in some other passages in which καὶ . . . δέ occurs (1252 a 13, 1313 b 32 sq.). 35. τοιαύτας Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: τοιαύτης Π². 37. καὶ

περὶ τὰς πολιτείας om. Γ M^a pr. P¹ (the words are added in the margin of P¹ in pale ink). 40. συγγνώσεσθαι Π² Bekk. Sus.: συγγνώσθαι M^a and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *indulgeri*), συγγνώσθαι pr. P¹

(corrected in pale ink).

1312 a 1. Σαρδανάπαλλον Bekk.² Sus.: σαρδανάπαλον Γ Π Bekk.¹. ξάροντα] Vet. Int. *percutientem se*. 2. ἀληθῆ] Vet. Int. *vere* (ἀληθῶς Γ?). 4. τοῦτο Γ Π¹ Sus., τοῦτο with τ superscribed over the second

τ M^a (two alternative readings being thus offered, 1. τοῦτο, 2. τοῦν' or τοῦτο τὸ, it is uncertain which): τὸ P²³ R^b V^b: om. P⁴ Ald. Bekk. 6. μεθύοντα] After this word I propose to insert 17, μάλιστα δέ . . .

20, ἐπιθέσεις. See explanatory notes on 1312 a 6, 17. 7. διὰ γὰρ τὸ πιστεῦσθαι καταφρονῶσιν ὡς λήσοντες] Vet. Int. *propter confidere enim contemnunt tanquam oblituri*. Πιστεῦσθαι is elsewhere in the

Politics rendered *credi* or *credibilis fieri*. *Confidere* stands for παρησιάζεσθαι in 1313 b 15, 16, and the translator may have misread

πιστεῦσθαι as παρησιάζεσθαι. Perhaps *latituri* should be read in place of *oblituri*. 10. καὶ om. Π¹ (z omits *et* with most of the

MSS. of Vet. Int., unlike a). 11. μονάρχους Π Bekk. Sus.: the reading of Γ is uncertain. The first family of MSS. usually has the form μονάρχης (vol. ii. p. liii).

12. Ἀστυάγει] ἀστυάγη L^a Ald. (Ἀστυάγη Bekk.): ἀστηάγει P⁴. See Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. Blass, i. 513, Anm. 2, and Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch d. gr. Eigennamen, s. v. Ἀστυάγης.

14. θράξ Π² (Θράξ Bekk.² Sus.²): θράξ M^a P¹ (Θράξ Bekk.¹ Sus.²a). 16. z has *ariobar sa ē* (perhaps = *ariobarsanem*); most of the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *ariō-*

barsane or *ariobar sane*. 18. παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις] Vet. Int. *a monarchis*. μονάρχοις Π Bekk. Sus.: the reading of Γ is uncertain. 19. θράσος Π Bekk. (θ in P¹ over an erasure): θάσος Giph. (p. 678) Sus. probably rightly: Vet. Int. *audacia*, which may represent either θράσος or θάσος, for it represents θρασύτης in 1269 b 35 and θάσος in 1258 a 11. 20. ὥσπερ κἀν] Vet. Int. *ac si utique*: so in 1278 a 37 ὥσεί is rendered *ac si*. 21. γίνονται] Vet. Int. *fierent* is probably a clerical error caused by *fieret* in the preceding line. See however critical note on 1313 a 14. 22. μονάρχοις P¹ Π³ Bekk.: μονάρχαις Γ M³ Sus. 23. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ] Vet. Int. *sed tamen*: see critical note on 1309 b 25. 24. οἱ om. M³ P¹ and perhaps also Γ. 25. μὴ om. Γ M³ pr. P¹ (it is added in P¹ in paler ink) possibly rightly, but these MSS. are prone to omit, and especially to omit small words. 26. ἐγγενέσθαι πολλοῖς Π² Bekk. Sus.: γενέσθαι πολλοῖς M³ P¹: Vet. Int. *adesse multis*, which probably stands for ἐγγενέσθαι πολλοῖς, though *adesse* is not the usual equivalent for ἐγγενέσθαι. 27. ὅπου] ὅποι Thompson Sus., but Xenophon sometimes wrote ὅπου where he should have written ὅποι (Rutherford, *New Phrynichus*, p. 115: see Liddell and Scott on ὅπου and οὐ), and it is possible that Aristotle wrote ὅπου here. 28. αὐτῷ Γ (Vet. Int. *siδε*): αὐτῷ Π Bekk. 29. τὸν βίον is added after τελευτῆσαι in P¹ and marg. P⁴: for similar explanatory additions in MSS. of the first family see critical note on 1255 b 12.

1312 b 4. αἱ om. M³ P¹ Sus. and perhaps Γ. 5. κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ Π¹ Sus. probably rightly (see explanatory note on 1311 a 17 and Hesiod, *Op. et Dies*, 25): κεραμεῖ κεραμεύς Π³ Bekk. 6. ἐν] z has *aliquando* with all the MSS. of Vet. Int. except a, which has *alii*, probably a miswriting of the contraction for *aliquando*. Did Vet. Int. find ἐνίστε in Γ? More probably he substitutes *aliquando* for *uno* for the sake of clearness. 7. ὅταν οἱ μετέχοντες στασιάζωσιν] Vet. Int. *quando qui participant seditiones fecerunt*. *Fecerunt* should probably be *fecerint*. 8. ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν περὶ Γέλωνα] Vet. Int. *sicut qui circa Gelonem*. Sus.¹ rightly suggests that *quae eorum* has dropped out before *qui*. 9. ἀρχῇ] z has *participaretur* wrongly with all the other MSS. of Vet. Int. in place of *principetur* or *principaretur*. συστησάτων P¹ ³⁴ R^b V^b Ald. Sus.: συστάτων Γ M³ P³ Bekk. (Vet. Int. has *congregatis* and renders συστάτες in 15 by *congregati*). 10. Should ἡ be added before τυραννίς? 11. αὐτῶν] Sus. '(μετ') αὐτῶν?', si omnino correctione opus est. 12. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κατα-

φρονεῖσθαι] Vet. Int. *ex contemptu autem*. 23. ἀπολλύουσι Π³ Bekk. pr. P² (corrected in the ink of the MS.) and corrections in P¹ in pale ink and in the margin of P²: ἀπολλύουσιν M^o pr. P¹ ³ Sus. See explanatory note on 1324 b 20.

1313 a 9. ἀν Π² Bekk.: ἐάν M^o P¹ Sus.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. 11. πρὸς ταῖς εἰρημέναις] z has *cum his quae dictae sunt*; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *cum his quae dicta sunt*. 14. ἐγένετο] Vet. Int. *fiere*. See critical note on 1312 a 28.

18. δῆλον Γ Π: it is bracketed by Schneider, Coray, and Bekk.² (see also Bon. Ind. 173 b 38 sqq.), but Vahlen, whom Sus. follows, is probably right in suggesting that δῆλον ὅτι should be read (Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik, 4. 432 sq.). 20. ἀν om. Π¹.

24. ἡ περὶ Μολοττοῦς] Vet. Int. does not translate ἡ, but see critical notes on 1304 b 35 and 1306 a 30. 32. παρέλαβεν] z has *acceperat*, a *acciperat*; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *accepit*. 33.

“οὐ δῆτα” φάναι] Vet. Int. *non oportet haec dicere*, but it is more likely that he misread his Greek text than that he found οὐ δεῖ ταῦτα φάναι in it. 38. τῶν is added after τῆς in P⁴ V^b Ald. Bekk.: om. M^o P¹ ³ Sus. (the reading of Γ is of course uncertain): in pr. P³ τῶν takes the place of τῆς, but is altered into τῆς by a corrector in the ink of the MS. 39. τά τε Γ Π² Bekk. Sus.: τὰ M^o P¹. Bekk.¹ conjectures οἶονται for οἶόν τε, and is followed by

Sus., but Bekk.² has οἶόν τε. Οἶονται seems to me to give a wrong sense; it implies that the advocates of this mode of preserving tyrannies are mistaken in thinking that it is preservative of them, whereas Aristotle admits that it is so (1314 a 12 sq., 29 sqq.), but says that it is wicked (1314 a 13 sq.). 41. συσσίτια] Vet. Int. *communicationes*: elsewhere in the Politics συσσίτια is always rendered *convivia*. Should *concenationes* (or *convinationes*) be read? *Convivare* stands for συσσιτεῖν in 1317 b 38. *Communicationes* usually stands for κοινωνίας.

1313 b 2. φρονήμά τε P¹ ⁸ R^b Ar. Bekk. Sus. and a MS. used by Victorius, and also the edition of the Vetus Interpres' translation contained in Albertus Magnus' Works: φρονήματά τε Γ M^o P² ³ ⁴ Q^b V^b Ald. (see Sus.¹). 7. καὶ om. Γ M^o pr. P¹ (it is supplied in P¹ in the ink of the MS.). 8. φρονεῖν] Vet. Int. *deprehendere*. Sus.¹

suggests that he may have found φωρᾶν in Γ, but perhaps he misread φρονεῖν as φωρᾶν. Φωρᾶν, however, is rendered by *depraedare* in 1303 a 34 and 1306 b 30. 13. συρακούσας P¹ Π² Bekk. Sus.: συρρακουσίους M^o (*Syracusanos* Vet. Int.). τοὺς ὠτακουστάς ἐξέπεμπεν

Π² Bekk.: τοὺς ὠτακουστας, οὓς ἐξέπεμπε Π¹ Sus.: οὓς ὠτακουστας ἐξέπεμπε Coray. But if with Π² we omit οὓς, the structure of the sentence introduced by οἶον, 12, will resemble that of not a few other passages (see explanatory note). 14. δ is added before Ἰέρων in M² P¹ Sus.: whether Γ added it is uncertain. 15. Vet. Int. has *confident* for παρηγοιάζονται, which is the reading of Π Bekk. Sus., and *latebunt* for λανθάνουσιν (Π Bekk. Sus.), but he sometimes renders the present by the future: thus in 1281 a 19 he has *corrumperet* for φθείρει and in 1287 a 31 *interimet* for διαφθείρει. 19. μήτε] See explanatory note on 1313 b 18. 20. πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ὄντες] Vet. Int. *occupati circa cotidiana*. Did he find not τῷ, but τοῖς in Γ? 23. Ὀλυμπίου Γ Π: Ὀλυμπίου Sus. probably rightly (see explanatory note). 24. τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργα Πολυκράτεια] Vet. Int. *eorum quae de Samo opera multi imperi*. Sus.¹ suggests that Γ had παρὰ in place of περὶ, but see 1258 b 40 and 1317 b 26 sqq., where *de* represents περὶ. See explanatory note. 28. δὴ om. Π² Bekk. probably wrongly: Π² are probably wrong in omitting δὴ in 1330 a 37. 32. τούτων is omitted in Γ M². αὐτὸν καθελεῖν is added after τούτων in P⁴ L² Ald. Ar., but see critical notes on 1255 b 12, 1303 b 35, and 1304 a 15. 33. δὲ Π² Bekk.: δ' ἔτι M² P¹ Sus. and possibly Γ, for though Vet. Int. has *adhuc* (= ἔτι) only and does not translate δὲ, he sometimes fails to give an equivalent for δὲ in rendering καὶ . . . δὲ (see critical note on 1311 b 30). 39. ἀμφοτέροις Π² Bekk. Sus.: ἀμφοτέραις Π¹ (Vet. Int. *utrasque*). 1314 a 2. οὐδ' ἂν εἴς Π¹ Π² Bekk. Sus.: οὐδεὶς ἂν Γ M². 4. ἦ] Vet. Int. *si* (εἰ Γ?). 5. μηδενὶ Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: μηδέν Π² (corrected in P² in the ink of the MS.). 7. Vet. Int. does not render ταυτοῦτον. 8. καὶ before ἐλευθεριάζων om. Π². 10. συσσιτίοις] συσσιτίοις Γ M² R^b: συσσιτίοις Π¹ with a dot under the second ι to erase it. 13. δ' ἐλλείπει Π² Bekk. Sus.: δὲ λείπει Π¹, δὲ λύπει M²: Vet. Int. *aulem deficit* (δ' ἐλλείπει probably Γ). 18. πιστεύσωσί Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. *credant*): in P² ου is written by the scribe himself over an erasure, so that πιστεύσωσί may have been the original reading: πιστεύουσιν Π² R^b V^b Ald. Bekk. and a correction in P². 19. αὐτοῖς] αὐτοῖς the third Basle edition of Aristotle followed by Vict. and Bekker: αὐτοῖς L² Ald.: the rest αὐτοῖς, and so Sus. 25. οὖν Γ Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: om. M² Π². 31. σχεδὸν ἐξ ἐναντίας] Vet. Int. *ut ex contrario* (*ut* om. z with g h m n). Had Γ ὥσπερ ἐξ ἐναντίας? 40. τὸν M² P¹ R^b Sus.: τὸ Γ P² L² V^b Ar. Bekk. τοῦ Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. *ut videatur*): om. Π² Bekk.

1314 b 1. *δαπανῶντα*] Vet. Int. *expendat* (the whole sentence running, *primo quidem, ut videatur curare communia neque expendat gratuita talia*), and so in 5 *ἀποδιδόντα reddat*. Schn. Bekk.² and Sus., but not Coray, add *eis* before *δωρεὰς*, probably rightly. 3. *δεδῶσι* Π² Bekk. Sus.: *διδόσι* M² P¹. 7. *δόξειεν* Π¹ Bekk.² Sus.: *δόξει* Π² Bekk.¹ 9. γ' om. M² P¹: the reading of Γ is uncertain, as Vet. Int. usually fails to render γε. 11. *ἐπιτιθεῖντο* P² R^b V^b Bekk. and corr. P³, *ἐπιτιθεῖν* τὸ Ald.: *ἐπιτίθοντο* P¹ Sus., *ἐπιτιθεύοντο* pr. P², *ἐπίθοντο* M²: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain (Vet. Int. *insilient*: z *insiliet*). See Kühner, *Ausführl. gr. Gramm.*, ed. Blass, § 282, Anm. 5, where Plato, *Laws* 922 B, is referred to for *τιθεῖντο*, and Xen. *Mem.* 3. 8. 10 for *τιθοῖτο*. *Τιθεῖμην* occurs in Plato, *Laws* 674 A etc. In 2. 11. 1273 b 6 all MSS. except M² have *προεῖτο*. 16. τε] Vet. Int. *autem*, as in 1336 a 5, where see critical note. 17. *κοινῶν* Π¹ P⁴ Bekk. Sus. and over an erasure P²: *κοινὸν* P³ R^b V^b. 22. *πολεμικῆς* Madvig (*Adv. Critica*, 1. 468)—who compares c. 12. 1315 b 16, διὰ τὸ *πολεμικὸς γενέσθαι* *Κλεισθένης οὐκ ἦν εὐκαταφρόνητος*, and 1315 b 28 sq.—and also Sus.: *πολιτικῆς* Γ Π Bekk. 26. *ἄλλας* Π² Bekk.: *τῶν ἄλλων* Π¹ Sus. . So in 1260 a 26 M² P¹ have *τι τοιούτων*, the rest *τι τῶν τοιούτων*, and in 1331 a 34 M² P² corr. P¹ have *μηδὲνα τοιούτων* and pr. P¹ (perhaps Γ also) *μηδὲνα τῶν τοιούτων*. See critical notes on 1331 a 34 and 1336 b 8. 32. *θαυμάσωσιν* Π, except corr. P² which is of no authority: *θυμιάσωσιν* corr. P² Cor. Bekk.² Sus. The reading of Γ is of course uncertain. See explanatory note. 33. τό γε] Vet. Int. *tunc* (τότε Γ?). See critical note on 1318 a 1.

1315 a 3. *ἀβελτηρίας*] *ἀβελτηρίας* Bekk.¹ (see Liddell and Scott): *ἀμελητίας* P⁴, the rest *ἀβελτηρίας*. 7. *ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων*] See explanatory note. 11. *περὶ* Π² Bekk.: *παρὰ* Π¹ Sus. 15. *δυεῖν* M² P¹ ² Sus.: *δυοῖν* Π² Bekk. See critical note on 1310 b 5. τὰ *σώματα* Π² Bekk.: τὸ *σῶμα* M² P¹ Sus. and probably Γ, for though a has *corporum*, several MSS. of Vet. Int. (including z) have *corpus*. *κολάσεως* is bracketed by Schneider Bekk.² and Sus. probably rightly. 20. ἢ μὴ is omitted in Γ in a lacuna; no blank, however, is left in z. 31. *ψυχῆς γὰρ ὠφέλιον*] Vet. Int. *animae enim pretium fieri*. 33. *παράρουν* P² etc. Bekk. and probably pr. P¹ (for ἀφ is over an erasure), *παράρουν* pr. P³ ⁴: *ἀφαίρουν* M² Sus. corr. P¹: the reading of Γ is uncertain (Vet. Int. *ablationem*, which is his equivalent for *παράρουν* in 1311 a 12). *Παράρουν* is probably right, for all the MSS. have *παράρουν* or *παράρουν* in 1311 a 12, and in the

Ἰ. Πολ. (see Sandys' Index) παραιρῆσθαι is exclusively used with ὄπλα, though in Plato, Rep. 569 B we have ἀφελόμενος τὰ ὄπλα. 40. τῶν before ἐπιτιθεμένων om. M^s pr. P¹ (it is supplied in P¹ in the ink of the MS.): the reading of Γ is of course uncertain.

1315 b 6. τῷ P² etc., τῷ Bekk. Sus.: τῶν M^s P¹ L^s. Vet. Int. has *quam quod meliores principentur et non humiles* (τοῦ βελτίονος ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ τεταπεινωμένους Γ?). 11. As to the brackets within which

I have placed 1315 b 11-39 see explanatory note on 1315 b 11. ὀλιγοχρονώτεροι] ὀλιγοχροσιώταται or rather ὀλιγοχροσιώτῃ and ἐστὶ in place of εἰσὶν, the words ὀλιγαρχία καὶ being omitted, Spengel (Aristot. Studien, 3. 63). Ὀλιγοχροσιώταται should probably be read. See critical notes on 1293 b 32 and 1299 a 27. 14. ἐτῇ δ' αὕτη

διέμεινεν ἑκατόν] Vet. Int. has *enim ipsa* for δ' αὕτη (γὰρ αὕτη Γ?). M^s has δ' αὕτῃ, P¹ δ' αὕτη. 18. γούν Π² Bekk. Sus.: οὖν Π¹.

See critical note on 1320 a 29. 24. ἐτυράνησεν Π² Bekk.:

ἐτυράννευσεν M^s Sus., ἐτυράνευσεν P¹: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. In 32 all MSS. have ἐτυράννευσεν (P¹ ἐτυράνευσεν), except P², which has ἐτυράνησεν, and in 36 all have τυραννέουσας. It seems likely, therefore, that the form τυραννέω should be preferred in all these three passages, though in 31 all MSS. have τυραννῶν. The form τυραννέω, however, occurs nowhere else in the Politics, and the Index Aristotelicus gives no other instance of it from Aristotle's writings; its occurrence here, therefore, throws additional doubt on the genuineness of 1315 b 11-39. The rare fem. ὀλιγοχρονοῖαι also occurs in 39 (ὀλιγοχρονοῖαι P¹ pr. P^s only). The Index Aristotelicus gives no reference for it to Aristotle's writings. In 1317 b 24 we have the fem. ὀλιγοχρονοῖους. 26. τέτταρα Π²

Bekk.: τέσσαρα M^s P¹: Vet. Int. *quatuor* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. See critical note on 1300 a 23. Susemihl is probably right in adopting T. Hirsch's emendation ἡμῶν. The symbol occasionally used in Greek MSS. to represent ἡμῶν is one which it would be easy to confound with that for τέτταρα: see Gardthausen, Gr. Palaeographie, p. 268. Ψαμμίτιχος] ψαμμίτιχος Π¹ P² Sus.:

Ψαμμήτιχος R^b V^b Ald. Bekk. (recte, ut videtur), ψαμμήτικος P¹ (Sus.). See Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch d. gr. Eigennamen for the two forms of the name and their use by various authors. The famous Greek inscription (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, p. 4) has the forms ψαμάτιχος and ψαμμήτιχος. Γορδίου] So Γ Π Bekk.: Sus. Γόργου, which is the correct name (it appears on two coins of Ambracia: see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 642. 6), but

it is possible that the writer of the passage made a slip: Γοργίου Röper and a MS. of the Vet. Int. (m), which has *gorgie*, not *gordie*, like the rest, and Plut. Sept. Sap. Conv. c. 17 sqq. 27. ταῦτά Γ P¹ Bekk. Sus., ταῦτα L¹: ταῦτα the rest (M¹ has *ταυ* with τ over the υ). 28. ἀδορυφόρητος] z has *sine armorum custodia* perhaps rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *sine armorum custodia*. 31. ἔφυγε] z has *fugit* rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *fuit*. 34. Bojesen and Sus. insert τῶν before περὶ Ἰέρωνα, but without necessity: see explanatory note. περὶ συρακούσας P¹ Sus., περὶ συρακούσας M¹: Vet. Int. *circa siracusam* or *syracusam* (περὶ συρακούσαν Γ?): περὶ συρακούσαις P² V^b Ald. Bekk.¹ (παρὰ Συρακουσίοις Schn. Bekk.²). 35. ἔτη δ' οὐδ' αὐτὴ πολλὰ διέμεινε] Vet. Int. *non autem permansit ipsa multis annis* (ἔτη δ' οὐκ αὐτὴ πολλὰ διέμεινε Γ?). M¹ P¹ have οὐδ' αὐτῇ. 36. θυοῖν P¹ Π³ Bekk. Sus.: θυεῖν M¹ P².

1316 a 1. τοῦ πλάτωνος is added after τῇ in P¹ L¹ Ald. Ar., but see critical note on 1313 b 32. 9. μὲν οὖν is left untranslated by Vet. Int., οὖν om. M¹. 14. γε corr. P¹ Cor. Bekk.² Sus.: τε M¹ P¹ Π² Bekk.¹: Vet. Int., as usual, does not render τε. δι' ὅν] *propter quod* b c g h k l m n rightly, for διὰ with the accusative is commonly rendered *propter* by Vet. Int.: *per quod* a z. 17. ἄρα om. Γ P¹ (οἶον, 16... μεταβάλλει, 17, is omitted in M¹): ἄρα ἅμα μεταβάλλει Thompson, Sus.². 26. Casaubon, followed by Sus., is probably right in adding οὗτ' εἰ ἴσται after ἴσται. 28. καὶ is added after δεῖ in Π¹. 29. συνεχές Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: συνεχῶς Π². 32. τῶν... 33. ὥσπερ ἡ om. Γ M¹, so that for these words P¹ is the only representative of the first family of MSS., and P¹ has τοῦ in place of τῶν in 32. 34. Χαριλάου] See critical note on 1271 b 25. καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι om. pr. P¹. Kluge (Aristoteles de Politia Carthaginiensium, p. 86) is perhaps right in thinking that something has dropped out after καὶ. He says, 'nomen quidem huius Poenorum regis, sub quo haec mutatio imperii facta fuerit, aut textu excidit aut philosophus ignorasse videtur.' 'H followed by the name of the tyrant in the genitive has perhaps dropped out. 36. αὶ om. M¹ P¹ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *plurimae*). 38. ἀναξιλάου P¹ Bekk. Sus.: ἀναξιλάου Γ M¹ P² R^b V^b Ald.

1316 b 1. πολὺ Γ P¹ Vict. (who however translates αὶ πολλοὶ) Schn. Cor. Göttl. Bekk.² Sus.: πολλοὶ M¹ Π² Bekk.¹ 2. εἶναι P¹ Π² Bekk.: om. Γ M¹: it is bracketed by Sus. See critical note on 1252 a 8. ἴσον] z has *equaliter* with a; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *equale* or *equalem*. τῆς πόλεως] z has *per civitates* with a; the

other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *per civilatem*. See critical note on 1253 a 10. 5. δημοκρατουμένη] See explanatory note on 1316 b 3. χρηματίζονται] z has *pecuniosi fiunt*, not *pecuniosi sunt*, as most of the other MSS., and probably rightly, for χρηματίζεσθαι is rendered *pecuniosum fieri* in 1316 b 4. 6. δε] z has *autem* with a; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *enim*. 8. αὐτῇ Π¹ Sus.: αὐτῇ Π² Bekk. 10. εἶσιν] ἦσαν Γ Μ⁸ (Vet. Int. *erant*). See critical note on 1311 a 21. 16. Lamb. Bekk.² Sus. add καὶ before κατατοκίζόμενοι, but see critical note on 1260 a 26. 20. οὐδὲ τότε Camotius in the later Aldine (or Camotian) edition of Aristotle's writings published at Venice in 1552, followed by Bekk.² and Sus.: οὐδέποτε Γ Π Bekk.¹ 23. See explanatory notes on 1316 b 23, 24. 24. P¹ adds οἱ after ἐξείναι, M⁸ οἱ, Γ οἱ (Vet. Int. *sibi*): [οἱ] Sus. The word is probably repeated from δ 14, which follows. 25. φησιν Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: φασί P² Π² Ar., φάσι P³. 27. As to the existence of a lacuna here see explanatory note.

BOOK VIII (VI).

1316 b 33. ποία M⁸ P^{1 4} etc. Sus.: ποία Γ Ar. Bekk. and pr. P³: ποία P¹.

1317 a 2. τε is placed after δλιγαρχικᾶς in M⁸ P¹, but not by Sus.: the reading of Γ is uncertain, as Vet. Int. seldom renders τε. 5. Spengel Bekk.² Sus. add περὶ τὸ before βουλευόμενον. δλιγαρχικῶς . . . 8. ἀρχαιρεσίας om. M⁸. 6. τὰ δὲ . . . 7. μὲν om. P^{4 6} R^b L⁸ Ald. Ar. and pr. P³, so that for these words we are dependent on Γ P^{1 2} (a recent correction in the margin of P³ has been erased). Spengel and Bekk.² read τὸ δὲ in place of τὰ δὲ. 11. δλιγαρχιών Γ P⁶ Ar. Vict. Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. *oligarchiarum*, though one MS., g, has *oligarchicarum*): all the MSS. except Γ P⁶ have δλιγαρχικῶν. 12. τίς R^b Ar. Bekk. Sus.: τὶ P¹, τί Γ M⁸ P^{2 3 4} etc. 13. Schneider, following the translations of Lamb. and Ramus, and followed by Bekk.², is probably right in adding ἐπεὶ before δὲ. 23. ἄσπερ Π² Bekk. Sus.: ἄς M⁸ P¹: the reading of Γ is uncertain, for Vet. Int. often fails to render περ. 28. ἀλλὰ καὶ] z has *sed et* rightly; a has *sed* and the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *sed ex*. 36. συναγαγὶν Π² Bekk.: συνάγειν M⁸ P¹: Vet. Int. *congregare* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. For similar differences of

reading see critical note on 1284 a 5. 39. λέγωμεν Π¹ R^b Ar. Bekk. Sus.: λέγομεν P³ etc.

1317 b 3. δημοτικὸν Π² Bekk.: δημοκρατικὸν M^o P¹ Sus. Vet. Int. has *democraticum*, which probably represents δημοκρατικόν, though δημοτικός is rendered *democraticus* in 1292 b 13, 16 and 1299 b 32. In 1318 a 18 all MSS. have τὸ δημοτικὸν δίκαιον, though in 1318 a 4 all have τοῦ δικαίου τοῦ ὁμολογουμένου εἶναι δημοκρατικοῦ and in 3. 9. 1280 a 8 all have τὸ δίκαιον τό τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικόν. 6. τοῦτ' εἶναι [καὶ] τέλος] καὶ om. Π¹ and Ar. does not translate it. Π¹ may be right, and I have bracketed καὶ, though the authority of these MSS. is small in cases of omission. Sus. follows Thurot in reading καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τέλος, but τοῦτο is probably the antecedent of ὁ τι. Compare for the form of the sentence 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 33, καὶ ὅπερ αὐτοῖς ἕκαστοι οὐ φασιν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐδὲ συμφέρον, τοῦτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνονται πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀσκούντες, and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 30 sq. 12. τὸ is added before τῆς in M^o P¹ Sus.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. 13. δουλεύοντος Π¹ Bekk.² Sus.: δούλου ὄντος Π² Bekk.¹ Πρώτου ὄντος takes the place of πρωτεύοντος in some MSS. in Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 16. I see no such reason for ὄντος here as exists in Plato, Laws 728 B, τὸ ὁμοιοῦσθαι τοῖς οὐσι κακοῖς ἀνδράσιν: Aristot. De Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 12: Demosth. in Lept. c. 7. 17. τούτων Π² Bekk.: τοιούτων Π¹ Sus. 24. Π¹ Sus. may be right in adding εἶναι after ὀλιγοχρόνους: it is omitted by all MSS. in the somewhat similar passage 2. 12. 1273 b 40, but there it can be more easily supplied from what precedes. 27. περὶ is added after εὐθυνῶν καὶ in M^o P¹ Sus. and possibly also in Γ, but this is uncertain because 'praepositionem cum plurium nominum casibus copulatam ante unumquodque eorum repetere solet Guilelmus' (Sus.¹ p. xxxiii: see vol. ii. p. 65), and here he repeats *de* not only before his equivalent for πολιτείας, but also before his equivalent for τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων. 29. πάντων ἢ τῶν μεγίστων] In Γ Π Bekk. the words ἢ τῶν μεγίστων follow ὀλιγίστων, 30, but (with Schn. Cor. and Sus.) I follow the third Basle edition of Aristotle in placing them after πάντων. It is possible that owing to the similar ending of μεγίστων and ὀλιγίστων the words ἀρχὴν δὲ μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἢ ὅτι ὀλιγίστων were omitted by the writer of the archetype and subsequently added by him in the margin without a sufficiently clear indication of the place at which he intended them to be inserted. The only thing which throws doubt on this transposition is the presence in the text of the second κυρίαν, which seems needless if

we adopt the transposition, but I do not think that this is sufficient to turn the scale. 30. *ὀλιγίστων*] *ὀλιγοστῶν* M^a pr. P¹ (corrected into *ὀλιγιστῶν* in P¹ in the ink of the MS.) and possibly γ. In 1320 a 12 P¹ has *ὀλιγοστὰς* with ι superscribed over the second ο. In Metaph. I. 1. 1053 a 9 A^b, and in Phys. 5. 3. 226 b 28 pr. E, have *ὀλιγοστὸν* (see also the various readings in De An. 3. 3. 428 b 19 and De Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 a 18, and Soph. Antig. 625, referred to by Liddell and Scott). 37. *καὶ βουλῇν*] *καὶ βουλὰς* Γ M^a (Vet. Int. *consilia*). Schneider and Bekker add *τὴν* before *βουλῇν*, but as to the omission of the article in enumerations see critical notes on 1291 a 4 and 1274 a 21, and cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 31 sqq. and Plato, Rep. 545 A. Sus. brackets *καὶ βουλῇν*, and no doubt it has just been implied that the Boulê is one of the magistracies, from which it is here distinguished, but Aristotle is sometimes inconsistent. Ἀρχαί and βουλαί are mentioned separately in a similar way in Plut. Solon, c. 16, πάντα δ' ὁμαλῶς ἐπιτρέψαντες, ἀρχὰς ἐκκλησίας δικαστήρια βουλάς. That the payment of the Boulê was of importance in a democracy we see from Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 99, πῶς οὐ δευόν, εἰ διὰ τὸν νόμον, ὃν σὺ τίθεικας μισθὸν λαβών, ἄμισθος ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἡ βουλὴ καὶ τὰ δικαστήρια ἴσται; 38. *ἔτι . . .* 41. *βαναυσία*] See explanatory note. 41. *ἔτι* Ar. Lamb. Sus.: *ἐπὶ* Γ Π Bekk.

1318 a 1. *καταλειφθῇ*] Vet. Int. *deficiat* (we expect *relicta sit* or *derelicta sit*: *deficere* usually represents *ἐλλείπειν*). τό γε Cor. Sus.: τότε Γ Π. See critical note on 1314 b 33. 3. *ταῖς δημοκρατίαις* Π^a Bekk. Sus.: *τῆς δημοκρατίας* Π¹. 7. P^a Ar. Bekk.^a Sus. have τοὺς εὐπόρους ἢ τοὺς ἀπόρους: P^a has τοὺς εὐπόρους (corrected into ἀπόρους) ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους: all other MSS., including Γ, have τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους. The authority of P^a is very small. As to *ἄρχειν* see explanatory note on 1291 b 32. 9. *πολιτεία* Π^a Ar. Bekk.: *πόλει* Π¹ Sus. *Πολιτεία* seems preferable to *πόλει*: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 34 sqq. and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq. 12. *χλίοις*] *τοῖς χλίοις* Γ (Vet. Int. *ipsis mille*). 14. *κατὰ τοῦτο*] Vet. Int. *in his* (*κατὰ τούτων* Γ with P¹?). 16. *αἰρέσεων* Camot. Vict. Lamb. Schn. Bekk.^a Sus. Bonitz (Ind. 180 b 59): *διαίρεσεων* Γ Π Bekk.¹ See critical note on 1332 b 36. Δι easily drops out and is easily added before ΑΙ. 24. *δίκαιος μόνος*] Vet. Int. *solum iustum* (*δίκαιον μόνον* Γ?). 27. *ὁμολογήσουσιν* P^a R^b Ald. Bekk. Sus.: *ὁμολογοῦσιν* Π¹ P^a⁴ L^a Ar. 32. τὸ is added after τοῦτο in Γ M^a. 34. *εἰ* om. Π^a Bekk. These MSS. omit *εἰ* in 1287 b 6 also. 35. *προσγεγίνηται*] Vet. Int. *adiungantur aulem*. Compare his addition of *aulem* in 1308 b 28,

37. *ποτέρων* Π^a Bekk. Sus. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *quorum-cumque*): *ποτέρων* M^a pr. Pⁱ (corrected in the ink of the MS.). 40. *δίχα* P^a R^b Ald. Bekk. and a recent correction in P^s, δι followed by a lacuna pr. P^a: *διχῇ* Pⁱ, *διχθῇ* M^a and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. *divisa in duo*): *διχῇ* Sus. *Δίχα* is probably right: cp. Hdt. 6. 109, τοῖσι δὲ Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῖσι ἐγένοντο δίχα αἱ γυνῆμαι.

1318 b 3. *συμπεῖσαι*] Vet. Int. *permittere* should probably be *persuadere*. 4. τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον Π^a Bekk.: τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἴσον Πⁱ Sus. In 2 all the MSS. have τοῦ ἴσου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου, and this is the usual order. It is possible that Πⁱ are right (compare the change from τὸ ἔθος καὶ τὴν ἀγωγὴν in 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 14 to τῇ ἀγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν in 1292 b 16), but it is more likely that Π^a are. For similar diversities of order in the two families of MSS., see critical notes on 1331 b 41 and 1333 b 36. 9. *διελοῖ*] *διέλη* Pⁱ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *sicut si quis distinguat populos*). 14. αἰτοῖς Πⁱ Sus.: om. Π^a Bekk. 17. ἡ P^a L^a Ald. and P^a in the margin, followed by Bekk. and Sus.: Γ also may have had ἡ (Vet. Int. *magis appetunt lucrum quam honorem*): om. M^a Pⁱ^a Q^b R^b. 36. ἀρκούσαν εἶναι] Vet. Int. *sufficere*.

1319 a 1. *φῦλον*] *φῦλον* M^a pr. Pⁱ and perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. *tribuale*). 7. τοῖς πολλοῖς Π^a Ar. Bekk.: τοῖς παλαιοῖς Πⁱ Sus., the acceptance of which reading necessitates the omission of τὸ ἀρχαῖον, which all MSS. have. The reading of Π^a is confirmed by the similarity of the language in 10. 10. γε om. M^a Pⁱ and possibly Γ, but this is doubtful, for Vet. Int. seldom renders γε. 14. Ἀφυταίων Sepulveda (p. 193 b), Camerarius (Interp. p. 253), Lambinus: ἀφυτάων Γ Pⁱ Π^a Ar. (λ however is over an erasure in P^s): ἀφυτάων M^a. 15. *καίπερ*] a z have *equidem* rightly, for Vet. Int. renders *καίπερ equidem* in 1309 b 32; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *quidem*, except k, which has *quidam*. 22. τὰ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις] τὰς πρὸς τὰ πολεμικὰ πράξεις Γ (Vet. Int. *actionibus ad bellica*), τὰ πρὸς τὰ πολεμικὰ πράξεις M^a. Sus. (following Schn.) brackets τὰ. 24. *θυραυλεῖν*] Vet. Int. *venari*. Did he misread *θυραυλεῖν* as *θηρεύειν*? 29. *κωλίσθαι*] z has *conversatur* probably rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *conversantur*. 33. The second τὴν χάραν is bracketed by Coray and Sus. and might well be dispensed with, but surplussage of a somewhat similar kind may be noted elsewhere in the Politics—e.g. in 3. 3. 1276 a 19–21 (see critical note on 1276 a 21), 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 23 sqq., 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 38–40 (cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 3) and 1340 a 33, 34, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 10 sq., 6 (4). 12. 1296 b

19 sqq. Cp. also Hist. An. 2. 11. 503 a 23 sqq., Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 21, § 5, [τὸ]ν νόμον τοῦτον ἦν τις θέλη [συ]χραῖαι ἢ προθέτα[ι] ψῆφον ὥστε μ[ὴ] εἶναι τὸν νόμον τοῦτον, and see critical note on 1319 b 35. 87. δημοκρατίας Lamb., Camerarius (Interp. p. 253), Bekk., Sus.: δημοκρατικαῖς Γ Π, because almost all the MSS. read ἐκκλησίαις, not ἐκκλησίας. ἐκκλησίας L^a Ald. Ar. Vict. Lamb. Bekk. Sus. and corr. P^a and pr. P^a: all the rest of the MSS. (including all the better ones) ἐκκλησίαις.

1319 b 7. ἰσχυρὸν] Vet. Int. *impotentem*. τῷ Π^a, τῷ Bekk.: om. Π¹ Sus. 8. ποιεῖν] Vet. Int. *aliquando* (ποτέ Γ?). 11. τοῦτο om. Π¹. 12. μέχρι M^a P¹ and possibly Γ (see critical note on 1336 b 39): μέχρις Π^a Bekk. Sus. 21. οἷς Π^a Bekk. Sus.: οἶον Γ M^a pr. P¹ (οἶο corr. P¹). 24. καὶ τὰ P¹ and (with γρ.) corr. P^a in the margin: κατὰ Γ M^a P² R^b Ald. Ar. pr. P^a. For this difference of reading cp. 1309 b 10. 26. διασυχθῶσιν] Vet. Int. *coniungantur*, which should probably be *disiungantur*, for διασυχθῆναι is rendered *disiungi* in 1276 a 21. 27. πρότερον Π^a Bekk.: πρότεραι Π¹ Sus. corr. P^a. 33. Vet. Int. *consistere* probably stands for συνιστάναι (not συνιστάναί, as Sus.¹ thinks): see critical note on 1291 b 12. 35. ἔργον is bracketed by Bekk.² and Sus., following Lamb., but cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 19 sqq., where δεῖν is repeated in a similar way, and 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 38 sqq., and see critical note on 1319 a 33.

1320 a 4. ἡ Π^a Bekk. Sus.: μηδ' Γ M^a, μὴ δ' pr. P¹ (corrected in the ink of the MS.). This μηδὲ is probably an intruder from two lines above. 8. φερόμενον Bernays (Ges. Abhandlungen, 1. 173. 1), Sus.², φερομένων Γ P¹, φερόντων the rest followed by Bekk. 10. καταψηφιεῖται corrections in P² in the ink of those MSS. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *corruptel sententias*), followed by Bekk. Sus.: καταψηφίζεται M^a P¹ and pr. P^a. 13. ἐπιτίμοις Π^a Bekk.: ἐπιζημίους Π¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. *damnis*, which probably stands for ἐπιζημίους, for ἐπιτίμα is rendered *increpationes* in 1309 a 23 and ἐπιζήμιον *damnosum* in Rhet. 2. 23. 1399 b 35). Π^a are likely to be right, for ἐπιζήμιον does not occur in this sense in the Politics, and the only instance of its use in this sense in Aristotle's writings given in the Index Aristotelicus is from Probl. 29. 14. 952 b 12. 16. τοί P^a L^a Ald., τοί Bekk. Sus.: τῇ the rest. See critical note on 1308 b 15. 21. δικαστηρίων φαύλων] Vet. Int. *praetoria malorum*, but whether he found δικαστήρια φαύλων in Γ is very doubtful. 23. δλίγας δ' ἡμέρας Π^a Bekk. pr. P¹ and a correction in P^a in the ink of the MS.:

ὀλίγαις δ' ἡμέραις M^s P^s pr. P^s and a correction in P¹ in the ink of the MS., followed by Sus. Vet. Int. has *paucis autem diebus*, which may represent either reading, for in 27 and 1314 b 30 *multis diebus* stands for *πολλὰς ἡμέρας*. 29. ἐθέλουσιν Π^s Bekk. (over an erasure in P¹): θέλουσιν M^s P¹ Sus.: the reading of Γ is of course uncertain. In the preceding line all MSS. except P⁴ have ἐθέλουσιν. Π¹ are rather apt to omit the first letter of words (see for instance critical notes on 1265 b 19, 1324 b 30, and 1315 b 18). 30. τὰ γὰρ πρώτα] Vet. Int. *obvenientia enim* (τὰ γὰρ παρίοντα Γ? In 1303 a 17 Vet. Int. translates *παρίναι intrare*). 35. γένοιτο P^s R^b Ald. Bekk.: γένοιτο δ (δ over an erasure) P⁴: γίνοιτο M^s P¹ Sus.: Vet. Int. *fiat* leaves the reading of Γ uncertain. Γένοιτο is probably right: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 29, θεωρεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε πᾶς δὲ γένοιτο. 38. συναθροίζειν Sus., συναθροίζων M^s P¹ and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *congregans*, but this verb represents ἀθροίζειν in 1314 b 10): ἀθροίζων Π^s Bekk.¹, ἀθροίζειν Ar., the third Basle edition of Aristotle, Bekk.² 39. ἐμπορίας Π¹ Ar. Bekk. Sus.: εἰπορίας Π^s.

1320 b 3. ἀφεμένους Γ P¹ Bekk.¹ Sus. (Vet. Int. *respuentes vanas oblationes*): ἐφεμένους M^s Π^s: ἀφεμένους Schn. Bekk.² 6. περιαιῖδας M^s P¹ Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. *negotia domus*, which perhaps stands for *περιοικίας*, the reading of Ald., for in 1269 b 3 *praedia circa domos* represents *περιοίκους*): *περιοικιδίας* P^s 40. 9. τὰ ταραντίων Π^s Bekk.: τὴν ταραντίων M^s P¹, but M^s has a lacuna after ταραντίων: τὴν ταραντίων ἀρχὴν Γ? (Vet. Int. *Tarentinorum principatum*). If Γ had τὴν ταραντίων ἀρχήν, and *principatum* was not merely supplied *e conj.* by Vet. Int., ἀρχήν may have been repeated from ἀρχὰς, 11. For if τὴν ταραντίων is right, one would be inclined to add πάλιν rather than ἀρχήν. 15. τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς Γ Schn. Cor. Bekk.² Sus. (Vet. Int. *de eodem principatu*): τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῆς Π Bekk.¹ 25. τῷ τε κτωμένῳ Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: τῶν τε κτωμένων Π^s. 26. εἰσαγομένους Π¹ Sus. (see explanatory note): εἰσαγομένου Π^s Bekk. 29. τοὺς κοινωνοὺς] Vet. Int. *communicantes*. See critical note on 1289 b 1. 30. μικρὸν] z has *parum*; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. probably rightly *parvum*. 35. Thurot (*Études sur Aristote*, p. 91) would add *καὶ* before τοῖς πλωτήρσιν, while Rasso, followed by Sus., would add τοῖς τε ἄλλοις *καὶ* in the same place. Something seems to be missing, and either Thurot or Rasso may be right. 38. δύναται Π Sus. and probably Γ: δύναται Ald. Bekk.

1321 a 3. δῆλον ὅτι Γ Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. *palam quod*): δηλονότι M^s P¹ Π². 5. μάλιστα Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: κάλλιστα Π². 6. βανασικὸν Π Sus., except that R^b and a recent marginal correction in M^s have βάνανσον (so Bekk.): ναυσικὸν pr. M^s (Vet. Int. *nautica*). The Index Aristotelicus does not include the word βανασικός. 12. ὀπλιτικὴν Camerarius (Interp. p. 258), Sus., and perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. *armativam*): ὀπλίτην M^s P¹ Π² Bekk.¹, ὀπλίην Lamb. Schn. Cor. Göttl. Bekk.² 14. δημοτικὴ] δημοκρατικὴ L^s Ald. Bekk. 16. χεῖρω Π² Bekk.¹: χείρον M^s P¹ Bekk.² Sus. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *deterius*). 19. δῆμοι Π Bekk. Sus.: δημοτικοὶ Γ (Vet. Int. *populares*). 20. The MSS. of Vet. Int. add *et* before the equivalent for πρὸς ἱππικὴν, but z omits this *et*. ἱππικὴν καὶ ὀπλιτικὴν Γ P²³ Bekk. Sus. (Vet. Int. *equestrem et armativam*): ἱππικὸν καὶ ὀπλιτικὸν M^s P¹: καὶ ὀπλιτικὴν is omitted in P⁴ L^s. 22. ἐφ' αὐτούς P²³ R^b Ald. Bekk.: ἐφ' αὐτοῖς P¹, ἐπ' αὐτοῖς M^s, ἐφ' αὐτοῖς P⁴: αὐτοῖς Γ (Vet. Int. *sibi ipsis*): ἐφ' αὐτοῦς Sus. Cp. ἐπὶ τοὺς πολίτας in 3. 14. 1285 a 28. 26. τὴν μετάδοσιν] Vet. Int. *appositionem* (πρόσθεσιν Γ?). He does not elsewhere render μετάδοσις thus. In Rhet. 3. 2. 1405 b 3 William of Moerbeke renders πρόσθεσις by *appositio*. 30. Μασσαλίᾳ] μασαλία M^s P¹ and perhaps Γ (*masalia* b g m n, *masilia* k). See critical note on 1305 b 4. For the various emendations of the words τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι which have been proposed see Sus.^{3a}. I have myself been sometimes tempted to substitute τιμήματι for πολιτεύματι (for τῶν ἐν τῷ τιμήματι cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 19), but I do not believe that any change in the text is called for. 31. τῆς πόλεως is added after ἔξωθεν in Γ M^s. 33. προσκείσθαι] Vet. Int. *appone*, but he probably found προσκείσθαι in Γ, for he often renders the passive by the active voice, and in 1297 a 17, 26 ἐπικείσθαι is rendered *imponi*. 35. εἰσιόντας] Vet. Int. *immittentes* (εἰσιόντας Γ or εἰσιόντας misread as εἰσιόντας?). 37. κοσμουμένην] z has *ornatam* rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. *armatam*. 40. τῆς δαπάνης] Vet. Int. *expensarum*, but see critical notes on 1287 a 27 and 1307 b 32-34.

1321 b 16. ἀλλήλων] z has *invicem* probably rightly; the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *ad invicem*. The equivalent for ἀλλήλων in Vet. Int. is usually *invicem* or *ab invicem*, not *ad invicem*. ὑπογνώτατον R^b Bekk.: ὑπογνώτατον M^s P¹ Sus.: ὑπογνώτατον P²³⁴ Q^b Ald.: the reading of Γ is uncertain. The form ὑπόγνιος occurs in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric (see Bon. Ind. s.v.): the Index Aristotelicus gives one reference for ὑπόγνος to the

genuine writings of Aristotle (De Gen. An. 3. 7. 757 a 28, where however Z has ὑποξ . . . οἰς). 26. λιμένων Π² Ar. Bekk.: λιμένος Π¹ Sus. In 1322 b 33 all MSS. have λιμένας, not λιμένα. 28. καὶ [τὰ] περὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ ἄστεος] Vet. Int. *et de eo quod extra oppidum*: hence it is likely that the first τὰ was omitted in Γ; it is omitted by Bekk.² and bracketed by Sus. In place of the second τὰ M^a has τοῦ and Γ also apparently. 35. τὰς is added before ἐκ by Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (Aristoteles und Athen, 1. 235, note), but see explanatory note on 1334 b 12. We might compare 2. 8. 1268 a 1, τὰς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐ διὰ ψηφοφορίας ᾤετο γίνεσθαι δεῖν, if it were clear that ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις should here be taken closely with τὰς κρίσεις. 38. ἔστι δὲ Γ Π Ar. Bekk.: ἔστι δ' (οὗ) Thurot, Sus.

1322 a 9. ἄλλους P² etc. Bekk. Sus.: ἄλλας P¹ Ald., ἄλας M^a. Γ may have had ἄλλας, for Vet. Int. has *propter quod melius non inquit esse hunc principatum, sed alios ex aliis praetoriis*, where *alios* may agree with *principatus* understood. 11. For the third τὰς Sus.², following Niemeyer, reads τὰ, and also for τὰς in τὰς τῶν ἐπιστάτων, 12, and in τὰς παρὰ and τὰς δὲ in 14, in all which passages Γ Π Bekk. have τὰς. See explanatory note on 1322 a 8. 12. ἔνων Scaliger, Sus.: νέων Γ Π Bekk. 14. τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀγορανόμων] παρὰ om. Π¹ (Vet. Int. *eos qui agoranomon*), but not Bekk. or Sus. 18. See explanatory note on 1322 a 16. 20. οἷον Ἀθήνησιν (ἡ) τῶν ἑνδεκα καλουμένων is bracketed by Sus., and he may well be right (see explanatory note and cp. 1300 b 28). Coray, followed by Bekk.² and Sus., is probably right in adding ἡ. 25. Γ adds ἄλλων before μᾶλλον (Vet. Int. *custodia aliorum magis*) and M^a has ἄλλων in place of μᾶλλον. 26. πρὸς αὐτοῖς] Vet. Int. *apud ipsos*, but Sus.¹ is mistaken in inferring from this that he found παρ' αὐτοῖς in Γ, for in 1331 b 10 *apud forum* represents πρὸς ἀγορᾶ (see critical note on 1329 b 18). 27. τὴν αὐτὴν Π Bekk. Sus.: Vet. Int. *eosdem* (if we follow a b z: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. have *eodem*), with which however it is possible that *principatus* should be supplied; in that case *eosdem* would represent τὰς αὐτάς. 33. ἄν Π¹ Sus.: om. Π² Bekk.¹: Bekk.² adds ἄν before εἰεν.

1322 b 2. ἐκάστων P¹ Π² Bekk.: ἑκάστον Γ M^a Sus. καθίστανται ἀρχαί Π¹ Bekk. Sus. (except that P¹ has ἀρχαὶ and pr. M^a ἀρχαῖς): καθίσταται ἀρχή Π². 9. προσευθύνουσαν Bekk. and many editors before him: προσευθύνουσαν Π Sus. (except that M^a has προσειθύνουσαν). Vet. Int. has *sumentem rationem et emendantem* for τὴν

ληφoμένη λογισμὸν καὶ προσευθυνοῦσαν (οἱ προσευθύνουσιν). 14. εἰσφορὰν Π² Bekk. Sus.: ἐφορεῖαν Π¹. ἡ Μ² Bekk.² Sus., ἡ Ρ¹²³⁴ etc. Bekk.¹, ἡ Γ (Vet. Int. *qua*). 16. καλεῖται] καλοῦνται Ρ¹ and perhaps Γ (for α ζ have *vocantur*). 18. σχεδὸν om. Γ Μ² pr. Ρ¹ (supplied in Ρ¹ in the ink of the MS.). 32. The second περὶ is omitted in Π¹ and bracketed by Sus. See critical note on 1331 b 24. 34. τὰ before περὶ is bracketed by Schneider and Sus. and expunged by Bekk.², but cp. 1317 a 6. συναλλαγμάτων Π¹ Bekk. Sus.: συναλλάγματα Π². 35. ἐπιλογισμούς] Vet. Int. *circa rationationes* (περὶ λογισμούς Γ?). 36. πρὸς εὐθύνας Μ² Ρ¹ Π² Bekk.: προσευθύνας Sylburg, Göttling, Sus., and perhaps Γ (Vet. Int. *et correctiones*). 37. ἰδία Π¹ Sus.: ἰδία Π² Ar.: ἰδίᾳ Bekk. 1323 a 2. συμβαίνει Π² Bekk. Sus. and probably Γ (Vet. Int. *accidit*): συμβαίνει Μ² Ρ¹. 3. γίνεσθαι Μ² Ρ¹²³ Bekk. Sus.: γενέσθαι Π²: Vet. Int. *feri* may stand for either. 7. καθ' is bracketed by Schn. Göttl. Bekk.², following Heinsius, whose phrase is, 'cum tres in civitatibus plerisque eligantur magistratus, qui sunt omnium supremi' (Politica, p. 758). It is omitted by Coray. 10. I follow Conring and Sus. in placing the mark of a lacuna after πασῶν.

NOTES.

BOOK VI (IV).

10. 'Εν ἀπάσαις ταῖς τέχναις κ.τ.λ. As to the absence of C. 1. a connecting particle see note on 1274 b 26. I am not aware ^{1288 b.} of any other passage in which Aristotle sets forth with equal fulness the manifold problems to which any art or science that lays claim to completeness must address itself, but we are more or less prepared for his teaching on this subject by Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 b 10 sqq., Top. 1. 3. 101 b 5 sqq., and Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1101 a 3 sqq. See vol. ii. p. 397 sqq. In ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις Aristotle must be speaking of ποιητικαὶ and πρακτικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι, not of θεωρητικαὶ ἐπιστήμαι, for the latter are not concerned with τὸ ἀρμόττον. For ταῖς τέχναις καὶ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 34-36, 3. 12. 1282 b 14, and 4 (7). 13. 1331 b 37. 'Επιστήμη is interchanged with τέχνη in 1288 b 21, 22 : cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 34-38, where ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη is said to be one of the τέχναις καὶ δυνάμεις. As to the various problems to which Political Science is here required to address itself, see vol. i. p. 488. They are as follows—it must seek to ascertain

1. τὸ περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἀρμόττον in its two forms,
 - A. the constitution which suits those who possess the best natural gifts and the best equipment, i.e. ἡ ἀρίστη πολιτεία,
 - B. that which suits those who are less well circumstanced (ἢ ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστη οἱ ἡ ἐνδεχομένη ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων),
2. how any given constitution (ἢ δοθεῖσα or ἡ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως πολιτεία) is to be brought into being and kept in existence as long as possible,
3. ἡ μάλιστα πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀρμόττουσα πολιτεία, or ἡ ῥάων καὶ κοινοτέρα ἀπάσαις,
4. what are οἱ ἀριστοὶ νόμοι and οἱ ἐκάστη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἀρμόττοντες.

See Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 707. 3 (Aristotle and the Earlier Peripa-

tetics, Eng. Trans., 2. 235. 3), and Sus.³, Note 1116. Aristotle's enumeration of the various problems with which Political Science has to deal prepares the way for a descent in the last three Books of the Politics to less exalted questions than those with which he has so far been dealing. It was something new to say that the inquiry how democracy or oligarchy or tyranny should be constituted so as to last holds as legitimate a place among the inquiries of Political Science as the inquiry respecting the best or the best attainable constitution.

ταῖς μὴ κατὰ μόριον γινομέναις, 'which do not come into being in a fragmentary shape': cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 21, καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμῳ δὲ μετέβαλεν ἡ πολιτεία κατὰ μόριον (Sus. 'theilweise'), and 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 28, μίτε πρὸς πολιτείαν τὴν κατ' εὐχὴν γυνομένην. That Political Science was often studied in a fragmentary way we know from Plato, Laws 630 E, quoted in vol. i. p. 375, note 1. For the contrast of κατὰ μόριον and τέλειος, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 3. 1174 a 24 sqq.

11. γένος ἐν τι, 'one whole class of subject-matter': cp. Plato, Laws 916 D, κυβηλείαν δὲ χρὴ πάντα ἄνδρα διανοηθῆναι καὶ ψεύδος καὶ ἀπάτην ὡς ἐν τι γένος ὄν.

12. μιᾶς (sc. τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης), 'one and the same art and science': cp. 22, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης.

ἕκαστον γένος, 'each description of thing,' whether it be κάλλιστα πεφυκὸς καὶ κεχορηγημένον or otherwise.

17. ἰκνουμένης = προσηκούσης (Bon. Ind. s.v.).

18. According to Bon. Ind. 8 a 16, where Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1114 a 8 and Probl. 30. 11. 956 b 16 are compared, ἀγωνία is here 'idem quod ἀγών.'

18. τμηδὲν . . . 19. δύναμιν†. This sentence appears to be corrupt or mutilated. See critical note.

τοῦ παιδοτρίβου καὶ τοῦ γυμναστικοῦ. The γυμναστικός imparts the correct εἶς of body and the παιδοτρίβης skill and science in the performance of athletic feats (5 (8). 3. 1338 b 6 sqq.). See note on 1338 b 7. For τοῦ γυμναστικοῦ, 'the master of gymnastic science,' cp. Plato, Polit. 295 C, Gorg. 464 A, and Protag. 313 D.

19. καὶ ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν, 'this inferior degree of capability also' (i.e. this inferior grade of bodily constitution and science).'

20. There is a roughness about ἐσθῆτα (i.e. ἐσθῆτος ποίησις, Bon. Ind. 289 a 15) which is not without occasional parallels in the style of the Politics (see note on 1258 b 19). We expect ὕφαντήν (cp. 4

(7). 4. 1325 b 41, *ὑφάντη καὶ ναυπηγῶ*), but *ἐσθῆτα* is more definite, because other things are woven besides clothes, and then again the difference between one quality of clothes and another may not be in the weaving but in the dyeing or something else. The word *ἱματιουργική* is used by Plato in *Polit.* 280 A and would have suited Aristotle's purpose here, but this word seems either to have been invented by Plato on this occasion or at any rate to have been rarely used. No general word for 'clothes-making' is given by Pollux in 7. 33 sq., 159. The non-repetition of *περί* before *ἐσθῆτα* links the making of ships and garments together as to a certain extent cognate: cp. c. 14. 1298 a 4 sqq. and 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 7—10.

23. *τίς ἐστι, καὶ ποία τις ἂν οὔσα κ.τ.λ.* The answer to *τίς* comes in a definition of the best constitution, the answer to *ποία τις* in a full description of it (see note on 1274 b 32).

24. *τίς τίσιν ἀρμόττουσα.* Cp. *Rhet.* 1. 4. 1360 a 30 sqq.

25. *τὴν κρατίστην τε ἀπλῶς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην.* For the combination of *κρατίστην* and *ἀρίστην* here Bonitz (*Ind.* 408 b 21 sqq.) compares *Eth. Eud.* 1. 3. 1215 a 4 sq.

26. *τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην*, 'the best that the assumed circumstances allow' (cp. 32, *τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων*). The phrase *ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων* does not seem to occur elsewhere in the *Politics*.

27. *τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικόν.* See note on 1274 b 36 and cp. c. 14. 1297 b 38, *τὸν σπουδαῖον νομοθέτην*, and *Eth. Nic.* 1. 13. 1102 a 8, *ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικός*: also *Eth. Eud.* 1. 5. 1216 a 23, *ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς τυγχάνουσι τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γὰρ εἰσι πολιτικοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν*, and Plato, *Rep.* 564 C, *τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἱατρὸν τε καὶ νομοθέτην πόλεως*, and 489 C, where *οἱ οὐκ ἀληθῶς κυβερνήται* are contrasted with *οἱ νῦν πολιτικοὶ ἄρχοντες*.

28. *ἐτι δὲ τρίτην τὴν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*, sc. *πολιτείαν θεωρῆσαι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης*, 'and still further it is the business of the same science to study as a third constitution that which is based on something given and presupposed'—for instance, it may be given and presupposed that the constitution to be studied is not to be either the best or the best attainable, but inferior to both (30 sqq.). So when the gymnastic trainer is asked to produce an *ἐξίς* falling short of *ἡ ἱκανομένη ἐξίς*, he is asked to produce an *ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐξίς* (16 sqq.). In c. 11. 1296 b 9 sqq., as Sus.³ (Note 1306) points out, *πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν* is used in a different sense. Contrast the tone of [Plato,] *Epist.* 7. 330 E, *τοῖς δ' ἔξω τὸ παράπαν βαίνουσιν τῆς*

ὀρθῆς πολιτείας καὶ μηδαμῇ ἐθέλουσιν αὐτῆς εἰς ἔχνος εἶναι, προαγορεύουσι δὲ τῇ ξυμβούλῃ τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν εἶναι καὶ μὴ κινεῖν, ὥς ἀποθανουμένη εἶναι κινῇ, ταῖς δὲ βουλῇσεσι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτῶν ὑπηρετοῦντα ξυμβουλευεῖν κελεύουσιν, τίνα τρόπον γίγνοιτ' ἂν ῥῆστά τε καὶ τάχιστα εἰς τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον, τὸν μὲν ὑπομένοντα ξυμβουλὰς τοιαύτας ἡγοίμην ἂν ἀνδρῶν, τὸν δ' οὐχ ὑπομένοντα ἀνδρά: cp. Plato, Laws 684 B sq.

29. ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε πῶς ἂν γένοιτο. This question has been raised as to the best constitution in 3. 18. 1288 b 2 sqq., and we are told in 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 30 sqq. how the polity comes into being, and in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 7 sqq. how kingship and tyranny come into being, but the question most often raised by Aristotle as to constitutions is rather πῶς δεῖ καθιστάναι οἱ κατασκευάζειν (see for instance 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 40, 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 14 sqq., 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 38 sqq., and 8 (6). 7. 1321 b 1 sqq.). The reason why this latter question is raised more often than the former probably is that the really important and difficult thing is not to bring a constitution into being, but to frame it so as to last (8 (6). 5. 1319 b 33 sqq.).

30. λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ. The structure of this sentence deserves study. Μῆτε, 31, is clearly answered by μῆτε, 32, but what is the place of ἀχορήγητόν τε εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων in the sentence? Does τε answer to μῆτε, 31, in the way in which τε often answers to μῆτε (i.e. in the sense of 'not only not—but': cp. 2. 10. 1272 b 19 sqq. and 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 35 sqq.)? It is possible, but I have not noticed a parallel in Aristotle's writings or elsewhere to this sequence of μῆτε—τε—μῆτε, and it seems better to regard ἀχορήγητόν τε εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων as a parenthetical addition to μῆτε τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτεύεσθαι πολιτείαν, and not as taking up μῆτε, 31. Richards, regarding it thus, would read δὲ in place of τε.

31. τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτεύεσθαι πολιτείαν. Cp. 2. 5. 1262 b 38 sq. and Plut. Phocion, c. 27, πολιτενομένους δὲ τὴν πάτριον ἀπὸ τιμημάτων πολιτείαν.

32. ἀχορήγητόν τε εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, 'and indeed to be unprovided even with the things that are necessary to it,' much more with those that are merely desirable and expedient with a view to it. For ἀχορήγητόν καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 33, τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαιδαγώγους, and see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 421. 4. Anm. 5, 6 (ed. Gerth, § 421. Anm. 5-7).

35. ὥς οἱ πλείστοι κ.τ.λ. That Political Science should make τὸ χρήσιμον its aim as well as τὸ ὀρθῶς ἔχον, we have already been told (see notes on 1253 b 14 and 1260 b 32). For ὥς, 'since,' cp.

1289 a 3. The Index Aristotelicus does not appear to notice this use of *ὥς* with the indicative.

38. καὶ εἰ by no means implies that the fact is so.

38. τὴν δυνατὴν, i.e. τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, 32, and τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην, 26.

τὴν ῥᾶν καὶ κοινοτέραν ἀπάσαις, 'that which is easier and more attainable by all States.' Supply ταῖς πόλεσιν. For other instances of the omission of the word πόλις see notes on 1266 b 1 and 1293 b 12.

38. δεομένην πολλῆς χορηγίας. Cp. 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 37 sq. and 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 27 sqq.

41. τὰς ὑπαρχούσας ἀναιρῶντες πολιτείας, 'abolishing the existing constitutions.' Aristotle no doubt refers to Plato among others: cp. Rep. 501 A, where Plato commends the lawgiver who makes the tablet a clean surface before he writes his laws upon it, and Rep. 540 E sq., and compare what Plutarch says of Lyscurgus in Lysurg. c. 5.

1. τινα ἄλλην, such as the State sketched by Plato in the Laws: 1289 a. cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 2 sqq., where it is implied that this State is allowed by Plato to approach that of the Republic too nearly to be practicable.

χρὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but a lawgiver should introduce a constitution of such a kind that those for whom he legislates will easily, starting from their existing constitutions, be induced and be able to live under it.' Aristotle apparently regards the constitution which he has described in 1288 b 38 as τὴν ῥᾶν καὶ κοινοτέραν ἀπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν as answering to this description, and looks upon its discovery as one way among others of amending (ἐπανορθῶσαι, 3) a constitution. See note on 6. He probably has before him a saying of Solon (Plut. Solon, c. 15), ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν ἀριστον ἦν, οὐκ ἐπέγαγεν ἱατροίαν οὐδὲ καινοτομίαν, φοβηθεὶς μὴ συγχέας παντάπασιν καὶ παρῆξας τὴν πόλιν ἀσθενέστερος γίνεσθαι τοῦ καταστήσασαι πάλιν καὶ συναρμόσασθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀριστον· ἃ δὲ καὶ λέγων ἤλπιζε πειθόμενοις καὶ προσάγων ἀνάγκην ὑπομένουσι χρῆσασθαι, ταῦτ' ἐπραττεν, ὥς φησιν αὐτός,

ὁμοῦ βίην τε καὶ δίκην συναρμόσας.

Ὅθεν ὕστερον ἐρωτηθεὶς, εἰ τοὺς ἀρίστους Ἀθηναίους νόμους ἔγραψεν, "ὦ ὦ," ἔφη, "προσεδέξαντο τοὺς ἀρίστους": cp. also Dio Chrys. Or. 80 (2. 437 R), Σόλων αὐτὸν εἰρηκεῖν φασὶν ὥς αὐτῷ μὴ ἐφείσσωτα εἰσπηγεῖτο Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' οἷς αὐτοὺς ὑπελάμβανε χρῆσεσθαι, Isocr. Areop. § 57, and Plato, Polit. 296 A and Laws 684 B sq.,

where Plato disagrees with the common view that lawgivers ought to impose such laws as the mass of the people will be ready to receive. 'Ἦν (sc. τάξιν) κοινωνεῖν I take to be a construction with a cogn. acc., τάξιν standing for κοινωνίαν: for κοινωνεῖν κοινωνίαν cp. Plato, Laws 881 E. I prefer this interpretation of the passage to taking ἦν (τάξιν) as equivalent to καθ' ἣν τάξιν and comparing 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 13, νεμεῖσθαι δὲ χρή τὴν εἰρημένην τάξιν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν χώραν.

2. καὶ πεισθήσονται καὶ δυνήσονται. We expect rather καὶ δυνήσονται καὶ πεισθήσονται (cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 2, ὁ δυνάμενος καὶ προαιρούμενος), but see note on 1264 b 18.

3. ὥς ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. Solon had been appointed διορθωτῆς καὶ νομοθέτης τῆς πολιτείας (Plut. Solon, c. 16 *sub fin.*), and the greatness of his task was well known. Burke in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (Works, ed. Bohn, 2. 439) speaks to much the same effect as Aristotle does here. 'At once to preserve and to reform is quite another thing' (i.e. calls for much ability). 'When the useful parts of an old establishment are kept, and what is super-added is to be fitted to what is retained, a vigorous mind, steady, persevering attention, various powers of comparison and combination, and the resources of an understanding fruitful in expedients, are to be exercised.'

τὸ ἐπανορθῶσαι πολιτείαν ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς. For the contrast cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 33 sqq., and for the omission of τό before κατασκευάζειν cp. Xen. Oecon. 9. 19, and see note on 1263 a 15. The difference of tense in ἐπανορθῶσαι and κατασκευάζειν should be noticed (see note on 1331 b 21). For ἐπανορθῶσαι πολιτείαν cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 35, l. 12 sq., Isocr. Areop. § 15, ἡς (πολιτείας) ἡμεῖς διεφθαρμένης οὐδὲν φροντίζομεν, οὐδὲ σκοποῦμεν ὅπως ἐπανορθώσομεν αὐτήν, and Strabo, p. 398, where we read of Demetrius Phalereus that he οὐ μόνον οὐ κατέλυσε τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπηνόρθωσε.

5. πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις, i.e. in addition to studying the best constitution and a constitution like the Lacedaemonian, more attainable than the best, but still involving for its realization the abolition of the existing constitution.

6. ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις πολιτείαις βοηθεῖν probably includes not only the discovery of a constitution the realization of which will not involve the sacrifice of the existing constitution, and in particular the discovery of τὴν ῥάῳ καὶ κοινοτέραν ἀπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσι, but also τὸ ἐπανορθῶσαι πολιτείαν in general, and perhaps in addition the

study of the question how any given constitution may be so instituted as to last as long as possible. The inquiry in 8 (6). 4-7 as to the way in which the different kinds of democracy and oligarchy should be framed so as to last illustrates the meaning of the expression. There was a proverb τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν: see Stallbaum on Plato, Gorg. 499 C, and Meineke on Cratin. Πυλαία, Fragm. 3 (Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 113),

ἄνδρας σοφοὺς χρὴ τὸ παρὸν πρᾶγμα καλῶς εἰς δύναμιν τίθεσθαι.

Cp. also Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1100 b 35 sqq. and 10. 10. 1180 b 25 sqq.

7. πρότερον, in 1288 b 28-39.

τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον κ.τ.λ., 'and this it is impossible to do, if one is ignorant how many kinds there are of a constitution' (for the sing. πολιτείας cp. c. 4. 1290 b 25, ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ζῆφου προηρούμεθα λαβεῖν εἶδη). If we supply ποιεῖν, the case of ἀγνοοῦντα is explained. Compare (with Büchschütz, Studien zu Aristoteles' Politik, p. 5, note) Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 17 sqq. In amending democracies and oligarchies it is necessary to distinguish between the different kinds of these constitutions and to deal with each kind in a different way, so that those who recognize only one kind of democracy and one of oligarchy cannot amend these constitutions aright.

9. τινες here, as sometimes elsewhere (e.g. in 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 39), refers to Plato: cp. 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 25 sqq.

οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθές. For the use in reference to Plato of this blunt expression cp. 1. 1. 1252 a 16, where see note.

10. τὰς διαφορὰς τὰς τῶν πολιτειῶν I take to mean 'the varieties of each constitution,' cp. 20 sqq. and c. 2. 1289 b 12 sqq. Sus., however, appears to understand the words otherwise, translating 'die sämtlichen Unterschiede unter den Verfassungen,' and Welldon also translates 'all the shades of difference between the various polities.'

11. συντίθενται ποσαχῶς, sc. αἱ τῶν πολιτειῶν διαφοραί, 'in how many ways the varieties of each constitution are compounded.' This is explained by 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 29, τὰ γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ἀκολουθοῦντα καὶ δοκοῦντα εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας οἰκεία ταύτης ποιεῖ συντιθέμενα τὰς δημοκρατίας ἑτέρας τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἐλάττω, τῇ δ' ἀκολουθήσει πλείονα, τῇ δ' ἅπαντα ταῦτα: cp. 1317 a 20 sqq.

μετὰ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ταύτης κ.τ.λ., 'and with the help of this same kind of scientific insight the man of political science should discover the best laws,' etc. In 1288 b 22 we have τῆς

αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης. For φρόνησις used as here in much the same sense as γνώσις or ἐπιστήμη, cp. *Metaph. M.* 4. 1078 b 15, εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη τῶς ἴσται καὶ φρόνησις, *Metaph. A.* 2. 982 b 24, ἡ τοιαύτη φρόνησις ἤρξατο ζητεῖσθαι, and other passages collected in *Bon. Ind.* 831 b 4 sqq. I have followed the text of the MSS., but there is some strangeness about μετὰ τῆς αὐτῆς φρονήσεως. Has ταῦτα fallen out after δέ (cp. c. 2. 1289 b 20, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα)? Since the above was written, I see that my suggestion has been anticipated by an annotator on the margin of the copy of Morel's edition of the *Politics* used by Stahr (see Stahr and Sus.¹).

13. πρὸς γὰρ τὰς πολιτείας κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 11. 1282 b 10, and see explanatory note on 1282 b 8. For τίθεσθαι (not τιθεῖναι), see note on 1283 b 38. We should have been glad if Aristotle had illustrated this remark and shown us by instances how laws vary to suit constitutions. Of course the laws in which the constitution is embodied will vary, and such laws as that prohibiting a repeated tenure of offices would be especially found in democracies, but other laws also would vary—for instance, laws as to inheritance (see note on 1309 a 23) and as to the disposal of orphan heiresses in marriage (note on 1270 a 21). Oligarchies tended to allow full freedom in these matters (cp. *Plato, Rep.* 552 A sq., 555 C: 'Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 35, l. 14 sqq.) and to ignore the claims of relatives (cp. *Pol.* 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 23 sqq.).

15. πολιτεία μὲν γάρ κ.τ.λ. This gives the reason why the laws must be adjusted to the constitution and not the constitution to the laws. The constitution embodies the end, the laws the rules to be followed by the magistrates and others with a view to that end. The sharp distinction here drawn between the constitution and the laws (cp. c. 14. 1298a 17, συνιέναι δὲ μόνον περὶ τε νόμων θέσεως καὶ τῶν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας) is not, however, always maintained; thus in c. 5. 1292 b 15, τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους πολιτείαν, it seems to be implied that the constitution is embodied in laws: on the other hand in *Eth. Nic.* 10. 10. 1181 b 12 sqq. we have τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας . . . καὶ ὅλως δὲ περὶ πολιτείας, as if τὸ περὶ νομοθεσίας was a part of τὸ περὶ πολιτείας, and not the latter a part of the former. So in *Laws* 735 A Plato had brought under the common head of πολιτείας the two things distinguished by Aristotle in the passage before us, for he there says, ἵστων γὰρ δὴ δύο πολιτείας εἶδη, τὸ μὲν ἀρχῶν καταστάσεις ἐκάστοις, τὸ δὲ νόμοι ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀποδοθέντες. Yet he seems to distinguish between πολιτεία and νομοθεσία in *Laws* 678 A. The distinction

between *πολιτεία* and *νόμοι* passed to Cicero, who marks off the 'optimus rei publicae status' from 'leges' (De Leg. i. 5. 15), and has been inherited by ourselves. With the account here given of the nature of a constitution cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq., where τὸ κύριον τῆς πόλεως is identified with τὸ πολίτευμα, and see vol. i. p. 243, note 1. That each form of constitution assigns a different end to the State, we see from such passages as 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 9 sq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 1 (cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 10 sq. and 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 37-b 2). See also Rhet. i. 8. 1366 a 2-6. Then again the normal constitutions aim at the common good and the deviation-forms do not.

16. *νεύμηνται*. For the perfect see notes on 1280 a 16 and 1282 b 24.

19. *φυλάττειν τοὺς παραβαίνοντας αὐτοὺς*, 'watch and check those who transgress them', for *φυλάττειν* probably here means something more than 'to watch': see Bon. Ind. s.v. and cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 40.

20. *τὰς διαφορὰς*, 'the varieties': see above on 10.

21. *τὸν ἀριθμὸν*, sc. *τῶν διαφορῶν*. Cp. c. 4. 1290 b 32.

24. *εἴπερ δὴ* according to Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 48, does not occur elsewhere in Aristotle's writings. As P³ C⁴ Π³ and pr. P³ have *πλείω* in place of *πλείους*, Stahr, followed by Eucken, proposes to read *εἴδη* in place of *δὴ* (cp., with Eucken, c. 2. 1289 b 13). *Ἐπερ δὴ* occurs, however, as Eucken points out, in Theophr. Hist. Plant. 6. 6. 3, and *πλείους* is supported by c. 11. 1296 b 4, *ἐπειδὴ πλείους δημοκρατίας καὶ πλείους ὀλιγαρχίας φασὶν εἶναι*.

26. *Ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* After the statements of c. 1 we expect to be c. 2. told in c. 2 that, the best constitution having already been dealt with, it remains to deal with the other questions marked out for consideration in c. 1, but in place of this we are unexpectedly carried back to the list of constitutions given in 3. 7 and are informed that two of these constitutions have now been dealt with, and that it remains to deal with the rest. An attempt is, in fact, made in c. 2 to represent the Sixth (old Fourth) Book of the Politics as taking up the programme set forth in 3. 7 *init.* in addition to that of the first chapter of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book. See vol. i. p. 489.

Ὡς τῇ πρώτῃ μεθόδῳ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν. This term does not include the First Book (cp. 1. 13. 1260 b 12), but it probably includes the Second, and certainly the Third, possibly also the Fourth (old Seventh) and Fifth (old Eighth). See vol. ii. p. xx sqq. Aristotle evidently regards the investigation on which he is entering

as a *δευτέρα μέθοδος* *περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν*, probably because he is about to deal with an inferior group of constitutions to that with which he has hitherto been dealing, for though polity is a normal constitution, it is inferior to kingship and aristocracy.

30. καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατίας κ.τ.λ. That the study of the best constitution is in fact equivalent to the study of kingship and aristocracy is implied in the closing chapter of the Third Book, where we are told that, if we wish to bring a kingship or an aristocracy into existence, we must ask what education and habits will produce citizens of the best State, or in other words good men. As it is implied here that the best constitution has been already dealt with, some inquiry on the subject must have intervened, or, if it was still unwritten, must have been intended to intervene, between the end of the Third Book and the beginning of the Sixth (old Fourth), but that this inquiry is that contained in our Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books we are not in a position to prove. It has already been pointed out (vol. i. p. 295) that while in the last chapter of the Third Book kingship and aristocracy are classed together as the best of constitutions, true kingship is dismissed as no longer practicable in our Fourth Book (4 (7). 14. 1332 b 16 sqq.). It seems strange that Aristotle should treat an inquiry respecting the best constitution as equivalent to a discussion of kingship and aristocracy, when he has in that inquiry dismissed kingship as impracticable. This inconsistency may be accounted for either by supposing that after writing the Third Book Aristotle passed on at once to the composition of the Sixth (old Fourth) Book, and that the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books had not yet been written when the passage before us was penned, or by supposing that the Fourth and Fifth Books are a second edition of the original inquiry on the subject of the best constitution, and that the reference in the passage before us escaped revision after the substitution of the second edition for the original inquiry. See on this subject vol. ii. p. xxv sq. and p. xxxi, note 2. I do not feel sure that Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (*Aristoteles und Athen*, i. 356) and Sus.⁴ (i. 660, 662) are right in holding that the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books were written before the Sixth (old Fourth). The remark in 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 14, *ἄρχοντος δ' ἐπίταξις καὶ κρίσις ἔργον*, may be a reminiscence of 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 25 sqq., and that in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 2-5 a reminiscence of 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 24 sqq.

Compare also 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 25 sqq. with 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 2 sqq., 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 29 sqq. with 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 3 sqq., and 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 37 sqq. with 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 3 sqq., though it is impossible to say whether the passages in the one Book were written earlier than those in the other. It is true, however, that we are reminded of 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 40 sqq. when we are told in the passage before us that the best constitution is based on fully equipped virtue. That aristocracy and kingship are based on virtue is implied in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 31 sqq.: cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sqq.

32. *περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν τῶν ὀνομάτων.* Cp. Isocr. De Antid. § 270, *περὶ δὲ σοφίας καὶ φιλοσοφίας τοῖς μὲν περὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ἀγνοομένοις οὐκ ἂν ἀρμόσκει λέγειν περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων*, i.e. about the things called by these names.

33. *κατ' ἀρετὴν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην*, 'to be constituted on the basis of virtue furnished with external means' (Weldon), just as the best constitution is. Cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 9, *ὅταν ἢ κατ' ἰσότητα τῶν πολιτῶν συνεστηκῆναι καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα*, and 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 19 sq. We do not hear of *πολιτεῖαι συνεστηκῆναι κατὰ πλοῦτον* or *κατ' ἐλευθερίαν*, though oligarchy and democracy might conceivably be thus described. Not all forms of aristocracy can be said to be 'constituted on the basis of virtue furnished with external means'—this can hardly be said, for instance, of those aristocracies which combine only democracy and oligarchy and differ from polities solely in inclining to oligarchy more than polities do: see c. 7. 1293 b 20 sq. and 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 10 sqq.—but aristocracy at its best aims at being thus constituted.

ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων ἀριστοκρατία καὶ βασιλεία. This has been explained in 3. 7. 1279 a 33 sqq., 3. 15. 1286 b 3 sqq., and 3. 16. 1287 b 35—17. 1288 a 15.

34. *καὶ πότε δεῖ βασιλείαν νομίζειν.* This has been explained in 3. 17. 1288 a 15 sqq. For *νομίζειν*, 'to adopt,' cp. 3. 1. 1275 b 7, *οὐδ' ἐκκλησίαν νομίζουσιν*.

38. *φανερὸν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* *Μὲν οὖν* appears to be answered by *ἀλλά* in 1289 b 11. Aristotle's remark is suggested by his identification of aristocracy and kingship with the best constitution, which implies that they are the best of the normal constitutions (cp. 3. 18. 1288 a 32 sqq.); hence the *καί* in *καὶ τούτων τῶν παρεκβάσεων* ('of these deviation-forms also'). Another reason for the remark is that the better a constitution is, the better is its claim

to priority of consideration (c. 8. 1293 b 27 sqq.), and the fewer precautions are needed for its preservation (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 30 sqq.). Thus the question which is the worst of the deviation-forms, and which is the worst but one and so forth, has a bearing on the task which lies before Aristotle. Besides, Plato had already considered it (Rep. 544 C: Polit. 302 B sqq.). Aristotle's solution of it seems to be that the worst deviation-form is that which deviates most from the normal constitution of which it is the deviation-form, and the least bad one that which deviates least. This is the case with democracy, as we are told in Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 19, *ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστιν ἡ δημοκρατία· ἐπὶ μικρῶν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος*.

39. *ἀνάγκη γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* Plato also had placed tyranny lowest in Rep. 544 C and 576 D, and Aristotle himself in Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 8 sqq. Cp. Plato, Rep. 491 D, and Shakespeare's lines (Ninety-Fourth Sonnet),

‘For sweetest things turn sourest by their deeds,
Lilies that fester smell far worse than weeds.’

Τυραννίς is said in 28 and in 3. 7. 1279 b 4 sq. to be the *παρέκβασις* of kingship, but here we learn that it is the *παρέκβασις* of the absolute form of kingship (cp. c. 10. 1295 a 17 sqq.). It is said in 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 5 sqq. to be ‘the most injurious of constitutions to the ruled’, and, if Aristotle sometimes groups the worst forms of democracy and oligarchy with it and calls them ‘divided tyrannies’ (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 17 sq.: 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 34 sqq.: 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 30 sqq.), he does not probably intend to say that they are as bad as tyranny (see note on 1292 a 17). *Καὶ θειοπάτης* is added after *τῆς πρώτης* to explain in what sense kingship is said to be the first of constitutions; it is the first in the sense in which what is divine is first (cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 11 sq.). Kingship is most divine, because the rule of Zeus is the rule of a king (1. 12. 1259 b 12 sqq.: 1. 2. 1252 b 24 sq.): cp. also Plut. Amat. c. 16. 759 D, *καθότι καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν δύο ταῦτα, βασιλείαν καὶ ἀρετήν, θειώτατα καὶ νομιζομεν καὶ ὀνομάζομεν*. A note on the passage before us written by Macaulay in his copy of the Politics runs, ‘I think narrow oligarchy on the whole the worst form of government in the world’ (*Macmillan's Magazine*, July, 1875, p. 221).

41. *τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν κ.τ.λ.*, i.e. but kingship must necessarily be the first and most divine of constitutions.

τοῦτομα μόνον ἔχειν οὐκ οὔσαν, like the kingship of a κληρωτὸς βασιλεύς (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 6).

1. ἡ διὰ πολλὴν ὑπεροχὴν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ βασιλεύοντος. Cp. 3. 13. 1289 b 1284 a 3 sqq., 3. 17. 1288 a 15 sqq., and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 10 sqq.

2. χειρίστην οὔσαν πλείστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας. As Thurot points out (Études sur Aristote, p. 56), we expect rather χειρίστην εἶναι πλείστον ἀπέχουσιν πολιτείας, but see Stallbaum on Plato, Laws 960 B.

πλείστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας, 'to be furthest removed from a constitution': cp. c. 8. 1293 b 27 sqq.

4. μετριοτάτην δέ, sc. εἶναι. See notes on 1279 b 7 and 1334 b 25.

5. ἥδη μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is answered by οὐ μὴν, 6, as in 2. 7. 1267 a 37 sqq., except that οὐ μὴν here introduces a participial clause. For ἥδη with the aorist see note on 1303 a 27.

τις τῶν πρότερον, Plato in Polit. 303 A sq.

6. οὐ μὴν εἰς ταῦτὸ βλέψας ἡμῖν, 'not however keeping in view the same thing as ourselves' (Vict. 'non tamen ad idem respiciens quod nos'). Plato took as his guide the principle that there is a good and a bad sort of oligarchy and democracy, Aristotle the principle that both oligarchy and democracy are perversions, and that there is no good sort of either. For βλέπειν εἰς or πρὸς, see Plato, Rep. 477 C—D, Laws 965 D, Cratyl. 389 A: Andoc. 3. 35: Isocr. De Pace § 142.

ἐκείνος μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for he [recognized a good and a bad form of each of these polities and] held,' etc. (Welldon). Cp. Plato, Polit. 303 A, διὰ γόγον (sc. ἡ τοῦ πλῆθους ἀρχή) πασῶν μὲν νομίμων τῶν πολιτειῶν οὐσῶν τούτων χειρίστη, παρανόμων δ' οὐσῶν ξυμπασῶν βελτίστη, καὶ ἀκολάστον μὲν πασῶν οὐσῶν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ζῆν, κοσμίῳ δ' οὐσῶν ἥμιστος ἐν ταύτῃ βιωτέον. Plato had not, however, called the good sort of oligarchy 'good oligarchy' but 'aristocracy' (Polit. 301 A).

9. ἡμεῖς δέ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 19 sq. and 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 35 sq.

ἐξηραρτημένους. The Index Aristotelicus gives no other reference for ἐξηραρτάνειν to the genuine writings of Aristotle.

11. ἦττον δὲ φαύλην. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 19 sqq. As Sussemlahl has already pointed out (Sus.², Note 1140), Aristotle does not always observe this rule; thus we find the epithets βελτίων and βελτίστη applied to varieties of democracy in c. 11. 1296 b 6 and 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 6.

ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. 'The judgement of which we have spoken' is the judgement in what order of demerit the deviation-forms stand. The subject does not seem to be farther considered in what we possess of the Politics, for in c. 11. 1296 b 3 sqq. the question raised relates to the order of merit in which the varieties of democracy and oligarchy stand.

12. ἡμῖν δὲ πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. As to this programme of the remaining inquiries of the Politics, see vol. i. p. 492 sqq., where we have seen that it does not fully harmonize with the contents of c. 1. The recapitulations in c. 13. 1297 b 28 sqq. and 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 10 sqq. should be compared with it. The first question suggested for examination—the question how many varieties of constitution there are—is one suggested for examination in c. 1. 1289 a 7–11, a passage which appears to be taken up in πόσαι διαφοραὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν here, though the words εἴπερ ἔστιν εἶδη πλείονα τῆς τε δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας seem to imply that the inquiry will be confined to varieties of democracy and oligarchy, a limitation for which we are not distinctly prepared in c. 1. 1289 a 7–11. Some sort of answer to the question how many varieties of constitution there are is obtainable from cc. 3 and 4 (see c. 3. 1290 a 11 sqq. and c. 4. 1290 b 34 sqq.), though in the recapitulation in c. 4. 1291 b 14 sq. the question which has been under consideration is said to have been the question whether there are more constitutions than one and why, not how many varieties of constitution there are (cp. c. 13. 1297 b 28 sqq.). It should be noticed that in εἴπερ ἔστιν εἶδη πλείονα τῆς τε δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας a fact is assumed the truth of which forms the subject of a separate inquiry in c. 4. 1291 b 15–30.

13. πλείονα (neut. plur.), not πλείω: cp. c. 4. 1290 b 8.

14. ἔπειτα κ.τ.λ. That ἡ κοινωτάτη πολιτεία and ἡ ἀρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν are not necessarily the same, we have learnt in 2. 6. 1265 b 29 sqq. Aristotle's language here leads us to expect to find in c. 11, where the topic now referred to is dealt with, a discussion both of the question what is the most generally attainable constitution and of the question what constitution is the most desirable after the best, but in fact he there asks what constitution is the best for most States and most men, and decides that it is ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων. Nothing is said in c. 11 of any constitution other than this which is at once 'aristocratic and well organized and suitable to most States.' The recapitulation in c. 13. 1297 b 32 sq. corresponds better with the actual contents of c. 11 than

does the preliminary announcement before us. Aristotle probably adds *κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλη κ.τ.λ.*, because he does not wish to exclude in advance the consideration of forms to which the superlatives *κραιστέα καὶ αἰρετωτάτα μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν* do not apply, but which are at once 'aristocratic' in the broader sense of the word and suitable to most States. Many aristocratic constitutions are not 'suitable to most States' (c. 11. 1295 a 31 sqq.).

17. *ἔπειτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τίς τίσιν αἰρετή*, 'next which among the other constitutions also' [i. e. other than those just referred to] 'is desirable for whom.' This question is dealt with in c. 12. 1296 b 13 sqq. As Sus.² points out (Note 1142), the addition of *καὶ* before *τῶν ἄλλων* prepares us to find the question *τίς τίσιν αἰρετή* considered with reference to other constitutions than democracy and oligarchy, and we do in fact find that it is considered with reference to the polity (c. 12. 1296 b 38 sqq.), though not with reference to the so-called aristocracy.

20. *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ.* This question is dealt with to some extent in 6 (4). 14—16, though not, as we should expect from the passage before us, exclusively with reference to the various kinds of democracy and oligarchy (see 6 (4). 14. 1297 b 35 sq.). The question is more fully dealt with, so far at least as the various kinds of democracy and oligarchy are concerned, in the Eighth (old Sixth) Book, cc. 1—7, and we are led in 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 36 sqq. and 1317 a 14 sq. to expect to learn in the Eighth Book how to construct the other constitutions also, but our expectation is disappointed. Thus promise and performance are at variance both in the Sixth (old Fourth) and in the Eighth (old Sixth) Book. There is, indeed, a further discrepancy between the intimation given in the passage before us and the sequel of the Sixth Book, for we find in c. 9. 1294 a 31 sq. (cp. 1294 b 40 sq.) an inquiry how the polity and the so-called aristocracies should be constructed, which is more than the passage before us leads us to expect.

22. *τέλος δὲ κ.τ.λ.* This question is dealt with in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book, which is often implied to be *περὶ τὰς φθορὰς καὶ τὰς σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν* (8 (6). 1. 1317 a 37 sq.: 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 37 sq.). The passage before us certainly leads us to expect that the old Fifth Book will be the last Book of the Politics, whereas the MSS. unanimously place the old Sixth Book after it. The insertion of the old Seventh and Eighth Books after the Third is justified by (among other things) indications in the MSS. at the close of the

Third that the old Seventh at one time followed immediately after it, but there are no similar indications in the MSS. to justify the insertion of the old Sixth Book between the old Fourth and the old Fifth. Aristotle may have come to see, as he progressed with his work, that his study of the way in which each form of democracy and oligarchy should be constructed in order to last (8 (6). 5. 1319 b 33 sqq.) should follow, and not precede, his study of the causes which prevent constitutions from lasting. That he did so seems likely from 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 37-1320 a 4. See vol. i. p. 493 sq. Vet. Int. takes *τέλος δὲ πάντων τούτων* together, translating 'tandem autem post omnia haec,' but the words can hardly be taken together, and a genitive is also needed after *ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἐνδεχομένην μίαν*. *Πάντων τούτων* is emphasized by being placed before *ὅταν*: cp. Aristoph. *Τελμησῆς*, *Fragm.* 1, 2 (Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.* 2. 1159),

φέρει δὴ τοίνυν, ταῦθ' ὅταν ἔλθῃ, τί ποιῶν χρή μ', ὦ Τελμησσεῖς;
and Philemon, *Ἀνακαλίπτων* *Fragm.* (Meineke, 4. 5),

*λυπουμένη δ' ὅταν τις ἀκολουθῶν λέγῃ
χαῖρ', ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὗτος οἰώσκειν λέγει.*

24. *τίνας φθοραὶ κ.τ.λ.*, 'what forms are assumed by the destruction and preservation of constitutions, both of constitutions in general and of each constitution separately, and by reason of what causes these destructions and preservations tend most to come about.' 'φθορὰς et σωτηρίας rerum publicarum vocat interitus et incolumitates' (Camerarius, *Interp.* p. 144). Sepulveda translates *τίνας φθοραὶ κ.τ.λ.*, 'quae res interitum afferant et quae vicissim rebus publicis sint salutare,' and many translate in a similar way (so Sus. 'welches die Mittel zur Zerstörung und zur Erhaltung der Verfassungen sind'), but I prefer the above rendering. Cp. 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 34, *ἔτι δὲ περὶ φθορᾶς τε καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ ποίων τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον*. We are not prepared in the passage before us for the separate treatment of the way in which monarchies are destroyed and preserved which we find in 7 (5). 10-12.

25. For *ταῦτα* referring to fem. substantives, see Vahlen on *Poet.* 4. 1449 a 7, and see notes on 1263 a 1 and 1291 a 16.

- C. 3. 27. As to the Third and Fourth Chapters see vol. i. Appendix A. We look to these chapters for an answer to the inquiry suggested in c. 2. 1289 b 12-14 and in c. 1. 1289 a 7-11 and 20 sqq., the inquiry how many varieties of each constitution, and especially of democracy and oligarchy, there are, and, as has been said above on

1289 b 12, we find in them some sort of answer to this question, but the answer which we find in them is by no means distinct, and the main aim of the two chapters seems rather to be to explain why there are many constitutions (an inquiry for which we have not been prepared in the opening chapters of the Book, though it is referred to in c. 13. 1297 b 28 sqq. as having been dealt with), and at once to account for and to disprove the view that there are only two constitutions, democracy and oligarchy, a heresy of which we hear nothing in cc. 1 and 2. A further defect of the Third and Fourth Chapters is that (as has been pointed out in vol. i. p. 495, note 1, and Appendix A: see also below on 1290 b 21-24) they give mutually inconsistent accounts of the parts of the State without distinctly substituting the one for the other. The first discussion traces the variety of constitutions to a variation in the way in which office is distributed to the different kinds of *δῆμος* and *γνώριμοι*, the second to a variation in the combinations made of the various forms assumed by the cultivators, artisans, deliberators, judges, and other necessary parts of the State. According to the first discussion, again, the reason why democracy and oligarchy are thought to be the only two constitutions is that the one represents the rule of the many and the other the rule of the few, and that the remaining constitutions are deviation-forms of these, while according to the second the reason is that a constitution implies the rule of a distinct class and the only necessarily distinct classes in a State are the rich and the poor, the former ruling in oligarchy and the latter in democracy. It is more easy to see that these chapters are unsatisfactory as they stand than to say how it happens that they are not more satisfactory than they are. There seems to be little doubt that both of them are from Aristotle's pen—it is, indeed, possible that, as has been pointed out above on 1289 a 30, a reminiscence of a passage in the Fourth Chapter (1291 a 24 sqq.) is contained in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 2-5—but it is difficult to think that he intended the two disquisitions, c. 3. 1289 b 27-c. 4. 1290 b 20 and c. 4. 1290 b 21-1291 b 13, to stand together in the text of the Politics. He may have written the second of these disquisitions in the margin of his manuscript of the Politics with the intention of substituting it for the first, or with the intention of using the two disquisitions as materials for a third, which would take their place on a final revision of the work, and an editor, finding the manuscript in this state and misinterpreting Aristotle's purpose, may have

added whatever was necessary to make a connected whole of them. Throughout the Sixth (old Fourth) Book there is much to suggest the suspicion that an editor's hand has been at work, piecing together materials which Aristotle had left in an unconnected state, or which at any rate were unconnected, whatever the cause. Susemihl brackets as interpolated the entire passage 1289 b 27-1291 b 13, but then the succeeding sentence 1291 b 14, *ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσι πολυτεταί πλείους, καὶ διὰ τίνος αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον*, ceases to have anything to refer to, unless we take it to refer to 3. 6. 1278 b 6 sqq. Besides, 1291 b 16, *φανερὸν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων*, appears to refer to 1289 b 32 sqq.

Τοῦ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. *Μὲν οὖν* has nothing to answer to it. Other explanations why there are more constitutions than one are to be found in 3. 6-7, in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 37 sqq., and in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq. In these passages Aristotle shows that there are more constitutions than one, and why this is so, but he does not show how large the number of possible constitutions is. He shows in 3. 6-7 that six constitutions exist, for rule may be in the hands of one man, or a few, or many, and the one, the few, or the many may rule for the common advantage or for their own, and elsewhere he shows that rule may be awarded for virtue, as in kingship and aristocracy, or for military virtue, as in polity, or for wealth, as in oligarchy, or for free birth, as in democracy, or it may be won by force and deceit, as in tyranny. But now he shows that the number of possible constitutions is not limited to six, but is very large. Constitutions, he now tells us, vary in relation to the parts of the State; these parts vary and rule is distributed among the varying parts in a varying way (c. 3), or the varying parts are combined in a varying way (c. 4). It may be noted that the explanations given in the chapter before us and in the succeeding chapter do not seem to account for the existence of kingship and tyranny.

29. *ἔπειτα πάλιν κ.τ.λ.* Cp. c. 11. 1295 b 1 sqq., and contrast 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 30 sq.

31. *καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, 'and indeed of the well-to-do and the poor the one part, [the well-to-do,] heavy-armed, and the other part, [the poor,] without heavy arms.' Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 33, where *ὁ πλούσιος* are distinguished from *ὁ δῆμος*, and 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12, *τὸ γὰρ ὀπλιτικὸν τῶν εὐπόρων ἐστὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἀπόρων*. Yet see note on 1294 a 41. Aristotle cannot mean to say that a part both of the

well-to-do and of the poor was heavy-armed and a part not, for surely none of the well-to-do would be *ἀνοπλοι*.

32. καὶ τὸν μὲν γεωργικὸν δῆμον ὀρώμεν ὄντα, τὸν δ' ἀγοραῖον, τὸν δὲ βάναισον. Aristotle usually divides the demos into four classes, not three—cultivators, artisans, traders, and day-labourers (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 5 sq.)—or into five, if we add herdsmen and shepherds (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 19—28). In 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 18 sqq. he adds τὸ περὶ τῶν βόλων and τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν εὐλεύθερον. Thus he omits in the passage before us day-labourers and herdsmen and shepherds, to say nothing of the two last-named classes. See note on 1319 a 24, and as to the ἀγοραῖοι note on 1291 a 4.

33. καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων κ.τ.λ. Here, as often elsewhere, the antithesis to ὁ δῆμος is οἱ γνώριμοι, a wide term including not only οἱ πλούσιοι, but also those whose claims were based on birth or virtue (cp. c. 4. 1291 b 28 sqq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sqq.). See note on 1304 b 1.

34. καὶ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῆς οὐσίας. Bonitz (Ind. 357 b 34) remarks as to the first καί, 'Ad καί praeparativum post aliquod intervallum εἰ referri videtur in Pol. 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 34, 40.' Τὰ μεγέθη τῆς οὐσίας is probably added to make it clear in what sense ὁ πλοῦτος is here used, for the word was sometimes used in the sense of ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς κτήσεως (1. 13. 1259 b 20). For the absence of κατὰ before τὰ μεγέθη see critical note on 1330 b 31.

35. οἷον ἵπποτροφίας, sc. διαφορὰ ἐστὶ. For the genitive of Epexegesis, see note on 1322 b 5 and Riddell, *Apology of Plato*, p. 124, who quotes Apol. 29 B, ἀμαθία . . . αὐτὴ ἢ ἐπονιδίαιτος, ἢ τοῦ οἰεσθαι εἶδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν, and other passages. For the fact mentioned cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 11, αἱ δ' ἵπποτροφίαι τῶν μακρὰς οὐσίας κεκτημένων εἰσὶν: 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq.: Xen. Ages. 1. 23. Why were rich men alone able to rear horses? We never find the same thing said of the rearing of horned cattle or sheep (cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 14), or even of mules. The reason must be that horses were used in ancient Greece mainly for war, racing, or similar purposes, and that it did not pay to keep them.

36. διότι κ.τ.λ. The sense is—and hence it was that in ancient times States whose strength lay in their cavalry were ruled by the wealthy, for the wealthy alone could rear horses, and that oligarchies existed in them. Aristotle's language implies that this was not as much the rule in later days, though it would seem that even in later days the more pronounced type of oligarchy found a congenial

home in States whose territory was suited to cavalry (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sqq.).

38. ἐχρῶντο δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and they were in the habit of using horses for their wars with their neighbours.' It would be difficult in early times to transport horses by sea for use in distant campaigns. The fact stated shows how important horses were to the State, and explains why supremacy in the State fell to those who were able to keep them. Wars with neighbours were more trying and more full of peril than any others (Demosth. Olynth. 2. 21: De Cor. c. 241). For one thing it was easy during such wars for slaves to desert *en masse* (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Blümner, 4. p. 89). For χρῆσθαι πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους, cp. 2. 6. 1265 a 22, τοιοῦτοι χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὅπλοις, and Aristot. Fragm. 499. 1559 a 31, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ φησιν ἐν τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείᾳ χρῆσθαι Λακεδαιμονίους φοινικίδι πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους. The sentence would be improved if the second πρὸς were omitted (for πόλεμος ἀστυγείτων cp. 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 17 sq.), but see note on 1328 a 19. We have in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 35, if the text is correct, ἐκ προκρίτων ἐκ τῶν χιλίων.

39. As to the oligarchy of the Hippobotae at Chalcis see Strabo, p. 447 (Aristot. Fragm. 560. 1570 a 40 sqq.), and as to the oligarchy of the Knights at Eretria see 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 35 sq. The Thessalians were ἵπποτρόφοι (Heraclid. Pont. ap. Athen. Deipn. 624 c-e). As to Magnesia on the Maeander we read in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 22, ἵπποτρόφοι δ' εἰσὶν, ὃν τρόπον καὶ Κολοφώνιοι, πεδιάδα χώραν ἔχοντες. In τῶν ἄλλων πολλοὶ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν there is no doubt a reference to Colophon (cp. Strabo, p. 643): Cyme also is probably among the cities referred to ([Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 11. 6). See notes on 1297 b 16 and 1321 a 8. Caria is said to be unsuitable for cavalry in Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 12 (cp. Julian, Or. 7. 205 D), and though this cannot have been true of the lower part of the valley of the Maeander, Aristotle is probably not speaking in the passage before us of most of the Greek cities of Caria. No doubt also he is not speaking of the islands off the coast of Asia Minor.

40. ἔτι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 711 D, μεγάλας τισὶ δυναστείαις, ἡ κατὰ μοναρχίαν δυναστευούσαις ἢ κατὰ πλούτων ὑπεροχὰς διαφερούσαις ἢ γενῶν.

1290 a. 1. καὶ εἴ τι δὴ κ.τ.λ. To what is this a reference? According to Susemihl (Sus.^{2a}, Appendix, p. 366), to 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 17-9. 1329 a 39, and it is true that τούτων γὰρ κ.τ.λ. (1290 a 3 sqq.) may

refer to 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 29 sqq., but we hear nothing in 4 (7). 7-9 of a *διαφορὰ τῶν γυωρίμων κατὰ γένος*, or indeed of *διαφοραὶ τῶν γυωρίμων* of any kind. Is not the reference rather to 3. 12. 1283 a 14 sqq.? See vol. ii. p. xxv.

3. *τούτων γὰρ τῶν μερῶν κ.τ.λ.*, '[for these parts are the cause of the existence of a plurality of constitutions,] for sometimes all of them share in the constitution, and sometimes a smaller number of them and sometimes a larger.' In democracy, for instance, all kinds of *γυωρίμοι* and all kinds of *demos* share in the constitution (4 (7). 9. 1328 b 32 sq.), while in the more extreme forms of oligarchy only *ἐπιποτρόφοι* share in it.

7. *πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* This is added to explain and justify what has just been said, that the existence of parts of the State differing in kind involves the existence of constitutions differing in kind. A constitution is an ordering of the parts of the State in relation to their participation in magistracies. One constitution gives the magistracies to the rich, another to the poor, another to rich and poor together, and constitutions differ according as they give the magistracies to one part of the State or to another. I repeat here for the sake of convenience the translation of the passage already given in vol. i. p. 566—'for a constitution is the ordering of the magistracies of the State, and this ordering all men distribute among themselves either according to the power of those who are admitted to political rights or according to some common equality subsisting among them—I mean, for example, the power of the poor or the rich—or some power common to both. Thus there will necessarily be as many constitutions as there are ways of ordering the magistracies of a State according to the relative superiorities and differences exhibited by the parts.' For *κατὰ τιν' αὐτῶν ἰσότητα αὐτήν*, cp. Plato, *Laws* 695 C, *νόμους ἡξίου θέμενος οἰκεῖν ἰσότητά τινα κατ' ἑκάστην εἰσφέρειν*, and *Pol.* 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 29 sqq., in addition to 3. 6. 1279 a 9, *ὅταν ἢ κατ' ἰσότητα τῶν πολιτῶν συνιστηκῆ καὶ καθ' ἑμίστητα*, and other passages referred to in vol. i. p. 566, note 1. With *τῶν ὑπέρων ἢ τῶν ὑπόρων* I supply *τὴν δύναμιν*, and with *ἢ κοινὴν τιν' ἑμφοῖν* I supply *δύναμιν*. In 12, *κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν μερίων*, it is implied that constitutions vary both according to the superiorities (in wealth, birth, or virtue, or in numbers) possessed by this or that part of the State and according to the differences between the parts (for instance, the *γυωρίμοι* may be *γυωρίμοι κατὰ πλοῦτον* or *κατὰ γένος* or *κατ' ἀρετήν*, and the *demos* may

be agricultural or trading or artisan). Τῶν μορίων is emphatic. Each constitution reflects a difference in *the parts of the State* and the way in which office is assigned to them. For κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχάς, cp. 3. 17. 1288 a 22 sq. and 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 11, ὥστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τούτων καθιστάσι, καὶ δύο πολιτείας δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, δημοκρατία καὶ ὀλιγαρχία: 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 1: 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 26 sqq.

13. μάλιστα δὲ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι δύο . . . 16. ὀλιγαρχία. For the structure of the sentence see note on 1253 b 35–37. Demosthenes took this view (vol. i. p. 494, note 1). Nothing is said about monarchy, but perhaps the inquirers here referred to regarded it as a form of oligarchy. Those who viewed ἡ κατ' ἀρετὴν διαφορά as a διαφορά τῶν γνωρίμων (1289 b 40 sqq.) would naturally be led to class ἀριστοκρατία as a kind of oligarchy; Aristotle himself, in fact, admits in 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 24 that it is ὀλιγαρχία πῶς. Politics, again, were accounted democracies in early times (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 24). Not many, however, can have held the view that there were only two constitutions, for we are told in c. 7. 1293 a 35 sqq. that the existence of four constitutions—monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and the so-called aristocracy—was recognized by all, though polity was generally ignored. There is a reference to the opinion that there are only two winds in Meteor. 2. 6. 364 a 19 sqq. and in Strabo, p. 29, where Posidonius is quoted as saying that it was not accepted by Aristotle or by Timosthenes (a Rhodian writer of the first half of the third century B.C.) or by the astronomer Bion. Some held that there were only two elements and not four (De Gen. et Corr. 2. 3. 330 b 13, οἱ δ' εἰθὺς δύο ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ Παρμενίδης πῦρ καὶ γῆν, τὰ μεταξὺ μίγματα ποιοῦσι τούτων, οἷον ἀέρα καὶ ὕδωρ), and some recognized only two Greek dialects, identifying the ancient Attic dialect with the Ionic and the Doric with the Aeolic (Strabo, p. 333). In the same way some studied dichotomy in their divisions of animals (De Part. An. 1. 2. 642 b 5 sqq.). This tendency would be favoured by the influence of Heraclitus' teaching (see Plut. De Tranq. An. c. 15). But the view that there were only two constitutions, democracy and oligarchy, may well have been suggested by the fact that most constitutions in ancient Greece were democratic or oligarchical (c. 11. 1296 a 22 sq.: 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 39 sq.), just as the view that there were only two winds, the North and the South, may well have been suggested by the fact that the wind blew oftenest from these

quarters (Meteor. 2. 4. 361 a 6: cp. Theophrast. Fragm. 5. 2 Wimmer).

15. οὕτω καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν δύο, sc. εἶδη δοκεῖ εἶναι: cp. 20, καὶ γὰρ ἰκαί τίθενται εἶδη δύο.

18. ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πνεύμασι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Meteor. 2. 6. 364 a 19, ὅλως δὲ τὰ μὲν βόρεια τούτων καλεῖται, τὰ δὲ νότια. προστίθεται δὲ τὰ μὲν ψυχρότερα τῇ βορέῃ (ψυχρότερα γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἀπὸ δυσμῶν πνεῖν), νότῃ δὲ τὰ ἀπληρωτικά (θερμότερα γὰρ τῇ ἀπ' ἀνατολῆς πνεῖν). For the reversal in the order of the words, τὸν μὲν ζέφυρον τοῦ βορείου, τοῦ δὲ νότου τὸν εὐρον, cp. 27—29 and see note on 1277 a 31.

19. τοῦ βορείου, sc. εἶδος.

24. ἀληθέστερον δὲ καὶ βέλτιον ὥς ἡμεῖς διείλομεν κ.τ.λ. The inquirers criticized by Aristotle regarded democracy and oligarchy as the forms of constitution of which the rest are deviations, but Aristotle is always inclined to point to a mean form as the best and to regard the extremes between which it lies as deviations from it. Each of the moral virtues, for instance, is a *μεσότης* between two extreme states which are deviations from it (Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 b 27 sqq.: 2. 9. 1109 b 18, ὁ μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαίνων), and the Dorian mode is a midway mode between two deviation-forms (Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 42 sqq.). That the correct form of constitution assumes only one or two shapes, while the deviation-forms are many, is quite what we should expect: cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 b 28, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἐστίν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἶκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς, where Aristotle follows Plato, Rep. 445 C, ἐν μὲν εἶναι εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀπειρα δὲ τῆς κακίας. Cp. also 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 26 sqq., where the existence of a multiplicity of constitutions is traced to the fact that men err (*ἀμαρτανόντων*) in their attempts to realize τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον. 'Αληθέστερον καὶ βέλτιον, because it is better so to classify constitutions as to give prominence to the best. 'Ὡς ἡμεῖς διείλομεν, i.e. in c. 2, where ἀριστοκρατία and βασιλεία are said to be the best constitution, and oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny to be deviation-forms (1289 a 38, b 9). Aristotle, however, speaks in the passage before us as if the polity was also a deviation-form, but this is probably by inadvertence; he speaks more exactly in c. 8. 1293 b 23 sqq. Plato had already said in Rep. 445 D, 449 A, that the best constitution may take the form either of a kingship or of an aristocracy, and that all other constitutions are deviation-forms of it. Aristotle's teaching in 3. 7.

1279 b 4 sqq. (cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 26-30) is different (see vol. i. p. 218).

27. ὀλιγαρχικὰς μὲν κ.τ.λ. Oligarchy is here compared with tense modes like the mixo-Lybian (5 (8). 5. 1340 a 42 sqq.) and democracy with relaxed modes like the softer variety of the Ionian. The metaphor recurs in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 20 sqq. and in Plut. Pericl. c. 15, Coriolan. c. 5 *sub fin.*, and Lycurg. c. 29 *sub fin.* Cp. also Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 26. l. 2, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνέβαιεν ἀνίσσθαι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν διὰ τοὺς προθύμους δημαγωγούοντας, and Demosth. c. Androt. c. 51, πάντα πραότερά ἐστιν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ.

- C. 4. 30. Οὐ δεῖ δὲ τίθεναι δημοκρατίαν κ.τ.λ. In *times* Aristotle probably refers among others to Plato, who had said in Polit. 291 D, *ἄΕ. καὶ μετὰ μοναρχίαν εἴποι τις ἄν, οἶμαι, τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλίγων δυναστείαν. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῶς δ' οὐ; ἄΕ. τρίτον δὲ σχῆμα πολιτείας οὐχ ἡ τοῦ πλήθους ἀρχή, δημοκρατία τοῦτομα κληθεῖσα*; The reason why Aristotle takes so much pains here to correct this definition of democracy and oligarchy appears to be that he holds that it tends to facilitate the error of reducing all constitutions to these two forms. He seeks, therefore, to show that democracy and oligarchy cannot be defined as forms in which supremacy falls to the majority or to the few, or even (though we thus approach nearer to the truth) as forms in which supremacy falls to *λευθερία* or to wealth; they are rather forms in which the *εὐθεροὶ* being a majority, and the rich being a few, rule. Two things (*λευθερία* and superior numbers), or even three, if we add poverty, must be conjoined in those who are supreme in a democracy, and two things (wealth and paucity), or three, if we add high birth, in those who are supreme in an oligarchy. If we thus define democracy and oligarchy, it becomes impossible to group all constitutions under these two heads and to treat polity as a kind of democracy and aristocracy as a kind of oligarchy, for in the polity the hoplites rule, who do not belong to the poorer class, and in the aristocracy rule falls not to wealth or to high birth, but to virtue. It is evident, then, that this inquiry as to the true definition of democracy and oligarchy is not altogether out of place here, looking to what precedes it, but we are surprised that no notice is taken in it of the similar inquiry in 3. 8, especially as a different definition of democracy and oligarchy is there arrived at, and one which takes fuller account of the difficulties of the question. For if in a democracy the free-born and poor being a majority rule, and in an oligarchy the rich and noble being few

in number rule, what are we to call the constitutions in which the free-born and poor not being a majority rule, and those in which the rich and noble not being few rule? They cannot be called democracies, nor can they be called oligarchies. This difficulty is considered and solved in 3. 8, but it is neither considered nor solved in the chapter before us. It should be noted that, notwithstanding what he says here and in c. 8. 1294 a 11 sqq., Aristotle takes τὸ κύριον εἶναι τὸ δοῦν τοῖς πλείοσιν as a mark of democracy in 1291 b 37 sqq., in 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq., and in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 4 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 18 sqq., 24 sqq.).

31. ἀπλῶς οὕτως, 'in this unqualified way': cp. Plato, Gorg. 468 C (where Stallbaum translates, 'sic simpliciter, ita ut nihil aliud respiciamus'), Protag. 351 C, and other passages referred to by Ast, Lex. Platon. s. v. ἀπλῶς.

καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ πανταχοῦ τὸ πλεον μέρος κύριον, i.e. τὸ πλεον μέρος τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς πολιτείας (cp. c. 8. 1294 a 11 sqq.).

35. τοῖς τριακοσίοις καὶ πένησιν κ.τ.λ., 'to those who are but three hundred in number and poor, though free-born' (or perhaps 'of citizen-birth') 'and alike in all other respects.' For τοῖς τριακοσίοις καὶ πένησιν, cp. 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 25, τὰ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ἐλαττόνων, and 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 22, τὸ περὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων καὶ ἐχόντων μέγεθος, and Polyaen. Strateg. 5. 47, τοὺς πένητας καὶ πεζοὺς τοῖς ὑπέρροις καὶ ἱππεύσι συνέκρουσεν.

37. τούτους, i.e. the members of the πόλις in which this is the case.

εἰ πένητες μὲν ὀλίγοι εἴεν, κρείττους δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'if there were a few men poor but stronger,' etc.

39. τὴν τοιαύτην, sc. πολιτείαν. For similar omissions see notes on 1266 b 1 and 1279 a 9.

3. εὐεῖθεροι μὲν γὰρ πολλοί, πλούσιοι δ' ὀλίγοι, 'for there are 1290 b. many free-born, but few rich.'

4. καὶ γὰρ ἄν κ.τ.λ., 'for otherwise,' etc. (i.e. if we define oligarchy as the rule of a few).

5. τινες. Herodotus says (3. 20: see above on 1282 b 27) that the Ethiopians chose their kings in this way (Schneider, Eaton). The case, however, which Aristotle is imagining is the choice not of kings, but of magistrates for their stature. In Hist. An. 2. 1. 499 a 20, ὥσπερ λέγουσιν τινες, Herodotus (3. 103) is similarly referred to.

ἢ κατὰ κάλλος. For the choice of kings on this principle, see

(with Schneider, Eaton, and Sus.³) Athen. Deipn. 566 c, Strabo, pp. 699 and 822, and Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 142 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 463), but these passages refer to kings, not magistrates.

7. οὐδὲ τοῦτοις μόνον, i.e. πλούτῳ καὶ ἐλευθερίᾳ.

8. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ., 'but since there are more elements than one both in a democracy and in an oligarchy, we must add this further distinction that,' etc. It is implied that democracy does not exist unless all its elements (the free-born, the many, and the poor) are present in the ruling class, nor oligarchy, unless all its elements (the rich, the few, and the noble) are present in the ruling class. Δῆμος here = δημοκρατία, as in 1290 b 1 and c. 3. 1290 a 16. For the expression μόρια τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 24, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πλήθῃ πάντα σχεδόν, ἐξ ὧν αἱ λοιπαὶ δημοκρατίαι συνεστᾶσι, πολλῷ φαυλότερα τούτων. The elements of a democracy or an oligarchy seem here to be the elements of which the dominant class in each is composed. The term μόριον τῆς πολιτείας is otherwise used in c. 14. 1297 b 37, c. 15. 1299 a 4, and 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 22. For πλείονα neut. plur. (not πλείω), cp. c. 2. 1289 b 13. The neuter plural substantive μόρια is followed, as often elsewhere, by a verb in the plural.

9. οἱ ἐλεύθεροι must here mean 'those of full citizen-birth.' In Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf (for κόλπῳ is to be supplied, see note on 1329 b 20) and in Thera no one seems at one time to have been accounted of full citizen-birth who was not a descendant of the earliest settlers. Ἦσαν, 12, implies that this was no longer the case in Aristotle's day. Compare 3. 2. 1275 b 23 sqq., where we read that there were those who denied the name of citizen to any one who could not trace back his origin to two or three or more citizen grandfathers. Apollonia and Thera in a similar spirit required of those who held office a pedigree reaching back to the very foundation of the colony. Oligarchy in these two cities was evidently of an old-world type, based on nobility of birth rather than on wealth. Apollonia was in many respects a kind of foil to its neighbour Epidamnus; it was an εὐνομοτάτῃ πόλις (Strabo, p. 316), whereas Epidamnus was famous for its civil broils (Thuc. 1. 24. 3). It was situated nearly seven miles from the sea, and more than one mile from the river Aous (Strabo, *ibid.*), whereas Epidamnus was a seaport; unlike Epidamnus, it kept strangers at a distance, just as Sparta did (Aelian, Var. Hist. 13. 15, ὅτι Ἀπολλωνιάται ξενηλασίας ἐποιοῦν κατὰ τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον νόμον Ἐπιδάμνιοι δὲ ἐπιδημῶν παρεῖχον τῷ βουλομένῳ).

12. οἱ διαφέροντες κατ' εὐγένειαν καὶ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας. Καί seems here to be explanatory; nobility in these two States was based on descent from the earliest settlers, for πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας no doubt includes the descendants of the original settlers, as well as the original settlers themselves. Οἱ πρῶτοι κατασχόντες τὰς ἀποικίας were the founders not only of the State but of its worships (Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1423 a 36, καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρῶτων οἰκιστῶν τὰς πόλεις καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἱδρυσαμένων τὰ ἱερὰ μάλιστα διὰ διαμένειν τὰς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπιμελείας). Compare the monopoly of the more important offices at Thurii by the Sybarite element in its citizen-body (Diod. 12. 11. 1 : Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 31 sqq.), and similar distinctions within the citizen-bodies of some Phoenician settlements (Freeman, Sicily, 1. 294). The same thing happened at Venice according to Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio, 1. 6 *inif.* 'As a great number of people were forced to retire into those isles where Venice now stands, and the multitude at last increased to such a degree that it became necessary to make some laws, in order to live peaceably and securely together, they established a form of government, and assembling frequently in council to deliberate on the affairs of the city, when they thought they were numerous enough to form a State, they ordained that nobody that should come thereafter to live amongst them should have any share in the government; and in course of time, when a sufficient number of inhabitants outside the government had settled in the place to give distinction to those who governed, they called themselves Gentlemen, and the others men of the People' (Farneworth's Translation with some modifications). Compare the way in which in the South African Republic the Boers have excluded the Uitlanders from full participation in the suffrage.

14. ὀλίγοι ὄντες πολλῶν. For this use of the partitive genitive, cp. Plato, Tim. 39 C, τῶν δ' ἄλλων τὰς περιόδους οὐκ ἐννεοηκότες ἄνθρωποι, πλὴν ὀλίγοι τῶν πολλῶν.

οὔτε ἂν οἱ πλούσιοι κ.τ.λ., 'nor if the rich rule [not because of their wealth, but] simply because they are more numerous than the poor, does an oligarchy exist.' Cp. 3. 8. 1280 a 1, ἀναγκαῖον μὲν, ὅπου ἂν ἄρχῃσι διὰ πλοῦτον ἂν τ' ἐλάττους ἂν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν, where διὰ πλοῦτον is emphatic. As to the reading ὀλιγαρχία see critical note on 1290 b 15.

15. οἷον ἐν Κολοφῶνι τὸ παλαιόν. For the fact cp. Athen. Deipn.

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526 a sqq. The war with the Lydians referred to occurred during the reign of Gyges, who captured Colophon (Hdt. i. 14), and therefore during the first half of the seventh century before Christ (Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ed. 2, 2. 458). Colophon was not only strong in cavalry at the time of which Aristotle speaks, but also had a fleet (Strabo, p. 643).

16. μακρὰν οδόν. Cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 11.

18. κύριοι τῆς ἀρχῆς ὄσιν, 'have rule in their hands': cp. 1290 a 33, κύριοι τῆς πολιτείας, and 35, μὴ μεταδοῖεν ἀρχῆς. The phrase is not a common one. For τῆς ἀρχῆς cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 8, πρὸς τὴν ἀρχήν.

21. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . . 24. πάλιν. The first of these sentences is repeated in 1291 b 14 sq., and it is likely enough that the disquisition which finds a place between these two identical remarks is a subsequent addition, whether it was inserted here by Aristotle or by some later hand. The sentences from 21, ὅτι μὲν οὖν, to 24, πάλιν, look as if they had been added by some editor, who has sought to link together two inconsistent disquisitions on the plurality of constitutions found by him in Aristotle's manuscript or among his papers. See note on 1289 b 27. The inquiry just concluded is said to have shown that there are more constitutions than one and why—an inadequate account of its drift—and the inquiry now announced is said to be designed to show that there are more constitutions than 'those which have been mentioned' and what they are and why this is so, but in reality the two inquiries deal with the same subject, though they are not at all in agreement (see note on 1289 b 27). Congreve, Sus., and others take 'the constitutions which have been mentioned' (τῶν εἰρημένων, 22) to be democracy and oligarchy, and certainly it is not easy to see what else the words can mean. But then it seems difficult not to attach the same meaning to τῶν εἰρημένων πολιτειῶν in 37; yet, if we do so, we must conclude that the inquiry which commences in 22 is intended to prove, not that there are more kinds of constitution than democracy and oligarchy, but that there are many varieties of democracy and oligarchy. This, however, can hardly be what it is intended to prove, for it is a point to the proof of which a separate inquiry (1291 b 15-30) is devoted. We seem, therefore, to be compelled to fall back on the only alternative open to us, which is to explain τῶν εἰρημένων πολιτειῶν in 37 differently from τῶν εἰρημένων in 22, and to take the former expression to refer to the six constitutions enumerated in c. 2.

1289 a 26—30, and the latter to refer to the two constitutions, democracy and oligarchy.

23. τὴν εἰρημέτην πρότερον, in c. 3. 1289 b 27.

25. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ζῴου προηροόμεθα λαβεῖν εἴδη κ.τ.λ. Eucken (Methode der Aristotelischen Forschung, p. 54) distinguishes this deductive mode of arriving at a classification of animals from the inductive method by which the classification of animals is arrived at which we find in Aristotle's zoological works (for this see Dr. Ogle, Aristotle on the Parts of Animals, p. xxxiii). The two methods are mentioned side by side, as Eucken points out, in Top. 1. 8. 103 b 3 sqq. in reference to the inquiry contained in that passage how many kinds of ταῦτόν there are. The teaching, however, of the text as to the nature of a zoological species agrees in the main with that of the zoological works. Both there and here Aristotle bases identity of species on identity of parts: see Ogle, p. 148, who says, 'When the individuals in a group are precisely alike in all their parts, the group is a species,' and p. 141, and cp. Hist. An. 1. 6. 491 a 14 sqq. and De Part. An. 1. 4. 644 b 7 sqq. We note, indeed, one difference between the passage before us and the teaching of the zoological works, for while in them we are told that a difference in any one part suffices to produce a difference of species, we are told here that only a difference in a necessary part does so. The question then arises, what parts are necessary to an animal. The list of necessary parts here given is a good deal longer than that which we find in De Part. An. 2. 10. 655 b 29, πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ τελείοις δύο τὰ ἀναγκαῖότατα μέρη ἐστίν, ἡ τε δέχονται τὴν τροφήν καὶ ἡ τὸ περίττωμα ἀφήσουσιν, or in Hist. An. 1. 2. 488 b 29, πάντων δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ζῴων κοινὰ μέρη, ᾧ δέχεται τὴν τροφήν καὶ εἰς δὲ δέχεται . . . μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἄλλα κοινὰ μέρη ἔχει τὰ πλείστα τῶν ζῴων πρὸς τοῦτοις, ἧ ἀφίεισι τὸ περίττωμα τῆς τροφῆς [καὶ ἡ λαμβάνει]. οὐ γὰρ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῦτο. καλεῖται δ' ἡ μὲν λαμβάνει, στόμα, εἰς δὲ δέχεται, κοιλία (where Aubert and Wimmer omit καὶ ἡ λαμβάνει), or in Περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως 2. 468 a 13, τριῶν δὲ μερῶν ὄντων εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται πάντα τὰ τέλεια τῶν ζῴων, ἐνὸς μὲν ᾧ δέχεται τὴν τροφήν, ἐνὸς δ' ἡ τὸ περίττωμα προέεται, τρίτον δὲ τοῦ μέσου τούτων, τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τοῖς μεγίστοις τῶν ζῴων καλεῖται στήθος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἀνάλογον . . . ὅσα δ' αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πορευτικά, πρόσκειται καὶ μέρη τὰ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ὑπηρεσίαν, οἷς τὸ πᾶν οἷσουςι κύτος, σκέλη τε καὶ πόδες καὶ τὰ τοῦτοις ἔχοντα τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν. In the passage before us Aristotle appears rightly to mark off the parts which serve for locomotion from those which it is necessary that every animal should

possess. He can hardly mean that any and every difference in a necessary part suffices to constitute a difference of species, for in that case blue-eyed men would belong to a different species from black-eyed men. Bonitz (Ind. 151 b 54 sqq.) points out that *εἶδη* is used here and in 36 interchangeably with *γένη*, 33. See above on 1258 b 32.

πρῶτον has nothing to answer to it, for it does not seem to be taken up by *πρὸς δὲ τοῖς*, 28; the second step, however, apparently is to point out the possible varieties of each part. A similar question arises as to the use of *πρῶτον* in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 (see note).

26. *ἐνὶ τε τῶν αἰσθητηρίων*. Organs of touch and taste are regarded by Aristotle as the most indispensable (De An. 3. 12. 434 b 11 sqq.): next come organs of smell. Aristotle doubts whether some animals possess organs of sight and hearing (Hist. An. 4. 8. 535 a 13 sqq.).

27. *τὸ τῆς τροφῆς ἐργαστικόν*, i.e. the mouth: cp. Hist. An. 2. 5. 501 b 29, *ὁ δ' ἐλέφας ὀδόντας μὲν ἔχει τέτταρας ἐφ' ἑκάτερα, οἷς κατεργάζεται τὴν τροφήν*, and *Περὶ νεότητος* 3. 469 a 2, *φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι μίαν μὲν τινα ἐργασίαν ἢ τοῦ στόματος λειτουργεῖ δύναμις, ἑτέραν δ' ἢ τῆς κοιλίας περὶ τὴν τροφήν*.

28. *οἷς κινεῖται μορίοις*, like c. 5. 1292 b 8, *ὥσπερ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις καὶ περὶ ἧς τελευταίας εἶπομεν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις*.

29. *εἰ δὴ τοσαῦτα [εἶδη] μόνον*. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1114 b 12, where *εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ* similarly refers back to what has preceded. I cannot follow Thurot and Sus. in reading *εἰ δέ* in place of *εἰ δὴ*. As to *εἰ δὴ* see note on 1331 a 10, and as to [*εἶδη*] see critical note. Supply *μόρια* with *τοσαῦτα* from *μορίοις*, 28.

30. *στόματός τινα πλείω γένη*. So birds have a peculiar kind of mouth (Hist. An. 2. 12. 504 a 19, *στόμα δ' οἱ ὀρνίθες ἔχουσι μὲν ἰδιῶν δέ οὔτε γὰρ χεῖλη οὐτ' ὀδόντας ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ ῥύγχος*). As to differences in the *κοιλία*, see De Part. An. 3. 14. 674 a 21 sqq. 'In homine pars motus est pes, in ave ala, in pisce pinna, et rursus in homine bini pedes, in beluis fere quaterni, et rursus in quaternis alii fissi, alii solidi' (Giph. p. 431). As to *τινὰ πλείω γένη* see note on 1319 b 34.

32. *τούτων*, sc. *τῶν διαφορῶν* (cp. 34, *διαφοράς*).

33. *πλείω γένη ζῶων*. In 25 we have *ζῶον* (not *ζῶων*) *εἶδη*. In just the same way we have in Plato, Rep. 445 D, *εἶντε (τρόποι εἰσι) πολιτειῶν*, and in Laws 735 A, *δύο πολιτείας εἶδη*.

ταύτων ζῶον, 'the same kind of animal.'

35. *τούτων*, sc. *τῶν διαφορῶν*.

συνδυασμοί, cp. c. 9. 1294 b 1 sq.

38. τοῦ ἔθνους. See note on 1286 b 17.

37. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τῶν εἰρημένων πολιτειῶν, 'and it is the same with the constitutions that have been mentioned': i. e. there are as many kinds of them as there are possible combinations of the various forms of necessary parts of the State. For the gen. see above on 1253 b 27. As to 'the constitutions that have been mentioned' see above on 21-24. It is easy to see how differences in some of the parts of the State enumerated here (e.g. in the fighting, the judicial, the well-to-do, the deliberative, and the official classes) would cause a difference in the constitution, but how would differences in the cultivating or day-labouring class or in the class of artisans or shopkeepers do so? And to what differences in these classes does Aristotle refer? Probably he refers partly to differences in the relative numbers of these classes (for the effect of such differences on the constitution see c. 12. 1296 b 26 sqq.) and partly to differences in their composition. For instance, if the *βάσαντοι* or the *ἀγοραῖοι* or the *θῆτες* consisted to a large extent of persons open to exception on the score of their extraction (half-servile, it may be, or half-alien or illegitimate), and persons of this kind had access to the deliberative, the dicasteries, and the magistracies, the result would be that an advanced form of democracy would exist.

39. ὥσπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, in 3. 1. 1274 b 38 sqq., 3. 12. 1283 a 14 sqq., 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 27 sq., and 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 23 sq.

ἐν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. For the differences between this list of the necessary parts of a State and that given in 4 (7). 8, see vol. i. p. 97.

40. οἱ καλούμενοι γεωργοί. Here, as in 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 20 sqq., Aristotle omits from his enumeration herdsmen, shepherds, fishermen, and hunters, though these also are providers of food; perhaps he is concerned both here and there only with those whose services cannot be dispensed with. Plato had spoken in the same way in Rep. 369 D. As to the expression οἱ καλούμενοι γεωργοί see note on 1331 b 9.

2. ὃν ἄνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι. We see from 3. 12. 1283 a 1291 a. 20 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 6 sqq.) that this phrase includes both the things without which a State cannot exist and the things without which it cannot exist nobly.

3. τὰς δὲ εἰς τρυφήν ἢ τὸ καλῶς ζῆν. These are the two opposites to that which is necessary, for τὰ ἀναγκαῖα are contrasted both with

τὰ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν (4 (7). 10. 1329 b 27 sqq.) and with τὰ καλὰ (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 32 sq.).

4. τρίτον δ' ἀγοραῖον κ.τ.λ. For the omission of the article before ἀγοραῖον see critical note. For τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ὥρας cp. 1291 b 19, τὸ ἀγοραῖον τὸ περὶ ὧν καὶ πρᾶσιν διατρίβον: Eth. Eud. 1. 4. 1215 a 31, χρηματιστικὰς δὲ (τέχνας) τὰς πρὸς ἀγορὰς μὲν (ἀγοράσεις Sylburg, Sus.) καὶ πράξεις καπηλικὰς: Plato, Rep. 525 C, οὐκ ὧν οὐδὲ πράξεως χάριν ὡς ἐμπόρους ἢ καπηλοὺς μελετῶντας: and Xen. De Vect. 3. 12. Neither τὸ ἀγοραῖον nor τὸ θητικόν is included among the necessary parts of a πόλις in 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 4 sqq., though it is afterwards implied that τὸ θητικόν is among them (see vol. i. p. 97), but in 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 14 sqq. buying and selling are treated as necessary incidents of life in a πόλις, and in the passage before us Aristotle goes farther and treats ἔμποροι and κάπηλοι as necessary classes. The term τὸ ἀγοραῖον is used here apparently in a sense inclusive both of ἔμποροι and of κάπηλοι, but in Xen. De Vect. 3. 12 sq. (cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 7. 6 and Plato, Rep. 371 D) ἔμποροι are distinguished from ἀγοραῖοι. The ἀγοραῖοι were so called because most selling was done in or near the agora (see Büchschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 469 sq.). The βάνουσι τεχνίται and the θήτες, however, were frequenters of the agora as well as οἱ ἀγοραῖοι (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 28 sqq.). In τὸ περὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ὥρας καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας καὶ καπηλείας one περί serves for all the substantives because the things they represent are nearly akin. Compare the use of περί in 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 16 sqq. and 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 6 sqq.

6. τὸ θητικόν. The existence in ancient Greece of a numerous class of this kind deserves notice, for, according to Mommsen, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 474. 4, 'the working of free persons for hire was confined in Italy within narrow limits.'

7. δ τούτων οὐδὲν ἥττον ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. For the construction see note on 1329 a 35.

8. μὴ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for is it not impossible that it should be meet to give the name of State to a State which is by nature the slave of others?' For ἄξιον εἶναι cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 17 sq. For the use of μὴ here see note on 1263 a 41. As to the importance of valour to a State compare a Delphic response to Lycurgus quoted in Diod. 7. 14. 2 and the comment of Ephorus in the next section, and also Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 480.

9. τὴν φύσει δούλην, not τύχη: cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 3, ὁ ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην.

10. αὐτάρκης γὰρ ἡ πόλις, τὸ δὲ δοῦλον οὐκ αὐτάρκης. For the reversal in the order of the words see note on 1277 a 31.

τὸ δὲ δοῦλον οὐκ αὐτάρκης. Cp. 1. 2. 1252 a 26—34, and 1. 5. 1254 b 20 sqq.

11. For ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ see note on 1342 a 32. The reference is to Rep. 369 B—371 E. For κομψῶς, οὐχ ἱκανῶς δὲ εἴρηται Bonitz (Ind. s.v. κομψῶς) compares De Caelo, 2. 9. 290 b 14 sq. and 2. 13. 295 b 16.

φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης κ.τ.λ. Contrast Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 31, οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτ' ἂν πόλις.

14. πάλιν δὲ προστίθῃσιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rep. 370 D.

16. ἔτι δ' ἐμπορόν τε καὶ κάπηλον. Cp. Rep. 371 A—D. The word κάπηλος is often used by Plato, but seldom by Aristotle, who here repeats it from Plato. It is omitted by mistake in the Index Aristotelicus.

ταῦτα πάντα, neuter, though referring to men: see notes on 1263 a 1, 1289 b 25, and 1307 a 39, and Holden's note on Xen. Oecon. 6. 13, τὰλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, who compares Demosth. Phil. 1. 8, ἐπέπλεχε πάντα ταῦτα, and refers to Jebb's note on Soph. O. T. 1195. As to the order ταῦτα πάντα, not πάντα ταῦτα, see critical note on 1282 a 40.

γίνεται, 'comes to be': cp. 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 5, 7 (5). 6. 1305 a 39, and 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 24.

17. τῆς πρώτης πόλεως, cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 7 sqq.

ὅς τῶν ἀναγκαίων τε χάριν πᾶσαν πόλιν συνεστηκυῖαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ἐλατοῦ μᾶλλον, ἴσον τε δεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν. All that Plato says is that the πόλις *comes into being* for the supply of the physical needs of those who form it, and Aristotle himself describes the πόλις in 1. 2. 1252 b 29 as *γυομένη τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν*. Still a real difference exists between them, for it is evident from the passage before us that in Aristotle's view soldiers and judges and deliberators must find a place even in the πρώτη πόλις, whereas Plato thinks that soldiers need not, and says nothing about judges and deliberators. Plato's language is open, in Aristotle's opinion, to another objection also. It implies that shoemakers are as necessary to a πόλις as cultivators, which is far from being the case.

19. τὸ δὲ προπολεμοῦν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rep. 373 D, οὐκοῦν τῆς τῶν πλησίον χώρας ἡμῖν ἀποτμητῆος . . . πολεμήσομεν δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὃ Γλαύκων; According to 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 7 sqq. a military force is necessary not only for defence against external foes, but also to control insubordinate members of the State.

20. πρὶν ἢ . . . καταστῶσιν. See note on 1336 b 21.

22. ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . 33. πόλεως. Cp. 3. 12. 1283 a 19-13. 1283 a 26 and 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 16-25. For the necessity of a judicial authority within the State, cp. 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 13 sqq.: 1. 2. 1253 a 37 sqq.: 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 5 sqq. For καὶ ἐν τοῖς τέτταρσι καὶ τοῖς ὁποσοῖσιν κοινωνοῖς, where ἐν is not repeated, see note on 1289 b 34.

25. τὰ τοιαῦτα, 'parts of the aforesaid kind,' i.e. χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον, not πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν. For the contrast cp. 1. 5. 1254 b 28 sqq.

27. δικαιοσύνης δικαστικῆς. Compare the account of ἡ τῆς τῶν δικαστῶν δυνάμεις ἰδία ἀρετὴ given in Plato, Polit. 305 B. The reference to the δικαιοσύνη δικαστικὴ possessed by judges and to the σύνεσις πολιτικὴ possessed by deliberators serves to sharpen the contrast between judges and deliberators on the one hand and τὰ εἰς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν συντείνοντα on the other, and to suggest a resemblance between the former classes and the soul.

τὸ βουλευόμενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ συνέσεως πολιτικῆς ἔργον. Cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 5. 1140 a 25, δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. I incline, looking to this passage, to translate σύνεσις πολιτικὴ here as 'political prudence,' and not as 'the political art,' as Sus.³ Ind. s. v.

28. καὶ ταῦτ' εἴτε κ.τ.λ., 'and whether these three kinds of work fall to separate classes or to the same persons makes no difference to the argument, for it often happens to the same persons to be hoplites and cultivators [and yet hoplites and cultivators are distinct parts of the State].' For the construction οὐδὲν διαφέρει εἴτε . . . εἴτε, cp. Rhet. 3. 15. 1416 a 5.

31. καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἑκείνα, i.e. both parts contributing to political life and parts contributing to merely necessary uses, or in other words both parts which constitute the soul of the State and parts which constitute its body.

32. τό γε ὁπλιτικόν, 'the hoplite force at any rate,' whatever we may think of other branches of the fighting class, such as trireme-oarsmen: cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 8, οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοῖς (i.e. τὸν ναυτικὸν ὄχλον) μέρος εἶναι δεῖ τῆς πόλεως.

33. ἑβδομον. The sixth part has not been named, and some think that a mention of it has been lost in a lacuna before ἑβδομον, but probably the judicial authority (22 sqq.) is the sixth, notwith-

standing the renewed reference to it in 39 sq. That the rich are a necessary part of the State, we see from Dio Chrys. Or. 38 (2. 130 R), *εἰ δὲ πάσαις μὲν ταῖς πόλεσι, μᾶλλον δὲ ταῖς μεγάλαις, δεῖ μὲν καὶ τῶν πλουσίων, ἵνα καὶ χορηγῶσι καὶ φιλοτιμῶνται ταυτὶ τὰ νενομισμένα δαπανήματα.*

34. ὄγδοον δὲ κ.τ.λ. *Kaí* is explanatory, as often elsewhere. Hesych. (s. v. *δημιουργός*), *παρὰ τοῖς Δωριεῦσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες, τὰ δημόσια πράττοντες*: Etym. Magn. (s. v. *δημιουργός*), *δημιουργοὶ δὲ ἐκαλοῦντο παρὰ τῇ Ἀργείῳ καὶ Θεσσαλοῖς οἱ περὶ τὰ τέλη* (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 327. 3).

35. *λειτουργοῦν*. See above on 1279 a 11.

36. *τοὺς δυναμένους ἄρχειν*, 'those who are fit to serve as magistrates': cp. 1291 b 6 and 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 32.

40. *ταῦτα*, i. e. *τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσιν*. Sus.² (Note 1189) misses a reference to the work of *τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς λειτουργοῦν*, but we often note an absence in the Politics of absolute completeness and precision.

1. *ἀναγκαῖον καὶ μετέχοντας εἶναι τινος ἀρετῆς τῶν πολιτικῶν*. 1291 b. These words have been interpreted in different ways. Some have taken *τῶν πολιτικῶν* as in the genitive after *τινας*: so Vet. Int. ('necessarium et aliquos politicorum esse participantes virtute'), Vict., Congreve, and Welldon. Sepulveda, however, following Aretinus and followed by Giph. and Schn., translates 'utique necesse est ut aliqui sint virtutis res civiles attingentis compotes,' while Sus. (and perhaps Lamb.) takes *τῶν πολιτικῶν* as in the genitive after *ἀρετῆς*, but makes the words masc. and not neuter. Sepulveda is probably right: cp. Plato, Laws 643 D, *τέλειον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρετῆς* (Stallbaum, 'virtutis quam negotium ipsius postulat').

2. *τὰς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* Cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 25 sqq. The cultivator in ancient Greece seems to have been sometimes also a handicraftsman—an interesting fact. This is confirmed by Diod. 1. 74. 7, *παρὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις* (i. e. other races than the Egyptian) *ιδεῖν ἔστι τοὺς τεχνίτας περὶ πολλὰ τῇ διανοίᾳ περισπωμένους καὶ διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν μὴ μένοντας τὸ παράπαν ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἐργασίας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐφάπτονται γεωργίας, οἱ δ' ἐμπορίας κοινωνοῦσιν κ.τ.λ.*: cp. also Plato, Rep. 397 E, 551 E sq. That cultivators and handicraftsmen were often also soldiers is well known. *Μὲν οὖν* is answered by *ἀλλά, 7. Δυνάμεις*, 'powers' or 'capacities,' such as the capacity to fight or to till the soil.

5. *ἀντιποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς πάντες*, so that they would not admit that a separate class of men possessed of virtue is a necessary

part of the State. 'Virtue also,' as well as serving in war, tilling the soil, judging, etc. Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 4. 1166 a 10, πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῇ ἐπιεικεί ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ἢ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι, and 1166 b 3 sq., and also the sarcastic line of Cratinus (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 141: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 221),

ἀνδρῶν ἀρίστων πᾶσα γαργαίρει πάλις.

6. καὶ τὰς πλείστας ἀρχὰς ἀρχειν οἴονται δύνασθαι, so that they would not admit that a separate official class is a necessary part of the State. That the demos did not claim a share in all offices, we see from [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 3 (cp. Pol. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 20 sq.). According to King George the Third (quoted by Bryce, American Commonwealth, 2. 484) 'every man is good enough for any place he can get.'

7. διὸ ταῦτα μέρη μάλιστα εἶναι δοκαῖ πόλεως, οἱ εὖποροι καὶ οἱ ἄποροι. Ταῦτα, i.e. οἱ πενόμενοι καὶ οἱ πλουτοῦντες, or, in Aristotle's own words, οἱ εὖποροι καὶ οἱ ἄποροι. Ταῦτα (= οὗτοι), like ταῦτα in 10, is attracted into the gender of μέρη (cp. αὕτη in 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32). Aristotle on the contrary holds that a fighting class, judges, and deliberators are parts of the State in the fullest sense, and not the rich and the poor (1291 a 24 sqq.).

8. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. As to ταῦτα see preceding note. The rich and the poor are again referred to. Cp. 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 38, κινούνται δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι καὶ ὅταν τάναντία εἶναι δοκοῦντα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἰσάζῃ ἀλλήλοις, οἷον οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ ὁ δῆμος, and 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 25 sqq., where the ἄποροι and the εὖποροι are spoken of as ἀντικείμενα μόρια. 'Εναντία is emphatic—not only parts of the State, as the rich and the poor have been said to be in 7 sq., but also opposite parts of the State, and it is into opposite parts embodying attributes which cannot be combined that a whole should be divided (cp. De Part. An. 1. 3. 643 a 31, ἔτι τοῖς ἀντικείμενοις διαιρεῖν· διάφορα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις τάντικείμενα, οἷον λευκότης καὶ μελανία καὶ εὐθύτης καὶ καμπυλότης). These inquirers, therefore, had something to urge in defence of their view, but they erred in supposing that all men have virtue and capacity for office. Besides, the rich and the poor are not as much opposites to each other as the good and the bad (7 (5). 3. 1303 b 15 sq.). For μέρη . . . μορίων see note on 1339 b 38.

11. ὥστε καὶ τὰς πολιτείας κ.τ.λ., 'so that they [not only treat the rich and the poor as opposite parts of the State, but also],' etc.

κατὰ τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τούτων καθιστάσι. Cp. 3. 17. 1288 a 20-24 and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 27-32.

14—30. That the first sentence of this passage repeats 1290 b 21 has been remarked already (see above on 1290 b 21—24). The doctrine of c. 3 that the parts of the State are the various kinds of *δημος* and *γνώριμοι* reappears here intact, notwithstanding the totally different account of the parts of the State given in c. 4. 1290 b 21—1291 b 13 (see vol. i. Appendix A). Much of what is said in 1291 b 14—30 has already been said with less detail in c. 3. 1289 b 27—1290 a 2, and we hardly expect to find the ground gone over again. In severing the artisan class from τὸ χειρωνακικόν (19, 25) the passage before us differs from 3. 4. 1277 a 38 sqq.; it may also be not quite in accord with 1291 a 4 sqq. (see note on 21). We are surprised to observe that little or no account is taken of its teaching when the various kinds of democracy and oligarchy come to be distinguished in 1291 b 30—c. 6. 1293 a 34.

15. *ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.* Plato in the *Politicus* (302 D sq.) had already distinguished democracy according to law from the opposite kind, and Isocrates (*Areop.* §§ 60, 70) had distinguished well constituted democracies from others. The Theban orator in *Thuc.* 3. 62. 4 had implied that a distinction exists between an *ὀλιγαρχία ἰσόνομος* and a *δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν*, and Plato in the *Politicus* (301 A) had marked off oligarchy according to law, which he calls aristocracy, from oligarchy not according to law. Isocrates implies that there are two kinds of oligarchy in *Panath.* § 132. Aristotle advances further in the same track.

16. *καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων*, 'even from what has been already said' (in c. 3. 1289 b 28 sqq.): cp. c. 6. 1292 b 23, *ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν ἐστιν*. Aristotle says nothing here as to the other cause for the existence of different kinds of democracy which he points out in 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 22 sqq., a passage which may probably have been written later than that before us.

18. *οἶον δήμου μὲν εἶδη κ.τ.λ.* In the terminology of the passage before us whatever does not fall under the head of *οἱ γνώριμοι* falls under that of *ὁ δῆμος*. 'Ο δῆμος thus becomes a term of wide extension; it includes not a few who were by no means poor; many *τεχνῖται*, for instance, were well-to-do (3. 5. 1278 a 24) and many *ἐμποροί*. The *μέσοι* or moderately well-to-do, again, of whom we read in c. 3. 1289 b 31, must here be reckoned among the *demoi*. But the term *ὁ δῆμος* is not always thus used. We sometimes find it used in contrast not to *οἱ γνώριμοι*, but to *οἱ εὐποροί* (c. 11. 1296 a 28: c. 12. 1297 a 9 sq.: 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 5 sqq.).

The demos then becomes the part of the citizen-body which is not *εὔπορον*, not the part which does not consist of *γνώριμοι*, and is consequently a less extensive class. In 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 1 sq. and 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 12 sq., again, *ὁ δῆμος* is opposed to *οἱ πλούσιοι*, and in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 25 to *οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες*. The poorest classes within the demos would be the fishermen (Theocr. Idyll. 21. 16) and the day-labourers (here called *τὸ χειρητικόν*). The trireme-oarsmen at Athens must also have been poor. A demos of trireme-oarsmen would be a demos of a very special type; it would have much more national feeling than a demos of *ἔμποροι* bent on gain and wandering from one seaport to another (see Herondas, 2. 55 sqq.), but it would be somewhat inclined to war: cp. Diod. 18. 10. 1, where we read of the Athenian assembly at the outbreak of the Lamian War, *πολὺ τοῖς πλήθεσιν ὑπερεῖχον οἱ τὸν πόλεμον αἰρούμενοι καὶ τὰς τροφὰς εἰωθότες ἔχειν ἐκ τοῦ μισθοφορεῖν* οἷς ποτ' ἔφησεν ὁ Φίλιππος *τὸν μὲν πόλεμον εἰρήνην ὑπάρχειν, τὴν δὲ εἰρήνην πόλεμον* (this, however, was said by Philip of the orators of the Athenian assembly: see his Letter to the Athenians, c. 19). There must have been a large contingent of trireme-oarsmen in the demos of Carthage, if Meltzer (Gesch. der Karthager, 2. 136) is right in thinking that the oarsmen and sailors of the Carthaginian fleet were taken as a rule and in the main from the demos. Aristotle includes the *γεωργοί* in his enumeration here, but not *οἱ νομαῖς*, as to whom see 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 19 sqq.

20. καὶ τούτου κ.τ.λ. For the distinction between *τὸ πορθμενικόν* and *τὸ ἀλιευτικόν*, cp. Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 23, *πολλὰ καὶ ἀλιευτικά* (sc. *πλοία*) *ἔλαβε καὶ πορθμεία ἀνθρώπων μεστὰ καταπλείοντα ἀπὸ νήσων*, and as to the class of vessels designated by the word *πορθμεία* see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 483. 8. Many Tenedians seem to have been employed as sailors in vessels carrying passengers from Tenedos or other islands to the mainland, or from one side of the neighbouring Hellespont to the other. Another city in which many of the inhabitants were similarly engaged was the Boeotian city of Anthêdon on the Euripus (Pseudo-Dicaearch. De Graeciae Urbibus, c. 24, *προσπεπονθότες πορθμοῖς οἱ πλείστοι καὶ ναυπηγοί*: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 259). As to *οἱ πορθμεύοντες εἰς Ἐρυθράς* in Chios see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 592. Büchsenschütz (Besitz und Erwerb, p. 348) says, 'as to the crews of trading vessels we have no information (fehlt es uns an Nachrichten), still it is probable that they consisted to a large extent of slaves,' and he refers to Demosth.

in Apatur. c. 8, but it would seem from the passage before us that their crews often formed part of the *demos* and therefore must often have consisted of freemen and citizens. The Athenian orator Demades had been a *καύτης* and a *πορθμεύς* (see Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 19. 4), and the lowness of his birth was a stock reproach to him. There was a proverb *ἀπὸ κώπης ἐπὶ βῆμα*, indicating the length of the step from the one to the other. As to the fishermen of Tarentum, see Mr. A. J. Evans in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 7. 35, and as to Byzantium, Dio Chrys. Or. 35, 2. 73 R, *φέρει δὲ, τίνας ἄλλους τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας ἀκούομεν; Βυζαντίους, χώραν τε ἀρίστην νεμομένους καὶ θάλατταν εὐκαρποτάτην· τῆς δὲ γῆς ἡμελίκασι διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς θαλάττης· ἡ μὲν γὰρ διὰ μακροῦ φέρει τὸν καρπὸν αὐτοῖς καὶ δεῖ λαβεῖν ἐργασαμένους, ἡ δὲ αὐτόθεν μηδὲν πονήσασιν.* Byzantium, as is well known, was a great centre for the tunny-fishery (Strabo, p. 320). The soil of Chios was rocky, and though its wine was good, its inhabitants must have been forced to live to a large extent by commerce, like those of Aegina (see note on 1258 a 34) and other States in a more or less similar position (see note on 1326 b 26). The passage before us shows that, whatever may have been the case in earlier times (see Isocr. De Pace, § 48, Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 326 sq., and above on 1327 b 11), in Aristotle's time many Athenian citizens served as oarsmen in the fleet. *τὸ ἐμπορικόν*, however, must also have been a numerous class at the Peiraeus.

21. *χρηματιστικόν*, explained by *ἐμπορικόν* in 24. Aristotle appears to be speaking of seafaring men on board merchant-ships; it is not quite clear whether he includes *ἐμποροὶ* among them. If he does, he brings *ἐμποροὶ* here under the head of *τὸ περὶ τὴν θάλατταν*, not under that of *τὸ ἀγοραῖον*, as in 1291 a 4 sqq. For the contrast of *πολεμικόν* and *χρηματιστικόν*, cp. 1. 9. 1258 a 10 sqq.

25. *τὸ χειρητικόν*, here apparently = *τὸ θητικόν*, though in 3. 4. 1277 a 38 sqq. *οἱ χειρῆγες* include *ὁ βάνυστος τεχνίτης*.

τὸ μικρὰν ἔχον οὐσίαν, less than the *γεωργοί*, who are grouped in c. 6. 1292 b 25 sq. with persons possessing *μετρίαν οὐσίαν*.

26. *τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον*, 'that which is not citizen by both parents': see vol. i. p. 248, note 1, and cp. c. 6. 1292 b 39, where *ἐλεύθεροι* seems to answer to *πολίτης* in c. 4. 1292 a 3. Cp. also Diog. Laert. 6. 4, *ὀνειδίζόμενός ποτε (Ἀντισθένης) ὡς οὐκ εἴη ἐκ δύο ἐλευθέρων, "οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκ δύο," ἔφη, "παλαιστικῶν, ἀλλὰ παλαιστικός εἰμι."* At Athens, democratic though it was, the class of

'half-breeds' was looked down upon, all the more so probably because the Athenians claimed to be αὐτόχθονες : cp. Eurip. Ion, 529 Bothe (589 Dindorf),

εἶναι φασὶ τὰς αὐτόχθονας
κλεινὰς Ἀθήνας οὐκ ἐπέισακτον γένος,
ὡς ἐσπεσούμαι δύο νόσω κεκτημένος,
πατρός τ' ἐπακτοῦ καὶ τὸς ὦν νοθαγενής.

They were regarded as ξένοι (3. 5. 1278 a 26 sqq.) and were often of partly servile origin (1278 a 33). Not every kind of democracy admitted them to citizenship (ibid. and 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 6-11), and even the democracies which made them citizens did so mostly when they were short of genuine citizens, and withdrew the boon when they ceased to be so (1278 a 29 sqq.). According to Isocrates they were the bane of the States to which they belonged (Panath. § 165, τοῖς τε μὴ δυναμένοις ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ζῆν καὶ τοῖς χεῖρον γεγυρόσιν ὧν οἱ νόμοι προστάτουσιν, οἷον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λυμαίνονται τὰς πόλεις : cp. Schol. Aristoph. Ran. 1532, μαχέσθωσαν οὖν, φησί, Κλεοφῶν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τοῦτο ὅμοιοί εἰσι ξένοι ἐν ταῖς πατρίσιν αὐτῶν, καὶ μὴ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ κεισίνωσαν πολέμους· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν πατρίς αὕτη). We learn from Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 13 that the class of citizens whose extraction was not pure was one of the classes which supported Peisistratus before he made himself tyrant. Many demagogues belonged to this class (Gilbert, Beiträge zur innern Geschichte Athens, p. 75 sqq.). It was to a corresponding class at Rome that Scipio Africanus the younger referred in the stern words which he addressed to the Roman mob, 'Taceant quibus Italia noverca est' (Val. Max. 6. 2. 3).

28. With τῶν γνωρίμων some such words as εἶδη ποιούσιν must apparently be supplied (Vict. 'notorum autem species constituunt divitiarum' etc.). For the fact cp. c. 3. 1289 b 33 sqq. and c. 8. 1293 b 37 sq., and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 39, ὀλιγαρχία καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ παιδείᾳ ὀρίζεται.

29. καὶ τὰ τούτοις λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαφορὰν. Τούτοις is neuter, though it refers to masc. and fem. substantives : see note on 1291 a 16. Κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαφορὰν is 'fere idem quod κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συστοιχίαν' (Bon. Ind. 192 b 34), and συστοιχία = 'series notionum quae eodem genere continentur' (Bon. Ind. s.v.). Cp. Metaph. Δ. 10. 1018 a 35, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὅν πολλαχῶς λέγεται, ἀκολουθεῖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα κατὰ ταῦτα λέγεται, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον.

30. δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle now goes on to fulfil the

promise he makes in 15 sq. (cp. c. 1. 1289 a 10 sq. and c. 2. 1289 b 12 sqq.) to show that there are more kinds than one of democracy and oligarchy. As to the various kinds of democracy see Essay on Constitutions. Aristotle deals with democracy before oligarchy because it is less bad than oligarchy, and the better constitutions deserve to be noticed first (c. 8. 1293 b 27 sqq.: 3. 7. 1279 a 23 sqq.). *Μέν οὖν* is taken up by *μέν οὖν*, 38, but to *μέν* after *πρώτη* there is nothing to answer. For the absence of the article with *δημοκρατία* cp. 3. 8. 1279 b 20, where see note. For *ἡ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον*, 'that which is so called most in accordance with equality,' cp. Meteor. 4. 3. 381 a 9, *ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν εἴησιν λεγομένη πέφικε τοῦτ' ἐστίν*. Aristotle regards this kind of democracy as placing rich and poor on a level more than any other, but his view is open to question. It placed rich and poor nominally on a level, but, as it did not provide pay, the holders of office would be unremunerated, and members of the assembly and dicasts would be so too. Hence it would be difficult for poor men to play an active part in the State, and Greek democrats would deny that this form of democracy really placed rich and poor on a level. The constitution of Rhodes as described by Cicero in *De Rep.* 3. 35. 48, in which pay was provided, seems to make a nearer approach to this ideal. It may, indeed, be questioned whether the kind of democracy described in the passage before us falls within the definition of democracy given in 3. 8. 1279 b 18, where democracy is said to exist when the poor are supreme, not when neither rich nor poor are supreme. It should be noticed that in the kind of democracy which ranks as first in the Eighth (old Sixth) Book—a kind which appears to answer to the first two of the chapter before us—property-qualifications for office may or may not exist; they may be entirely absent (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 31 sq.), as indeed they may be in the *πάτριος δημοκρατία* (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sqq.), but they may also exist, and indeed may reach a high amount in the case of the most important offices (1318 b 30 sq.), and in that case these would be quite beyond the reach of the poor.

32. τὸ μὴδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους. Ὑπάρχειν is the reading of *Γ* *M*⁸ *P*² ³ etc. *Vat. Pal. Bekk.*, while *P*¹ ⁴ *Ar. Sus.* have *ὑπερέχειν*, but in 8 (6). 2. 1318 a 6 sqq., a passage apparently based on that before us, we have *ἴσον γὰρ τὸ μὴδὲν μᾶλλον ἄρχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μὴδὲ κυρίου εἶναι μόνους ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐξ ἴσου κατ' ἀριθμόν*. Hence *Vict.*, followed by *Schn.*,

Coray, Stahr, Bonitz (Ind. 789 b 2 sqq.), and Welldon, would read *ἄρχειν* in place of *ὑπάρχειν*. It is not easy to account for the addition in the MSS. of the prefix *ὑπ-*, but I am inclined on the whole to think that Vict. is right, unless indeed *ἄρχοντας* or some such word should be added before *ὑπάρχειν*.

34. *εἴπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, '[and the law is right,] for if,' etc. *Γάρ* introduces a justification of the interpretation of political equality adopted by the law of this democracy. Freedom will be enjoyed by the citizens under a democracy of this kind, because office will be open alike to all (cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 2 sqq.), and equality, because they will all share alike. That freedom and equality were commonly thought to go with democracy, we see from 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq.: cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 19, Isocr. Areop. § 60, Plato, Rep. 562, and Plut. Themist. c. 27, where Artabanus says to Themistocles, *ὑμᾶς μὲν οὖν ἐλευθερίαν μάλιστα θαυμάζειν καὶ ἰσότηρα λόγος*. But in 3. 6. 1279 a 21 Aristotle says that all the *παρεκβάσεις* are *δеспотικαί*.

37. *ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Here the test of the existence of a democracy is found in *τὸ κύριον εἶναι τὸ δόξαν τοῖς πλείοσιν*, notwithstanding what has been said in c. 4. 1290 a 30 sqq. See note on that passage.

39. *ἄλλο δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, 'and another, the characteristic of which is that the offices are held on a property-qualification, this property-qualification being, however, small.' *Δεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* is added to make it clear that admissibility to office is not confined in this kind of democracy to those who at the moment of its institution happen to possess the small prescribed property-qualification, but falls of right to any one who may acquire the property-qualification from time to time, and is not retained by any one who loses it. Cp. c. 5. 1292 a 41. *Μετέχειν*, sc. *τῶν ἀρχῶν*. In *τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι*, 39, we have the plural *ἀπὸ τιμημάτων*, and this occurs more frequently in such phrases than the singular *ἀπὸ τιμήματος*, but the latter occurs in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 7 sqq., 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 28, and elsewhere.

1292 a. 1. For the absence of *δέ* after *ἔτερον* cp. 4, c. 16. 1300 b 20, 31, Rhet. 2. 23. 1397 a 20, *ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων*, and 3. 15. 1416 a 6, 13; 20, 21, 24.

2. *ἄνθρωποι ἀνυπεύθυνοι*, i. e. *κατὰ τὸ γένος*: cp. c. 6. 1292 b 35 sq., where see note. Compare also Diog. Laert. 1. 55, *καὶ ὁ ἀρχὸς ὑπεύθυνος ἔστω παντὶ τῷ βουλευμένῳ γράφεσθαι*. To the mind of a Greek there would be a great difference between a democracy which excluded from office persons of illegitimate birth or wholly or in part of alien or slave,

extraction, and a democracy which did not. Aristotle distinguishes in 3. 5. 1278 a 17 sq., 26 sqq., between democracies which admitted artisans and day-labourers to citizenship and democracies which went further and made half-aliens and νόθοι citizens. So Aeschines traces disastrous results to a contamination of the Athenian citizen-body (De Fals. Leg. c. 173, παρεμπεσόντων δ' εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν ἡμῶν οὔτε ἐλευθέρων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοῖς τρόποις οὐ μετρίων κ.τ.λ.). Compare the cry sometimes heard in France, 'À bas les Juifs! Vive la France Française!' Some States of the American Union are easier than others in admitting aliens to citizenship (Bryce, American Commonwealth, Part 3, c. 62: vol. ii. p. 440 sq.), and this no doubt affects the working of the State-constitution.

3. δὲν μόνον ἡ πολιτείας. This answers to ὅσοι δὲ ἐλεύθεροι ὄντι in c. 6. 1292 b 39. Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 27, ὁ γὰρ ἐκ πολιτείας ἐν τισὶ δημοκρατίαις πολίτης ἐστίν.

4. ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας κ.τ.λ. Ταῦτά seems to mean 'the same as in the last-mentioned kind of democracy.' For κύριον δ' εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον (where τὸ πλῆθος = ὁ δῆμος, cp. 11 and 26-28), compare c. 14. 1298 b 13, συμφέρει δὲ δημοκρατία τε τῇ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκούσῃ δημοκρατία νῦν (λέγω δὲ τοιαύτην ἐν ᾗ κύριος ὁ δῆμος καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐστίν) κ.τ.λ. An Attic law quoted in Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 87 and Andoc. De Myst. c. 87 contains a provision, ψήφισμα μηδὲν μίττε βουλῆς μίττε δήμου νόμου κυριώτερον εἶναι. In the kind of democracy to which Aristotle here refers the assembly sets itself above the law, and passes decrees which are not in accordance with it. The majority of the Athenian assembly claims a right to do this in Xen. Hell. 1. 7. 12, τὸν δὲ Καλλίξενον προσεκαλείσαντο παράνομα φάσκοντες γεγραφεῖναι Εὐρυπτόλεμός τε ὁ Πεισιάνακτος καὶ ἄλλοι τινές. τοῦ δὲ δήμου ἐνιοὶ ταῦτα ἐπύκνουσιν, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ μὴ τις εἴσσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν ὃ δὲ βούληται: cp. [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 88, ὁ γὰρ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναίων κυριώτατος ὢν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀπάντων καὶ ἐξὸν αὐτῷ ποιεῖν ὃ τι δὲ βούληται, οὕτω καλὸν καὶ σεμνὸν ἡγήσασθαι εἶναι δῶρον τὸ Ἀθηναίων γασθῆναι, ὥστε νόμους ἔθετο αὐτῷ καθ' ὅς ποιεῖσθαι δεῖ, εἴν τινα βούλωνται, πολίτην, and see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 310, on these two passages. Aeschines appears to imply in c. Timarch. c. 177 sqq. that decrees were often passed by the Athenian assembly which were in contradiction of law. This may well have been the case, notwithstanding what Demosthenes says of Midias in c. Mid. c. 150, πατριδὸς τετευχώς ἡ νόμοις τῶν ἀπασῶν πύλειν μάλιστα οἰκείσθαι δοκεῖ.

That Aristotle objects to rule uncontrolled by law, except in the case of the absolute king, we have seen already (see note on 1272 b 7 and cp. also 3. 16. 1287 a 28 sqq.). His statement that when the decrees of the assembly come to be supreme and not the law, this is due to the demagogues, appears to be inconsistent with the statement which he makes immediately after, that demagogues do not arise except in the kind of democracy in which the law is already not supreme. Elsewhere he does not seem to hold that demagogues do not exist in democracies according to law, for he implies in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 29 sqq. that Peisistratus was a demagogue, yet he cannot think that in those early times a democracy existed at Athens in which decrees, not laws, were supreme: see also 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 28 sqq., where it is implied that demagoguery is practised even in the *πατρία δημοκρατία*. In c. 6. 1292 b 41 sqq. the rise of the ultimate kind of democracy is traced to a different cause; it is ascribed not to the flattery of the assembly by demagogues, but to profounder causes—to an increase of the States in populousness and in revenue and to the provision of pay. It is implied in 36 sq. that the difference between a law and a decree of the assembly is that a law is universal in its terms, whereas a decree is drawn to meet the shifting circumstances of the moment (cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 14. 1137 b 27 sqq.) and is not universal. Yet we find an instance of a decree of an universal character in Plut. Aristid. c. 22, γράφει (ὁ Ἀριστείδης) ψήφισμα κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἰρέσθαι. We might infer from what Aristotle says here that it was the assembly only that shook off the restraints of law in the ultimate democracy, but it would seem from 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25–36 that the individual citizens also did so. Did the dicasteries in an ultimate democracy observe the laws? Aristotle appears to be silent as to this in the Politics.

7. τοὺς δημαγωγούς. The word *δημαγωγός*, which appears to be modelled on *παιδαγωγός*, is occasionally used in a neutral sense of influential *ρήτορες* in general (e.g. in Thuc. 4. 21. 3, Isocr. De Antid. § 234, and [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 2. 4), and in 2. 12. 1274 a 14 we hear of *δημαγωγοὶ φαῦλοι* and in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 26 of *δημαγωγοὶ πονηροί*, so that we conclude that Aristotle regarded some demagogues as good, but he commonly uses the word in an unfavourable sense of those among them who habitually flattered the demos. Here the *δημαγωγός* is tacitly contrasted with *οἱ βέλτιστοι*

τῶν πολιτῶν, 'the upper class of citizens.' The word is for obvious reasons seldom used by the Attic Orators (with the exception of Isocrates), and, if one may judge by the silence of Ast's *Lexicon Platonium*, never by Plato.

ἐν μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Supply πᾶσι (with Welldon). Cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 28, ἕως μὲν οὖν Περικλῆς προειστήκει τοῦ δήμου βελτίω τὰ κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν ἦν, τελευτήσαντος δὲ Περικλέους πολὺ χείρω. πρῶτον γὰρ τότε προστάτην ἔλαβεν ὁ δῆμος οὐκ εὐδοκίμουνα παρὰ τοῖς ἐπιεικίσιν ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρότερον χρόνοις αἰεὶ διετέλουν οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς δημαγωγοῦντες: Schol. Aristoph. Pac. 681 (quoted by Sandys): and Pol. 2. 12. 1274 a 14 sq. (see note).

9. οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν, 'the upper class of citizens': cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 34 (where οἱ βέλτιστοι = οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ γνῶριμοι): Isocr. Hel. § 33 (τοὺς βελτίστους τῶν πολιτῶν): Diod. 11. 86. 5 (οἱ χαριέστατοι τῶν πολιτῶν): Plut. Phocion, c. 34 (οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν): Thuc. 8. 47 (τοὺς βελτίστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων): Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 6 (οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν Μαρτινέων), and Grote's remarks on this passage in *Hist. of Greece*, Part 2. c. 76 (vol. 10. 50, note). It was no doubt a name which this class of the citizens had given themselves (Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 22). But the phrase is sometimes used in a more purely ethical sense, e.g. in Isocr. De Pace, § 119, and perhaps in Panath. § 148. In c. 8. 1293 b 41 we have τοῖς ἀρίστοις τῶν πολιτῶν, and in Xen. Hell. 1. 4. 13 κράτιστος τῶν πολιτῶν, used in this ethical sense.

εἰσὶν ἐν προεδρίᾳ = εἰσὶν οἱ μέγιστοι (cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 22).

11. μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται κ.τ.λ., 'for there' (i. e. where the laws are not supreme) 'the demos becomes a monarch.' The picture of a tyrant Demos surrounded by flatterers comes to Aristotle from the *Equites* of Aristophanes: cp. Eq. 1111 Didot,

ὦ Δῆμε, καλὴν γ' ἔχεις
ἀρχήν, ὅτε πάντες ἀν-
θρωποι δεδίασί σ' ὡς-
περ ἄνδρα τύραννον.
'Ἄλλ' εὐπαράγωγος εἴ,
θωπευόμενός τε χαί-
ρεις κ.τ.λ.

and 1330,

δείξατε τὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡμῖν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆσδε μόναρχον.

Compare 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 38 sqq., 2. 12. 1274 a 5 sqq., and 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 31 sqq. It is when a democracy or an oligarchy (c. 6. 1293 a 17 sqq.) comes to be like a monarchy that law ceases to be supreme and men become supreme in place of it.

18. Ὅμηρος, in II. 2. 203 sqq., where Odysseus addressing men of the people says,

οὐ μὲν πως πάντες βασιλεύσομεν ἐνθάδ' Ἀχαιοί.
οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκυρανήν' εἰς κοίρανος ἔστω,
εἰς βασιλεύς, ᾧ ἴδωκε Κρόνου παῖς ἀγκυλομήτεω.

Aristotle sees that there may be two kinds of πολυκυρανή, one in which the ruler is one, though made up of many individuals, and another in which there are more rulers than one. As to the evils of the latter kind, see Thuc. 6. 72. 3, Xen. Anab. 6. 1. 18, and Isocr. Nicocl. § 24 sq.

15. ὁ δ' οὖν τοιοῦτος δῆμος κ.τ.λ., 'be that as it may, the kind of demos we have mentioned,' etc., as in 23, though in 17 the same words must mean (as in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 11) 'a democracy of the kind we have mentioned.' By ὁ τοιοῦτος δῆμος is meant a demos which is not ruled by law. For the thought cp. Fragm. Trag. Adesp. 426 Nauck (506, ed. 2),

πάντων τύραννος ἢ τύχη ἐστὶ τῶν θεῶν,
τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ὀνόματα ταῦτα πρόσκειται μάτην
μόνη διοικεῖν οὖν ἅπαντα βούλεται, -

or, if we adopt Nauck's reading in his second edition,

μόνη διοικεῖ γοῦν ἅπανθ' ἢ βούλεται.

17. ὥστε οἱ κώλακες ἐντιμοί. Cp. 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 38 sqq.: Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 234 sqq.: Aristoph. Eq. 1116 Didot: Demosth. Phil. 3. 4.

καὶ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 5. 1292 b 7 sqq., 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 5 sq., 37 sq., and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 30 sqq. Had this been said of the ultimate democracy by any one before? Aristotle, however, does not probably mean to say that this kind of democracy is as bad as tyranny, for tyranny combines in itself the evils of the extreme forms of oligarchy and democracy (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 3 sqq., 1311 a 8 sqq.: see also above on 1289 a 39).

19. δεσποτικὰ τῶν βελτιόνων. Cp. c. 10. 1295 a 19 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 15 sqq. In the first, or most moderate, form of democracy the ἐπικεῖς καὶ γνώριμοι are not ruled by men worse than themselves (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 35 sqq.).

20. τὰ ἐπιτάγματα, the technical term for the 'ukases' of tyrants: cp. Plato, Laws 722 E, τυραννικὸν ἐπίταγμα, and 859 A: Stob. Floril. 99. 34, ὁ φιλοσοφία, τυραννικά σου τὰ ἐπιτάγματα, and Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 185, where, however, it is implied that oligarchies

issue ἐπιτάγματα as well as tyrants: also (with Vict.) Demosth. Ol. 2. 30, εἰ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ὥσπερ ἐκ τυραννίδος ὑμῶν ἐπιτάττειν ἀποδώσετε. Προστάγματα δεσποτῶν occurs in Plut. Pelop. c. 34.

καὶ ὁ δημαγωγὸς καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάλογον. Cp. 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 40 and Aristot. Fragm. 421. 1548 a 24, τῶν δημαγωγῶν τὰ πλήθῃ κολακεύοντων, ὥς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν πολιτείαις (referred to in Bon. Ind. 174 a 38). Καί before ἀνάλογον means 'or,' as in 2. 3. 1262 a 8, διςχιλίῳν καὶ μυρίῳν. See also note on 1294 a 35.

23. τοῖς δῆμοις τοῖς τοιούτοις. For the omission of παρά, see notes on 1274 b 12 and 1295 a 29.

25. πάντα ἀνάγοντες εἰς τὸν δῆμον, everything, even matters regulated by law. For ἀνάγοντες cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 32 sqq. and 2. 8. 1267 b 40. For the fact cp. c. 15. 1300 a 3 sq. and 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 29 sqq.

28. ἔτι δ' οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες κ.τ.λ., 'and further those who bring charges against the magistrates [also add to the supremacy of the people, for they] say,' etc. Not a few held that the many were the fittest judges of disputed questions when the arguments of the contending parties had been placed before them (3. 11: 3. 16. 1287 b 23 sqq.: so Athenagoras in Thuc. 6. 39. 1).

29. δέχεται τὴν πρόκλησιν, 'receives the invitation' to decide the question at issue. Δέχεσθαι τὴν πρόκλησιν is a phrase of frequent occurrence (Thuc. 3. 64. 5: Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 39 *init.*: Plut. Pyrrh. c. 12 *init.*, Sulla, c. 22 *sub fin.*), and in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 41 we have τὴν ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον πρόκλησιν. Thus there is little doubt that πρόκλησιν is the true reading here, and not πρόσκλησιν, though the latter reading has the support of Vat. Pal. as well as Π¹.

ὥστε καταλύονται πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαί, as well as the law. Even the Boulê (c. 15. 1299 b 38 sqq.: 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 30 sqq.).

31. ὁ φάσκων. Plato is probably referred to: cp. Rep. 557 C sqq., Laws 712 E, and Plut. Dion, c. 53, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἄκρατον δημοκρατίαν, ὥς οὐ πολιτείαν ἀλλὰ παντοπόλιον οὖσαν πολιτείῳν κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα κ.τ.λ.

οὐ πολιτείαν. For the position of the negative see Waitz on Categ. 6. 4 b 22 and Bon. Ind. 539 a 5 sqq.

32. οὗτου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἀρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία. Cp. 2. 10. 1272 b 9 sqq. If it is objected that the absolute kingship, in which laws do not rule, is nevertheless a form of constitution,

Aristotle's reply would probably be that the absolute king is himself a law.

δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for the law ought to rule over everything, and the magistrates and the citizen-body to decide [only] in reference to particulars.' For the suppression of 'only' see note on 1282 a 36. Aristotle probably remembers the saying of Pindar quoted in Hdt. 3. 38 (cp. Plut. Demetr. c. 42), ὁρθῶς μοι δοκεῖ Πίνδαρος ποιῆσαι, νόμον πάντων βασιλέα φήσας εἶναι. The magistrates and the citizen-body should decide about particulars, because the magistrates will deal with some things best and the citizen-body with others (3. 11. 1281 b 21-38: 3. 15. 1286 a 26 sqq.: 3. 16. 1287 b 15 sqq.). For the gen. τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. Gerth, § 417. 4. Anm. 10 c (p. 363), where Plato, Rep. 576 D, ἀλλ' εὐδαιμονίας τε αὐτὸ καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὡσαύτως ἢ ἄλλως κρίνεις; is referred to (see Stallbaum's note), and cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 36, αἱ περὶ τὸ βουλευόμενόν εἰσι τῶν κοινῶν (see note on 1322 b 37). For πολιτεία in the sense of 'universitas civium' see Bon. Ind. s. v. and Liddell and Scott.

35. ἐν ᾗ ψηφίσμασι πάντα διοικεῖται. Cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 41, where we read of Athens, ἀπάντων γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν πεποιήκεν ὁ δῆμος κύριον καὶ πάντα διοικεῖται ψηφίσμασιν καὶ δικαστηρίοις, ἐν οἷς ὁ δῆμος ἐστὶν ὁ κρατῶν, and Cic. De Rep. 1. 27. 43, Athenienses quibusdam temporibus sublato Areopago nihil nisi populi scitis ac decretis agebant. Contrast the language of Demosthenes about Athens in c. Timocr. c. 152, ἡ γὰρ πόλις ἡμῶν, ὧ ἄνδρες δικασταί, νόμοις καὶ ψηφίσμασι διοικεῖται.

36. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψήφισμα εἶναι καθόλου, and in constitutions the universal rules, because law rules in them and law is an embodiment of the universal.

C. 5. 39. As to the various kinds of oligarchy see Essay on Constitutions.

40. μὴ μετέχειν, sc. τῶν ἀρχῶν, or, which is the same thing, τῆς πολιτείας.

πλείους ὄντας. But suppose the poor are not more numerous but fewer than the privileged class, does not an oligarchy exist even then? The answer given in 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 19 sq. is 'No,' but in 3. 8. 1280 a 1 sqq. 'Yes.' In the polity the class which shares in the advantages of the constitution is more numerous than that which does not (c. 13. 1297 b 4 sqq.). Even in an oligarchy the privileged class ought to be *stronger* than those excluded (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 26 sqq.).

41. εἶναι δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας. That this was the rule in the first form of oligarchy is confirmed by 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 25 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 26—28). The words before us are added because even where the property-qualification was not high, admission to the privileged class might be made subject to additional conditions, such as the abandonment of trade or selection by the authorities (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 26 sqq.).

1. ὅταν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μακρῶν ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαί. Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 1292 b. 21 sqq.

καὶ αἰρῶνται αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας. Αὐτοὶ is usually explained to mean 'the office-holders,' but in c. 6. 1293 a 23, where the kind of oligarchy referred to in the passage before us is further described, αὐτοὶ means οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες, or in other words 'the class which has access to office, the members of the πολίτευμα,' and that is probably what it means here. Τοὺς ἐλλείποντας is explained in c. 6. 1293 a 24 by τοὺς εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα βαδίζοντας. I can hardly think, therefore, that the explanation of Bonitz (Ind. 238 b 10), 'eos magistratus qui desunt,' is correct.

2. ἀν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. 'Ἐκ πάντων τούτων, 'from all those who possess this property-qualification.' For τούτων thus used cp. ταῦτα, 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 24, and see note on 1252 a 33. Aristotle regards this mode of electing as comparatively aristocratic, and the mode in which the choice is made from a designated section of those who possess the property-qualification as oligarchical, because, when some elect out of all, the arrangement is aristocratic (c. 15. 1300 b 4 sq.), and when some elect out of some, oligarchical (1300 b 1 sq.).

5. εἰσίη, sc. εἰς τὰς ἀρχάς (so Stahr and Welldon), or possibly εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα, not, I think, εἰς τὴν βουλὴν (as Bonitz suggests, Ind. 224 b 15, where c. 14. 1298 b 2 sqq. is compared).

6. τε is displaced; it should follow ὑπάρχει, not τό.

7. καὶ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. This echoes the corresponding remark about the extreme democracy in c. 4. 1292 a 17.

For ἀντίστροφος ὥσπερ, cp. De Gen. An. 1. 19. 727 a 3, ὅτι ἀλόγον ὡς τοῖς ἀρρεσιν ἢ γονῇ οὕτω τοῖς θήλεσι τὰ καταμήνια, φανερόν. Aristotle probably has before him here Thuc. 3. 62. 4, where the Thebans say, ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἡ πάλαι τότε ἐτύγχανεν οὔτε κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσόμορον πολιτεύουσα οὔτε κατὰ δημοκρατίαν· ὅπερ δὲ ἐστὶ νόμοις μὲν καὶ τῷ σωφροσεντάτῳ ἐναντιώτατον, ἐγγυτάτῳ δὲ τυράννου, δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν εἶχε τὰ πράγματα. See also c. 6. 1293 a 31 and 2. 10. 1272 b 7—11.

9. καὶ καλοῦσι δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'and further they call,' etc. For καὶ . . . δὴ see note on 1253 a 18. Vict. 'quare addit, vocare consuerunt hunc dominatum paucorum dynastiam, quia par similisque est huiuscemodi principatui: dynastas vero appellare mos erat regulos.' Zeus is called a *δυναστής* in Soph. Antig. 609. For the term *δυναστεία* see (with C. F. Hermann) Thuc. 3. 62. 4 (quoted above) and 4. 78. 3: Andoc. De Reditu, c. 27: Plato, Rep. 544 D: Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 46: Isocr. Paneg. § 105.

11. οὐ δεῖ δὲ λανθάνειν κ.τ.λ. This remark is added to convey a caution: compare the similar caution introduced by δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν in 3. 1. 1275 a 34 sqq. We must not suppose that the list of democracies and oligarchies just given exhausts the subject. It is not the case that the only democratically ruled States are those in which the constitution as embodied in the laws is democratic, and the only oligarchically ruled States those in which it is oligarchical. There are virtual as well as actual democracies and oligarchies. A State may be democratically ruled, though its constitution is oligarchical, if its customs and training are democratic, and a State may be oligarchically ruled, though its constitution is democratic, if its customs and training are oligarchical. When the constitution is not in harmony with the prevailing customs and training, the reason usually is that a revolution has occurred which has affected the customs and training of the State, but has not yet affected its constitution. Under circumstances of this kind the law is often the last thing to be changed. Plato had already spoken to much the same effect (Rep. 424 D: see vol. i. p. 78, note 1). It is interesting to observe that revolutions of a democratic or oligarchical nature were attended with changes of customs and training. A democratic revolution would bring with it an alteration in the bearing of the poor to the rich and of the rich to the poor, and an oligarchical revolution an alteration of an opposite kind. Mr. Bryce (American Commonwealth, end of c. 76) refers to England as a country 'where, though the constitution has become democratic, the habits of the nation are still aristocratic': this is the reverse change to that described by Aristotle. For συμβαίνει followed by ὥστε see note on 1261 a 34. For the distinction between οἱ νόμοι and τὸ ἔθος καὶ ἡ ἀγωγή, cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 103, εἰ μὴ ὄντων τῶν νόμων κατὰ ἔθνη καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα χρηστῶς πολιτεύονται, for ἐπιτηδεύματα = ἀγωγή, as we see from Diod. 11. 87. 5, καὶ καθόλου πολλοὶ τὰ φαῦλα τῶν ἐπιτηδεύματων ἀντὶ τῆς παλαιᾶς καὶ σπουδαίας ἀγωγῆς



ἡλλάττοντο. Some light is thrown on the meaning of ἀγωγή by Diod. 9. 1. 4, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς Σόλων τὴν ὅλην ἀγωγὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐχούσης Ἰωνικῇ, καὶ διὰ τὴν τρυφὴν καὶ τὴν ῥαστώνην ἐκτεθλαμμένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, μετέθηκε τῇ συνηθείᾳ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ ζῆλον τῶν ἀρρενωπῶν πράξεις.

14. The subject of πολιτεύεσθαι is probably τὴν πολιτείαν, 12, as the subject of ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι, 16, is τὴν πολιτείαν, 15 (cp. 2. 11. 1273 b 1): compare Plato, Laws 701 E, τούτων ἕνεκα δὴ πολιτείας τὴν τε δεσποτικωτάτην προελλόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερικωτάτην ἐπισκοποῦμεν συνί, ποτέρα τούτων ὁρθῶς πολιτεύεται, and see note on 1293 b 8.

18. οὐ γὰρ εὐθὺς μεταβαίνουσιν, sc. ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν, or *vice versa*, 'for they' (i. e. the citizens of the State which undergoes a change of constitution) 'do not [in this case] change at once from the one constitution to the other' (cp. Plato, Rep. 550 D). Bonitz (Ind. s. v. μεταβαίνειν) supplies αἱ πολιτεῖαι, but it seems better to supply the same subject with μεταβαίνουσιν and with ἀπαύσι.

19. παρ' ἀλλήλων, i. e. the oligarchical party from the democratic or *vice versa*.

23. ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν εἰρημένων, i. e. probably from the account which C. 6. has been given in c. 4. 1291 b 17 sqq. of the different εἶδη or μέρη τοῦ δήμου. The reference may, however, possibly be to c. 3. 1289 b 32 sq. and 1290 a 3-5. For in one form of democracy (the ultimate form) all these kinds of demos both share (μετέχουσι) in the constitution and take an active part in its working (κοινωνοῦσι), whereas in two at any rate of the three other forms not all of them even share in it, access to a share in it being accorded in the one to those only who acquire a certain property-qualification, and in the other to those whose extraction is unimpeachable, while in all three those who share in the constitution (owing to the absence of revenues and consequently of pay) have not the leisure to take an active part in its working.

25. τὸ γεωργικὸν καὶ τὸ κεκτημένον μετρίαν οὐσίαν. The γεωργοὶ are a part only of τὸ κεκτημένον μετρίαν οὐσίαν, for the νομίς also belong to this category (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 9 sqq.) and probably other classes. The γεωργοὶ of Aristotle are evidently peasant-proprietors, and the νομίς also may have been owners of land as well as of the herds and flocks they tended (see notes on 1318 b 9 and 1319 a 19, and for cases of the existence of democracies of this kind see note on 1318 b 10). We read of μετρία οὐσία here and in 2. 7. 1266 b 28 sq., and the class which is here said to have μετρία οὐσία appears to be the same as that which is said in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 11 sq. to

have *μὴ πολλὴν οὐσίαν*: we read, again, of *οὐσία μέση καὶ ἱκανή*, a larger amount apparently, in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 40, of *μικρὰ οὐσία* in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 26 and *οὐσία βραχεία* in 2. 7. 1267 a 9 sq., and of *μακρὰ οὐσία* and *μακραὶ οὐσίαι* in 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 16 and 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 11.

28. *τὸν νόμον ἐπιστήσαντες*, 'setting the law over men's doings as a ruler': cp. Plut. Solon, c. 21, *ἐπέστησε δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἐξόδοις τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ τοῖς πένθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἑορταῖς νόμον ἀπείργοντα τὸ ἄτακτον καὶ ἀκόλαστον*, and c. 6. 1293 a 20, *ἀνάγκη τὸν νόμον ἀξιούν αὐτοῖς ἀρχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτούς*.

ἐκκλησιάζουσι τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐκκλησίας. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 11, *διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειν ἄσχυλος (ὁ γεωργικὸς δῆμος), ὥστε μὴ πολλάκις ἐκκλησιάζειν*. It was when meetings of the assembly came to be frequent that it was led to draw all authority to itself (6 (4). 15. 1300 a 3 sq.) and to set itself above the law.

29. *τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις μετέχειν ἕξεστιν κ.τ.λ.* So that not only does the class in possession of power rule in accordance with law, but the admission of those outside it to its ranks is also regulated by law, and indeed by a law which does not leave it free to admit or exclude whomsoever it pleases: contrast the law referred to in 1293 a 23 sqq. *Μετέχειν*, sc. *τῆς πολιτείας* (cp. 39), or in other words *τῶν ἀρχῶν*, though the *γεωργοὶ* and *οἱ κεκτημένοι μετρίαν οὐσίαν* would enjoy only a nominal access to office, as they would not be rich enough to hold office without pay (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 13 sqq.), and pay is not forthcoming in this kind of democracy. It is not clear whether in democracies of this type purity of extraction is made a condition of sharing in the constitution, as well as the possession of a certain property-qualification, but this may be Aristotle's meaning.

30. *ὅλως μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, 'for that it should not be open on any terms to all to share in the constitution is characteristic of an oligarchy [and inappropriate to a democracy], but that it should be open to all to do so is characteristic of a democracy; hence it is open [in this form of democracy] to all who have acquired the property-qualification to share in the constitution, but it is impossible [for the ruling class in it] to take leisure in the absence of revenues, [and consequently to hold office].' As to the text of this passage see critical note on 1292 b 30-33. *ὅλως* qualifies *μὴ ἐξείναι*: cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 8, *ἡ τὸ ὅλως μὴ ἐξείναι κεκτηῖσθαι πλείω γῆν μέτρου τινὸς ἢ ἀπὸ τινος τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ τὴν πόλιν*. For the repetition of *μὲν*

cp. 3. 1. 1275 a 23—26 and Plato, Rep. 421 A, *εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμῆς μὲν φυλάκας ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιούμεν ἥκιστα κακούργους τῆς πόλεως κ.τ.λ.* For δὲ δὴ cp. 1293 a 21 and c. 11. 1295 a 34. 'Δὲ δὴ secundum usum vulgarem Aristoteles ita adhibet, ut δὴ "manifesto fere" (sed lenior vis est particulae δὴ) significans oppositionem urgeat, id quod maxime post εἰ fit' (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 46). For τὸ μὲν ὅλως μὴ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ὀλιγαρχικόν, cp. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ἀρχεῖν δημοκρατικόν, and 3. 11. 1281 b 28 sq. By πρόσοδοι are meant special revenues providing a surplus which can be distributed as pay or otherwise (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 29 sqq.). These revenues might be derived from dependent allies or from an emporium (4 (7). 6. 1327 a 29 sq.) or from a monopoly of some special product such as the silphium at Cyrene ([Aristot.] Oecon. 2. 1346 a 5 sqq.). See note on 1320 a 17.

33. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν εἶδος ἐν δημοκρατίας διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας, 'this then is one kind of democracy by reason of these causes': i. e. it is marked off from other kinds by the fact that, while it opens office to all who can acquire a moderate property-qualification, and therefore is a democracy, office in it falls to those who are enabled by adequate means to take leisure. For διὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας cp. 1293 a 10 sqq. and c. 10. 1295 a 23, τυραννίδος μὲν οὖν εἶδη ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας.

35. διὰ τὴν ἐχομένην διαίρεσιν. I follow Spengel, Sus., and Bonitz (Ind. 18 b 52) in reading διαίρεσιν in place of αἵρεσιν, which is the reading of Γ Π Bekk. Sus. translates διὰ τὴν ἐχομένην διαίρεσιν, 'durch die zunächst angrenzende Unterscheidung' ('by reason of the distinction which stands next in order'). Διὰ τὴν ἐχομένην αἵρεσιν is rendered by Sepulveda 'per proximam rationem mandandi magistratus,' and so Vict., Lamb., and others. I should prefer the rendering 'by reason of the choice [of a ruling class] which stands next in order,' if αἵρεσιν were retained, but it seems better to read διαίρεσιν.

καὶ πᾶσιν . . . τοῖς ἀνυπευθύνους κατὰ τὸ γένος, 'to all those also who are not open to objection on the score of extraction,' as well as to those who possess a certain property-qualification. For τοῖς ἀνυπευθύνους κατὰ τὸ γένος, see above on 1292 a 2, and cp. Libanius' Life of Demosthenes (prefixed to Bekker's Demosthenes, p. 5), Δημοσθένης τοῖνυν τῷ ῥήτορι πατὴρ ἦν Δημοσθένης, ἀνεπιληπτος τῷ γένει δοκῶν: Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 169, οἶμαι τοῖνυν ἀπαντας ἀν ὑμᾶς ὁμολογήσαι τάδε δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τῷ δημοτικῷ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐλεύθερον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ πρὸς πατὸς καὶ πρὸς μητρός, ἵνα μὴ διὰ τὴν περὶ τὸ γένος ἀτυχίαν δυσμενὴς ᾖ

τοῖς νόμοις οἱ σώζουσι τὴν δημοκρατίαν : 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 13. l. 22, οἱ τῷ γένει μὴ καθαροί.

39. ὅσοι ἂν ἐλεύθεροι ᾧσι answers to ἐν μόνον ἢ πολίτης in c. 4. 1292 a 3. It would seem from c. 4. 1291 b 26, τὸ μὴ εἶ ἀμφοτέρων πολιτῶν ἐλεύθερον, that even those who were the offspring of only one citizen parent would be accounted ἐλεύθεροι.

40. ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ. Because, as there is no revenue to furnish the ruling class with pay, they cannot meet in the popular assembly often enough to usurp the place of the law (cp. c. 15. 1300 a 3 sq.).

1293 a. 1. ἡ τελευταία τοῖς χρόνοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γεγενημένη. Cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 29, τὴν νεωτάτην δημοκρατίαν. Aristotle's language in 3. 4. 1277 b 1, διὸ παρ' ἐνίοις οὐ μετείχον οἱ δημιουργοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἀρχῶν, πρὶν δῆμον γενέσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον, suggests that he regarded the ultimate democracy as not having been introduced very recently.

διὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Does τὰς πόλεις here mean 'cities' or 'States'? 'Ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι in the preceding sentence means 'in the States'; it is probably, therefore, better to take τὰς πόλεις to mean 'States,' but when States are said to have grown larger, or in other words more populous (for, notwithstanding 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 24 sq., μείζων seems here to mean 'more populous'), the increase referred to in their population is no doubt an increase in the population, and especially the citizen-population, of the central city and its seaport, if it has one, not an increase in the rural population. Hence the meaning of the passage is much the same, whether we translate τὰς πόλεις 'cities' or 'States.' That an increase in the size and populousness of a State was favourable to democracy, and in particular to extreme democracy, we see from 3. 15. 1286 b 20 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 17 sq. : cp. Isocr. Areop. § 62, τῶν τοίνυν ἄλλων πόλεων ταῖς ἐπιφανεστάταις καὶ μεγίσταις . . . εὐρήσομεν τὰς δημοκρατίας μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας συμφερούσας. Athens is described by Critias in Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 24 as 'the most populous of Greek States.' This increase in population would lead to an increase of revenue, because a large part of the revenue of Greek States was derived from imposts which would become more productive as the population of the State increased, such as customs, market-dues (cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 a 29 sq.), fees and fines in the lawcourts, and the like, to say nothing of the probability that the State, as it became more populous, would acquire dependent allies and would receive tribute from them. Compare Xen. Anab. 7. 1. 27 and Demosth. Phil. 3.

40. An ultimate democracy might, however, exist where there were no πρόσδοι (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 17 sqq.). For προσόδων εὐπορίας cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 2. 1422 a 13, προσόδων εὐπορία (with Bonitz), and for the plural εὐπορίας Demosth. De Pace, c. 8, τοῖς ἐκεῖθεν ἐθάδε τὰς εὐπορίας ἀγουσιν, and Diod. 12. 30. 1, διὰ τὰς προειρημένας εὐημερίας.

3. μετέχουσι μὲν πάντες τῆς πολιτείας διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλῆθους, 'all share in the constitution on account of the superiority' (in number, not in quality) 'of the multitude': cp. c. 12. 1296 b 24, ὅπου μὲν οὖν ὑπερέχει τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος τὴν εἰρημένην ἀναλογίαν, ἐπαυθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατία, καὶ ἕκαστον εἶδος δημοκρατίας κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ δήμου ἑκάστου, and 1296 b 34.

4. κοινωνοῦσι δὲ καὶ πολιτεύονται. Cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 15, ὁ διὰ τοῦ συμπολιτεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πόλεως (βίος). For κοινωνοῦσι cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 2. Πολιτεύεσθαι is a wider term than ἀρχεῖν: it includes sharing in any kind of political activity, for instance habitual attendance at the meetings of the assembly and dicasteries. Pay enabled the poor to attend frequent meetings of the assembly (Plato, Rep. 565 A: Pol. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 1 sqq.).

6. τὸ τοιοῦτον πλῆθος, 'the kind of multitude we have described,' i. e. one composed of poor men receiving pay.

8. τοὺς δὲ πλουσίους ἐμποδίζει κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 14. 1298 b 13 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 27 sqq. Aristotle does not say that the rich often did not belong to the Boulê, but this seems to be a natural inference from these passages. It is hardly likely that at Athens, if the lot fell on them and they declined to serve, they were forced to do so. They do not appear to have been liable to any fine for refusing to serve on the dicasteries (c. 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.), and they were probably not liable to a fine if they declined to serve on the Boulê. As to the absence of the rich from the dicasteries at Athens see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 289.

10. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 10. 1295 a 23 sq., and for διὰ ταύτας τὰς ἀνάγκας (with Bon. Ind. 43 b 42) De Caelo, 1. 8. 277 a 11, τοῖς αὐτοῖς τεκμηρίοις τούτοις καὶ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἀνάγκαις: cp. also Hippocr. De Aere, Aquis, Locis, vol. i. p. 560 Kühn, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν ἀναγκάων οὐ πολὺγόνον ἔστιν τὸ γένος τὸ Σκυθικόν, and De Morbis, 4. vol. ii. p. 348 Kühn, κατ' ἀνάγκην τοιγάρ, and Iamblich. Protrept. 96. 1 (quoted by Blass, De Antiphonte Sophista Iamblichi auctore, Fragm. E, p. 15), διὰ ταύτας τοῖνυν τὰς ἀνάγκας τὸν τε νόμον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐμβασιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. In Plato, Rep. 489 D, τῆς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν ποιηρίας

τὴν ἀνάγκην βούλει τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διελθόμεν, the word ἀνάγκη is explained as = 'causa' by Ast, *Lex. Platon.* s. v.

12. τὰ δὲ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, sc. τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν.

15. καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι κ.τ.λ. For τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ πολιτεύματος cp. c. 13. 1297 b 9. We see from what follows that the mere numerousness of the dominant class does not by itself suffice to secure the supremacy of the law, if the dominant class possesses leisure, being either so rich as to be able to live without paying close attention to its property or so poor as to be supported by State-pay. The class which is supreme in an ultimate democracy is very numerous, and yet it becomes collectively a monarch, because it possesses leisure, being supported by State-pay.

17. We expect ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλείον κ.τ.λ. to be answered by τοσοῦτον μᾶλλον ἀνάγκη τὸν νόμον ἀξιῶν αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν, but the clause is in fact answered by ἀνάγκη τὸν νόμον ἀξιῶν αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν without τοσοῦτον μᾶλλον. This is probably due to the interposition of καὶ μήτε . . . πόλει between ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν πλείον ἀπέχῃσι τῆς μοναρχίας and ἀνάγκη τὸν νόμον ἀξιῶν αὐτοῖς ἄρχειν. It rarely happens that τοσοῦτον μᾶλλον is omitted after ὅσῳ with a comparative. Kühner (*Ausführl. gr. Gramm.*, ed. 2, § 582. ii. 2. Anm. 1), however, gives an instance of this from Xen. *Cyrop.* 1. 3. 14, καὶ χάριν σοι εἰσομαι ὅσῳ ἂν πλεονάκεις εἰσίης ὡς ἐμέ, and another will be found in Demosth. *Prooem.* 51. p. 1457, ὅτε γὰρ ἂν πλεονάκεις ἐξετάζη τις αὐτά, ἀνάγκη τοὺς τοῦτων αἰτίους εὐδοκμεῖν.

20. Vict., Eaton, and Sus. take αὐτοῖς to be in the dative after ἄρχειν (Vict. 'statuere ut lex ipsis imperet'), but the *Index Aristotelicus* gives no instance of ἄρχειν governing the dative, and perhaps we should rather translate 'for them' (Welldon, 'in their case'). The position of the word makes it unlikely that it is to be taken with ἀνάγκη.

22. πλείω δέ, sc. οὐσίαν ἔχουσι.

24. For τοὺς εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα βαδίζοντας, cp. Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr. Gr. No.* 171. 60 (vol. i. p. 270), τοὺς καταχωρομένους εἰς τὸ πολίτευμα.

26. τὸν νόμον τίθενται τοιοῦτον, 'they enact the law in terms of that kind,' i. e. to the effect that the members of the πολίτευμα shall have the power to elect those who are to be admitted into it from the outside. In the third form of oligarchy the law provides that when a member of the πολίτευμα dies, his son shall succeed him, so that in this form no one is admitted from outside (28 sqq.). For

τίθενται τοιοῦτον, cp. De Part. An. 4. 5. 680 b 27, διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δ' αἰτίαν καὶ ἡ κοιλία τοιαύτη ἐσχισται.

ἐπιτείνωσι, 'strain matters further in the direction of excess.' For *ἐπιτείνειν*, 'non addito obiecto,' Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) refers to 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 26, 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 30, and Eth. Nic. 6. 1. 1138 b 23.

28. For δι' αὐτῶν ἔχειν cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 12, and Aristid. Leuctr. 1. p. 421, λέγειν γὰρ ἔφη πρὸς αὐτοὺς Ἐπαμεινώνδαν ὡς οὐδὲν ὄφελος τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ πλεονεκτημάτων, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν βάλατταν δι' αὐτῶν ἐξουσιν.

29. τῶν τελευτώντων, 'those who from time to time die': cp. 2. 8. 1268 a 8, and 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 20, τῶν πιπτόντων οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ ὁδῶν σωτηρία καὶ διάρθρωσις, and 1322 b 21: also Plut. Lycurg. c. 26 *infra*. See note on 1324 b 18.

31. ἐγγὺς ἡ τοιαύτη δυναστεία μοναρχίας ἐστίν repeats Thuc. 3. 62. 4, quoted above on 1292 b 7. Ἡ τοιαύτη δυναστεία, i. e. α δυναστεία τῶν πολλῶν ὑπερτερόντων ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς πολυφιλίαις.

33. ἀντίστροφον τῷ τελευταίῳ τῆς δημοκρατίας. Cp. c. 14. 1298 a 31 sqq.

35. Ἐτι δ' εἰσὶ κ.τ.λ., 'and further there are,' etc. Besides that C. 7. there are more kinds of democracy and oligarchy than one, there are other constitutions besides democracy and oligarchy. Aristotle has now dealt with the question which stands first in the programme contained in c. 2. 1289 b 12 sqq., the question how many varieties of democracy and oligarchy there are, and we expect that he will pass on to the next, τίς πολιτεία κοινωτάτη καὶ τίς αἰρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, but this he does not do; he does not deal with this question till c. 11, and cc. 7-10 are occupied with investigations respecting constitutions which have not hitherto been sufficiently studied. Aristocracy has been studied, so far as it is coincident with the best constitution, but the 'so-called aristocracy' (which, it would seem from 1293 a 38 sq., was the only form of aristocracy commonly included in enumerations of constitutions) has not been studied, nor have polity and tyranny. These forms are therefore dealt with in cc. 7-10, before Aristotle passes on to the question τίς πολιτεία κοινωτάτη καὶ τίς αἰρετωτάτη μετὰ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν. Aristotle has, in fact, already promised in c. 2. 1289 a 35 sqq. to treat of polity and tyranny as well as of democracy and oligarchy, so that we are prepared for the investigations contained in cc. 7-10 with the exception of those relating to the so-called aristocracy. In 35 his words are παρὰ δημοκρατίαν τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν, but in strictness he should have said παρὰ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ μοναρχίαν

(cp. c. 8. 1294 a 26). When he says that all included aristocracy in their list of constitutions, his statement is not literally correct (see vol. i. p. 211, note 1). The view, however, that there were four constitutions, monarchy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, was no doubt a common one; we trace it in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 22 sq., in Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 29 sq., and in the title of the *Πολιτείας* ascribed to Aristotle, *Πολιτείας πόλεων δυοῖν δεούσαιν ρῆ . . . δημοκρατικάί, ὀλιγαρχικάί, ἀριστοκρατικάί, τυραννικάί* (where however *τυραννίς* takes the place of monarchy, and kingship is omitted), Aristot. Fragm. 1465 b (143).

36. ὦν τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν λέγουσὶ τε πάντες καὶ εἴρηται κ.τ.λ. For the structure of the sentence cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 27, *ὅσας μὴ τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν ἀποδιδῶσιν ὁ νόμος, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἐστίας ἔχουσι τὴν τιμὴν*.

38. τέταρτον δὲ τὴν καλουμένην ἀριστοκρατίαν, 'and in the fourth place the so-called aristocracy.' Aristotle appears to imply that no one had yet included in their list the true aristocracy, that in which the good citizen is also a good man. Even the aristocracy sketched in Plato's Republic would count among its citizens many who could not be called good men in the sense which Aristotle attaches to the term.

39. πέμπτη δ' ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. The existence of the 'polity' specially so called was generally recognized (*πολιτείαν γὰρ καλοῦσιν*, cp. c. 8. 1293 b 34 sqq.), but those who sought to enumerate the different kinds of constitutions had omitted it from their lists. As to Plato, indeed, all that Aristotle says is that he had not included the polity in the list of constitutions given in the Republic, so that Aristotle's words do not absolutely exclude the supposition that he regarded it as included in the list given in the *Politicus* (302 C sqq.). In Laws 712 C Plato enumerates only three constitutions, democracy, oligarchy, and aristocracy, in addition to tyranny and kingship (=monarchy). The expression *ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις* refers either to the Republic of Plato as a whole (for other instances of the use of it in this sense see Henkel, *Studien zur Geschichte der griechischen Lehre vom Staat*, p. 10, who refers to Themist. Or. 2. 32 c, *Πολιτεαὶ τε αἱ κλειναὶ καὶ οἱ θεσπέσιοι Νόμοι*, etc.) or (as Bonitz, Ind. 598 a 42, and Sus.², Note 1231, think) to the Eighth and Ninth Books of it only (see note on 1342 a 32). Though Aristotle says here that the Polity 'did not occur frequently,' we gather from c. 13. 1297 b 24 sq. that what were called democracies in early times were really polities, and of early democracies there can have been no lack; besides, as Prof. Francotte points out (*Les Formes Mixtes de Gouvernement*

d'après Aristote, p. 17, note 1), the polity appears to have existed at one time or another at Malis (c. 13. 1297 b 14 sqq.), at Tarentum (7 (5). 3. 1303 a 3 sqq.), at Syracuse (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 27 sqq.), and at Oreus (7 (5). 3. 1303 a 18 sqq.).

1. ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'true, it is right to call by the name of aristocracy,' etc. Aristotle feels it necessary to justify his use of the name in 38 sq. in reference to the 'so-called aristocracy.' As to the reference in *περὶ ἧς δεῖλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις* see vol. ii. p. xxv. Sus.^{3a} (p. 367) takes the reference to be to the Fourth and Fifth (old Seventh and Eighth) Books, and it is very possible that 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11 sqq. (cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 37 sqq.) is referred to, but this is not certain, and as a similar account of the best constitution is already in substance given in the Third Book (cc. 4-5, c. 7. 1279 a 34 sqq., c. 15. 1286 b 3 sqq., and c. 18. 1288 a 37 sqq.), the reference may be to the Third Book. It is not certain that the Fourth and Fifth Books were in existence when the words before us were written (see note on 1289 a 30 and vol. ii. p. xxv sq.).

3. τὴν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for to only one constitution is it right to apply the name of aristocracy, to the constitution the citizens of which are men best in respect of virtue absolutely and not merely good with reference to certain given conditions, for in this constitution alone the same man is an absolutely good man and good citizen, whereas in all others good citizens are good men only relatively to their own constitution' (i. e. with reference to certain given conditions, not absolutely). 'Ἀρίστων κατ' ἀρετὴν,' 'best in respect of virtue,' and not merely in respect of other things such as practical ability or serviceableness to the constitution under which they live (cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10, *κρείττων κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν πρακτικὴν τῶν ἀρίστων*). For the account here given of aristocracy cp. 4. (7). 9. 1328 b 37, *ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτευομένη πόλει καὶ τῇ κεκτημένη δικαίους ἀνδρας ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν*, and 3. 5. 1278 b 1 sqq., and as to the variation of virtue and justice with the constitution, 3. 4. 1276 b 30 sqq. and 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 36 sqq. For *πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα ἀγαθῶν*, cp. Probl. 10. 52. 896 b 22, where *τὸ πρὸς χρεῖαν τιὰ καλὴν* is contrasted with *τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καλόν*.

8. τὰς ἀλιγαρχουμένας, sc. πολιτείας (see note on 1292 b 14).

The words *καὶ καλοῦνται ἀριστοκραταί*, which follow *διαφορὰς* in Γ Π, are placed by Thurot and Sus. after *πολιτείας*, probably rightly. Jackson and Welldon would omit them.

10. *δοῦο γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, 'seeing that in them,' etc.: cp. Plato, Rep.

343 A, *ὅτι τοῖ σε, ἔφη, κορυζῶντα περιορᾷ καὶ οὐκ ἀπομύττει δεδόμενον, ὅς γε αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα γινώσκεις.* 'Οπου γε often = 'quandoquidem,' and Liddell and Scott, s.v. *ὅπου*, give the words that meaning here, but in *ὅπου γε* as used here *ὅπου* seems to retain its ordinary meaning of 'where.' Magistrates are elected *πλουτίσδην* in oligarchies (2. 11. 1273 a 21 sqq.), and Aristotle appears to imply here that they are not elected even partially *ἀριστινδην* in politics (see vol. i. p. 219, note 2). How far does this agree with what we are told in 3. 17. 1288 a 14 sq., that elections to office in politics take place *κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διαιρέοντα τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς*? Perhaps to distribute office among the well-to-do in accordance with *ἀξία* is not to elect *ἀριστινδην*. It should be noticed that in 2. 11. 1273 a 23 sqq. a constitution in which magistracies are filled *ἀριστινδην καὶ πλουτίσδην* is distinguished from an aristocracy on the ground that in an aristocracy election to office is *κατ' ἀρετήν*. Aristotle's conception of aristocracy in the Sixth Book appears to be less strict than in the Second.

11. *αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία.* For the asyndeton see note on 1286 a 30.

12. *καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* This is added to explain and justify *ἀριστινδην* and *ἀριστοκρατική*. When, in the absence of a public care for virtue on the part of the State, men reputed to be good (*ἐπιεικεῖς*) are elected to office, the community may fairly be said to elect *ἀριστινδην* and its constitution may be called aristocratic. Cp. Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 35, *οἱ γὰρ ἐμμεμενηκότες ἐν τοῖς νομίμοις ἐν τῇ ἀριστοκρασίᾳ ἀρχοῦσιν· ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους φαίνεσθαι ἀρίστους· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτομα εἰληφε τοῦτο*, and Plato, Laws 854 B, *ἔτι ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν λεγομένων ἀνδρῶν ὕμν ἡγαθῶν ξυνουσίας*. Cp. also Plato, Rep. 554 C, *ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις συμβολαίοις . . . ἐν οἷς εὐδοκιμεῖ δοκῶν δίκαιος εἶναι*: also 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 25, (*Ἐφιάλτης*) *δοκῶν ἀδωροδόκητος εἶναι καὶ δίκαιος πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν*, and the line of Cratinus quoted on 1291 b 5. *Πώλεσι* must be supplied with *ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιουμένοις κοινῇ ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς*: this is a word which is frequently omitted by Aristotle (see notes on 1266 b 1 and 1288 b 38). For the use of *ὅμως* here cp. De Part. An. 1. 5. 645 a 5 sqq. (quoted in note on 1258 b 10).

14. *ὅπου οὖν κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle does not explain why a constitution which recognizes virtue and wealth only is not an aristocracy. Looking to 10, we expect him to regard a constitution of this kind as an aristocracy. Such a constitution would seem at any rate to be superior to constitutions which do not recognize virtue at all, yet these are allowed the name of aristocracies in 20 sq.

19. τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν. Cp. c. 8. 1294 a 24, τὴν ἀληθεῖαν καὶ πρώτην, and 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 3, τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας καὶ πρώτης οὐσης, and 28, τὴν πρώτην καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην.

20. καὶ τρίτον κ.τ.λ., 'and in the third place whatever [mixed] constitutions incline towards oligarchy more than the polity does,' for πολιτεῖαι should probably be supplied with *ἔσσαι*, and not ἀριστοκρατίαι (cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 15, where πολιτείας, not ἀριστοκρατίας, must be supplied). Aristotle here departs from the account which he frequently gives of aristocracy as a constitution in which virtue is recognized in the award of office either alone or in combination with other things, and concedes the name to constitutions in which this is not the case. Hence Sus. brackets as interpolated καὶ τρίτον . . . μᾶλλον, but the same view reappears in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 10–16, and Sus. is compelled to bracket this passage together with its context, a course in which it is difficult to follow him. It seems more probable that both passages are genuine, and that Aristotle is guilty of an inconsistency, into which he is led, partly by his reluctance to depart too far from the ordinary classification (cp. De Part. An. 1. 3. 643 b 10 sqq.) and from the ordinary use of language, partly by the difficulty of bringing these constitutions under any other of the six forms of constitution recognized by him, and partly by the kinship which (following Plato in Polit. 301 A and other inquirers) he always conceives to exist between aristocracy and oligarchy (3. 7. 1279 b 5: 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 22 sqq.). See Prof. H. Sidgwick in the *Classical Review*, 6. 144.

23. ἐτάξαμεν δ' οὕτως, sc. τὴν ὀνομαζομένην πολιτείαν. Οὕτως, i. e. C. 8. among the παρεκβάσεις, and not before them, where we expect to find polity dealt with looking to the announcements in c. 2. 1289 a 35 sqq. and 3. 7. 1279 a 23 sqq.

24. ταύτην, i. e. the polity. See note on 1306 b 26.

25. In τὸ μὲν ἀληθές we have an instance of *μέν solitarium* (see notes on 1262 a 6 and 1270 a 34).

πᾶσαι, i. e. both polity and the aristocracies just described.

26. ἔπειτα καταριθμοῦνται μετὰ τούτων, 'and consequently are counted with the deviation-forms': cp. c. 3. 1290 a 16 sqq., where aristocracy is said to be often held to be a form of oligarchy and polity of democracy.

εἰσὶ τ' αὐτῶν αὗται παρεκβάσεις, 'and these deviation-forms are deviation-forms of them' (i. e. of the aristocracies just described and of polity). This implies that oligarchy is a deviation-form of

the so-called aristocracy and not of the true aristocracy, but we are not told this elsewhere. Tyranny at any rate is a deviation-form of the true kingship (c. 2. 1289 a 40).

27. ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχήν, i.e. in 3. 7, where however oligarchy is not said to be a deviation-form of the so-called aristocracy, but of aristocracy generally.

τελευταῖον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Contrast Hist. An. 5. 1. 539 a 7, νῦν δὲ περὶ τούτου (i.e. ἀνθρώπου) τελευταῖον λεκτέον διὰ τὸ πλείστην ἔχειν πραγματείαν (comparing with this passage c. 10. 1295 a 1 sqq.). That tyranny is the worst of the deviation-forms we have been told in c. 2. 1289 a 39 sqq. (cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 3 sqq.).

30. τέτακται, sc. ταῦτα. Cp. ἐτάξαμεν, 23.

31. νῦν δὲ δεικτέον ἡμῖν περὶ πολιτείας κ.τ.λ. For the use of *δεικνύμαι* without an object, Bonitz (Ind. 167 b 26 sqq.) compares Phys. 8. 6. 259 a 25 sqq. and Eth. Nic. 7. 1. 1145 b 7. For ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς cp. c. 10. 1295 a 9 and 1. 4. 1254 a 13, τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δούλου καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον, and Isocr. Panath. § 134, αἱ μὲν οὖν φύσεις καὶ δυνάμεις τῶν πολιτειῶν οὕτως ἔχουσιν. Aristotle describes how polity differs from the so-called aristocracy in the remainder of c. 8, and how it comes into being and how it should be constituted in c. 9.

34. εἰώθασι δὲ καλεῖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just said that the polity is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, and now he goes on—'but people are wont to give the name of polity to those mixtures of oligarchy and democracy only which incline to democracy and to call those which incline to oligarchy aristocracies.' Twice before in this Book (c. 3. 1290 a 22 sqq. and c. 4. 1290 a 30 sqq.) Aristotle has corrected customary views, and now he corrects this one. He grudges the name of aristocracy to a mere mixture of oligarchy and democracy inclining to oligarchy, and gradually feels his way in 1293 b 34–1294 a 25 to the conclusion that, next to the true aristocracy, the constitution which has *most* right to the name of aristocracy is that in which there is a mixture of all the three things which claim to be recognized in constitutions—free birth, wealth, and virtue. This conclusion is quite in harmony with the tendency of what is said in 3. 13. 1283 a 26 sqq. and 2. 6. 1266 a 4 sq. (It would seem from Aristotle's use of the word 'most' that while he ranks the claims of the form in which all the three attributes are recognized above those of the form in which only two—virtue and free birth—are recognized,

and also above those of the mixed constitutions which incline to oligarchy rather than to democracy, he does not deny the name of aristocracy to either of these forms.) Thus he is led to draw a different distinction between the so-called aristocracy and the polity from that which was commonly drawn. He first describes in 1293 b 34—42 the way in which mixtures of oligarchy and democracy inclining to oligarchy had come to be thought specially to deserve the name of aristocracies, and then in 1293 b 42 sqq. he appeals in correction of this view to the commonly received opinion that aristocracy and *εὐνομία* go together, and argues that if this is the case and *εὐνομία* involves obedience to well-constituted laws, and well-constituted laws are either the best attainable or the best absolutely, then aristocracy implies obedience either to the best attainable laws or to the laws which are absolutely the best, neither of which tests is satisfied by laws inclining towards oligarchy. A further proof of the same conclusion is derived from another commonly held opinion that aristocracy especially implies the award of office for virtue, whereas in oligarchy office is awarded for wealth.

37. *παιδείαν καὶ εὐγένειαν*. It is taken for granted that these attributes are closely connected with aristocracy. That *παιδεία* is so, we see from c. 15. 1299 b 24, *ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπωδνημένων (αἱ ἀρχαὶ εἰσιν)*, and that *εὐγένεια* is so may be inferred from the fact that virtue is an element in it (1294 a 20 sqq.). For the connexion of *παιδεία* and *εὐγένεια* with wealth cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 38 sqq.

38. *ἔτι δὲ δοκοῦσιν κ.τ.λ.* Cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 5, *ἐν γὰρ τοῖς βελτίστοις ἔτι ἀκολασία τε ὀλιγίστη καὶ ἀδικία, ἀκρίβεια δὲ πλείστη εἰς τὰ χρηστά· ἐν δὲ τῇ δῆμῳ ἀμαθία τε πλείστη καὶ ἀταξία καὶ πονηρία· ἡ τε γὰρ πένια αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον ἄγει ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχροὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπαιδευσία καὶ ἡ ἀμαθία δι' ἰδίων χρημάτων ἐνίοις τῶν ἀνθρώπων*. That this view is not regarded by Aristotle as correct we see from 2. 7. 1267 a 2 sqq. A wealthy man is not saved by his wealth from temptations to commit injustice.

39. *ὅθεν καὶ καλοὺς κάγαθοὺς καὶ γνωρίμους τούτους προσαγορεύουσιν*. Cp. Plato, Rep. 569 A, *τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶν κάγαθῶν λεγόμενων ἐν τῇ πόλει*, and Cic. De Rep. 1. 34. 51: perhaps also Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 313, *πλούτῳ δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κύδος ὀπηδεῖ*. Aristotle appears to hold that the belief in the virtue of the rich won them the name not only of *καλοὶ κάγαθοί*, but also of *γνωρίμοι*, so that

he must understand γνώριμοι to mean 'widely known for their virtue': cp. 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 27 sq.

41. τὴν ὑπεροχὴν. Cp. 3. 17. 1288 a 20 sqq.

καὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας εἶναι φασιν ἐκ τῶν καλῶν καγαθῶν μᾶλλον. Bonitz (Ind. 503 b 7 sq.), followed by Sus.³, Ind. s.v., takes ὀλιγαρχία here in the sense of τὸ ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πολίτευμα, κύριον, and groups this passage with 7 (5). 6. 1305 a 39, ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, but I do not feel sure that they are right: cp. c. 7. 1293 b 3 sqq., 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 24, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πλήθη πάντα σχεδόν, ἐξ ὧν αἱ λοιπαὶ δημοκρατίαι συνστάσι κ.τ.λ., and 2. 6. 1265 b 26-29.

42. δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι κ.τ.λ. Μή is placed by Γ Π before εὐνομεῖσθαι, but I follow Thurot and Sus. in transferring it to after τὴν and before ἀριστοκρατουμένην. If Γ Π were right in placing μή before εὐνομεῖσθαι, we should expect the second clause to run ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ μὴ ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν εὐνομουμένην, but Γ Π have ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ εὐνομουμένην, which seems to show that the first clause should run τὸ εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν μὴ ἀριστοκρατουμένην πᾶν ἄλλὰ πονηροκρατουμένην. The change in the position of μή has this further advantage, that the words ἄλλὰ πονηροκρατουμένην, which are not easily explained if we retain the reading of Γ Π, no longer present any difficulty. The view that εὐνομία is found where the best men rule, is implied in Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 154, ὅτ' εὐνομεῖτο μᾶλλον ἢ πόλις καὶ βελτίοσι προστάταις ἐχρήτο, and in Isocr. Panath. § 132 sq., and indeed in Theogn. 43-52 and Pindar, Pyth. 10. 71 sq. Bergk: cp. also Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 5 sq. and Plato, Rep. 605 B.

1294 a. 3. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ εὐνομία κ.τ.λ. This had been already in substance said by Xenophon in Oecon. 9. 14 and by Ephorus in Fragn. 47 (Müller, Fragn. Hist. Gr. 1. 246), εὐνομεῖσθαι γὰρ οὐ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἅπαντα φυλαττομένους τὰ τῶν συκοφαντῶν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐμμένοντας τοῖς ἀπλῶς κειμένοις: cp. Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 6 and Demosth. c. Mid. c. 57. But the remarks of Aeschines on Athenian ways in c. Timarch. cc. 177-179 are especially present to Aristotle's memory.

4. διὸ μίαν μὲν εὐνομίαν κ.τ.λ. In Diog. Laert. 3. 103 Plato is said to have distinguished three senses of εὐνομία—εὐνομία διαιρεῖται εἰς τρία· ἐν μὲν εἰς ὧν οἱ νόμοι σπουδαῖοι, εὐνομίαν φασὶν εἶναι ἕτερον δὲ εἰς τοῖς κειμένοις νόμοις ἐμμένωσιν οἱ πολῖται, καὶ τοῦτο φασιν εὐνομίαν εἶναι· τρίτον δὲ εἰς μὴ ὄντων τῶν νόμων κατὰ ἔθνη καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα χρηστῶς πολιτεύωνται, καὶ τοῦτο εὐνομίαν προσαγορεύομεν. Compare with this

the definition of *εὐνομία* which we find in the Definitions ascribed to Plato, 413 E, *εὐνομία πειθαρχία νόμων σπουδαίων*. How far either of these accounts of *εὐνομία* is correctly attributed to Plato is extremely doubtful. Aristotle appears to find true *εὐνομία* in obedience to good laws.

7. τοῦτο δὲ ἐνδέχεται διχῶς κ.τ.λ., 'and this' (i.e. obedience to well-constituted law) 'is possible [only] in two ways, for [it is possible to obey] either the best laws attainable in the given case or those which are absolutely the best.' For the omission of 'only,' see note on 1282 a 36.

9. δοκεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'aristocracy again is thought especially to consist in the distribution of the offices according to virtue,' and not according to wealth, which would be the rule of distribution if it bordered on oligarchy. See note on 1309 a 2.

11. τὸ δ' ὃ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσιν, sc. κύριον εἶναι, 'but the principle that whatever the majority decide is supreme [is not characteristic of any particular constitution, for it] is recognized in all.' Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 31 sq., 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq., and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 4 sqq., where it appears that the supremacy of the decisions of the majority was commonly conceived to be a mark of democracy.

12. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For the repetition of *ἐν* see notes on 1325 b 10 and 1305 b 4.

15. For τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος καλεῖται, 'the form which is called polity exists,' cp. Xen. Oecon. 4. 6, *ἐνθα δὴ ὁ σύλλογος καλεῖται*, which Holden translates, 'where the so-called muster of forces is,' and see Stallbaum's note on Plato, Phaedo 107 C, *τοῦ χρόνου τούτου ἐν ᾧ καλούμεν τὸ ζῆν*.

17. For the absence of *καί* before *πλούτου καὶ λευτερίας* see explanatory note on 1277 b 10 and critical note on 1260 a 26.

σχεδὸν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See above on 1293 b 39. For the absence of *τῶν* before *τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν* (which Coray, Bekk.³, and Sus. add without necessity), cp. Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 470 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 325 and 5. ccxc),

μήποθ' (μήθ' MSS.) ὁ ποιητὴς κατεχέτω χρηστοῦ τόπον.

19. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but since there are three things which lay claim to an equal participation in the constitution, free birth, wealth, and virtue—I say three, for the fourth, that which is called nobility, [is not a distinct thing, for it] is a concomitant of the two latter.' For *ἀμφισβητοῦντα* cp. 3. 12. 1283 a 16 sqq., where, as

Bonitz points out (Ind. 40 a 28 sqq.); ἀντιποιεῖσθαι is used as synonymous with ἀμφισβητεῖν (1283 a 11, 38), and for τῆς ἰσότητος τῆς πολιτείας, c. 11. 1296 a 30, τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῆς πολιτείας, and 3. 9. 1280 a 18, τὴν τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα.

21. ἡ γὰρ εὐγένειά ἐστιν κ.τ.λ. In 3. 13. 1283 a 37, εὐγένεια γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ γένους, we hear nothing of wealth (cp. Plato, Rep. 618 B, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ γένεσι καὶ προγόνων ἀρεταῖς, and Aristot. Fragm. 83. 1490 a 18 sqq.), but in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 3 those persons οἷς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλοῦτος are said to be thought εὐγενεῖς. The common Greek view probably was that εὐγένεια implied nothing more than descent from several generations of *wealthy* ancestors: cp. Plato, Theaet. 174 E, τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ὑμνούμενων, ὡς γενναῖός τις ἐπὶ πάμπαν πλουσίους ἔχων ἀποφῆναι, and a fragment from the Aeolus of Euripides (Fragm. 22), in which one of the characters, no doubt wishing to depreciate noble birth, says of it, ἐν χρήμασιν τόδ' ἐστί, and adds,

ᾧ δ' ἂν ἐν δόμοις

χρόνον συνοικῇ πλείστον (sc. τὰ χρήματα), οὗτος εὐγενής.

Cp. also Julian, Or. 2. p. 81 B, φασὶ γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς ἐκ πάλαι πλουσίους εὐγενεῖς. The Greeks would, it would seem, refuse the epithet εὐγενής to a newly-made Peer of the Realm, unless the family to which he belonged had been distinguished for wealth for generations past.

C. 9. 30. Τίνα δὲ τρόπον κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 22 sqq. and see notes on 1288 b 29 and 1293 b 31 and vol. i. p. 294, note 1.

34. τὴν τούτων διαίρεσιν, i.e. τὴν τούτων διαφορὰν (Bon. Ind. 180 b 40, where Phys. 7. 4. 249 a 3 is referred to, ἀλλ' ἄρα οὐ μόνον δεῖ τὰ συμβλητὰ μὴ ὁμώνυμα εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ μὴ ἔχειν διαφορὰν, μήτε ὁ μήτε ἐν ᾧ; λέγω δὲ οἷον χρῶμα ἔχει διαίρεσιν). Sus.³ (Ind. s. v. διαίρεσις), however, explains διαίρεσιν here as synonymous with διαρισμός. Τούτων, i.e. τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας.

ἐκ τούτων is rendered by Vict. in his translation 'post haec' (so Stahr, 'alsdann,' and apparently Sus. and Welldon), but in his commentary 'ex ipsis,' and Lamb. and Giph. render the words 'ex his' (i. e. of democracy and oligarchy). I incline to render ἐκ τούτων in the latter way, taking it with συνθετόν: cp. Plato, Soph. 252 B, ἐκ τούτων συντιθέντες, and Cratyl. 427 C, ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ λοιπὰ ἤδη αὐτοῖς τούτοις συντιθέναι ἀπομμούμενους. The words ἀφ' ἐκατέρας ὥσπερ σύμβολον λαμβάνοντας will then be added to explain the exact method by which the polity is to be compounded of democracy and oligarchy.



35. σύμβολον, 'pars' (Bon. Ind. s.v.), where we find a reference among other passages to De Gen. An. 1. 18. 722 b 10, φησὶ γὰρ (Ἐμπειροκλήης) ἐν τῷ ἄρρενι καὶ τῷ θήλει οἶον σύμβολον εἶναι, ὅλον δ' ἀπ' οὐδετέρου ἀπείναι, 'ἀλλὰ διέσπασται μελέων φύσις, ἥ μὲν ἐν ἀνδρός' (cp. De Gen. An. 4. 1. 764 b 3 sqq.).

εἰσὶ δὲ ὅροι τρεῖς τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ μίξεως, 'and there are three determining principles of this combination or mixture.' For καί= 'or,' see note on 1292 a 20 and cp. De An. 1. 4. 407 b 30, καὶ γὰρ τῇ ἀρμονίᾳ κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι. Μίξεως is probably added because the polity had been described as a μίξις in 1293 b 34 and 1294 a 16, 23. Ὅρος is explained by Bonitz (Ind. 529 b 53) in the passage before us and in 1294 b 15 as 'id quo alicuius rei natura constituitur et definitur.' Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 33, δῆλον ὅτι τούτους ὅρους τρεῖς ποιητόν εἰς τὴν παιδείαν, τό τε μέσον καὶ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ τὸ πρέπον.

37. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις . . . 40. ἡμίαν. This is repeated in c. 13. 1297 a 21—24 and 35—38, and in c. 14. 1298 b 13 sqq. It appears from the passage before us that there were oligarchies in which dicasteries existed composed of both rich and poor, though the poor would not be likely often to act on them, no pay being provided, and the rich would be sure to act, as they would incur a penalty if they did not. The oligarchies in which this system existed would not be oligarchies of an extreme type, for in extreme oligarchies the poor would be excluded from the dicasteries altogether. So again paid dicasteries would not exist in all forms of democracy, but only in those which approached the ultimate form.

41. ποιῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 13. 1297 a 38 sqq. We gather from the passage before us that in a polity there may be poor dicasts receiving pay, yet in c. 13. 1297 b 1 sqq. we read of the polity, δεῖ δὲ τὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι ἐκ τῶν τὰ ὅπλα ἔχόντων μόνον, and in what follows οἱ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντες are tacitly distinguished from οἱ πένητες (see note on 1289 b 31). We must suppose that there might be a proportion of poor men even in the hoplite class (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12). See vol. i. p. 503, note 1. This is confirmed by 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 12, καὶ τὸ τῷ πλῆθει μηδὲν πιστεύειν, διὸ καὶ τὴν παραιρέσιν ποιοῦνται τῶν ὅλων, which implies that the πλῆθος has heavy arms to be taken away.

1. πολιτικόν, 'characteristic of a polity.'

1294 b.

εἰς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. In the first of the three modes of mixing democracy and oligarchy here described the entire arrangement

characteristic of democracy is adopted in conjunction with the entire arrangement characteristic of oligarchy, in the second an institution (a property-qualification for the assembly) is borrowed from both, not however in the form in which it exists in democracies and oligarchies, but in a midway form, and in the third a part of the arrangement characteristic of democracy is adopted in conjunction with a part of the arrangement characteristic of oligarchy. Thus in framing a polity the lawgiver might balance a democratic institution with an oligarchical one, or he might steer a midway course between democracy and oligarchy, or he might ally a part of a democratic institution with a part of an oligarchical one. A polity would evidently differ much according as one or other of these methods was predominantly employed in its construction.

3. οἷον ἐκκλησιάζειν κ.τ.λ. Supply τάττουσιν. It would seem from this passage that even in democracies a small property-qualification for membership of the assembly might exist (see vol. i. p. 508, note 3). We also gather that an assembly often existed in oligarchies, though membership of it would be confined to those possessed of a high property-qualification (cp. Plato, Polit. 298 C, συλλέξαι δὲ ἐκκλησίαν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἥ ξύμπαντα τὸν δῆμον ἢ τοὺς πλουσίους μόνον). This would not be the case in the first, or most moderate, form of oligarchy, for in that form a high property-qualification would hardly be required for membership of the assembly, and in not a few oligarchies there would be no assembly whatever (3. 1. 1275 b 7).

4. κοινὸν δέ γε κ.τ.λ. Thus in a polity there would be a moderate property-qualification for membership of the assembly, but none for office (1294 b 12 sq.).

5. τὸ μέσον ἐκατέρου τιμήματος τούτων. For ἐκατέρου τιμήματος τούτων see note on 1283 b 4.

6. τρίτον, 'in the third place.' Τρίτος would have been more regular, but for a similarly imperfect correspondence cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 23, where τρίτον δ' ἀδυναμία τῶν πραγμάτων should have been τρίτου δ' ἀδυναμίας τῶν πραγμάτων.

ταγμαῶν takes up τάττουσιν, 3. The Index Aristotelicus translates τάγμα here by 'lex, institutum,' and gives no other instance of the occurrence of the word in the genuine writings of Aristotle. Τάγμα occurs in a different sense in Oecon. 2. 1349 a 24.

τὰ μὲν, sc. λαμβάνειν, obtained from 2 (cp. λαβεῖν, 11).

7. λέγει δ' αὖτις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle is here only stating the popular impression (δοκί). As a matter of fact, even extreme democracies did not always, or perhaps generally, claim that all magistracies should be filled by lot (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 20 sq.), and magistracies would seem to have been sometimes filled by lot in oligarchies, though of course not ἐκ πάντων but ἐκ τινῶν (6 (4). 15. 1300 b 1 sq.; cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 8 sq.). So again the filling of magistracies by election, and not by lot, is not peculiar to oligarchy; the magistracies are filled by election on the ground of virtue in an aristocracy (2. 11. 1273 a 25 sq.); what is characteristic of oligarchy is rather to elect to magistracies on the ground of wealth (ibid.). But indeed they seem to have been filled in some oligarchies not by election, but by hereditary succession (c. 5. 1292 b 4 sq.). In 3. 5. 1278 a 23 it is implied to be characteristic of oligarchy not simply to require a property-qualification for office, but to require a high property-qualification. Indeed, in the more moderate forms of democracy a property-qualification for office often existed (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 39: see note on 1305 a 28), sometimes varying with the importance of the office (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 30 sq.); still it is true that the tendency of democracy was to do away with property-qualifications for office (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 22 sq.). Cp. Diod. 18. 18. 4, τὴν δὲ πολιτείαν μετέστησεν ἐκ τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ προσέταξεν ἀπὸ τμήσεως εἶναι τὸ πολίτευμα.

10. ἀριστοκρατικὸν τοῖσιν καὶ πολιτικὸν κ.τ.λ. For the association here of aristocracy and polity cp. 2. 11. 1273 a 4, τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας κ.τ.λ. The reference to aristocracy here shows that the mode of combining democratic and oligarchical elements in the case of a so-called aristocracy is similar to that which obtains in the case of a polity. Aristotle, in fact, considers himself to have been dealing in c. 9 with so-called aristocracies as well as with polities (1294 b 40 sq.). Though according to the passage before us it is appropriate to a so-called aristocracy that no property-qualification for office should exist, we learn from 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2 sq. that it is appropriate to the same constitution (ἀριστοκρατικόν) that the γνώρῃμοι should hold the offices. This would be all the more likely to be the case because it is ἀριστοκρατικόν that offices should be unpaid (2. 11. 1273 a 17). It may be noted that the conception of ἀριστοκρατία in a fragment of the 'Constitutions' ascribed to Aristotle (Aristot. Fragm. 560. 1570 b 4), προέστησαν γὰρ αὐτῆς (i. e. τῆς τῶν ἱπποβοτῶν

πολιτείας) ἀπὸ τιμημάτων ἄνδρες ἀριστοκρατικῶς ἄρχοντες, and in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 25. 4, πολιτείαν δὲ κατεστήσαντο ἀριστοκρατικὴν χλίοι γὰρ πάντα διοικοῦσιν αἰρετοὶ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, which may also be derived from the 'Constitutions,' stands in marked contrast to that in the passage before us, for in these passages we read of aristocracies in which office was elective, subject to a property-qualification. For another instance of a discrepancy between the Politics and [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. see note on 1306 b 29.

12. ἐκ μὲν τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τὸ αἰρετὰς ποιεῖν τὰς ἀρχάς. As to the way in which offices were filled in a polity see note on 1288 a 12.

15. ὅρος, 'the determining mark,' or 'criterion': see note on 1294 a 35.

ἐνδέχεται, 'it is possible.'

18. ἐμφαίνεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 7. 1234 b 5, ἐν τῇ μέσῃ γὰρ ἐστὶ πως τὰ ἄκρα, and De An. 2. 11. 424 a 6, τὸ γὰρ μέσον κριτικόν γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων.

ὅπερ συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείαν. "Οπερ seems to refer to 15, ὅταν ἐνδέχεται λέγειν τὴν αὐτὴν πολιτείαν δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν. Aristotle has here before him Plato, Laws 712 D sqq., and also Isocr. Areop. § 61, οἶδα γὰρ . . . Λακεδαιμονίους διὰ τοῦτο κάλλιστα πολιτευομένους, ὅτι μάλιστα δημοκρατούμενοι τυγχάνουσιν ἐν γὰρ τῇ τῶν ἀρχῶν αἰρέσει καὶ τῷ βίῳ τῇ καθ' ἡμέραν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἴσοι μὲν ἀπὸ αὐτοῖς τὰς ἰσότητας καὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας μᾶλλον ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἰσχυρούσας, while another mood of Isocrates' mind is represented in Nicocl. § 24, ἔτι δὲ Καρχηδονίους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, τοὺς ἀρίστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων πολιτευομένους, (ἅπαντες ἴσμεν) οἴκοι μὲν ὀλιγαρχουμένους, παρὰ δὲ τὸν πόλεμον βασιλευομένους.

21. τὴν τάξιν = τὴν πολιτείαν, as in c. 1. 1289 a 1, c. 3. 1290 a 12, and c. 11. 1296 a 40 (Sus.³ Ind. s. v.).

πρῶτον is taken up by ὁμοίως δέ, 24.

τροφὴν, 'bringing-up,' whereas in 26 sq. τροφή means 'food.' In an oligarchy the bringing-up of the sons of the rich, or at any rate those of them who were in office, was luxurious (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 22 sqq.) and very unlike that of the sons of the poor.

23. For τὸν τρόπον τούτον see note on 1281 a 21.

24. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and [things are ordered] similarly.' We are not probably intended to carry on τρέφονται and παιδεύονται.

26. οὐδὲν γὰρ διάδηλος ὁ πλούσιος καὶ ὁ πένης. Cp. Thuc. 1. 6. 4 and Plato, Laws 696 A.

οὕτω τὰ περὶ τὴν τροφήν ταῦτὰ πᾶσιν ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις, 'and [just as no difference is made between the rich and the poor in other ways,] so also is the food in the syssitia the same for all.' Οὕτω carries on the comparison just as if *καθάπερ* had preceded. Sus. translates 'so sehr ist die Kost für Alle dieselbe in den gemeinsamen Mahlzeiten'—'so much is the food the same for all in the common meals'—but I doubt whether this is the meaning of οὕτω, and Welldon translates the word 'so too.' For the fact cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 10. Τροφή and ἐσθής are mentioned together in 3. 16. 1287 a 14 sq.

27. καὶ τὴν ἐσθῆτα κ.τ.λ. Spengel would insert *ἔχουσιν*, but we are by this time familiar with Aristotle's tendency in the Politics to omit words. See vol. ii. p. li, note 4. For *τις καὶ τῶν πενήτων ὄντισιν* cp. Plato, Rep. 350 A, εἴ τις σοι δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμων ὄντισιν πλείων ἢ ἐθέλειν αἰρεῖσθαι ἢ ὅσα κ.τ.λ. The dress of the rich in ancient Greece would ordinarily differ from that of the poor in fineness of material and in dye, to say nothing of ornamental accessories. It is interesting to gather from the passage before us that a too great contrast between the rearing and education, and also the food and dress, of rich and poor was regarded as undemocratic (cp. Demosth. Ol. 3. c. 25 sq.: yet that a difference did exist between the dress of the rich and the demos at Athens is implied in [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 10). Was the change from an ornate costume to *μητρία ἐσθής* which Thucydides (1. 6. 3) describes at Athens connected with the rise of democracy there? At Venice the Nobili and the Cittadini wore the same plain black clothes, partly because the poorer Nobili were thus saved expense, and partly because in concourses the small number of the ruling class became less conspicuous (Roscher, Politik, p. 159).

29. ἔτι τῷ δόξο κ.τ.λ. Supply *δημοκρατίαν εἶναι λέγουσιν*.

τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς seems to imply that the senatorship and the ephorship were greater offices than the kingship in the Lacedaemonian State. Yet the kings are said to be *μεγάλων κύριοι* in 2. 11. 1272 b 41 (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 35). As to the way in which the ephors were appointed see note on 1270 b 28.

31. οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαν, sc. *εἶναι λέγουσιν*.

32. πάσας, sc. *τὰς ἀρχάς*, which must be supplied from 29. As to the non-employment of the lot in appointments to offices in oligarchies see note on 7.

33. ὀλίγους εἶναι κυρίους θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς. The reference is to

the Lacedaemonian senate (Xen. Rep. Lac. 10. 2: Plut. Lycurg. c. 26). In democracies the infliction of these penalties fell to the popular assembly (c. 14. 1298 a 5-10) or to popular dicasteries. But did it not fall to a few in aristocracies as well as in oligarchies?

34. *δεῖ δ' ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κ.τ.λ.*, 'and in the polity that is mixed well both of the mixed elements' (democracy and oligarchy) 'should seem to be present and neither of the two.' The mixture must be so subtle and complete that the mixed elements are felt to be both present in it and not present, just as one might say of a glass of wine and water both that wine and water are each present in it and that neither is present but only a mixture of wine and water.

36. *καὶ σώζεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς καὶ μὴ ἔξωθεν*, sc. *τὴν πολιτείαν*. Cp. 2. 11. 1273 b 21 sq.

καὶ δι' αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 21 sq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 14 sqq.

37. As to [*ἔξωθεν*] see critical note.

38. Kaissling (Ueber den Gebrauch der Tempora und Modi in des Aristoteles Politica und in der Atheniensium Politia, p. 7) notes the use here of the substantival infinitive with *ἄν*.

40. *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ὀνομαζόμενας ἀριστοκρατίας*. Hardly any reference has been made in c. 9 to the so-called aristocracies, but the use of the word *ἀριστοκρατικόν* in 1294 b 10 probably indicates that Aristotle has had them in view in this chapter as well as polities (see note on 10).

C. 10. 1. *Περὶ δὲ τυραννίδος κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle sometimes treats of
1295 a. a subject last when it requires especially full treatment (Hist. An. 5. 1. 539 a 7, *νῦν δὲ περὶ τούτου τελευταῖον λεκτέον διὰ τὸ πλείστην ἔχειν πραγματείαν*), so now he explains that he does not treat of tyranny last for this reason.

2. *ἀλλ' ὅπως λάβῃ τῆς μεθόδου τὸ μέρος*. Bonitz (Ind. 455 b 2) compares Meteor. 1. 1. 338 a 25, *λοιπὸν δ' ἐστὶ μέρος τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης ἐπὶ θεωρητέον, ὃ κ.τ.λ.* Tyranny was often contrasted with *πολιτεῖαι*, as in Demosth. Olynth. 1. 5, and indeed by Aristotle himself in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book of the Politics.

4. *ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις κ.τ.λ.*, i. e. in 3. 14-17.

7. *πόθεν*, 'from what source': cp. Plato, Rep. 375 C, *πόθεν ἄμα πρῶον καὶ μεγαλόθυμον ἦθος εὐρήσομεν*; and Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 10, *καθίσταται βασιλεὺς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν*. The answer given has been, from men of surpassing virtue, not from men of surpassing stature, as was the practice in Ethiopia (6 (4). 4. 1290 b 4 sq.).

τυραννίδος δ' εἴη κ.τ.λ. In these two kinds of tyranny rule is exercised over willing subjects (16), and yet they are here classed as tyrannies. This does not agree with 3. 14. 1285 a 27, αἱ δὲ (τύραννοι) ἀκούσιν ἀρχοῦσιν. Aristotle, in fact, here includes among tyrannies any forms of monarchy in which the monarch rules δεσποτικῶς κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην (16 sq.). In 3. 14. 1285 a 16 sqq. he classes these two kinds of tyranny among kingships; still even there he seems to feel that they are rather μοναρχίαι than βασιλείαι (see note on 1285 a 16).

8. μὲν is taken up by δέ in τρίτων δὲ εἶδος τυραννίδος, 17.

ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, in 3. 14. 1285 a 16-b 3. The two kinds of tyranny there described are the form of hereditary kingship with despotic authority which existed among some barbarian races and the aesymenteship of the early Greeks. As to the electiveness of these barbarian kingships see note on 1285 b 2. They seem to have been hereditary as well as elective, though we hear nothing of their hereditariness here (see note on 1313 a 10). How they combined the two characteristics we are not told.

9. διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν, 'because their nature in a way overlaps in relation to kingship also [as well as mutually].' As to ἐπαλλάττειν, which is here followed by πρὸς, see note on 1255 a 13. For τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν cp. c. 8. 1293 b 32, ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς.

11. ἔν τε γὰρ τῶν βαρβάρων πᾶσιν κ.τ.λ. The fact that these monarchs were elective is dwelt on because it shows that their monarchy was in accordance with law: cp. Diog. Laert. 3. 92, αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀρχόντες ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπὶ πάν ἀιρεθῶσι, κατὰ νόμον ἀρχοῦσιν. Αὐτοκράτορας is explained by κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γνώμην, 17. Niebuhr (quoted by Eaton) thinks that Aristotle here refers to the Roman Dictatorship, and certainly we are reminded of the passage before us in Appian, Bell. Civ. 1. 99, 'Ρωμαῖοι δὲ . . . χειροτονοῦσι τὸν Σῶλλον ἐς ὅσον θέλοι τύραννον αὐτοκράτορα' τύραννος μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν δικτατόρων ἀρχὴ καὶ πάλαι, ὀλίγῃ χρόνῳ ὀριζομένη, τότε δὲ πρῶτον ἐς ἀόριστον ἐλθοῦσα τυραννὶς ἐγίγνετο ἐντελής, but Aristotle may have in his mind among other barbarian kings those of the Ethiopians, who are spoken of as elected in Diod. 3. 9. 4. See note on 1313 a 10.

13. τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, i. e. by election.

15. ἦσαν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 2 sq. διὰ τὸ κατὰ νόμον, sc. εἶναι.

18. ἥπερ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ τυραννίς. So we hear of a μάλιστα λεγομένη βασιλεία in 5, and of a μάλιστα εἶναι δοκoῦσα δημοκρατία in

c. 14. 1298 b 13 sq. and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 26. Cp. also 1.9. 1256 b 40, ἔστι δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἢν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν, χρηματιστικῇν.

19. τὴν μοναρχίαν, ἥτις κ.τ.λ. Possibly a reminiscence of Hdt. 3. 80, κῶς δ' ἂν εἴη χρῆμα κατηρηγμένον μοναρχίῃ τῇ ἔξῃστι ἀνευθύρ ποιεῖν τὰ βούλεται; For the definition here given of ἡ μάλιστα τυραννίς, cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 41 sqq. and Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 37, μοναρχία δ' ἐστὶ κατὰ τοῦτομα ἐν ᾗ εἰς ἀπάντων κύριός ἐστιν· τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν κατὰ τάξιν τῷ βασιλείᾳ, ἡ δ' ἀόριστος τυραννίς.

- C. 11. 25. Τίς δ' ἀρίστη πολιτεία κ.τ.λ. Welldon places a note of interrogation after μετασχεῖν, 31, and he may be right, but perhaps it is more likely that the sentence is incomplete and that σκεπτόν or some such word would have been added but for the interposition of the clause καὶ γὰρ . . . λεκτέον (31-34), which distracts the writer's attention. I do not think (with Conring and Sus.) that any word or words have fallen out of the text after μετασχεῖν, 31, for the same thing occurs elsewhere in the Politics, e. g. in 1. 12. 1259 a 37 sqq.

26. μήτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν κ.τ.λ. For the dative συγκρίνουσι compare the dative in Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 31, ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθόντων θεωροῦντι. For ἀρετὴν τὴν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἰδιώτας see note on 1330 b 38.

27. μήτε πρὸς παιδείαν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle appears here to speak not of παιδεία in general, but of a specially exalted kind of it; in Lucian, Somn. c. 1, however, we read of παιδεία in general, τοῖς πλείστοις οὖν ἔδοξε παιδεία μὲν καὶ πόνου πολλοῦ καὶ χρόνου μακροῦ καὶ δαπάνης οὐ μικρᾶς καὶ τύχης δεῖσθαι λαμπρᾶς.

28. τυχερᾶς qualifies χορηγίας, but not, I think, φύσεως, as Sus. apparently holds that it does (Sus.⁸ Ind. s. v. φύσις). Τύχη is something apart from φύσις (cp. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 27 sqq. and 4 (7). 13. 1331 b 41). For the contrast of φύσις and χορηγία cp. Polyb. 6. 2. 13.

29. βίον τε τὸν τοῖς πλείστοις κοινωνῆσαι δυνατόν. Supply πρὸς. See note on 1274 b 12, and cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 23. For βίον τὸν τοῖς πλείστοις κοινωνῆσαι δυνατόν cp. Xen. Anab. 4. 1. 24, αὐτὸς δ' ἔφη ἡγήσασθαι δυνατόν καὶ ὑποζυγίοις πορεύεσθαι ὁδόν.

31. καὶ γὰρ ὅς κ.τ.λ. The sense is—for the so-called aristocracies described by us just now, which might seem to be in a special degree the constitution of which we are in quest, are partly beyond the reach of most States, so that they do not really concern us now, and partly border on the polity, so that they are not more the constitution of which we are in quest than the polity is, and we must speak of them and of it as one constitution.

Aristotle adds this remark to show that the question which he has just asked has not as yet been answered, and that it still needs to be dealt with.

32. τὰ μὲν ἐξωτέρῳ πίπτουσι ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων. This is implied as to the Lacedaemonian constitution in c. 1. 1288 b 40 sqq. For ἐξωτέρῳ πίπτειν see Bon. Ind. 594 b 59 sqq.

34. ἀμφοῖν, these aristocracies and the polity.

ἡ δὲ δὴ κρίσις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle shows in 34-1295 b 1 that the μέσος βίος and the μέση πολιτεία are the best. He thus prepares the way for the conclusion which he is occupied in establishing in 1295 b 1-35, that ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία is the best, a distinct conclusion, be it observed, from that which he had previously arrived at, that the μέση πολιτεία is the best, for we can conceive a μέση πολιτεία which is not διὰ τῶν μέσων. However, Aristotle identifies ἡ δὲ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία with ἡ μέση πολιτεία in 1296 a 7. He proves that ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία is the best in the following way:—A mean state in respect of the gifts of fortune is best. For those who are thus circumstanced (1) obey reason most readily, and therefore are less likely to commit unjust acts, (2) they are most capable, as citizens should be, of both ruling and being ruled, and also most alike and equal, and for both these reasons are best suited for membership of a πόλις, for a πόλις thrives best when it consists of men alike and equal, among whom the friendship and community of feeling essential to a πόλις are most likely to be found; besides, those who are moderately well-to-do are most secure, for they are least given to plot against others and are least plotted against themselves. Hence the constitution which places supreme power in the hands of the moderately well-to-do class is the best (1295 b 34 sqq.). It is also the best because it is least subject to civil discord (1296 a 7 sqq.). A further indication that it is the best may be found in the fact that the best lawgivers have belonged to this class (1296 a 18 sqq.). It is only because in many States the moderately well-to-do class is small, and for other reasons which Aristotle gives in 1296 a 22-b 2, that ἡ μέση πολιτεία, or in other words ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία, has so seldom existed.

περὶ ἀπάντων τούτων, i. e. which is the best constitution and the best life for most States and most men (25 sq.).

35. ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων, 'based on the same elementary principles': cp. Top. 6. 5. 143 a 13, σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ γένη στοιχείων, and Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 16, τὸ πολλάκις εἰρημένον μέγιστον

στοιχείων, τὸ τηρεῖν ὅπως κ.τ.λ. : also Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 16, ταῦτα γὰρ στοιχεῖα πρῶτα καὶ μέγιστα χρηστῆς πολιτείας ἐστίν.

36. ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς. Probably a reference to Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 9-21, as well as to Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1101 a 14 sqq. and similar passages.

τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον, 'that which is unimpededly lived in accordance with virtue.' 'Ἀνεμπόδιστον agrees with βίον understood, not with ἀρετὴν, as Vet. Int. supposes that it does, translating 'cam quae secundum virtutem non impeditam.'

37. μεσότητα δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 8. 1108 b 11, τριῶν δὲ διαβάσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἑλλειψιν, μίᾱς δ' ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος. As Sus.² points out (Note 1288), Aristotle would have spoken more exactly if he had said that *moral* virtue is a mean state. Τὴν is added before ἀρετὴν because κατ' ἀρετὴν has preceded : see note on 1286 b 17.

τὸν μέσον ἀναγκαῖον βίον εἶναι βέλτιστον. Cp. Plato, Rep. 619 A. Τὸν μέσον βίον = τὸν κατὰ μεσότητα βίον.

38. τῆς ἐκάστοις ἐνδεχομένης τυχεῖν μεσότητος, 'ea mediocritate quae potest singulis contingere' (Sepulv.). This is added because the same mean state is not within the reach of every one (see Eth. Nic. 2. 5. 1106 a 32 sqq.). The mean state of a great wrestler like Milo in respect of food is not attainable by a novice. For the explanatory genitive τῆς ἐκάστοις ἐνδεχομένης τυχεῖν μεσότητος, added in interpretation of τὸν μέσον βίον, compare the somewhat similar genitive in Plato, Laws 776 C, ἡ 'Ηρακλεωτῶν δουλεία τῆς τῶν Μαρνανδυνῶν καταδουλώσεως ('servitium, sive servi, Heracleotarum, qui extiterunt ex subiectione Mariandynorum,' Stallbaum), and see Stallbaum's note on Phaedo 97 A, ἡ ξύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι.

39. τοὺς δὲ αὐτοὺς τούτους ὁρους κ.τ.λ., 'and these same criteria must necessarily be the criteria of the goodness or badness of a State also and a constitution,' i. e. States and constitutions will be good or bad according as they are or are not in a mean condition, just as the life of an individual will be good or bad according as it is or is not in a mean condition. Καί before πόλεως probably means 'also,' not 'both,' though it is followed by another καί : see note on 1342 a 4.

40. ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία βίος τίς ἐστι πόλεως, i. e. for what holds of a State is likely to hold of a constitution, for a constitution is a form of the life of a State. See vol. i. p. 210, note 1.

1. ἐν ἀπέσσει κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 3. 1289 b 29 sqq., where the μέσοι are 1295 b. the midway class between the εὐποροὶ and the ἀποροὶ, just as they are in 1296 a 10—13 and 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 28 sqq., whereas in the passage before us they are the midway class between the εὐποροὶ σφόδρα and the ἀποροὶ σφόδρα. In 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 1 sq. they are the midway class between οἱ πλούσιοι and ὁ δῆμος (cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 40 sqq., where οἱ πλούσιοι and οἱ πένητες are the extremes between which they stand), and in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 12 sqq. the midway class between οἱ γνῶρμοι and ὁ δῆμος. In Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 b 18 sqq. they are opposed to οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις. We hear nothing of the μέσοι in 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 30 sq. It would seem from 1296 a 10 sqq. that, notwithstanding what is said in the passage before us, the μέσοι hardly existed in small Greek States. Aristotle no doubt has before him Eurip. Suppl. 225 Bothe (238 Dindorf),

τρεῖς γὰρ πολιτῶν μερίδες· οἱ μὲν ἄλβιοι
ἀνωφελεῖς τε πλείονων τ' ἐρῶσ' αἰεὶ
οἱ δ' οὐκ ἔχοντες καὶ σπαρίζοντες βίου,
δεινοί, νέμοντες τῇ φθόγῃ πλείον μέρος,
εἰς τοὺς ἔχοντας κέντρ' ἀφιάσων κακῆ,
γλώσσαις πονηρῶν προστατῶν φηλούμενοι
τριῶν δὲ μοιρῶν ἡ 'ν μέσῳ σώζει πόλεις,
κόσμον φυλάσσουσ' ὅντιν' ἂν τάξῃ πόλις.

3. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὁμολογεῖται τὸ μέτριον ἀριστον καὶ τὸ μέσον. Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 14 sq. As Camerarius points out (Interp. p. 163), the saying Μέτρον ἀριστον was ascribed to Cleobulus of Lindus (Diog. Laert. 1. 93), and Theognis had said (335),

μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν πάντων μίση' ἀριστα.

For τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ μέσον, cp. De Part. An. 2. 7. 652 b 17 sq. and Plut. De Profect. in Virt. c. 13 *sub fin.*, εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίστασθαι καὶ μέτρον.

4. φανερόν ἐστι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1153 b 21 sqq. Under εὐτυχήματα Aristotle evidently includes both bodily and external goods; both are the gifts of fortune (Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 27 sq.). He has before him here and in what follows Plato, Laws 679 B sq. and 728 D, *μηρύνει δὲ μοι φαίνεται . . . 729 A, ὡς τὸ πολὺ.* Compare also Eurip. Fragm. 80 Nauck (79, ed. 2),

βροτοῖς τὰ μείζω τῶν μέσων τίεται νόσους·

θειῶν δὲ θνητοῦς κόσμον οὐ πρέπει φέρειν,

and the fragment of Rhianus referred to in vol. ii. p. 419 (Stob. Floril. 4. 34).

δ. ῥᾶστη γὰρ τῇ λόγῃ πειθαρχεῖν, 'for it is most ready to obey reason': cp. [Plato.] Menex. 249 C, τοῖς τε γὰρ τελευταῖσιν καὶ τοῖς ζώσιν οὕτως ἂν προσφιλέστατοι εἴητε καὶ ῥᾶστοι θεραπεύειν τε καὶ θεραπεύεσθαι, and Plut. Anton. c. 6, οὐ γὰρ οὕτως εὐχερὴς ἦν οὐδὲ ῥᾶδιος ὑπ' ὀργῆς ἐκπεσεῖν τῶν λογισμῶν Γάιος Καῖσαρ, ὥστε κ.τ.λ. We hardly expect to find Aristotle asserting so close a connexion between a moderate amount of property and a readiness to be swayed by reason after what he has said in 2. 7. 1266 b 28 sqq. and 1267 a 41 sqq.

ε. ὑπερίσχυρον. Cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 17. 470 R.

θ. γίγνεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 2. 16. 1390 b 32, τῇ δὲ πλούτῃ δ' ἐπεται ἥθη, ἐπιπολῆς ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν ἀπασιν ὑβριστὰς γὰρ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι, πάσχοντές τι ὑπὸ τῆς κτήσεως τοῦ πλούτου· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔχοντες ἀπαντα τὰγαθὰ οὕτω διακίονται, and Plato, Laws 742 E.

10. τῶν δ' ἀδικημάτων κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 2. 13. 1390 a 18, καὶ τὰδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν (οἱ πρὸςβύτεροι καὶ παρηκμακότες) εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ὕβριν.

12. ἔτι δ' ἡκισθ' οὗτοι φυλαρχοῦσι καὶ βουλαρχοῦσιν ταῦτα δ' ἀμφοτέρω βλαβερά ταῖς πόλεσιν. Οὗτοι evidently refers to the μέσοι, who have not, however, been mentioned since 3. It may be doubted, therefore, whether the words ἔτι δ' . . . πόλεσιν stand in their right place; they would be more in place after πόλεως, 28, or εἶναι, 34. As to their probable meaning see vol. i. p. 499, note 1, and compare Xen. Oecon. 2. 5 sq. (already referred to in vol. i. p. 580). Cp. also Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 17 sqq. If the words are in their right place, they adduce a further proof that the μέσοι are more under the guidance of reason than the very rich, derived from their abstinence from extravagant expenditure on liturgies. Giph. (p. 467) would expunge ἔτι δ' . . . βουλαρχοῦσιν as an interpolation and retain in the text only ταῦτα . . . πόλεσιν, and Sus. adopts a similar course, bracketing ἔτι δ' . . . βουλαρχοῦσιν and reading ταῦτα δὴ in place of ταῦτα δ'. It is of course possible that the words ἔτι δ' . . . βουλαρχοῦσιν, and indeed the whole clause ἔτι δ' . . . πόλεσιν, are nothing more than a remark added by Aristotle or some one else in the margin which has crept into the text, but I incline on the whole to a more favourable view of them, though, as has been said, I doubt whether they are in their right place.

13. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle now turns to the political, as distinguished from the moral, defects of those who have too much or too little of the goods of fortune. He has before him Plato, Laws 728 D–729 A: cp. also Laws 791 D, λέγω δὲ τό γε παρ' ἡμῶν

δόγμα, ὡς ἡ μὲν τρυφή δύσκολα καὶ ἀκρόχολα καὶ σφόδρα ἀπὸ μικρῶν κινούμενα τὰ τῶν νέων ἦθῃ ἀπεργάζεται, τὸ δὲ τούτων ἐκαστίον ἢ τε σφόδρὰ καὶ ἐργία δούλωσις ταπεινούς καὶ ἀνελευθέρους καὶ μισανθρώπους ποιοῦσα ἀνεπιτηδείους ξυνοίκους ἀποτελεῖ. We are told, however, in Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 a 20 sq. that an abundance of the goods of fortune is thought to engender greatness of soul (μεγαλοψυχία). In Pol. 7 (5) 7. 1307 a 19 sq. much the same unfavourable account is given of οἱ ἐν ταῖς εὐπορίαις generally, not merely of those who are extremely rich.

16. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐθὺς κ.τ.λ. Εὐθὺς οἴκοθεν, 'from their parents' house at the outset': cp. Xen. Cyrop. 2. 3. 7, Κύρῳ πως ἐπὶ οἴκοθεν συνήθη καὶ ἀρεστὸς ἀνὴρ. For the fact here mentioned, cp. Carneades ap. Plut. De Adul. et Amic. c. 16, Καρνεάδης δὲ ἔλεγε, ὅτι πλουσίων καὶ βασιλείων παῖδες ἡπείνουν μόνον, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδὲν εὖ καὶ καλῶς μανθάνουσι· κολακεύει γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς ὁ διδάσκαλος ἐπαυνῶν, καὶ ὁ προσπαλαίων ἵποκατακλυόμενος. Plato had said much the same thing in Laws 695 B, παραλαβόντες δ' οὖν οἱ παῖδες τελευτήσαντος Κύρου τρυφῆς μεστοὶ καὶ ἀπεπληξίας, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἑτερον ἄτερος ἀπέκτεινε τῇ ἴσῳ ἀγανακτῶν κ.τ.λ., and 695 E, τὸ δ' αἰτίων οὐ τύχης, ὡς ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, ἀλλ' ὁ κακὸς βίος, ἐν οἷς τῶν διαφερόντως πλουσίων καὶ τυράννων παῖδες τὰ πολλὰ ζῶσιν. Cp. also Laws 791 D, quoted above on 13. 'A boy has the best chance of being well brought up in a household where there is solid comfort combined with thrift and simplicity' (Trevelyan, Life of Lord Macaulay, 1. 37).

21. γίνεται οὖν κ.τ.λ. That a πόλις in which one section of the citizens consists of masters and the other of slaves is no true πόλις is a view inherited by Aristotle from the Menexenus (238 E sq.), and from Plato, Laws 756 E sq. (quoted in vol. i. p. 499, note 2) and 712 E, and Rep. 417 A—B. He probably also remembers Laws 679 B, ἢ δ' ἂν ποτε ξυνοικίᾳ μήτε πλοῦτος ξυνοικῇ μήτε πενία, σχεδὸν ἐν ταύτῃ γυναιότατα ἦθῃ γίγνεται· ἂν οὔτε γὰρ ὕβρις οὐτ' ἀδικία, ζῆλοί τε αὐ καὶ φθόνοι οὐκ ἐγγίγνονται. That the πόλις is an association of ελευθεροὶ we are told in 3. 6. 1279 a 21.

23. κοινωνίας πολιτικῆς. Πολιτικῆς goes only with κοινωνίας, not with φιλίας. For κοινωνίας πολιτικῆς without the article cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 38.

24. ἡ γὰρ κοινωνία φιλικόν, 'for association is a thing connected with [and springing from] friendliness': cp. 3. 9. 1280 b 38, τὸ δὲ ταούτων φιλίας ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ συζῆν προαίρεσις φιλία, and Plato, Gorg. 507 E, ὅτι δὲ μὴ ἐπὶ κοινωνία, φιλία οὐκ ἂν εἴη. In Laws 697 C

τὸ φίλον is conjoined with τὸ κοινόν, and in 695 D φιλία with κοινωνία; cp. also Laws 837 B.

οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁδοῦ βούλονται κοινωνεῖν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. Is Aristotle thinking of Aeschines and Demosthenes on their second embassy to Pella? Cp. Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 97, οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ (i. e. Δημοσθένει) συσσιτεῖν, ὅτ' ἐξήμεμεν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑστέραν πρεσβείαν, ἤθελεν, οὐδὲ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς, ὅπου δυνατόν ἦν, εἰς ταῦτόν παρδοκεῖον καταλύειν. More probably he has in view the general inclination of foes to give each other a wide berth (Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 225: Aristoph. Plut. 837). We read of the old families and their antagonists at Lausanne in 1817 in Mr. S. Lane-Poole's Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe (i. 274), 'The spirit of democracy showed itself even on the high-road, and whenever cart met carriage, the latter in most instances had to knock under.'

25. βούλεται δὲ γε ἡ πόλις ἐξ ἴσων εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίων ὅτι μάλιστα. βούλεται, i. e. 'aims at being,' not 'tends to be,' for Aristotle does not mean to assert that the πόλις tends, as time goes on, to become an union of men alike and equal. Aristotle is here speaking of the citizens of the πόλις, not, as in 3. 4. 1277a 5, ἐπεὶ ἐξ ἀνομοίων ἡ πόλις, of all its components. Compare Eth. Eud. 7. 10. 1242 b 30, κατ' ἰσότητα δὲ βούλεται εἶναι ἡ πολιτικὴ φιλία, and Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 35, ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστι τῶν ὁμοίων. Political rule itself is a rule over men free and equal (1. 7. 1255 b 20). It is not of course enough that the citizens should be alike; poor men are alike and slaves are alike, yet a πόλις composed of poor men or of slaves would not be a πόλις (3. 12. 1283 a 18 sq.). Machiavelli (Discorsi sopra la Prima Deca di Tito Livio, Book 1. c. 55) goes so far as to say that 'whosoever shall attempt to found a Republic where there are many gentlemen will never effect his purpose except he can first root them all out.' He explains that he means by 'gentlemen' 'such as live in idleness and abundance on the income of their estates without needing to trouble themselves to till the soil or to undertake any other kind of labour, in order to live.' He holds that if three Republics, Florence, Siena, and Lucca, had subsisted a long time in the not large country of Tuscany, it was because there were but very few gentlemen there and no Lords with castles and subjects of their own, whereas Lombardy and the Kingdom of Naples abounded with these two sorts of men, and were consequently marked out for monarchy.

27. ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ., 'so that this State' (i. e. a State com-

posed of moderately well-to-do citizens) 'will necessarily be best constituted in respect of those elements of which we say that the State is by nature composed.' The elements referred to are the very rich, the very poor, and the moderately well-to-do (1295 b 1 sqq.). A saying is attributed to Thales in [Plut.] Sept. Sap. Conv. c. 11 that the best democracy is that in which the citizens are neither very rich nor very poor. For *ταύτην τὴν πόλιν* = *τὴν ἐκ τῶν μέσων συσταῶσαν πόλιν*, cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 6, *ταύτας τὰς πολιτείας* (= *τὰς τῶν ἄριστα δοκούντων πολιτεύεσθαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων*). For the ellipse in *ἐξ ἧν* see note on 1253 b 3.

22. *καὶ σώζονται δ' ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν κ.τ.λ.*, i. e. not only save the State, but also save their own lives and fortunes. Euripides had said, *τρίων δὲ μοιρῶν ἡ 'ν μέσῃ σώζει πόλεις* (see note on 1295 b 1): cp. also Plato, Rep. 417 A, *καὶ οὕτω μὲν σώζονται τ' ἂν καὶ σώζοιεν τὴν πόλιν*. For the fact cp. *Fragm. Trag. Adesp.* 462 Nauck (547, ed. 2), esp.

ἡ δὲ μεσότης ἐν πᾶσι ἀσφαλεστέρα,
and Xen. Mem. 4. 2. 35.

31. *τῆς τούτων*. Aristotle expects us to supply *οὐσίας*: compare the omission of *πολιτειῶν* in 1296 a 5. For similar omissions see vol. ii. p. li, note 4.

καθάπερ τῆς τῶν πλουσίων οἱ πένητες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. Compare the passage from the Supplices of Euripides quoted above on 1295 b 1, Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 28—31, and Corn. Nepos, Chabrias, c. 3, *neque animo aequo pauperes alienam opulentium intueantur fortunam*.

33. *διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.* For the asyndeton see note on 1286 a 30.

Φακυλίδης, fragm. 12 Bergk. Cp. Pindar, Pyth. 11. 52 sq. Bergk.

34. *ὁῦλον δρα κ.τ.λ.*, 'it is clear then that the constitution also in which the moderately well-to-do are supreme is best,' as well as *ἡ μέση κτῆσις τῶν εὐτυχημάτων* (1295 b 4 sq.), or perhaps as well as the *παλλὲς* of 34. 'Ἡ *κοινωνία* ἡ *πολιτική* here means 'the constitution,' as in 2. 1. 1260 b 27 (cp. 3. 4. 1276 b 29). In 1. 1. 1252 a 7 it seems to mean 'the πόλις.' For *ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων*, cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 6 sq.

36. *καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας κ.τ.λ.* 'The condition of economical and political well-being in any highly civilized nation is a harmony of large, moderate, and small incomes. Things are best when the moderate incomes predominate—when, as Rousseau says, "no citizen is so rich that he can buy up the rest and none so poor

that he must needs sell himself" (Roscher, Politik, p. 473). Mr. A. J. Balfour remarked of Ireland in the House of Commons (*Times*, March 11, 1890), that one reason why its land-system was imperfect was that 'there was an absence of a class intermediate between the occupying farmer and the landlord which might hold the balance between the two.' Cp. 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 38 sqq.

ἐν αἷς δῆ. 'Δή vim relativi urguet, "welcher eben," "welcher gerade"' (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 43).

39. τὰς ἐναντίας ὑπερβολάς, i.e. extreme democracy and unmixed oligarchy.

40. τοὺς πολίτευομένους, 'cives optimo iure' (Bon. Ind. 613 b 27), 'the active citizens' (Welldon). See note on 1328 a 17.

1296 a. 1. ὡς ὅπου κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 36 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 32 sqq.

ἡ δῆμος ἴσχατος ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἄκρατος. Cp. 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 35 sq. and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21.

2. ἡ τυραννὶς δι' ἀμφοτέρων τὰς ὑπερβολάς, 'or, as a result of both these extremes' (extreme oligarchy and extreme democracy), 'a tyranny.'

3. καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Τῆς νεανικωτάτης probably qualifies both δημοκρατίας and ὀλιγαρχίας: cp. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 3, ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ὑστάτης σύγκειται καὶ δημοκρατίας. The reason why extreme democracies and extreme oligarchies were apt to change into tyrannies may be gathered from 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 20 sqq.; both these constitutions placed great power in the hands of individuals, the one of them in the hands of demagogues and the other in those of the leading oligarchs. Tyranny often arose out of oligarchy (7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 sqq.), and according to a saying of Dionysius the younger (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Dionys. Iun. 4. 176 D), the elder Dionysius became tyrant μισουμένης δημοκρατίας. The narrow oligarchy of the Bacchiadae at Corinth ended in a tyranny, but the less narrow oligarchy which was set up on the fall of the tyranny had not been replaced by a tyranny, though it is true that Timophanes had attempted to overthrow it (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 23 sq.).

5. τῶν μέσων, sc. πολιτειῶν, which is suppressed because easily supplied. The term ἡ μέση πολιτεία is used of a constitution midway between oligarchy and democracy in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 13. l. 18.

τῶν σύνεγγυς, i.e. the moderate forms of oligarchy (cp. 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21, τὴν μὲν εὐκρατον μάλιστα τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν καὶ πρώτην, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ σύνεγγυς τῇ καλουμένῃ πολιτείᾳ) and also of democracy. Thus

the cities of Achaia, being under moderate democracies, were mostly free from tyranny (Paus. 7. 7. 1: Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 105).

τὴν δ' αἰτίαν κ.τ.λ. The reference perhaps is especially to 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 20 sqq. (see above on 3).

7. ἡ μέση, sc. πολιτεία. It is implied that in the μέση πολιτεία the midway class will be large: cp. 23 sqq., where ἐν ταύταις apparently means ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις πολιτείαις, and c. 13. 1297 b 26, δι' ὁλιγαθροπίας γὰρ οὐκ εἶχον (αἱ ἀρχαῖαι πολιτεῖαι) πολὺ τὸ μέσον.

8. ὅπου γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 30, τὸ μέσον αἰεὶν τοῦτο γὰρ διαλύει τὰς διὰ τὴν ἀμισθέτητα στάσεις. Aristotle has before him Plato, Laws 744 D, δεῖ γὰρ ἐν πόλει που, φαμέν, τῇ τοῦ μεγίστου νοσήματος οὐ μεθεξούση, ὃ διδάσασιν ἢ στάσει ὀρθότερον ἂν εἴη κεκλησθαι, μήτε περὶ τὴν χολεπὴν ἐνεῖναι παρὰ τισι τῶν πολιτῶν μήτ' αὐτοῖς πλοῦτον, ὥς ἀμφοτέρων τυκόντων ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρα. This passage lends support to the reading of the MSS. here, στάσεις καὶ διαστάσεις, and makes it unlikely that Schneider and Sus. are right in reading συστάσεις in place of στάσεις, a change suggested by the rendering of Vet. Int., 'conturbationes et dissensiones politiarum,' where however 'conturbationes' may stand for στάσεις, for στάσις is not always rendered 'seditio' by Vet. Int. Compare also Menecles of Barca, Fragm. 1 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 4. 449), οἱ πολῖται ἐν τῇ Θήρᾳ ἐστασίσσαν καὶ διέστησαν ἀλλήλων, and Gellius' version of Solon's law as to neutrality in a sedition (Gell. 2. 12, si ob discordiam dissensionemque seditio atque discessio populi in duas partes (στάσις καὶ διάστασις) fiet, etc.); also Plato, Rep. 560 A, στάσις καὶ ἀνίστασις, and Plut. Solon, c. 12, τῆς στάσεως ἀκμὴν λαβούσης μάλιστα καὶ τοῦ δήμου διαστάντος. In a διάστασις the citizens were divided into two camps, and a division into two camps was probably often the precursor of actual fighting (cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 19).

9. αἱ μεγάλαι πόλεις, 'large States' probably, not 'large cities,' as in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sq. The tendency of small States to στάσις may be illustrated by the examples of Cynaetha (Polyb. 4. 17), Epidamnus (Thuc. 1. 24), and Delphi (Pol. 7 (5). 4. 1303 b 37 sqq.). Aristotle's remark that τὸ μέσον was a numerous class in large Greek States throws an interesting light on the distribution of property in them. If we could trust the statement of the tribune Marcus Philippus in B.C. 104 that there were not two thousand men in Rome who possessed property (Cic. De Offic. 2. 21. 73), which is in all probability an exaggerated one, the state of things at Rome must have been at that time very different.

10. ἐν δὲ ταῖς μικραῖς κ.τ.λ. If *oi μέσοι* were so few in number in small Greek States, the polity can hardly have been suitable to them. Yet were not most Greek States small? If so, can the polity have been suitable to most Greek States? Aristotle says himself in 1296 a 23 sqq. that the midway class was often a small one in Greek States. The difficulty just pointed out does not seem, however, to have occurred to him.

11. μηδὲν μέσον, 'nothing midway between the very rich and the very poor.'

13. καὶ αἱ δημοκρατίαι δὲ ἀσφαλέστεραι τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν κ.τ.λ. A different reason is given for this in 7 (5). 1. 1302 a 8 sqq.: cp. also 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 15 sqq.

16. ἐπεὶ introduces a proof that the greater durability of democracy as compared with oligarchy is due to the *μέσοι*, the proof being furnished by the fact that when the supremacy of the poor in a democracy is not due to the aid of the *μέσοι* but to their own superiority in number, democracies do not last long. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 12-19. The fact mentioned by Aristotle is interesting. The Athenian democracy, which lasted long, must have had the support of the *μέσοι*. Mommsen (History of Rome, Book 4, c. 6: Eng. Trans., ed. 1, vol. iii. p. 212) says of the demagogues Saturninus and Glaucia, 'While Gaius Gracchus, clearly perceiving that no government could be overthrown by means of the proletariat alone, had especially sought to gain over to his side the propertied classes, these continuators of his work began by producing a reconciliation between the aristocracy and the *bourgeoisie*.' For *κακοπραγία γίνεται* cp. Plato, Laws 701 E, ἐγένετο εὐπραγία.

18. σημεῖον δὲ κ.τ.λ. An indication of what? Probably of the fact that the constitution which gives supreme power to the midway class is the best.

19. Σόλων τε γὰρ ἦν τούτων (δηλοῖ δ' ἐκ τῆς ποιήσεως). For *δηλοῖ* = *δῆλον ἵστί*, see Liddell and Scott and Bon. Ind. 174 a 14 sqq. That Solon belonged to the moderately well-to-do class is testified also by 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 5 and Plut. Solon, cc. 1 and 14. No evidence of the fact is to be found in Solon, Fragm. 15, which seems only to show that he was not wealthy, nor do the quotations from his poems in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 5 prove the point, as the writer seems to think that they do. Aristotle probably did not regard Cleisthenes as one of the best lawgivers. He must have been a wealthy man.

20. οὐ γὰρ ἦν βασιλεὺς. This is added in correction of those who

had said that Lycurgus was king. Ephorus had done so (Fragm. 64, ap. Strab. p. 482, *τίως μὲν οὖν ἐβασίλευεν ὁ Λυκούργος ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ, γενομένου δὲ παιδὸς ἐπετρόπευσεν ἐκείνον*: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 3). Other authorities went further; according to them Lycurgus was for many years king at Lacedaemon (Plut. Solon, c. 16). Wide domains were attached to the Lacedaemonian kingship (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 44. 2), and if Lycurgus had been king, he would have been a rich man and not one of the *μέσοι*. Cp. Hom. Odys. i. 392,

οὐ μὲν γάρ τι κακὸν βασιλευμένῳ αἰψά τί οἱ δῶ
ἀφνειὸν πέλεται, καὶ τιμωρίστερος αὐτός.

The view that Lycurgus was not a king recurs in the speech of Cleomenes III in Plut. Cleom. c. 10, *τὸν Λυκούργον, ὅς οὔτε βασιλεὺς ἦν οὔτε ἀρχὼν, ἰδιώτης δὲ βασιλεύειν ἐπιχειρῶν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις προῆλθεν εἰς ἀγορὰν κ.τ.λ.*

21. *Χαρώνδας*. Charondas, though praised here, is apparently referred to in c. 13. 1297 a 23 sqq. as the author of an *ἀριστοκρατία* embodying one at any rate of the *σοφίσματα* to which Aristotle objects (see note on 1274 a 22).

22. *φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτων κ.τ.λ.* Three reasons for the comparative rarity of *ἡ διὰ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία* are given in what follows:— (1) the class of *μέσοι* is often small, (2) the constitution is the outcome of a victory of the rich or the poor, (3) those who have had the hegemony in Greece have seldom favoured this constitution. In 7 (5). i. 1301 b 39 sqq. a different reason is given for the tendency of constitutions to assume the form of oligarchy or democracy.

23. *ἐν ταύταις*, i. e. *ἐν ταῖς πλείστοις πολιτείαις* (cp. 14 sqq.).

27. *πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κ.τ.λ.* Compare Plato, Laws 715 A, and as to Argos Thuc. 5. 82. 2, Plut. Alcib. c. 15, and Paus. 2. 20. 2. As to Tegea see Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 6—10.

30. *τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῆς πολιτείας*, 'the superior share in the advantages of the constitution': cp. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 28, *τοῖς ἥττων παυσούσι τῆς πολιτείας*, and 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 19, *τῆς ἰσότητος τῆς πολιτείας*.

32. *ὅτι δὲ κ.τ.λ.* The cause now mentioned for the general prevalence in Greece of democracy and oligarchy does not account for the prevalence of these two constitutions throughout the Greek world, for though the constitutional development of the States of Greece Proper, Western Asia Minor, the Northern Aegean, and

the Propontis, etc. was considerably influenced by the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, this can hardly be said of the constitutional development of the Greek States of Italy and Sicily, in which Athens did not interfere till a comparatively late date, or of Cyrene and Massalia, where neither the Lacedaemonians nor the Athenians appear to have interfered at all.

τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων τῆς Ἑλλάδος, 'those who held in the past the hegemony of Greece.' Aristotle refers to the Athenians and Lacedaemonians (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 22 sqq.). For the phrase cp. Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 133, οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ποτὶ ἀξιοῦντες ἡγεμόνες εἶναι (said of the Lacedaemonians): Demosth. Fragm. 17, τῶν ἡγησαμένων τῆς Ἑλλάδος (said of the Thebans): and Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem. 6. 9, οἱ τε τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡγούμενοι καὶ ἐπ' ἀνδρία διαβόητοι Σπαρτιῶται. Cp. also for γίγνεσθαι ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 5, τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς γενομένους.

38. ὀλιγάκις καὶ παρ' ὀλίγοις. Aristotle often uses expressions like this: cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 23, ὀλιγάκις ἢ ὀλίγας, and see Vahlen on Poet. 14. 1454 a 1, who refers to Poet. 24. 1460 a 9, De Gen. An. 1. 19. 727 b 28 sq. and 3. 5. 756 a 16 sq., Eth. Nic. 7. 11. 1151 b 30, and other passages. See also Bon. Ind. s. v. ὀλιγάκις, and Plato, Rep. 491 B.

εἷς γὰρ ἀνὴρ κ.τ.λ., 'for one man only of those formerly in a position of supreme authority was persuaded to allot this constitution [to those with whom he had to do].' For the use of ἐπὶ in τῶν πρότερον ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων, cp. ἐπ' εὐπραξίᾳ in Soph. O. C. 1554,

εὐδαίμονες γένοισθε, καὶ εὐπραξίᾳ
μέμνησθέ μου θανόντος εὐτυχεῖς αἶε.

It is doubtful whether we should supply τῆς Ἑλλάδος with ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ, though we have had τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων τῆς Ἑλλάδος in 32; Bonitz (Ind. s. v. ἡγεμονία) and Sus.³ (i. 597) do not appear to supply τῆς Ἑλλάδος, but to take statesmen at the head of their respective States to be referred to. Statesmen at the head of the greater Greek States would, however, be in a position to exercise an influence over the affairs of Greece. It is to be noticed that while the reference is to peoples in 32, statesmen are now referred to. I take the allusion to be to Theramenes: see vol. i. p. 470. A constitution which Thucydides describes both as ὀλιγαρχία and as ἀριστοκρατία was introduced at Thasos and in other States dependent on Athens in the time of the Four Hundred (Thuc. 8. 64). Aristotle

may well have thought that Epaminondas and Pelopidas missed a splendid opportunity of introducing the polity when the victory of Leuctra made Thebes the leading power in Greece, and that Arcadia, for instance, might have prospered better if Epaminondas had advised those who reorganized it to give it a less democratic constitution than they actually did. Why *συνπεισθή* and not *πεισθή*? *Συνπειθεῖν* seems hardly to differ in meaning from *πειθεῖν* in De Caelo, 2. 1. 284 a 2, *διόπερ καλῶς ἔχει συνεπειθεῖν αὐτὸν τοὺς ἀρχαίους καὶ μάλιστα πατέρας ἡμῶν ἀληθεῖς εἶναι λόγους*, and the word is said by Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 254. 3 to be often used in the same sense as *πειθεῖν* by Theopompus. *Συνπεισθή* may mean no more here, or it may mean, as Richards suggests, 'was persuaded to agree in doing so and so.' For *ταύτην ἀποδοῦναι τὴν τάξιν*, where I can hardly think (with Welldon) that *ἀποδοῦναι* means 'to restore' (Sus. translates the word 'ins Leben zu rufen,' 'to call into being'), cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 5, *οὐ πρότερον ἀπέδωκε τῷ πλήθει τοὺς νόμους (ὁ Λυκούργος)*. In 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 11, *τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἀποδόσειν*, the word perhaps means 'to restore.'

40. ἦδη δὲ κ.τ.λ. Καὶ τοῖς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, 'among those in the individual cities also,' as well as among rulers of the leading States of Greece: cp. Xen. Anab. 6. 6. 12, *εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγγυς αἱ Ἕλληνίδες πόλεις τῆς δὲ Ἑλλάδος Λακεδαιμόνιοι προεστήκασιν* *ἱκανοὶ δὲ εἰσι καὶ εἰς ἑσπυτοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὃ τι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι*. Aristotle evidently holds that the bad spirit to which he refers had had its origin in the policy of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian statesmen and had spread from it to the dependent States ruled by them. Macaulay perhaps remembers the passage before us when he writes of the Englishry and Irishry of Ireland in 1688-9 (History of England, c. 12), 'It was now impossible to establish in Ireland a just and beneficent government. . . . The opportunity had passed away; compromise had become impossible; the two infuriated castes were alike convinced that it was necessary to oppress or to be oppressed, and that there could be no safety but in victory, vengeance, and dominion.' *Μηδὲ βούλεσθαι τὸ ἴσον*, 'not even to wish for that which is equal and fair,' much less to endeavour to realize it. For *τὸ ἴσον* cp. 29, *οὐ καθιστάσι κοινὴν πολιτείαν οὐδ' ἴσην*.

2. ἀρίστη, sc. ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι (c. 11. 1295 a 25: c. 13. 1296 b. 1297 b 33).

5. καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐχομένην. Cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 15, *καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον δηλον ὅτι μεριούσιν*: Metaph. Z. 2. 1028 b 24,

καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐπεκτείνει τὰς οὐσίας, and other passages collected in Bon. Ind. 173 a 16 sqq. In 7 (5). 3. 1303 b 16 we have καὶ οὕτω δὴ, which is less common.

7. δαὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. So in 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21 sq. we are told that the first form of oligarchy is that which makes a near approach to the polity.

9. πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν, 'in relation to a presupposition' (in contradistinction to ἀπλῶς), i.e. in relation to the presupposition of a given case in which what is in the abstract most choiceworthy is not most advantageous. For πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν see Bon. Ind. 797 a 52 sqq.

λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ. It does not follow that what is in the abstract most choiceworthy will be advantageous in a given case. Punishment, which is in the abstract by no means choiceworthy, will be advantageous in the case of a criminal (4 (7). 13. 1332 a 10 sqq.). Cp. also Rhet. 2. 13. 1389 b 37, τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἀπλῶς. Thus, though the first form of oligarchy, which makes a near approach to the polity, is in the abstract the most choiceworthy form, in a given case an extreme form of oligarchy may be advantageous (cp. c. 12. 1296 b 33 sq.).

C. 12. 18. Τίς δὲ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 1. 1288 b 24 sqq. and c. 2. 1289 b 17 sqq. Compare also Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 30, χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας τὸ μὴ μόνον ἐπαίειν τίς πολιτεία συμφέρει ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων θεωροῦνται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰδέναι, αἱ ποῖαι τοῖς ποιοῖς ἀρμόττουσιν.

14. ληπτέον, i.e. ὑποθετέον: cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 16, λαμβάνει γὰρ ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν ὁ Σωκράτης, and 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 18. 'In a logical sense λαμβάνειν is used synonymously with αἰτεῖσθαι, ὑποθέσθαι, and in contrast to δευκύναι' (Bon. Ind. 422 b 11). That the principle here insisted on was inherited by Aristotle from Theramenes we have seen in vol. i. p. 491. Aristotle draws attention to it here because it has a bearing on the question what constitution is advantageous in a given case. To answer this question we must begin by ascertaining what is the strongest element in the given State, and what constitution will enlist its support.

17. ἔκ τε τοῦ ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ. For the omission of the article before ποσοῦ cp. 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 1, πρὸς τε τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις καὶ πολεμικάς. 'New England abolished caste; in Virginia they still talk of "quality folk"' (Lowell, Among my Books, p. 239).

18. λευθερία, which is said in c. 8. 1294 a 11 to be the ὄρος of

democracy, is here distinguished from ἡ τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχή. The *πλῆθος*, in fact, may include others than οἱ ἐλεύθεροι (3. 15. 1286 a 36). For the grouping together of *πλοῦτον παιδείαν εὐγένειαν* cp. c. 4. 1291 b 28 sq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 39.

20. For *ἐτέρῃ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε μερῶν ἡ πόλις*, see note on 1339 b 38. For the reversal of the order of the words in τὸ μὲν ποῦν ὑπάρχειν *ἐτέρῃ μέρει τῆς πόλεως* . . . ἄλλῃ δὲ μέρει τὸ ποσὸν see note on 1277 a 31, and cp. 26, *ἕκαστον εἶδος δημοκρατίας κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ δήμου ἐκάστου*.

23. *ὑπερέχειν*, sc. τοῦτο τὸ μέρος.

25. τὴν εἰρημένην ἀναλογίαν, i. e. so as to overbalance its defect in quality.

26. Though Aristotle uses the word *πέφικεν* here, he does not probably intend to imply that democracy or oligarchy exist by nature under any circumstances (cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 39 sq.).

29. *ὅταν δὲ τὸ τῶν βαναύσων καὶ μισθαρνούντων, τὴν τελευταίαν*. This hardly agrees with c. 6. 1293 a 1 sqq. No doubt the ultimate democracy will exist only in States in which artisans and day-labourers are very numerous, but it will not exist even in them unless the revenue is large enough to make an ample provision of pay possible.

31. *ὅπου δὲ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ γνωρίμων κ.τ.λ.* We see from 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sqq. that other things have to be taken into account in deciding what kind of oligarchy is suitable to a given State besides that mentioned here—for instance, the character of the territory. In 2. 12. 1274 a 18 we have *ἐκ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων*, but in the passage before us the article is omitted after *καὶ* because the two classes are treated as nearly akin. Compare with 31 sq. *Περὶ μακροβιότητος* 5. 466 a 33, *μακροβιότερα γὰρ τὰ λειπόμυνα τῷ πλήθει τοῦ ὄγρου, ἢ πλείονι λόγῳ ὑπερέχει κατὰ τὸ ποῦν ἢ λείπεται κατὰ τὸ ποσόν*.

34. *κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ πλήθους*, 'according to the degree of superiority' (i. e. in quality) 'possessed by the oligarchical population.' *Πλῆθος* must here be used of the class referred to without much reference to its numbers: cp. 31, *τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ γνωρίμων* (sc. *πλήθος*). The phrase recurs in 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 11, *ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ποῖα τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν ποῖα πλήθει*.

34. *δεῖ δὲ* . . . 38. *τούτους*, and 1297 a 6. *ὅσῳ* . . . b 1. *μόνον* Sus., following Buecheler, would transfer to before 1294 b 14, *τοῦ*, and 1297 b 1. *δεῖ* . . . 28. *ἐρχεσθαι*, to after *ὅλως*, 1294 b 40. But

Wellدون retains the traditional order of these passages, and, I think, rightly. I do not see any reason why Aristotle should not in 1296 b 34-38 advise the framers of oligarchies and democracies to frame their constitutions so as to satisfy the *μείσοι*, and though the counsel as to the construction of durable polities and aristocracies which is given in 1297 a 6-b 28 might have been given in c. 9, where Buecheler and Sus. would place it, it should not escape attention that *μονιμωτέρα*, 1297 a 7, evidently takes up *μόνιμον*, 1296 b 40, and that it can hardly be right to tear asunder the two sentences in which these words occur, as Buecheler and Sus. would do. It should also be noticed that the closing remark in 1297 b 26-28 as to τὸ μέσον comes better after, than before, what we have been told in c. 11 as to the importance of οἱ μέσοι. Aristotle's object in 1297 a 6-b 28 is to add two cautions to what he has already said in c. 9 as to the proper way of constructing polities and aristocracies, the one against falling into the error into which framers of these constitutions frequently fell, and trying to deceive the demos in addition to giving an unfair share of power to the well-to-do, and the other against fixing the property-qualification without reference to the circumstances of the particular case, and omitting to take care that those admitted to political rights shall be more numerous than those excluded from them. The latter caution is in complete harmony with, and was probably suggested by, what is said at the outset of the discussion in c. 12. 1296 b 14 sqq.

35. ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ goes with προσλαμβάνειν, and we should translate 'should make the moderately well-to-do sharers in the advantages of the constitution in addition to the class specially favoured by him.' Bonitz (Ind. s.v. προσλαμβάνειν) compares with the passage before us 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 7, τῷ προσλαμβάνειν ὡς πλείστοι καὶ ποιῖν πολίτας μὴ μόνον τοὺς γησίους ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς νόθους κ.τ.λ.

36. στοχάζεσθαι τῶν μέσων. Cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 22, στοχαζόμενον τοῦ πλῆθους, and Polyb. 6. 15. 9.

37. εἰάν τε δημοκρατικούς κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 11. 1296 a 13 sqq.

38. ὅπου δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but where the mass of the moderately well-to-do outweighs either both the extreme classes taken together or even one of them only, there it is possible for a durable polity to exist.' See vol. i. p. 501, note. Ὑπερτείνει probably means 'outweighs' (cp. 32, ὑπερτείνει τῷ ποσῷ), not 'exceeds in number,' though in small Greek States the very rich may often have been

more numerous than the moderately well-to-do (c. 11. 1296 a 10 sqq.).

40. For οὐδὲν φοβερὸν μὴ cp. (with Bon. Ind. 828 a 30) Metaph. θ. 8. 1050 b 23, καὶ οὐ φοβερὸν μὴ ποτε στῇ: cp. also Xen. Hiero, 1. 12, φοβερὸν γὰρ μὴ ἅμα στειρηθῶσι τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἀδύνατοι γίνωνται τιμωρῆσασθαι τοὺς ἀδικήσαντας.

2. οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἄτεροι βουλήσονται δουλεύειν τοῖς ἑτέροις κ.τ.λ. 1297 a. The sense is—for, if the rich are to combine with the poor against the μέσοι, either the one class must submit to be ruled by the other, and neither of the two classes will agree to that, or they must fall back on a κοινὴ πολιτεία which will give both classes a share of power, and if they seek to find a πολιτεία more κοινὴ than this, they will seek in vain.

3. οὐδεμίαν εὐρήσουσιν ἄλλην ταύτης. Vict. and Lamb. supply κοινοτέραν before ταύτης, while Sus.³ ('so werden sie keine andere als diese finden') and Welldon ('they will not discover any other than this') make ταύτης in the gen. after ἄλλην. For ἄλλος with the gen. cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1138 a 15 sq. and see Bon. Ind. s. v. I incline myself, however, to supply κοινοτέραν.

4. ἐν μέρει γὰρ ἀρχειν κ.τ.λ. Τὸ ἐν μέρει ἀρχειν καὶ ἀρχεισθαι is a sign of freedom (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 2 sq.), and a constitution in which it found a place would be especially κοινή.

6. διαιτητῆς δ' ὁ μέσος. Cp. De An. 2. 11. 424 a 6, τὸ γὰρ μέσον ἡμισίων γίνεται γὰρ πρὸς ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων. Aristotle's conception of the μέσοι ruling as arbitrators between rich and poor was perhaps suggested to him by the fact that Greek States occasionally had recourse to an ἀρχων μεσιδίας when the ἀπιστία πρὸς ἀλλήλους mentioned in 4 sq. existed (cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 26 sqq., where the phrase recurs).

8. οὐ δ' ἐν ἁμείνων ἡ πολιτεία मिथῇ, τοσούτῳ μονιμωτέρα. Cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 5 sqq.

7. καὶ τῶν τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς βουλομένων ποιεῖν πολιτείας, 'even of those who wish to construct aristocratic constitutions,' not merely of those who wish to construct oligarchies. I incline to think that τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας means here 'aristocratic constitutions,' not 'aristocratic polities,' though in c. 14. 1298 b 10 we have πολιτείας ἀριστοκρατικῆς used in the sense of an 'aristocratic polity.' That many aristocracies were not unlike oligarchies we know from c. 7. 1293 b 20 sq. and 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 15 sqq.

9. ἐν τῷ παρακροῦσθαι τὸν δῆμον. How odious laws were

which deceived the demos, we see from Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 79.

10. ἀνάγκη γὰρ κ.τ.λ. By ψευδῶς ἀγαθὰ Aristotle means apparent privileges which come to nothing and disappoint those to whom they are given. He perhaps remembers Theogn. 607,

ἀρχῇ ἐπὶ ψεύδους μικρὴ χάρις· ἐς δὲ τελευτὴν
αἰσχρὸν δὴ κέρδος καὶ κακόν, ἀμφότερον,
γίνεται· οὐδέ τι καλόν, ὅτ' ψεύδος προσομαρτῇ
ἀνδρὶ καὶ ἐξέλθῃ πρῶτον ἀπὸ στόματος

(a saying which is apparently referred to in Soph. Fragm. 749, 750 Nauck; cp. also Plato, Rep. 490 C, ἡγομένης δὲ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἂν ποτε, οἶμαι, φαίμεν αὐτῇ χορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθῆσαι). Eurip. Fragm. 1022 Nauck (1035, ed. 2) should also be compared,

δύστηρος ὅστις τὰ καλὰ καὶ ψευδῇ λέγων
οὐ τοίσδε χρῆται τοῖς καλοῖς ἀληθείαις,

and Fragm. 266 Nauck (264, ed. 2),

τὰ γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς πρᾶσσόμεν' ὀρθῶς
τοῖς πρᾶσσουσιν κακὸν ἦλθεν,

and Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. cclxx (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 292),

κρίττον δ' εἰσθαι ψεύδος ἢ ἀληθὲς κακόν.

Some familiar proverb or verse probably lies at the root of all these passages.

11. αἱ γὰρ πλεονεξίαι τῶν πλουσίων ἀπολλύουσι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν ἢ αἱ τοῦ δήμου, 'for the undue gains of the rich' (i. e. the superiority of political advantage which the ingenious constitutional contrivances referred to secure to the rich) 'are more fatal to the constitution than those of the demos.' Πλεονεξία here = τὸ πλεόν εἶχειν, not τὸ βούλεσθαι πλεόν εἶχειν (Bon. Ind. s. v.). The reason why the undue gains of the rich are more fatal to the constitution than those of the poor probably is that these gains fall to a minority, and to a minority specially keen for political predominance (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 17, κρίττον τε γὰρ τὸ πλεόν καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾶσιν ἴσον ἔχοντες) and specially ready to abuse it (1307 a 19 sq.).

C. 13. 14. Ἔστι δ' ὅσα κ.τ.λ. Ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις probably means 'in politics,' i. e. in politics strictly so called: cp. 7 (5). 8. 1307 b 40 sqq., where a warning is addressed to 'well-mixed constitutions' not to trust to the artifices described in the chapter before us; hence it is likely that framers of aristocracies and politics often committed the error of trusting to them. We know that Plato did so

in the Laws (see vol. i. p. 502, note 2), and the constitution sketched in the Laws is said by Aristotle to be meant for a polity (2. 6. 1265 b 26 sqq.). Plato may have been misled by the example of Charondas (1297 a 23). The plan followed in the aristocracies and polities which Aristotle here criticizes was to give the demos an apparent, but illusory, share in the popular assembly, in office, in the dicasteries, and in the possession of arms and the practice of gymnastic exercises. Similar devices are occasionally practised in modern times. Thus in the South African Republic the Uitlander or alien after a period of two years' residence and naturalization acquires only a vote in the election of the second Raad, a worthless franchise, for the Acts of this body must be presented to the President of the Republic for consideration, and can only become law if he decides to submit them for the approval of the first Raad, and its approval is obtained (*Times*, Jan. 1, 1896). It should be noticed that the advice which Aristotle himself gives to oligarchies to associate the demos with the privileged class in the deliberative, but to give it only a nugatory or consultative voice (c. 14. 1298 b 32 sqq.) comes perilously near that which he censures here. It would seem from what Aristotle says in the passage before us that even in polities the rich had to be forced by penalties to attend in the assembly and dicasteries, and to possess heavy arms and practise gymnastic exercises, so that it is not surprising that in extreme democracies they commonly absented themselves from the meetings of the assembly and dicasteries (c. 6. 1293 a 8 sq.).

17. περὶ ἐκκλησίαν μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 9 sqq. Aristotle does not object to the imposition of a fine on all, whether rich or poor, for non-attendance at the assembly, but to the imposition of a fine exclusively on the well-to-do, or of a much larger fine on them than was imposed on the poor, unless indeed the imposition of a fine on the rich is balanced by the provision of pay for the poor (1297 a 38 sqq. : cp. c. 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.). A fine was imposed at Athens on those who did not attend the assembly (Pollux, 8. 104, where habitual absentees are perhaps meant by τοὺς μὴ ἐκκλησιάζοντας), but no doubt on rich and poor alike, though of course a fine would not be easily leviable from the very poor. If the fine thus levied was of equal amount for both rich and poor, it would obviously fall more lightly on the rich than on the poor, and therefore would be more effective in securing the attendance of the poor

than of the rich, whether this was intended by those who instituted it or not. The comitia centuriata at Rome were so organized that the centuries of the rich outnumbered those of the poor (Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, p. 350).

19. περὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς κ.τ.λ. A device of a somewhat similar kind finds a place in the constitution of the imaginary Persia of Xenophon's Cyropaedia, for under this constitution office was confined to the 'complete citizens,' and no one could become a complete citizen without having in youth attended the public schools, which only those could do whose fathers could afford to maintain them in idleness. Thus while Xenophon can say that none of the 120,000 Persians were excluded from office by law, it was practically possible only for the sons of well-to-do parents to hold office (Xen. Cyrop. 1. 2. 15).

20. τοῖς μὲν ἔχουσι τίμημα, 'those who possess rateable property,' cp. 3. 12. 1283 a 17, τίμημα φέροντας, and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 39, l. 24, ἐν τοῖς τὰ τιμήματα παρεχομένοις.

μὴ εἶναι ἐξόμνυσθαι. It is implied that in the constitutions to which Aristotle refers men were glad to avoid holding office; hence no pay can have been attached to the offices, or at any rate no pay large enough to be tempting. The tenure of office without pay is described in 2. 11. 1273 a 17 as characteristic of aristocracy, and some of the constitutions to which Aristotle here refers were aristocracies (cp. 8); whether offices were unremunerated in politics also, we do not learn.

21. καὶ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 14. 1298 b 16 sqq. In the constitutions referred to here there seem to have been dicasteries of which the poor were nominally at any rate members, but in the Lacedaemonian and Carthaginian aristocracies the magistrates constituted the judicial authority of the State (3. 1. 1275 b 8 sqq.).

22. ἐν τοῖς Χαλκιδέων νόμοις. Charondas legislated for Catania and the other Chalcidian cities of Italy and Sicily (2. 12. 1274 a 23 sqq.), but his laws seem to have been in use also at Thurii, if we may trust Diod. 12. 11 sqq., at Mazaca in Cappadocia (Strabo, p. 539), and apparently at Cos (Herondas, 2. 48: see Crusius, Untersuchungen, p. 34 sqq.), and very possibly in other cities of which we do not hear.

23. ἀπογραφάμενοις, 'after having their names entered in a register.' There was a list of members of the assembly at Athens (πίναξ ἐκκλησιαστικός), in which men entered their names on attain-

ing the proper age (Demosth. Or. 44. in Leoch. c. 35: Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., pp. 199, 289: Haussoullier, *Vie Municipale en Attique*, p. 112 sq.), and such lists must have existed in most Greek States which had assemblies, for otherwise it would be impossible to exclude persons not entitled to serve, especially where pay was forthcoming for attendance, but the peculiarity of the arrangement described in the text is that registration was optional, and that poor men were discouraged from registering by the imposition of heavy penalties on those who after registering failed to attend (τούτους, 27). This device differs from the rest in not affecting the poor exclusively. Not a few rich persons might be glad to avoid all risk of incurring these heavy penalties, and might consequently abstain from entering their names on the register. As to the use of the word ἀπογράφεσθαι see Mr. W. Wyse in *Class. Rev.* 12. 392.

29. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κ.τ.λ. Some oligarchies deprived the many of their heavy arms (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 12 sq.), and the constitutions referred to here did in a stealthy way much the same thing as those oligarchies did openly. We are told in 2. 5. 1264 a 20 sqq. that the Cretan States forbade their slaves to practise gymnastic exercises and to possess heavy arms, and the two things go together in the passage before us also.

34. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὀλιγαρχικὰ τὰ σοφίσματα τῆς νομοθεσίας. Cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1173 b 8, ταῦτα δὲ σωματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη.

35. ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις κ.τ.λ. This was the case at Athens, where pay was provided for attendance at the assembly and dicasteries, but no special fine was imposed on the rich for non-attendance. Pay would be provided in democracies for holders of office also, but Aristotle does not dwell on that, because in many democracies the real authority rested to a large extent with the assembly and the dicasteries. We do not hear, so far as I am aware, that poor men were ever in democracies enabled by pay to possess heavy arms and practise gymnastic exercises.

40. τοῖς μὲν μισθὸν πορίζειν τοῖς δὲ ζημίαν. Πορίζειν does not suit with ζημίαν, and we expect τοῖς δὲ τάρτειν ζημίαν (cp. 38), but see notes on 1257 a 21 and 1287 b 26, and cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 17 sqq., where τάρτειν is used both with μισθὸν and with ζημίαν. Aristotle evidently sees that simply extending the fine to the poor would not suffice, inasmuch as many of them would be too poor to pay it, and indeed could not afford to attend without remuneration.

41. κοινωνοῦεν, sc. τοῦ ἐκκλησιάζειν καὶ δικάζειν.

- 1297 b. 1. δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but the constitution [of the polity] should indeed be composed of' (or in other words 'should give political rights to') 'the possessors of heavy arms and none others, [so that it will be necessary to name a property-qualification for membership of it;] still it is not possible to define the amount of this property-qualification absolutely' (in contradistinction to 'relatively to the particular State') 'and to say that it should be this or that, but we must consider what is the highest amount falling within the reach of the particular State that will allow those who share in the constitution to outnumber those who do not, and we must fix this amount.' Sus. and Welldon translate τὴν πολιτείαν here 'the polity,' but if we translate it thus, we can hardly avoid translating ἡ πολιτεία in 12 sq. and 14 sq. in the same way. In 14 sq., however, at any rate ἡ πολιτεία cannot be thus translated, and neither Sus. nor Welldon thus translate it there. I incline, therefore, to translate τὴν πολιτείαν here 'the constitution [of the polity],' and to translate ἡ πολιτεία in 12 sq. and 14 sq. 'the constitution.' Bonitz (Ind. 612 b 12 sq.) translates τὴν πολιτείαν in the passage before us and ἡ πολιτεία in 12 sq. 'universitas civium,' but I prefer the rendering 'the constitution' (see note on 1293 b 41). That the polity will confine political rights to the possessors of heavy arms is taken for granted; this has been already said in 2. 6. 1265 b 28 sq. and 3. 7. 1279 b 2 sqq. If the property-qualification were fixed so high as to make those excluded from political rights more numerous than those admitted to them, the constitution would not be a polity but an oligarchy (c. 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.). The property-qualification which entitles to political rights in the polity will vary in different States; it will be high where a high qualification will bring an adequate number within the constitution, it will be lower where that will not be so. When it is said that the constitution must be 'composed of' the possessors of heavy arms (for εἰ here designates the material of which the constitution is made, cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 28 sq. and 3. 7. 1279 b 2 sqq., and see notes on 1290 b 8 and 1319 a 24), the meaning probably is that membership of the assembly and dicasteries and the right of electing magistrates should be confined to this class. For though καὶ μὴ μετέχοντες τῶν τιμῶν, 6, might seem to indicate that the phrase implies access to office strictly so called, a distinction is drawn in 14 sqq. between membership of the πολιτεία and eligibility to office. It is evident, in fact, from 2. 8.

1268 a 27 sqq. and 3. 11. 1281 b 28 sq. that, though the expression *μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας* often means *μετέχειν τῶν τιμῶν* (e.g. in c. 5. 1292 a 41 and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 26)—in one passage, indeed (2. 8. 1268 a 21 sqq.), it means *μετέχειν πασῶν τῶν τιμῶν*—it does not always do so, and sometimes implies nothing more than membership of the assembly and dicasteries and the right of electing magistrates. Under *οἱ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντες* Aristotle probably includes only *οἱ ὀπλιτεύοντες*, not *οἱ ὀπλιτευκότες* (cp. 12 sqq. and 2. 8. 1267 b 32 sq., where *τὸ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχον* is coupled with *τὸ προπολεμοῦν*). *οἱ τὰ ὅπλα ἔχοντες* are tacitly distinguished in what follows from *οἱ πένητες*: see as to this above on 1289 b 31 and 1294 a 41. For *ὀρισσάμενους* Busse (*De Praesidiis Aristotelis Politica Emendandi*, p. 22) compares *Poet. c. 7. 1451 a 9*, *ὁ δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὁρος, αἰεὶ μὲν ὁ μείζων μέχρι τοῦ σύνδηλος εἶναι καλλίων ἵστί κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ὡς δὲ ἀπλῶς διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν, ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κ.τ.λ.* Δεῖν must be supplied with *ὑπάρχειν* (Schneider) and δι with *τάττειν*. As to the suppression of *δεῖ* see notes on 1335 b 5 and 1328 a 8.

6. *ἐθέλουσι γὰρ οἱ πένητες κ.τ.λ.*, 'for [this course will not cause any difficulty with the poor, for] they are willing,' etc. We learn, however, from 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 34 sqq. and 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 14 sqq. that something besides abstinence from outrage or spoliation on the part of the rulers is necessary if the poor are to remain quiet; office must not be a source of large gains. Who are meant by *οἱ πένητες*, we see from *Aristoph. Plut. 552 Didot*,

*πτωχοῦ μὲν γὰρ βίος, ὃν σὺ λέγεις, ζῆν ἐστὶν μηδὲν ἔχοντα
τοῦ δὲ πένητος ζῆν φειδόμενον καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις προσέχοντα,
περιγίγνεσθαι δ' αὐτῷ μηδὲν, μὴ μέντοι μηδ' ἐπιλείπειν.*

The passage before us shows that they possessed some property: in 1. 2. 1252 b 12 it is implied that the *πένητες* owned an ox for ploughing, but of course this would be true only of small cultivating landowners, not of urban *πένητες*. In *Plato, Rep. 552 A* the terms *πίνης* and *ἄπορος* are conjoined. As to the *ἄποροι* see note on 1279 b 19.

9. *χαρίεντας*. See note on 1267 a 1.

10. *καὶ εἰώθασι δέ κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle has just noticed a difficulty in connexion with his proposal which may be removed by wise conduct on the part of the ruling class, and now he notices another of which the same thing may be said. He perhaps remembers how the Council of the Areopagus had induced the poorer citizens of

Athens to take their place in the triremes and to fight at Salamis by giving each man eight drachmae ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 23). Compare the experience of the oligarchical leaders at Mytilene (Thuc. 3. 27. 2). To be willing to fight on condition of receiving food and without any pay was evidence of an easily contented disposition: cp. Plato, Rep. 420 A, καί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτά γε ἐπισίτιοι καὶ οὐδὲ μισθὸν πρὸς τοῖς σιτίοις λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι (ἐπίκουροι), and Eubul. Δαίδαλος, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 216),

ἰθὺλει δ' ἄνευ

μισθοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς καταμίνειν ἐπισίτιος.

Cp. also Plut. Aristid. c. 10, ὀργίζεσθαι δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους, ὅτι τὴν πενίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν τὴν νῦν παρούσαν Ἀθηναίους μόνον ὀρώσι, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς φιλοτιμίας ἀμνημονοῦσιν ἐπὶ σιτίοις ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀγωνίζεσθαι παρακαλοῦντες. It would seem from the passage before us that the poor were commonly expected to help in fighting for the State even in a polity—whether as hoplites or as light-armed troops (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 13 sq.), we are not told.

12. ἔστι δ' ἡ πολιτεία παρ' ἐνίοις οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῶν ὀπλιτευόντων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὀπλιτευκόντων. 'H πολιτεία, 'the constitution.' Aristotle would approve this arrangement because it adds to the number of those admitted to political rights (and so to the strength of the polity) without altering the class to which they belong. Plato (Laws 753 B: vol. i. p. 446) had given the right of nominating the three hundred citizens from whom the thirty-seven Nomophylakes are afterwards chosen by the whole city to those citizens, ὅποσοι περ ἂν ὄπλα ἰσχυρὰ ἢ πεζικὰ τιθῶνται καὶ πολέμου κεκοινωνήκωσιν ἐν ταῖς σφετέραις αὐτῶν τῆς ἡλικίας δυνάμεσι, a constituency not very unlike that described in the text.

15. ἐκ τούτων, i.e. ἐκ τῶν ὀπλιτευόντων καὶ τῶν ὀπλιτευκόντων. Membership of the assembly and the dicasteries was conferred on both these classes. So in the constitution of the imaginary Persia of Xenophon's Cyropaedia office was confined to those citizens who, being between the ages of twenty-six and fifty-one, bore heavy arms and served on foreign expeditions, while the citizens above fifty-one years of age elected the holders of the magistracies and acted as judges (Xen. Cyrop. 1. 2, 13 sq.).

16. καὶ ἡ πρώτη δὲ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ. This is added in justification of the recommendation in 1297 b 1 that the polity should confine political rights to the possessors of heavy arms. The earliest constitution gave political rights to those who fought for the State,

and Aristotle is probably inclined to presume that the earliest constitution will have been framed on a correct principle; thus he holds that the oldest kind of democracy is the best (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 6 sqq.). We do not hear what was the nature of the military force under the kings, but the knights were supreme in the oligarchies which arose after the fall of kingship. It is clear from c. 3. 1289 b 36 sqq. that the strength of every State did not lie in cavalry, and therefore that these oligarchies of knights did not exist everywhere, but they are said in that passage to have existed, among other places, at Chalcis and Eretria, at Magnesia ad Maeandrum, and at many cities in Asia. They probably existed wherever there was a spacious open (Hdt. 5. 63) plain near the city, in which cavalry could act with effect (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 8 sqq.). See notes on 1289 b 39 and 1321 a 8.

18. τὴν γὰρ ἰσχύον καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἐν τοῖς ἱππεύουσιν ὁ πόλεμος εἶχεν. Cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 31 sq., De Part. An. 2. 7. 653 b 13, τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς τροφῆς περιττώματα περὶ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς σκέψιν καὶ θεωρίαν οὐκ ἔχει τοὺς λόγους, and Diod. 14. 72. 4, παραταχόμενοι δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἐξέτης τοῦ καιροῦ τὴν ἑαυτῶν σπουδὴν εἶχον ἀπρακτον.

19. οὕτω μὲν γὰρ συντάξαι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eurip. Herc. Fur. 185 Bothe (190 Dindorf),

ἀνὴρ ὀπλίτης δοῦλός ἐστι τῶν ὄπλων,
καὶ τοῖσι συνταχθεῖσιν οὔσι μὴ ῥαβοῖς
αὐτὸς τίθηκε δουλίᾳ τῇ τῶν πύλων,

and Plut. T. Flamin. c. 8, ζῶν γὰρ ἡ φύλαξις τοῖς ἀμάχεσσι τὴν ἰσχύον, ὥς ἐν ἐστὶ σῶμα καὶ τηρεῖ τὸν συνασπισμὸν ἐν τάξει μὲν, διαλυθείσης δὲ καὶ τὴν καθ' ἑαυτὴν ὀπλίσκει τῶν μαχομένων ἕκαστος διὰ τε τὸν τρόπον τῆς ὀπλίσσεως καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς ὁλοῦ τοῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων μέρει μάλλον ἢ δι' αὐτὸν ἰσχύον.

20. αἱ δὲ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐμπειρίαι καὶ τάξεις ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις οὐκ ὄντων, 'and the crafts and tactical rules connected with the above-mentioned matters' (i.e. the ordering of hoplites) 'did not exist among the ancients.' Aristotle speaks of ἐμπειρία, not τέχνη, because the crafts based on mere practice to which he refers hardly deserved the name of arts; arts have to do with τὸ καθόλου, not μετ' ἐμπειρία (Metaph. A. 1. 981 a 15 sq.). Cp. Pol. 3. 11. 1282 a 1, τὰς ἄλλας ἐμπειρίας καὶ τέχνας, and Plato, Phaedr. 260 E, οὐκ ἔστι τέχνη, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνὸς τριβή, Gorg. 462 B sq., 465 A, and Laws 938 A, αὐτὸ οὖν τέχνη εἴτε ἀτεχνός ἐστὶ τις ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή. For τάξεις ('taktischen Regeln,' Stahr), cp. Plato, Laws 688 A, τὰς τάξεις τῶν

νόμων: 721 A, ταῖς τάξεσι ('praescriptionibus suis,' Stallbaum): 823 C, τάξεις καὶ ζημίας ἐπιτιθέντα. For ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, cp. c. 10. 1295 a 12, ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἑλλήσιν.

22. αὐξανομένων τῶν πόλεων, 'the States increasing in size': see notes on 1293 a 1, where it has been explained that this increase would especially consist in an increase of the central city, and on 1310 b 17.

24. διόπερ, 'hence,' i.e. the constitutions which then arose were called democracies (though they would now be called polities), because the possessors of political rights under them were more numerous than before and might well seem to be a demos when compared with the handful of men who ruled in the oligarchies which preceded them. It was perhaps in part because Aristotle saw that the earliest democracies were polities that he came to regard democracy as a perverted development of polity.

25. αἱ ἀρχαῖαι πολιτεῖαι. Bonitz (Ind. 613 b 12), Susemihl, and others take these words to mean 'the ancient polities,' but I incline rather to render them, with other interpreters, 'the ancient constitutions.' The words αἱ ἀρχαῖαι πολιτεῖαι seem to take up ἡ πρώτη πολιτεία ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν, where πολιτεία means 'constitution,' not 'polity.' Prof. Francotte (Les Formes Mixtes de Gouvernement d'après Aristote, p. 41, note 2) is not altogether satisfied with Susemihl's rendering, though he follows it.

26. δι' ὀλιγαριθρωπῖαν γὰρ οὐκ εἶχον πολὺ τὸ μέσον (sc. αἱ πόλεις). Cp. c. 11. 1296 a 9 sqq.

27. ὀλίγοι τε ὄντες τὸ πλήθος καὶ κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν. 'Ολίγοι must be supplied with κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν in the sense of 'insignificant,' which of course is not its natural sense, but Aristotle often makes one word do, where the use of a second would have improved the sentence (see notes on 1257 a 21 and 1297 a 40). I do not think that any adjective, such as φαῦλοι, has dropped out before or after κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν. What is the suppressed nominative to ὑπέμενον? I incline to think οἱ δημοτικοί, or in other words the class which rose to supreme power in the democracies, better called polities, which succeeded the kingships and oligarchies, i.e. οἱ τὰ ὀπλὰ ἔχοντες. For the displacement of τε, which should follow τό, see note on 1325 a 19.

28. διὰ τίνα μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἰτίαν αἱ πολιτεῖαι πλείους. This question has been dealt with in c. 3. 1289 b 27—c. 4. 1291 b 13.

29. καὶ διὰ τί παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας ἕτεραι. Τὰς λεγομένας appears to include monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy, one kind only of

democracy and oligarchy being recognized: cp. c. 8. 1294 a 25, *οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἕτερα πολιτείας εἶδη παρὰ μοναρχίαν τε καὶ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν*. This question has been dealt with in c. 4. 1291 b 15—c. 8. 1294 a 25.

31. τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. For the genitive see note on 1253 b 27. Monarchy has two forms, kingship and tyranny; oligarchy has four (c. 5), aristocracy several (cc. 7–8); we are not distinctly told that there are more forms than one of polity, though we hear incidentally of aristocratical polities (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 10: cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 41 sq.).

ἐν δὲ τίνες αἱ διαφοραὶ καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν συμβαίνει, 'and further what the differences between them are, and owing to what cause it happens [that they are what they are].' Cp. c. 6. 1293 a 10 sqq. and 3. 6. 1278 b 8.

32. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις τίς ἀρίστη κ.τ.λ. Dealt with in c. 11.

33. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποία κ.τ.λ., 'and of the other constitutions which constitution' (literally, 'which of the constitutions') 'is suitable to whom.' Dealt with in c. 12. Cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 10 sqq.

35. Πάλιν δὲ κ.τ.λ. This inquiry is referred to as past in 8 (6). C. 14. 1. 1316 b 31 sqq., but we are not prepared for it in the programme given in c. 2. 1289 b 12–26, except so far as it relates to democracy and oligarchy (see vol. i. p. 493). Its aim is to show how the deliberative magisterial and judicial elements should be organized under each constitution and each variety of constitution so as to harmonize with the constitution of which they form a part (cp. 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 31 sqq.: 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 11 sqq.: 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 12 sqq.). Aristotle seeks to enable the statesman to avoid in framing each constitution adopting an organization of any one of these elements inappropriate to the tendency and spirit of the constitution, his special aim being, it would seem from c. 16. 1300 b 36 sqq., to prevent civil troubles and constitutional innovation. It should be noticed that Aristotle here proceeds to study constitutions in their parts, the most searching way of studying them (see note on 1252 a 17, τὴν ὑψηλὴν μέθωδον), and also that τὸ προσαλομενόν, notwithstanding what is said as to its importance in c. 4. 1291 a 6 sqq., is not one of the μόρια τῶν πολιτειῶν mentioned here. Aristotle appears to regard it as a μέρος τῆς πόλεως, and an important one, but not a μέρος τῆς πολιτείας. It is, in fact, concerned, not with ruling or judging, but with fighting.

38. αὐτῶν, i.e. τῶν ἐφεξῆς.

37. μόρια τῶν πολιτειῶν πασῶν. Cp. c. 15. 1299 a 4, τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς πολιτείας, and see vol. i. p. 514, note. Compare also Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 79, τρία γάρ ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν ἡ πολιτεία συνέστηκεν, ὁ ἄρχων, ὁ δικαστής, ὁ ιδιώτης. The expression αἱ πολιτεῖαι πᾶσαι seems to be used here in a sense exclusive of kingship and tyranny, of which we hear hardly anything in cc. 14-16.

38. ἐκάστη τὸ συμφέρον, cp. 8 (6). i. 1316 b 38, καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸν συμφέροντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς ἐκάστην.

ὧν ἐχόντων καλῶς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 48, ὡς παρ' ἑκαστον τῶν μερῶν ἢ καλῶς ἢ κακῶς τὸ σύμπαν ἔξον, οὕτω σπουδάσετε περὶ αὐτῶν. That the parts, on the other hand, cannot be in a good state if the whole is not so, is a remark ascribed to the Thracian Zamolxis in Plato, Charm. 156 E, where he is made to say of the Greek physicians, that they knew not how to cure most diseases, ὅτι τὸ ὅλον ἀγνοοῖεν, οὐ δέοι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιῆσθαι, οὐ μὲν καλῶς ἔχοντος ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὸ μέρος εὖ ἔχειν.

39. καὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀλλήλων διαφέρειν ἐν τῷ διαφέρειν ἑκαστον τοῦτων. We have been told in 3. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq. that constitutions differ because they give supreme power to different supreme authorities, but now we are told that they also differ because they organize the deliberative, magisterial, and judicial elements in a different way.

41. ὅστι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Zeller has already remarked (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 749: Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 283) that the three 'elements of all constitutions' named by Aristotle—the deliberative, the magistracies, and the judiciary—do not coincide with the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities of modern theorists. Aristotle's deliberative is indeed charged with legislative functions, but it is also charged with executive functions (for questions of peace, war, and alliance come before it) and with judicial functions (for it has power to inflict the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation). For the union of legislative and judicial authority in the hands of the deliberative no defence can be offered; it was not well that the deliberative authority should have power to punish with death, exile, or confiscation. But when the Greek State gave the authority which had to do with legislation a voice in questions of war, peace, and alliance, it anticipated the practice of modern States. Prof. H. Sidgwick (Elements of Politics, ed. 1, p. 439) recommends that 'the consent of the legislature should be required, as a general rule, for making war,

or ceding or annexing territory, or making treaties that pledge the State to any such measures or that otherwise affect materially the financial liabilities or resources of the State.' The three elements named by Aristotle were probably marked off from each other in most Greek constitutions, but they were not in all. In many forms of oligarchy, for instance, and in some of aristocracy (3. 1. 1275 b 8 sqq.) judicial authority rested with the magistrates, and in some extreme forms of oligarchy one or more magistracies—often perhaps a *gerusia*—constituted the deliberative (1298 a 8 sq.). The deliberative in Greek States was not so called because it had a monopoly of deliberation, for the magistrates also deliberated (c. 15. 1299 a 25 sqq.), but because certain specially important subjects of deliberation were made over to it, just as in a modern joint-stock company the consideration of some specially important matters is often reserved for meetings of the shareholders. (Compare Tac. Germ. c. 11, *de minoribus rebus principes consultant, de maioribus omnes, ita tamen ut ea quoque quorum penes plebem arbitrium est apud principes pertractentur*.) What these subjects were, we learn from 1298 a 3 sqq. It should be noticed that the right to inflict the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation and that of reviewing the conduct of magistrates in office (c. 16. 1300 b 19) were often possessed also by dicasteries, so that the deliberative had not exclusive competence on these subjects. We see from the chapter before us that some of the powers enumerated in 1298 a 3 sqq. were given to the magistrates even in some forms of democracy, for there were democracies in which the functions of the assembly were confined to the enactment of laws and of provisions connected with the constitution, while in others they did not include the review of the magistrates' conduct in office and the infliction of the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation. In the 'ultimate' form of democracy, on the other hand, not only did the competence of the assembly include the whole range of the subjects mentioned in 1298 a 3 sqq., but the functions of the magistracies (with the exception no doubt of those of the *stratēgi* when employed on expeditions) extended only to making preliminary inquiries, the right of effectual decision on all important matters being reserved for the assembly, which thus tended to become the supreme administrative authority of the State (cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 27, *ὁ δῆμος . . . τὰ μὲν ἑκὼν τὰ δὲ ἄκων προηρείτο τὴν πολιτείαν διοικεῖν αὐτός*). That the *demos* at Rome possessed most of the powers ascribed to the

deliberative by Aristotle, we see from Polyb. 6. 14, *τιμῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τιμωρίας ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ μόνος ὁ δῆμος κύριος . . . κρίνει μὲν οὖν ὁ δῆμος καὶ διαφόρου πολλὰκις, ὅταν ἀξιώχρεων ᾖ τὸ τίμημα τῆς ἀδικίας, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς τὰς ἐπιφανείας ἐσχηκότας ἀρχάς, θανάτου δὲ κρίνει μόνος . . . καὶ μὴν τὰς ἀρχὰς ὁ δῆμος δίδωσι τοῖς ἀξίοις . . . ἔχει δὲ τὴν κυρίαν καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν νόμων δοκιμασίας, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης οὗτος βουλευέται καὶ πολέμου. καὶ μὴν περὶ συμμαχίας καὶ διαλύσεως καὶ συνθηκῶν, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ βεβαιῶν ἕκαστα τούτων καὶ κύρια ποιῶν ἢ τοῦναντίον.* Aristotle omits to mention some of the powers possessed by the deliberative—for instance, its power of conferring citizenship and its powers in reference to taxation, such as the power to impose an *eisphora* or a new tax. Nor does he say anything of the power sometimes possessed by it of suspending or displacing any magistrate whom it held to discharge his duties ill (as to the exercise of this power by the deliberative at Athens, see Gilbert, *Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 223 sq.).

- 1298 a. 2. *ἀς δεῖ*, sc. *εἶναι*. For *ἀς*, not *τίνας*, though *τίνων* follows, see Kühner, *Ausführl. gr. Gramm.*, ed. 2, § 562. 4, who refers to Isocr. *Ad Demon.* § 5, *διόπερ ἡμεῖς . . . μέλλομέν σοι συμβουλευεῖν ἕν χρητὸς νεωτέρους ὀρέγεσθαι καὶ τίνων ἔργων ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ποίοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις ὁμλεῖν καὶ πῶς τὸν ἑαυτῶν βίον οἰκονομεῖν*. Cp. also Plato, *Laws* 728 D, *τὰς δ' αὖ τιμὰς δεῖ σκοπεῖν, καὶ τούτων τίνας ἀληθείας καὶ δασαὶ κίβδηλοι*.

ποῖαν τιὰν δεῖ γίγνεσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν. Cp. c. 15. 1299 a 10 sqq.

3. *τὴν αἵρεσιν* must here include appointment by lot as well as by election.

5. *καὶ περὶ νόμων*. That it often fell to the whole body of citizens to enact, or at any rate to confirm, laws, we see from Xen. *Mem.* 1. 2. 42, *πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι νόμοι εἰσὶν, οὓς τὸ πλῆθος συνελθὼν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἔγραψε, φράζον ἃ τε δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μὴ*. A common course was for the assembly to appoint *νομογράφοι* to draft laws and submit them to it for confirmation: see as to Teos Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 126. 45 sqq.* (referred to by Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 313. 2), where the assembly of Teos is advised by Antigonos to appoint *νομογράφοι* for this purpose, and compare *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 29 sqq., where the Athenian assembly appoints *συγγραφεῖς* to draw up a new constitution, which is afterwards submitted to it for confirmation (cc. 30 *init.*, 32 *init.*). Laws, however, were occasionally enacted by the deliberative without recourse being had to *νομογράφοι* or *συγγραφεῖς*:

see Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 470 (quoted by Gilbert *ibid.*), [ἐγ]αθῆι τύχη, [οἰκ]ονομοῦντος Δημητρίου, μηνὸς Θαργγλιῶνος δευτέραι, Ἀλέξων Δάμωνος εἶπεν νόμον εἶναι Γαμβρειώταις κ.τ.λ. As to the mode in which laws were enacted at Athens, see Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 300 sqq., and Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ed. 2, 3. 1. 290 sqq., and on the broad subject of direct legislation by the people Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, c. 39. There is this to be said in favour of direct legislation by the people in a Greek City-State, that the people were not precluded by their numbers from meeting together for discussion, as the people of a modern State are.

καὶ περὶ θανάτου καὶ φυγῆς καὶ δημεύσεως. That questions of this kind came not only before the dicasteries in Greek States, but also before the deliberative is proved by the inscriptions collected by Gilbert in *Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 314. 1—Cauer, *Delectus Inscr. Gr.* No. 551 (about B. C. 357), ἔδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ Φίλωνα καὶ Στρατοκλέα φεύγειν Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ τήν γῆν τὴν Ἀμφιπολιτέων ἀειφυγίην καὶ αὐτο[ύ]ς καὶ το[ύ]ς παῖδας, καὶ ἡμ πο[ύ] ἀλίσκωνται, πάσχειν αὐτο[ύ]ς ὡς πολεμίο[υ]ς καὶ ηπιονεῖ τεθνάναι, τὰ δὲ χρήματα αὐτῶν δημόσια εἶναι: Dittenberger, *Syll. No.* 77 (from Iasus), ἔδοξεν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ, μηνὸς Ἀπατουριῶνος, ἐπὶ στεφανηφόρου Παταίκο τοῦ Σκύλυκο[ς] τ[ῶ]ν ἀν[δρ]ῶν τῶν ἐπιβουλευσάντων Μαυσώλλῳ καὶ τῇ Ἰασέων πόλει τὰ κτήματα δημεύσαι . . . καὶ φεύγειν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐγκόρουσ [ἐς] τὸν αἰδιον χρόνον. Gilbert also quotes Cic. *De Rep.* 3. 35. 48, where we read of the Rhodians, et in theatro et in curia res capitalis et reliquas omnis iudicabant idem. As to Athens see *Hdt.* 6. 136, *Xen. Hell.* 1. 7. 9 sq., and Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 306.

Θ. καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν αἰρέσεως καὶ τῶν εὐθυνῶν. *Cp.* 3. 11. 1282 a 26 sqq.

8. οἷον ἀρχῇ τινὶ μιᾷ ἢ πλείοσιν, ἢ ἑτέραις ἑτέρας, 'as for instance all may be assigned to some one magistracy or to more magistracies than one, or some may be assigned to certain magistracies and others to others.' Aristotle here has oligarchies mainly in view, and it appears from what he says that in an oligarchy a single magistracy—possibly even a single magistrate—might be invested with all these great powers, the right, that is to say, to punish with death, exile, or confiscation, the right to appoint the magistrates and to review their conduct in office, the right to make laws, and the supreme control over the foreign policy of the State. When a single magistrate possessed all these powers, it must have been easy for him to convert

his position into a tyranny (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 22 sqq.). There were well-governed oligarchies where a single magistracy possessed these high prerogatives; the oligarchy of Massalia would seem to have been a case in point, for the great council of the Six Hundred *ἑξήκοντα* must probably have possessed them (cp. Cic. De Rep. 1. 27. 43, ac modo si Massilienses, nostri clientes, per delectos et principes cives summa iustitia reguntur, inest tamen in ea condicione populi similitudo quaedam servitutis). Oligarchy would assume a still more extreme form, where the magistracy which was invested with these prerogatives was less numerous than at Massalia. On the other hand, it would be less extreme where they were given to more magistracies than one, acting, we must suppose, together, and less extreme still, when some of these powers were given to some magistracies and others to others, for then the one group of magistracies would be a check on the other.

9. ἢ τινὰς μὲν αὐτῶν πᾶσι τινὰς δὲ τισίν. This would be the case in an aristocracy or a polity.

τὸ μὲν οὖν πάντα καὶ περὶ ἀπάντων δημοτικόν. Supply *βουλευέσθαι* before *δημοτικόν*. Cp. Cic. De Rep. 1. 32. 48, si vero ius suum populi teneant, negant quicquam esse praestantius, liberius, beatius, quippe qui domini sint legum, iudiciorum, belli, pacis, foederum, capitis uniuscuiusque, pecuniae.

10. τὴν τοιαύτην ἰσότητα, i. e. the equality implied in all deliberating about everything. This is arithmetical, in contradistinction to proportional, equality, τὸ πλῆθει ἢ μεγέθει ταὐτὸ καὶ ἴσον (7 (5). 1. 1301 b 29 sqq.). Cp. Plato, Laws 757 A, *δυσὸν γὰρ ἰσοσότητος εἶναι κ.τ.λ.*

11. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ τρόποι τοῦ πάντα πλείους. All may be said to share in deliberative authority, (1) if all do so successively (i. e. by relays) on almost all subjects, and the subjects on which all deliberate collectively are very few, so that the powers of the collective gathering of all the citizens are small, and deliberative work falls for the most part either to relays of citizens, the magistrates taking no part in it, or to a council of magistrates to which all the citizens are admitted by relays; (2) if all deliberate collectively on a considerable number of subjects, and magistrates elected or taken by lot from all deliberate on the rest; (3) if all deliberate collectively on a considerable number of subjects, and magistrates deliberate on the rest taken by lot (from all?) in all cases in which the nature of the office does not make it essential

that its holders shall be skilled persons, and consequently that it shall be filled by election (from all?); (4) if all deliberate collectively about all subjects and the magistrates merely make preliminary inquiries. But if τὸ πάντας βουλευέσθαι καὶ περὶ πάντων is democratic (1298 a 9 sq.), are the second and third modes really democratic?

12. εἰς μὲν τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντας ἀθρόους, sc. βουλευέσθαι. It was possible to give deliberative authority to sections of the whole citizen-body in rotation, or to a council composed of boards of magistrates on which every citizen served by turns, and by thus admitting all the citizens in relays to a share in deliberation, to reduce to a minimum the work of the collective assembly of all the citizens. Of the Telecles mentioned in the text nothing is known but what we learn here. Sus.³ (Note 1321) regards him as a constitutional theorist, and groups him with Hippodamus and Phaleas. Certainly the phrase ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Τηλεκλέους ἐστὶ τοῦ Μιλησίου reminds us of ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος in 2. 1. 1361 a 5. A parallel to his constitution is offered to some extent by the arrangements in connexion with the Five Thousand at Athens, at any rate as represented by the envoys of the Four Hundred to the armament at Samos (Thuc. 8. 86. 3, τῶν τε πεντα-
ποχλίων ὅτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μετέξουσιν). So again, in the democracy of Mantinea and others the right to elect the magistrates belonged not to the assembly, but to τινὲς αἱρετοὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐκ πάντων (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23 sqq.). We must not mix up Telecles' organization of the deliberative with the first kind of democracy described in c. 4. 1291 b 30 sqq. and c. 6. 1292 b 22 sqq., for in this kind of democracy the deliberative seems to have consisted of all the citizens, not of a part of them only (c. 6. 1292 b 27 sqq.). We are not told of what nature the sections were to which deliberative authority was successively entrusted under the constitution of Telecles. Were they tribes or subdivisions of the tribe, or were they independent of the tribe? It is evident that if some sections lived nearer to the city than others, it would be easier for them to act when their turn of deliberative authority came than for those farther off. Nor are we told for what length of time each section was to continue to act as a deliberative. The successive sections appear to have been given the power of appointing the magistrates (by election or by lot or in both ways?) and that of inflicting the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation, and the concession to them of these great powers would be attended with many dangers.

We do not learn whether popular dicasteries were to exist in the State of Telecles or not. Obviously he had no choice but to withhold from the sections the right of legislation, or at any rate of legislation in relation to the constitution, and to reserve it for a collective gathering of the citizens, for otherwise each section would have been able during its term of power freely to modify, and even to abolish, the constitution; the sections, in fact, would have been, especially if no popular dicasteries existed, the absolute masters of the State. The scheme of Telecles, however, possessed this merit, that the deliberative would not be as large as if it consisted of the whole citizen-body, and that it would not be likely to claim or to acquire that supremacy over the law which the popular assembly tended to acquire in the ultimate form of democracy (cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 32 sqq.). Demagogues would not have the same power in a deliberative of this kind as they had in gatherings of the whole citizen-body. True, even under this constitution the whole citizen-body would occasionally meet in a collective assembly, but as it would meet only for the enactment of laws and to deal with questions as to the constitution and to receive the directions of the magistrates, it would meet but seldom, and consequently the assembly would acquire but little cohesion or power.

13. καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις δὲ πολιτείαις κ.τ.λ. These constitutions (we are not told whether they were ideal or actual) were more democratic than that of Telecles, for while he gave every citizen by turns a place in the deliberative assembly, they gave every citizen by turns a share of office (cp. c. 15. 1300 a 23 sqq.); this was exactly what Solon, who distrusted the fitness of the many for office, had sought to avoid (3. 11. 1281 b 32 sqq.). In the opinion of the Greeks democracy was most fully realized when a rotation of office was established, so that every citizen held office in turn: cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 30 sqq., and Eurip. Suppl. 392 Bothe (406 Dindorf),

δῆμος δ' ἀνάσσει διαδοχαῖσιν ἐν μέρει
ἐνανυσίασιν, οὐχὶ τῷ πλούτῳ διδοῦς
τὸ πλεῖστον, ἀλλὰ χῶ πένης ἔχων ἴσον.

'The effect of the rule forbidding more than one reappointment to the Boulê at Athens was to give every Athenian citizen at some period of his life a seat in that body' (Sandys on 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 62). So we read in Cic. De Rep. 3. 35. 48 as to Rhodes, omnes erant idem tum de plebe tum senatores, vicissitudinesque habebant, quibus mensibus populari munere fungerentur, quibus senatorio:

utroque autem conventicium accipiebant. Democracy, in fact, meant to the Greeks equality, and the arrangement most consonant with equality was a rotation of office; even appointment to office by lot fell short in this respect of rotation. The system described in the passage before us had this merit, that under it the participation of all the citizens in the government was effected at a far smaller cost than in those democracies in which a paid and frequently meeting assembly existed. It was open, however, to the objection that there was no security that the decisions of the portion of the citizen-body which happened to be in office at any given time would be satisfactory to the citizens generally.

14. αἱ *συναρχίαι* *συνιοῦσαι*. This is an early instance of the occurrence of the word *συναρχίαι*. For another see Aen. Poliorc. c. 4. 11. The word is often met with in inscriptions after the death of Alexander and also in Polybius (4. 4. 2: 38. 11. 4 sq.). *Συναρχίαι* here means 'the boards of magistrates,' as in Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr., Nos. 132, 234. The principal boards of magistrates were frequently formed into a combined board—a great administrative improvement, for the magistracies were thus grouped together in a kind of Cabinet and were better able to consult and to act in concert—and we sometimes find this combined board discharging the functions of a pre-considering body in relation to the Boulê and Assembly (see Gilbert on *συναρχίαι* in Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 322. 1, and Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, pp. 249, 323). In the constitutions referred to in the passage before us, however, the *συναρχίαι* appear to have been invested with far more considerable powers; they were not a mere pre-considering body entitled to draw up resolutions to be sanctioned or the reverse by the Boulê and Assembly, but were the deliberative authority of the State, competent to deal finally with questions of war and peace and alliance, to inflict the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation, and to review the conduct of the magistrates on the expiration of their term of office, the only matters withdrawn from their jurisdiction being the making of laws and of enactments relating to the constitution. We are, in fact, surprised to find any form of Greek democracy trusting these great powers to a board composed of magistrates; we must remember, however, that all citizens in turn became members of this board. It should be noted that *συναρχίαι* appear to have existed at Miletus, the city of Telecles, in later days at any rate than his; see Meineke,

Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 625, where *Μιλασίους καὶ ταῖς συναρχαῖαι καὶ τοῖς γερύταις* is quoted from a grammarian.

16. τῶν μερίων τῶν ἐλαχίστων. Households are probably referred to.

17. διελθῇ, sc. τὸ ἄρχεω. See note on 1300 a 26.

συνιέναι δὲ μόνον κ.τ.λ., sc. πάντας, i. e. the whole body of citizens, for Hildenbrand (*Gesch. und System der Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie*, 1. 468) seems to me to be right in translating 'während Generalversammlungen der Bürgerschaft nur dann zusammentreten, wenn es gilt Gesetze zu geben,' etc. (so too Welldon). In a democracy like that of Telecles it was necessary to reserve legislative authority for a collective gathering of the citizens for the reason mentioned above on 12; besides it was well to have the consent of all the citizens to laws and constitutional enactments, and also to have means of acquainting them with directions given by the magistrates.

18. τῶν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας. Cp. 1298 b 31, τῶν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν, and 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 4, τῶν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. Here the distinction between νόμοι and πολιτεία is maintained, which is not always the case (see above on 1289 a 15).

19. ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος κ.τ.λ. In this form the magistracies are not filled in turn by all the citizens, but those who hold them are selected by election or lot out of all the citizens, so that a turn of office does not necessarily come to every citizen, and consequently the powers of the collective assembly of all the citizens are more extensive. The magistracies being less accessible to all, the collective assembly naturally acquires greater importance. As to this form and the next see note on 1298 a 11. In it the right to inflict the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation apparently falls to the magistrates, though we might have expected it to be given to popular dicasteries.

22. τὰ δ' ἄλλα τὰς ἀρχὰς βουλευέσθαι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Anab. 6. 1. 33, τὰ δ' ἄλλα, ἐπειδὴν ἐκείσε ἔλθωμεν, βουλευσόμεθα. Τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἐφ' ἑκάστοις τεταγμένας probably stands in opposition to αἱ συναρχαῖαι συνοῦσαι, 14.

24. ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος κ.τ.λ. In this form only those offices are filled by election which an advanced democracy will allow to be so filled—the offices referred to are explained to be those which demand experience and skill in the holder (cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 21: [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 3)—and all the rest are filled by lot (a system specially dear to democracy, 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 20 sq.), and here

again the powers of the collective assembly are extensive. They do not, however, include the right to inflict the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation, which seems to fall, as in the last form, to magistrates, nor is the making of laws expressly mentioned among them, though the omission of any reference to this latter subject is probably accidental. In the explanation given above of *δυνας ἐνδέχεται* I follow Sepulveda and Victorius. The former (p. 136 b) explains these words thus—'ratio reipublicae popularis poscit ut magistratus non suffragio mandentur sed sortibus, permittit tamen ut suffragio mandentur qui debent a doctis aut peritis administrari necessitatis causa.' Welldon's translation is similar—'who are appointed by suffrage so far as is possible [in this advanced form of democracy].' *Ἐξ ἀπάντων* is not added with *ἀρετῆς οὐσας*, as in 23 sq., but this is probably what is intended, for otherwise the *τρόπος* under consideration would not be democratic.

30. τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς περὶ μηδενὸς κρίνειν ἀλλὰ μόνον προανακρίνειν. Cp. c. 4. 1292 a 28 sqq. and 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 28 sqq., and for *ἀνακρίνειν* 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 56. l. 29 sq. That this had come to be true of the Boulê at Athens, we see from 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 45 (cp. Pol. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 38—1300 a 4) and c. 55. l. 10 sqq.; that it had also come to be true of the archons, we see from 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 3. l. 31 sqq. (where see Sandys' note) and c. 48. l. 26 sqq. As to the euthyni, see c. 48. l. 23 sqq. That the powers of the stratêgi when employed on expeditions cannot have been narrowed in this way, we have seen above on 1297 b 41.

32. ἢ ἀνάλογόν φαμεν κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 4. 1292 a 17 sqq. and c. 6. 1293 a 32 sqq.

35. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for when eligibility to the deliberative body is conferred by a comparatively moderate property-qualification, and a comparatively large number of persons is eligible because of its moderateness, and the members of the deliberative do not make changes in things which the law forbids to be changed but conform to the law, and it is open to any one acquiring the property-qualification to be elected to the deliberative, the constitution is indeed an oligarchy, but it is an oligarchy bordering on polity by reason of its moderateness of spirit.' Sepulveda, who translates *μετέχειν*, 39, 'aditus ad rempublicam,' supplies *τῇ πολιτείᾳ* with *μετέχειν* and is followed by Vict. and Lamb.: Sus. also translates 'der Zutritt zu allen Aemtern offen steht.' But it seems more natural to supply τοῦ βουλευέσθαι (cp. 40, ὅταν δὲ μὴ

πάντες τοῦ βουλευέσθαι μετέχουσιν). It would appear from the passage before us that in the most moderate form of oligarchy the deliberative was not composed of the whole number of those who were privileged under the constitution, but was an elective body chosen from them (and by them?). Yet we gather from c. 9. 1294 b 3 sqq. that there were oligarchies in which an assembly existed, and we know that this was so at Corinth (Plut. Dion, c. 53). Aristotle's list of the forms assumed by the deliberative in oligarchies is silent as to those oligarchies in which deliberative authority was confined to the magistrates, but the demos had a consultative voice (1298 b 33 sq.). Nor does it quite tally with his list of oligarchies.

38. ἀκολουθῶσι, sc. τῷ νόμῳ : see note on 1339 a 19.

39. ὀλιγαρχία μὲν πολιτικὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 10, καὶ ἐνθα μὲν πολιτικωτέρα ἐγένετο ἢ ὀλιγαρχία.

ἢ τοιαύτη, sc. πολιτεία.

40. ὅταν δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but when not all [those who acquire the property-qualification] have access to the deliberative, but only selected persons, but they rule in accordance with law, as before also, this is oligarchical.' Αἵρετοί seems to be used here in much the same sense as ἀφωρισμένοι in c. 15. 1300 a 16 sqq. We are not told who the electors were in this form. Under the rule of the Thirty at Athens the magistracies (including the Boulê) were confined, if the text is correct, to πρόκριτοι ἐκ τῶν χιλίων, i.e. out of the knights ('Ath. Pol. c. 35. l. 3 sqq.). Office was sometimes confined in oligarchies to the members of certain clubs (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 31 sq.).

1298 b. 5. τὴν τάξιν ταύτην, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 36.

ὅταν δὲ τινῶν τινές κ.τ.λ. Supply κύριοι ὄσιν from what precedes. Πάντες περὶ πάντων is the democratic arrangement, τινές περὶ πάντων the oligarchical, τινές περὶ τινῶν the arrangement appropriate to an aristocracy or polity, being intermediate between the other two. In the aristocracy which Aristotle imagines questions of peace and war and the review of the conduct of magistrates in office and probably their election would fall within the competence of 'all' acting collectively, while legislation and the conclusion and dissolution of alliances and the infliction of the punishments of death, exile, and confiscation would be reserved for the cognizance of 'some.' It is not surprising to find legislation reserved for 'some' in an aristocracy, for in 2. 8. 1269 a 24 sqq. Aristotle in effect suggests that not any one and every one should have to do with the alteration of laws, but only select persons. There would also

be an obvious advantage in reserving for the consideration of a few questions relating to alliance and the infliction of the grave punishments referred to, though the reservation to a few of the power to inflict these punishments was in the case of the Lacedaemonian State commonly criticized as oligarchical (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 33 sq.). When, on the other hand, we are told in 7 that the magistrates of an aristocracy may be appointed either by election or by lot (i.e. apparently by lot pure and simple, not by lot *ἐκ προκρίτων*, as to which see note on 8), the statement conflicts with 2. 11. 1273 a 17, τὸ δὲ ἀμίσθους καὶ μὴ κληρωτὰς ἀριστοκρατικὸν θετεῖον (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 4 sq.), and Brandis, followed by Sus., is probably, therefore, right in bracketing ἡ κληρωτοί. Another reason for bracketing ἡ κληρωτοί is that, if we do not, it becomes difficult to distinguish the organization of the deliberative in aristocracy from its organization in those forms of democracy in which some of the subjects dealt with by the deliberative are reserved for the cognizance of magistrates elected or taken by lot out of all (1298 a 19 sqq.), unless indeed we add *ἐκ τινῶν* in 7 before αἵρετοί ἢ κληρωτοί. Vict., followed by Giph. (p. 497), reads ἡ πολιτεία in 8 in place of ἡ πολιτεία, and Giph. (ibid.) explains, 'et aristocratiae quidem (proprium), ubi magistratus non sortito verum suffragiis mandentur, reipublicae vero, ubi sortito sint facti,' but Camerarius, Bekk., and Sus. are probably right in reading ἡ πολιτεία. It should be noted that even where the magistrates are appointed by election, if they are not elected for virtue, the constitution does not really deserve the name of an aristocracy (c. 7. 1293 b 7 sqq. : c. 8. 1294 a 9 sq., 19 sqq.).

6. For ὅπερ in the sense of *περί*, see Bon. Ind. s.v. and Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 47, who remarks that it is used in this sense oftener in the Nicomachean Ethics, the Rhetoric, and the Topics than elsewhere in Aristotle's writings.

8. εἰδὲν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Two questions arise as to the organization of the deliberative which is here said to be suitable to an aristocratic polity or a polity—1. Are we to carry on from 5 sq. οὖν πολέμου μιν καὶ ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης καὶ εὐθυνῶν πάντες, so that the modes of organization described in 8 sqq. apply only to those subjects which are not reserved for the cognizance of all? This question should probably be answered in the affirmative. 2. Are the αἵρετοί and κληρωτοί, or the mixed body of αἵρετοί and κληρωτοί referred to in 8 sqq., magistrates, or are they simply a deliberative council? The answer is doubtful, but as Aristotle does not repeat the

word *ἀρχοντες*, perhaps the chances are in favour of the latter hypothesis. The plans appropriate to polity proper are probably that by which some subjects are assigned to persons appointed by election and others to persons appointed by lot, and that by which some members of a deliberative council are appointed by election and others by lot (compare the advice which Aristotle gives to extreme democracies in 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11-16), while the appointment of deliberators by lot *ἐκ προκρίτων* savours rather of an aristocratic polity. Thus, when Athens was under a democracy mingled with aristocracy (Isocr. Panath. §§ 130-1), it appointed its magistrates in this way (Panath. § 145, *καθίστασιν ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τοὺς προκριθέντας ὑπὸ τῶν φυλετῶν καὶ δημοτῶν*: cp. Areop. § 22, *οὐκ ἐξ ἀπάντων τὰς ἀρχὰς κληροῦντες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ τοὺς ἰκανωτάτους ἐφ' ἑκάστον τῶν ἔργων προκρίνοντες*, and Ath. Pol. c. 8. l. 1 sqq.: c. 22. l. 20 sqq.: c. 30. l. 11 sq.: c. 31. l. 2 sqq.). Appointments to priesthoods were sometimes made in this way (Demosth. Or. 57. in Eubul. c. 46). When it is implied in 2. 11. 1273 a 17 sq. that the appointment of magistrates by lot is inconsistent with aristocracy, Aristotle probably refers to their appointment by lot *ἐκ πάντων*, not *ἐκ προκρίτων*. In 2. 6. 1266 a 8 we are told that the appointment of magistrates by lot out of elected persons is common to oligarchy and democracy; it would seem, therefore, that both oligarchy and democracy used this mode of appointing magistrates.

9. In ἡ κοινῇ αἵρεσι καὶ κληρωτοί the reference seems to be to a mixed body or bodies composed of elective members and members appointed by lot, acting as the deliberative in relation to all the subjects which are not reserved for the cognizance of all.

11. διήρηται μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. For πρὸς cp. 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 37, *δύο δ' εἰσὶν ἡλικίαι πρὸς ἃς ἀναγκαῖον διηρῆσθαι τὴν παιδείαν*. In 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 5 sqq. we have *οἱ μὲν οὖν τρόποι τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς . . . διήρηται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας οὕτως*, cp. Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 27, *τὰ δὲ κύρια διήρηται κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας*.

13. συμφέρει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Further advice as to the assembly in the ultimate democracy is given in 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 17 sqq., but here Aristotle places in the forefront of his recommendations the adoption of measures to induce the *γυῖρμιοι* to attend its meetings. As to these recommendations see vol. i. p. 513. They are quite in harmony with the views expressed in 3. 11. 1281 b 34 sqq. (see note on 1281 b 35) and 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 25 sqq., but they can have had but little chance of being adopted in an ultimate democracy.

συνφέρει δὲ δημοκρατία τε τῇ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκούσῃ δημοκρατίᾳ ὡν κ.τ.λ. Bekk.² omits τε, and Schneider, though he leaves it in his text, calls it superfluous (2. 265), but Sus.² may be right in regarding it as corresponding, though in an anacoluthic way, to δέ in ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, 26. Aristotle would probably have continued καὶ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, if the intervening recommendations to the ultimate democracy had not run to a considerable length. For τῇ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκούσῃ δημοκρατίᾳ νῦν, cp. c. 10. 1295 a 5, 18, and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25, ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῖς μάλιστα εἶναι δοκούσαις δημοκρατίαις, which suggests whether we should not read δημοκρατικῇ in place of the second δημοκρατία (or δημοκρατία ἡ Π¹) in the passage before us. The expression ἡ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκούσα δημοκρατία is applied in 8 (6). 2. 1318 a 5, not to an ultimate democracy, as in the passage before us and in 1310 a 25 sqq., but to one in which rich and poor stand on a level, neither being alone supreme.

14. λέγω δὲ τοιαύτην κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 4. 1292 a 5.

16. ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις. Cp. c. 9. 1294 a 37 sqq.

18. οἱ δὲ δημοτικοὶ μισθὸν τοῖς ἀπόροις. Cp. c. 13. 1297 a 36 sqq.

19. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας ποιεῖν. For τοῦτο δέ see Ast, *Lex. Platon.* 1. 422, who says of τοῦτο δέ in Plato, *Tim.* 59 D, 'reintegrat orationis structuram post parenthesin quae dicitur.' Richards, however, would read δὴ in place of δέ in the passage before us.

20. βουλευσονται γὰρ βέλτιον κ.τ.λ. See note on 1281 b 35. So lawsuits will be tried all the better if rich and poor sit together on dicasteries (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 26 sqq.). Cp. also 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 25 sqq. Contrast the provision in Plato's *Laws* 764 A by which attendance at the assembly is made compulsory only on members of the first and second property-classes, not on members of the third and fourth, though the composition of the Boulê in the *Laws* (756 B sqq.) suggests that Plato no less than Aristotle sought to bring rich and poor to deliberate together, for while the Athenian Boulê was composed of representatives not of the property-classes but of the tribes, Plato in the *Laws* by a remarkable innovation makes his Boulê consist of representatives of the property-classes, and thus secures that both rich and poor shall find a place upon it. Aristotle's desire that the assembly and dicasteries in an ultimate democracy should be composed of both rich and poor deserves

notice, because this is not the way in which our own deliberative assemblies and juries are constituted, but we must not lose sight of the fact that he recommends this only in the case of an ultimate democracy. He would undoubtedly prefer assemblies and dicasteries in which the moderately well-to-do predominate.

21. συμφέρει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Compare with this suggestion 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 13 sqq. Ἐκ τῶν μορίων, which I have taken in vol. i. p. 513 to refer to tribes and other sections of the State, probably rather refers to the sections just named, the γνώριμοι and δῆμος (cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 25 sqq.). We gather from what follows that Aristotle regards this suggestion as suitable only to the case in which there is no great disparity between the numbers of the γνώριμοι and δῆμος. He comes here near to suggesting a representative assembly, though one of a doubtfully workable kind, for would a representative chamber prove workable in which half the members were returned by the γνώριμοι and half by the δῆμος? It is true that Zurich was ruled for many years by a Council of twenty-six, half of the members of which were taken from the upper class (Konstafel) and half from the trades or arts (Dändliker, Geschichte der Schweiz, 1. 456-8: Short History of Switzerland, Eng. Trans., p. 70).

23. συμφέρει δὲ κἀν κ.τ.λ. Κἀν, 'if also': cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 1, εἰ δὲ κἀν ὥσιν ἱππέις κ.τ.λ. When the numbers of the δῆμος greatly exceed those of the γνώριμοι, evil results follow; the constitution becomes disorderly and the γνώριμοι insubordinate (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 11 sqq.: 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 16 sqq.: 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 31 sqq.).

24. For οἱ δημοτικοί, 'the men of the people,' cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 22: 7 (5). 4. 1303 b 36: 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 14.

τῶν πολιτικῶν here seems = τῶν γνωρίμων, 25. For the contrast drawn between οἱ δημοτικοί and οἱ πολιτικοί compare that between οἱ ἐργαστικοί and οἱ πολιτικοί in Polyb. 10. 16. 1, and that between τὸ βάνανσον and τὸ ἀστέιον in Plut. Camill. c. 38.

26. τοὺς πλείους, 'those who are in excess of this number.' Cp. Isocr. Philip. § 63, καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ πλείω λέγειν;

ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις κ.τ.λ. Just as the ultimate democracy is advised to induce the γνώριμοι to take part in the work of the deliberative, so oligarchies are advised to allow the voice of the δῆμος to be heard in the deliberative, not however without taking certain precautions. As to these precautions see vol. i. p. 513 sq.

27. ἢ προσαιρείσθαι τινὰς ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους. Supply συμφέρει.

Sos. is probably right in suggesting that *προσαιρεῖσθαι* should be read in place of *προαιρεῖσθαι*: cp. Xen. *Cyrop.* 1. 5. 5—6. So we are told in Xen. *Hell.* 2. 3. 17 that Theramenes said *ὅτι εἰ μὴ τις κοινωνοὺς ἱκανοὺς λήψοιτο τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀδύνατον ἔσοιτο τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν διαμένειν*. At Solothurn in Switzerland in the fourteenth century the Council of Twelve chosen from the nobles added to itself two representatives of the eleven arts (*Zünfte*) selected by itself (*Dändliker, Geschichte der Schweiz*, 2. 367).

¶ *κατασκευάσαντας κ.τ.λ.* Cp. c. 15. 1299 b 30 sqq., where probuli are said to be an oligarchical magistracy, 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 16 sq., and 1323 a 6 sqq., the last-named passage so far disagreeing with that before us that it connects *νομοφύλακες* with aristocracy, not with oligarchy. Compare (with Arnold) Thuc. 8. 1. 3, where the Athenians after the disaster at Syracuse decide to appoint *ἀρχὴν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων, ὡς ἂν καιρὸς ᾖ, προβουλευέσονται*. It is possible that in the long-lived oligarchy of Corinth, in which probuli found a place side by side with a Boulê (see note on 1299 b 36), and, it would seem from Plut. *Dion.* c. 53, a popular assembly, the powers of the popular assembly were restricted in the manner described in the text. Even where probuli were not elderly men, they would be few in number in comparison with a Boulê, and therefore the institution would be oligarchical (c. 15. 1299 b 34 sqq.). A sole *πρόβουλος* occurs in an inscription which probably belongs to Leucas (*Oberhummer, Akarnanien*, pp. 272, 274). As to probuli see Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 315, and as to nomophylakes, *ibid.* 2. 337 sq., though no instances are there given of nomophylakes acting in a probouleutic capacity. We read in Pollux, 8. 94 of nomophylakes at Athens, who *τοῖς προῖδοις ἐν ἐκκλησίαις συγκαθίσκουσιν, ἵνα διακωλύοντες ἐπιχειροταίνειν, ὅσα μὴ συμφέρει*. The existence of probuli in a State appears to imply the existence in it of a larger deliberative body, for the function of the probuli was to consider beforehand matters to be brought before such a body. Thus probuli will hardly have existed in the more extreme forms of oligarchy, for in them this larger body will not have found a place.

81. *τῶν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν.* Cp. 1298 a 18.

82. *ἔτι ἢ ταῦτ' αὖ ψηφίεσθαι τὸν δῆμον ἢ μηδὲν ἐναντίον τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις.* A stronger measure than the restriction of the deliberations of the popular assembly to proposals introduced by probuli or nomophylakes, for the latter measure would leave the assembly free to deal with these proposals as it pleased, whereas the former would

tie its hands. For this measure cp. 2. 10. 1272 a 10 sqq. and 2. 11. 1273 a 9 sqq. In some States only the *χρηστοί* were allowed to speak in the assembly ([Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 6).

33. ἡ τῆς συμβουλῆς κ.τ.λ. A stronger measure still. For the implied contrast between a consultative and an effective voice in deliberation, cp. Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 65, ἐν ᾧ φαίνεται γεγραφὸς τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν συμβουλεύειν τὸν βουλόμενον, τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ τοὺς προδρους ἐπιψηφίζειν τὰς γνώμας, λόγον δὲ μὴ προτιβεῖναι.

34. καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον δὲ κ.τ.λ. This recommendation of course applies only to cases in which the assembly has something more than the mere right to give advice. It would seem that in politics the few (by which is probably meant the magistrates) often possessed a final and decisive voice in rejecting a measure, while affirmative resolutions arrived at by them were not valid until confirmed by the assembly. Aristotle advises oligarchies to adopt the opposite plan—to give the assembly a final voice only in rejecting, and to require that affirmative decisions should be referred back for confirmation by the magistrates. (So I understand the passage: compare Vict., who explains, 'iubet igitur ipsos contrarium facere eius quod servatur in statibus liberis et qui reguntur a multitudine, id est, permittere multitudini ut improbet repudietque quae sibi non placent, nec tamen valeat sententiam ullam confirmare ac ratam facere, quia necesse est quod illi probatum sit referri ad principes.' Stahr and Weldon, on the other hand, take ἐπαστρέσθαι πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας to refer not to affirmative decisions of the assembly, but to bills rejected by it. Whichever view we adopt, however, as to the meaning of these words, there is no difference of opinion as to the invalidity attaching to affirmative decisions of the assembly.) The restriction suggested by Aristotle would place a check on rash affirmative resolutions of the assembly—resolutions, for instance, in favour of a declaration of war—by making them invalid if the magistrates withheld their approval. Compare the rule at Rome as stated by Cicero, De Rep. 2. 32. 56, quodque erat ad obtinendam potentiam nobilium vel maximum, vehementer id retinebatur, populi comitia ne essent rata, nisi ea patrum adprobavisset auctoritas, and by Livy, 1. 17. 9, decreverunt enim ut cum populus regem iussisset, id sic ratum esset, si patres auctores fierent, and 6. 42. 10. Compare also the addition to the Rhetae of Lycurgus made by the kings Polydorus and Theopompus, αἱ δὲ σκολιὰν ὁ δῆμος ἔλαστο, τοὺς πρεσβυγενίας καὶ ἀρχαγέτας ἀποστατήρας ἡμεν, τοῦτ' ἵστι μὴ κυροῦν, ἀλλ'

ὡς ἀφίστασθαι καὶ διαλύειν τὸν δῆμον (Plut. Lycurg. c. 6), and see Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 49. 3. 'I am so far anti-democratic,' says H. Crabb Robinson in a letter dated Sept. 13, 1831 (*Diary and Reminiscences*, 2. 509), 'that I would allow the people to do very little; but I would enable them to *hinder* a great deal.' Yet it would hardly have been to the advantage of Rome if the Roman comitia had persisted in their refusal to declare war against Philip V of Macedon in B.C. 200 (see Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, Book 3, c. 8: Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 233).

35. ἀποψηφίζομενον. For the use of ἀποψηφίζεσθαι in the sense of 'reject,' cp. Plato, *Laws* 800 D, τοῦτον δὲ τὸν νόμον ἄρ' οὐκ ἀποψηφίζεσθαι; Demosth. *De Fals. Leg.* c. 174, and Deinarch. c. Aristog. c. 9.

36. For the use of καταψηφίζομενον in the sense of 'voting affirmatively,' or perhaps simply in that of 'decernere,' see Bon. Ind. s.v., where Poet. 25. 1461 b 2 is referred to, and Vahlen, *Beiträge zu Aristoteles' Poetik*, 4. 423.

38. ἀντιστραμμένως. Cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 10. 1242 b 7, where however Fritzsche reads ἀντιστραμμένως, as indeed Bekker (with one or two inferior MSS.) does here.

1. καὶ τοῦ κυρίου δὲ τῆς πολιτείας. Cp. c. 1. 1289 a 17, 8 (6). 1. 1299 a 1316 b 31 sq., and 3. 11. 1282 a 25 sqq. In 2. 6. 1264 b 33 sq. τὸ βουλευόμενον is said to be κύριον τῆς πόλεως, not τῆς πολιτείας.

2. Ἐχομένη δὲ τούτων κ.τ.λ. The list of questions as to magi- C. 15.
stracies given in c. 14. 1298 a 1 sqq. omits, as Sus.² points out (Note 1343), the third question mentioned here, the question as to the period for which they are held and the permissibility of a repeated tenure, and this question is not dealt with either in the chapter before us or in 8 (6). 8, though something may be learnt on the subject from 34 sqq. and more from 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 13 sqq. If we look back to c. 14. 1297 b 37 sqq., we shall see that the main object which Aristotle has in view is to discover what organization of the magistracies is appropriate to each constitution, and it is to this problem that he chiefly addresses himself in the chapter before us, but he finds it requisite to inquire first, what are and what are not magistracies (1299 a 14-30), and what magistracies are absolutely necessary to a State and what are desirable if the constitution is to be a good one (a question as to which we learn but little from 1299 a 31-b 13, and more from 8 (6). 8), and to deal with one or two other preliminary inquiries (1299 b 14-20),

before he strikes into his destined path and asks how far the same magistracies will exist in different constitutions (1299 b 20-1300 a 8), and how the mode of appointing to them will differ in each (1300 a 9 sqq.). See as to the contents of the chapter before us and its relation to 8 (6). 8, vol. i. p. 514 sqq.

4. ἔχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Πόσαι τε ἀρχαί κ.τ.λ. is added to explain in reference to what points the many differences spoken of arise. Compare the very similar sentence in 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 5, ἔστι δὲ πολιτικῆς χορηγίας πρῶτον τό τε πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὑπάρχειν δεῖ φύσει, as to which see note. For τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς πολιτείας cp. c. 14. 1297 b 37. In the Lacedaemonian State the magistracies would seem to have been much fewer and less specialized than at Athens. Judging from 8 (6). 8, one would say that Aristotle desires to steer a midway course between the two States in this matter. It would be easy to add to the list of questions as to magistracies and their tenure which Aristotle gives here. Questions might be raised as to whether magistracies should be salaried, whether they should be subject to review and by whom, whether more than one should be allowed to be held by the same person at the same time, whether the chief magistracies of a State should be combined to form a single great board, and whether boards are better than single magistrates, and if so, of how many members they should be composed, etc.

6. οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Democracies liked to make magistracies, or as many of them as possible, tenable for only a short time (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 24 sq.), six months (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 13 sqq.) or less. In early democracies, however, we hear of magistracies tenable for long periods (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 21 sq.). The prytaneis at Athens held office for thirty-five or thirty-six days ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 43), and their epistatês for one day and night only (c. 44). Still there were magistrates at Athens (for instance, the ταμίης στρατιωτικῶν, and οἱ ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικόν, and ὁ τῶν κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητής: see 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 43) who held office for four years; Aristotle, indeed, can hardly mean to say that some States made *all* their magistracies of brief tenure. Democracies were especially opposed to offices tenable for life (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 41 sqq.). In oligarchies, on the other hand, offices were often held for life (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 16 sqq.), or at any rate for long terms (7 (5). 8. 1308 a 13 sqq.). In the Lacedaemonian ἀριστοκρατία the kings and senators held their offices for life.

9. πλεονάκις τοὺς αὐτοὺς, sc. ἄρχειν. For πλεονάκις τοὺς αὐτοὺς

Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares Top. 5. 2. 130 a 29 and 6. 3. 141 a 21. Democracies tended to set limits to a repeated tenure of all offices except those relating to war and a few others (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 23 sq., where see note: see also Sandys' note on 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 62. l. 18). At Thurii a course was adopted unusual even in democracies, and restrictions of this kind were extended to offices relating to war, the office of *stratêgus* not being tenable a second time by the same person, except after an interval of five years (7 (5). 7. 1307 b 7).

10. τὴν κατάστασιν τῶν ἀρχῶν, cp. 1300 a 9 sq., 32, b 7 sq., and Plato, Laws 768 D, αἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς καταστάσεις.

11. δεῖ γίνεσθαι, sc. τὴν κατάστασιν τῶν ἀρχῶν: cp. 1300 b 7, πῶς δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὰς καταστάσεις.

12. πῶς, i. e. by election, or by lot, or by a combination of the two.

14. ποῖαι, sc. ἀρχαί.

ἵστι δὲ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1275 a 26, and compare Aeschin. c. Ctes. cc. 13—19, a passage which is probably present to Aristotle's mind here, λέγουσι δὲ . . . καὶ ἕτερόν τινα λόγον . . . ὥς ἄρα ὅσα τις αἰρετὸς ὢν πράττει κατὰ ψήφισμα, οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ἀρχὴ ἀλλ' ἐπιμελεία τις καὶ διακονία (cp. τῶν ἐπιμελειῶν, 20). ἀρχὰς δὲ φήσουσιν εἰκίνας εἶναι ἅς οἱ θεσμοθέται ἀποκληροῦσιν ἐν τῇ Θησίῳ, κἀκίνας ἅς ὁ δῆμος εἴωθε χειροτονεῖν ἐν ἀρχαιρείαις, στρατηγούς καὶ ἱππάρχους καὶ τὰς μετὰ τούτων ἀρχάς, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα πραγματείας προστεταγμένας κατὰ ψήφισμα. To this plea Aeschines opposes the language of the law, which declares ἀρχὰς ἀπάσας εἶναι ἅς ὁ δῆμος χειροτονεῖ, "καὶ τοὺς ἐπιστάτας" φησὶ "τῶν δημοσίων ἔργων" (ἔστι δὲ ὁ Δημοσθένης τειχοποιός, ἐπιστάτης τοῦ μεγίστου τῶν ἔργων) κ.τ.λ., where we are reminded of 15, πολλῶν γὰρ ἐπιστατῶν ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία δεῖται. (If cc. 13—19 of Aeschin. c. Ctes. are here present to Aristotle's mind, the passage before us cannot have been written before B. C. 330, for Aeschines' speech was delivered in that year.) Aristotle seems here by implication to deny the name of magistracy to any post which is not filled either by election or by lot, and consequently to the position of member of the assembly, if not to that of dicast. He speaks more decidedly here than in 3. 1. 1275 a 26 sqq. He adds that not all posts which were filled by election or lot were to be accounted magistracies; priests were not magistrates (cp. Demosth. Prooem. 55. p. 1461), though some of them were elected (Paus. 7. 20. 1) and others appointed by lot (Demosth. Or. 57. in Eubul. c. 46), nor were chorêgi, though some of them were elected ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 56. l. 7 sqq.), nor heralds (of the mode of whose appointment in

most States little seems to be definitely known, though they were a hereditary profession at Sparta, Hdt. 6. 60), nor ambassadors, who were elected (19). Aristotle may have been led to mark off πολιτικαὶ ἀρχαὶ from such posts as those of priests and heralds by a recollection of what Plato had said of priests and heralds in Polit. 290.

18. διόπερ πάντας οὔτε τοὺς αἵρετοὺς οὔτε τοὺς κληρωτοὺς ἀρχοντας θετέον. The inference appears to be—as so many functionaries are required for the purposes of the political association, it is not likely that they will all be magistrates, and therefore we must not treat as magistrates all those functionaries who are appointed by election or by lot. For the absence of οὐ before πάντας, which some would add, see critical note.

18. τοῦτο, the office of priest. Aristotle does not explain why he denies the name of ἀρχοντες to priests, chorēgi, heralds, and envoys.

19. ἔτι δὲ χορηγὸν καὶ κήρυκα. We should probably supply 'are not magistrates.' It would, however, also be possible to supply 'are elected.'

αἰροῦνται δὲ καὶ πρεσβευταί. See critical note. Compare [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 31, νόμος δὲ ἦν Χαλκιδεῦσι μὴ ἀρξαι μηδὲ πρεσβεῦσαι νεώτερον ἑτῶν πενήκοντα, and Harpocr. εἶθυνα (Aristot. Fragm. 405. 1545 b 43), οἱ πρεσβεύσαντες ἢ ἀρξάντες ἢ διοικήσαντες τῶν δημοσίων, passages which imply that the post of envoy was not an office. 'In Attic inscriptions the plural of πρεσβευτής is till B.C. 250 πρόσβεις, afterwards πρεσβευταί' (Meisterhans, Gramm. d. Att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 112). The plural πρεσβευταί, however, occurs in our text of Thucydides (8. 77 and 86), and πρεσβευτάς in Andoc. 3. 41 and Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 12.

20. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν πολιτικαὶ τῶν ἐπιμελειῶν. Τῶν ἐπιμελειῶν takes up πολλῶν ἐπιστάτων, 15. Aristotle appears to regard only πολιτικαὶ ἐπιμελειαὶ as ἀρχαὶ in the truest sense. Πολιτικαὶ ἐπιμελειαὶ are explained to be offices in which an ἐπιμελεια is exercised over the whole or a part of the citizens (πολίται, hence πολιτικαὶ) with a view to a given action. It is implied apparently that no such ἐπιμελεια is exercised in the case of οἰκονομικαὶ or ὑπηρετικαὶ ἐπιμελειαὶ. Aristotle does not explain how treasurers or auditors or registrars of contracts, whom he no doubt regards as entrusted with πολιτικαὶ ἐπιμελειαὶ, can be said to exercise an ἐπιμελεια of the kind to which he refers.

πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν. Supply ἐπιμελειαὶ.

21. For πρὸς τινα πρᾶξιν cp. 1299 b 18, πότερον κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα δεῖ διακρίναι ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, and Polyb. 10. 16. 2.

στρατηγὸς στρατευομένων, sc. ἐπιμελούμενος. We expect στρατηγία, but cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 3, μέγιστοι δὲ καὶ πρῶτοι τῶν ἀρχῶν ἦσαν βασιλεὺς καὶ πολέμαρχος καὶ ἀρχῶν], c. 7. l. 9 sqq., and c. 31. l. 16 : also Pol. 3. 1. 1275 a 23—26, and the passage quoted above on 14 from Aeschin. c. Ctes. cc. 13—19, κακείνας κ.τ.λ.

22. ἢ κατὰ μέρος, 'or sectionally.' It is implied that women and children are citizens, which is of course not strictly the case.

23. οἰκονομικά, 'economic': i. e. these magistracies have to deal with matters similar to those with which the head of a household has to deal, for instance the distribution of food (cp. 1. 10. 1258 a 21 sqq.).

πολλάκις γὰρ αἰρούνται σιτομέτραι. 'Corn-measurers' would be elected when corn was distributed among the citizens, and this would occur in times of scarcity or when a present of corn was made to the State : thus we read in Diod. 13. 58. 4 οἱ γὰρ Ἀκραγαντινοὶ σιτομετρήσαντες αὐτοῖς δημοσίᾳ δίδωκαν κατὰ τὰς οἰκίας : see also an inscription from Iasus in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 8. 100, and Plut. Cato Censor, c. 8 *ini.* In Pollux 7. 18 σιτομέτραι are included under the head of αἱ ἐπὶ ταῖς τροφαῖς τέχναι. They must not be confounded with the Prometrêtae, as to whom see Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, Eng. Trans., pp. 48, 239. Public 'measuring-out' of wheat no doubt took place at Athens during the four years of scarcity B.C. 330—326 (see vol. i. p. 135, note 2, and Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 268 sq.), and it is possible that the passage before us was written during or after the scarcity which these distributions of food were intended to alleviate. Cp. Demosth. Or. 34. in Phorm. c. 37, ἐν τοιοῦτῳ καιρῷ ἐν ᾧ ὑμῶν οἱ μὲν ἐν τῷ δῶτει οἰκοῦντες διμετροῦντο τὰ ἀλφίτα ἐν τῷ φδοίῳ, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ ἐν τῷ νεωρίῳ ἐλάμβανον κατ' ἀβολὴν τοὺς ἀρτους καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς μακρᾶς στοᾶς, τὰ ἀλφίτα καθ' ἡμέκτον μετρούμενοι καὶ καταπατούμενοι. Sus.² (Note 1348) identifies the σιτομέτραι with the σιτοφύλακες, but not, I think, rightly, nor do I agree with Liddell and Scott that 'inspectors of corn-measures' are referred to in the passage before us.

24. αἱ δ' ὑπηρετικά κ.τ.λ. Plato had already marked off magistrates from ὑπηρέται in Polit. 290 B, ὅπερ εἶπες νῦν, ὑπηρέτας, ἀλλ' οἷα αὐτοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀρχοντας. As to the employment of public slaves as clerks and the like, see Gilbert, Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 341, note 3. Ὑπηρέται were a despised race (Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 249 : Diod. 14. 66. 6).

25. μάλιστα δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 14, where see note. Aristotle has before him Plato, *Polit.* 260 C sqq., where τὸ ἐπιτάττειν, or rather ἡ αὐτεπιτακτική, is ascribed to ὁ ἄρχων, and probably also Xen. *Mem.* 3. 9. 11, ὅποτε γάρ τις ὁμολογήσει τοῦ μὲν ἄρχοντος εἶναι τὸ προστάττειν δὲ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ. (cp. *Poet.* 19. 1456 b 17, τὸ γὰρ κελεύσαι, φησί (sc. Πρωταγόρας), ποιεῖν τι ἢ μὴ ἐπιτάξις ἐστίν). In *δσαις ἀποδίδεται βουλευσασθαι τε περὶ τινῶν καὶ κρίναι καὶ ἐπιτάξει* Aristotle adds *περὶ τινῶν* because a magistracy has a definite, not an indefinite, sphere of competence. He does not confine the name of ἀρχή to posts of which *δσαις* κ.τ.λ. can be said, but he thinks that these deserve it best. He would hardly include among the posts which best deserve the name of ἀρχαί the ἐπιμέλειαι which he describes as οἰκονομαί and ὑπηρετικάί, or indeed the magistracies of ultimate democracies, for they possessed only the power to make preliminary inquiries (c. 14. 1298 a 30 sqq.). But he does not distinctly say to what posts he would give the name of ἀρχή and to what he would not. The question was made all the more perplexing by the fact that in the ordinary use of the Greek language a distinction was drawn between ἀρχαί and such posts as that of envoy. Giphanius remarks (p. 504), 'Bodinus in methodo historica, pagina 195, ita definit: Magistratus, inquit, est is qui imperii publici partem habet—publici inquam, ut ab imperio herili, patrio, aut alio domestico distinguatur: ubi multis quoque verbis hunc locum et definitionem Aristotelis reprehendit.' The criticism referred to by Giph. will be found in Bodinus, *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem*, p. 154, ed. 1595. Vict. quotes Cic. *De Leg.* 3. 1. 2, videtis igitur magistratus hanc esse vim, ut praesit praescribatque recta et utilia et coniuncta cum legibus. But is a magistrate not a magistrate if the things which he orders to be done are not 'recta et utilia,' etc.?

28. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. This remark is added to break off the discussion (for similar breakings-off see note on 1274 a 30 and see 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 18 sqq.); what Aristotle says in 30 explains why he has given a certain amount of consideration to the question. 'Hoc dicit, quoniam (ut alio in loco adnotavimus et saepe ipse admonet) in doctrina civili, licet pleraque omnia ad actionem pertineant, ut in ceteris doctrinis practicis sive activis, tamen quaedam cognitionis duntaxat gratia traduntur' (*Sepulveda*, p. 140 b): cp. 3. 8. 1279 b 11 sqq.

ταῦτα, the determination of the question who is a magistrate and who is not.

πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις, 'in relation to practice' (in contrast to πρὸς τὰς θεωρήσεις).

29. οὐ γὰρ πω κ.τ.λ., 'for no decision has yet been given, the discussion having been merely about the name.' The fact is mentioned to show that the question is not one of practical importance. It would have already been decided one way or the other, if it had been. For κρίσις γίνεται cp. c. 16. 1300 b 34, δεῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτων γίνεσθαι κρίσιν.

30. ἔχει δὲ τιν' ἄλλην διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν, 'but it offers an opportunity to a certain extent for speculative inquiry': cp. Hist. An. 5. 1. 539 a 7, εἰς δὲ περὶ τούτου τελευταῖον λεκτικὸν διὰ τὸ πλεῖστην ἔχει πραγματείαν, and Eth. Eud. 1. 1. 1214 a 12, ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἔχει φιλοσοφίαν μόνον θεωρητικὴν. "Ἄλλος is pleonastic, as often elsewhere (see note on 1309 b 30).

31. ποῖαι δ' ἀρχαὶ κ.τ.λ. For the answer to this question see 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 29 sqq. (cp. 1300 a 4 sqq.).

33. πρὸς ἀπασάν τε δὴ πολιτείαν κ.τ.λ., 'with a view to every constitution, and especially with a view to small States.' For δὴ following ἀπας, cp. Soph. Aj. 992. For καὶ δὴ καί, cp. Poet. 24. 1460 a 5: Meteor. 2. 3. 357 b 26: 'Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 2. 1. 2 sqq.: and Plato, Laws 758 E. Aristotle occasionally studies the circumstances of small States, e.g. in c. 11. 1296 a 10 sqq., 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 35 sqq., and 2. 11. 1273 b 12 sqq. Most Greek States were small, and it is probable that many of his pupils, like himself, came from small States, for the attractions of philosophy were greater where those of a political career were less (Plato, Rep. 496 B).

34. ἐν μὲν γὰρ δὴ ταῖς μεγάλαις κ.τ.λ., 'for in the large States [there will be as many offices as there are duties to be discharged, for in them] it is possible and right for one office to be set apart for the discharge of one duty.' Aristotle has already said of Carthage what he says here (2. 11. 1273 b 8 sqq.). The course which he here recommends had not always been followed at Athens, though it was a large State: thus we read of the Commissioners of the Theoric Fund (οἱ ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικὸν κεχειροτονημένοι) in the days of the ascendancy of Eubulus, ἤρχον μὲν πρὶν ἢ τὸν 'Ηγήμονος νόμον γενέσθαι τὴν τοῦ ἀντιγραφίως ἀρχήν, ἤρχον δὲ τὴν τῶν ἀποδεκτῶν καὶ κωρῶν ἀρχήν, καὶ συνεθεήκειν ἐκιδόμενον, ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ὁδοποιοὶ καὶ σχεδὸν τὴν ἑλλην διοίκησιν εἶχον τῆς πόλεως (Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 25).

37. ὥστε τὰς μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'so that in the case of some offices men intermit the tenure of them for a long time, while others they hold

only once.' Cp. 3. 1. 1275 a 24 sqq. So in the constitution adopted at Erythrae after its reduction by Athens towards the middle of the fifth century B.C. no one was to be a member of the Boulê a second time till four years had elapsed (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 23). At Athens the position of epistatês of the prytaneis could only be held once by the same individual (Αθ. Πολ. c. 44). So in the days of the Four Hundred at Athens, according to Αθ. Πολ. c. 31. l. 16 sqq., it was ordained that except in the case of the Boulê and the office of stratêgus, no one should hold the same magistracy twice. Aristotle does not notice, or at any rate point out, that the frequent tenure of important posts by novices which regulations of this kind involve would not be favourable to efficiency.

38. καὶ βέλτιον κ.τ.λ., 'and every task is better attended to, when the attention of the person discharging it is directed to doing one thing and not many.' Compare 1. 2. 1252 b 3 sqq. and 2. 11. 1273 b 14 sq. Aristotle has here before him Plato, Rep. 370 C, ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἕκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ῥᾶον, ὅταν εἷς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καιρῷ, σχολὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων, πράττη, and 374 A sqq., and (as Vict. points out) Laws 846 D sqq. He probably also has before him Xen. Cyrop. 2. 1. 21, ἐκείνο δοκῶν καταμεμαθηκέναι ὅτι οὗτοι κράτιστοι ἕκαστα γίγνονται οἱ δὲ ἀφήμενοι τοῦ πολλοῖς προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν ἐπὶ ἐν ἔργῳ τράπωνται, and 8. 2. 5-6, where the increased specialization of labour in large States as compared with small is dwelt upon, and the increased excellence of work resulting from this is described. 'Formae monopraxiæ et polupraxiæ unicum ex hoc loco exemplum posuit Stephanus' (Schn.).

1299 b. 1. συνάγειν εἰς ὀλίγους. Cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 6. 14, πᾶσαι δὲ συγκεφαλαιοῦνται πολιτικαὶ πράξεις εἰς ὀλίγους ἐπιστάτας, and Pol. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 37, ὅταν ἴσῃ εἰς ἐλάττους ἔλκωσι τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.

2. ὀλιγαριθρωπείαν, 'paucity of citizens,' as is clear from 1299 a 37, διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς πολίτας.

5. καὶ νόμων, i.e. laws regulating the tenure and administration of magistracies.

πλὴν αἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'but large States often require the same magistracies, whereas it is only at long intervals that small States do so.' In large States, for example, magistrates for the repair of the walls will often need to be appointed, not so in small States. Cp. c. 16. 1300 b 29, συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ ὀλίγα καὶ ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις πόλεσιν. It appears from the Gortyna Code that the ὀργανοδικασταί of Gortyna 'n'avaient qu' une existence inter-

mittente,' for the words of the Code are αἱ καὶ μὴ ἴσονται ἀρπανοδοκασταί (col. 12. 22 sq.: see Dareste, *Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques*, première série, pp. 390, 476).

7. διότι οὐδὲν κωλύει κ.τ.λ. In small States several magistracies may be held by the same person at one time, for they will not clash, because some of them for long periods of time together will give their holders but little to do.

9. πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαριθμίαν, 'to suit the paucity of citizens.' Cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 1, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀρίστην.

10. ὀβελισκολύχνια. See notes on 1252 b 1 and 2. We read of similar contrivances in Athen. Deipn. 700 d, Ἑρμιππος δ' ὁ καμφιδίπποιος ἐν τοῖς Ἰάμβοις τὸ στρατιωτικὸν λυχνεῖον σύνθετον οὕτως (i. e. λυχνεῖον) ὀνομάζει (Hermipp. Fragm. 8 Bergk), and 700 e, ξυλαλυχνούχου δὲ μίμηται Ἀλεξίς καὶ τάχα τοῦτ' ἔμοιρόν ἐστι τὸ παρὰ Θεοπόμῳ ὀβελισκολύχνιον (see Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Gr.* 3. 517).

πύσας, sc. ἀρχάς, which does not come to the surface, as it were, till 13. See notes on 1281 a 26 and 1336 a 21.

14. ἀρμόττει δὲ κ.τ.λ. This question needs to be considered because it has a bearing on the question raised in 1299 a 31 sqq., what offices are necessary. A similar question would be whether it is better to give the stratēgi, as at Athens, command both by land and by sea, or, as in the Lacedaemonian State, to give the command by land to one magistracy and the command by sea to another.

16. εὐκοσμία. Cp. 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 14, 20, and Plato, *Laws* 764 B. At one time in the history of Athens the Council of the Areopagus was charged with the maintenance of εὐκοσμία throughout the State: cp. Isocr. *Areop.* § 37, τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴν ἐπίστησαν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς εὐκοσμίας, and Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 3, ἣ δὲ τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν βουλὴ τὴν μὲν τάξιν εἶχε τοῦ διατηρεῖν τοὺς νόμους, διέκει δὲ τὰ πλείστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ κολάζουσα καὶ [ημι]ῶσα πάντας τοὺς ἀνομοῦντας κυρίως. This width of jurisdiction had its drawbacks, especially as the Council not only tried and sentenced culprits, but also carried the sentence into effect (Ἀθ. Πολ. *ibid.* and c. 8. l. 19 sqq.: cp. Pol. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 16 sqq.), and we may probably infer from 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 12 sqq. that Aristotle prefers, at any rate in the case of large States, the arrangement by which the task of caring for εὐκοσμία is entrusted to more magistracies than one. There is obviously something to be said on the other side. In modern States we are accustomed to look to one supreme police-authority in each city. We note that Aristotle entrusts the receipt

and paying out of the revenue to one magistracy with jurisdiction everywhere (8 (6). 8. 1321 b 31 sqq.: 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 9 sq.).

17. ἄλλον δὲ κατ' ἄλλον τόπον, i. e. *astynomi* in the city and *agronomi* in the country (8 (6). 8. 1321 b 18 sqq., 27 sqq.). The *proedri* ἐπεμελοῦντο τῆς εὐκοσμίας in the assembly ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 44. l. 10).

18. καὶ πότερον κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα δεῖ διαιρεῖν ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. The latter method seems to have been followed in some cases in Persia according to Xen. Oecon. 4. 9, καὶ εἰσὶ δ' αὐτῷ οἱ ἄρχοντες διατεταγμένοι ἐφ' ἑκάτερον οὐχ οἱ αὐτοί, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἄρχουσι τῶν κατοικούντων τε καὶ τῶν ἐργατῶν . . . οἱ δ' ἄρχουσι τῶν ὀπλισμένων φρουρῶν. We are ourselves familiar with Guardians charged with the care of the poor and Commissioners charged with the care of lunatics.

19. λέγω δ' οἷον ἓνα τῆς εὐκοσμίας. Supply πότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖ.

21. καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν γένος, 'the magistracies also,' as well as the constitution. Τὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν γένος probably means no more than αἱ ἀρχαί. See as to expressions of this kind Ast, Lex. Platon. i. 382, and cp. Plato, Laws 797 A, τὸ τῶν παιδιῶν γένος, and Tim. 76 C, τὸ τῶν τριχῶν γένος.

24. ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαιδευμένων. Cp. Rhet. i. 8. 1365 b 33, ἀριστοκρατία δὲ ἐν ᾗ οἱ κατὰ παιδείαν (διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς).

27. καὶ κατ' αὐτάς, i. e. κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας (cp. 21, καθ' ἑκάστην), as well as κατὰ τοὺς τόπους, κατὰ τὰ πράγματα, and κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.

29. ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Great magistracies were seldom found in democracies (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 24 sq., 29 sq., 41 sqq.), except in early times (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 20 sqq.).

30. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰδιαίτινές εἰσιν. To the magistracies mentioned here as peculiar to special constitutions a *gerusia* may be added, for a *gerusia* can hardly have existed in democracies.

31. ἢ τῶν προβούλων. See note on 1298 b 27.

αὕτη γὰρ οὐ δημοκρατική. Nor was the office of *probulus* suitable to an aristocracy either: cp. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 8 sq.

32. βουλὴ δὲ δημοτικόν. The name *Boulê* seems, however, sometimes to be applied to Councils not of a democratic character: see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 131. 1: 2. 190: 2. 315. 3. The *γερονσία* in the Cretan States, which was composed of persons who had held the office of *cosmus*, an office tenable only by the members of certain gentes, was called a *Boulê* (2. 10. 1272 a 7 sq., 33 sqq.), though there was nothing democratic about it. It is implied in 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 6-9, where the word *βουλευουσι* is used, that a *Boulê* might exist in an oligarchy.

33. *ὅπως ἀσχολῶν ἔσται*, 'in order that it may be able to attend to its business.'

34. *τοῦτο δ', εἰν ὀλίγοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχικόν*. Cp. Plut. Camill. c. 1, *τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνδρας, ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο, τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐφιστάναί παρεμυθεῖτο τοὺς βαρυνομένους τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν*.

36. *ἀλλ' ὅπου κ.τ.λ.*, 'but where both these magistracies exist, [the arrangement is still oligarchical, for] the probuli are established as a check upon the bouleutae.' We can trace the existence of probuli in addition to a Boulê at Corinth (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 90, who refers to Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 60 in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 394), at Corcyra (Gilbert, 2. 234 sq.), at Eretria (Gilbert, 2. 67), and indeed at Athens after the Syracusan disaster (Thuc. 8. 1. 3). Since the foregoing note was written, I have noticed that my remark as to the coexistence of probuli and a Boulê at Corinth has been anticipated by Professor Wilisch (Beiträge zur inneren Geschichte des alten Korinth, p. 17) and by Mr. Lutz (*Class. Rev.* 10. 419).

38. *καταλύεται δὲ . . . 1300 a 4. κρίνουσιν*. The connexion with what precedes is, 'but though the Boulê is a democratic institution, even its authority is destroyed in extreme democracies.' The substance of this passage is repeated in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 30—35. Cp. also 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 29, *ὥστε καταλύονται πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαί*, and Cic. pro L. Flacco, c. 7. 16, *Graecorum autem totae respublicae sedentis conitionis temeritate administrantur*. As to Athens, cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 41. l. 24 sqq., c. 45, c. 49. ll. 20—24, and see Sandys' note on c. 43. l. 30, where ways are pointed out in which a departure occurred from 'the principle laid down by Solon, *μηδὲν εἰν ἀπροβούλευτον εἰς ἐκκλησίαν εἰσφέρεισθαι* (Plut. Solon, c. 19).' It should be noticed that Aristotle here connects the decline of the power of the Boulê with the introduction of liberal pay for the assembly (cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 31, *ὅπου μὴ μισθοῦ εἰσφορά πᾶσιν*). This throws light on the date at which he would place the decline of the Boulê at Athens.

4. *παιδονόμος δὲ κ.τ.λ.* This remark is partly repeated in 8 (6). 1300 a. 8. 1323 a 3 sqq.

5. *καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle refers to the *γυμνασίαρχος* among others, as appears from 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 37 sqq.: see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 337. 3, where Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 246. 30 sqq. is quoted, *γυμνασίαρχός τε αἰρεθεὶς τῆς τε εὐταξίας τῶν ἐφήβων καὶ τῶν νέων προενοήθη, τῆς τε ἄλλης εὐσχημοσύνης τῆς κατὰ τὸ γυμνάσιον ἀντελάβετο καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως*.

6. πῶς γὰρ οἶόν τε κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5 sq.

7. τρυφῶσι γὰρ αἱ τῶν ὀλιγαρχούντων. Cp. Plato, Rep. 550 D, 556 B.

8. περὶ μὲν τούτων. In the next line we have *περί* with the acc. See for other instances of this Bon. Ind. 579 b 20 sqq., where 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 30 sq. is among the passages referred to. Cp. also 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 28 sq.

10. For *ἐξ ἀρχῆς* see Bon. Ind. 111 a 56 sqq.

εἰσὶ δ' αἱ διαφοραὶ ἐν τρισὶν ὅροις, 'and the varieties [in the mode of appointing magistrates] are dependent on three determining factors' (see note on 1294 a 35). For *εἶναι ἐν*, see note on 1330 b 8. Compare also c. 16. 1300 b 14 sq. and Plato, Protag. 354 E, *ἐπεὶ ἐν τούτῳ εἰσὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις* ('in hac re totius disputationis nostrae cardo versatur,' Stallbaum).

14. ἐκάστου δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων διαφοραὶ τρεῖς εἰσὶν. I take the nine *διαφοραὶ* to be as follows:—All appoint, or some, or all to some offices and some to others; the appointment is made out of all, or out of some, or to some offices out of all and to others out of some; the appointment is made by election or by lot, or to some offices by election and to others by lot.

17. γένει, as the Cosmi in Crete (2. 10. 1272 a 33 sq.).

ἀρετῇ, as in the election to the Lacedaemonian Gerusia (2. 9. 1270 b 23 sqq.).

ὥσπερ ἐν Μεγάρῳ κ.τ.λ. Plato appears to have cases of this kind before him in Laws 715 A, *ἀρχῶν περιμαχέτων γενομένων, οἱ πᾶσιν ὅσοι τε πράγματα κατὰ τὴν πόλιν οὕτως ἐσφτερίσαν σφόδρα, ὥστε ἀρχῆς μὴδ' ὅτιοῦν μεταδιδόναι τοῖς ἡττηθείσι, μήτε αὐτοῖς μήτε ἐκγόνοις, παραφυλάττοντες δὲ ἀλλήλους ζῶσιν, ὅπως μὴ ποτέ τις εἰς ἀρχὴν ἀφικόμενος ἐπαναστῇ μεμνημένος τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γενομένων κακῶν*. It is not certain when the change from democracy to oligarchy at Megara referred to in the text took place. A change of this nature probably took place there in the time of the poet Theognis, whose date however is a contested point (see Christ, *Gesch. d. gr. Litt.* p. 113 sq., and Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ed. 2, 2. 394. 2). Plutarch may have the democracy of those days in view when he describes in *Quaest. Gr.* c. 18 the oppressive way in which the rich were at one time treated at Megara, and in c. 59 the disorderly spirit which prevailed there and the sacrilegious outrage of which some Megarians were guilty; he does not, however, mention that it was overthrown and that an oligarchy took its place. It is to the overthrow of this

democracy that Welcker (Theogn. p. xii), Sus.² (Notes 1365, 1513, and 1556), and Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 70. 1) take Aristotle to refer in the passage before us and in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 30 sq. and 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 34 sqq. Busolt, on the other hand (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 395. 6), takes Aristotle to refer to this revolution in 7 (5). 5. 1304 b 34 sqq., but thinks that the reference in the passage before us and in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 30 sq. is to the events of B. C. 424, described in Thuc. 4. 66–74, when a democracy was succeeded at Megara by an extreme oligarchy (Thuc. 4. 74). He does not give the reasons which lead him to take this view. Others, among whom are Schlosser (Aristoteles' Politik, 2. 169, note) and E. Meyer (Gesch. d. Alterth. 2. 633), take all the three passages to refer to the revolution of B. C. 424. Sus.² (Note 1365) objects that the account of Aristotle does not suit the description of the events given by Thucydides, and it is true that while Aristotle evidently refers to an overthrow of democracy which was the result of a victory over the demos won by oligarchs returning from exile, Thucydides says nothing of any such victory and represents the fall of the democracy to have been due to the intervention of Brasidas and his army aided by a Boeotian force. Still the oligarchical exiles at Pegae, who, as Thucydides tells us (4. 74), were enabled by the fall of the democracy to return to Megara, *may* have won a victory over the demos which Thucydides omits to record, and certainly his description of the oligarchy set up in B. C. 424 as 'extremely oligarchical' (4. 74) quite agrees with what Aristotle says in the passage before us. A third view is that of Congreve, who in his notes on 1302 b 30 and 1304 b 34 connects the overthrow of democracy at Megara mentioned in the three passages of the Politics with the withdrawal of Megara from the Athenian alliance after the battle of Coroneia in B. C. 447 (Thuc. 1. 113 sq.). An oligarchy in which power was confined to returned exiles would probably be especially oppressive, for exiles could hardly fail to return embittered by exile. Philip of Macedon set up an oligarchy of this type at Thebes after Chaeroneia (Justin, 9. 4, pulsos deinde per iniuriam in patriam restituit: ex horum numero trecentos exules iudices rectoresque civitati dedit).

19. πάλιν ταῦτα συνδυάζόμενα, 'again there is the case of these things being combined.' For the asyndeton in πάλιν cp. 1. 5. 1254 b 10.

22. τούτων δ' ἐκαστὴς ἔσονται τῆς διαφορᾶς τρόποι τέτταρες, 'and

of each variety of these there will be four modes.' *Τούτων*, i. e. *τῶν τριῶν ὁρῶν* (10 sq.). Take, for instance, the first *ὁρος*—'who is it that appoint?' One variety under this head is that all appoint. There will be four modes of this variety.

All may appoint from all by election,

" " " lot,

All may appoint from some by election,

" " " lot.

The same holds good of the second variety under this head, that in which some appoint.

Some may appoint from all by election,

" " " lot,

Some may appoint from some by election,

" " " lot.

So again as to the third variety, in which partly all, partly some, appoint.

Partly all, partly some may appoint from all by election,

" " " " lot,

Partly all, partly some may appoint from some by election,

" " " " lot.

Thus there will be twelve modes of each *ὁρος*, if we confine our attention to one only of the three possible *συνδυασμοί*, i. e. the *συνδυασμός* 'partly all, partly some,' and neglect the two others, which are 'partly from all, partly from some' and 'partly by election, partly by lot.' This is explained in 30 sq. If we took account of all three *συνδυασμοί*, there would be more than twelve modes. See Spengel, *Aristotelische Studien*, 3. 53, whose explanation I follow. But what is exactly meant by all or some appointing by lot? If an appointment is made by lot, how can it be said that all appoint or some appoint?

23. *ἡ γὰρ πάντες* . . . 1300 b 5. *ἀριστοκρατικόν*. As to the text of this passage see critical notes.

24-26. The first of these two modes of appointing from all is open to the objection that, as the magistrates would be taken by election or lot or both from each of the tribes, demes, and phratries composing the State in succession, all the magistrates of the State might at a given moment belong to one and the same tribe.

25. *φρατρίας*. The way in which phratries are referred to here

suggests that they were a subdivision of the deme. As to the relation of the phratry to the deme at Athens see Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ed. 2, 2. 428 sq.

28. διελθῇ. Sus. apparently takes the nom. to διελθῇ to be 'die Ernennung aus Allen' ('the nomination out of all'), and probably this is so. In c. 14. 1298 a 17, on the other hand (cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 4. l. 16), τὸ ἀρχεῖον has to be supplied with διελθῇ.

δεῖ ἐξ ἀπάντων, i.e. on each occasion out of all; not merely out of all, if we take several occasions together.

31. χωρὶς τῶν δύο συνδυασμῶν. See above on 22.

τούτων δ' αἱ μὲν δύο καταστάσεις δημοτικαί κ.τ.λ. It has been objected to the text as it stands that not two, but only one mode of appointing is mentioned in what follows (τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων), or else three (τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων αἰρίσει ἢ κλήρῳ ἢ ἀμφοῖν): hence Sus. would read *τρῖς* instead of *δύο*, and H. Rabe would insert *καὶ τὸ πάντας ἐκ τινῶν* after *πάντων*, 32. I incline to think that no change should be made in the text. It has been explained in 24—26 that the one democratic mode of appointing (τὸ πάντας ἐκ πάντων) assumes two forms, τὸ πάντας ἐξ ἀπάντων ἀνὰ μέρος and τὸ πάντας δεῖ ἐξ ἀπάντων. *Μέν* is answered by *δέ*, 34. I take Aristotle's meaning to be that if all appoint out of all taken in successive sections, so that the appointment is made out of all, though not out of all simultaneously, the arrangement is democratic, but that if all appoint by successive sections, one section appointing first and then the next and so on till all have had their turn of appointing, and the appointment is made out of all—the MS. text adds (probably erroneously), 'or out of some'—by lot or election or both, or to some offices out of all and to others out of some by lot or election or both, the arrangement is suitable to a polity. In other words, it is essential to democracy that the appointment should be made by all simultaneously, but not that the selection should be made from all simultaneously. It should, however, be pointed out that in one or two passages of the *Politics* Aristotle seems to take a different view. Thus in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23—27 a scheme under which persons elected from all the citizens by alternation (*τινὲς αἰρετοὶ κατὰ μέρος ἐκ πάντων*) elect the magistrates is treated as democratic. Perhaps, however, in this scheme the electors were elected by all simultaneously, and this is regarded by Aristotle as equivalent to the election of the magistrates being made by all simultaneously. Another passage which deserves attention is that in which the

constitution of Telecles is described (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 11 sqq.). This constitution is regarded by Aristotle as a democratic constitution. Were not, however, successive sections of the citizens invested under it with the right of appointing the magistrates? We are not explicitly told that they were, but, if this was the case, it is not easy to reconcile the teaching of 1298 a 11 sqq. with that of the passage before us.

1300 b. 1. τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐκ τινῶν κ.τ.λ. See note on 1292 b 2.

3. As to μὴ γινόμενον δ' ὁμοίως see note on 1300 b 37.

4. τὸ δὲ τινὰς ἐξ ἀπάντων κ.τ.λ. See note on 1292 b 2.

7. τίνα δὲ τίσις συμφέρει κ.τ.λ. Τίνα, sc. τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. We gather from this remark that offices of importance ought not to be filled in the same way as minor ones. Perhaps they should be filled by election (8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq.) and exclusively or predominantly from the class favoured by the constitution (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 30 sqq.). See vol. i. p. 516 sq.

8. ἅμα ταῖς δυνάμεσι τῶν ἀρχῶν, [καὶ] τίνας εἰσὶν, 'as soon as the prerogatives of the various magistracies shall have become manifest, what they are.' As to [καὶ] see critical note.

9. τὴν κυρίαν τῶν προσόδων, sc. ἀρχήν, the magistracy of the apodectae or tamiae (8 (6). 8. 1321 b 31 sqq.).

10. τὴν κυρίαν τῆς φυλακῆς, the magistracy of the stratēgi (8 (6). 8. 1322 a 33 sqq.).

11. τῆς τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν συμβολαίων κυρίας, the magistracy of the agoranomi (8 (6). 8. 1321 b 12 sqq.: Plato, Rep. 425 C sq.). We see from Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 112 how humble the position of an ἀγορανόμος or ἀστυνόμος or δικαστὴς κατὰ δῆμους was at Athens compared with that of an envoy. Cp. also Pol. 2. 5. 1264 a 31, where it is implied that ἀστυνομικά and ἀγορανομικά νόμιμα are of little importance.

C. 16. 14. κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπέθεισιν, 'in accordance with the same plan': cp. Plato, Gorg. 454 C, ἀλλὰ οὐ τὰ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὥπως ἐν βούλῃ περαίησιν.

ἵστι δὲ διαφορὰ κ.τ.λ., 'now there is a difference between dicasteries, dependent on three determining factors': cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 3, διαφορὰ δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν. In c. 15. 1300 a 10 we have εἰσὶ δ' αἱ διαφοραὶ ἐν τρισὶν ὅροις, where the article is added before διαφοραί. See note on 1300 a 10. There were other differences between dicasteries besides those noticed here. For instance, the members of some were paid, of others

not; the richer members of some were fined for non-attendance, of others not; the members of some were numerous, of others not, and so forth. Aristotle takes no notice of these differences, and confines his attention to the three points mentioned by him, which he probably regards as more closely connected with the *κατάστασις τῶν δικαστηρίων* than the others.

16. *πρῶτον οὖν διαιρεῖσθω πόσα εἶδη δικαστηρίων.* Aristotle takes it for granted that a separate kind of dicastery will exist for each of the more important departments of judicial jurisdiction. Hippodamus had classified lawsuits (2. 8. 1267 b 37 sqq.) as concerned with three subjects only, *ὑβρις*, *βλάβη*, *θάνατος*: he would seem, therefore, to omit offences against the State and against religion unless they can be brought under one or other of these three heads (see note on 1267 b 37). Aristotle, on the other hand, gives much prominence to offences against the State (no doubt for the reason mentioned in 36 sqq.), but omits from his classification many suits which Hippodamus includes in his; we hear nothing from him about suits connected with *ὑβρις* or *βλάβη*, except where there is a contract (*συνάλλαγμα*), nor indeed of any criminal trials except those for homicide or offences against the State; none connected with offences against the gods. Which of his dicasteries, again, would try questions of inheritance? Plato had already distinguished, as Aristotle does here, between the way in which dicasteries dealing with offences against the State and dicasteries dealing with offences against private persons should be constituted (Laws 767 sq.: 957 A). We see which were the most important dicasteries of those enumerated here from 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 25, *τὸ δικάζειν πάντας καὶ ἐκ πάντων καὶ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῶν κυριωτέρων, ὅσον περὶ εὐθυνῶν καὶ πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων.* The most important dicasteries were probably also those on which the largest number of dicasts sat (see 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 53. l. 15 sqq. and Sandys' note, and Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 31. 12 sqq.). We hear at Athens of dicasteries of 200, 400, 500, 1,000, 1,500, 2,000, and 2,500 members (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 393).

19. *ἐν μὲν εὐθυντικόν.* As to this kind of dicastery see 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 48 *sub fin.* It has this peculiarity, that the persons brought before it were exclusively magistrates. Dicasteries of this kind seem to have found a place both in democracies and in oligarchies (Plato, Polit. 298 E sq.). Aristotle might have added as another

kind of dicastery those which dealt with the *δοκιμασίαι* of magistrates (*Αθ. Πολ.* c. 55. l. 6 sqq.).

20. ἄλλο δὲ εἴ τις τι τῶν κοινῶν ἀδικεῖ, 'and another dealing with any one who commits an offence against any public interest': cp. *Rhet.* I. 13. 1373 b 20, διὸ καὶ τὰδικήματα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διχῶς ἔστιν ἀδικεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἕνα καὶ ὀρισμένον ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινόν ὁ γὰρ μοιχεύων καὶ τύπτων ἀδικεῖ τινὰ τῶν ὀρισμένων, ὁ δὲ μὴ στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινόν (compared by Bonitz, *Ind.* 9 a 58), *Rhet. ad Alex.* 39. 1446 b 35, τοὺς ἀδικούντας τι τῶν κοινῶν, and Plato, *Laws* 767 B, τὸ δ' ὅπῃ τὸ δημόσιον ὑπὸ τινας τῶν πολιτῶν ἡγήται τις ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ βουληθῇ τῷ κοινῷ βοηθεῖν. Under the head of ἀδικήματα πρὸς τὸ κοινόν would fall not only the avoidance of military service, but theft of public property (*Laws* 941 C-D: *Xen. De Vect.* 4. 20 sq.), the non-payment of debts to the State, and a host of other offences. See Demosth. in *Lept.* cc. 100, 135, and c. *Timocr.* c. 172 sq.

ἕτερον ὅσα εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει. For the ellipse of *περι ταῦτα* before ὅσα see note on 1253 b 3. Cp. also Demosth. *Or.* 41. in *Spud.* c. 7, τὸν νόμον, δε οὐκ ἐφ' διαρρήδην, ὅσα τις ἀπετίμησεν, εἶναι δίκας οὐτ' αὐτοῖς οὐτε τοῖς κληρονόμοις. For εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει cp. Plato, *Rep.* 449 D. Acts alleged to be unconstitutional and attempts to change the constitution by force would fall within the province of this kind of dicastery.

21. τέταρτον κ.τ.λ., 'a fourth both for magistrates and for private persons dealing with contentions arising about impositions of penalties.' How important it was that a court of this kind should exist, we see from 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 13 sqq. This court, unlike the one which will next be mentioned as dealing only with differences between private persons, had to do with questions affecting both private persons and magistrates. Plato perhaps refers to this kind of dicastery among others in *Laws* 957 A, τὰ δὲ δημόσια καὶ κοινὰ (sc. δικαστήρια) καὶ ὅσοις ἀρχὰς δεῖ χρωμένους τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστη τῶν ἀρχῶν διοικεῖν. *Ζημίσεις* appears to be a rare word. Greek officials, unlike officials in general among ourselves, had the power of imposing money-fines (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 13 sqq.: as to Athens see Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 215. 3). Plato, indeed (*Laws* 847 A), empowers the *ἀστυνόμοι* of his State in a particular case to punish the offender, if a citizen, *ὀνειδισί τε καὶ αἰνίμασι*, i.e. with penalties other than money-fines.

22. πέμπτον κ.τ.λ. Cp. Polyb. 6. 17. 7, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ἐκ ταύτης ἐπυθιδόνται κριταὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ τῶν ιδιωτικῶν συναλ-

λαγρᾶτων, ὅσα μέγεθος ἔχει τῶν ἐγκλημάτων. In ιδίων καὶ ἐχόντων μέγεθος a limitation of ιδίων seems to be introduced by καί: see as to this use of καί Bon. Ind. 357 b 8 sqq., and cp. Plato, Laws 766 C, οἱ προσήκοντες καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντες πρὸς πατρός καὶ μητρός μέχρι ἀνεψιῶν παίδων.

24. φονικοῦ μὲν οὖν εἶδη κ.τ.λ. This is based on Athenian custom. For similar enumerations of courts dealing with homicide see 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 57. l. 14 sqq., Demosth. c. Aristocr. cc. 65-77, and Helladius, ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 279 (p. 535 a 22 sqq. Bekker). In the passage before us and in Helladius only four kinds of court are enumerated, whereas Demosthenes and the 'Αθ. Πολ. mention five, the additional court being that which tries cases of homicide in which death is caused by the impact of stone, wood, iron, or the like, the thrower being unknown.

27. ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου. Cp. 1. 6. 1255 a 16, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν, Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1135 b 27 sq., and Rhet. 3. 17. 1417 b 25 sq.

τέταρτον δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and a fourth kind of court concerned with acts of homicide charged against persons who have left the country for homicide upon their return.' The first act of homicide would be accidental, the second wilful: cp. Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 77, ἐπὶ τοίνυν πέμπτον δικαστήριον ἄλλο θεάσασθε οἷον ὑπερβέβηκε, τὸ ἐν θρασυτοίᾳ· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ . . . κελεύει δίκας ὑπέχειν ὁ νόμος, εἴαν τις ἐπ' ἀκουσίῳ φόνῳ πεφευγός, μήπω τῶν ἐκβαλόντων αὐτὸν ἡδεσμένων, αἰτίαν ἔχη ἐτέρου φόνου ἰκουσίῳ.

29. καί, 'for instance.' See note on 1255 a 36.

συνβαίνει δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'For the first time during the last twenty years the Isle of Man has been the scene of a trial for murder' (*Times*, Nov. 15, 1892). 'Ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ, cp. Plato, Tim. 36 E, πρὸς τὸν ξύμπαντα χρόνον, and Phaedo, 107 C, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον, ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός: Cauer, *Delectus Inscr. Gr. No. 117. 15*, συμμαχῶ τοῖς Ἱεραπυτνίοις τὸν πάντα χρόνον: Pindar, Pyth. 1. 46, ὁ πᾶς χρόνος. Π' have ἐν τῷ παρόντι χρόνῳ, which seems less suitable.

31. τοῦ δὲ ξενικοῦ ἐν μὲν ξένοις πρὸς ξένους, ἄλλο ξένοις πρὸς ἀστούς, 'and of the dicastery for alien suits one kind for aliens in litigation with aliens, and another for aliens in litigation with citizens.' Ξένοις πρὸς ἀστούς might refer only to suits brought by aliens against citizens, and not to litigation between aliens and citizens generally. But Susemihl, Welldon, and other interpreters are probably right in giving the words the wider meaning. At

Athens according to Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 254, 'the *πολέμαρχος* had jurisdiction in most private suits in which the defendant was a foreigner.' The kind of dicastery which dealt with litigation between aliens and citizens would obviously be regarded as more important than that which dealt with litigation between aliens; it would also be that in which infractions of justice were most likely to occur (*Isocr. Ad Nicocl.* § 12), and infractions of justice which might possibly result in war. We read of *ξενοδίκαι* at Oeantheia and Chaleion in Hicks, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, No. 31.

32. *ἔτι δὲ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα κ.τ.λ.* Supply *δικαστήριόν ἐστι*. The Forty had jurisdiction at Athens in suits where the matter in dispute did not exceed the value of ten drachmae (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 53. l. 5).

33. *μικρῷ πλείονος*. Here the amount of money which is involved in the contract is expressed in the genitive: see Kühner, *Ausführl. gr. Gramm.*, ed. 2, § 418. 6 c (ed. Gerth, § 418. 7).

34. *οὐκ ἐμπίπτει δὲ εἰς δικαστῶν πλῆθος*. Bonitz (*Ind. s. v. ἐμπίπτειν*) compares such expressions as *ἐμπίπτουσι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι καὶ εἰς ἄλλας λύσεις* (*Soph. El.* 30. 181 b 19). Cp. also *Plut. Solon*, c. 18, τὰ γὰρ πλείστα τῶν διαφόρων ἐνίπτεται εἰς τοὺς δικαστάς.

35. *περὶ μὲν τούτων*, sc. τῶν δικαστηρίων. *Δικαστηρίων* must also be supplied with τῶν φορικῶν καὶ τῶν ξενικῶν and with τῶν πολιτικῶν. The term τὰ πολιτικά δικαστήρια seems to include the first five kinds of dicastery. We read of οἱ πολιτικοὶ ἀγῶνες in *Rhet.* 2. 18. 1391 b 18 (*Bon. Ind.* 614 a 57): cp. also *Lys. Or.* 30. c. *Nicom.* c. 8. That injustice in the review of magistrates' conduct in office had a special tendency to produce στάσις we see from *Plato*, *Laws* 945 D sq.

37. *περὶ ὧν μὴ γινομένων καλῶς διαστάσεις γίνονται καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν αἱ κινήσεις*. At the end of this sentence should possibly be added *μὴ γινομένων δ' ὁμοίως* from 1300 b 3. See critical note on 1300 b 38. For the thought cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 20 sqq.

38. *ἀνάγκη δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle does not consider the possible alternative of all the citizens sitting as a dicastery. He would probably regard a dicastery of this kind as too numerous. He takes it for granted that a dicastery will comprise only a part of the citizens, whether selected by election or by lot or by both.

39. *περὶ πάντων τῶν διηρημένων*, 'respecting all the subjects which have been distinguished' (cp. 1300 b 18, *διακρίσθω*). Looking to 35-38, we expect Aristotle to confine his attention to the matters with which political dicasteries have to do, but *περὶ πάντων τῶν διηρη-*

μίων seems to imply, as Prof. Jowett remarks, that he does not do so.

41. *περὶ ἐνίων τῶν αὐτῶν*. This has been interpreted in different ways. Vict. 'de quibusdam certisque': Sepulv. 'de quibusdam eiusdem generis controversiis': Welldon, 'or some of them must invariably come before certain judges appointed partly by lot and partly by suffrage.' Of these interpretations I prefer those of Vict. and Welldon, but another is possible, and I incline to adopt it, 'about some things, the same [for both classes of dicasts].' If my view is correct, Aristotle adds *τῶν αὐτῶν* wishing to make it clear that the two classes of dicasts, those elected and those appointed by lot, have similar competence and deal with the same, and not with different, causes. Cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 35, *καὶ ὅλως ἐν ᾧ ἂν ταύτῃ ὑπερέχῃ πολὺ, οἷον ἐν χρήμασιν ὁ πλούσιος πένητος καὶ ἐν τῇ λέγειν ῥητορικῶς ἀδυνατόν εἰπεῖν* κ.τ.λ., where *ταύτῃ*, which has been doubted (A^c has *ταῦτα*), receives some support from the passage before us.

2. *οἱ κατὰ μέρος*, 'the sectional modes,' i. e. the modes in which 1301 a. some, not all, judge.

3. *Ἰς καὶ οἱ δικάζοντες* 'the dicasts also' as well as those appointed to magistracies, who have been dealt with in c. 15. 1300 a 27 sqq. ? Spengel brackets *καὶ* and Sus. is inclined to transfer it to before *ἐκ τῶν*, 2, but perhaps without absolute necessity.

4. *τὰ μὲν κλήρῳ τὰ δὲ αἵρεσει*, 'partly by lot and partly by election.' The dicasteries dealing with the more important matters would probably be elective.

5. *ἢ ἑτα δικάστηρια περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκ κληρωτῶν καὶ αἵρετῶν*, 'or some dicasteries composed of persons appointed by lot and by election, the subjects dealt with being the same for both classes of dicasts.'

6. *οὗτοι μὲν οὖν* κ.τ.λ. It seems likely that one or more words have dropped out in this sentence. Vict. and Sus. insert *οἱ αὐτοὶ εἰσι* after *οἱ τρόποι*, while Schneider and Coray add *ἴσοι*, which Coray places after *τοῖς εἰρημένοις*. Possibly *ἀντίστροφος* may be the missing word, and should be added after *οἱ τρόποι*. 'Ἀντίστροφος' would easily drop out after *τρόποι* from the similarity of the ending. The translation will then be, 'these modes then, as they were previously said to do, correspond to those already mentioned.'

7. *τὰ αὐτά*. *Δικάστηρια* should probably be supplied, as with *τὰ μὲν* and *τὰ δέ*.

10. *ἀμφοῖν*. I take Aristotle's meaning to be that dicasts might

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be appointed from all or from some or from both all and some, either by election or by lot or by both methods.

11. *τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ.* *Τὰ μὲν πρῶτα*, sc. *δικαστήρια*. It seems from this that there was nothing undemocratic in an elected dicastery or in a dicastery appointed partly by election and partly by lot, if only the dicasts were elected out of all. This is remarkable, as even in the Solonian democracy, a very moderate form, the dicasts were appointed by lot (2. 12. 1274 a 5). Aristotle probably preferred in a democracy dicasteries appointed from all wholly or in part by election to dicasteries wholly appointed from all by lot, but would Greek democrats agree with him in regarding such dicasteries as democratic? And would they be content even with dicasteries appointed by lot from all, if these dicasteries were not both numerous and paid? Dicasteries appointed wholly or in part by election would hardly be suitable to any but moderate democracies. And what does Aristotle mean by dicasts appointed by election? Does he mean dicasts thus appointed for a given term—say a year or some longer or shorter term—or for a given trial? There would be obvious objections to appointing dicasts by election for a given trial, though the three hundred dicasts who tried the *εὐαγείς* for the murder of the followers of Cylon were appointed for the trial and by some sort of selection, not by lot (Plut. Solon, c. 12). Imagine if the English judge and jury who tried the leaders in the Transvaal raid had been appointed for the given trial by election!

12. *τὰ δὲ δεύτερα ὀλιγαρχικά, ὅσα ἐκ τινῶν περὶ πάντων*. So that if the dicasts were selected *ἐκ τινῶν* by lot or partly by election and partly by lot, the plan would be oligarchical. Aristotle does not tell us whether the plan would be oligarchical, if they were elected *ἐκ τινῶν* by all, but probably it would not. It is to be presumed that by *ἐκ τινῶν* Aristotle means 'from the rich' or 'from the well-born,' for there would be nothing oligarchical in a selection from 'the good.'

13. *τὰ δὲ τρίτα κ.τ.λ.*, 'and the third sort of dicasteries is suitable to an aristocracy or a polity, all those which are partly taken from all and partly from a limited class.' So Sus. probably rightly: Stahr, however, translates *τὰ μὲν*—*τὰ δὲ* 'for some matters' and 'for others' ('für einige Sachen' and 'für andere'). Dicasteries composed both of members appointed out of all and of members appointed out of a limited class (*ἐξ ἀμφοῖν*, 8) are not distinctly named, though Aristotle probably intends to class these also as suitable to

aristocracies and politics. He may well, indeed, have preferred dicasteries of this kind to any others, if we may judge by what he says in c. 14. 1298 b 20 sq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 26 sqq., where he holds that in an extreme democracy rich and poor should deliberate and judge together. But of the three other plans—that by which some suits were dealt with by dicasts taken from a limited class and others by dicasts taken from all, that by which all suits were dealt with by dicasts taken from all, and that by which all suits were dealt with by dicasts taken from a limited class—he will have preferred the first. Here again it is remarkable that Aristotle does not explain what sort of limited class he means by *τυπῆς*. Would he regard it as an aristocratic arrangement if some suits were tried by dicasts taken from all and others by dicasts taken from the rich?

BOOK VII (V).

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

A few remarks may here be added to what has already been said in vol. i. p. 521 sqq. as to the teaching of this Book.

If we study the eleven causes of *στάσις* and constitutional change enumerated in c. 2. 1302 a 34 sqq. (see vol. i. p. 523 sqq.), we shall see that they may be grouped under three main heads. *στάσις* and constitutional change may arise either from a certain emotional state of the minds of the citizens or some of them, or from social causes, such as the increase of a class in size out of proportion to the rest or the unlikeness of one part of the citizen-body to the other, or from negligence on the part of the authorities of the State and similar causes. It is obvious that a great difference exists between the second group of causes and the two others. Negligence in government can be avoided, and it is possible also to avoid arousing feelings of envy, or contempt, or indignation at oppression or fears of future oppression, but it is far less easy to prevent a class increasing in size or credit, or an individual or individuals acquiring a pre-eminence in power, or to secure the existence of a midway class capable of holding the balance between rich and poor, or to soften distinctions of race or geographical contrasts. If the increase of a class in relative magnitude is often due to accidental causes, as we are told that it is in c. 3. 1303 a 3 sqq., how is it possible to prevent it in these cases? When the numbers of the upper class at Tarentum were greatly reduced in consequence

of the defeat of the Tarentines by the Iapygians, what amount of good conduct or vigilance on the part of the magistrates would have saved the polity from becoming a democracy?

Aristotle's analysis of the causes of *στάσις* and constitutional change reveals, in fact, the existence of causes with which it is extremely difficult for the statesman to deal, however great his skill and watchfulness. Aristotle himself seems, indeed, to be hardly conscious of this. He hardly realizes how difficult it is to prevent *στάσις* and constitutional change when they are brought about by changes in the size or credit of classes, or other social changes not easily guided or controlled. He may possibly have underrated the difficulty of doing this, for we find him in 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 30 advising statesmen under certain circumstances to 'try to increase the midway class' without betraying much consciousness of the difficulty of the task.

Another consequence of his recognition of the share of social causes in bringing about *στάσις* and constitutional change seems also to be imperfectly realized by him. Does not the fact suggest a resort to means of preserving constitutions of which he would hardly approve? If the increase of the rich in numbers or wealth is often fatal to democracies (7 (5). 3. 1303 a 10 sqq.: 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 12 sqq.), will not democracies be wise if they thin the numbers of the rich and impoverish them? This view was commonly held by Greek democrats (see vol. i. p. 538 sqq. and Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 8 sqq.), but Aristotle advises democracies to adopt an opposite policy and to spare the resources of the rich (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 14 sqq.). Is he not rather inconsequent in this? He would probably reply that, however dangerous to democracies an overgreat increase in the numbers or wealth of the rich may be, the danger of driving the rich to combine against the democracy by oppressive measures is still greater (7 (5). 5. 1304 b 20 sqq.).

When at the close of c. 4 Aristotle passes on from studying the causes of constitutional change in constitutions taken as a whole to study in cc. 5-7 its causes in each constitution taken separately, some causes are pointed out of which we hear nothing in the first four chapters. We now learn that changes of constitution may result in democracies from oppression practised on the rich not by magistrates, but by demagogues (c. 5. 1304 b 20 sqq.), or from the ambition of demagogues who are also generals, in oligarchies from the rivalry of great officials in courting the favour of those who

elect to offices, from an overgreat narrowness of the constitution, from feuds within the ruling class, or from the ruin of individual oligarchs by spendthrift and dissolute habits of life, and in aristocracies from strong contrasts of wealth and poverty within the citizen-body. These are causes of constitutional change of which we have not heard before.

It has already been pointed out in vol. i. p. 527 that the theory of constitutional change set forth in this Book is not quite the theory which we expect from Aristotle. We do not hear as much in it as we expect of the effect of ethical changes in the citizens in bringing about changes of constitution. We know that the constitution represents the mode of life preferred by the State (vol. i. p. 209 sqq.) and reflects its conception of justice, and its view as to the things which produce happiness (vol. i. p. 220 sq.), or in other words is an indication of the moral level of the community, and we are, in fact, told in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 14 sqq. that each constitution is preserved by the *phorai* appropriate to it, so that we infer that a change in the *phorai* of the citizens will often produce a change in the constitution, but this cause of change remains unnoticed in this Book till we are told in c. 9. 1310 a 12 sqq. how important it is that the citizens should receive an education conducive to the preservation of the constitution. We infer, again, from such passages as 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 28 sqq. that the rise or increase of new classes in a State, such as those of artisans, day-labourers, or seafaring men, will result in constitutional change, but this source of constitutional change is nowhere dwelt on in this Book. Other causes of constitutional change which we expect to find noticed in it, but do not, are pernicious and erroneous teaching, or teaching likely to overthrow or undermine the existing constitution, disasters to the State (see note on 1304 a 33), disease and famine (Plato, *Laws* 709 A), great differences of opinion among the citizens, the mistakes of statesmen, the presence of *δῆμοι* within the city ([Xen.] *Rep. Ath.* 3. 12 sq.), or of exiles in neighbouring cities. Something is said in c. 11. 1314 b 1 sqq. of the dangers attaching to heavy taxation in tyrannies, but we hear little or nothing of it as a source of *στάσις* and constitutional change in constitutions generally, except incidentally in c. 5. 1305 a 5, c. 8. 1309 a 14 sqq., and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 20 sqq. Aristotle does not notice how often the foreign relations of a State helped to determine its constitution. One reason why Corinth, for instance, was oligarchically governed

no doubt was that its dreaded neighbour, Argos, was democratically governed, and one reason why a democracy existed at Argos was that its enemy, the Lacedaemonian State, was in the opposite camp. States were apt to give supreme power to the class which was least likely to betray them to the foe they feared. Instances of this might easily be multiplied. Some occasions of *στάσις* and constitutional change which Aristotle notices elsewhere escape mention in this Book. We gather, for instance, from 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq. that changes in the relative importance of different arms of the military force of the State bring with them changes of constitution, but we hear nothing of this in the Book before us. So again we gather from the Second Book that *στάσις* is caused by the continued rule of the same men (2. 5. 1264 b 8 sqq.), and by the coexistence of two similar and rival great magistracies (2. 9. 1271 a 39 sqq.). In Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 9-16 bad men are said to be in a state of *στάσις* among themselves because of their moral badness. Of these sources of *στάσις* we hear nothing in this Book.

As to the causes to which the fall of monarchies is traced in it, we note that while we hear of their being overthrown owing to misgovernment, and especially owing to *ὕβρις* in its various forms (c. 10. 1311 a 27 sqq.), owing to fear, and owing to contempt (1311 a 25 sqq.), and we gather that they sometimes fell in consequence of disunion within the ruling family (1312 b 9 sqq., 40 sq.) or of making a single individual overgreat (c. 11. 1315 a 8 sqq.), or not taking sufficient care to have the strongest class in the State on their side (1315 a 31 sqq.), we do not hear that they were affected, as constitutions strictly so called were, by what we have termed the social causes of constitutional change, such causes, for instance, as the disproportionate increase of a class in size or the like.

From the counsels given in cc. 8 and 9 we learn that constitutions are especially preserved (1) by vigilance. The constitution must be carefully guarded; in well-balanced constitutions small infractions of law must not be tolerated, and in oligarchies resting on a property-qualification and politics the property-qualification must be altered, if any changes should occur from time to time in its value; the first beginnings of rivalries and feuds among the notables must be detected and checked; both in oligarchy and in democracy the private life of the citizens must be watched and spendthrift habits controlled. Under no constitution should a single individual be made overgreat or be suddenly dispossessed of his greatness.

(a) Both the class favoured by the constitution and the class not so favoured should be fairly treated. In aristocracies and oligarchies the members of the former class should be placed as far as possible on a level, and their access to office facilitated by making official terms short. In all constitutions special care should be taken of the class not favoured by the constitution. It must not be wronged or oppressed. Its more ambitious members must not suffer in their honour nor the many in their pecuniary interests, and those who are fit for rule must be brought within the constitution. If this class is excluded from office, as was often the case in oligarchies, it should be reconciled to its exclusion by laws and regulations securing that office shall not be a source of gain, but oligarchies are advised in 1309 a 20 sqq. to reserve minor but lucrative offices for it, and both oligarchies and democracies are advised (1309 a 27 sqq.) to award it honorary distinctions to make up for its non-admission to the more important offices. Too often, it would seem, the class favoured by the constitution claimed a monopoly both of power and of honour and profit: Aristotle advises, on the contrary, that it should be content with a monopoly, or something like it, of the more important offices, and allow a full share of honour and profit to the less fortunate class. But he evidently holds that neither vigilance nor fair and kindly treatment both of the class favoured by the constitution and of the class not so favoured would suffice without attention to a third point (3). The constitution, if a deviation-form, must be moderate and must have the strongest element in the State on its side, and the ruling class must be prepared by an appropriate education to rule in such a way as to secure that the constitution will last. Vigilance, fair treatment of all within the State, a moderate and strongly supported constitution, and a ruling class fitted by education to rule—these are the things which make constitutions durable.

Aristotle's counsels are wise, but yet we feel that he has pointed out causes of *στάσις* and constitutional change with which they do not enable us to deal. How is it possible to counteract the social causes of *στάσις* and constitutional change, such causes, for instance, as the disproportionate increase of a class, especially in those cases in which it is due to defeat in war or other circumstances of an accidental kind?

The question of the causes of *στάσις* and constitutional change had been studied to some extent by others before Plato and Aristotle

took it up. Some light is thrown on it now and then by Herodotus (e. g. in 3. 80-82), by Thucydides (e. g. in 3. 82 sqq. and 8. 89. 3), and by Ephorus (ap. Strab. p. 480 : see note on 1302 a 34). The date of Phaleas is not known, but he had evidently considered it. No one, however, appears to have dealt with it at all fully till Plato dealt with it in the Republic and Laws and Aristotle in the Politics.

Throughout the Politics Aristotle often illustrates and confirms general statements made by him by adducing historical examples in support of them, but in none of its Books does he make a larger use of this method than in that before us. U. Köhler (*Rhein. Mus.* 53. 491) has anticipated me in raising the interesting question what class of Greek writers first made use of this method, and in pointing out that it is already used by Aeneas in his Commentarius Poliorceticus thirty years or more before the Politics was written. He may well be right in thinking that Aeneas will not have been the first to use it. I am sometimes inclined to suspect that the references in medical writers to cases occurring in their practice (see e. g. Hippocr. De Morb. Vulgar. 6) suggested the employment of a similar method in other fields of inquiry.

The historical examples adduced in this Book are drawn pretty evenly from most parts of the Hellenic world, most freely perhaps from the less remote parts of the coast of Asia Minor and the islands lying off it. In Greece Proper they are largely furnished by the history of the chief cities, Athens, Megara, Corinth, Argos, Lacedaemon, Heraea, Elis, Thebes, Larissa, Pharsalus; no reference is made to the cities of Achaia, to Messene after its restoration, or to Megalopolis, to the Acarnanians or Aetolians, to Corcyra (which is surprising, considering how full an account Thucydides had given of its troubles), or to Crete. Not many illustrations are drawn from the history of the Sicilian cities, with the exception of Syracuse, nor from that of the Aegean islands other than those lying near the mainland of Asia or Europe; none from the history of the cities of the more distant part of the Euxine. We might have expected that Aristotle would make more use than he appears to do of the histories of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon. Whether he made a larger use of the history of Ephorus, we cannot say. It is not easy to trace the source from which he obtained his illustrations. Some of the facts he mentions may have become known to him personally (see notes on 1304 a 4 and 1311 a 36), and he may have learnt others from his numerous pupils.

19. *Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἂν προειλόμεθα σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πάντων.* C. 1. 1301 a. For the needless repetition of *περὶ* in *περὶ πάντων* cp. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 9, *περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀρχῶν, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πασῶν*, and 2. 12. 1273 b 29 sq. (compare also 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 40 sqq.). In *Περὶ τῆς καθ' ὑπὸν μαντικῆς* 2. 464 b 18, where Bekker reads *ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῆς ἐκ τῶν ἐνυπνίων μαντικῆς εἴρηται*, Biehl (who reads *μαντείας* in place of *μαντικῆς*) adds *περὶ πάσης* after *εἴρηται* with EMY, probably rightly. Cp. *Περὶ ἀσπνοῆς* 21. 480 b 21 sq.

20. *ἐκ τίνων δὲ μεταβάλλουσιν αἱ πολιτεῖαι καὶ πόσων καὶ ποίων.* This question, stated in a slightly different form in c. 2. 1302 a 16, *ἐπεὶ δὲ σκοποῦμεν ἐκ τίνων αἱ τε στάσεις γίνονται καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας* (cp. c. 4. 1304 b 5 sqq., 17 sqq., and c. 7. 1307 b 24 sq.), is dealt with in cc. 2—4. It has been already noticed in vol. i. p. 521 that this summary does not prepare us for the distinction between *πολιτεῖαι* and *μοναρχία* which is a conspicuous feature of the Book. See also note on 1289 b 24.

21. *τίνες ἐκάστης πολιτείας φθοραί.* This question is dealt with in cc. 5—7.

22. *ἐκ ποίων εἰς ποίας μάλιστα μεθίστανται.* This is a question on which light is occasionally thrown in cc. 5—7 and elsewhere in the Book. We gather, for instance, from c. 5 that democracies are apt to change into oligarchies and tyrannies: see also c. 7. 1307 a 20—27.

ἔτι δὲ σωτηρίαι τίνες καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστης εἰσίν, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τίνων ἂν μάλιστα σῴζοιτο τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκάστη. Giphanius (p. 525) brackets *ἔτι δὲ διὰ τίνων—ἐκάστη*, and Spengel and Sus. regard these words as an alternative recension of *ἔτι δὲ σωτηρίαι—εἰσίν*. It is possible that they are so; it is also possible that they are a gloss which has crept from the margin into the text; I incline to think, however, that they are neither, but, on the contrary, are in place where they stand: cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 23, *πειρατῶν ἐπελθεῖν τίνες φθοραὶ καὶ τίνες σωτηρίαι τῶν πολιτειῶν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἐκάστης, καὶ διὰ τίνων αἰτίας τὰτα μάλιστα γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν*, and 8 (6). 1. 1316 b 34; *ἔτι δὲ περὶ φθορᾶς τε καὶ σωτηρίας τῶν πολιτειῶν, ἐκ ποίων τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνων αἰτίας, εἴρηται πρότερον*. Both these passages distinguish between the *σωτηρίαι*, or modes of preserving constitutions, and the *αἰτίαι σωτηρίας*, the means by which they are preserved. Thus in 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 34 sqq. and 1314 a 29 sqq. two broad modes of preserving tyrannies are described, distinct from the means which each mode employs for the purpose. So again in 8 (6). 5. 1319 b

37 sqq. the *σωτηρίαί* are mentioned side by side with τὰ σώζοντα. We often trace in the Politics a distinction between the *τρόπος* and the δι' οὗ, e. g. in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 41, ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων ἕκαστοι τοῦτο θηρεύοντες κ.τ.λ.: 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 5, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται: 3. 18. 1288 a 39, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν.

25—1302 a 15. The contents of this part of c. 1 may be thus summarized. The origin of *στάσις* is to be found in the fact that men seek what is equal and that many constitutions do not give what is equal, inasmuch as they treat as equals men who are not really equal, or as unequals men who are not really unequal. Hence *στάσις* arises, which sometimes seeks to substitute one constitution for another, and sometimes does not. What it always seeks to do is to obtain that which is equal. But the equal is of two kinds—the arithmetically equal and the equal according to desert. Hence two main constitutions come into existence, democracy and oligarchy, the one based on the one sort of equality and the other on the other. Democracy is safer than oligarchy, but they both rest on one sort of equality only, and both are consequently unsafe. Constitutions should combine both sorts of equality. Here Aristotle follows in the track of Plato, Laws 757 A–E.

Aristotle has promised in 1301 a 20 sq. to inquire into the causes of changes of constitution (ἐκ τίνων μεταβάλλουσιν αἱ πολιτεῖαι καὶ πόσων καὶ ποίων), but we find him inquiring in the passage before us how *στάσις* originates, and hence he is led in c. 2. 1302 a 16 sqq. to enlarge the subject of his inquiry, and to ask what are the causes of *στάσις* as well as of changes of constitution. Now *στάσις* does not always aim at a change of constitution (1301 b 6–26), nor are changes of constitution always preceded or accompanied by *στάσις* (c. 3. 1303 a 13 sqq.), so that Aristotle's addition of an inquiry into the cause of *στάσις* to an inquiry into the causes of constitutional change somewhat complicates his investigation. Still it enables him to insist that the constitution should realize that which is equal and should realize it in both its forms, and this he is no doubt glad to have an opportunity of doing. It should be noticed, however, that constitutional change may occur not only without being preceded or accompanied by *στάσις*, but also without the existence in anybody's mind of a sense of injustice. In oligarchies based on a property-qualification and politics, for instance, it may occur through accident, if owing to any cause there should be a rise or a fall in the value of property (c. 6. 1306 b 6 sqq.: c. 8. 1308 a 35 sqq.).

25. δεῖ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπολαβεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν κ.τ.λ., 'and we must first assume the starting-point that the reason why many different constitutions have come into being is that,' etc. Cp. De Gen. An. 1. 18. 724 a 14, ἀρχὴ δὲ καὶ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων πρῶτον λαβεῖν περὶ σπέρματος τί ἐστίν. For ὑπολαβεῖν ('sumere ac statuere aliquid pro vero,' Bon. Ind. 799 b 26), cp. Anal. Post. 1. 16. 79 b 26 sqq., where ἀπλῶς ὑπολαβεῖν is opposed to διὰ συλλογισμοῦ λαβεῖν τὴν ὑπόληψιν. The first step taken is the assumption of the starting-point that the existence of numerous constitutions is due to an error as to what is just and proportionally equal, but what is the next? Perhaps to point out (1301 a 37 sqq.) that στάσις arises when constitutions are found by certain classes (the rich and the freeborn) not to give them the position which they think their due.

26. πάντων μὲν ὁμολογούντων τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον. Spengel, Bekk.², and Sus. read εἶναι in place of καί (cp. 1301 b 35 sq.), but Bonitz (Ind. 512 a 33) brackets καί, coupling the passage before us with 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 3, ἐπεὶ τοῖνυν ὁμολογεῖται τὸ μέτριον ἄριστον. I doubt whether any change is called for in the text: καί is probably here, as often elsewhere, explanatory ('the just in the sense of that which is proportionally equal': see note on 1318 a 33). For ὁμολογεῖν with an acc. (meaning 'to agree about') cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 18, τὴν μὲν τοῦ πράγματος ἰσότητα ὁμολογοῦσι, τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι, and Plato, Rep. 597 E, τὸν μὲν δὴ μιμητὴν ἐμολογήκαμεν. For τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 9. 1241 b 32, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τοῦ δικαίου εἶδη ἔσται καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας κ.τ.λ., 7. 3. 1238 b 19 sqq., and 7. 10. 1242 b 12 sqq. In a just award of advantages to persons proportionally, not arithmetically, equal the advantages which fall to each are proportionally, not arithmetically, equal, i. e. they are proportioned to the comparative ἀξία of the persons (Pol. 3. 9. 1280 a 16 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 24 sqq.). Hence in 1301 b 29 sqq. and c. 7. 1307 a 26 we have τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον in the same sense as τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον here. But τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον is τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον (1301 b 35 sq.: cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 9. 1158 b 30, ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον πρῶτως τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως): therefore τὸ δίκαιον is identified in the passage before us with τὸ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἴσον.

28. ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, in 3. 9. 1280 a 7 sqq. and 3. 12. 1282 b 14 sqq.

31. ὀλιγαρχία δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 12. 1316 b 1 sqq.

32. πάντων τῶν ἴσων ἀξιοῦσι μετέχειν, and so demand a democracy.

πάντων τῶν ἴσων. Cp. Diod. 15. 29. 6, προσελάβοντο δὲ καὶ τοῖς Θηβαίοις ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν συνέδριον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις πᾶσιν: Plut. Alex. c. 13, τοῖς καταφυγούσιν ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀπάντων μετεδίδοσαν τῶν φιλανθρώπων: Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 321, καὶ γὰρ καὶ οἰκίας ἐγκτήσιν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τίμια καὶ φιλάνθρωπα πάντα ὅσα κ.τ.λ. Various changes in the text have been proposed (see Sus.² a), but, as it seems to me, without necessity.

33. πλεονεκτεῖν ζητοῦσιν, and so demand an oligarchy.

τὸ γὰρ πλεῖον ἄνισον, 'for [they seek the unequal and] the more is unequal.'

34. πᾶσαι, i. e. both democracy and oligarchy. See note on 1280 a 9.

ἡμαρτημένοι δ' ἀπλῶς εἰσίν, 'but from an absolute point of view they are erroneous.' They are κατὰ τὶ ὀρθά, but ἡμαρτημένοι ἀπλῶς. Compare (with Lutoslawski, Erhaltung und Untergang der Staatsverfassungen, p. 91) Plato, Rep. 543 D, ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ τὰς ἄλλας ἡμαρτημένας ἔλεγες, εἰ αὕτη ὀρθή. Cp. also 3. 6. 1279 a 19 sq. and 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 9.

35. διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν. Does this mean 'because democracy and oligarchy are ἡμαρτημένοι ἀπλῶς, based on erroneous views of what is just,' or 'because the supporters of democracy and oligarchy take erroneous views of what is just'? I incline to the former interpretation. Cp. Plato, Laws 757 A, διὰ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρα ταῦτα (the giving of too much power to the few and of an equal share to the good and the bad) στάσεις αἱ πολιτεῖαι πληροῦνται.

36. στασιάζουσιν. What is the exact meaning of στάσις and στασιάζειν? Τὸ στασιάζειν occurs when a number of the citizens of a State form themselves into a faction for the attainment of some political end by legal and illegal means. A party is assumed to pursue its end by legal means only, whereas a στάσις is prepared to carry its point by illegal means, if necessary. Στάσις may have as its aim either an entire change of constitution or something short of that (1301 b 6-26). The existence of στάσις implies the absence of ὁμόνοια (Plato, Rep. 352 A); it implies hostility between those who ought to be friendly to each other (Rep. 470 B), but τὸ στασιάζειν is distinguished from τὸ ἐπιτίθεσθαι in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 25, and στάσις from μάχαι in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 27 sqq. (cp. 7 (5). 3.

1303 b 1 sq.) and Plato, Rep. 560 A, and from *πόλεμος* in Polit. 271 E etc., though in Laws 629 D *στάσις* is said to be *πάντων πολέμων χαλεπώτατος*.

After *στασιάζουσιν* I propose to insert c. 3. 1303 b 3, *στασιάζουσι δέ—7, ὅντες*: see critical note on 1301 a 39 and explanatory notes on 1303 b 3–5.

πάντων δὲ δικαιοτάτα κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 13. 1283 a 24 sqq.

2. *οὐκ ἀξιοῦσι τῶν ἰσῶν αὐτοῦς*. Cp. 3. 13. 1284 a 9, *ἀξιούμενοι* 1301 b. *τῶν ἰσῶν*, and Plut. Pelop. c. 25, *τῶν ἰσῶν οὐκ ἤξιοτο*, and for the fact Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 34 sqq.

3. *εὐγενεῖς γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle uses the word *δοκοῦσιν* here, but in 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 21 sq. (where see note) he adopts this view as his own. In the passage before us he hints that true *εὐγένεια* is something different (cp. 1. 6. 1255 a 39 sqq. and the fragment of Menander quoted in the note on 1255 a 34, where true nobility is identified with virtue). Whatever claim to rule wealth and virtue may confer on their possessors, mere descent from the wealthy and virtuous confers none.

4. *ἀρχαὶ μὲν οὖν ὡς εἰπεῖν αὐταὶ καὶ πηγαὶ τῶν στάσεων εἰσιν, ὅθεν στασιάζουσιν*, 'these then are the sources, speaking broadly, and the springs of civil discord, from which civil discord takes its rise.' *Μὲν οὖν* may possibly be taken up by *ἐπεὶ δὲ σκοποῦμεν*, c. 2. 1302 a 16, but it is not certain whether (owing to the length of the disquisition which follows) it is taken up by anything. *Ἀδται*, i. e. a sense on the part of a person or persons that they have not the position under the constitution which they regard as their due. Thurot would place *ὡς εἰπεῖν* before *πηγαί* and Sus. after it, because, while *ἀρχαί* 'est une expression ordinaire, qui n'a pas besoin d'être adoucie et excusée,' *πηγαί* 'est une expression figurée,' but *ὡς εἰπεῖν* is often used where no 'expression figurée' has gone before, to restrict and qualify an absolute statement (e. g. in 3. 11. 1282 a 5, 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 28 sq., and 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 4 sq.): see Bon. Ind. 872 a 34 sqq. and Ast, Lex. Platon. 1. 631, who says '*ὡς εἰπεῖν* proprie est modeste loquentis et rem infinita ratione vel universe significantis.' So here Aristotle uses it to express the fact that it is only in a broad way that inequality under the constitution can be said to be the source of *στάσις*, for a more detailed investigation (c. 2. 1302 a 16 sqq.) reveals to him that a sense of unequal treatment under the constitution is not the only source of *στάσις* and constitutional change. The phrase *πηγαὶ τῶν*

στάσεων comes to Aristotle from Plato, Laws 690 D, *νῦν γὰρ δὴ στάσεων πηγὴν τινα ἀνευρήκαμεν ἡμεῖς*.

8. διδὲ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται διχῶς, 'hence the changes also [as well as the στάσεις that lead to them] come into being in two ways' (i.e. they arise either from στάσις which seeks a complete change of constitution or from στάσις which does not). As the aim in στάσις is broadly the removal of inequality, and inequality may be removed with or without a change of constitution, the changes which result may be either changes in the constitution or changes stopping short of that. The long parenthetical passage, 1301 b 6-26, breaks the continuity of the argument and looks at first sight like a marginal note which has found its way into the text, but this it can hardly be, for it is with reference to the case of Lysander mentioned in 19 sqq. that the inequality of a perpetual kingship, where all are equal, is dwelt upon in 27 sq.

ὅτε μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, sc. στασιάζουσιν.

10. ταύτας ἐξ ἐκείνων, i.e. oligarchy and democracy in place of polity and aristocracy.

ὅτε δ' οὐ πρὸς τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν πολιτείαν κ.τ.λ. Of this kind of change (i.e. change which does not seek the substitution of one constitution for another), three kinds are mentioned; its promoters may seek either (1) to leave the constitution as it is, but to take the place of the existing holders of supreme power, or (2) to make the constitution more moderate or more pronounced, or (3) to alter a part of it. Those whose aims fall under the second or third head, no less than those who do not desire any change in the constitution, are marked off from those who seek to replace the existing constitution by another, for they seek only to modify it. I cannot follow Susemihl, therefore, in transposing 10, *ὅτε δὲ . . . 13, μοναρχίαν*, to after *πολιτεία ταύτη*, 26. Aristotle makes no mention here of a fourth type of revolution, of which we read in 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 17 sqq. The leaders in this sought the total overthrow of the existing constitution and its replacement by another, but they did not, when successful, proceed at once to overthrow it, resting content for a time with acquiring supreme power for themselves and modifying the customs and training of the State.

18. ἢ τὴν μοναρχίαν. Cp. c. 12. 1316 a 29, *ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα τυραννίς, ὥσπερ ἡ Σικυῶνος ἐκ τῆς Μύρωνος εἰς τὴν Κλεισθέους*.

ἔτι περὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, sc. στασιάζουσιν.

14. *οἷον ἢ ὀλιγαρχίαν οὔσαν κ.τ.λ.* *Μεταβάλλουσιν* should probably be supplied.

15. *ἢ δημοκρατίαν οὔσαν εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον δημοκρατεῖσθαι*, like Cleisthenes at Athens (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 21 sq.).

16. *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν*, sc. *στασιάζουσιν*.

17. *ἔτι κ.τ.λ.* Here again we must supply *στασιάζουσιν*.

18. *μέρος τι τῆς πολιτείας*. See note on 1297 b 37 and vol. i. p. 514, note.

ἀρχὴν τινα καταστήσαι, as for instance at Epidamnus a Boulê. Kingship is here treated as an *ἀρχή*, as in c. 10. 1313 a 5, 8.

19. *ἢ ἀνελεῖν*. So, in addition to Lysander and Pausanias, Empedocles at Agrigentum *τὸ τῶν χιλιῶν ἄθροισμα κατέλυσε συνεστὸς ἐπὶ ἑτη τρία* (Diog. Laert. 8. 66). See also Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 10 (quoted on 1306 a 12) as to Ephialtes at Athens and Phormion at Elis. As to Lysander see note on 1271 a 21. In strictness his plan seems to have been to open the kingship to the best of the Spartans irrespectively of descent, but this change was equivalent to putting an end to the kingship of the Heraclidae (cp. Diod. 14. 13, *διὲς ἐπὶ τούτοις πεφρονηματισμένος διενόετο καταλῦσαι τὴν τῶν Ἑρακλειδῶν βασιλείαν καὶ κοινὴν ἐκ πάντων Σπαρτιατῶν ποιῆσαι τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν βασιλείων*), and perhaps Aristotle here means no more than this by his phrase *καταλῦσαι τὴν βασιλείαν*, as to which cp. Xen. Ages. 1. 4. As to the question to what Pausanias Aristotle here refers, see notes on 1333 b 34 and 1307 a 3. Pausanias *ὁ βασιλεύς* is said in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 32 sqq. to have tried to make himself master of his own State, and we know that Pausanias the victor of Plataea did so (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 2 sqq.). Is it likely that two men of the name of Pausanias plotted at Sparta at different times with the same end in view?

21. *καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Changes of a part of a constitution would mostly occur where the partisans of the existing constitution were strong and offered a vigorous resistance to proposals of change. In a State torn by faction like Epidamnus this would be likely to be the case.

22. *ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν φυλάρχων βουλὴν ἐποίησαν*. For *ἐποίησαν* cp. 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 8, *τῶν τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς βουλομένων ποιῆν πολιτείας*, and see note on 1274 b 7. This was of course a change in a democratic direction, for a Boulê was a democratic institution (6 (4). 15. 1299 b 32). The context implies that the *φυλάρχοι* were an element of inequality in the State, and that their exalted position

gave rise to a feeling in the minds of the citizens generally that they were unjustly dealt with. Gilbert (*Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 236) conceives them to have been the heads of the three Dorian tribes and to have acted as a council to the single magistrate who managed the affairs of the State (1301 b 25). This is possible, but we know too little about Epidamnus to be sure of it. That the three Dorian tribes existed at Epidamnus is likely enough, for we find traces of one of them at all events in the mother-State, Corcyra (Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 236. 2). But it is not certain that they existed there, nor that, if they did, they were the only tribes, for at Calymna we find the three Dorian tribes co-existing with others (Gilbert, 2. 213). As we know neither how many tribes there were at Epidamnus nor whether each tribe had one or more *φύλαρχοι* at its head, we cannot tell how many in number the *φύλαρχοι* were, but they were no doubt less numerous than the Boulê which took their place. As to Epidamnus see notes on 1290 b 9 and 1304 a 13.

28. εἰς δὲ τὴν ἡλιαίαν κ.τ.λ., 'but it is still obligatory on the magistrates [alone] among the members of the privileged class to proceed to the Heliæa when an appointment to a magistracy is put to the vote, [which is an oligarchical arrangement].' Götting was apparently the first to interpret this passage aright. He says (p. 391), 'sic intelligendus est locus aristotelicus: ex omnibus iis qui ad rempublicam accedere possunt non nisi magistratibus imperatur interesse comitiis cum creatur aliquis magistratus; ceteris civibus interesse licet quidem, at non imperatum est.' Susemihl and Welldon take the passage substantially in the same way. Stahr, on the other hand, in his translation of 1860, takes τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ not as a partitive genitive after τὸς ἀρχαίς, but as in the genitive after τὴν ἡλιαίαν ('the Heliæa of the members of the privileged class'), and this is a possible view, though I prefer the other. To enforce the attendance of the magistrates exclusively at elections by the Heliæa was an oligarchical measure, because when one set of men were forced to be present and the rest were not, the probability was that those only would be present whose attendance was enforced, and that they would thus acquire a decisive voice in the election. The magistrates would, in fact, be almost placed in a position to name their successors in office. Plato in a similar spirit arranges in *Laws* 755 C and 756 A that the nomophylakes shall propose the generals and hipparchs to the assembly, though he allows any one to propose alternative names.

Some Greek States enforced the attendance of the rich exclusively at meetings of the assembly (6 (4). 13. 1297 a 17 sqq.); Epidamnus enforced the attendance of the magistrates exclusively at elections by the *Heliæa*. Compare Baunack, *Die delphischen Inschriften*, No. 2561. D 25 (in Collitz, *Sammlung der gr. Dialekt-Inschriften*), α[ι δ' ἁ]λίαν ποιόντων ἄρχων ἀ]πείη, ἀποτεισάτω ὁδελόν, where the assembly of the members of the Delphic phratry of the Labyadae is referred to. Aristotle mentions the continued existence of this oligarchical feature of the constitution of Epidamnus, and of the other to which he refers in 25 sq., in order to show that democratic innovation there was confined to one point and that the constitution *μετίβαλε κατὰ μέρος*. The *ἡλιαία* (i.e. the assembly) at Epidamnus was probably called there *αλιαία* or *αλία* (see Liddell and Scott on these words), but Aristotle uses the Attic form. For *εἰς τὴν ἡλιαίαν βαδίζειν* cp. Plut. Dion, c. 53, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς συνέδριον παρακαλούμενος οὐκ ἐβούλετο βαδίζειν.

25. ὀλιγαρχικὸν δὲ καὶ ὁ ἄρχων ὁ εἰς τὴν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ. That the single supreme magistrate was an oligarchical feature, we see from 3. 10. 1281 a 32 sqq. and 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 22 sq., though it is implied in 3. 16. 1287 a 4 sqq. that making one man *κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως*, as at Epidamnus and Opus, was not an arrangement peculiar to oligarchies. The use of the word *διοίκησις* suggests that this great officer did not add military functions to his civil ones (see note on 1287 a 6). In c. 4. 1304 a 16 it is implied that a plurality of magistrates existed at Epidamnus, at any rate at one time. A difficulty arises in connexion with *ἦν*, 26, for this magistracy is referred to in 3. 16. 1287 a 7 as actually existent, but too much need not be made of this discrepancy, for the office may have ceased to exist when the passage before us was written. Π¹ omit *ἦν*, but little weight attaches to these MSS. when they omit small words.

26. πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἄνισον ἢ στάσις· οὐ μὲν (εἰ) τοῖς ἀνίστοις ἐπάρχει ἀνίστορον (ἀίδιος γὰρ βασιλεία ἄνισος, ἐὰν ἢ ἐν ἴσοις). I add *εἰ* before *τοῖς ἀνίστοις*, and translate, 'for everywhere' (i.e. both where those who stir civil discord seek to overthrow the constitution and where they stop short of this) 'civil discord arises on account of inequality, not however if unequals receive in proportion to the inequality subsisting between them (for a perpetual kingship [such as that which Lysander sought to abolish] is unequal [only] if it exists among equals).' In other words, inequality of advantage

does not give rise to civil discord if those to whom it falls deserve the superiority of advantage which they enjoy. Compare 3. 9. 1280 a 12, καὶ τὸ ἄριστον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ γὰρ ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσι ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίστοις, 3. 16. 1287 a 10 sqq., and Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 3, οὐ γὰρ νίμει πλέον τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν. Aristotle has in his memory in the passage before us Plato, Laws 757 A, τοῖς γὰρ ἀνίστοις τὰ ἴσα ἅμισα γίγνεται ἄν, εἰ μὴ τυγχάνοι τοῦ μέτρου διὰ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρα ταῦτα στάσεων αἱ πολιτεῖαι πληροῦνται. Schneider (following Sepulveda, who has 'cum non' in his translation for οὐ μὴν, and Ramus, who has 'nisi') reads οὐ μὴ in place of οὐ μὴν, and is followed by Coray and Sus., but οὐ μὴν can be retained if we add εἰ before τοῖς ἀνίστοις. Welldon retains the reading of the MSS. and takes ἀνάλογον with τοῖς ἀνίστοις, translating 'not that inequality [in this sense] exists among people who are only proportionately unequal,' but I cannot follow him in this. The thought that inequality is the source of στάσεις is derived from Solon (Plut. Solon, c. 14, φωνή τις αὐτοῦ περιφερομένη πρότερον εἰπόντος ὡς τὸ ἴσον πόλεμον οὐ ποιεῖ: compare the proverb ἰσότης φιλότης in Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 8 and elsewhere, and Plato, Rep. 547 A, Laws 757 A).

29. ἔστι δὲ διττὸν τὸ ἴσον. Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, Laws 757 A sqq., and Isocr. Areop. § 21 sq. See Stallbaum on Laws 757 B.

30. λέγω δὲ ἀριθμῷ μὲν τὸ πλήθει ἢ μεγέθει ταῦτ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἴσον. Cp. Plato, Laws 757 B, τὴν μέτρῳ ἴσην καὶ σταθμῷ καὶ ἀριθμῷ (ἰσότητα).

31. κατ' ἀξίαν δὲ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ. That which is equal according to desert is the proportionally equal, because in any just distribution between *A* and *B* the share of *A* will be to the share of *B* as the desert of *A* is to the desert of *B*. See note on 1301 a 26.

32. οἷον ὑπερέχει κ.τ.λ. This is added not to prove that the equal according to desert is the proportionally equal, for that it does not do, but to illustrate by an example the difference between the proportionally equal and the arithmetically equal. The excess of four over two is proportionally equal to the excess of two over one, but not arithmetically equal to it, for what is arithmetically equal to the excess of two over one is the excess of three over two, not that of four over two. The proportion in which two stands to four is the same as that in which one stands to two, for two is the half of four and one is the half of two.

35. *ὁμολογούντες δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, 'and though men agree that the absolutely just is that which is in accordance with desert, they differ' etc. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 25, τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἱ δ' εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ' ἄριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετὴν. Yet in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3 we read καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ δημοτικὸν τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἐστὶ κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν (cp. 1318 a 3 sqq.). See note on 1288 a 22. For the contrast of *ὁμολογεῖν* and *διαφέρεισθαι* cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 16 sq.

36. *καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον*, in 1301 a 26 sqq.

39. *διὸ καὶ μάλιστα κ.τ.λ.*, 'hence two constitutions especially come into being, democracy and oligarchy, for [only constitutions championed by a large number of supporters are likely to come into being, and] while high birth and virtue are found in few, the attributes on which democracy and oligarchy are based are found in a larger number.' These attributes are wealth and poverty. Contrast the reasons given for the prevalence of democracy and oligarchy in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 22 sqq. For *καὶ μάλιστα* cp. Plato, Phaedo 61 D and Laws 773 C, quoted by Riddell in his Digest of Platonic Idioms, § 133 (Plato, Apol. p. 169 sq.).

40. *εὐγένεια γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ ἐν ὀλίγοις*. Cp. Theogn. 149 sq.

2. *εὐποροὶ δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀποροὶ δὲ καὶ ἀποροὶ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀποροὶ πολλοὶ*, 1302 a. τὸ δὲ ἀπλῶς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 757 E, οὕτω δὲ χρηστέον ἀσφαλίως μὲν τοῖν ἰσοτήτοι ἀμφοῖν, ὥς δ' ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐπ' ὀλιγίστοις τῇ ἐτίρῃ, τῇ τῆς τύχης δεομένη. We need not perhaps supply τὴν πολιτείαν with *τετάχθαι*: cp. c. 8. 1308 b 31 sqq. It follows that, if *στάσις* is to be avoided, the constitution must not only secure the citizens 'that which is equal,' but must combine the two kinds of equality. It has hitherto been implied that democracy no less than oligarchy rests on a misconception of τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσον (cp. 1301 a 25 sqq., b 35 sqq.), but now Aristotle implies that it rests on arithmetical equality, not on equality according to desert. Perhaps he regards its contention that those who are equal in one thing are wholly equal as tantamount to a demand for arithmetical equality.

4. *οὐδὲμία γὰρ μόνιμος ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν*, 'for of constitutions of the sort we have mentioned' (i.e. constitutions based on one of the two kinds of equality) 'none is durable.' For the use

of *ἐκ* here, see Kühner, *Ausführl. gr. Gramm.*, ed. 2, § 414. 5 b, Anm. 4 (ed. Gerth, § 414. 5 b, Anm. 5). Compare also its use in 3. 3. 1276 a 16, *τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος (πράξεις)*, where, as in the passage before us, the simple genitive would have sufficed.

5. *τούτου δ' αἴτιον κ.τ.λ.* Cp. c. 4. 1303 b 28 sqq., and (with Camerarius, *Interp.* p. 177 sq.) Soph. *Fragm.* 747,

*ἔργου δὲ παντὸς ἦν τις ἀρχηται καλῶς,
καὶ τὰς τελευτὰς εἰκός ἐσθ' οὕτως ἔχειν*

(lines which are perhaps in Isocrates' memory in *De Pace* §§ 101, 105: cp., with Vict., Cic. *Epist. ad Att.* 10. 18. 2, *ut male posuimus initia, sic cetera sequuntur*): also Eurip. *Herc. Fur.* 1152 Bothe (1261 Dindorf),

*ὅταν δὲ κρηπίς μὴ καταβληθῇ γένους
ὀρθῶς, ἀνάγκη δυστυχεῖν τοὺς ἐγγόνους,*

and Demosth. *Olynth.* 2. 10. Camerarius adds Eurip. *Fragm.* 32,

κακῆς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς γίνεται τέλος κακόν,

and a line of Gregory of Nazianzus,

ἀρχῆς καλῆς κάλλιστον εἶναι καὶ τέλος.

In *τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἡμαρτημένον* (cp. *Isocr. De Pace* § 101, *τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν ἡμαρτημάτων*) the basing of the constitution exclusively on one kind of equality is referred to.

8. *ὁμως δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, 'but nevertheless,' i. e. though both democracy and oligarchy are unsafe, as resting on one kind of equality only. It appears from c. 6. 1305 b 2 sqq. that oligarchy is exposed to a third sort of *στάσις* besides the two mentioned here, when the privileged class does not include all the rich—to *στάσις* arising between the privileged and the excluded rich. The fact mentioned in 12 sqq. that *στάσις* did not arise to any considerable extent within the *demos* is remarkable, for the interests of the peasants must often in ancient Greece, as in modern times, have been by no means the same as those of the artisans and labourers of the city (cp. *Aristoph. Eccl.* 431 sqq.). At Athens the trireme-oarsmen gained by war (see note on 1291 b 18) and the peasant-proprietors by peace. Did not *στάσις* arise within the *demos* when one part of it was of pure extraction and the other alien or semi-alien, or when the *demos* was composed of persons differing in race? *Στάσις* will also have arisen in democracies between rival demagogues and their followers. The fact that democracy is safer than oligarchy is differently accounted for in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 13 sqq.

11. καὶ ἔτι, cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b 21 (Bon. Ind. s.v. ἔτι).

12. τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, 'the oligarchs,' as in c. 6. 1305 a 39 sq.

13. ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Yet we are told in 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 22 sqq. that the most moderate form of oligarchy is *σύνεγγυς τῇ καλουμένῃ πολιτείᾳ*. Are we to infer from the passage before us that the constitution in which the midway class is supreme is based on both kinds of equality?

14. ἐγγυτέρω. For *ἐγγυτέρω εἶναι* cp. Plato, Apol. Socr. 30 A, *μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυτέρω ἐστὶ γένει*, and Rep. 330 E, *ὥσπερ ἤδη ἐγγυτέρω ὦν τῶν ἐκεί.*

15. τῶν τοιούτων πολιτειῶν, 'of the constitutions of the kind we have mentioned.' What constitutions are referred to? Sepulveda (p. 145 b) takes Aristotle to refer to the 'depravatae respublicae, seu quae ab optimo statu reipublicae deflexerunt,' Sus.² (Note 1508 b) interprets the phrase in the same way, and it is not easy to see what else it can mean, though we might have expected it to bear the same meaning as in 5. Cp. Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 23 sqq.

17. περὶ τὰς πολιτείας may go either with αἱ μεταβολαί (cp. c. 7. C. 2. 1307 b 24 sq.) or with γίνονται (cp. c. 4. 1304 b 17 sq.). Sus. and Welldon perhaps rightly take the words with αἱ μεταβολαί.

καθόλου πρῶτον, 'first generally' in constitutions as a whole (cp. c. 4. 1304 b 5 sqq., 17 sq., and c. 7. 1307 b 2 sq.), afterwards in each constitution taken separately.

18. τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν. Cp. 34 sq., and see for the phrase Bon. Ind. 112 a 49 sqq.

εἰσι δὲ κ.τ.λ. We gather from what follows that it is not enough to cause στάσις and constitutional change that there should be a sense of injustice in men's minds and advantages to be won; there must also be occasions calling that sense of injustice into activity (1302 a 34 sqq.). Special stress is laid on these occasions in Aristotle's theory of constitutional change, as we have it in the Book before us, and if we study cc. 8 and 9, the chapters in which the means of preserving constitutions are described, we shall see that Aristotle's counsels are mainly directed to preventing the rise of these occasions of evil. He perhaps rates rather too highly the share of these 'occasions' in causing constitutional change.

19. ὡς διοριστέον καθ' αὐτὰς τύπῳ πρῶτον, 'which we must mark out each by itself first of all in outline.'

20. δεῖ γὰρ λαβεῖν κ.τ.λ. See vol. i. p. 523, note 1, where it has been already shown that a similar classification is employed in

the Rhetoric (i. 10. 1368 b 27): compare also Eth. Nic. 7. 4. 1146 b 15 sqq.

21. τῶν πολιτικῶν ταραχῶν καὶ τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους στάσεων. Τῶν πολιτικῶν ταραχῶν, because there are such things as ταραχαί between members of the same family or between States (Thuc. 5. 25, καὶ εὐθὺς ἄλλη ταραχὴ καθίστατο τῶν συμμάχων πρὸς τὴν Λακεδαιμόνα). The ταραχαί here referred to are between citizens of the same State. For the conjunction of ταραχαί and στάσεις, cp. Isocr. Philip. § 107, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν πόλεσι στάσεις καὶ ταραχὰς καὶ σφαγὰς ἐμποιοῦντες ἐκτῶντο τὴν τιμὴν ταύτην, and Diod. 15. 40. 1, μετὰ γὰρ τὴν συγχωρηθεῖσαν τοῖς δῆμοις αὐτονομίαν αἱ πόλεις ἐνέπιπτον εἰς ταραχὰς μεγάλας καὶ στάσεις. Ταραχὴ implies strife, but not necessarily actual fighting; it is coupled with ἔρις in Demosth. De Cor. c. 18, ἀλλὰ τις ἦν ἀκριτος καὶ παρὰ τούτοις καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἔρις καὶ ταραχὴ. It is a more general word than στάσις: thus in Hdt. 4. 162 the recourse of Arcesilaus of Cyrene to στάσις is an incident of the πολλὴ ταραχὴ περὶ τῶν τιμῶν.

24. περὶ ἧς ἤδη τυγχάνομεν εἰρηκότες, in c. 1. 1301 a 33 sqq. and 1301 b 35 sqq.

28. τούτων, i. e. equality and inequality.

29. ἐλάττους, 'smaller,' opposed to μείζους: cp. Alex. Κυβερνήτης, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 434),

ὅσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βίων δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἡ τύχη

ἡμῶν μεγάλοις προσέειπε τοὺς δ' ἐλάττους.

31. περὶ ὧν δὲ στασιάζουσιν κ.τ.λ., in other words τὰ τέλη (c. 10. 1311 a 28). Thucydides had said much the same thing (3. 82. 16, πάντων δ' αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν, which is perhaps present to Aristotle's memory in Pol. 2. 9. 1271 a 16 sqq.: cp. Thuc. 1. 76. 2, οὕτως οὐδ' ἡμεῖς θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν πεποιήκαμεν οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου, εἰ ἀρχὴν τε διδομένην ἐδεξάμεθα, καὶ ταύτην μὴ ἀνίμεν ὑπὸ τῶν μεγίστων νικηθέντες, τιμῆς καὶ δέους καὶ ὠφελείας). Plato also implies in Rep. 464 D sq. that one of the causes of στάσις is χρημάτων κτήσις. Phaleas had held (2. 7. 1266 a 38 sqq.) that στάσις arises exclusively in connexion with property, and especially, it would seem, landed property, for he meddled with nothing else (2. 7. 1267 b 9 sqq.), and hence had gain or the avoidance of loss as its object and had nothing to do with honour (2. 7. 1266 b 38 sqq.).

32. καὶ γὰρ ἀτιμίαν φεύγοντες κ.τ.λ. So at Epidamnus (c. 4. 1304 a 13 sqq.) and at Heracleia and Thebes (c. 6. 1306 a

36 sqq.). 'C. etiam Caesar dicebat se civile bellum movisse ut ignominiam a se depelleret, quod quasi concedit M. Cicero, cum Q. Ligarium defenderet' (c. 6. 18), 'refellit autem ac falsum esse docet in epistola quadam ad Atticum' (7. 11. 1) 'his verbis, Atque omnia se facere ait dignitatis causa, qui ne umbram quidem τοῦ καλοῦ vidit unquam' (Vict., who slightly alters the passage).

33. ἡ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἡ τῶν φίλων. Cp. c. 11. 1315 a 27 sq. The preposition is not repeated before τῶν φίλων: cp. c. 10. 1311 a 29, b 25 sq., and 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 31.

34. αἱ δ' αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν κινήσεων κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. 392 b 11 sqq.) appears to supply τῆς πολιτείας with τῶν κινήσεων, and he may well be right, for though Stahr and Sus. translate 'Bewegungen' ('movements'), and Polybius uses κίνησις in this sense (3. 4. 12: 3. 5. 1), I do not notice that Aristotle does so elsewhere. Vict. explains τῶν κινήσεων 'motuum animi,' but this can hardly be the meaning of the word here. It is implied in 22 sqq. that a sense of injustice is broadly the cause of the mental state which prompts to revolution, but now we study the causes of revolution more in detail, and the detailed study of them discloses that a sense of injustice is not always present in the minds of those who aim at constitutional change. For men may be stirred to aim at constitutional change by witnessing the *deserved* enjoyment by others of a superior degree of profit or honour, or, in other words, under circumstances which leave no room for a sense of injustice in their minds. Nor do the circumstances under which constitutional change is said to occur in c. 3. 1303 a 13—25 seem to be connected with a sense of injustice. With the account here given of the causes of στάσις and constitutional change compare the view of Ephorus (ap. Strab. p. 480, Fragm. 64 in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 249: cp. Cic. Pro Rosc. Amerin. 27. 75), who holds that διχοστασία arises διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ τρυφήν, which cause φθόνος ὕβρις and μῖσος, so that the best means the lawgiver has of preventing διχοστασία is to compel the citizens to lead a temperate and frugal life. The Cynic Crates seems to have taken a similar view (Plut. De tuenda sanitate praecepta, c. 7: see Wytttenbach's note on 125 E), but Aristotle agrees with Ephorus only in part; he holds, indeed, that φθόνος and ὕβρις are potent causes of στάσις, but he does not think that the prevention of luxurious living will do much to prevent it, nor would he say that φθόνος ὕβρις and μῖσος are its only causes: it may arise, for instance, when none of these things are present, but only

ὑπεροχή or *αἰθέσεις* παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. It should be noticed that of the seven causes enumerated by Aristotle the first four affect those who are depressed in the political scale and the three others those who are exalted. Revolution as often proceeds from those who 'wax fat' as from those who are in the opposite case. The order in which the causes are enumerated here (*ὑβρις, φόβος, ὑπεροχή, καταφρόνησις* κ.τ.λ.) agrees with the order in which the causes of attacks on monarchies are enumerated in c. 10. 1311 a 31-1312 a 39 (*ὑβρις, φόβος, καταφρόνησις, φιλοτιμία*). The list of causes of *στάσις* and constitutional change here given seems incomplete. Other causes besides the seven or eleven here mentioned appear to disclose themselves when Aristotle proceeds in cc. 5-7 to deal with each constitution separately. The overthrow of oligarchies, for instance, by the demagogy of some of the oligarchs (c. 6. 1305 b 22 sqq.) or by spendthrift and ruined oligarchs (c. 6. 1305 b 39 sqq.) cannot easily be brought under any of the eleven heads.

37. *ἔστι δ' ὡς πλείους*, i. e. if we count in the four additional causes mentioned in 1302 b 3 sqq. 'Nam septem sunt quae magis per se iram et seditionem movent, alia vero, ut negligentia . . . , magis ex accidenti' (Sepulveda).

ὢν δύο μὲν κ.τ.λ. *Μέν* is here displaced, as occasionally elsewhere (see notes on 1259 b 15 and 1268 b 12); it qualifies *ταῦτά*. Supply *ταῦτά* with *ὡσαύτως*: see note on 1257 b 35.

38. *διὰ κέρδος γὰρ καὶ διὰ τιμὴν* κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 38 sqq. and 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 30 sq.

40. *πρότερον*, in 31 sqq.

1302 b. 2. *ἔτι διὰ ὕβριν*, sc. *παροξύνονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους*.

3. *ἔτι δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον* κ.τ.λ. Here again we must supply *παροξύνονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους*. Hence it would seem that the four causes now named by Aristotle *may* produce *στάσις*, though we learn in 1303 a 13 sqq. that they do not always do so. I do not agree with Vict., therefore, when he explains *ἄλλον τρόπον* 'alio pacto, id est sine dissensionibus et armis' (he is followed in this by Giph., p. 539): Aristotle's meaning seems rather to be that we have now to do with causes of a more remote kind and acting less directly, due to the action or default of the authorities of the State (see Sepulveda, quoted above on 1302 a 37).

5. *δι' ἀνομοιότητα*. This cause is dealt with in 1303 a 25 sqq. Compare Oecon. 1. 4. 1344 a 18, *αἱ γὰρ ἀνομοιότητες τῶν ἡδὼν ἥμισυ φαλκόν*. Democritus had long before said that his atoms were in

a state of *στάσις* because of their unlikeness (Aristot. *Fragm.* 202. 1514 b 18, *στασιάζειν δὲ καὶ φέρεσθαι ἐν τῇ κενῇ διὰ τε τὴν ἀνομοιότητα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς εἰρημένας διαφοράς*), and Plato (*Rep.* 547 A), speaking of *ἀνομοιότης καὶ ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος*, says, *ἀ γενόμενα, οὐ ἂν ἐγγένηται, αἰεὶ τίκτει πόλεμον καὶ ἔχθραν*.

θ. πῶς αἷτια, sc. *στάσεως*, cp. 11.

C. 3.

ὑβριζόντων τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 8. 1308 b 31 sqq. The subject of *στασιάζουσι* is 'the citizens.' Aristotle probably has before him *Theogn.* 43–52. *ὕβρις* and *πλεονεξία* are often mentioned in conjunction (c. 7. 1307 a 20: *Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 94*: *Polyb. i. 81. 10*). *Ἄδικία* is said to be the offspring of *ὑβρις* in Plato, *Laws* 691 C (cp. 713 C, *ὑβρεὺς τε καὶ ἀδικίας*, and 775 D). It was by the *ὑβρις* and *πλεονεξία* of the leading men of Agrigentum that Empedocles was roused to action (*Plut. Adv. Colot. c. 32*, *Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τοὺς τε πρώτους τῶν πολιτῶν ὑβρίζοντας καὶ διαφοροῦντας τὰ κοινὰ ἐξελέγξας κ.τ.λ.*: *Diog. Laert. 8. 64*). Cp. also Solon, *Fragm.* 4. 37,

*εὐθύνη δὲ δίκας σκολιὰς ὑπερήφανά τ' ἔργα
πραῦνει,*

and *Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 5* *σὺδ φίη.*, καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐλεγείας δεδοικέναι φησὶν (ὁ Σόλων)

τὴν τε φ[ιλαργυρ]ίαν τὴν θ' ὑπερηφανίαν,

ὡς διὰ ταῦτα τῆς *ἔχθρας ἐπιστώ[σ]ης*. As to τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, see note on 1303 b 22.

θ. ἡ δὲ *πλεονεξία* γίνεται ὅτε μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων, ὅτε δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν. Depredations by magistrates on public property were probably more frequent than on private—we hear of them at Apollonia on the Euxine in c. 6. 1306 a 7, and Aristotle makes special provision against them in c. 8. 1308 b 31 sqq.—but depredations by magistrates in oligarchies on the property of the many seem to be referred to in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 19 sq.

11. καὶ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἀτιμαζόμενοι καὶ ἄλλους ὀρώντες τιμωμένους *στασιάζουσιν*. Aristotle remembers the case of Lysander (see c. 7. 1306 b 31 sqq.). Compare also the conspiracy of wealthy Athenians just before the battle of Plataea (*Plut. Aristid. c. 13*, *ἄνδρες ἐξ οἴκων ἐπιφανῶν καὶ χρημάτων μεγάλων πένητες ὑπὸ τοῦ πολέμου γεγονότες καὶ πᾶσαν ἄμα τῇ πλούτῃ τὴν ἐν τῇ πόλει δύναμιν αὐτῶν καὶ δόξαν οἰχομένην ὀρώντες, ἐτέρων τιμωμένων καὶ ἀρχόντων, . . . συνωμόσαντο καταλύσειν τὸν δῆμον*).

12. ταῦτα δὲ κ.τ.λ. Ταῦτα, 'this honouring and dishonouring.' There is perhaps here a reminiscence of Hippias of Elis, *Fragm.* 13

(Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* 2. 62), 'Ἰππίας λέγει δύο εἶναι φθόνους, τὸν μὲν δίκαιον, ὅταν τις τοῖς κακοῖς φθονῇ τιμωμένους, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον, ὅταν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. For κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, not κατ' ἀξίαν, cp. 8 (6). 6. 1321 a 2 sq.

15. δι' ὑπεροχὴν δέ κ.τ.λ., sc. στασιάζουσιν. We read of the ὑπεροχὴ of Themistocles at Athens in *Diod.* 11. 54. 5 (cp. *Demosth.* c. *Aristocr.* c. 205, ἐκεῖνοι Θεμιστοκλέα λαβόντες μίζον αὐτῶν ἀξιούστα φρονεῖν ἐξήλασαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως καὶ μηδισμὸν κατέγνωσαν); we read also of Theron before he became tyrant of Agrigentum in *Diod.* 10. 27. 3, ὅτι Θήρων ὁ Ἀκραγαντῖνος γένει καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος φιланθρωπία πολὺν πρᾶξειεν οὐ μόνον τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων τῶν Συκελιωτῶν. Compare *Eurip.* *Phoeniss.* 650 *Bothe* (703 *Dindorf*),

ἦκουσα μίζον αὐτὸν ἢ Θήβας φρονεῖν,

κῆρδε τ' Ἀδράστου καὶ στρατῷ πεποιότα,

Justin, 21. 4. 1, opes suas, quibus vires reipublicae superabat, and *Aeschin.* c. *Ctes.* c. 235, οὐ μέμνησθ' ὅτι οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐπέθετο πρότερον δήμου καταλύσει, πρὶν ἂν μίζον τῶν δικαστηρίων ἰσχύσῃ; Μίζων ἢ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ πολιτεύματος, 'great out of proportion to the State and to the power of its supreme authority.' It appears, however, from c. 6. 1305 b 39 sqq. that not only over-powerful men but also men of ruined fortunes sought to make themselves tyrants.

17. μοναρχία ἢ δυναστεία. The former, if this superiority of power is possessed by one man; the latter, if by more than one. Cp. c. 6. 1306 a 22 sqq. and *Plato*, *Gorg.* 492 B, ἀρχὴν τινα ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ δυναστείαν. For μοναρχία, which is here apparently = τυραννίς, cp. c. 10. 1313 a 4.

18. διὸ ἐνιαχοῦ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1284 a 17. The ostracism seems to have been not unknown to the laws even of the oligarchy of Berne. 'If the influence of a citizen had increased so much, owing to benefits conferred by him on the people, that in the opinion of the Council or a majority of the Council it threatened to be injurious to the State, he was to absent himself from the city for five years and to pay a fine of ten pounds. An ostracism, in fact, in *optima forma*' (*Geiser*, *Gesch. der bernischen Verfassung* von 1191-1471, p. 31).

19. καίτοι βέλτιον κ.τ.λ. Compare the saying of Pittacus quoted in the note on 1308 a 33. For τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχοντες (not οἱ τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχοντες) see *Kühner*, *Ausführl. gr. Gramm.*, ed. 2, § 462. 1.

21. οἳ τε ἡδικηκότες, δεδιότες μὴ δῶσι δίκην. Cp. *Cic. pro Sest.* 46. 99, etenim in tanto civium numero magna multitudo est eorum qui

aut propter metum poenae peccatorum suorum conscii novos motus conversionesque reipublicae quaerant, aut etc. To this category belong the five wealthy men brought to trial at Corcyra (Thuc. 3. 70. 5 sqq.), Hanno at Carthage in his alleged second attempt to make himself tyrant (Justin, 21. 4. 6), and the friends of Catiline at Rome (Sallust, De Coniur. Catil. c. 14, referred to by Giph.). Hence too the support given to the designs of Peisistratus by persons who claimed to be citizens of Athens without being of pure Athenian extraction ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 13. l. 22 sqq.), and, if we could trust 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 25. l. 11 sqq., the intrigue of Themistocles against the Council of the Areopagus.

22. καὶ αἱ μέλλοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ. For an instance of this at Argos see Diod. 15. 58. 1. We see from c. 5. 1305 a 5 sqq. that a period during which the rich were plied with calumnious accusations often preceded that in which actual wrong was done to them, and no doubt they frequently took up arms during the period in which there was only a menace of future wrong. 'Eadem causa et Caesarem concitavit et impulit, metuentem ne dimisso exercitu privatus, Romam et domum reversus, a potentissimis inimicis opprimeretur' (Giph.). But Caesar had more genuine reasons than this for the course which he took.

23. δὲ 'Ρόδοι. Cp. 32 sq. and c. 5. 1304 b 27 sqq. The three passages probably refer to the same combination of the notables against the demos, though it would seem from 1304 b 27 sqq. that the notables were driven to combine not by the dread of wrong, but by actual experience of wrong, the action of the demagogues being such as to expose them to the lawsuits briefly referred to in the passage before us, and it would also seem from 1302 b 32 sq. that they were encouraged to combine by a feeling of contempt for the disorderliness of the democracy. Susemihl is probably right in taking the revolution of B.C. 390 to be referred to, though Schäfer (Demosthenes, 1. 427), followed by Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 175), believes Aristotle to refer to the substitution of an oligarchy for a democracy in B.C. 357 (Demosth. De Rhod. Libert. cc. 14, 19), when Rhodes revolted from Athens at the commencement of the Social War. We find, in fact, that Diodorus in describing the revolution of B.C. 390 uses the same expression as Aristotle does in 33, where he speaks of ἡ ἐπανάστασις (Diod. 14. 97, οἱ λακωνίζοντες τῶν 'Ροδίων ἐπαναστάσαντες τῷ δήμῳ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν 'Αθηναίων φρονοῦντας ἐξέβαλον ἐκ τῆς πόλεως). It is true that, as Susemihl points out (Sus.²,

Note 1511), Xenophon (Hell. 4. 8. 20-24) represents this revolution as effected not by the Laconizing party at Rhodes, as does Diodorus, but by an intervention of the Spartan Teleutias at the head of a fleet after the failure and exile of the Rhodians who were opposed to the democracy; this, however, only shows that Aristotle's version of the transaction agrees with that of the authority followed by Diodorus, and not with that of Xenophon.

25. καὶ στασιάζουσι καὶ ἐπιτίθενται. The two words are conjoined in 2. 7. 1267 a 41 also. τὸ στασιάζειν does not necessarily involve τὸ ἐπιτίθεσθαι (see note on 1301 a 39).

26. ἐν τε ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, ὅταν πλείους ᾖσιν οἱ μὴ μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας. We might infer from 6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq., where we are told that even in the first and most moderate form of oligarchy the poor, though more numerous than the rich, do not share in the offices, that in all forms of oligarchy those who do not share in the constitution are more numerous than those who do, but it is implied in 3. 8. 1280 a 1 sqq. that there were oligarchies in which this was not the case.

28. καταφρονήσαντες, as in c. 7. 1307 b 9 (cp. c. 11. 1314 b 32, θανμάσωσιν). We have καταφρονούντες in c. 10. 1312 a 10, 15 sq., and καταφρονῶν in 1312 a 12.

τῆς ἀταξίας. Some light is thrown on what is meant by this word by Plut. Quaest. Gr. c. 59, οἱ μὲν οὖν Μεγαρεῖς δι' ἀταξίαν τῆς πολιτείας ἡμέλησαν τοῦ ἀδικήματος.

29. οἷον καὶ ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένων ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη. The wording of this passage is ambiguous, and we cannot be sure that we are right in inferring from it that the democracy the existence of which at Thebes after the battle of Oenophyta it clearly implies dated from that battle, and did not exist before it, for Aristotle may only mean that the maladministration of the democracy began then, but it is likely enough that this was the case. Nor do we learn from the passage when the democracy was overthrown, but its fall probably did not occur till after the Athenian defeat at Coroneia (Thuc. 1. 113). The course of events in Boeotia after the battle of Oenophyta is disputed and obscure. Busolt's view on the subject, whether it is correct or not, may be gathered from Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 320. 3. He places the battle of Oenophyta in B.C. 457 (ed. 2, 3. 1. 258. 1) and that of Coroneia in B.C. 447 (ibid. p. 422. 1).

30. καὶ ἡ Μεγαρεῶν δι' ἀταξίαν καὶ ἀναρχίαν ἡττηθέντων. Supply

δημοκρατία διεφθάρη. Cp. Plut. Quaest. Gr. c. 59, “πόθεν ἐν Μεγάρῳ γένος ἀμφοκυλιστῶν;” ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκολάστου δημοκρατίας, ἡ καὶ τὴν παλιντοκίαν ἐπέειρε καὶ τὴν ἱεροσυλίαν, ἐπορεύετο θεωρία Πελοποννησίων εἰς Δελφοὺς διὰ τῆς Μεγαρικῆς. This θεωρία was maltreated by certain Megarians, and then the narrative proceeds, οἱ μὲν οὖν Μεγαρεῖς δι’ ἀταξίαν τῆς πολιτείας ἡμέλησαν τοῦ ἀδικήματος κ.τ.λ. It seems likely that ἡττηθέντων in the passage before us refers to the victory won by the returning oligarchical exiles over the commons of Megara (see note on 1300 a 17), but this is not absolutely certain. As Richards points out, ἡττηθέντων may refer, as in 1303 a 4, to a victory won over the Megarians by a foreign foe.

31. καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις πρὸ τῆς Γέλωνος τυραννίδος, καὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ ὁ δῆμος πρὸ τῆς ἐπαναστάσεως. It is not certain what should be supplied after ἐν Συρακούσαις and after ὁ δῆμος, but I incline to think that we should supply in the former place ‘the democracy aroused contempt by disorderliness’ and in the latter ‘aroused contempt in a similar way.’ I take ὁ δῆμος here to mean ‘the commons,’ not ‘the democracy’; it was against the commons that the insurrection of the notables was directed (see Diod. 14. 97, quoted above on 23). Some supply ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη after ἐν Συρακούσαις and διεφθάρη after ὁ δῆμος, but I cannot think that this is right, for the democracy was overthrown at Syracuse *by*, and not *before*, the advent of Gelon as tyrant, and at Rhodes *by*, and not *before*, the insurrection against it. As to Syracuse, see Freeman, Sicily, 2. 126, and Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 785. The demos of Syracuse had recently put an end to the oligarchy of the Gamori and expelled them from the city with the help of the serfs who tilled the soil of the State. Both demos and serfs were probably to a large extent of Sicel origin, and it is likely enough that a demos of this kind, intoxicated by its triumph, would be disorderly and undisciplined. As to Rhodes see above on 23.

34. ὥσπερ γὰρ σῶμα κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. 122 b 17) compares De Gen. An. 4. 3. 768 b 27, τῇ μὲν γὰρ κρατοῦν (sc. τὸ πεπτόμενον) τῇ δὲ οὐ κρατοῦν ποιεῖ πολύμορφον τὸ συνιστάμενον, ὅλον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀθλητῶν συμβαίνει διὰ τὴν πολυφασίαν· διὰ πλῆθος γὰρ τροφῆς οὐ δυναμένης τῆς φύσεως κρατεῖν, ὥστ’ ἀνάλογον αἰεὶ καὶ διαμένειν ὁμοίαν τὴν μορφήν, ἀλλοῖα γίνεται τὰ μέρη, καὶ σχεδὸν ἐνίοθ’ οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲν εἰκεῖναι τῷ πρότερον. παραπλήσιον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τὸ νόημα τὸ καλούμενον σατυριᾶν καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ διὰ ῥύματος ἢ πνεύματος ἀπέπτου πλῆθος, εἰς μόρια τοῦ προσώπου παρεμπεσόντες, [τοῦ (φύου)] καὶ σατύρου φαίνεται τὸ πρόσωπον,

and De Gen. et Corr. 1. 5. 321 b 28 sqq. Compare also Dio Chrys. Or. 17. 470 R. In the passage before us we must supply τὸ σῶμα before αὐξάνεσθαι (35), with φθείρεται (36), and with μεταβάλλει (38) and αὐξάνοιτο (39). We gather from what Aristotle says that a whole consisting of parts, for instance a body or a State, must grow in such a way as to preserve a certain proportion or symmetry between its parts, otherwise it will be destroyed and may even change into a wholly different entity. I am not aware that Aristotle anywhere formulates this doctrine as clearly as he does here, but we trace some approach to it in Phys. 1. 5. 188 b 12 sqq., where he tells us that τὸ ἡρμωμένον φθείρεται εἰς ἀναρμοστίαν, and in Fragm. 41. 1482 a 6 (compared by Bonitz, Ind. 744 a 45), τῇ ἁρμονίᾳ τοῦ σώματος ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀναρμοστία τοῦ σώματος, ἀναρμοστία δὲ τοῦ ἐμψύχου σώματος νόσος καὶ ἀσθένεια καὶ αἰσχος. An overgreat increase of a part, indeed, is fatal to the identity not only of the whole of which it is a part, but also of the part itself (c. 9. 1309 b 27 sqq.).

38. ἐνίστε δὲ κ.τ.λ. This would happen if, for instance, the human foot not only grew to be out of proportion to the body in size, but also underwent a disproportionate qualitative increase, e.g. in hardness, so that flesh and muscle stiffened into horn, and the foot became a hoof. Changes not unlike this were thought to occur in certain diseases, such as satyriasis (see above on 34), leontiasis, and elephantiasis, which were held to cause the human form to approach that of the satyr, the lion, or the elephant. See a paper by F. E. Hoggan, M.D., on the Leper Terra-Cotta of Athens in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 13. 101, where 'the leonine aspect characteristic of leprosy' is mentioned.

40. οὕτω καὶ πόλις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not directly tell us anywhere how he proposes to prevent the disproportionate increase of a part of the State, but we can see from passages like c. 8. 1309 a 20-26 and 8*(6). 5. 1320 a 29-b 16 how he would combat an increase of the poor. The measures suggested in c. 8. 1309 a 20-26 would also serve to some extent to prevent a disproportionate increase in the numbers of the rich.

- 1303 a. 1. οἷον τὸ τῶν ἀπὸρων πλῆθος ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις καὶ πολιτείαις. That a too great excess of poor is fatal to democracies, we have seen in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 16 sqq. But why are democracies and polities mentioned alone? That the numbers of the poor may increase in oligarchies, we see, if we needed to be told it, from c. 12. 1316 b 10 sqq. But Aristotle would probably say that in

oligarchies the poor are not a part of the State (6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.), and that in them an increase of the poor would not be an increase of a part of the State. As to the use in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book of the term 'parts of the State' see vol. i. p. 567. The change to which Aristotle refers may have occurred in recent times among ourselves, for I read in the *Times*, April 7, 1899, that 'what is certain is that the wage-earning class [in Great Britain] has greatly added to its numbers—probably out of all proportion to the increase in other classes of the community—during the past thirty years.'

3. συμβαίνει δ' ἐνίοτε τοῦτο καὶ διὰ τύχης, 'and this' (i.e. a change of constitution arising from the disproportionate increase of a part of the State) 'happens occasionally by reason of accidents also,' as well as in consequence of insensible or unnoticed growth. The τύχαι referred to would not escape notice: cp. c. 6. 1306 b 14 sqq. The Athenian Stranger in *Laws* 708 E is tempted to say ὡς οὐδεὶς ποτε ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲν νομοθετεῖ, τύχαι δὲ καὶ ξυμφοραὶ παντοῖαι πίπτονται παντοίως νομοθετοῦσι τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν.

οἷον ἐν Τάραντι κ.τ.λ. 'Ἡττηθέντων, sc. τῶν Ταραντίων (cp. 8, ἀτυχούντων περὶ, sc. τῶν Ἀθηναίων). As to the meaning of τῶν Μηδικῶν see note on 1341 a 28. This great defeat is placed by Diod. 11. 52 in B.C. 473: see also Hdt. 7. 170 and Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ed. 2, 2. 805 sq. 'Ut contigit post Sembachiam cladem, qua Helvetiorum qui montes accolunt nobilitas paene tota occubuit; ceteri ferre liberum exilium quam plebis direptionibus et contumeliis patere maluerunt' (Bodinus, *De Republica*, p. 235).

6. καὶ ἐν Ἀργεὶ κ.τ.λ., 'and at Argos, those [who perished] on the seventh day of the month having been put to death by Cleomenes the Laconian, they were compelled to receive into the citizen-body some of the serfs.' That οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐβδόμῃ most probably means 'those who perished on the seventh day of the month' appears from Plut. *De Mulierum Virtutibus*, c. 4, where we read as to the victory of Cleomenes, τὴν δὲ μάχην οἱ μὲν ἐβδόμῃ λέγουσιν Ἰσταμίνου μηνός, οἱ δὲ νομμηνίᾳ γενέσθαι κ.τ.λ. The first and seventh days of the month were sacred at Athens to Apollo (see C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Ant.* 2. § 44. 5), and probably at other places also, and there was evidently a tradition at Argos that the battle occurred on a day sacred to Apollo, though some thought that it occurred on the first and others (with whom Aristotle agrees) on the seventh. For ἐν τῇ ἐβδόμῃ cp. Lucian, *Pseudolog.* c. 16, ὁ δὲ ἐβδόμῃ (sc. τινὰ εἶπεν), ὅτι, ὥσπερ οἱ

παῖδες ἐν ταῖς ἑβδομαῖς, κακεῖνος ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἔπαιζε καὶ διεγέλα καὶ παιδιὰν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν σπουδὴν τοῦ δήμου. The first and seventh days of the month were days on which Apollo was specially honoured at Sparta (Hdt. 6. 57), and the victory was no doubt attributed to aid rendered by Apollo, which would evoke all the more gratitude in the minds of the Spartans because Apollo was also one of the chief gods of Argos (Paus. 2. 19. 3: 2. 24. 1). Apollo was believed to have been born on the seventh of the month (Preller, Gr. Mythologie, 1. 187) and was therefore called *ἑβδομαγενής* (Plut. Sympos. 8. 1. 2), and it was remembered of Plato and Carneades that they were born, like Apollo, on the seventh (Plut. *ibid.*). See as to the seventh day of the month Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 410 (59 h). Vict. remarks, 'est autem obscurum quid hic valeat illud auctoris τῶν ἐν τῇ ἑβδομῇ: a diversis sane interpretibus longe aliter acceptum est, cum quidam ipsorum putarint tempus ostendere, et ipsum infaustum, alii vero locum. Ego facile crederem ordinem quendam certum in ea republica significare.' Welldon accordingly translates 'the members of the seventh order.' It is conceivable that *φυλῇ* or some such word should be supplied, and not *ἡμέρᾳ*, for we read ἐν τόνῳ ἑβδομῳ in an inscription of Tenos, a city divided into τόνοι (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 207. 2), but on the whole I prefer to supply *ἡμέρᾳ*, at any rate till we are in possession of some fresh data on the subject. Cleomenes is distinguished as δ Λάκων because there were other well known persons of the name, for instance the nomarch of the Arabian nome of Egypt under Alexander. τῶν περιούκων τινάς, 'some of the serfs,' for this is the sense in which the word *περίουκοι* seems always to be used by Aristotle. Herodotus speaks of them as δούλοι (6. 83, Ἄργος δὲ ἀνδρῶν ἐχρηώθη οὕτω, ὥστε οἱ δούλοι αὐτέων ἔσχον πάντα τὰ πρήγματα, ἀρχοντές τε καὶ διέποντες ἐς δ' ἐπήβησαν οἱ τῶν ἀπολομένων παῖδες). It would seem that the serfs admitted to citizenship became the masters of the State. Plutarch, indeed (De Mul. Virt. c. 4), claims that the persons admitted to citizenship were not slaves, but Perioeci, using the word apparently in the sense in which we use it of the Lacedaemonian Perioeci, and it is of Perioeci of this kind that Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 75. 2) and Sus.³ (Note 1518) understand Aristotle to speak, but the word does not appear to be used in this sense by Aristotle.

8. καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις κ.τ.λ., 'and at Athens owing to reverses by land the upper class came to be less numerous than before, because

during the Laconian War service in the army fell on citizens taken from the service-list [and not on mercenaries].’ In Aristotle’s day the citizens were apt to leave service in the hoplite force to mercenaries (Demosth. Olynth. 3. 30). Κατάλογοι were kept at Athens of citizens who served in the cavalry (‘Αθ. Πολ. c. 49. l. 8 sqq. with Sandys’ note), of citizens liable to serve as hoplites (including only the three higher property-classes, and not the Thetes, Thuc. 6. 43), and apparently also of trireme-oarsmen (Demosth. Or. 50. in Polycl. cc. 6, 16). It is to the two former lists, and especially to the second of them, that Aristotle here refers. This list included all Athenian citizens from eighteen to sixty years of age belonging to the three higher property-classes, except presumably those who rendered cavalry service (see Gilbert, Constitutional Antiquities of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 315). A similar catalogue of οἱ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ seems to have been kept at Syracuse (Plut. Nic. c. 14): as to the cities of Boeotia see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 58 sq. The phrase ἐκ καταλόγου στρατεύεσθαι occurs in Xen. Mem. 3. 4. 1, and we read in ‘Αθ. Πολ. c. 26, τῆς γὰρ στρατείας γυγνομίης ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις ἐκ καταλόγου. In the last-named passage a diminution in the number of οἱ ἐπιτεκεῖς καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων is said to have occurred in the time of Cimon owing to τὸ στρατεύεσθαι ἐκ καταλόγου, whereas in the passage before us Aristotle speaks of the γυνήριμοι becoming fewer from the same cause during the Peloponnesian War. Isocrates in De Pace, § 86 sqq. traces losses extending over the whole period of the first Athenian Empire ending in the disappearance of many ancient families at Athens (§ 88 : cp. Diod. 13. 97. 1). That the rich became fewer at Athens towards the close of the Peloponnesian War is evident from the fact that the task of equipping a trireme was then for the first time allowed to be divided between two trierarchs (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 370). The Chorêgia for tragedy and comedy was also then allowed to be divided between two citizens (Schol. Aristoph. Ran. 404 : Gilbert, ibid. p. 359). Aristotle does not say that a change of constitution resulted at Athens, but he may have thought that the constitution became more democratic in consequence of these losses.

10. ἐπὶ τὸν Λακωνικὸν πόλεμον. For ἐπὶ Eucken (Praepositionen, p. 74) compares c. 7. 1306 b 38. For τὸν Λακωνικὸν πόλεμον in the sense of the Peloponnesian War, cp. c. 4. 1304 b 14, τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους. Cp. also Diod. 15. 25. 1, ἐπὶ δὲ

τούτων ὁ κληθεὶς Βοιωτικὸς πόλεμος ἐνίστη Λακεδαιμονίους πρὸς Βοιωτοὺς διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας. In Paus. 8. 48. 4 ὁ Λακεωνικὸς πόλεμος is used of an early war between Tegea and the Lacedaemonians in the days of King Charillus or Charilaus.

11. τοῦτο, i. e. a change of constitution arising from the disproportionate increase of a part of the State, as in 3.

πλείονων γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This explains why not a few democrats thought that the best means of preserving a democracy was to oppress and plunder the rich ([Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 4, 14). That when the rich increased in wealth without increasing in numbers a *δυναστεία* often resulted is what we should expect from 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 30 sqq.

18. *δυναστείας*. After this word Sus. would insert 1304 a 17, μεταβάλλουσι δὲ... b 5, πρὸς πολλούς, but this change of order involves the insertion of a passage dealing with the ἐξ ἑν αἱ μεταβολαί, which is the subject treated in 1303 b 17-1304 b 5, in the midst of a passage dealing with the δι' αἱ μεταβολαί, the subject treated in 1302 a 37-1303 b 17, for ἐκ τοῦ εὐδοκμῆσαι, 1304 a 18, takes up the ἐκ of 1303 b 18, 21, 37, 1304 a 4, 10, 14. Besides, the passage 1304 a 17-b 5 must not be severed from what immediately precedes it in 1303 b 17-1304 a 17, for it stands in contrast to this, a transition being made from revolutions occasioned by insult to revolutions occasioned by a rise in reputation and greatness (see note on 1304 a 17).

μεταβάλλουσι δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι καὶ ἄνευ στάσεως κ.τ.λ., 'and constitutions change even without civil discord,' etc. See note on 1302 b 3. Another way in which constitutions changed without civil discord was through a change in the value of the property-qualification (c. 6. 1306 b 6 sqq.: c. 8. 1308 a 35 sqq.). This is not mentioned here.

14. τὰς ἐριθείας. Ἐριθεία ('canvassing for office') occurs in the sing. in c. 2. 1302 b 4, but both it and ἐριθειέσθαι (16) are very rare words.

ὥσπερ ἐν Ἡραίᾳ. Heraea appears to have been under an oligarchy when this change was introduced (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 130). The lot is spoken of as an antidote to στάσις in Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3. 1424 a 12 sqq. Compare the reason for which the lot was introduced in 1268 at Venice in the election of the Doge (De La Houssaye, Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise, 1. 15: Yriarte, Patricien de Venise, pp. 340 sqq., 345), and also that for which the

practice of 'imborsazione' was introduced at Florence. The names of all who were to hold any of the magistracies for a long time to come were put into a bag or purse and drawn out from time to time when an office had to be filled. 'It was thought that these "imborsations" would prevent much trouble to the city and remove the cause of those tumults which took place on the creation of magistrates from the number of candidates for office' (Machiavelli, History of Florence, Book ii, c. 6: Eng. Trans., p. 81). 'The lot was introduced at Basle in 1718 to prevent election intrigues. The only exception made was in the case of the Burgomaster and of envoys' (Roscher, Politik, p. 369, note 13). See note on 1305 a 28 as to the risks attending the filling of offices by popular election.

15. ἐποίησαν, sc. τὰς ἀρχάς, which is suppressed because it will readily be supplied (see note on 1296 a 5). It is hardly likely, however, that all the offices, the military ones not excepted, came to be filled by lot. Still Aristotle seems to imply that the change amounted to a modification of the constitution in a democratic direction.

16. καὶ δι' ὀλιγωρίαν κ.τ.λ. Hence the advice given in c. 9. 1309 a 33 sqq. That a magistrate had special opportunities of overthrowing a constitution we see from Plato, Laws 715 A, παραφυλάττοντες δὲ ἀλλήλους ζῶσιν, ὅπως μὴ ποτέ τις εἰς ἀρχὴν ἀφικόμενος ἐπαναστῇ μεμνημένος τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γεγονότων κακῶν: see also note on 1310 b 23. It is well known how many precautions were taken at Florence to prevent Ghibellines finding their way into office.

17. εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς κυρίας παρίεναι. Cp. Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 10, Πομπήϊος δὲ καὶ θριαμβεύειν ἡξίου μήπω παρὶν εἰς σύγκλητον, and [Demosth.] Epist. 3. p. 1481, εἰς τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι παρῆι. Τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς κυρίας, 'the supreme magistracies.' The phrase recurs in c. 9. 1309 a 33 sq. and c. 10. 1310 b 20 and in 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 7: cp. 2. 8. 1268 a 23, 3. 6. 1278 b 10, 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 25, and 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 31 sq. In 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 30 we read of ἀρχαὶ κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας, which is not quite the same thing. The expression αἱ κύριαι ἀρχαί does not seem to be of frequent occurrence outside the Politics. It does not occur in the Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία.

18. ὡς περ ἐν Ὀρεῶ κ.τ.λ. Hestiaeae in Euboea (mentioned under that name in c. 4. 1303 b 32 sqq.) came to be often called by the name of Oreus, one of its demes, when after its revolt from Athens in B.C. 446 its citizens were expelled from Euboea and their place was taken by 2,000 Athenian cleruchs. Sus.² (Note

1529) and Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 64. 2, refer the change introduced by Heracleodorus to B.C. 377, when the State revolted from the Lacedaemonians (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 56 sq.) and joined the new Athenian Confederacy, in which it appears under the title [Ἑσ]τιαιῆς (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 81). This was, in fact, still the official name of the colony, though the name Oreus was more commonly used (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 430. 2). According to Pausanias (7. 26. 4) some people even in his day called Oreus by its old name Hestiaea. Oreus lay on the coast a little to the west of Hestiaea (Baedeker's Greece, p. 208). Compare with the case of Heracleodorus at Oreus that of Leontiades at Thebes, who, holding the office of polemarch, introduced the Spartan Phoebeidas and his troops into the Cadmeia and revolutionized the State (Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 76: vol. 10, p. 80 sqq.).

20. καί, 'or rather': see Shilleto on Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 90 (102), ἀπόλωλε καὶ γέγονεν ἀσθενής, where Phil. 3. c. 39, ἀπόλωλε καὶ νενόσθηκεν ἡ Ἑλλάς, is compared, and cp. Thuc. 6. 60. 1, πάντα αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ὀλιγαρχικῇ καὶ τυραννικῇ πεπεράχθαι. See also notes on 1262 a 6 and 1335 b 40.

ἐτι διὰ τὸ παρὰ μικρόν, 'further on account of the slightness of the difference between one thing and another.' This source of constitutional change is marked off from ὀλιγωρία because, while in cases of ὀλιγωρία the peril is not overlooked but is made light of, here it is overlooked and escapes attention altogether. For τὸ παρὰ μικρόν see Bon. Ind. 562 a 28 sqq., where Anal. Pr. 1. 33. 47 b 38 is referred to among other passages, αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀπάτη γίνεται ἐν τῷ παρὰ μικρόν ὥς γὰρ οὐδὲν διαφέρει εἰπεῖν τόδε τῷδε ὑπάρχειν ἢ τόδε τῷδε παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, συγχωροῦμεν (a passage evidently based on Plato, Phaedrus, 261 E sq., which Eaton quotes). In c. 7. 1307 b 2 sq. and c. 8. 1307 b 32 τὸ μικρόν takes the place of τὸ παρὰ μικρόν. As to Ambracia see note on 1304 a 31.

22. τῶν νομίμων. The expression τὰ νόμιμα is used in much the same sense as οἱ νόμοι in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5, 7 (see note), but in Plato, Crito, 53 C and Laws 793 A sqq. τὰ νόμιμα and οἱ νόμοι are distinguished, the latter passage explaining τὰ νόμιμα to be the unwritten customs which are the best support of written laws. In the passage before us τὰ νόμιμα probably includes both written and unwritten law, so that Susemihl's rendering 'der gesetzlichen Zustände' ('of the legal order of things') is perhaps not far from the truth.

25. στασιωτικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον, ὥς ἂν συμπνεύσῃ.

Here we enter on the class of *στάσεις* caused by *ἀνομοιότης* (c. 2. 1302 b 5). There may be *ἀνομοιότης* of race (i. e. *τῶν ἀνθρώπων*) or *ἀνομοιότης* of site (*τῶν τόπων*). The former is dealt with in 1303 a 25—b 3, and the latter in 1303 b 7—17. Aristotle does not say that unlikeness in either respect causes constitutional change, but only that it causes *στάσις*. For *στασιωτικόν* (the adjective *στασιαστικός* is not given in the Index Aristotelicus and does not appear to be used by Aristotle, though all MSS. have *στασιαστικῶς* in 3. 13. 1284 b 22), cp. c. 6. 1306 a 38, where Π² have *στασιωτικῶς* and M² P¹ and possibly Γ *στασιαστικῶς*. Aristotle has here before him Plato, Laws 708 D (where Plato may remember the experience of Thuri), τὸ δ' αὖ παντοδαπὸν ἐς ταῦτ' ξυνεργηκὸς γένος ὑπακούσαι μὲν τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν τάχα ἂν ἐβελήσειε μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ συμπνεῦσαι καὶ καθάπερ ἱππῶν (ζυγὸς καθ' ἓνα εἰς ταῦτόν, τὸ λεγόμενον, ξυμφυσῆσαι χρόνον πολλοῦ καὶ παγχάλεπον. Cp. also Plut. Lycurg. et Num. inter se comp. c. 4 *sub fin.*, πόλει οὕτω συμπεπνευκίας, and Sympos. 4. 1. 2, and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3. 10 *sub fin.*, ἡ δ' ὑμετέρα πόλις ἀδιακόσμητος ἔστιν ἔτι καὶ ἀδιάτακτος, ὅτε νεόκτιστος οὖσα καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν συμφορητῇ ἐθνῶν, ἢ μακρῶν δει χρόνων καὶ παθημάτων παντοδαπῶν, ἵνα καταρτισθῇ καὶ παύσῃται ταραττομένη καὶ στασιάζουσα ὥσπερ νῦν. See also Eth. Nic. 8. 4. 1156 b 25 sqq. and 9. 5. 1167 a 11 sqq. As to τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον see note on 1330 a 26. It would seem from the examples adduced in what follows that Aristotle denies the name of *ὁμόφυλοι* not only to Achaeans and Troezenians or to Lesbians and Chians, but also to Zancleians and Samians and to Amphipolitans and Chalcidians, though all four peoples were of Ionic extraction. Aristotle's remark is illustrated by our own experience in South Africa. 'There is a native population in South Africa in varying stages of civilization, and there is a white population of diverse nationalities. There are descendants of Dutch settlers and of French refugees, a considerable German population, and a large number, but not a majority, of English people. It is not an easy matter to carry on the administration of affairs in such a country, but it has been the aim of the Colonial Governments to weld together as one people those various nationalities' (Speech of Sir J. Gordon Sprigg, *Times*, August 5, 1886). It will be noticed that in most of the instances given by Aristotle either the one stock or the other was expelled from the State. Conflicts of race were as bitter within the Greek City-State as conflicts of class. We notice also that after a time distinct races came to pull better together. The children born in the colony

would feel less removed from each other in race, and would agree better together, than the immigrants themselves had done, and the lapse of time would do something to improve the relations even of the latter to each other. Plutarch (Num. c. 17) gives an interesting account of the way in which he conceives that Numa at Rome sought to make the distinction between the Sabines and Romans less sharp (see note on 1319 b 19).

26. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος πλήθους πόλις γίγνεται. Sus.² (Note 1531 b) refers to 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 18 and to 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 16, ἡ γὰρ πόλις πλήθους ἐστὶν οὐ τὸ τυχόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ζῶν ἀνταρκες, which explains the passage before us. Not any and every body of men will serve to form a πόλις: they must not be too many or too few (4 (7). 4. 1326 b 2 sqq.), nor all slaves nor all poor men (3. 9. 1280 a 32: 3. 12. 1283 a 18), nor all βάνανσοι (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 18 sqq.); some of them must be fighting men (6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6 sqq.), some fit to be judges and members of the deliberative (1291 a 22 sqq.). They must be unlike (2. 2. 1261 a 22 sqq.), yet not too unlike (6 (4). 11. 1295 b 21 sqq.). For ὥσπερ οὐδέ followed by οὕτως οὐδέ, cp. Xen. Cyrop. 1. 6. 18, λέγεις σύ, ἔφη, ὦ πάτερ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὥσπερ οὐδέ γεωργοῦ ἀργοῦ οὐδὲν ὄφελος, οὕτως οὐδέ στρατηγοῦ ἀργοῦντος οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι.

27. διὸ ὅσοι ἤδη συνοίκους ἐδέξαντο ἢ ἐποίκους, οἱ πλείστοι διεστασίασαν. See in *Rhein. Mus.* 42. p. 424 O. Crusius' remarks on the Greek proverbs, ποιήσόν με Ἴνικον, ἵνα σὲ ποιήσω ἔξικον, and ἔπηλυσ τὸν Ἴνικον, λείπει τὸ ἐξίβαλλεν. Διό, 'hence,' because τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον is productive of στάσις. It is implied that σύνοικοι and ἐποίκοι will not be ὁμόφυλοι. The word σύνοικοι is here used of those who join in founding a city, but it is not always used in this strict sense; it is not, for instance, in Thuc. 2. 68. 5 and Diod. 14. 9. 9, where the σύνοικοι spoken of might have been called ἐποίκοι. Aristotle's first two examples are of σύνοικοι, the rest of ἐποίκοι. All his illustrations of ἐποίκοι are taken from colonies. States in Greece Proper, however, must sometimes have recruited their population with ἐποίκοι. The introduction of ἐποίκοι from the mother-city will hardly have been attended with the risks here described, though even ἐποίκοι from the mother-city would perhaps not be accounted ὁμόφυλοι. It was when, as at Antissa and Zancle, the ἐποίκοι came not from a variety of alien sources, but from a single State which was not the mother-State of the colony, or when they belonged to an alien stock powerful in the vicinity, as

at Amphipolis and Argos Amphiloichicum (Thuc. 2. 68. 5), or when, as at Syracuse, they formed a body of men accustomed to act together, that the operation of introducing *ἔποικοι* was attended with most risk. The metoeci and other aliens to whom Cleisthenes gave citizenship at Athens probably came from a variety of sources, not from a single city or stock, and their successful fusion with the older citizens was no doubt due partly to this, and partly to the pains which Cleisthenes took to mingle the two elements of the citizen-body (8 (6). 4. 1319 b 19 sqq.: 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 21). 'Ἦδη, 'ere now,' cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 5 sq., Xen. Mem. 4. 8. 5, οὐχ ὄρας . . . ὅτι οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι δικασταὶ πολλοὺς μὲν ἤδη μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας λόγῳ παραχθέντες ἀπέκτειναν, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀδικοῦντας ἀπέλυσαν; and Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 b 18 sq. 'Ἦδη with the perfect, as in Hist. An. 7. 6. 585 b 7 sq., is much less common than *ἦδη* with the aorist' (Richards). *Διεστασίαν* is here intrans. as in Polyb. 1. 82. 4: it is used in a transitive sense in c. 4. 1303 b 26 and c. 6. 1306 a 3.

28. οἷον Τροίησι τοῖς Ἀχαιοὶ συνέκρησαν Σύβαριν. 'Cp. Solin. 2. 1' (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 398. 5)—Solin. 2. 10 Mommsen. Some identify the expulsion of the Troezenians here mentioned with the expulsion by the demagogue Telys of the five hundred wealthiest citizens mentioned by Diodorus (12. 9. 2), but with doubtful correctness. The expulsion of the Troezenians probably occurred at a far earlier date.

30. ὅταν τὸ ἔργον συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις. The *ἔργον* at Athens is well known. We hear of an *ἔργον* also at Megara (Plut. Quaest. Gr. c. 59) and at Delphi (Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32. 825 A sqq.), to say nothing of that which arose from the murder of Aesop there (Plut. De Sera Numinis Vindicta, c. 12). In the last-named chapter we read of a *μήνιμα* τῆς Λευκαδίας 'Ἦρας with which Sybaris was afflicted—*Συβαρίταις δὲ φράζων* (ὁ 'Απόλλων) ἀπέλυσεν τῶν κακῶν, ὅταν τρισὶν ἐλέθροις διάσωνται τὸ μήνιμα τῆς Λευκαδίας 'Ἦρας—but whether this was identical with the *ἔργον* mentioned in the text does not appear. See as to the passage before us Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 769. 1, where other crimes are noticed which were supposed to have led to the destruction of Sybaris.

31. καὶ ἐν Θουρίοις Συβαρίται τοῖς συνοικήσαν, sc. *διεστασίαν* οἱ ἐστειλάν. Cp. Diod. 12. 11. 1, ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον ὁμονοήσαντες οἱ Θούριοι στάσει μεγάλῃ περιέπεσον οὐκ ἀλόγως· οἱ γὰρ προὔπαρχοντες Συβαρίται τὰς μὲν ἀξιολογώτατας ἀρχὰς ἑαυτοῖς προσέειπον, τὰς δ' εὐτελεῖς τοῖς ὑποταγομένοις πολίταις, καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἐπιβίβειν τοῖς θεοῖς

ᾤοντο δὲιν πρώτας μὲν τὰς πολίτιδας, ὑτέρας δὲ τὰς μεταγευστέρας· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὴν μὲν σύγγενυσ τῇ πόλει χώραν κατεκληρούχουν ἑαυτοῖς, τὴν δὲ πόρρω κειμένην τοῖς ἐπὶ ἡλυσί· γενομένης δὲ διαφορᾶς διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας, οἱ προσγραφέντες ὑστερον πολῖται πλείους καὶ κρείττους ὄντες ἀπέκτειναν σχεδὸν ἅπαντας τοὺς προϋπάρχοντας Συβαρίτας (Aristotle says that the Sybarites were driven out) καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτοὶ κατέκτισαν, and Strabo, p. 263, ὕστερον δ' οἱ περιγεγόμενοι (Συβαρίται) συνελθόντες ἐπέκουν ὀλίγοι· χρόνῳ δὲ καὶ οὗτοι διεφθάρσαν ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, οἱ συνοικήσαντες μὲν ἐκείνοις ἀφίκοντο, καταφρονήσαντες δὲ αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν διεχειρίσαντο . . . τὴν δὲ πόλιν εἰς ἕτερον τόπον μετέθηκεν πλησίον καὶ Θουρίου προσηγύρευσαν ἀπὸ κρήνης ὁμωνύμου. Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 523. 3) bases partly on this passage of Strabo, partly on other considerations, his conclusion that the colonization of Thurii from Athens and other parts of Hellas was preceded by a similar colonization of Sybaris, and that it was from Sybaris, and not from the subsequently founded colony of Thurii, that the Sybarite section of the colonists was expelled in consequence of the position of superior privilege assumed by it. Aristotle's language in the passage before us, however, leaves no doubt that, in his view at any rate, the expulsion took place at Thurii.

32. ὡς σφετέρας τῆς χώρας, 'in the view that the country belonged to them.' Τῆς χώρας means, I think, 'the country,' not 'the soil.' Cp. Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 177, ὡς αὐτοῦ τῆς χώρας οὐσης. The extent to which the Sybarite members of the colony of Thurii carried their claims may be inferred from the fact that the name πολίτιδες is given in Diod. 12. 11. 1 (quoted above on 31) to their wives and daughters exclusively. So in Thera and in Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf the descendants of the first settlers were alone accounted ἐλεύθεροι and were alone admissible to office (6 (4). 4. 1290 b 9 sqq.). In our own day, as has been noticed already, the 'burghers' of the South African Republic, representing the original colonists, claim in a similar way to exclude the 'Uitlanders,' or alien new-comers to the colony, from all real participation in political power.

33. καὶ Βυζαντίους κ.τ.λ. Nothing is known of this event, or of the events at Antissa mentioned in the next line. The success of the people of Antissa in ridding themselves of the Chians is evidently contrasted with the failure of the Zancleans to rid themselves of the Samians. It was a bold step on the part of a small Aeolian State like Antissa to receive a body of exiles belonging to

a powerful Ionian State like Chios. It was through receiving exiles from Colophon that the Aeolic city of Smyrna was detached from the neighbouring group of Aeolic States (Hdt. 1. 150). These Chian exiles probably hoped to repeat at Antissa the *coup* which had succeeded so well at Smyrna.

35. Ζαγκλαῖοι δὲ Σαμίους ὑποδεξάμενοι ἐξέπεσον αὐτοί. According to Hdt. 6. 22 sqq. the Zancleaeans did not invite the Samians who fled their country after the suppression of the Ionic Revolt to join them at Zancle; they invited the Ionians of Asia Minor in general to found a new Ionic colony at Calê Actê on the north coast of Sicily, no doubt with the object of strengthening the Ionic element in Sicily against the Doric and of strengthening Zancle against the Sicels; it was a foe of Zancle, Anaxilaus tyrant of Rhegium, who suggested to the Samians to give up colonizing Calê Actê and to seize Zancle during the temporary absence of its citizens, who were occupied in besieging a Sicel city. The whole story is told by Herodotus (6. 22 sqq.): see also Freeman, Sicily, 2. 109 sqq. 'Εξέπεσον αὐτοί contrasts the case of Zancle with those of Byzantium and Antissa, in which the new settlers were expelled.

36. καὶ Ἀπολλωνιάται οἱ ἐν τῇ Εὐξείνῃ πόντῳ κ.τ.λ. The last five words are added to distinguish this Apollonia, which was a colony of Miletus, from other cities of the same name, and especially from Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf, which was a colony of Corinth and Corcyra. The busy seaport of the Euxine coast of Thrace with its two large harbours, situated, partly on an island, close to the southern horn of the deep bay of Bourgas, was, however, a very different sort of place from the quiet and 'well-ordered' city of Illyria nearly seven miles from the sea, as to which see note on 1290 b 9. The Thracian city owed its name to its famous temple of Apollo (Strabo, p. 319: Head, Hist. Num. p. 236), and perhaps also to its Milesian origin, for one of the chief worshipers of the Milesian State was that of Apollo at Branchidae. It is said in the poem which passes under the name of Scymnus Chius (730 sqq.) to have been founded 'fifty years before the kingship of Cyrus,' i.e. in B.C. 610, but if it was founded by the philosopher Anaximander (Aelian, Var. Hist. 3. 17), who was apparently born in B.C. 611 and died soon after B.C. 547 (Diog. Laert. 2. 2), it must have been founded at least twenty or thirty years later. It deserves notice that the Megarian colony of Heracleia, which was founded on the south coast of the Euxine by Megarians and Boeotians

(Ephor. *Fragm.* 83: Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* 1. 259) about the middle of the sixth century B. C. (Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ed. 2, 2. 487), and which was situated at about the same distance from Byzantium as Apollonia, was named after Heracles just as Apollonia was named after Apollo, probably because Heracles was born at Thebes and his mother Alcmenê and son Hyllus had tombs at Megara (Paus. 1. 41: cp. Justin, 16. 3. 4). Apollonia was in all likelihood founded a good deal earlier than Heracleia, but the resemblance of the names of the two colonies suggests that the latter may have been founded in rivalry with the former. The Euxine (Ἐϋξῖνος, not Ἐξέτινος, probably because it received its name from the Milesian settlers on its shores) is here called by its full title: more usually Aristotle speaks of it as ὁ Πόντος (5 (8). 4. 1338 b 21: 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 36, 1306 a 9). We read in c. 6. 1306 a 7 sqq. of an oligarchy at the Pontic Apollonia which was overthrown by citizens attacking dishonest office-holders, but whether the incident mentioned in the passage before us was connected with the fall of this oligarchy it is impossible to say.

88. καὶ Συρακοῦσιοι κ.τ.λ. As to this passage see Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, 5. 318, note. The 'aliens and mercenaries' referred to were already citizens before the fall of the tyranny of Thrasybulus—they had been made citizens by the tyrants (Diod. 11. 72. 3)—but now the Syracusans made them citizens, rendering them however—and this important fact Aristotle does not mention—inadmissible to office (Diod. *ibid.*). It was the infliction of this disability on men who, as Grote says, had been the first citizens of the State under the tyrants, that led them to rebel. They rebelled, in fact, not because they were citizens of a different stock from the rest, which is the cause assigned by Aristotle for their rebellion, but because the citizenship conferred on them was of an inferior kind. 'This is not a case properly adducible to prove the difficulty of adjusting matters with new-coming citizens' (Grote). Sus.² (Note 1538) seeks to reconcile Aristotle's account with that of Diodorus by taking μετὰ τὰ τυραννικά exclusively with ἰστανταίαν and not also with ποιησάμενοι, but it seems hardly possible to get over the difficulty in this way.

μετὰ τὰ τυραννικά. See note on 1270 b 11.

τοὺς ξένους καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους. Kai is here explanatory (see note on 1257 b 7). The addition of καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους, however, also serves to place the step in its full significance before the

reader. To make ξῖνοι citizens was a strong measure, but to make μισθοφόροι citizens was a still stronger one. Μισθοφόροι were both disliked and despised in Greece (Plato, *Laws* 630 B: Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 123). Wyttenbach (Index to Plutarch, s. v. μισθοφόρος) remarks, 'In vita Dionis μισθοφόροι dicuntur Dionysii milites, ξῖνοι Dionis milites. Attamen aliquoties Dionis milites dicuntur μισθοφόροι, sed ex persona Syracusanorum, qui iam Dionis ξῖνους odisse incipiebant.' See note on 1310 b 12, ἐκ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τοῦ πλήθους.

2. καὶ Ἀμφιπολίται κ.τ.λ. The people of Amphipolis were rash. 1303 b. The city lay in the immediate neighbourhood of the powerful Chalcidian Confederacy, the cities composing which had from the first viewed with jealousy its colonization by Athens (Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ed. 2, 3. 1. 560), and to admit a body of Chalcidians to citizenship was to incur a great risk. This soon became evident. The newly-made Chalcidian citizens, strong in the support of the neighbouring Confederacy, expelled most of the older citizens of Amphipolis (cp. c. 6. 1306 a 2 sqq.). It is possible that Amphipolis was already on friendly terms with the Chalcidian Confederacy when it decided to admit these new citizens; it is, however, also possible that the step prepared the way for the close relation in which we find Amphipolis standing to Olynthus, the head of the Chalcidian Confederacy, in B.C. 365-4. Schäfer (Demosthenes, 2. 9) takes the latter view. In any case the victory of the Chalcidian settlers at Amphipolis strengthened the hold of Olynthus on the city and secured to the Chalcidian Confederacy the important bridge over the Strymon at Amphipolis which was a main means of communication between Macedon and Thrace, much no doubt to the dissatisfaction of Macedon. Amphipolis was, in fact, in B.C. 365-4, not long in all probability after the event here mentioned by Aristotle, 'a free Greek city inhabited by a population in the main seemingly Chalcidic, and in confederacy with Olynthus' (Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, 10. 344, who refers to Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 150). Hence Timotheus, seeking in that year to recover Amphipolis for Athens, attacked and took many Chalcidic towns allied with Olynthus (Diod. 15. 81: Deinarch. c. Demosth. c. 14, c. Philocl. c. 17). Olynthus was thus weakened, and 'the most effective barrier against Macedonian aggrandizement' broken down (Grote, 10. 525). The coins both of Amphipolis and of the Chalcidian Confederacy have a head of Apollo on the obverse, in the former however facing, in the latter in profile (Head, *Hist.*

Num. pp. 185, 190). It is probable that some of the Amphipolitans who were exiled by the Chalcidian intruders on the occasion referred to in the text lived to see with vengeful exultation the destruction of Olynthus by Philip of Macedon in B.C. 348. For the qualifying addition of *οἱ πλείστοι αὐτῶν* cp. Strabo, Book 7. Fragm. 11, *ἐξ ὧν* (sc. πόλεων) ὕστερον ἐκβαλλόμενοι (οἱ Χαλκιδείς) συνήλθον εἰς μίαν οἱ πλείους αὐτῶν.

3. [στασιάζουσι δὲ—7. ὄντες]. I agree with Sus. and others that this paragraph is not in place here. Sus.³ thinks that there is no other place to which it can fitly be transferred, but it has been already suggested in the critical and explanatory notes on 1301 a 39, *στασιάζουσιν*, that it should be inserted after that word.

4. *ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις*. In aristocracies also, it would seem (c. 7. 1307 a 23 sqq.).

5. *πρότερον*, in c. 1. 1301 a 33 sqq. It is no objection to the proposed transposition that, if we place 1303 b 3-7 after 1301 a 39, *στασιάζουσιν*, the reference in *καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον* will be to what has been said eight lines above. Reference is made in a similar way to passages equally near or nearer in 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 11, where *ὅπερ εἴρηται πρότερον* refers to 1328 a 1 sqq., in 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 29, where *καθάπερ εἵπομεν* refers to 1328 b 24-28, and in De Caelo, 1. 1. 268 a 19, where *ὥσπερ εἴρηται* refers to 268 a 13 sqq.

7. *στασιάζουσι δὲ ἐνίοτε αἱ πόλεις καὶ διὰ τοὺς τόπους κ.τ.λ.* Καὶ διὰ τοὺς τόπους stands in tacit contrast to διὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, or in other words διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁμόφυλον, which is the origin of στάσις dealt with in what precedes, if we remove 1303 b 3-7 to another place. See note on 1303 a 25. Cp. Plut. Solon, c. 13, οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι . . . τὴν παλαιὰν αἰθὴν στάσιν ὑπὲρ τῆς πολιτείας ἐστασίαζον, ὅσας ἡ χώρα διαφορὰς εἶχεν, εἰς τοσαῦτα μέρη τῆς πόλεως διαστάσης. Cities, both Greek and other, were often built partly on an island close to the coast and partly on the mainland itself: so Cnidus, which Strabo calls δίπολις on this account (p. 656), Apollonia on the Euxine (note on 1303 a 36), and also Aradus and Tyre. 'Comme Arad, Tyr avait une partie insulaire où s'élevaient ses temples et ses arsenaux, une partie continentale qu'on appelait la vieille Tyr, Palae-Tyros' (Maspero, Hist. Ancienne des Peuples de l'Orient, p. 192). We read of the Aradians in Polyb. 5. 68. 7, τὴν διαφορὰν τὴν προὔπαρχουσιν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κατέπαυσεν (Ἀντίοχος), διαλύσας τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ πρὸς τοὺς τὴν ἡπειρὸν κατοικοῦντας τῶν Ἀραδίων. Part of Clazomenae, again, was on an island, part on the mainland

opposite to it, and the two parts did not pull well together. The interest of those who dwelt in the island would be to favour the masters of the sea, for instance Athens; the interest of those who dwelt on the mainland would be to favour Persia. So in Thuc. 3. 34 Persia finds it easier to win Colophon than Notium, the seaport of Colophon. We are reminded of the feud between Plymouth and Plymouth Dock in Boswell's *Life of Johnson*. 'Johnson affecting to entertain the passions of the place was violent in opposition . . . No, no! I am against the Dockers; I am a Plymouth man. Rogues! Let them die of thirst. They shall not have a drop!' The relations between England and Ireland might have been better if the two countries were not severed by the sea.

9. οἱ ἐπὶ Χύτρῳ, sc. στασιάζουσι. Sus.³ and Mr. E. L. Hicks (Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 76) follow Sylburg in reading *Χυτῷ* in place of *Χύτρῳ*, referring to *Corpus Inscr. Att.* 2. pp. 397, 423, with which Sus. compares Ephor. *Fragm.* 136 (Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* 1. 271), and it is much in favour of their view that the phrase οἱ ἐπὶ *Χυτῷ* occurs in the inscription, and that τ and τρ are easily confused (see critical note on 1338 b 23), but Strabo (p. 645) has *Χύτριον*, and this fact lends some support to the reading *Χύτρῳ* here. There was a town called *Χύτρος* in Cyprus, and another called *Χυτρόπολις* in Thrace (Theopomp. *Fragm.* 150: Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* 1. 304). Why ἐπὶ *Χύτρῳ*, not ἐν *Χύτρῳ*? Is ἐπὶ here = ἐν, or does it mean 'near' (cp. Soph. *Philoct.* 353, τὰπὶ Τροίᾳ πύργῳ)?

10. καὶ Ἀθήνησιν κ.τ.λ. Ἀθήνησιν, 'in the Athenian State,' as in 2. 7. 1267 b 18, 3. 2. 1275 b 35, 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 24 etc., not specially 'at Athens,' for evidently Ἀθήνησιν includes the Peiraeus. Compare the use of ἐν *Λακεδαιμόνι* in 2. 5. 1263 a 35, where see note. Aristotle does not say of the Athenian citizens resident at the Peiraeus and of those resident at Athens what he says of the two sections of Clazomenians, that they στασιάζουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, though that did come about in the days of the Thirty (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 4. 24 sqq., 35—37), but only that there is a difference of political sentiment between them. Perhaps, however, this was more due to a difference of class and occupation, the Peiraeus being full of ναῦτας καὶ κελευστὰς καὶ κυβερνήτας (Plut. *Themist.* c. 19 *sub fin.*), than to residence on a distinct site. The site of Eleusis was distinct from that of Athens, but no great difference of political sentiment seems to have resulted.

12. ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις. Aristotle implies that the thing did not happen much in marches in time of peace.

15. μεγίστη μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'the greatest severance is perhaps that of virtue and vice.' This is so because it involves a difference of soul and of character (Poet. 2. 1448 a 2 sqq.), a difference in respect of goods of the soul, not external goods (4 (7). 1. 1323 b 6 sqq.). It is only on a severance of this kind that Aristotle consents to base the distinction of slave and free, well-born and low-born (1. 6. 1255 a 39 sqq.). Μὲν οὖν has nothing to answer to it, but it is perhaps virtually taken up by ὅν μία καὶ ἡ εἰρημένη ἐστίν, i.e. 'but the severance we have mentioned is a severance, though a minor one.'

διάστασις. We expect rather διαφορά, but Plato (Rep. 360 E) had spoken of the διάστασις of the ἄδικος and the δίκαιος.

16. καὶ οὕτω δῆ. See note on 1296 b 5.

μᾶλλον, sc. διάστασις ἐστίν.

- C. 4. 17. γίνονται μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle's reference to the effect of small differences of locality in producing στάσεις leads him to notice other minute causes of στάσις. Μὲν οὖν introduces a summing-up of what has just been said, in order that a further statement may be added to make the exact extent of Aristotle's assertion clear. Some might infer from his remarks that στάσις is in his view concerned with things of trivial moment, and Aristotle hastens to correct this impression by adding that though the occasions of στάσις are often small (I do not understand him to mean that they always are), the things with a view to which recourse is had to στάσις are great, and indeed that small discords are most fruitful of result when they arise within the circle of those who are supreme in the State (ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις, 19). In 1303 b 17—1304 b 5 we have to do with the ἐξ ὧν of constitutional change, its immediate occasions, not its profound causes. We see this from the recurrence of ἐκ in 1303 b 18, 21, 37, 1304 a 4, 10, 14, 18 (see note on 1303 a 13). That disagreements often arise ἐκ μικρῶν we have been told in 2. 5. 1263 a 17 sqq. We read in De Gen. An. 5. 6. 785 b 36 ἐβάρυνον καὶ εὐκίνητον τὸ μικρόν. Solon had said of the beginnings of Atē (Fragm. 13. 14),

ἀρχὴ δ' ἐξ ὀλίγου γίγνεται ὥστε πυρός,
φλαυρὴ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον, ἀνιερὴ δὲ τελευτᾷ,

and a similar thought may be traced in Soph. Aj. 1077 sq. : Eurip. Fragg. 415 Nauck (411, ed. 2),

μικροῦ γὰρ ἐκ λαμπηῆρος Ἰδαίων λίπας
πρήσειεν ἄν τις,

and 424 Nauck (420, ed. 2): Demosth. in Lept. c. 162 (already referred to in vol. i. p. 525, note 2): Polyb. 3. 7. 7, ἐπειδὴ φύεται μὲν ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων πολλάκις τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων: Tac. Ann. 4. 32 *sub fin.* Compare also De Caelo, 4. 3. 310 b 26, καίτοι ἐνίοτε καὶ ταῦτα ἐξ αὐτῶν μεταβάλλει, καὶ μικρὰς γενομένης ἐν τοῖς ἔξω κινήσεως τὸ μὲν εἰς ὑγίαν ἔρχεται τὸ δ' εἰς ἀξήν. Aristotle does not consider whether constitutional change is not sometimes prevented, as well as brought about, by small things. It should be noticed that the instances which Aristotle gives in what follows of στάσεις arising from small causes seem all to be taken from oligarchies (cp. c. 6. 1306 a 31 sqq.). Quarrels would be especially frequent and mischievous in oligarchies.

19. μέλιστα δὲ κ.τ.λ. Καὶ αἱ μικραί, sc. στάσεις, 'even small discords' (much more great ones): cp. 30, καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ μικρὸν ἀμάρτημα. Plato had said in Rep. 545 D, πᾶσα πολιτεία μεταβάλλει ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῇ τοῦτ' ἐγγίνηται, ὁμοιοῦντος δέ, καὶ πάνυ ὀλίγον ἢ, ἀδύνατον κινήθῃαι. Compare also for the thought De Gen. An. 4. 4. 771 a 11, τὰ μὲν οὖν μικρὸν παρεκβαίνοντα τὴν φύσιν (sc. τῶν τικτομένων) ζῆν εἴωθεν, τὰ δὲ πλείον οὐ ζῆν, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς κυρίοις τοῦ ζῆν γένηται τὸ παρὰ φύσιν, and Hist. An. 8. 2. 590 a 2, ὥστε δηλον ὅτι καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συστάσει ἀκαριαίου τινὸς μεταβάλλοντος τῷ μεγέθει, εἰαν ἢ ἀρχοειδές, γίνεται τὸ μὲν θῆλυ τὸ δ' ἄρρεν.

20. οἷον συνέβη καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις. Καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις, 'for example in Syracuse' (see note on 1255 a 36). If Busolt is right (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 785. 2), this feud arose under the oligarchy of the Gamori at Syracuse shortly before it was overthrown by the demos and the serfs (see note on 1302 b 31), an event followed by Gelon's seizure of Syracuse in B.C. 485. For ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 13, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων, and 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 7, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων, and see note on 1285 a 30. This story and that told about Delphi in 37 sqq. are told with added details in Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32, where we read, ἐν δὲ Συρακούσαις δυοῖν νεανίσκων συνήθων, ὁ μὲν τὸν ἐρώμενον τοῦ ἐταίρου λαβὼν φυλάσσειν διέφθειρεν ἀποδημούντος· ὁ δ' ἐκείνῳ πάλιν ὥσπερ ἀταποδίδους ὕβριν ἐμοίχευσε τὴν γυναῖκα· τῶν δὲ πρσιβυτέρων τις εἰς βουλὴν παρελθὼν ἐκέλευσεν ἀμφοτέρους ἐλαύνειν πρὶν ἀπολέσαι καὶ ἀναπλησθῆναι τὴν πόλιν ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῆς ἐχθρας· οὐ μὴν ἔπεισεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ

τούτου στασιώσαντες ἐπὶ συμφοραῖς μεγάλας τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἀνέτρεψαν. Plutarch not only, like Aristotle here, tells the two stories together, but also, as U. Köhler points out (*Rhein. Mus.* 53. 491), prefixes to them a remark very similar to that made by Aristotle in 1303 b 26 sqq., οὐδενὸς ἦπτον τῷ πολιτικῷ προσήκει ταῦτα (i.e. τὰς ἐκ πραγμάτων καὶ προσκρουσμάτων ἰδίων διαφορὰς) ἰᾶσθαι καὶ προκαταλαμβάνειν, ὅπως τὰ μὲν οὐδὲ ὅλως ἔσται, τὰ δὲ παύσεται ταχέως, τὰ δ' οὐ λήγεται μέγεθος οὐδὲ ἄψεται τῶν δημοσίων, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτοῖς μενεῖ τοῖς διαφερομένοις, αὐτὸν τε προσέχοντα καὶ φράζοντα τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς ἴδιαι κοινῶν καὶ μικρὰ μεγάλων αἰτία καθίσταται, παροφθέντα καὶ μὴ τυχόντα θεραπείας ἐν ἀρχῇ μὴδὲ παρηγορίας. Köhler thinks that Aristotle and Plutarch derive the stories from some common source in which they were narrated together and the moral was drawn as to the duty of the statesman which both of them draw. It should be noticed, however, that the two stories are told by Plutarch in a different order, the Delphian story coming first and the Syracusan second, and the intervening story about Hestiaea being omitted; that no mention is made by Plutarch of the point on which Aristotle especially insists, the fact that the two young Syracusans belonged to the ruling class; and that the moral drawn by Plutarch is not the same as that drawn by Aristotle, for while Plutarch advises that private feuds should be prevented from spreading to public affairs, Aristotle's advice is that feuds about small matters arising between members of *leading families* should be prevented from ending in a conflagration involving the whole State. If Aristotle and Plutarch, therefore, used a common source, one or other of them must have failed to follow it closely. Other hypotheses are possible. It will be observed that the two stories told by Plutarch are love-stories, and that he does not tell the story of the two brothers who quarrelled over an inheritance at Hestiaea. This fact suggests that the source from which the two stories came to him may have been a collection of Ἐρωτικά, possibly that of the Peripatetic Ariston of Ceos, from whom he gets the story that the hostility between Aristides and Themistocles at Athens began in a love-quarrel (Aristid. c. 2, and Themist. c. 3, where the account ends, ἐκ δὲ τούτου διετέλουν καὶ περὶ τὰ δημόσια στασιάζοντες, words which remind us of the passage quoted above from Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32). Whether the more detailed form in which Plutarch gives the two stories came ultimately from the 'Constitutions' ascribed to Aristotle, as has been suggested in vol. ii. p. xix, it

is impossible to say, but Ariston of Ceos would no doubt be acquainted with the 'Constitutions.'

22. *ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὄντων*. Köhler remarks (*Rhein. Mus.* 53. 490, note) that 'these words should not be taken to refer to the holding of definite offices, a view which has often been taken of their meaning, but to indicate that the two Syracusans belonged to the ruling class.' His interpretation of them suits the passage before us well, for it is a little surprising to hear of two *νεαῖσκοι* holding office, and also of one of them being absent from the State, though in office, unless indeed his office was a military office. The word *νεαῖσκοι*, however, must not be pressed too much, for one of the *νεαῖσκοι* was old enough to have a wife, and the use of *ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς εἶναι* in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 2 sq., where it seems clearly to mean 'to be in office,' makes against Köhler's view. Looking to this passage we shall probably be right in interpreting the phrase in the same way in c. 3. 1302 b 6 sqq., c. 6. 1305 b 2 sqq., c. 8. 1309 a 3, and the passage before us: cp. c. 8. 1308 a 5 sq., 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 12, and Thuc. 8. 89. 2.

23. *ἐταῖρος ὢν τις*, 'a person, though being his comrade': cp. c. 10. 1312 b 16, *κηδεστής ὢν*. We expect *ἄτερος* in place of *τις* (so Coray, placing it before *ἐταῖρος*), but cp. Philipp. 'Αργυρίου 'Αφανισμός, *Fragm.* (Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Gr.* 4. 469),

ἀν γὰρ ἀναβῇ τις, εὐθύς ἕτερος ἤρπασεν,
and Epicrat. Inc. Fab. *Fragm.* (Meineke, 3. 371),

λάχανόν τις ἔφη στοργγύλον εἶναι,
ποῖαν δ' ἄλλος, δένδρον δ' ἕτερος.

25. *ὡς αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν*. Cp. *Rhet.* 2. 23. 1398 a 24 sq. (*Bon. Ind.* 872 b 2). If adultery was a criminal offence at Syracuse, as it was at Heracleia and Thebes and elsewhere (see note on 1306 a 36), the aggrieved husband might have prosecuted the adulterer, though the fact that he was the original offender would probably have told against him in the lawcourt. But we hear nothing of any resulting lawsuit, only of a *στάσις* and *διάστασις*.

26. *διστασάσαν*, here transitive (see note on 1303 a 27).

διόπερ ἀρχομένων κ.τ.λ. τῶν τοιούτων, 'the feuds which we have described,' cp. c. 8. 1308 a 31, *τὰς τῶν γυναικῶν φιλονεικίας καὶ στάσεις*. Aristotle's precept is based on an early medical precept, which may be traced in Theogn. 1133,

Κύρνε, παροῦσι φίλοισι κακοῦ καταπαύσομεν ἀρχήν,
ζητῶμεν δ' ἄλκι φάρμακα φυομένῃ,

quoted by Leutsch and Schneidewin, *Paroem. Gr.* 2. 308, in their note on the proverb ἀρχὴν ἰᾶσθαι πολὺ λῑιον ἢ τελευτήν, where they also refer to Ovid, *Rem. Amor.* 91 sq. and *Pers. Sat.* 3. 64. Compare too Xen. *De Re Equestri*, 4. 2, and Hippocr. *Aphor.* vol. iii. p. 716 Kühn.

28. τῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ δυναμένων. Cp. Plato, *Gorg.* 525 E, ἀλλὰ γὰρ . . . ἐκ τῶν δυναμένων εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ σφόδρα πονηροὶ γεγνημένοι ἄθροαστοι.

ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ ἀμάρτημα, 'for the error arises in a starting-point' (or 'source'). The error referred to is the initial feud. Aristotle is led to speak of the ruling class as a starting-point, because the Greek word for 'rule' means also 'beginning.' Compare the similar play on the word in the *De Pace* of Isocrates, §§ 101, 105. Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, *Laws* 792 C, ἔστι γὰρ οὖν ἡμῖν ἡ τοιαύτη πρᾶξις διαφθορὰ μεγίστη πασῶν ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ γίγνεται ἐκάστοτε τροφή. Cp. *c.* 1. 1302 a 6, and *De Anim. Motione*, 7. 701 b 24, ὅτι δὲ μικρὰ μεταβολὴ γινομένη ἐν ἀρχῇ μεγάλας καὶ πολλὰς ποιεῖ διαφορὰς ἀποθεῖν, οὐκ ἄδηλον· οἶον τοῦ οἴακος ἀκαριαῖόν τι μεθισταμένου πολλὴ ἢ τῆς πρῆφρας γίνεται μετάστασις: *De Gen. An.* 1. 2. 716 b 3 sqq., 4. 1. 766 a 28 sqq., and 5. 7. 788 a 11, μικραὶ μεταστάσεις μεγάλων αἰτίαι γίνονται, οὐ δὲ αὐτάς, ἀλλ' ὅταν συμβαίῃ ἀρχὴν συμμεταβάλλειν· αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαὶ μεγέθει οὐσαι μικραὶ τῇ δυνάμει μεγάλαι εἰσὶν, τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀρχὴν εἶναι, τὸ αὐτὴν μὲν αἰτίαν εἶναι πολλῶν, ταύτης δ' ἄλλο ἄνωθεν μηδέν, together with *Fragm. Aristot.* 85. 1491 a 2 sqq.

29. ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ λέγεται ἡμῖσι εἶναι παντός. As to this familiar proverb see Eaton's note and that of Leutsch and Schneidewin in *Paroem. Gr.* 2. 13.

30. ἀνάλογόν ἐστι πρὸς τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν, 'bears a similar proportion to the errors in all the other parts,' i.e. is half of the whole, and therefore is equal to them, as they can be no more. Cp. *De Caelo*, 1. 5. 271 b 6 sqq., and especially 11, τούτου δ' αἰτίον ἐστι ἡ ἀρχὴ δυνάμει μείζων ἢ μεγέθει, διόπερ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ μικρόν ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ γίνεται παμμέγεθες.

31. ὅλως δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and broadly' (i.e. whether they arise *περὶ ἐρωτικὴν αἰτίαν*, like the one at Syracuse just referred to, which involved the whole State in its consequences, or not).

32. οἶον ἐν Ἑστιάᾳ κ.τ.λ. As to Hestiaea see note on 1303 a 18. As to τὰ Μηδικά see note on 1341 a 28. This quarrel appears to have happened between the battle of Plataea and the reduction of Hestiaea by Athens in B.C. 446. It is likely that the dissatisfied brother brought his case before a court of law, but without success.

Hestiaea was probably under an oligarchy at the time (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 64. 2), and the law or the lawcourts of an oligarchy may have favoured the richer suitor. Ἀποφαίνειν τὴν οὐσίαν is a technical expression: cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 4. l. 8, and [Demosth.] Or. 42. in Phaenipp. cc. 1, 11, 14. It will be noticed that in 35 the treasure discovered by the father is distinguished from ἡ οὐσία, perhaps because it was less unequivocally the property of the deceased man. This treasure may have been a treasure buried by the Persians like that discovered by Ameinocles the Magnesian, as to which compare (with Eaton) Hdt. 7. 190. See Schneider's note. But it may also have been a treasure 'laid up' by some Greek 'for himself and his family': cp. Plato, Laws 913, where we learn what was thought of those who took up such treasures.

37. καὶ ἐν Δελφοῖς κ.τ.λ. The story is thus told by Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32, οἷον ἐν Δελφοῖς ὁ μέγιστος λέγεται γενέσθαι νεωτερισμὸς ὑπὸ Κράτητος, οὗ μέλλον θυγατέρα γαμεῖν Ὀργίλαος ὁ Φάλιδος, εἴτα τοῦ κρατήρος αὐτομάτως ἐπὶ ταῖς σπονδαῖς μέσου βράγντος ὠλισμώμενος καὶ καταλειπὼν τὴν νύμφην ἀπῆλθε μετὰ τοῦ πατρός· ὁ δὲ Κράτης ὀλίγον ὕστερον θύουσιν αὐτοῖς ὑποβαλὼν χρυσίον τι τῶν ἱερῶν, κατεκρήμνισε τὸν Ὀργίλαον καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀκρίτους, καὶ πάλιν τῶν φίλων τινας καὶ οἰκίαν ἱκετεύοντας ἐν τῇ ἱερῇ τῆς Προναίας ἀνέϊλε· πολλῶν δὲ τοιούτων γενομένων, ἀποκτείναντες οἱ Δελφοὶ τὸν Κράτητα καὶ τοὺς στασιάζοντας ἐκ τῶν χρημάτων ἐναγκῶν προσπαρουνθέντων τοὺς κάτω ναοὺς ἀνγκοδόμησαν. See also Aelian, Var. Hist. 11. 5. The name of the defaulting bridegroom should perhaps be Orsilaus, not Orgilaus. At the marriage-feast in the house of the bride's father, at the close of which the bride would be conducted in procession to her new home, and in the presence of many of her relations and friends the cratêr, or vessel for mixing wine and water, burst asunder just when the libations were being made, the worst moment at which the mischance could happen. U. Köhler (*Rhein. Mus.* 53. 487) takes the κάτω ναοί of Plutarch to be three temples in a line with a fourth, identified by him as that of Athene Pronaia, the foundations of which have been traced below the road leading from Arachova to Delphi, a little before it crosses the brook which flows from the fountain of Castalia (see Frazer, Pausanias, 5. 251), but the point is uncertain. Aesop seems to have met a similar fate at Delphi to that which befel Orgilaus and his brother (Plut. De sera numinis vindicta, c. 12: Aristoph. Vesp. 1446 sqq. Didot). Vict. and many after him have compared the story of the jilting of a girl of the Amidei family at Florence by

young Buondelmonte (Machiavelli, Hist. of Florence, Book ii : Eng. Trans. Bohn, p. 50). The Emperor Frederick the Second, Machiavelli adds, took the side of the Amidei and Uberti, who drove out the Buondelmonti, 'and so our city came to be divided into Guefts and Ghibellines, as the whole of Italy was for a long time.' However, Orgilaus had a better case than Buondelmonte, for the latter had no ill omen to plead. It is not surprising that Delphi was much troubled with *στάσις*, for, to begin with, it was a small State, and small States were more troubled with *στάσις* than large (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 9 sqq.), and then again we can easily imagine how many opportunities of lawful and unlawful gain the authorities of the Delphic temple must have possessed (see for instance Diod. 14. 13), and how keen in consequence must have been the struggle for political power and control over the temple. Inscriptions recently discovered at Delphi have shown also how much profit of a lawful kind the Delphians and their phratries derived from the influx of strangers desirous of consulting the oracle (see Buchheim, Beiträge zur Geschichte des delphischen Staatswesens, I. 21 sqq.).

38. διαφοράς. See note on 1334 b 37.

ἐγένετο, sc. ἡ διαφορά. For the construction compare 1304 a 4 sqq. and 10 sqq., and see Vahlen's note on Poet. 4. 1449 a 9.

1304 a. 1. οἰωνισάμενός τι σύμπτωμα. Not, as Vict., 'cum enim sponsus ominatus esset quendam gravem casum,' but, as Weldon, 'interpreting as an omen of evil some accidental occurrence': compare Plutarch's narrative (quoted on 1303 b 37) and also Xen. Cyrop. 1. 6. 1, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔξω τῆς οἰκίας ἐγένοντο, λέγονται ἀστραπαὶ καὶ βροταὶ αὐτῷ αἰσίοι γενέσθαι· τούτων δὲ φανέντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἔτι οἰωνιζόμενοι ἐπορεύοντο.

2. οἱ δ' ὡς ὕβρισθέντες κ.τ.λ. The bride's relations thought that they were treated with *ὑβρις*, but in reality Orgilaus' act was not one of *ὑβρις*, but of superstitious dread. We learn from Plutarch that Orgilaus and his brother were put to death without trial: cp. Aelian, Var. Hist. 11. 5, λαβόντες οὖν αὐτοὺς ὡς θεοσύλας, ἀπήγαγον ἐπὶ τὴν πέτραν, καὶ κατεκρήμνισαν κατὰ τὸν Δελφικὸν νόμον. Precipitation from a cliff was the recognized punishment at Delphi for persons guilty of sacrilege (Paus. 10. 2. 4), and it may have been lawful, especially for men of high position like Crates, to inflict this punishment without a previous trial on offenders caught in the act. As to summary punishments of this kind see Thonissen, Droit Pénal de la République Athénienne, p. 92. Crates' subsequent

murder of friends and relatives of the victims, when suppliants in a temple, cannot, however, have been even technically legal.

4. καὶ περὶ Μιτυλήνην δὲ κ.τ.λ. See Prof. Jowett's note. I agree with him that there is no inconsistency between the passage before us and the account given by Thucydides of the revolt of Mytilene, except that the deeper causes of the revolt are better set forth by the latter. Thucydides explains how the proxenus of Athens 'spurred on' the Athenians in 3. 2. 3, *Τενέδιοι γὰρ ὄντες αὐτοῖς διάφοροι καὶ Μηθυμναῖοι καὶ αὐτῶν Μυτιληναίων ἰδίᾳ ἄνδρες κατὰ στάσιν, πρόξενοι Ἀθηναίων, μνησταὶ γίγνεται τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὅτι ξυνοικίζουσι τε τὴν Λέσβον ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην βίᾳ καὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν ἄπασαν μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν ξυγγενῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ ἀποστάσει ἐπείγονται*. It is evident from the speech of the Mytilenean envoys in Thuc. 3. 9 sqq. that the real cause of the revolt was the fear which the Mytileneans not unnaturally entertained of the ultimate loss of their independence, and nothing would do more to intensify this fear than the consciousness that they had been denounced to the Athenians. Aristotle was for some time a resident at Mytilene (vol. i. p. 466), and he may have heard this story there, possibly from a descendant of Timophanes, or he may have heard it from his friend and pupil Theophrastus, who belonged to Eresus in Lesbos.

5. ἐγένετο, sc. ἡ στάσις (see note on 1303 b 38).

7. Τιμοφάνους γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We are more familiar with the Corinthian Timophanes, the brother of Timoleon, of whom we read in c. 6. 1306 a 23 sq. We do not learn whether Timophanes had made a will and bequeathed his two orphan heiresses to others than the two sons of Dexander, or why, if he had not, they did not pass in marriage to the nearest male relative (see note on 1270 a 21). Perhaps the question who the nearest male relative was may have been a disputed one and may have been decided by the magistrates or lawcourts of the Mytilenean oligarchy against Dexander, or perhaps the strict rules which prevailed at Athens with respect to succession to the hand of an orphan heiress did not prevail at Mytilene, and much was left to the discretion of the magistrate or the heir of the deceased father (as at Sparta: see note on 1270 a 21). It is evident that a precise rule as to the succession to the hand of an orphan heiress and an honest application of it by the magistrate or the lawcourt were things very conducive to the internal peace of Greek States. Aristotle's narrative does not make it clear why Dexander avenged his disappointment, not on his successful

rival, but on the State of Mytilene; probably, however, the authorities of the State had in some way or other lent support to the claims of his opponent.

8. ὁ περιωσθεὶς, cp. c. 6. 1306 a 32.

τοῖς υἱαῖσιν αὐτοῦ, 'for his own sons,' a dative of gain.

9. The difference of tense in ἦρξε and παρώξυνε (a continued action) should be noticed.

10. καὶ ἐν Φωκεῦσιν κ.τ.λ. Περὶ Μνασέαν, 'in connexion with Mnaseas': cp. Hdt. 3. 76, τὰ περὶ Πρηξάσπεια γεγονότα, 'the circumstances that had happened in connexion with Prexaspes.' Τὸν 'Ονομάρχου, sc. πατέρα. The passage before us is our only source of information with respect to this στάσις. Mnason was a friend of Aristotle (Timaeus ap. Athen. Deipn. 264 d) and was probably his informant, as Schäfer (Demosthenes, 1. 445) has pointed out. He seems to have given evidence favourable to the conduct of Aeschines in Phocian matters at the trial of the latter in B.C. 343 for misconduct on his second embassy to Philip, which ended in his acquittal (Aeschin. De Fals. Leg. c. 142 sq.), and later to have become the tyrant of Elateia (Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 36). His house and that of Onomarchus were among the leading houses of Phocis (Schäfer, 1. 444 sq.). As to his patronage of artists see Plin. Nat. Hist. 35. 99, 107. Aristotle does not tell us in what way the quarrel between the two houses resulted in the Sacred War. The immediate causes of the war were 1. the imposition of a heavy fine by the Amphictyonic Council under the influence of Thebes on some Phocians (Onomarchus perhaps being one of them) who had cultivated land belonging to the Delphic temple, and 2. a threat that, if the fine remained unpaid, Phocis should be declared to have escheated to the Delphic god (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 11. 342 : Curtius, Hist. of Greece, Eng. Trans., 5. 62 sqq. : Schäfer, 1. 443 sqq.). Aristotle probably means that the existence of this στάσις in Phocis encouraged Thebes and the Amphictyons to do what they did, or else that Mnaseas invoked the aid of Thebes. Justin (8. 1) lays the blame of the war entirely on Thebes; Aristotle, on the other hand, as a friend of Macedon, which had overthrown and ruined Phocis in the war, was perhaps not sorry to be able to point out that some leading families of Phocis itself were partly to blame (see note on 1306 a 10).

13. μετέβαλε δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἐπιδάμνῳ ἡ πολιτεία ἐκ γαμικῶν κ.τ.λ. The change of constitution at Epidamnus here referred to may

probably be the same as that described in c. 1. 1301 b 21 sqq., but we cannot be certain of this. Does *καὶ ἐν Ἐπιτάμνῳ* imply that the troubles arising *ἐκ γαμικῶν* at Delphi and Mytilene and in Phocis had also led to a change of constitution?

14. *ὑπομνηστευσάμενος*, 'having betrothed his daughter to a man.' *Ἄτερρος* is added in 16 with fatal results to the sentence: see note on 1306 b 9.

17. *μεταβάλλουσι δὲ κ.τ.λ.* See note on 1303 a 13. So far we have had to do with cases in which *στάσις* has arisen from contumely or wrong: now we learn that constitutional change may arise from the growth in reputation or power of a magistracy (such as the Council of the Areopagus) or a part of the State (such as the *demos* or the *παντικὸς ὄχλος* or the *γυῖρμιοι*). A similar transition from *τὸ ἀτιμάζεσθαι* to *ὑπεροχή* is made in c. 3. 1302 b 15.

20. *οἷον ἢ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῃ βουλή κ.τ.λ.* The Council of the Areopagus had induced the poorer citizens to man the triremes and to fight at Salamis by distributing eight drachmae to each man (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 23: *Plut. Themist.* c. 10: see note on 1297 b 10). Cicero goes further in *De Offic.* 1. 22. 75, where he says of the war against the Persians, *est enim bellum gestum consilio senatus eius, qui a Solone erat constitutus*.

21. *συντονωτέραν*, i.e. more approaching oligarchy (6 (4). 3. 1290 a 27: *Rhet.* 1. 4. 1360 a 23 sqq.: *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 26. l. 2). Cp. 2. 12. 1273 b 39 sq.

καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος κ.τ.λ., 'and on the other hand the naval multitude, having been the cause of the victory at Salamis and by means of it of the hegemony by reason of the power [of the State] by sea, made the democracy of a more decided type.' Cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 12 sqq. and *Plut. Aristid.* c. 22, and for *ισχυροτέραν* 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 9. With *Sus.* and *Welldon* I take *διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν* with what precedes, and not (as *Lamb.* and *Stahr*) with *τὴν δημοκρατίαν ισχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν*. Πάλιν here, as in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 4 and other passages, 'contrarium motum vel actum significat' (*Bon. Ind.* 559 a 60 sqq.). *Ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος* refers to the trireme-oarsmen who formed a large element in the Athenian *demos* (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 23 sq.). *Διὰ ταύτης*, sc. *τῆς νίκης*.

25. *καὶ ἐν Ἀργεῖ κ.τ.λ.* The *γυῖρμιοι* referred to are the thousand picked warriors of the richest class (*Diod.* 12. 75-7, 80. 3), who after the battle of Mantinea in B.C. 418 'took it in hand' to overthrow the democracy at Argos, and indeed ruled the State for some months

(eight according to Diod. 12. 80. 4, but see Grote, Hist. of Greece, 7. 136. 2), and might have ruled it longer but for the brutal conduct of their leader Bryas (Paus. 2. 20. 2). See as to the thousand Thuc. 5. 67, Diod. 12. 75, 80, Plut. Alcib. c. 15, and Paus. 2. 20, with Gilbert's note in Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 78. As to their success against the Lacedaemonians see Thuc. 5. 72. 3 and Diod. 12. 79. 4 sqq. That they won credit in a war with the Lacedaemonians is mentioned because this added to the credit acquired, and it is for the same reason that we are told in what follows that the war in which the Syracusan demos triumphed and won political supremacy was a war with Athens. Καταλύειν τὸν δῆμον recurs in c. 5. 1304 b 30, 31, 34, and c. 7. 1307 b 24. In c. 5. 1304 b 35 we have κατελύθη ἡ δημοκρατία. Καταλύειν τὸν δῆμον, κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου were the phrases used in the νόμος εἰσαγγελίας, as to which see 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 8. l. 25 sq. and Sandys' note.

27. καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις κ.τ.λ. For τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου cp. Plato, Laws 641 A, νίκη πολέμου τοῖς ἐπομένοις ἀν γίγνεται, and 638 A, νικῶν τε καὶ ἦσαν λέγοντες μάχης: Thuc. 1. 121. 5, μὴ τε νίκη ναυμαχίας κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἀλίσκονται. Aristotle sometimes distinguishes ὁ δῆμος from οἱ ὀπλίται (c. 6. 1305 b 33: cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 12-14). Does he mean here that the failure of the Athenians in the siege of Syracuse was brought about rather by the fleet and light troops of the Syracusans than by their hoplites and cavalry? The turning-point of the siege came when the victory of Gylippus (Thuc. 7. 6) made it possible for him to complete the building of his wall (Freeman, Sicily, 3. 254 sq.). This victory was won by the Syracusan hoplites assisted by their cavalry and light troops (ἀκοντισταί), but, to judge by Thucydides' account, the cavalry did more to win it than the hoplites and light troops. Aristotle may have been otherwise informed, or he may have regarded the first victory won by the Syracusan fleet in the Great Harbour (Thuc. 7. 41: Freeman, 3. 298 sqq.) as the real turning-point of the siege. There is at any rate no doubt that the Syracusan fleet and light-armed did much to make the disaster complete and irreparable (Thuc. 7. 71: 7. 81. 4: 7. 84. 4). 'The Syracusan heavy-armed infantry seems to have been of a very inferior description and never to have encountered the Athenians with effect except when supported by the Syracusan cavalry' (Arnold on Thuc. 7. 84). But the cavalry, a force not recruited from the demos, appears to have often done good service. At the same time nothing reflected more lustre on Syracuse or did

more to depress the spirits of the Athenians than the unexpected victory of her fleet (Thuc. 7. 55). Aristotle appears to consider that a polity or aristocracy (c. 10. 1312 b 6-9) existed at Syracuse from B.C. 466-5, when the tyranny was overthrown, to B.C. 413, the date of the failure of the Athenian expedition. Yet in c. 12. 1316 a 32 sq. we are told that the tyranny was succeeded by a democracy. As to the part of the Twelfth Chapter in which this statement occurs, however, see vol. i. p. 519, note 1. Thucydides (7. 55) says that the Syracusans were under a democracy at the time of the Athenian invasion. The main change in the institutions of Syracuse which was made after the Athenian repulse seems to have been that the lot came into use in appointments to magistracies (Diod. 13. 34. 6). It is perhaps this change that Aristotle has in view when he says that a polity was succeeded by a democracy. *τὴν πολιτείαν* must apparently be supplied with *μετίβαλεν*.

29. καὶ ἐν Χαλκίδι κ.τ.λ. Nothing is known about the tyrant Phoxus at Chalcis, or about the tyrant Antileon, who is mentioned in c. 12. 1316 a 31 sq. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 66) surmises that these two tyrannies occurred as temporary breaks in the continuity of the oligarchy of the Hippobotae at Chalcis, which seems to have lasted from very early times till the reduction of Chalcis by Athens in B.C. 506. Unlike the tyranny of Antileon, which was followed by an oligarchy (1316 a 31), the tyranny of Phoxus was followed by a democracy. Hence it is not likely that Phoxus was the last tyrant of a dynasty founded by Antileon. Φοξός (the accent being altered, as usual, in proper names) means 'peaked in the head,' an indication of impudence ([Aristot.] Physiognom. 6. 812 a 8); Thersites is φοξός in Hom. Il. 2. 219. But φοξοί were believed often to possess great physical strength (Hippocr. De Morb. Vulgar. 6: vol. iii. p. 583 Kühn). Compare such names as Simus and Pyrrhus. The name Phoxus occurs at Phocaea (Polyaen. Strateg. 8. 37).

31. εἶχετο τῆς πολιτείας, 'took firm hold of the constitution.'

καὶ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ κ.τ.λ. We might have expected the order of the words to be *Περιανδρὸν τὸν τύραννον τοῖς ἐπιθεμένοις ὁ δῆμος συνεβαλὼν*, but then it would have resembled too nearly the order of the words in the preceding sentence, and therefore a different order is preferred. Cypselus, tyrant of Corinth, sent his illegitimate son Gorgus to found a colony at Ambracia, and Gorgus had two sons, Psammetichus and Periander. The former in B.C. 585 succeeded Cypselus' son Periander in the tyranny of Corinth and was slain,

and the tyranny overthrown, three years later. The latter became tyrant of Ambracia and was expelled (Plutarch, *Amat.* c. 23, says slain), probably not long after the fall of Psammetichus at Corinth, under the circumstances narrated in c. 10. 1311 a 39 sqq. A democracy was then established at Ambracia, but as this revolution occurred early in the sixth century B.C., it is perhaps hardly likely that in the democracy then set up the low property-qualification for office existed of which we read in c. 3. 1303 a 23 sqq. It may have been introduced later. The neighbouring Corinthian colony Leucas seems to have undergone a somewhat similar change in a democratic direction (2. 7. 1266 b 21 sqq.), but we are not told at what time this happened. At Corinth, on the other hand, the tyranny was succeeded by an oligarchy, which held its own for a very long time (Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 90).

33. καὶ ὅλως δὴ κ.τ.λ., 'and further broadly this must not escape notice' etc. For καὶ . . . δὴ, see note on 1253 a 18, and cp. 1. 13. 1259 b 32, καὶ καθόλου δὴ. Aristotle has said that when a magistracy or a part of the State, such as the demos or the γνῶριμοι, grows in reputation or influence, constitutional change is apt to follow, and now he adds the broad statement that all winners of power for the State, even if the winner is not a magistracy or an important part of the State like the demos or γνῶριμοι, but only a private individual or a body of individuals, become the source of στάσις. Of men who won power for their State as magistrates and who afterwards were not willing μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἴσων we have a conspicuous instance in Lysander (see Diod. 14. 13. 1 sq.). Themistocles may have been another (see note on 1302 b 15). Hermocrates of Syracuse made his State great by his policy of resistance to Athens and was eventually banished by his fellow-citizens (Xen. *Hell.* 1. 1. 27: Freeman, *Sicily*, 3. 429 sqq.). The Council of the Areopagus helped to make Athens great by its action before the battle of Salamis (1304 a 20 sq.: *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 23), and the honours paid it in consequence may well have aroused jealousy and caused στάσις, and ultimately led to a limitation of its powers. Aristotle may possibly have before him among other things in his reference to private individuals, and also in ἐπιοικοῦν πλῆθος, the services rendered by Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans to Croton. It was during the period of their ascendancy that Croton conquered and destroyed Sybaris in B.C. 510, and the honours they then earned may probably have led to the attack which was subsequently made on them and to their expul-

sion from Croton. I do not know to what tribes Aristotle refers. The Aeantid tribe at Athens covered itself with glory at Marathon and Plataea and received special honours in consequence (Plut. Sympos. 1. 10. 3, Aristid. c. 19), but whether these honours aroused the jealousy of other tribes, we are not told. The Aeschronian tribe at Samos must have done much for the greatness of the State, for some members of it were resident in Herodotus' day in the Great Oasis, seven days' journey west of Thebes (Hdt. 3. 26), but we know of no resulting *στάσις*. It is possible that Aristotle has in view the case of Sicyon, where the tribe Aegialeis, to which the tyrant Cleisthenes belonged and on which he heaped honours (Hdt. 5. 68), may well have helped him to achieve greatness for the State with the result that *στάσις* followed and the tyranny was overthrown. That *στάσις* sometimes arose in connexion with gentes we see from the story of the Myletidae in Thuc. 6. 5. The case of the Aegeidae at Sparta (Hdt. 4. 149) may have been similar. 'Οποιοσὺν πλῆθος, e.g. whether composed of rich men like the 'thousand picked warriors' at Argos or of poor men like the *ναυτικὸς ὄχλος* at Athens or of philosophers like the Pythagoreans. Aristotle does not notice that those to whose mismanagement a diminution in the power of the State is due are still more often the cause of *στάσις* than those who have added to its power. The troubles, for instance, of the reigns of Richard the Second and Henry the Sixth in England were to some extent due to the loss of the possessions of the Crown in France. National ill-success had something to do with the French Revolution of 1789 and the following years. 'Throughout ancient as well as modern history defeat and embarrassment in the foreign relations have proved fruitful causes of change in the internal government' (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 10. 598).

34. οἱ δυνάμεις αἵτιοι γινόμενοι. Cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 2, ὁ δῆμός ἐστιν ὁ ἐλαύνων τὰς καὶς καὶ ὁ τὴν δύναμιν περιτιθεὶς τῇ πόλει.

37. διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν. Cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 a 6, ἀγαπακοῦσι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν.

38. κινεῶνται δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here passes from cases in which one part of the State is greatly superior in position to the rest to the case in which the rich and the demos stand on an equality in respect of strength. For the thought cp. Manil. Astronom. 1. 334 (a line pronounced by Bentley to be spurious),

Semper erit paribus bellum, quia viribus aequant,
and Justin, 13. 2. 3, who says of the generals of Alexander after

his death, inter ipsos vero aequalitas discordiam augebat, nemine tantum ceteros excedente ut ei aliquis se submitteret, and 16. 3. 1, adsidium inter pares discordiae malum. *Εἶναι δοκοῦντα*, because the really contrary parts of the State are the good and the bad (c. 3. 1303 b 15). That the rich and the poor are thought to be contrary we have seen in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 2-11; they are treated as actually so in 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 27 sq.

1304 b. 1. οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ ὁ δῆμος. 'Ο δῆμος is contrasted with οἱ πλούσιοι here and in 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 11 sqq., with οἱ εὐποροὶ in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 28, 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 9 sq., and 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 6 sq., with οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 25; still oftener with οἱ γνῶρμιοι, especially in the present Book (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20 sq.: 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 25 sqq., 30: 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 16 sq.: 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 29 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 12 sq.: 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 18); elsewhere with οἱ ἐπιτεκνίς (2. 12. 1274 a 12 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 9 sq.: 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 34 sq.). In 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 33 ὁ δῆμος is distinguished from οἱ ὀπλίται, and in the passage before us by implication from τὸ μέσον. And yet we see from 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 18 sqq. that ὁ δῆμος includes classes many members of which must have been rich, for instance the τεχνῖται (3. 5. 1278 a 24, πλουτοῦσι γὰρ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν).

5. ὀλίγοι γὰρ γίνονται πρὸς πολλούς, 'for they come to be few against many.' See notes on 1252 b 7 and 1264 a 14, and cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 24.

καθόλου μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This is virtually repeated in 17, ἀπλῶς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., and it is very possible that the passage 7-17, which intervenes between these two sentences, is a later addition, though it may well have been placed where it stands by Aristotle.

7. κινουσι δὲ τὰς πολιτείας κ.τ.λ. This is mentioned in order that those who seek to preserve constitutions may be prepared for the various methods to which those who seek to destroy them may be expected to have recourse. Peisistratus won his tyranny on the first two occasions by deceit and on the third by force (Aθ. Παλ. cc. 14, 15), and Dionysius the Elder imitated him in beginning by deceit (Diod. 13. 95. 5 sq.). Lysander had sought to change the Lacedaemonian constitution by attempting to suborn various oracles to give answers in support of his policy (Diod. 14. 13), and was no doubt prepared, if necessary, to follow up his intrigue by the use of force. Tyrants were commonly conceived to win their tyrannies either by deceit or by force (Diog. Laert. 3. 83: cp. Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 10 and

Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 9 sq.): it was Aristotle's merit to have pointed out that all persons who sought to change a constitution were apt to resort either to force or to deceit or to a combination of the two. To win by deceit was more odious than to win by force (Thuc. 4. 86. 4: Dio Cass. 52. 2. 6 sq.). We need not take Aristotle to mean that constitutional change is always effected either by force or by deceit or by a combination of the two.

10. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀπάτη διττή, 'for deceit also is twofold [and therefore it is not surprising that force is so].' Καὶ γάρ here retains its full meaning, as in 1. 9. 1257 b 8. There is deceit which is eked out by a subsequent use of force, force being called in to complete what deceit has begun, and there is deceit which is not supplemented subsequently by force, but suffices by itself and is employed throughout.

12. κατέχουσιν, sc. τὴν πολιτείαν (cp. 15: see Bon. Ind. 377 a 12), 'keep the constitution in their hands.' Cp. Demosth. Ol. 2. 9, καὶ μὴ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ταῦτα μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν ἡγείται, οἴεται δὲ βίᾳ καθίξειν αὐτὸν τὰ πράγματα τῇ τὰ χωρία καὶ λιμένας καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα προειληφέναι, οὐκ ἔρβος οἴεται.

οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων κ.τ.λ. 'Aristotle seems to imply that Peisander and his colleagues had overstated from the first their confidence in the promises of Alcibiades, and were not so sinned against as Thucydides describes' (Mr. E. L. Hicks in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 8. 403, note).

13. ἐξηπάτησαν, sc. οἱ μεταβάλλοντες τὴν πολιτείαν.

τὸν βασιλέα. The article is usually omitted (as in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 29. ll. 4, 8) when the Persian king is referred to (see Liddell and Scott s.v.).

14. ψευδόμενοι, 'after this false statement' (Welldon). Bonitz (Ind. s.v.), however, explains ψευδόμενοι as synonymous with ἐξαπατάσσετε, 10. Perhaps the latter of these two interpretations is to be preferred.

17. αὐτῶν, i. e. those living under the constitution.

19. Καθ' ἕκαστον δ' εἶδος πολιτείας κ.τ.λ., 'but [we must not rest C. 5. content with ascertaining the broad causes common to all constitutions;] we must take each kind of constitution, and making these broad principles our starting-point, we must study kind by kind what happens in each.' So in c. 12. 1316 a 3 sqq. Aristotle finds fault with the Platonic Socrates for not tracing the overthrow of the best constitution to causes special to it. Μεριζώντας, sc. τὰς

πολιτείας, 'dividing constitutions as a whole into the different kinds composing the whole.' For τὰ συμβαίνοντα cp. c. 10. 1310 b 1 sq., and see Bon. Ind. 713 a 19 sqq.

20. αἱ μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίαι κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is taken up by μὲν οὖν, 1305 a 34, and then answered by δέ in c. 6. 1305 a 37. In the chapter before us Aristotle dwells only on those modes of change special to democracy which are most apt to affect democracies (μάλιστα, 20: yet πᾶσαι σχεδόν, 1305 a 35). Demagogues are especially fatal to them, causing them to change into oligarchies and formerly into tyrannies, and also causing them to change from the traditional kind of democracy into the ultimate democracy. We have been told in c. 3. 1302 b 6 sqq. that ὕβρις and πλεονεξία in magistrates are sources of constitutional change, but now we learn that the misconduct of demagogues, who are not necessarily magistrates, is a source of constitutional change in democracies. That there are other causes of change in democracies not special to them, we have learnt already. They are subject to changes arising from contempt engendered by disorder (c. 3. 1302 b 27 sqq.), from the disproportionate increase of a class (in their case the rich: cp. c. 3. 1303 a 10 sqq.), from the admission to important offices of men unfriendly to the constitution (c. 3. 1303 a 16 sqq.), and from the aggrandizement of single individuals or a few persons (c. 3. 1302 b 15 sqq.), to mention no others. Plato had ascribed the fall of democracies rather to ἡ ἄγαν ἐλευθερία (Rep. 562 B, 564 A) than to the license of demagogues; he had also said (Rep. 564 A: cp. c. 12. 1316 a 22 sq.) that democracies tended to change into tyrannies, and Aristotle agrees that this is especially true of the extreme democracy (see note on 1316 a 24), but he thinks, as the chapter before us shows, that democracies were in his own day less apt to change into tyrannies than they had once been, and that their tendency then was rather to change into oligarchies (cp. c. 12. 1316 a 23 sq.). The view that the 'impudent license' of demagogues leads to the fall of democracies comes to Aristotle from Lysias (Or. 25. 27, quoted by Eaton) and from Isocrates (De Pace, §§ 108, 123). In the hope of counter-acting this source of change in democracies Aristotle gives some wholesome advice in c. 8. 1309 a 14 sqq. and c. 9. 1310 a 2 sqq., and also in 8 (6). 5, where he suggests means of checking the abuse of the lawcourts by demagogues. Possibly too the advice given in c. 8. 1308 b 10 sqq. not to make any single individual overgreat refers

to demagogues among others, though it seems rather to refer to the aggrandizement of magistrates. It will be noticed that in 8 (6): 5 what he dreads for the extreme democracy is not its conversion into a tyranny, but its tendency to alienate the rich. Democracies do not seem, to judge by the chapter before us, often to have changed into aristocracies or polities, nor do we often hear of the extreme democracy changing into *ἡ πατρία δημοκρατία*. Yet that this sometimes occurred seems clear from c. 6. 1306 b 21, *ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκείνας*.

21. *τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν*. The passage before us should be compared with 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 15 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 4 sqq. In all these three passages some light is thrown on the ways in which the rich were oppressed in those democracies in which they suffered oppression. In 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 15 sqq. democracy is said not only to exile the notables, but also to destroy them secretly and openly. Of this we do not hear anything in the passage before us or in 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 4 sqq. The demagogues are said in the passage before us to oppress the rich in a variety of ways. Sometimes they made the rich as a class the object of their attacks, setting the many on them (cp. c. 9. 1310 a 3 sqq.); sometimes they singled out individual rich men for attack and brought calumnious accusations against them with a view to the confiscation of their property, or confiscated their property without these preliminary accusations, often exiling them to make the thing easier (we do not learn whether in these cases confiscation was effected by the assembly—cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 6, *δημεύσεως*—or by the dicasteries); sometimes, again, they robbed the rich of part of their income by imposing heavy liturgies upon them (cp. c. 8. 1309 a 14 sqq.). From the third passage, 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 4 sqq., we gather that what the rich had to fear in a democracy was rather the confiscation of their property by dicasteries and as a result of 'public actions' than its confiscation by the assembly, and that they were especially exposed to oppression in those extreme democracies in which, the assembly being a very numerous body, a large sum of money was required to provide it with pay, and there were no special revenues to supply the pay. In such democracies the *eisphora* would be heavy, confiscations frequent, and the dicasteries bad. We sometimes find democracy credited with a leaning to a general redivision of the land and a cancelling of debts—e. g. by Plato (Rep. 565 E sq.) and Polybius (6. 9. 8 sq.: cp. Justin, 16. 4. 2)—but of this Aristotle says nothing.

22. τὰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This is based on Plato, Rep. 565 A-B. Compare the circumstances under which the famous σκνταλισμός at Argos arose, which are thus narrated by Diodorus (15. 58. 1), τῆς πόλεως τῶν Ἀργείων δημοκρατουμένης καὶ τινων δημαγωγῶν παροξυνόντων τὸ πλῆθος κατὰ τῶν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις καὶ δόξαις ὑπερεχόντων, οἱ διαβαλλόμενοι συστάτες ἔγνωσαν καταλύσαι τὸν δῆμον κ.τ.λ., though it is not clear that in this instance the demagogues singled out individual rich men for calumnious attack.

23. συνάγει γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐχθίστους ὁ κοινὸς φόβος. Cp. Plut. De Solert. Anim. c. 31, ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης ἱστορεῖ φιλίας ἀλεπίσκου καὶ ὄφιν διὰ τὸ κοινὸν αὐτοῖς παλέμον εἶναι τὸν ἀέτον, however the fox and snake are said to be friends in Hist. An. 9. 1. 610a 12: cp. also Rhet. 1. 6. 1362 b 36, οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ἐνίοτε ταῦτ' ἀντιθέμεν τοῖς ἐναντίοις· ὁθεν λέγεται ὡς τὰ κακὰ συνάγει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν ἢ ταῦτ' ἐλαβεῖν ἀμφοῖν.

24. ἐπάγοντες, 'setting on,' as hunters do dogs (Hom. Odys. 19. 445: Xen. Cynege. 10. 19: Plut. Pelop. c. 29: see Liddell and Scott s.v.).

τοῦτο, i. e. the overthrow of democracies owing to the misconduct of demagogues.

25. καὶ ἐν Κῷ κ.τ.λ. Schäfer (Demosthenes, 1. 427) connects this change with the defection of Cos from the Athenian Confederacy in B.C. 357 (Diod. 16. 7. 3), but nothing is certainly known as to its date. We notice that the examples which follow are taken from Dorian States (Cos, Rhodes, the Pontic Heracleia, and Megara).

27. καὶ ἐν Ῥόδῳ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1302 b 23. The demagogues at Rhodes, in their anxiety to provide funds for the supply of pay to the poorer citizens (for attendance probably at the assembly and dicasteries, etc.), seem to have prevented, or at any rate delayed, the payment to the trierarchs (who would of course belong to the class of γυῖοι) of sums due to them from the State for work done by ship-builders or ship-fitters by their direction, the result being that the ship-builders or ship-fitters brought actions against the trierarchs for the recovery of the money owing to them. In other words the demagogues obtained the means of providing pay for the poorer citizens by leaving expenses in connexion with ship-building or ship-fitting for which the State was properly responsible to be defrayed by the trierarchs. As to liturgies at Rhodes connected with the navy see Strabo, p. 653, where however a lacuna in

the text makes the exact nature of the liturgy obscure. At Rhodes there was a refusal under the influence of demagogues to pay money justly due to γνῶριμοι from the State, or at any rate a delay to pay it; at Heracleia, Megara, and Cyme the demagogues went further and exiled many of the γνῶριμοι.

28. ἐπὶ ῥιζόν . . . ἐκώλυον. The tense used shows that the demagogues kept doing this (cp. 33, ἐξέπιπτον, and 36, ἐξέβαλλον).

29. διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας βίκας. Cp. Diod. 20. 62. 5, ὁ δὲ φοβηθεὶς τὰς ἐπιφερομένας εὐθύνας καὶ κρίσεις ἀπεχώρησεν εἰς τὴν Γέλαν.

31. καταλύθη δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ κ.τ.λ. What Heracleia is here referred to? The Trachinian Heracleia according to C. O. Müller and Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 190. 2), the Pontic Heracleia according to Bonitz (Ind. 319 b 39), Sus.³ (Note 1555), and Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 395). The latter view is probably correct, for though in c. 6. 1305 b 36 we have ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ τῇ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ as the designation of this city, the words ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ (without τῇ ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ) in c. 6. 1305 b 5 and 1306 a 37 appear to refer to the Pontic Heracleia, as do the words ἡ πόλις τῶν Ἡρακλειωτῶν in 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 14. So in Diog. Laert. 7. 166 πόλει δὲ Ἡρακλείας refers to the Pontic Heracleia. This was a colony of Megara, founded in the middle of the sixth century B.C. (see note on 1303 a 36), and it would seem from the passage before us to have been at the outset democratically governed. It is not clear whether it is to this democracy that Aeneas refers in Poliorc. 11. 10, or to a democracy of a later date (see note on 1305 b 33). The chronology of the constitutional changes at Megara in the sixth century B.C. is too little known to us to allow of a certain answer to the question whether a democracy existed at Megara when it founded Heracleia, but this may possibly have been the case (Plut. Quaest. Gr. cc. 18, 59: see note on 1300 a 17). The transition to Megara in 34 sqq. makes in favour of the view that the Pontic Heracleia is referred to. The demagogues appear to have behaved in much the same way in the mother-city and in the colony, and with fatal results to the democracy in both places. We observe that the contrast of δῆμος and γνῶριμοι existed in Heracleia immediately after the foundation of the colony; this seems to show that the original lots of land there cannot have been equal (see note on 1266 b 1). Newly founded cities were often in a disturbed state (Isocr. De Pace, § 49, χεῖρον καὶ παραχυδίστερον τὴν ἡμετέραν αὐτῶν διοικοῦμεν τῶν ἄρτι τὰς πόλεις οἰκίσαντων).

32. Some light is thrown on the meaning of *ἀδικούμενοι* by 1305 a 3-5.

34. *παραπλησίως δὲ κ.τ.λ.* See note on 1300 a 17. It appears from c. 3. 1302 b 31 that the democracy at Megara referred to fell not only owing to the conduct of the demagogues, but also because much *ἀταξία καὶ ἀναρχία* prevailed under it. The democracies introduced by Thebes in the cities of Achaia fell in a somewhat similar way to this Megarian democracy (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 43).

36. *ἵνα χρήματα ἔχῃσι δημεύειν*, 'in order to be able to confiscate property': cp. 1305 a 6 sq. The proceeds of the confiscated property, or whatever part of them was not plundered on the way by the demagogues, would be distributed among the poorer citizens or used to provide them with pay for attendance at the assembly and dicasteries. 'Nullo loco Aristoteles optativo post particulas finales utitur, sed promiscue et post tempus praesens et post praeteritum coniunctivum adhibet' (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 52). In 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 35, *τεχναστῶν οὖν ὅπως ἂν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιοι*, according to Eucken, 'videtur particula ὅπως vi plane relativa uti,' and in Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 9-12 Eucken would read *γίνονται* with M^b in place of *γίγνονται*. Weber, however (Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 25), retains *γίγνονται* and explains it by attraction to *ποιεῖτο*. He produces (ibid.) another exception to the rule (overlooked apparently by Eucken), Hist. An. 9. 9. 614 b 14, *καὶ τιθασσυνόμενος δέ τις ἦδη ἀμύγδαλον εἰς ῥωγμὴν ξύλου ἐνθεῖς, ὅπως ἐναρμοσθῇ ὑπομείνειεν αὐτοῦ τὴν πληγὴν, ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ πληγῇ δέικοντε καὶ κατήσθιε τὸ μαλακόν*, but adds that this exception does not interfere with our acceptance of the rule.

39. *τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν*, perhaps 'the well-known oligarchy': cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 17 sqq.

συνέβη δὲ ταῦτόν κ.τ.λ. Nothing is known about these events. Which Cyme is referred to, is uncertain both here and in 2. 8. 1269 a 1. 'Forma generis neutrius *ταῦτόν* saepe legitur non solum ante vocales, verum etiam ante consonantes' (Bon. Ind. 125 b 16).

1305 a. 2. *τῶν ἄλλων*, sc. *πόλεων*. See note on 1266 b 1.

3. *ἵνα χαρίζονται*, sc. *τῷ δήμῳ*, the mark of a demagogue (see Plato, Gorg. 502 E, and note on 1274 a 5).

4. *ἥ τὰς οὐσίας κ.τ.λ.* Cp. c. 8. 1309 a 15 sqq. 'It is curious that in both places *ἀναδάστους* is applied somewhat loosely to the second substantive. The annual proceeds are not *re-divided*' (Richards). See notes on 1257 a 21, 1297 a 40, and 1297 b 27.

7. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχαίων κ.τ.λ. For this expression see notes on 1303 b 20 and 1285 a 30. In 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 28. l. 28 sqq. Nicias, Thucydides son of Melesias, and Theramenes are marked off from οἱ ἀρχαῖοι. Μετέβαλλον, sc. αἱ δημοκρατίαι. We read in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 22 ὅτι Πεισίστρατος δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγὸς ὢν τύραννος κατέστη. Plato (Rep. 565 C sqq.), following Herodotus (3. 82) and Euripides (Fragm. 628 Nauck: 626, ed. 2), had depicted the conversion of the δήμου προστάτης into a tyrant, evidently holding that the change was as likely to occur in his own time as in earlier days, but Aristotle thinks otherwise for three reasons—1. the modern demagogue was not, like the demagogue of earlier times, a man of military skill and prowess, therefore he was not equally able to seize power by force; 2. great magistracies held by individuals were rarer than they had been; 3. the demos no longer lived a busy life in the country, so as to be unable to control the action of its champion in the city, but dwelt to a large extent in the city. It should be noticed, however, that Aristotle speaks of the change of democracy into tyranny in c. 8. 1308 a 20 sqq. and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 3 sqq. without any intimation that it was of rarer occurrence than it had once been. Cypselus, the founder of the tyranny at Corinth, was a demagogue (c. 10. 1310 b 29: c. 12. 1315 b 27) and also polemarch (Nic. Damasc. Fragg. 58: Müller, Fragg. Hist. Gr. 3. 392). Panaetius of Leontini (Polyaen. Strateg. 5. 47), Peisistratus, and Dionysius the Elder were, like him, both demagogues and holders of high military offices. The same thing is true of Euphron, who made himself tyrant of Sicyon in B.C. 368 or soon after (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 44 sqq.). The tyrants of mediaeval Italy also were commonly men of military prowess, though this is not true of the founders of the Medicean dynasty (Roscher, Politik, p. 684). Military prowess alone, however, did not usually suffice in ancient Greece to enable a man to win a tyranny; he had also to gain the confidence of the demos by action hostile to the rich. Plato had said much the same in Rep. 565 D sq., but he goes farther than Aristotle in that passage, for he speaks as if tyranny *always* arose ἐκ προστατικῆς μίσης, whereas Aristotle only says that *most* of the ancient tyrants had been demagogues before they were tyrants. There were, in fact, kings (like Pheidon of Argos), and holders of great offices (like the tyrants of Ionia, and, also Phalaris) who had made themselves tyrants without having been demagogues (c. 10. 1310 b 18–29). The same thing holds

of *δυνασταί* in oligarchies (c. 8. 1308 a 22 sqq.), and of commanders of mercenary troops (c. 6. 1306 a 21 sqq.). Indeed we gather that any citizen who surpassed the rest in wealth and influence was often suspected of a design to make himself tyrant (3. 13. 1284 a 20 sqq. : 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 15 sqq. : 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 22 : Diod. 19. 1). That the orators at Athens were no longer also the generals of the State had already been remarked by Isocrates (De Pace, § 54 sqq. : cp. Philip. § 140). Phocion, indeed, made it his aim, according to Plut. Phocion, c. 7, to be both *ρήτωρ* and *στρατηγός*, as Solon Aristides and Pericles had been (see this passage, which confirms what Aristotle says), but he probably stood almost alone in this ambition at Athens. At Thebes, however, Epaminondas and Pelopidas were surely both *δημαγωγοί* and *στρατηγοί*.

8. *σχεδόν γάρ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. c. 10. 1310 b 14, *σχεδόν γάρ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν ὥς εἰσεῖν, πιστευθέντες ἐκ τοῦ διαβαλλεῖν τοὺς γυναικίους*, where *ἀρχαίων* disappears, and Plato, Rep. 565 D sq. For *τῶν ἀρχαίων τυράννων* cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 18, *τὰς ἀρχαίας τυραννίδας*. 'With *ἀρχαίων* the perfect *γεγόνασιν* is hardly logical. I have noticed a few similar uses, e. g. Thuc. 1. 50. 2, *γεγένηται* : Plato, Apol. Socr. 28 C, *τεταλευντήκασιν* : Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 70, *περγεγόνασι*. In all these places the perfect seems = the aorist. *Γέγονα* is very commonly thus used in late Greek, e. g. in giving a man's date, *γέγονε κατὰ τὴν . . . 'Ὀλυμπιάδα'* (Richards).

11. *οὐ γάρ πω δεῖνοι ἦσαν λέγειν*, 'nondum hominibus dicendi facultatem adeptis' (Sepulveda). I prefer this interpretation to that of Sus., 'because there were as yet no trained speakers' ('weil es damals noch keine geschulten Redner gab'). It seems better to render *ἦσαν* 'men were' than 'there were.'

14. *πλὴν εἴ ποτε κ.τ.λ.*, 'except if anywhere one or two cases of the kind have occurred.' For *βραχύ τι* cp. Plato, Rep. 496 B and Laws 711 D. '*Βραχύ τι*, per breve tempus?', suggests Bonitz (Ind. 143 a 44), but I do not think that he can be right. To what cases Aristotle refers is unknown.

15. *ἐγίγνωτο δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. c. 10. 1310 b 20 sqq. and c. 8. 1308 a 20 sqq., from which passages we learn that the tenure of great offices for long terms was especially apt to result in tyranny, and that great offices were often held for long terms even in democracies in early days, though not many would be so in the democracies of Aristotle's own day (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 24 sqq.).

16. *ἄσπερ ἐν Μελίτη ἐκ τῆς πρωταγίας*. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt.

2. 139. 2) thinks that the tyranny of Thrasybulus (Hdt. 1. 20) is here referred to as arising out of the office of prytanis. The same thing is said of tyranny throughout Ionia in c. 10. 1310 b 28 sq. The prytanis at Miletus appears to have been a sole magistrate, like the annual prytanis who took the place of the king at Corinth under the Bacchiadae (Diod. 7. 9. 5 : Paus. 2. 4. 4), and unlike the later prytaneis at Rhodes, who were six in number (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 178). As to the title see 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 26 sqq.

18. *ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ μεγάλας εἶναι τότε τὰς πόλεις κ.τ.λ.* *τὰς πόλεις* here must mean 'the cities,' not, as in 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sq. and 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22, 'the States.' As the demos lived a busy life in the country, it could not itself rule, and it was obliged to allow the leader whom it trusted to seize and exercise supreme power. The Eupatridae lived in the city, the demos lived in the country and were mostly tillers of the soil (Etymol. Magn. p. 395. 50 : Thuc. 1. 126. 7, 2. 14). Thus the *ἄγροικοί* formed in early days a large section of the demos at Athens ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 13 : see Sandys' note). Compare Theogn. 55 sqq., and as to Epidaurus Plut. Quaest. Gr. c. 1. Compare what we read of the Allobroges at a far later time (Strabo, p. 186, 'Αλλόβριγες δὲ . . . γεωργοῦσι τὰ πεδία καὶ τοὺς αὐλῶνας τοὺς ἐν ταῖς Ἀλπεσι' καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι κωμηδὸν ζῶσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπιφανέστατοι τὴν Οὐλίαναν ἔχοντες . . . κατεσκευάκασιν πόλιν). At Plataea in the fourth century B. C. the peasants lived in the city (Paus. 9. 1. 4—7), but this was owing to their distrust of the Thebans. Tanagra is a better instance of a 'peasant-town.' There the townsmen were largely tillers of the soil (Pseudo-Dicaearch. De Graeciae Urbibus, c. 9 : Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 257). In c. 10. 1310 b 17 sqq. the acquisition of tyrannies by demagogues is said to have occurred *ἤδη τῶν πόλεων ἡξήμενων*, where *τῶν πόλεων* probably means 'the States' (see note); the cities may well have been small, however, even if we take *τῶν πόλεων* to mean 'the cities.'

20. *οἱ προστάται τοῦ δήμου* here takes the place of *οἱ δημαγωγοί*, 11. In c. 6. 1305 a 39, 40 *προστάτης* is explained by *ἡγεμὼν*. *οἱ προστάται τοῦ δήμου* is probably a somewhat narrower term than *οἱ δημαγωγοί*, for not every demagogue would be one of the heads of the demos. For *τυραννίδι ἐπιτίθεντο* see note on 1305 b 41.

21. *πάντες δὲ τοῦτο ἔδρων ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πιστευθέντες*. Cp. c. 10. 1310 b 14 sqq.

23. *Πεισίστρατος*, sc. *ἡξιώθη τῆς τυραννίδος*.

24. *τοὺς πεδειακούς*. The form *πεδιακός* recurs in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 13.

The more usual form is *pedeis* (see Sandys' note). Cp. Plato, Rep. 566 A, οὗτος δὴ, ἔφην, ὁ στασιάζων γίγνεται πρὸς τοὺς ἔχοντας τὰς οὐσίας ; In Diog. Laert. 1. 58 the *Pedieis* are distinguished from οἱ ἐξ ἄσπεως as well as from οἱ παράλιοι.

καὶ Θεαγένης κ.τ.λ. Nothing is known from any other source of the exploit mentioned in the text.

25. λαβὼν παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν ἐπινέμεντας, 'having caught them grazing their herds and flocks in land not their own by the river.' 'Ἐπιωμέειν est in alieno agro pascere' (Stallbaum on Plato, Laws 843 D): cp. Demosth. Or. 55. in Callicl. c. 11.

26. καὶ Διονύσιος κ.τ.λ. Daphnaeus was one of the Syracusan generals who failed to save Agrigentum from capture by the Carthaginians and who were consequently accused by Dionysius the Elder before the Syracusan assembly and dismissed from office, Dionysius himself being one of the generals appointed in their place (Diod. 13. 86-92). When Dionysius had made himself tyrant, Daphnaeus became one of his chief opponents till Dionysius convoked an assembly and had him put to death (Diod. 13. 96. 4). We can guess what allegations Dionysius would make against generals who were rich men from Diod. 13. 91. 5.

28. ὡς δημοτικὸς ὤν. It was Peisistratus' reputation for being δημοτικός that more than anything else enabled him to become tyrant ('Ath. Pol. c. 13. l. 21: c. 14 *init.*: c. 16. l. 29 sq.).

μεταβάλλουσι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Supply αἱ δημοκρατίαι. Cp. c. 6. 1306 b 17 sqq., where however the contrast is between αἱ ἱπποκοιταὶ δημοκρατίαι and αἱ κύριοι. We have ἡ πατρία δημοκρατία here, but ἡ πάτριος δημοκρατία in 2. 12. 1273 b 38. Πάτριος is the more common form of the fem. in Aristotle's writings (see critical note on 1285 b 5), but all the MSS. have πατρίας here except P^a, which has πατρίδος wrongly: in 3. 14. 1285 b 5 only Π^a and possibly Γ have πάτριον. Τὴν νεωτάτην, cp. 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 41, τέταρτον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας ἡ τελευταία τοῖς χρόνοις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γεγενημένη. Polybius (6. 57) gives a somewhat similar account of the change of democracy into ochlocracy. We gather from the passage before us that in the πατρία δημοκρατία there may be no property-qualification for office, and this agrees with 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27-32. The absence of a property-qualification for office is said to be characteristic of democracy in 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 9 sq. (cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 22 sq.); yet it would seem from 2. 7. 1266 b 21 sqq. (cp. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 21 sqq.) that the absence of a property-qualification for office makes a constitution

too democratic; hence a *πατρία δημοκρατία* in which there is none is defective. It is true that in a polity there may be no property-qualification for office (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 10 sqq.), but then in a well-organized polity it is not the demos that elects to office, but the hoplites (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 1 sq.). The teaching of Aristotle in the passage before us is in effect that if in a *πατρία δημοκρατία* there is no property-qualification for office and the demos elects, a keen competition for office results (see note on 1303 a 14), and the competitors make rival bids for the favour of the demos with the result that they eventually place the demos in a position of superiority to the laws. (Thurot has already pointed out in *Études sur Aristote*, p. 82, referring to c. 6. 1305 b 30 sqq., that even when there is a property-qualification for office, candidates for office will do the same thing; hence he proposes to place *μὴ ἀπὸ τῶν πάντων δέ* after *ὁ δῆμος*, translating ‘où l’élection est faite par le peuple entier, sans condition de cens,’ while Sus. proposes to omit these words, but the tendency to demagogy would at any rate be stronger where there was no property-qualification for office. For one thing the competitors would be more numerous.) Aristotle adds that this would happen less often if the magistrates were elected not by the demos as a whole, but by the tribes. We do not learn whether what he recommends is that the right of electing the magistrates should fall to each tribe in turn (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 23 sqq.), or that one tribe should elect to one magistracy and another to another, or that the magistracies should be organized as boards and that each tribe should elect a member of each of the boards. Perhaps he would prefer the last-mentioned alternative. Chorēgi, *τεχνοποιοί*, *ταφροποιοί*, and *τριηροποιοί* were elected by the tribes at Athens (Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 202), and at one time the preliminary selection of the persons out of whom the magistrates appointed by lot were so chosen seems to have rested (with one or two exceptions) with the tribes (Gilbert, *ibid.*, p. 217: cp. Isocr. *Panath.* § 145). Election by the tribe would have the advantage that no competitor for office, however eager he might be, would be likely to make the tribe with which the election lay superior to the laws. At Rome even in its democratic days the assemblies voted not *per capita* as in Greece, but by divisions (*curiae*, *centuriae*, *tribus*)—see Roscher, *Politik*, p. 343, and Willems, *Droit Public Romain*, p. 168—but Aristotle would hardly have been satisfied with this. He seems to have desired

that the magistrates should be elected, not in a collective assembly of the citizens, but by each tribe meeting separately from the rest. The evil of which he complains would be remedied by the adoption of the lot in appointments to office, but he probably does not think the lot a fit means of filling high offices in a *πατρία δημοκρατία* (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 sqq.); some offices, indeed, could not well be filled by lot. Another remedy would be, as Thurot says, to introduce a property-qualification for office, but this it might be difficult to do under the circumstances described in the text. Aristotle forgets to mention in the passage before us that an abundance of pay must be forthcoming before an ultimate democracy can come into being even in a State in which there is no property-qualification for office (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 41 sqq.). The experience of modern States has confirmed Aristotle's view that the filling of the highest offices by popular election has its dangers, but it has taught us that these dangers exist, whether the election is made in a collective assembly or not. The influential men who compete for high office are exposed to the temptation of making rival bids for popular support, and of promising, where the institutions of the State give them opportunities of fulfilling their promises, to promote an alteration of the constitution in a popular direction.

32. *ἄκος* 84 τοῦ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1267 a 3. If *ἄκος* is here used in its usual sense of 'remedy,' τοῦ κ.τ.λ. will be in the genitive after it and will express the effect of the remedy.

- C. 6. 37 sqq. In the sixth chapter we have in strictness to do only with those causes of the fall of oligarchies which are special to them: still some of the causes enumerated must have affected other constitutions also; we know, for instance, that the paucity of those admitted to office was perilous to aristocracies as well as to oligarchies (c. 7. 1306 b 22 sqq.). Causes which affect oligarchies in common with other constitutions have been already dealt with in cc. 3 and 4 (for instance in c. 3. 1302 b 15 sqq. and 1303 a 16 sqq. and in c. 4. 1304 a 17 sqq.). Some additional causes of the fall of oligarchies over and above those mentioned in cc. 3, 4, and 6 may be gleaned from c. 8. 1308 a 18 sqq. and c. 10. 1310 b 22 sqq., where the long tenure of a great office by one man or the union of several great offices in the hands of one man is said to be often fatal to them (cp. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 3 sqq. and 3. 15. 1286 b 16 sqq.), and from 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 14 sqq. and 26 sqq., whence we gather that oligarchies were often overthrown owing to their making no satis-

factory provision for the admission of deserving members of the demos into the privileged body, and owing to the defective numbers and quality of their light-armed troops. On two or three points Aristotle differs from Plato. The latter had said in Rep. 564 A, *εἰκότως τοῖσιν, εἶπον, οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλης πολιτείας τυραννὶς καθίσταται ἢ ἐκ δημοκρατίας*: Aristotle holds, on the contrary, that extreme oligarchy was specially apt to pass into tyranny (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 3 sqq.: cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 16 sq. and 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 sqq.). Plato, again, had spoken in a passage of the Republic (545 D: cp. Laws 683 E) as if changes of constitution were always due to quarrels among the holders of supreme power: Aristotle, on the contrary, points out in the chapter before us that oligarchies were often overthrown without discord among the oligarchs. Indeed, oligarchies based on a property-qualification (and politics also) might owe their fall to a mere accidental rise of the average level of the wealth of the individual members of the State. So again in Rep. 551 D sq. Plato had spoken of oligarchies as unable to make war without risk of overthrow, and hence Aristotle is careful to point out that they ran a similar risk in time of peace (1306 a 19 sqq.). The sixth chapter distinguishes between *ἐννομοί* and *κύριοι ὀλιγαρχίαι* (1306 b 20 sq.), but it takes no account of this distinction in dealing with the causes of the fall of oligarchies; it is evident, however, that most of the causes which it enumerates would affect *κύριοι ὀλιγαρχίαι* in a higher degree than *ἐννομοί*. Not a few of these causes were probably pointed out here for the first time; there is more that was new in this chapter than in the preceding one. Here and there we may suspect that Aristotle exalts the occasions of constitutional change into its causes.

Αἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαι κ.τ.λ. The use of *διά* in *διὰ δύο τρόπους* ('owing to two modes') is remarkable. In c. 11. 1314 a 29 we have *ὁ μὲν οὖν εἰς τὸν τρόπον δι' οὗ γίγνεται σωτηρία ταῖς τυραννίσι τοιοῦτός ἐστιν*. The two *φανερώντα* *τρόποι* are (1) *ἐὰν ἀδικῶσι* (sc. *οἱ ὀλιγαρχοῦντες*) *τὸ πλεῖστος*, or if in some other way civil discord originates with others than the oligarchs (see note on 1305 b 1), and (2) if it originates with the oligarchs.

38. *ἓνα μὲν* has nothing strictly answering to it, but is virtually taken up in 1305 b 22, *κινεῦνται δ' αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξ αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.*

39. *πᾶς γὰρ ἱκανὸς γίνεται προστάτης*, i. e. *πᾶς γὰρ προστάτης (καὶ ἐτυχὴν) γίνεται ἱκανός* (Coray, p. 329).

μέλιστα δέ, sc. *ἱκανὸς γίνεται*, not, I think, *μεταβάλλουσιν*.



ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας = ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ὀλιγαρχούντων: cp. c. 1. 1302 a 12.

40. καθάπερ ἐν Νάξῳ Λύγδαμος κ.τ.λ. Supply ἐγένετο ὁ ἡγεμὼν. As to Lygdamis see Hdt. 1. 61, 64, Aristot. *Fragm.* 517 (from the 'Constitution of the Naxians' ascribed to Aristotle, ap. Athen. *Deipn.* p. 348), *Oecon.* 2. 1346 b 7 sqq., and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 15 with Sandys' notes. The fragment of the 'Constitution of the Naxians' traces the Naxian στάσις to an outrage committed by some young Naxians of the wealthy class on a fellow-citizen named Telestagoras belonging to the same class and his two daughters, not on members of the demos, but it is likely enough that similar outrages were also committed on the demos. We find Lygdamis first heading the Naxian demos in its successful revolt against the oligarchs and establishing, it would seem, a democracy in place of the pre-existing oligarchy, then after an interval of uncertain length visiting Eretria to offer Peisistratus aid in men and money in acquiring for the third time the tyranny at Athens—whether as head of the Naxian democracy or after his own fall from power or the fall of the democracy, we do not know—and thus paving the way for his own accession to the tyranny of Naxos, which followed on Peisistratus' capture of the island. When the fragment of the 'Constitution of the Naxians' says that Lygdamis became tyrant of Naxos in consequence of his leadership of the people against the authors of the outrage referred to, the statement may be so far correct that, if he had not led the demos, he would not have been in a position to induce Peisistratus to make him tyrant. See Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ed. 2, 2. 324. 3.

- 1305 b. 1. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἄλλων ἀρχὴ στάσεως διαφορὰς. Compare 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 35, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο διαφορὰς πλείους. Ἄλλων has been interpreted in many different ways. Sepulveda, Giphanius, Heinsius, and Götting take it to mean ἄλλων ἢ τοῦ πληθους, but if we so take it, it is difficult to explain the mention in 1305 b 18 sqq. of the revolution at Erythrae, which was caused by the demos, and also to explain καί, for we have not been clearly told that, when civil discord originates with the many, it originates in different ways. Stahr's interpretation, 'from other causes than that just mentioned' ('es gehen aber auch noch aus andern Ursachen die Anfänge zu Revolutionen hervor, die verschiedene Erscheinungen bieten'), escapes the first of these difficulties, but ἄλλων in ἐξ ἄλλων is probably masculine. Vict. explains ἄλλων as 'others than those

who have governed oppressively' ('expertibus illius iniustae potestatis'), but not, I think, rightly. The natural meaning of *ἄλλων* appears to me to be *ἄλλων ἢ τῶν ὀλιγαρχούντων*: I translate, therefore, 'but when civil discord originates also with others than the oligarchs [as well as when it originates with the oligarchs], it originates in different ways.' That civil discord originating with the oligarchs originates in different ways, we see from 1305 b 22 sqq. Some would emend *ἄλλων*, but the emendations hitherto proposed do not seem satisfactory. *Αὐτῶν* is suggested in place of it in the margin of the third Basle edition of Aristotle and is read by Schneider, Coray, and Welldon; *αὐτῶν* by Nickes and Congreve. Spengel, followed by Sus., would read *ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἀρχὴν στάσεως διαφορὰ*. But if we read *αὐτῶν, αὐτῶν, ὅς ἀλλήλων*, we must take these words to mean *τῶν ὀλιγαρχούντων*: the examples which follow, however, are of changes of constitution brought about not by *οἱ ὀλιγαρχούντες*, but by *εὐποροὶ* or *γυῖρμοι* excluded from office, as Prof. Jowett has already pointed out, or else by the spontaneous action of the demos, as at Erythrae.

2. *ὅτι μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* There is nothing to answer to this *μὲν*, but Aristotle intended to go on 'and sometimes from the demos.'

οὐ τῶν ὄντων δ' ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς. For the phrase see note on 1303 b 22.

3. *γίγνεται κατάλυσις.* Cp. c. 11. 1314 a 30, *γίγνεται σωτηρία*. At Istrus there was a complete *κατάλυσις* of oligarchy, but at Massalia and Heracleia only a *κατάλυσις* of the extreme oligarchy in favour of a moderate form.

4. *ὅσον ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ κ.τ.λ.* As to the repetition of *ἐν* here see notes on 1294 a 12 and 1325 b 10, and cp. Plato, Rep. 563 E, *ἐν ἑραῖς τε καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ἥμισυ*, and Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 3, *ἐπεὶ περ ἔγνωσαν τὸ πείθεσθαι μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν στρατιᾷ καὶ ἐν οἴκῳ*. In the States here mentioned it was the rule that father and son or more brothers than one should not be in office at the same time. The object of the rule no doubt was to place on an equal footing the various households comprised within the privileged class and to prevent any one of them acquiring a disproportionate share of power, but this object might have been attained equally well if three or four members of each household, not one or two only, had been allowed to be in office at the same time, and then the number of those in office would not have been so small. At Venice three members of the same family

could be Senators at the same time (Yriarte, *Patricien de Venise*, p. 76), though two nobles from the same quarter of the city or the same family could not be Counsellors of the Doge at the same time (Yriarte, p. 349). The rule mentioned by Aristotle finds many parallels in mediaeval Italy. Thus at Siena there were five families two of whose members 'could be in the government at the same time, while for all other families the number was limited to one' (Duffy, *Tuscan Republics*, p. 73). So again in the Republic of San Marino, 'as of old at Venice, precautions are taken that family rings should not dominate the State, for' in elections to the Council 'but one member from each family may be chosen, and if personal interests are discussed in Council, the Statutes provide that relations to the third degree shall leave the hall' (E. Armstrong, 'A Political Survival,' *Macmillan's Magazine*, No. 375, Jan. 1891, p. 199). Spinoza adopts a similar rule for the judges and councils of an aristocracy (*Tractat. Polit. c. 8. 39*, *quamvis non opus sit ut unusquisque (iudex) ex diversa sit familia, necesse tamen est ne duo sanguine propinqui simul in subselliis locum occupent; quod in reliquis conciliis observandum est, praeterquam in supremo, in quo sufficit, si modo in electionibus lege cautum sit ne cuiquam propinquum nominare, nec de eo, si ab alio nominatus sit, suffragium ferre liceat, et praeterea ne ad imperii ministrum quemcumque nominandum duo propinqui sortem ex urna tollant*). If, as is probable, the *Heracleia* here mentioned is the Pontic *Heracleia*, the three States instanced by Aristotle were all of them situated in positions of peril on the outskirts of the Hellenic world, and precautions of this kind would be especially in place under those circumstances; the restriction, however, also existed at *Cnidus* (12 sqq.), which was in a different geographical position.

8. *ἐκίνουν*, 'turbas ciebant' (Sus.², 'Unruhen erregten'): cp. Polyb. 1. 69. 6, *πλείστα κεινηκὼς κατὰ τὰς προειρημένας ταραχάς*.

10. *καὶ ἐνθα μὲν πολιτικωτέρα ἐγένετο ἡ ὀλιγαρχία*, i. e. *ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ*. For *πολιτικωτέρα* cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 39. It was at this time in all probability that the machinery was devised by which members of the demos were admitted to the privileged class (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 29 sqq., where Aristotle gives it his approval). In B.C. 196 (Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 200*) and in the time of Strabo (p. 179) the city was ruled by a Council of 600 *timuchi*, holding office for life, who were required to be fathers of children and to be

descended from three generations of citizens, but it is doubtful whether this supreme Council of 600 came into existence on this occasion, for in that case we might have expected Aristotle to say of Massalia what he says of Heracleia, ἐξ ἑλαττόνων εἰς ἑξακοσίους ἦλθεν ἡ ὀλιγαρχία.

11. ἀπετελεύτησεν, sc. ἡ ὀλιγαρχία.

12. εἰς ἑξακοσίους ἦλθεν, sc. ἡ ὀλιγαρχία, cp. c. 7. 1307 a 36, εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ οὐσίαι ἔρχονται. The chief place in the oligarchy overthrown by Agathocles at Syracuse was held by a Council of 600 (Diod. 19. 5. 6). See above on 1305 b 10 as to Massalia. It is not clear whether the arrangement as to the dicasteries at the Pontic Heracleia described in 1305 b 34 sqq. existed there under the oligarchy of 600 which is here referred to.

μετέβαλε δὲ κ.τ.λ. At Cnidus, unlike the States just mentioned, the oligarchy was not overthrown by the excluded γνῶριμοι, but by the demos, as in Naxos (1305 a 38 sqq.), but this case is distinguished from that because at Cnidus (as also at Erythrae) the demos was not driven to revolt by oppression; its revolt was due rather to contempt (c. 3. 1302 b 25 sqq.). As this oligarchy was overthrown by the demos, it is probably to be distinguished from the oligarchy at Cnidus which is said in 1306 b 3 sqq. to have been overthrown by some members of the privileged class disgusted with the despotic character of its rule.

15. ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν πρεσβύτατον. Bonitz (Ind. 33 a 61 sqq.) includes this among the passages in which 'ἀλλ' ἢ ad significationem particulae πλὴν vel εἰ μὴ prope accedit,' of which he gives a considerable number.

18. καὶ ἐν Ἐρυθραῖς δὲ κ.τ.λ. We find a gens of Basilidae also at Ephesus (Baton ap. Suid. Πυθαγόρας, quoted by Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 141. 2: cp. Strabo, p. 633, διόπερ τὸ βασιλεῖον τῶν Ἰώνων ἐκεῖ (at Ephesus) συστήναι φασί, καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἱ ἐκ τοῦ γένους ὀνομάζονται βασιλεῖς ἔχοντές τινας τιμὰς, προεδρίαν τε ἐν ἀγῶσι καὶ πορφύραν ἐπίσημον τοῦ βασιλικοῦ γένους, σκίπτωνα ἀντὶ σκίπτρου, καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τῆς Ἐλευσινίας Δήμητρος), and perhaps also at Chios (Gilbert, 2. 153. 1). See Toepffer, Attische Genealogie, p. 240. The gens of the Basilidae was probably composed of descendants of the kings: compare the Neleidae at Miletus (Aristot. Fragm. 515. 1562 a 29), the Penthilidae at Mytilene (7 (5). 10. 1311 b 25 sqq.: Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 162), and the Eupatridae at Athens, who are described by one authority as οἱ αὐτὸ τὸ ἄστυ οἰκούντες καὶ

μετέχοντες βασιλικῷ γένει (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 102. 3).

19. καίπερ καλῶς ἐπιμελομένων τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ. Lamb. 'quamvis ea quae ad rempublicam pertinerent bene procurarent,' and Sus.^{3a} (Ind. p. 347) apparently takes τῶν to be neuter, but surely τῶν is masc., and the sentence should be rendered 'though those who possessed rights under the constitution managed [the affairs of the State] well.'

22. κινούνται δ' αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle now passes to the second of the heads under which he groups the causes of the overthrow of oligarchies, causes originating with the oligarchs themselves. Cp. Thuc. 8. 89. 3, κατ' ἰδίαν δὲ φιλοτιμίαι οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τῇ τοιοῦτῃ προσέκειντο, ἐν ᾗ περ καὶ μάλιστα ὀλιγαρχία ἐκ δημοκρατίας γενομένη ἀπώλλυται· πάντες γὰρ αὐθιγερὸν ἐξιοῦσιν οὐχ ὅπως ἴσται, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἕκαστος εἶναι (which is partly based on Hdt. 3. 82), and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 13, where ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλοκία is mentioned as a cause of στάσις at Athens.

23. ἡ δημαγωγία δὲ διττή, ἡ μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀλίγοις κ.τ.λ. This is repeated in c. 8. 1308 a 17. 'Ἡ μὲν is answered not without some roughness by ἡ ὅταν κ.τ.λ., 28: cp. 3. 1. 1275 a 23 sqq., where ἐνίας μὲν is followed by ἡ (see note on 1275 a 24), and see note on 1338 b 1. Δημαγωγία is a humouring of the propensities of the δημαγωγούμενος with a view to the aggrandizement of ὁ δημαγωγῶν, and may be resorted to not only in relation to a few persons or many, but even in relation to one (c. 10. 1312 b 12 sq.).

25. οἷον ἐν τοῖς τριάκοντα κ.τ.λ. Οἱ περὶ Χαρικλέα, i. e. Charicles (Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 66). It would seem that in Aristotle's opinion the Thirty were led into the excesses which proved fatal to them by Charicles rather than by Critias. The name of Charicles also comes first in Lys. c. Eratosth. c. 55, ἕτεροι οἱ δοκούντες εἶναι ἐναντιώτατοι Χαρικλεῖ καὶ Κριτίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐταιρείᾳ. We hear nothing of Charicles in the 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία, which is remarkable if the work is from Aristotle's pen. According to Isocr. De Big. § 42, Charicles was a returned exile and eager both to enslave Athens to the Lacedaemonians and to rule over her himself. Δημαγωγούντες τοὺς τριάκοντα, 'through courting the Thirty.' Kaibel (Stil und Text der 'Αθ. Πολ., p. 54) remarks, 'Everywhere in the 'Αθ. Πολ. the word δημαγωγεῖν is used absolutely: δημαγωγεῖν τὸν δῆλον etc. occurs in the Politics, but not in the 'Αθ. Πολ.'

26. καὶ ἐν τοῖς τετρακοσίοις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle was friendly to

Theramenes ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 28: Plut. Nic. c. 2), and we find him here, unlike most people, laying the responsibility for the fall of the Four Hundred not on his shoulders, but on those of Phrynichus.

29. *οἷον ἐν Λαρίσῃ κ.τ.λ.* As to the *πολιτοφύλακες* see note on 1268 a 22. They may probably have been annual magistrates, but it would seem that they were re-eligible. We see from 2. 8. 1268 a 21 sqq. that their office was a very important one—the custody of the city and of its walls and gates was probably in their hands (8 (6). 8. 1322 a 33 sqq.: compare the functions of the *πολιταρχες* in Aen. Poliorc. 26. 12 and of the *πολιτάρχαι* in Acts 17. 6 sqq.)—and we may perhaps infer from the passage before us that at Larissa it was tenable only by persons possessed of a high property-qualification, though the right of electing the *πολιτοφύλακες* belonged to the whole people. We are not told that the *demos* at Larissa elected the magistrates generally, as in some of the oligarchies mentioned in 30 sqq. All we are told is that it elected the *πολιτοφύλακες*. The rivalry of these great officials with each other in courting the body which elected them may have ended (cp. 1306 a 26 sqq.) in the transfer of their functions to an *ἄρχων μεσιδίας* at the head of a body of mercenaries, who used his position to make himself tyrant of the city. No wonder that a State so disunited as Larissa found it difficult to make head against the tyrants of Pherae and was obliged to call in Philip of Macedon against them (Schäfer, Demosthenes, 1. 458).

30. *καὶ ἐν ὅσαις ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐχ οὗτοι αἰροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἄρχοντές εἰσιν κ.τ.λ.* It is not quite clear what should be supplied before *ἐν ὅσαις ὀλιγαρχίαις*. Should we supply *δημαγωγῶσι*, *οἱ κινεῦνται αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι*, *οἱ κινεῦνται αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι ἐξ αὐτῶν διὰ φιλονεκίαν δημαγωγούντων*? I incline to think that we should supply the last-mentioned words. We may probably infer from the passage before us that in most oligarchies the magistrates were elected by the class which was eligible for the magistracies. Among the oligarchies referred to here the first form of oligarchy must, it would seem, find a place, for in that form the right of electing to the higher magistracies would commonly be possessed by a far more numerous body than that which had the right to hold them, inasmuch as the latter right was commonly confined to citizens possessing a high property-qualification (8 (6). 6. 1320 b 21 sqq.). The same weakness, however, was shared by other constitutions

also—for instance by aristocracies, for offices seem often to have been unpaid in aristocracies (2. 11. 1273 a 17 sq.) and must therefore in practice have been tenable only by the rich, and indeed by democracies of the Solonian type, in which office was confined to the three higher property-classes and some offices were confined to the highest class, though the whole people had the right of electing to them. The cause of constitutional change here indicated by Aristotle—the rivalry of the holders of great offices in courting those who elect them with a view to their own aggrandizement—is indeed widely traceable in history both ancient and modern—for instance in the history of ancient Rome and in that of our own country—and is far from being confined in its operation to oligarchies (see note on 1305 a 28).

81. ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἀρχαὶ ἐκ τιμημάτων μεγάλων εἰσὶν ἢ ἐταιριῶν, αἰρούνται δ' οἱ ὀπλίται ἢ ὁ δῆμος. Cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 39. 1446 b 24, ὀλιγαρχιῶν δ' εἰσὶ δύο τρόποι· ἡ γὰρ ἐξ ἐταιρείας ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν τιμημάτων. Here, however, we have ἐκ (not ἀπὸ) τιμημάτων μεγάλων, and *τιμημα* must mean not 'property-qualification,' but 'the class possessing the property-qualification.' For ἐκ τιμημάτων αἱ ἀρχαὶ εἰσὶν cp. Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12, ὅπου δ' ἐκ τιμημάτων (αἱ ἀρχαὶ καθίσταται), πλουτοκρατίας, ὅπου δ' ἐκ πάντων, δημοκρατίαν, Plato, Rep. 553 A and Laws 698 B, and for ἐκ τιμημάτων μεγάλων Pol. 2. 6. 1266 a 20, οἱ ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων, and Plato, Laws 756 D, τετάρτη δὲ φέρειν μὲν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ μικροτάτου τιμήματος πάντας. Oligarchies in which only members of certain clubs are eligible for office are not distinctly named in the list of oligarchies in 6 (4). 5–6, though the class of oligarchies to which they belong is referred to in 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 15 sqq. (cp. also 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 40 sqq.). The oligarchies established by Lysander after Aegospotami were of this nature (Plut. Lysand. c. 13, καταλύων δὲ τοὺς δῆμους καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας ἕνα μὲν ἀρμοστήν ἐκάστη Λακεδαιμόνιον κατέλιπε, δέκα δὲ ἄρχοντας ἐκ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ συγκεκροτημένων κατὰ πόλιν ἐταιριῶν· καὶ ταῦτα πράττων ὁμοίως ἔν τε ταῖς πολεμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμάχοις γεγενημέναις πόλεσι παρέπλει σχολαίως, τρόπον τινα κατασκευαζόμενος ἑαυτῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡγεμονίαν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀριστίνδην οὔτε πλουτίνδην ἀπεδείκνυε τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ἀλλ' ἐταιρείαις καὶ ξενίαις χαριζόμενος τὰ πράγματα καὶ κυρίους ποιῶν τιμῆς τε καὶ κολάσεως. The oligarchy of Abydos so far resembled those founded by Lysander that the magistracies were tenable only by persons belonging to certain clubs, but it differed from them in this, that the hoplites or the demos had the right of electing the magistrates, a peculiar arrange-

ment, as Prof. Jowett has already remarked; it appears, in fact, to have resulted in the tyranny of an *ἀρχων μεσιδιος* supported by mercenary soldiers (1306 a 26 sqq.). The competition of the oligarchs for the favour of the electors would be intensified by the circumstance that they belonged to rival clubs. How soon oligarchy at Abydos assumed the form described in the text, we have no means of knowing, but an oligarchy of some kind was probably set up there after the revolt of the city from Athens in B.C. 411 (Thuc. 8. 62), when it became for more than twenty years 'the great military station of Sparta for her northern Asiatic warfare' (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 9. 443), remaining faithful to the Lacedaemonians even after the defeat of their fleet at Cnidus in B.C. 394, notwithstanding the general defection of the Greek States of Asia Minor. This fidelity was ill repaid at the peace of Antalcidas, when with most of Asiatic Greece Abydos was abandoned by the Lacedaemonians to Persia. Still even down to the time of Demosthenes (c. Aristocr. c. 158) the dissolute (Athen. Deipn. 524 f sqq.) but gallant little city (see the story of its heroic defence against Philip V of Macedon in B.C. 200 in Polyb. 16. 29—33) remained 'persistently hostile to Athens' and in all probability an oligarchical State. Sestos on the opposite side of the Hellespont was also hostile to Athens (see the account of its fate at the hands of Chares in B.C. 353 in Diod. 16. 34); no cities, in fact, were more coveted by Athens than these two, which, lying as they did at the narrowest point of the Hellespont, were the natural stepping-stones between Europe and Asia, and hence of great importance. Another important advantage possessed by Abydos was the excellence of its harbour, which offered a secure anchorage to vessels, while outside it a strong current ran in the Hellespont (Polyb. 16. 29. 13 sq.). That the *ἐταιρίαι* at Abydos, or at any rate their domination, had passed away at the time at which Aristotle wrote seems to be implied by his language in 1306 a 30 sq. *τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι καθ' ἐταιρείας* was bad; cp. Dio Chrysost. Or. 45 (2. 206 R), *μάλιστα μὲν γὰρ ἡξίουν μηδὲ ἕτερον μηδένα τοιοῦτον ἔθους εἰσάγειν μηδὲ καθ' ἐταιρείας πολιτεύεσθαι μηδ' εἰς μέρη διασπᾶν τὴν πόλιν*.

33. καὶ ὅπου τὰ δικαστήρια μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πολιτεύματός ἐστιν, 'and where the dicasteries are composed of others than those who are eligible for office.' As to *πολίτευμα* cp. 1306 a 14 sq., where this seems to be the meaning of the word. Aristotle probably does not

mean that the members of the *πολίτευμα* were excluded from the dicasteries, but that membership of the dicasteries was not confined to them (cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 8, *γίνονται δ' ἐκ τοῦ δήμου πάντες*). This arrangement existed at one time at Heracleia on the Euxine, and it seems to have led to a change of the oligarchy into a democracy. If so, this democracy cannot have been that which appears to have been instituted at Heracleia at the foundation of the colony (see note on 1304 b 31); it must have arisen at a later date. If the dicasteries referred to by Aristotle were popular dicasteries, and if they possessed the power of inflicting the penalties of death and exile, no arrangement was more alien to the spirit of an oligarchy (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 31-34). This important power was reserved for a few not only in most oligarchies but also in such aristocracies as the Lacedaemonian and the Carthaginian (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 31 sqq. : 3. 1. 1275 b 9 sqq.). The authority which Solon conceded to dicasteries open to persons who were not under his constitution admissible to office (2. 12. 1274 a 3, 18 sqq.) was thought by many to have proved fatal to the moderate democracy founded by him (1274 a 3 sqq.). When C. Gracchus gave judicial authority to the equestrian order (Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, Eng. Trans., vol. iii. p. 116), he dealt a heavy blow at the oligarchy. Still Aristotle knew of constitutions in which the deliberative and the magistracies were oligarchically organized, but the dicasteries were organized as in an aristocracy (8 (6). 1. 1317 a 4 sqq.).

86. *ἔτι δ' ὅταν ἔνιοι κ.τ.λ.* Supply *μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν* before *ὅταν*. This is mentioned in connexion with changes due to τὸ διὰ φιλονεικίαν *δημαγωγεῖν* because calling in the *demos* is akin to τὸ *δημαγωγεῖν*, though in strictness there is no *φιλονεικία* in the case, for the excluded members of the oligarchy are *obliged* to call in the *demos*. The narrowing of an oligarchy is conceived to lead to democracy in a slightly different way in 3. 15. 1286 b 18, αἰεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες δι' αἰσχροπείδειαν ἰσχυρότερον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, ὥστ' ἐπιθίσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι δημοκρατίας.

89. *γίγονται δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Compare (with Prof. Jowett) c. 12. 1316 b 14 sqq. and Plato, *Rep.* 555 D: cp. also Eurip. *Herc. Fur.* 552 Bothe (588 Dindorf),

πολλοὺς πένητας, ὀλβίους δὲ τῷ λόγῳ
δοκοῦντας εἶναι, συμμάχους ἀναξ ἔχει,
οἱ στάσιν ἔθηκαν καὶ διώλεσαν πόλιν

ἐφ' ἀρπαγαῖσι τῶν πύλας, τὰ δ' ἐν δόμοις
δαπάναισι φρουῖδα διαφυγόνθ' ὑπ' ἀργίας.

Aeneas (Poliorc. 14. 1) says of debtors in a besieged city, *δπου γε καὶ φοβερύτατοι ἐφεδροὶ εἰσιν οἱ τοιοῦτε ἄνθρωποι*. The loss of wealth would be especially likely to cause constitutional change in oligarchies, because it would often entail exclusion from the ruling class, but would it not tend to cause constitutional change in democracies also? This cause of change is guarded against in c. 8. 1308 b 20 sqq. In illustration of Aristotle's remark the instances of Catiline and Julius Caesar may be referred to (Appian, *Rel. Civ.* 2. 1 sq.).

40. ἀναλώσῃσι, sc. τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τινέσι. Cp. c. 12. 1316 b 18, *ὅταν μὲν τῶν ἡγεμόνων τινὲς ἀπολέσῃσι τὰς οὐσίας, καινοτομοῦσιν*.

καὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, 'for men of the kind just described also.'

41. ἡ τυραννίδι ἐπιτίθενται αὐτοί. 'Ἐπιτίθεσθαι τυραννίδι here, as in c. 5. 1305 a 21 and c. 8. 1308 a 22 sq., means 'affectare tyrannidem' (*Bon. Ind.* 281 a 51 sq.), but we have in c. 10. 1311 a 26 *ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς μοναρχίαις* and in 1312 b 18 *ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς τυραννίσι*, where the meaning is 'attack monarchies' or 'tyrannies.' Ruined oligarchs, as well as men of wealth and influence, seem to have been able to make themselves tyrants (see note on 1302 b 15).

1. ὥστερ Ἱππαρίνος Διονύσιον ἐν Συρακούσαις. See Grote, *Hist.* 1306 a. of Greece, 10. 599 and 11. 76 (Congreve). Hipparinus was a leading citizen of Syracuse and was, like Dionysius the Elder, one of the *stratēgi* who were chosen when the previous *stratēgi* were deposed by vote of the people (*Diod.* 13. 92), and were themselves displaced when Dionysius was elected *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* in a.c. 406–5 (*Diod.* 13. 94: *Plut. Dion.* c. 3: *Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography*, art. Hipparinus). His position as a colleague of Dionysius would make it easy for him to aid the designs of the latter. That his support of Dionysius, who married his daughter Aristomache, enabled him completely to retrieve his fortunes, is pointed out by Grote (11. 76), who refers to the fact that his son Dion became one of the richest men in Syracuse. Aristotle does not mean to imply that Syracuse was under an oligarchy when Dionysius the Elder obtained the tyranny; it was, in fact, democratically governed (c. 4. 1304 a 27 sqq.: *Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth.* 176 D).

2. καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει κ.τ.λ. See note on 1303 b 2. 'A man whose name was Cleotimus' introduced Chalcidian *ἔπικοι*, and after

their arrival created a *διάστασις* between them and the rich of Amphipolis, whether with the view of making himself tyrant or some one else, Aristotle does not explain, nor does he tell us how the thing ended. We cannot even infer from the passage with any certainty that an oligarchy existed at Amphipolis before the events here narrated. All that is clear is that Cleotimus' conduct was caused by his dissipation of his own fortune, and that his object was tyranny, for himself or for another.

ὦ ὄνομα ἦν Κλεότιμος. Cp. Hdt. 3. 143, ταῦτα εἶπε ἐὼν ἐν τοῖσι ἀσποῖσι δόκιμος, τῷ ὄνομα ἦν Τελέσαρχος: Diod. 15. 30. 3, Νεογένης τις ὄνομα: [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 8. 2, Ἀρχιλοχὸν τὸν ποιητὴν Κόραξ ὄνομα ἔκτεινε: Aristot. Fragm. 508. 1561 a 39, Εἰξενος δ' ὁ Φωκαεὺς Νάνῳ τῷ βασιλεῖ, τοῦτο δ' ἦν αὐτῷ ὄνομα, ἦν ξένος: Ammian. Marc. 27. 8. 10, Civilem nomine. It is evident that in some of these passages the explanation that the word is a proper name is added because otherwise misapprehension might occur, but this does not seem to be the case in the passage before us.

8. ἐλθόντων. See notes on 1281 b 4, 13.

4. καὶ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ κ.τ.λ. Nothing is known of this 'transaction with Chares' from any other source, but it is easy to guess what happened. A wealthy Aeginetan who had wasted his fortune in riotous living made application to the Athenian general Chares, who usually had mercenaries at his disposal, for the assistance of his mercenaries in an attempt to make himself or some one else (we are not told which) tyrant in Aegina, offering Chares no doubt a great reward in the event of success. The attempt seems to have been made, but to have failed. The 'promises of Chares' were proverbially delusive (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. i. 463). The date of the 'transaction' referred to may have been B.C. 367, when Chares was stationed at Corinth with Athenian mercenaries (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 10. 372, 393). Athens was then siding with the Lacedaemonians against Thebes, and Aegina, her constant foe, may not improbably have been on the side of Thebes. Chares would therefore be glad to substitute for the existing government of Aegina a tyrant who would owe his position to Athens. For the unfavourable use of τὴν πρᾶξιν πράττειν cp. Plato, Laws 831 D. The phrase itself occurs in Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 18. l. 13 sq.

6. διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, i.e. because he had dissipated his fortune (cp. 1306 b 17 and 3. 13. 1284 a 23 sq.).

7. *θεν κ.τ.λ.*, 'whence civil trouble is stirred against the oligarchs either by the depredators or by those who resist them in their depredations.' 'The two cases are (1) where the government does not connive at these misappropriations of public moneys, in which case the thieves attempt to create a *στάσις* to escape punishment (*διὰ φόβου*, c. 3. 1302 b 21 sqq., which should be compared); (2) where it *does*, in which case the section opposed to the speculations rises against the conniving government' (Postgate, Notes on the Politics of Aristotle, p. 22). It would seem that at Apollonia on the Euxine the revolt against the oligarchy was raised by the opponents of the depredators, so that here the oligarchs must have connived at the depredations. Cp. Hdt. 3. 82, where we are told that when some champion of the demos put a stop to the misdeeds of plunderers of public property, he often became a tyrant.

9. *δμοιοῦσα δὲ ὀλιγαρχία οὐκ εὐδιάφορος ἐξ αὐτῆς*. Plato (Rep. 545 D) had said that no constitution can be overthrown if *τὸ ἔχον τὰς ἀρχάς* is at one with itself; Aristotle will commit himself only to this, that an oligarchy of which this can be said is not easily overthrown from within; it may be overthrown by the demos or by excluded rich men. He remembers the case of Erythrae (1305 b 18 sqq.).

10. *σημεῖον δὲ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῃ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ.* The expression *τὸ χρῆσθαι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καλῶς* suggests, if we compare c. 8. 1308 a 10 sqq., that Pharsalus put the members of the privileged class as far as possible on a level, both in respect of participation in office and in other ways. Pharsalus had not always been free from *στάσις*. We read in Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 2 sq. that, having been in a state of civil discord (*στασιάζοντες*), the citizens of Pharsalus at some time previous to B.C. 375 entrusted Polydamas, one of their number, with the custody of the acropolis and with the receipt and employment of the revenue, and that Polydamas proved himself worthy of their confidence. Not long after B.C. 375, however, Pharsalus was forced to become dependent on Pherae (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 18), and Jason's successor, Polyphron, put Polydamas and eight other Pharsalians to death (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 34). In B.C. 352, when Philip of Macedon reduced Pherae, Pharsalus exchanged its dependence on Pherae for a virtual dependence on Macedon. Philip showed much favour to the city (Schäfer, Demosthenes, 2. 248, 324, 503), which derived considerable importance from its position at 'the entrance of the most direct and central of the passes which

lead from the plains of Thessaly to the vale of the Spercheius and Thermopylae' (Leake, Northern Greece, 1. 449). For how long the Pharsalian oligarchy had deserved the praise which Aristotle gives it, we cannot say with any certainty; it did so at any rate at the time at which he wrote. His commendation of Pharsalus is just what we should expect from a friend of Macedon (see note on 1304 a 10). Not long after it was penned, Pharsalus took part in the rising of Thessaly against Macedon in the Lamian War (Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 352).

11. πολλῶν κύριοί εἰσι, 'are masters of many men': cp. Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 8, where we read of 'the cities dependent on Pharsalus' in B.C. 375 (τῶν ἐξ ὑμῶν ἡρτημένων πόλεων). Philip gave Halus to Pharsalus (Strabo, p. 433: Schäfer, Demosthenes, 2. 248. 1).

12. καταλύονται δὲ κ.τ.λ. This is perhaps suggested by what immediately precedes, for to create an oligarchy within an oligarchy is the opposite to τὸ χρησθαι σφίσι αὐτοῖς καλῶς. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 101. 1) identifies these senators with the δημιουργοί of Thuc. 5. 47. 9, but this is doubtful. That this oligarchy at Elis was overthrown is clear from the passage before us, but we are not told whether it was overthrown by the members of the πολίτευμα who found themselves virtually excluded from the senate or by an union of these persons with the demos or by the demos acting by itself. It was probably overthrown by a man named Phormion: compare (with Schn.) Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 10, οὐκ ἄγνοῶ δὲ ὅτι καὶ βουλὴν τινὲς ἐπαχθῇ καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὴν κολούσαντες, ὥσπερ Ἐφιάλτης Ἀθήνησι καὶ Φορμίων παρ' Ἠλείοις, δύναμιν ἄμα καὶ δόξαν ἔσχον. It is quite uncertain, however, when Phormion lived (see Sus.², Note 1586, and Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 102. 4).

18. ἐνενήκοντα ὄντας, 'being only ninety in number.'

τὴν δ' αἵρεσιν δυναστευτικὴν εἶναι καὶ ὁμοίαν τῇ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι γερόντων. Δυναστευτικὴν, 'of a character savouring of a δυναστεία,' i. e. favourable to the interests of a few very wealthy families: see notes on 1271 a 9 and 1272 b 2.

19. γίγνεται δὲ . . . 81. Ἰφιάδου. We have still to do here with revolutions in oligarchies due to the oligarchs themselves, for in the cases now described the overthrow of the oligarchy is brought about by the oligarchs, who entrust the defence of the State in war to mercenary troops or to the demos, or its custody in peace to a neutral magistrate at the head of mercenaries. This passage corrects Plato, Rep. 551 D sq. (see note on 1305 a 37 sq.).

ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ continues *δταν*, 1305 b 39 and 1306 a 13. Constitutional change was usually more to be feared in time of war than in time of peace (Thuc. 3. 82. 3: Plato, *Laws* 709 A). The Athenian democracy, according to Isocr. *De Pace*, § 51, thrived in time of peace, but had been twice overthrown in time of war.

21. ἐν μὲν πολέμῳ. Should τῷ be added before πολέμῳ? In 26 we have ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ, where τῇ is added before εἰρήνῃ probably because καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ has preceded in 20: cp. c. 8. 1308 b 21, τοὺς ζῶντας ἀσυμφόρως πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἐν δὲ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. Yet it should be noticed that in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 17, 18 ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις is followed by ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἰβηρσιν just as in the passage before us ἐν μὲν πολέμῳ is followed by ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ.

τὴν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ἀπιστίαν. Cp. c. 10. 1311 a 12, where τὸ τῷ πλῑθι μὴδὲν πιστεύειν is said to be characteristic of oligarchy.

22. ᾧ γὰρ ἂν ἐγχειρίσωσιν, sc. τοὺς στρατιώτας.

23. οὗτος πολλάκις γίγνεται τύραννος. Cp. Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 139, ἵστε γὰρ δῆπου τοῦθ', ὅτι πάντες οἱ ξεναγούμενοι οὗτοι πόλεις καταλαμβάνοντες Ἑλληνίδας ἄρχειν ζητοῦσι, and Aen. Poliorc. c. 12, οἷον καὶ Ἡρακλείδαις τοῖς ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ συνέβη' ἐπαγαγόμενοι γὰρ ξένους πλείονας τοῦ προσήκοντος, πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς ἀνιστασιώτας ἀπέλκον, ἔπειτα αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀπώλεσαν, τυραννευθέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰσαγαγόντος τοὺς ξένους. This seems to refer to Clearchus, who founded in B. C. 364 a tyranny which lasted till B. C. 285 (Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 190: Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, Part 2, c. 98, vol. 12. 622 sqq.). Here we come upon tyrants who became tyrants, unlike some of their earlier compeers (c. 5. 1305 a 8 sqq.), without having been demagogues. In this, and also in having been leaders of mercenary troops, they resemble many tyrants of mediaeval Italy.

ᾧ περ ἐν Κορίνθῳ Τιμοφάνης. As Gilbert (*Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 90. 4) points out, Aristotle here implies that Corinth was under an oligarchy when Timophanes was appointed. This agrees with Plut. *Dion.* c. 53. It was at the time at war with Argos and Cleonae (Plut. *Timol.* c. 4). According to Diod. 16. 65. 3, Timophanes did not actually make himself tyrant, but only acted like a tyrant; Plutarch, however (*Timol.* c. 4), and Aristotle here speak otherwise. As to Timophanes, see Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, Part 2, c. 85, vol. 11. 192 sqq. The distrust of the demos felt by the Corinthian oligarchs would be intensified by the circumstances connected with the return from Argos of the exiled democrats,

which Diodorus refers to B.C. 375 (15. 40. 3), and by the scheme of Athens in B.C. 366 to get possession of Corinth, in which she may probably have counted on aid from the Corinthian demos (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 4 sq.: Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 79, vol. 10. 396 sq.). The appointment of Timophanes was subsequent to the failure of this Athenian project (Grote, Part 2, c. 85, vol. 11. 193).

24. *ἀν δὲ πλείους κ.τ.λ.* Supply *ἄσων*. "Ἔσται is omitted in 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 17 (where see note), and *ἀν εἷη* probably in 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 35 sq., and *ἔστω* apparently in 8 (6). 3. 1318 a 38.

25. *ὅτι δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Plato, Rep. 551 D sq. Machiavelli remarks (Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio, 1. 6) that the circumstance that the Romans did not, like the Venetians, abstain from employing the plebs in war 'gave the plebs additional force and influence and infinite occasions of raising tumults.' We read in a quotation from the *Fremdenblatt* of Vienna (*Times*, Oct. 12, 1893) that 'the introduction of conscription [in Austria] made it morally incumbent on the State to grant the right to vote to those who had borne heavy burdens for the commonweal.' 'Taine (Origines de la France Contemporaine: Le Régime Moderne, 1. 284-296) justly describes conscription as the natural companion or brother of universal suffrage' (Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, ed. 1, 1. 261).

26. *ἐν δὲ τῇ εἰρήνῃ κ.τ.λ.* See note on 21. "Ἀρχοντι μεσιδίῳ, 'to a neutral magistrate' standing midway between the contending parties: cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 7. 1132 a 22, *καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον, καὶ καλοῦσιν ἔνιοι μεσιδίους, ὡς εἰάν τοῦ μέσου τύχῃσι, τοῦ δικαίου τευξόμενοι*, and Pol. 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 4, *ἐν μέρει γὰρ ἄρχειν οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείναιεν* (sc. οἱ πλούσιοι καὶ οἱ πένητες) *διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους* παταχῶς δὲ πιστότατος ὁ διαιτητής, διαιτητής δ' ὁ μέσος, where *διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους* again occurs. Were the services of a 'neutral magistrate' ever resorted to in conflicts between rich and poor as well as in conflicts between two oligarchical factions? The position of Polydamas of Pharsalus (see note on 1306 a 10) must be distinguished from that of a 'neutral magistrate,' for we are not told that he was at the head of a body of mercenaries, and besides he was charged with the receipt and employment of the revenue, which the 'neutral magistrate' does not seem to have been.

29. *ὅπερ συνέβη κ.τ.λ.* "Ὅπερ refers to *ὅς ἐρίοιτε γίνεται κύριος ἀμφοτέρων*. Larissa and Abydos are here again named together, as in 1305 b 29-33. Perhaps in both the competition of high magis-

trates for the favour of the people produced in the minds of the two oligarchical factions a strong distrust of each other, and led to the custody of the acropolis, walls, and gates of the city being placed in the hands of a 'neutral magistrate,' who however ultimately made himself master of both factions. That there were two factions at Larissa in B.C. 431 we see from Thuc. 2. 22, ἡγοῦντο δὲ αὐτῶν ἐκ μὲν Λαρίσης Πολυμήδης καὶ Ἀριστόνους, ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως ἑκάτερος. I take ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀλευαδῶν ἀρχῆς τῶν περὶ Σίμον to mean 'in the time of the rule of Simus the Aleuad' (cp. c. 10. 1312 b 10, ἡ τῶν περὶ Γέλωνα τυραννίς), and Simus was in all probability the 'neutral magistrate' referred to, just as Iphiades was at Abydos. The name Simus (as to which see note on 1304 a 29 and cp. Plin. Nat. Hist. 11. 158, where the Roman name Silo, derived from silus, 'snub-nosed,' is compared with it) is one which occurs more than once in the family of the Aleuadae—for instance, the father of an early Aleuas was named Simus (Euphoriion in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 72)—but there can be little doubt that the Simus of the passage before us is the well-known Simus of Larissa, who is said by Demosthenes (De Cor. c. 48) to have, in conjunction with Eudicus, also of Larissa, brought Thessaly into subjection to Philip of Macedon, and to have lost his favour as soon as he had done so. We read of his dissolute youth in [Demosth.] c. Neaer. cc. 24 sq., 108. He is thought to have been tetrarch of one of the four divisions into which Thessaly was broken up by Philip in B.C. 342 (Demosth. Phil. 3. 26 : Curtius, History of Greece, Eng. Trans., 5. 368 : Schäfer, Demosthenes, 2. 402 : Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 13. 3), and his name may appear in this capacity on some coins of Larissa of the fourth century B.C. which bear the inscription ΣΙΜΟΞ (Gardner, Catalogue of Greek Coins, Thessaly, Introduction, p. xxvi, and p. 31 : Head, Hist. Num. pp. 253, 255). As to Iphiades, that he was a skilful soldier appears from the narrative in Aen. Poliorc. c. 28. 6 (referred to by Schneider). The Iphiades mentioned in Demosth. c. Aristocr. cc. 176—7, who had a son in Cersobleptes' custody as a hostage on behalf of Sestos, may probably be the same man. Another Iphiades of Abydos is mentioned in Polyb. 16. 30. 7. That clubs were often 'centred round a single individual' we see from the example of those at Athens, where we hear of the clubs of Phaeax, Euphiletus, Alcibiades, and others (Vischer, Kleine Schriften, 1. 153—204, quoted by L. Whibley, Political Parties in Athens, p. 83 sq.).

31. γίνονται δὲ στάσεις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has just been describing how oligarchies were often overthrown if power were placed in the hands of captains of mercenaries or a demos or a neutral magistrate, and now he goes on to show that στάσεις might arise within the circle of the oligarchs themselves without any external intervention. They might arise either when the oligarchs treated each other despitely or when the oligarchy itself was intrinsically over-despotic. In either case some of the oligarchs might step in and overthrow the oligarchy. Aristotle suggests precautions against the former source of trouble in c. 8. 1308 a 31 sqq. Cp. Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32. 824 F sqq.

32. τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ. Cp. Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 126 (an inscription from Chios), οἱ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ.

34. μὲν is answered by δέ, 36.

αἱ εἰρημέναι πρότερον, in c. 4. 1303 b 37-1304 a 17. Supply ἐγένοντο from γίνονται, 31.

35. καὶ τὴν ἐν Ἐρετρίᾳ δ' ὀλιγαρχίαν τὴν τῶν ἱππέων κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 36-40. This Eretrian oligarchy helped Peisistratus in his final recovery of the tyranny at Athens (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 15). Diagoras was evidently one of the oligarchs, and his disappointment (probably of the hand of an heiress) was due not to the decision of a dicastery, but to a factious intrigue against him (cp. 33, καταστασιζέσθαι κατὰ γάμους). The Diagoras mentioned in [Heraclicid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 12 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 217), Διαγόρας εἰς Σπάρτην πορευομένην καὶ ἐν Κορίνθῳ τελευτήσαντι Ἐρετρίαις εἰκόνα ἔστησαν, is probably the same man. Müller distinguishes him from the famous Διαγόρας ὁ ἄθλος of Melos. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 66) thinks that the overthrow of this oligarchy by Diagoras probably occurred before the Persian wars.

36. ἐκ δὲ δικαστηρίου κρίσεως κ.τ.λ. Μοιχεία was a criminal offence in Greek States (Aeschin. c. Timarch. c. 91 : Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 59). The technical term μοιχεία included at Athens not only adultery, but also some kinds of illegal intercourse with unmarried women or widows, and the offender, if taken in the act, might be put to death by the husband, or, in the case of an unmarried woman or widow, by the father, brother, or grandfather, if her κύριος (Meier und Schömann, Der attische Process, ed. Lipsius, p. 402 sqq.). Aristotle makes some suggestions as to the punishment of adultery in 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 38 sqq.; he seems to regard the degrading punishment mentioned in the text as excessive. The κύριος was

a wooden yoke placed on the back of the neck, which kept the head bowed down (see Suidas, s. vv. *Κύφωνες* and *Ἐπίκουρος*, and Schol. Aristoph. Plut. 476), and exposure in it in the most public part of the city was a punishment rather for thieves than for nobles (Pollux, 10. 177: Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 114: Plut. Nic. c. 11, where we read of Hyperbolus, *οὗτος ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ τοῦ μὲν δοστράκου πόρῳ τιθέμενος ἑαυτὸν, ὅτε δὴ τῷ κύφῳ μᾶλλον προσήκων*). It may, however, have been an obsolete punishment revived for the occasion, for a similar punishment was inflicted on adulteresses at Cyme (Plut. Quaest. Gr. 2). The punishment inflicted on Dercyllidas by Lysander (Xen. Hell. 3. 1. 9: Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 72, vol. 9. 289) was far less degrading, yet he felt it deeply. The *στάσεις* at Heracleia (probably the Pontic Heracleia) and Thebes to which Aristotle refers were apparently well known. We are not told whether they led to any change in the constitution.

1. *ἐφιλονείκησαν γὰρ αὐτούς*. *Φιλονεικεῖν* seems here to have an 1306 b. accusative of the person after it because it contains much of the meaning of *φιλονεικῶς ἐδίωξαν* or *ἐκόλασαν*. But verbs compounded with *φιλο-* occasionally take an accusative of the person: so *φιλοστοργεῖν* in Plato, Laws 927 B and Polyb. 5. 74. 5, and *φιλανθρωπεῖν* in Polyb. 3. 76. 2 and 11. 26. 5. Richards, however, would read *αὐτοῖς* with Liddell and Scott (s. v. *φιλονεικέω*).

2. *ἐν ἀγορᾷ*, as in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 16 and often in Plato (see Ast, Lex. Platon. s. v. *ἀγορά*). In 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 20 we have *τὸν ἀνδριάντα τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ καθήμενον*. As to *κατὰ πόλιν* and *κατὰ τὴν πόλιν* see note on 1285 b 13.

3. *πολλὰι δὲ κ.τ.λ.* We read in Diod. 15. 40. 2 that the holders of office in the Peloponnesian oligarchies in the days of Lacedaemonian supremacy had dealt with the citizens imperiously (*ἐπιτακτικῶς*), and that they suffered in consequence after the fall of the oligarchies. This throws light on the meaning of *ἀγαν δεσποτικῶς* here. Cp. also 3. 6. 1279 a 21 and 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 27 sq.

6. *γίνονται δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Compare 2. 12. 1274 a 12 and the changes *διὰ τύχης* mentioned in 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 3 sqq. The polity would be exposed to changes of this kind because it imposed a property-qualification on members of the assembly (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sqq.: 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 1 sqq.). Some oligarchies would not be affected by the change in the value of property to which Aristotle refers—for instance, those in which office was confined to members of certain clubs (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 31 sq.), or to persons who in addition

to possessing a high property-qualification were elected by the *πολίτευμα* (6 (4). 5. 1292 b 1 sq.) or succeeded to office by right of birth (1292 b 4 sqq.). Aristotle omits to refer to the democracies in which a property-qualification for office existed (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 39 sqq.: 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 sqq.). If there were aristocracies in which there was a property-qualification for office, notwithstanding the counsel given in 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 10 sqq.—and Thuri seems to have been a case in point (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 23-29)—Aristotle is silent also as to these. Nor does he take any notice here of the liability of the same constitutions to a change in the opposite direction—that of increased narrowness—if the general level of wealth in the State should fall instead of rising, though he deals with this also in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 35 sqq. A property-qualification for the assembly appears to have existed in some oligarchies in which an assembly existed (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 3 sq.), but Aristotle refers here only to property-qualifications for office. For the effect of peace on the prosperity of Greek States see Diod. 11. 72. 1 and Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 95 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 259). It is possible that the cessation of internal war in Greece enforced by the Congress of Corinth after the battle of Chaeroneia (see Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 48) had done something by the time at which Aristotle wrote to raise the average level of wealth in Greek States (see as to Athens Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 272). According to Roscher, Politik, p. 412, 'the old centurial constitution of Rome had wellnigh lost its timocratic character by the time of Fabius Maximus, in B.C. 304, because the property required for the first class hardly implied even well-to-do circumstances.'

8. *βουλευούσι*, i.e. *βουλευταί εἰσι* (Sus.³ Ind. s.v.). Cp. 3. 11. 1282 a 29 sq. See note on 1299 b 32.

τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχάς. In many of the oligarchies to which Aristotle refers judicial functions would be exercised by magistrates; indeed, some claimed that a member of a dicastery held a magistracy (see note on 1275 a 26).

9. *πολλάκις γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* Bonitz (Ind. s.v. Anacoluthia) compares this passage with De Gen. An. 3. 9. 758 b 2, *τὰ δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ζῳοκοῦντα τρόπον τινὰ μετὰ τὸ σύστημα τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς φειδῆς γίνεται*, De Gen. An. 4. 1. 765 b 31 sqq., and Top. 1. 15. 106 a 1 sqq., remarking that in all these passages 'nominativus in principio enunciati ponitur quasi absolute et tituli instar.' Susemihl, like Coray, Thurot, and others, believes that something has dropped out of the text after

συμβαίνει, but Bonitz is probably right. See notes on 1304 a 14, 1315 b 40, and 1326 a 34.

11. εὐετηρίας γιγνόμενης. Cp. Xen. Hiero, 5.4, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἂν εὐετηρίων γιγνομένων ἀφθονία τῶν ἀγαθῶν γίγνηται, οὐδὲ τότε συγχαίρει ὁ τύραννος.

14. ἐκ προσαγωγῆς. See note on 1336 a 18.

17. στασιάζουσι refers to 1306 a 31 sqq. I have not found any other passage in which constitutions are said στασιάζειν: this is often said of States. Yet cp. Plato, Laws 757 A.

ὅπως δὲ κ.τ.λ. All constitutions are said in c. 12. 1316 a 18 sqq. to change more often into their opposites than into allied forms. Aristotle more than once traces, though less fully than we should wish, how democracies ruled by law pass into absolute democracies (e.g. in c. 5. 1305 a 28 sqq. and 2. 12. 1273 b 35—1274 a 21), and we learn something as to the way in which a similar change occurs in oligarchy from c. 3. 1302 b 15 sqq., c. 6. 1306 a 24 sq., c. 8. 1308 a 18 sqq., b 6 sqq., and 1309 a 23 sqq., but of the change from absolute oligarchies and democracies into oligarchies and democracies ruled by law we hear hardly anything from him. He does not tell us how this happy change was to be brought about (for instances of it see note on 1305 b 3), but it is easy to see that anything which promoted a more equal distribution of property would tend in this direction in oligarchies, and that anything which diminished the omnipotence of the assembly and the demagogues would tend in a similar direction in democracies.

20. τὰς κυρίους. For the fem. form κύριος cp. (with Sus.² Ind.) 3. 15. 1285 b 36 and 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 7. It is not meant that there are more κύριοι δημοκρατίαι καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι than one (cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 17). In 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 4 sqq. and 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 5 sqq. only one form of each in which the law is not supreme is recognized.

22. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις κ.τ.λ. Nothing answers to αἱ μὲν, C. 7. but these words seem to be virtually taken up in 1307 a 5 sqq. Some στάσεις in aristocracies arise from the fewness of those who share in office (cp. c. 8. 1309 a 2, τὸ τοὺς γνωρίμους εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀριστοκρατικόν), and others from too large a proportion of power being given to the rich. The latter sort seems to be thought by Aristotle to be the more destructive (λύονται δὲ μάλιστα, 1307 a 5). The former cause of στάσις is said to be most operative when it is reinforced by other causes of discontent—(1) when virtue is thought not to meet with its due meed of honour, whether it is that the many claim to be equal in virtue to the ruling few, or that indi-

viduals of high merit and position are insulted by men of still higher position, or that an individual of manly character is excluded from office; or again (2) when there is a great inequality of wealth in the State, some of the citizens being very rich and others very poor; or again (3) when an individual already great is not satisfied with his greatness but seeks to be sole ruler. All Aristotle's examples but one are taken from Lacedaemonian history, and he evidently regards the sharers in office in the Lacedaemonian aristocracy as few, notwithstanding that the ephorate was open to all the citizens. The Lacedaemonian aristocracy was also affected by the other cause of *στάσις* in aristocracies. It did not, indeed, like Thurii at one time (1307 a 27 sqq.), make a high property-qualification a condition of the tenure of office, but it allowed property to find its way into the hands of a few (1307 a 35 sq.). It is implied in c. 8. 1308 a 3 sqq. that aristocracies are not safe constitutions. It will be noticed that in none of the instances adduced in 1306 b 27-1307 a 5 was the *στάσις* successful.

23. *εἴρηται*, in c. 6. 1305 b 2 sqq.

24. *διὰ τὸ καὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναι πως*. Cp. 1307 a 34 sq.

25. *οἱ ἄρχοντες = οἱ τοῦ ἄρχεῖν μετέχοντες = οἱ τῶν ἀρχῶν μετέχοντες*: cp. c. 8. 1308 b 34 sq., 37 sq.

οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταῦτ' ὀλίγοι. The rulers are few in an oligarchy because the rich are few, in an aristocracy because the good are few.

26. *ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γε διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἡ ἀριστοκρατία ὀλιγαρχία εἶναι*. This is added in confirmation of what has just been said, that the rulers are few both in aristocracy and in oligarchy. It is because they are few in both that some take aristocracy to be a kind of oligarchy (6 (4). 3. 1290 a 16 sq.). The inference drawn from the fact is a proof of the reality of the fact. Cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 25 sqq., where a false inference drawn from the fact that happiness is concerned with the use of absolute goods is adduced in evidence of the fact. For the interposition of *οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταῦτ' ὀλίγοι* between *ἐπεὶ—εἶναι* and *ἐν ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ ὀλίγοι οἱ ἄρχοντες*, cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 22 sq., where *τινὸς μέντοι πολίτου* is similarly interposed, 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 27, where *τὸ εἰρημένον* refers not to what immediately precedes, but to 23, *ἡ μὲν ἀριστοκρατία εἰς δῆμον*, and 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 24, where *ταύτην* refers not to *τυραννίδος*, which immediately precedes, but to *τῆς ὀνομαζομένης πολιτείας*.

27. *τοῦτο*, i. e. the production of *στάσις* by the fewness of the rulers.

28. *ὅταν ᾗ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πεφρονηματισμένων ὡς ὅμοιον κατ' ἀρετὴν*, 'when the mass of the people is of the type which is elated with the belief that it is like the ruling few in virtue.' *τῶν πεφρονηματισμένων*, sc. *πληθῶν*. *τὸ πλῆθος* (= *ὁ δῆμος* in Diod. 15. 72. 2) here stands in opposition to the ruling few, just as it is opposed to *οἱ ἄρχοντες* in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 34 sqq. The true *πλῆθος* for an aristocracy is a *πλῆθος ἀρχεσθαι δυνάμενον τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικῶν πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν* (3. 17. 1288 a 10 sqq.): if the *πλῆθος* thinks itself just as *ἡγεμονικῶν πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν* as the rulers, trouble will result. When the ruled are of a high spirit, they are inclined to plot against their rulers (c. 11. 1314 a 15 sqq.: cp. Plato, Symp. 182 C, 190 B).

29. *οἷον ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι κ.τ.λ.* Different accounts are given of the origin of the Partheniae: perhaps those who were friendly to Tarentum took a more favourable view of it than others. Aristotle often speaks well of Tarentum, and the account given of the origin of the Partheniae in the passage before us is more favourable than most. Antiochus, an historian belonging to the rival city of Syracuse and contemporary with Thucydides, says (ap. Strab. p. 278) that they were sons of 'Lacedaemonians' who had been degraded to the rank of Helots because they had failed to serve in the Messenian War (the First Messenian War), and that they were themselves *ἄτιμοι*. I do not think (with Sus.², Note 1592) that by 'Lacedaemonians' Antiochus means Perioeci, for the word is used of Spartans in the account given by Strabo (p. 279) of Ephorus' views (cp. Diod. 15. 66 and [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 26). The account given on the authority of Ephorus by Strabo (p. 279) is less unfavourable. According to Ephorus the Spartans serving in Messenia in the tenth year of the Messenian War, finding that owing to their ten years' absence from home the citizen-population was dwindling, and being themselves precluded from returning by the oath which they had taken not to return till the Messenians were conquered, sent home the younger men, who had not taken the oath, to recruit the population by intercourse with Spartan virgins. This account treats the founders of Tarentum as the sons of Spartan fathers (whether of Homoei is not clear) and Spartan mothers, but by irregular, though specially authorized, unions. Aristotle, on the other hand, in the passage before us implies that in his opinion the Partheniae had Spartan Homoei for their fathers; of their mothers he says nothing. A fourth account

is to be found in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 26, *ὅτε δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Μεσσηνίοις ἐπολέμουν, αἱ γυναῖκες, ἀπόντων τούτων, παῖδας τινας ἐγέννησαν, οὓς ἐν ὑποψίαις εἶχον οἱ πατέρες ὥς οὐκ ὄντας αὐτῶν καὶ Παρθενίας ἐκάλουν.* If this statement is founded on the 'Constitutions' ascribed to Aristotle, like many others in [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspublicis, the 'Constitutions' did not agree with the Politics. For while the Politics represent the Partheniae as the sons of Spartan Homoei, [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspublicis represents them as the sons of Spartan women by unknown fathers, possibly Helots. For another instance of a discrepancy between the Politics and [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. see note on 1294 b 10. It should be noticed that a similar, but still keener, controversy raged as to the position and character of the original colonists of the Epizephyrian Locri, the unfavourable side being here taken by the 'Constitution of the Locrians' ascribed to Aristotle and the favourable by Timaeus (Polyb. 12. 5, 6, 10-12: Aristot. *Fragm.* 504). The fact probably is that many unions were temporarily recognized as legitimate during the First Messenian War, when the numbers of the Spartans were being thinned by the war, which were no longer regarded as legitimate when the war came to an end and the drain ceased. Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 28 sqq.

30. *ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων γὰρ ἦσαν*, 'for they were descended from the Homoei,' is added to explain why they held themselves to be like the ruling few in virtue. Descent from the good, however, is not a sure evidence of goodness (1. 6. 1255 b 1 sqq.). Aristotle implies that the Partheniae were not Homoei, but does not tell us why they were not. His view may be that they were the sons of fathers who were Homoei by mothers of an inferior grade. As to the Homoei of the Lacedaemonian State, see Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 39.

31. *ἢ ὅταν τινὲς κ.τ.λ.* *Τινὲς* stands in contrast to *τὸ πλῆθος*, 28. It appears to refer to single individuals, for Lysander is mentioned in illustration. See note on 1327 b 38.

33. *οἷον Λύσανδρος ὑπὸ τῶν βασιλέων.* First by king Pausanias when he intervened against Lysander at Athens in B.C. 403 after the fall of the Thirty (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 4. 29), and afterwards by king Agesilaus in Ionia (Plut. *Lysand.* c. 23).

34. *ἀνδράδης*, and therefore *φιλότιμος* (Rhet. 2. 17. 1391 a 22 sqq.) and *δυνάμενος ἀρχειν* (Eth. Nic. 4. 11. 1126 b 1 sqq.). Thus *ἀνδράδης* is not far removed in meaning from *ἡγεμονικός* (c. 8. 1308 a 8).

οἷον Κινάδων κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Hell. 3. 3. 5, where we read of Cinadon, οὗτος δ' ἦν καὶ τὸ εἶδος πανίσκος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εὐρωστος, οὐ μάλιστα τῶν ὁμοίων. See for the story of Cinadon Xen. Hell. 3. 3. 4—11, Polyæn. 2. 14, and Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 73, vol. 9. 343 sqq. His object was to be μηδενὸς ἤττων ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι (Xen. Hell. 3. 3. 11). His case illustrates the danger of excluding from office and placing in a position of inferiority a man of manly and vigorous character, where the ruling class is small and those excluded have weapons of any kind at their disposal (Xen. Hell. 3. 3. 5, 7). It does not appear that Cinadon had been oppressed or ill-treated in any way. Aristotle probably remembers the affair of Cinadon when in c. 8. 1308 a 8 he recommends aristocracies to bring within the constitution any of those outside it who are fit to rule. The oligarchy of Massalia was in this matter wiser than the Lacedaemonian aristocracy, for it would have brought Cinadon within the privileged class (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 29 sqq.). Compare the conspiracy of Francesco Balduino at Venice in 1412 (H. F. Brown, Venice, p. 271 sq.).

36. εἴτι δταν κ.τ.λ. Precautions are taken against this evil in c. 8. 1308 b 24 sqq. For the results of a great inequality of property see 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 21 sqq. and 1296 a 1 sqq. Cp. Sallust, De Coniur. Catil. c. 20. 11 sqq.

37. καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις τοῦτο γίνεται. Aristotle's remark is confirmed by the experience of Rome in the Second Punic War (see Lange, Röm. Alterth. 2. 170 sq.). The English landowners grew richer in the long war with Napoleon and the poor poorer.

συνέβη δὲ καὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. 'This also,' i. e. στάσις resulting from the production by war of strong contrasts of wealth and poverty, occurred at Lacedaemon, as well as στάσις resulting from the causes mentioned before. There is nothing to show whether the Messenian War here referred to is the same as that mentioned in 2. 9. 1270 a 3. It seems likely from 2. 9. 1269 b 3 sqq. that Aristotle looked back to more wars than one between the Lacedaemonians and Messenians. If we follow the traditional account and that of Pausanias, we shall say that the Messenian War referred to is the Second Messenian War. The raids of Aristomenes from his fastness at Eira during this war were so ruinous to the farms of the Spartans both in Messenia and in the neighbouring part of Laconia that the Messenians profited more by the cultivation of the land than the Spartans, and an ordinance was made that the land

exposed to these raids should not be sown while the war lasted, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου σιτοδεία ἐγένετο ἐν Σπάρτῃ καὶ ὁμοῦ τῇ σιτοδείᾳ στάσις· οὐ γὰρ ἤνείχοντο οἱ ταύτῃ τὰ κτήματα ἔχοντες τὰ σφέτερα ἀργὰ εἶναι, καὶ τούτοις μὲν τὰ διάφορα διέλυε Τυρταῖος (Paus. 4. 18. 1-3). The owners of land in Messenia and the border of Laconia, in fact, were impoverished, while the owners of land farther from the seat of war grew richer, because they alone had produce to sell.

39. δῆλον δὲ [καὶ τοῦτο] ἐκ τῆς Τυρταίου ποιήσεως τῆς καλουμένης Εὐνομίας. As to [καὶ τοῦτο] see critical note. For ποίησις in the sense of 'poem' see Liddell and Scott. The poem was intended to compose dissensions at Sparta, and hence its title.

1307 a. 1. θλιβόμενοι γὰρ τινες κ.τ.λ. This is mentioned to show that war produces στάσις by producing extremes of wealth and poverty.

2. ἔτι ἐάν τις μέγας ᾗ κ.τ.λ. We pass here to a case in which the plotter is not, as in the instances previously given, driven to plot by humiliation or poverty, but plots purely from ambition. See note on 1304 a 17.

3. Before ἵνα μοναρχῇ supply στάσις κινεῖ.

ὡσπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι κ.τ.λ. See notes on 1333 b 34 and 1301 b 19. The aim ascribed to the Pausanias of the passage before us, that of becoming sole ruler, agrees well with that ascribed to 'Pausanias the king' in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 32 sqq., where he is said to have been accused of seeking to rule his own State. In 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 20 sq., on the other hand, 'Pausanias the king' is said to have sought according to some to abolish the ephorate, which might seem at first sight a more restricted aim; still, as the ephorate resembled a tyranny in the extent of its power (2. 9. 1270 b 13 sq.: 2. 6. 1265 b 40), there is nothing in this account of his aim to show that 'Pausanias the king' is not referred to in the passage before us. The ephorate was the main barrier in the way of any one who sought to set up a tyranny at Sparta. Aristotle does not commit himself to a positive statement that Pausanias was guilty. For κατὰ τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον cp. c. 12. 1315 b 28, κατὰ τὴν ἀρχήν, and Hdt. 7. 137, κατὰ τὸν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων πόλεμον.

5. καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι Ἄνων. As to Anno or Hanno see Justin, 20. 5 and 21. 4. He appears to have been one of the Carthaginian generals in a war in Sicily with Dionysius the Elder (Justin, 20. 5. 11 sqq.). Aristotle is careful not to affirm his guilt, and it seems to have been doubted (Justin, 22. 7. 10); at any rate he did not succeed any more than Pausanias did in making himself tyrant.

Meltzer, however (Gesch. d. Karthager, I. 504), takes Aristotle to refer here and in c. 12. 1316 a 34 to an earlier Hanno. To what Hanno Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 3 and Aelian, Var. Hist. 14. 30 and Hist. An. 5. 39, refer is uncertain. In 2. 11. 1272 b 32 Aristotle says that no *στάσις* worth mentioning had occurred at Carthage.

λύονται δὲ μέλιστα κ.τ.λ. Λύονται is emphatic. If aristocracies are troubled with *στάσις* for the reasons which have been mentioned, both polities and aristocracies are mostly *overthrown* owing to some contravention of justice in the framing of the constitution itself, and especially to an undue leaning in favour of either the rich or the many. Cp. 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 6, ὅσῃ δ' ἂν ἄμεινον ἢ πολιτεία μυχθῇ, τοσούτῃ μοιμωτέρα. In the passage before us αὐτὴ ἡ πολιτεία seems to be tacitly contrasted with the administration of the State (cp. c. 8. 1308 b 32, καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ οἰκονομίᾳ, and 2. 9. 1270 a 13 sqq.).

7. ἀρχὴ γάρ, sc. λύσεως. Cp. c. 8. 1307 b 39.

11. ταῦτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for it is only these two things that polities endeavour to mingle and most of the so-called aristocracies also.' See note on 1293 b 20.

13. τοῦτῃ, 'only in this,' i.e. in the way in which they mix these two things.

14. διὰ τοῦτ', 'on account of this,' i.e. the way in which the two things are mixed. For the repetition of τοῦτο see notes on 1284 b 28, 1325 b 11, and 1317 b 5.

αἱ μὲν, aristocracies: αἱ δέ, polities.

15. τὰς γὰρ ἀποκλινοῦσας μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, sc. πολιτείας. For the phrase cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 34—38.

16. τὸ πλεῖθος. See note on 1322 b 16.

17. κρείττον τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The many are stronger than the few and therefore have a securer hold of power, and besides they are more apt to be content with an equal share. Euripides had already said of the rich (Suppl. 225 Bothe, 238 Dindorf),

οἱ μὲν ὀλβιοὶ

ἀνοφελεῖς τε πλείωνον τ' ἐρώσ' αἰεὶ.

In μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶσιν ἴσον ἔχοντες Aristotle repeats the remark of Callicles in Plato, Gorg. 483 C, ἀγαπῶσι γὰρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοὶ (i.e. οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποι καὶ οἱ πολλοί), ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχωσι φαιλότεροι ὄντες. Cp. also c. 8. 1308 a 11 sq. With ἀγαπῶσιν supply οἱ πλείους from τὸ πλείον (see note on 1319 b 14).

19. For οἱ ἐν ταῖς εὐπορίαις cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 b 19, τοὺς ἐν

B b 2

αἰσώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις, and Rhet. 2. 5. 1382 b 35, οἱ ἐν εὐτυχίαις μεγάλας ὄντες.

20. ὅλως δ' ἐφ' ὁπότερον κ.τ.λ. According to Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 21 sq. the normal constitutions are most apt to change into their *παρεκβάσεις*—kingship into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, timocracy (i. e. polity) into democracy. But according to Pol. 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 18 sqq. constitutions are most apt to change into their opposites—democracy, for instance, into oligarchy, and *vice versa*. 'Ἡ πολιτεία, 'the constitution,' as in 19.

21. ἐκατέρων, 'either favoured class,' whether it be the rich or the poor.

τὸ σφέτερον, 'quod suum est' (Vict.).

22. ἡ μὲν πολιτεία εἰς δῆμον. So at Tarentum (c. 3. 1303 a 3 sqq.) and at Syracuse (c. 4. 1304 a 27 sqq.). The freedom with which the article is added and omitted in 22–25 deserves notice. See Vahlen on Poet. 21. 1457 b 7.

ἀριστοκρατία δ' εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. Aristotle appears to have anticipated a change of this kind at Carthage (see note on 1273 b 1).

23. εἰς τάναντία. We expect ἐπὶ τάναντία (cp. 21, ἐπὶ ταῦτα), but εἰς is continued from εἰς δῆμον, εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, and takes the place of ἐπὶ in εἰς τάναντία.

26. μόνον γὰρ μόνιμον κ.τ.λ., i. e. for all constitutions are wanting in durability in which there is an unfair leaning to one side or the other (20) and advantages are not distributed in strict accordance with desert. For the thought cp. Isocr. Nicocl. § 14.

τὸ ἔχειν τὰ αὐτῶν, 'the possession of one's due': cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 7. 1132 a 28, b 17, and 5. 8. 1133 b 3.

27. τὸ εἰρημένον, i. e. the change of a constitution into its opposite, in this case the change of aristocracy into democracy. At Thurii the property-qualification for office was high, whereas in an aristocracy there ought to be no property-qualification for office at all (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 10 sqq.). The aristocracy of Thurii favoured the rich too much, and this infraction of justice in the constitution led to its change into a democracy. It should be noticed, however, that this aristocracy with oligarchical leanings was rash enough to employ the demos in war, always a dangerous thing for an oligarchy to do (c. 6. 1306 a 25 sq.). Schlosser (Aristoteles Politik, 2. 199, note 104) and Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 244. 1) refer these events to the early days of the colony of Thurii, when the Sybarite section of the colonists was expelled or put to

death (see note on 1303 a 31) for various acts of encroachment, one of them being (according to Diod. 12. 11) that they allotted to themselves all the land near the city, and it is true that at this time (Diod. 12. 23) a war was waged by Thurii with Tarentum which might be the war referred to in 1307 a 32, and that the word *πλειονεκτείν*, which is used in 31, is applied in c. 3. 1303 a 32 to the encroachments of the Sybarite section of the colonists, but Sus.² (Note 1602) is probably right in questioning the correctness of this view. The grievance at Thurii at that time, in fact, was, not that a high property-qualification was required for office, but that the Sybarite citizens of Thurii claimed all the chief offices for themselves; not that the leading citizens had bought up all the land, but that the Sybarites had allotted to themselves all the land near the city; nor was the penalty inflicted on the Sybarites simply deprivation of the land, for they were slain or expelled from the State. Sus.² (Note 1602) holds that the events narrated by Aristotle occurred during the time which followed the disastrous defeat of Athens at Syracuse, when the party friendly to Athens at Thurii was expelled ([Plut.] Decem Orat. Vitae, 3, Lysias, 835 D sq.). An aristocracy with a leaning to oligarchy may well have then been introduced and have been overthrown later on in the way described by Aristotle. Busolt, on the other hand (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 3. 1. 533. 4), places the constitutional change at Thurii described in 1307 b 6—19 before the constitutional change described in 1307 a 27—33, and takes that which he regards as the later of the two changes to have occurred in the fourth century B.C. He argues that the concentration of the whole of the landed property of the State in the hands of the *γνώριμοι* and the language of Plato in Laws 636 B, *ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ξυσσίτια πολλὰ μὲν ἄλλα νῦν ὠφελεῖ τὰς πόλεις, πρὸς δὲ τὰς στάσεις χαλεπά· δηλοῦσι δὲ Μιλησίων καὶ Βοιωτῶν καὶ Θουρίων παῖδες*, point to the fourth century B.C., but I do not find this argument convincing. Nor can I think that the constitutional change described in 1307 a 27—33 occurred in the *δυναστεία* the establishment of which is described in 1307 b 6—19, for a narrow oligarchy of this type would hardly be based on a property-qualification, however high; the constitution in which the change occurred seems rather to have been, if we may judge from the context, an oligarchical kind of aristocracy.

ὁδὸν μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For the form of the sentence cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 11 sqq.

28. εἰς ἑλαττον μετέβη, i. e. εἰς ἑλαττον τμήμα μετέβη ἢ πολιτεία, not τὸ τμήμα. So Bonitz (Ind. 458 a 35 sqq.).

29. καὶ εἰς ἀρχεῖα πλείω. This also was a change in a democratic direction, for it gave access to office to a larger number of citizens, and the democratic principle is τὸ ἀρχειν πάντας μὲν ἑκάστων ἑκάστων δ' ἐν μέρει πάντων (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 19: cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 13 sqq.). Cp. also Plato, Polit. 303 A, where τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς διασπενμῆσθαι κατὰ σμικρὰ εἰς πολλοὺς is said to be characteristic of democracy.

30. συγκτήσασθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον. Συγκτήσασθαι, 'bought up,' like συνωνεῖσθαι, συμπρίασθαι (1. 11. 1259 a 24). The law referred to seems to have resembled those mentioned in 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 8 sqq. and 2. 7. 1266 b 16 sqq.

ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ. This is added to show that the constitution was in fault, for the point which the example is adduced to illustrate is that a deviation from justice in the constitution itself often causes the overthrow of polities and aristocracies (cp. 5 sqq., 20 sqq.).

32. ὁ δὲ δῆμος κ.τ.λ. See critical note on 1307 a 31.

τῶν φρουρῶν. The φρουροί mentioned here and in 1307 b 9 were probably citizens of Thurii placed in the φρούρια scattered over the territory of the State to guard it from the Lucanians (cp. Oecon. 2. 1351 a 26 sqq.). They may perhaps have been young men (cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 27 sq.) and of the wealthy class, for they are contrasted with the demos.

33. πλείω, 'more than the law allowed' (Vict. 'plus aequo'). Πλείω ἦσαν ἔχοντες takes up πλεονεκτεῖν, 31.

34. ἔτι διὰ τὸ κ.τ.λ. The meaning is 'besides (apart from any deviation from justice in the constitution) the mere fact that aristocracies give office to a few only makes it possible for the γνῶριμοι to have their own way too much.' Μᾶλλον goes with πλεονεκτοῦσιν (cp. 36, ἔξεστι ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν θέλωσι τοῖς γνῶριμοῖς μᾶλλον).

35. οἷον καὶ ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 9. 1270 a 15 sqq.

37. κηδεύειν ὅτῃ θέλουσιν. Cp. 2. 9. 1270 a 26 sqq.

38. διὰ καὶ ἡ Λοκρῶν πόλις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle implies that the Epizephyrian Locri was under an aristocracy, and an aristocracy not well compounded but favouring the rich too much in its mixture of elements, at the time when it voted the acceptance of Dionysius the Elder's proposal to marry the daughter of one of its citizens (Diod. 14. 44. 6: Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 82, vol. 10. 663). Forty years later Locri suffered for its acceptance, for when Dionysius the Younger, the offspring of this marriage, abandoned

Syracuse in B.C. 356 and removed to Locri, the tyranny which he exercised there for six years was of so outrageous a kind that the Locrians rose in insurrection as soon as his absence from Locri made a successful insurrection possible, and avenged his misgovernment on his wife and family (Clearnch. ap. Athen. Deipn. p. 541: Justin, 21. 2 sq.: Strabo, p. 259 sq.: Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2, c. 85, vol. 11. 188 sq.). The city, however, would probably have suffered still more if it had rejected the proposals of Dionysius, for Rhegium, which did so, was pursued by the tyrant in consequence with relentless hostility till it was destroyed and its inhabitants enslaved in B.C. 387. The Epizephyrian Locri is here called simply ἡ Λοκρῶν πόλις because the mention of Dionysius makes it unnecessary to add, as in 2. 12. 1274 a 22 sq., τῶν ἐπιζεφυρίων. Τοῖς ἐπιζεφυρίοις is omitted for a similar reason in Rhet. 2. 21. 1395 a 1. Its omission in Pol. 2. 7. 1266 b 19 cannot be thus explained, but the Italian Locri may nevertheless well be referred to there, for in 3. 16. 1287 a 8 the Opuntian Locri is called simply Ὀπουντοί.

39. δ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο, οὐδ' ἂν ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμιγμένη. 'O refers to τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον κηδείας: for other instances of a neuter referring to words not in the neuter, see notes on 1263 a 1, 1289 b 25, and 1291 a 16. Rhegium was probably democratically governed when it refused Dionysius' matrimonial proposals (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 239): this may be present to Aristotle's mind. Was Croton under an aristocracy when Philippus, one of its citizens, had to retire into exile after his betrothal with the daughter of Telys, the tyrant of Sybaris (Hdt. 5. 47)? Whether Aristotle regarded the Lacedaemonian constitution as a 'well-tempered aristocracy' is uncertain, but at any rate the Lacedaemonian kings were not allowed to marry any but Spartan women (Schömann, Gr. Alterth. 1. 233 sq., who refers to Plut. Agis, c. 11: see also Hdt. 5. 32). Athens was under an oligarchy when Cylon married the daughter of Theagenes tyrant of Megara (Thuc. 1. 126), but the Solonian democracy must have been in existence when Megacles married Agaristê, the daughter of Cleisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon (in B.C. 576 or 572, according to Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 661. 4). Whether Peisistratus was tyrant of Athens when he married the Argive woman Timonassa is doubtful (Λθ. Πολ. c. 17), so that we need not ask what the government of Argos was at the time. Demosthenes says in Phil. 2. 21, οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλεῖς ταῖς πολιτείαις αἱ πρὸς τοῖς τυράννοις αὐταὶ λίαν ὀμιλῶσι. 'The nobles of Venice cannot

marry alien women, nor give their daughters in marriage to subjects of a foreign Prince' (De La Houssaye, *Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise*, 1. 30). In a few exceptional cases noticed by De La Houssaye in which Venetian women had married foreign Princes, the Senate adopted the brides (*ibid.*).

40. *μάλιστα δὲ λαμβάνουσιν κ.τ.λ.*, 'and aristocracies are most apt to undergo insensible change through being overthrown little by little.' Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, *Phaedr.* 262 A, *ἀλλὰ γε δὴ κατὰ μικρὸν μεταβαίνων μᾶλλον λήσεις ἐλθὼν ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ κατὰ μέγα*, and see note on 1307 b 30. In what other ways aristocracies undergo insensible change, he does not tell us. They would probably do so if the numbers of the rich or the poor insensibly increased (c. 3. 1303 a 1).

1307 b. 2. *ὑπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καθόλου κατὰ πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν.* 'Ἐν τοῖς πρότερον', in c. 3. 1303 a 20 sqq. For *εἴρηται κατὰ πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν* Bonitz (*Ind.* 368 a 34 sqq.) compares among other passages *De An.* 1. 4. 408 a 1, *ἀρμόζει δὲ μᾶλλον καθ' ὑγιείας λέγειν ἀρμονίαν, καὶ ὅλως τῶν σωματικῶν ἀρετῶν, ἢ κατὰ ψυχῆς.*

4. *τῶν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν*, 'of the things which pertain to the constitution': cp. *Metaph.* 2. 15. 1040 a 6, *τῶν πρὸς ὅρον* ('quod ad definitionem attinet,' Bonitz). In 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 18 we have *τῶν περὶ τῆς πολιτείας*, and in 1298 b 32 *τῶν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν*.

5. *πάντα τὸν κόσμον* (sc. *τῆς πόλεως*, Bon. *Ind.* 406 a 30) is explained by *ἡ τάξις πᾶσα τῆς πολιτείας*, 18.

6. *συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Θουρίων πολιτείας*, 'and this happened in the case of the constitution of Thurii for example' (see note on 1255 a 36). If this sentence followed more closely than it does on 1307 a 27, I should read with Garve *καὶ τοῦτο* in place of *τοῦτο καί*. It is not quite clear that the constitution of Thurii was an aristocracy when the change into a *δυναστεία* described in the text occurred. The displaced constitution may have been the democracy the origin of which is traced in 1307 a 27 sqq., for it is evident that under it the *stratēgi* were elected by the *demos* and that *νεώτεροι* were eligible subject to the restriction mentioned in respect of a repeated tenure of the office. The existence, however, of *σύμβουλοι* charged, it would seem, with the duty of guarding the laws against alteration savours rather of aristocracy (8 (6). 8. 1323 a 8), and if the displaced constitution was a democracy, it was one of a qualified character. Democracies were especially opposed to the repeated tenure of most offices, but

the law prohibiting a repeated tenure of the office of *stratêgos*, except after an interval of five years, was an unusual one even in them (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 23 sq.), and it strikes us as out of place in a State like Thurii, which needed generals of experience if it was to hold its own against its Lucanian neighbours. A similar law, however, existed at Tarentum (Diog. Laert. 8. 79), though it was contravened in favour of Archytas, and a law was enacted at Rome in B.C. 342, 'ne quis eundem magistratum intra decem annos caperet' (Liv. 7. 42. 2: cp. 10. 13. 8), but instances of the contravention of this law occur from time to time (see Plut. Marius, c. 12, and Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, 1. 424. 3), and then again Rome was a much larger State than Thurii, and fit candidates for military offices would be more plentiful there. The law was no doubt a safeguard against the rise of tyrants, and the feeling against a monopoly of important offices by a few men would be all the stronger at Thurii because the attempt of the Sybarite section of the colonists to keep the more important offices to themselves would be remembered with bitterness. The revolution described in the text seems to have been due to a combination between certain younger members of the wealthy class, the *φρονοί*, and the *demos* against the chief magistrates of the State (*τῶν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις*, 9), who were probably for the most part older men of the wealthy class. If, as is likely, it occurred in the fourth century B.C., the aim of its promoters may have been in part to meet an increasing pressure from the Lucanians and Bruttians who threatened the existence of the State by preventing the removal from office of capable and experienced generals. The narrow *δυναστεία*, however, to the establishment of which the movement actually led, was not likely to be a source of strength to Thurii, which declined greatly in power in the course of the fourth century B.C. Indeed, if Diod. 16. 15. 2 is to be trusted, it was reduced by the Bruttians.

9. *τῶν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις*. Schneider compares Thuc. 3. 28. 1, *οἱ ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοις*. Cp. also Demosth. Prooem. 55. p. 1461, *τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πρῶτων ὄντας*, and (with Richards) Demosth. De Cor. c. 45, *τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείνεσθαι καὶ πράττειν*, and Hdt. 2. 82, *τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ ἐν ποιήσῃ γενόμενοι*.

10. *νομίζοντες βραδίως κατασχέσειν*, i. e. 'fore ut obtinerent, perficerent id quod susceperant' (Bon. Ind. s. v.). Cp. (with Liddell and Scott) Lys. Or. 3. in Simon. c. 42, *εἰ δὲ μὴ κατέσχον*, and Pol.

7 (5). 10. 1312 a 32, ἂν μὴ μᾶλλον κατασχέσειν τὴν πρᾶξιν, where we have the full phrase.

18. αἱ δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ καλούμενοι σύμβουλοι. For αἱ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι, cp. Plato, Laws 952 E, τοὺς ἐπὶ τούτοις ἄρχοντας τεταγμένους: Pol. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 22 sq.: and Sandys' note on 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 15. l. 20, οἱ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι. The σύμβουλοι at Thurii appear to have been entrusted with the duty of guarding the laws against change, but they cannot have possessed a veto on proposals of change, as otherwise their ultimate resistance would not have been in vain. Probably all they could do was to advise the popular assembly against such proposals, and hence their name, a softened version of πρόβουλοι. It is interesting to find at Thurii, a colony founded under the supervision of Pericles, a magistracy designed to protect the laws against change, like the Council of the Areopagus, the powers of which he had done so much to curtail. But it must be remembered that the Council of the Areopagus had not confined itself to its function of guarding the laws, but had drawn to itself a large share of administrative authority ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 3. l. 34 sqq.: c. 23. l. 2 sqq.). Hence probably its fall (see note on 1299 b 16).

18. ἀλλὰ μετέβαλεν ἡ τάξις πᾶσα τῆς πολιτείας εἰς δυναστείαν τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν. Something like this probably often happened: see as to Megara 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 17 sqq., and cp. Thuc. 8. 66. 1, ἣν δὲ τοῦτο εὐπρεπὲς πρὸς τοὺς πλείους, ἐπεὶ ἔξω γὰρ τὴν πόλιν οἵπερ καὶ μεθιστάναι ἔμελλον.

19. πᾶσαι δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 10. 1312 a 39 sqq. and Polyb. 6. 57. 2. Compare also De Gen. An. 1. 18. 724 a 31, τῶν δὲ τοιούτων ἐνίων μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεώς ἐστιν, οἷον καὶ ἐν τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις (μέρος γάρ τι ἡ διαβολὴ τῆς πάσης ταραχῆς ἐστίν), ἐνίων δ' ἔξω, οἷον αἱ τέχναι τῶν δημιουργουμένων καὶ ὁ λύχνος τῆς καυομένης οἰκίας.

22. ἐπ' Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, 'in the days when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians were supreme in Greece.' So Lamb. followed by Schneider in his translation (vol. i. p. 494). Cp. Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 7, οὔτε δημοκρατίας ἐτι οὔσης, ὥσπερ ἐπ' Ἀθηναίων, οὔτε δεκαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Λυσάνδρου, and [Demosth.] Phil. 4. 51, τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλον ἅπαντα (χρόνον) εἰς δύο ταῦτα διήρητο τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ ἡμᾶς, τῶν δ' ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων οἱ μὲν ἡμῖν οἱ δὲ ἐκείνοις ὑπήκουον. Dr. Welldon translates 'in the case of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians,' not, I think, rightly. As to the fact compare 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 32 sqq., Thuc. 1. 19 and 3. 82. 1, and

(with Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ed. 2, 3. 1. 225. 2) Isocr. Paneg. § 105 and Panath. § 54. Busolt, however, remarks (p. 224) that we find oligarchical governments existing in Samos and Mytilene, notwithstanding their alliance with Athens (Thuc. 1. 115 : 3. 27, 47 : cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 24. l. 7 sqq.). It is to be noted that Aristotle does not say of the Thebans what he says of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians. At a later date than that of which Aristotle is here speaking (in B.C. 375) the Athenian commander Timotheus acted very differently, not interfering with the political constitutions of the States whose alliance he won for Athens (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 64). See also Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 2, 7 as to the Lacedaemonian ephors.

23. οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες. We have Λακεδαιμονίων in 22, and οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες here. The same thing occurs in 2. 9. 1271 b 17 and 2. 10. 1271 b 23, and in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 12 and 19, and also in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 19. l. 7 and c. 23. l. 18 sqq. (cp. also c. 19. l. 20 sqq.). If we examine the Ninth chapter of the Second Book, we shall find that after the formal use of the long name Λακεδαιμόνιοι at its commencement (1269 a 29), the shorter name Λάκωνες is preferred throughout (1269 a 38, b 3, 31, 36 sq., 40, 1271 a 29). Xenophon sometimes uses the two words in a similar way (see Anab. 7. 6. 4, τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, and 7. τοὺς Λάκωνας, τὸ Λάκωνα, and 7. 7. 12, 15, 19). 'In Attic writers, e.g. in Aeschylus, Euripides, Isocrates, Lysias, Andocides, etc., the word Λάκων is either not used at all, or for the most part in the singular only . . . Aristophanes, however, often uses it. Plato uses it in the plural in Meno 99 D' (Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch der gr. Eigennamen, s.v. Λάκων).

26. Περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας κ.τ.λ. The opening recommendations of C. 8. cc. 8 and 9 (1307 b 30—1308 b 10) are mostly addressed to the two least safe constitutions, aristocracy and oligarchy, but from 1308 b 10 onwards to 1310 a 36 (end of c. 9) Aristotle's recommendations are for the most part applicable to all constitutions. As to the counsels given in these two chapters see Appendix A.

27. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. There is nothing to answer to this μὲν οὖν.

29. τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων κ.τ.λ. So that the opposite of what produces φθορά will produce σωτηρία.

30. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς εἰς κεκαρμέναις πολιτείαις κ.τ.λ. This μὲν οὖν is taken up by μὲν οὖν, 39, and then answered by ἔπειτα, 40. Aristotle has before him in this passage Plato, Rep. 424 B-D: compare especially τοῦτου ἀνθεκτίον τοῖς ἐπιμεληταῖς τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως

ἀν . . . παρὰ πάντα αὐτὸ φυλάττωσι, τὸ μὴ νεωτερίζειν περὶ γυμναστικὴν τε καὶ μουσικὴν παρὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλ' ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα φυλάττειν, and ἡ γοῦν παρανομία ῥᾱδίως αὕτη, ἔφη, λανθάνει παραδυομένη, and οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐργάζεται, ἔφη, ἄλλο γε ἢ κατὰ μικρὸν εἰσοικισαμένη ἡρέμα ὑπαρρεῖ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle, however, seems to have in view small changes or infractions of law, such as those which led to the overthrow of the constitution of Thuri, rather than the small changes in education of which Plato speaks. These small changes of law would be especially dangerous to well-tempered constitutions, for 'a constitution made up of balanced powers must ever be a critical thing' (Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, Nov. 3. 1774: Works, I. 448 Bohn). Hesiod's lines (Op. et Dies, 361),

εἰ γὰρ κεν καὶ μικρὸν ἐπὶ μικρῷ καταθεῖο,
καὶ θαμὰ τοῦτ' ἔρδοις, τάχα κεν μέγα καὶ τὸ γένοιτο,

are remembered by Plato in Rep. 401 C and Laws 843 B and by Demosthenes, De Fals. Leg. c. 228, and are no doubt present to Aristotle's memory here. Greek physicians dreaded those fevers most which begin κατὰ μικρόν (Plut. Praec. Coniug. c. 22). Aristotle appears to have said elsewhere much the same thing as he says here: cp. Plut. Libr. Perdit. Fragm. 11. 17 (Comm. in Hesiod.), καὶ εἰ τοῦτο ἀληθές, ὁρθῶς Ἀριστοτέλης ἔλεγεν, ὅτι χεῖριστον τῶν ἐν τῇ βίῃ τὸ 'μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο' λεγόμενον' εἰ γὰρ καταφρονοῖτο ὡς μικρὸν ἕκαστον καὶ ἐπιλέγοιμεν 'μὴ παρὰ τοῦτο,' κακῶς πράξομεν . . . ἡ γὰρ καθ' ἐν ἕκαστον ἔλλειψις μεγάλῃν ἀθροίζει τοῖς παρορῶσι τὴν βλάβην, with which Wyttenbach compares De Profect. in Virt. c. 17, ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τὸ πλουτήσειν ἀπεγνωκότες ἐν οὐδενὶ τίθενται τὰ μικρὰ δαπανήματα, μηδὲν οἰόμενοι ποιεῖν μέγα τὸ μικρῷ τινὶ προστιθέμενον. Cp. also Plut. Cleom. c. 9, where Aristotle is said to have explained the object of the ephors' proclamation to the citizens, κείρεσθαι τὸν μύστακα καὶ προσέχειν τοῖς νόμοις, to have been, ὅπως καὶ περὶ τὰ μικρότατα τοὺς νέους πειθαρχεῖν ἐβίβωσι. Theramenes, whose political views were in some respects akin to those of Aristotle, was a great foe to illegality (see Meineke's notes in Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 867 and 1165, where he quotes Hesych. τῶν τριῶν ἐν: Θηραμένης ἐψηφίσατο τρεῖς τιμωρίας κατὰ τῶν παράνομόν τι δρώντων, and Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 28 end, ed. Sandys, where I have already referred to these notes of Meineke). Aristotle's advice is probably addressed to the Lacedaemonians among others, as to whom we read in Diod. 7. 14. 7 that 'after a while annulling each of the laws little by little and turning aside into luxury and idleness, and

further being corrupted by using money and accumulating wealth, they lost the hegemony of Greece.'

31. παρανομῶσι, sc. οἱ πολῖται.

34. λανθάνει δὲ ἡ δαπάνη διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀθρόα γίνεσθαι. Cp. c. 6. 1306 b 14 sq.

35. παραλογίζεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for the mind is misled by the small outlays in the fashion indicated by the sophistical puzzle, "if each is small, all also are small."' For παραλογίζεται ἡ διάνοια, Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) compares Probl. 5. 25. 883 b 8 sq. and 30. 4. 955 b 15 sq. 'Υπ' αὐτῶν, 'by the repeated small outlays': cp. c. 10. 1311 a 33, τῆς δ' ὕβριως οὐσης πολυμεροῦς, ἕκαστον αὐτῶν (i.e. τῶν μερῶν τῆς ὕβριως) αἴτιον γίνεται τῆς ὀργῆς. The sophistical puzzle referred to turned on the difficulty of supposing that what holds of each of a number of things does not hold of the whole which they make up. If each is small, all are small, and the whole, it is inferred, must be small. But 'all' may mean either 'all taken individually' or 'all gathered into a whole.' 'All taken individually' are small, but not so 'all gathered into a whole.' What is true of each individual thing is not necessarily true of the whole which the individual things make up. For instance, the parts may be odd and the whole even (2. 5. 1264 b 20 sqq.). That the converse of this is true, and that what holds of the whole does not necessarily hold of each of its parts, we see from 2. 5. 1264 b 17 sqq. and from 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 36 sqq. Compare Plato, Laws 901 B, ἡ διαφέρων οὐδὲν οἰόμενος εἶναι τῷ ὅλῳ ἀμελουμένων τῶν σμικρῶν, and 902 D sq.

39. ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, sc. μεταβολῆς or φθορᾶς: cp. c. 7. 1307 a 7.

40. ἔπειτα μὴ πιστεύειν κ.τ.λ. Plato's language in Rep. 459 C sqq. had given some encouragement to the opposite view, and Aristotle probably regarded some of the arrangements in his Laws as σοφίσματα of the kind which he disapproves (see note on 1297 a 14 and vol. i. p. 502, note 2).

2. ποῖα δὲ λέγομεν κ.τ.λ., 'and what constitutional sophisms we 1308 a. refer to, has been explained before,' i.e. in 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 14 sqq.

3. ἔτι δ' ὁρᾶν κ.τ.λ. Some aristocracies and even some oligarchies—for oligarchies are less safe than aristocracies—held their ground because those who from time to time were in office dealt justly and kindly with those outside the constitution, not wronging them and bringing those fit for rule within the privileged class, and treated those within the constitution in a democratic spirit of

equality, making office accessible to all. Cp. Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 16, *γεννώσκων ὅτι καὶ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν εἴται πλείστον χρόνον διαμένουσιν, αἵτινες ἂν ἄριστα τὸ πλῆθος θεραπεύουσιν.* Aristotle perhaps also remembers a saying of the Lacedaemonian king Theopompus, *Θεόπομπος πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτήσαντα πῶς ἂν τις ἀσφαλῶς τηροίη τὴν βασιλείαν, Εἰ τοῖς μὲν φίλοις, ἔφη, μεταδιδοίη παρρησίας δικαίας, τοὺς δὲ ἀρχομένους κατὰ δύναμιν μὴ περιορῇ ἀδικουμένους* (Plut. Apophth. Lac. Theopomp. 1). It will be noticed that the passage before us implies that there may be persons outside the constitution not only in oligarchies, but also in aristocracies. It is uncertain to what aristocracies Aristotle here refers. Carthage (2. 11. 1273 b 18 sqq. : 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 4 sqq.) and Tarentum (8 (6). 5. 1320 b 9 sqq.) to a certain extent answer to his description, but the practice which obtained at Carthage of allowing one man to hold several offices (2. 11. 1273 b 8 sqq.) is not at all in harmony with the advice which Aristotle gives in 1308 a 10 sqq. The Lacedaemonian *ἀριστοκρατία* erred in its treatment of those outside the constitution, as the conspiracy of Cinadon proved (see note on 1306 b 34), and also in its treatment of those within it, for though the ephorate was open to all citizens, some of the chief offices at Sparta were tenable for life and therefore accessible only to a few, and the mode of electing senators was *δυναστευτική* (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 18 sqq.). As to oligarchies, those of Massalia (8 (6). 7. 1321 a 29 sqq.) and Pharsalus (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 10 sqq.) are probably present to Aristotle's mind, though we do not hear from him of any oligarchy which combined all the merits he mentions. The oligarchy of Elis seems also to have been one of those which dealt kindly with the many, so much so that they were quite content to remain in the country on their farms (Polyb. 4. 73. 8, *τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται διὰ τὸ μεγάλην ποιεῖσθαι σπουδὴν καὶ πρόνοιαν τοὺς πολιτευομένους τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας κατοικούντων, ἵνα τό τε δίκαιον αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τόπου διεξάγεται καὶ τῶν πρὸς βιωτικὰς χρείας μηδὲν ἐλλείπη*). At Naxos, on the contrary (7 (5). 6. 1305 a 38 sqq.), the oligarchs oppressed the many. Oppression of this kind was one of the causes which led to the French Revolution. 'It was not a question of the power of the king, or the measure of an electoral circumscription, that made the Revolution; it was the iniquitous distribution of the taxes, the scourge of the militia service, the scourge of the road service, the destructive tyranny exercised in the vast preserves of wild game, the vexatious rights and imposts of the lords of manors, and all

the other odious burdens and heavy impediments on the prosperity of the thrifty and industrious part of the nation' (J. Morley, Burke, p. 159). But Aristotle holds that it is just as dangerous to insult the aspiring few among those outside the constitution, or even to fail to bring within it those who are fit for rule, as to oppress the many. We read of the Spanish colonies in America:—'If as an exception to the rule an aspiring, and therefore dangerous, individual appeared in the ranks of the negroes, recourse was had to the means by which so many demagogues have been reduced to silence; a patent was given him "that he should count for a white." If he did not thus become a direct adherent of the privileged class, at any rate he was made an object of suspicion to the men of his own race. So in the Dutch East Indies every child which an European father recognized as his own was counted as European, and the great danger to which the State would otherwise have been exposed from the half-breeds was thus diminished' (Roscher, Politik, p. 156).

5. τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς γινομένους. Cp. Thuc. 4. 74, ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγένοντο.

6. καὶ τοῖς ἔξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι. Πολιτεία and πολιτεύμα are here evidently used as terms not far removed from each other in meaning: cp. c. 6. 1306 a 14, 16, and see 3. 6. 1278 b 11 and 3. 7. 1279 a 25 sq.

9. τοὺς μὲν φιλοτίμους μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἰς ἀτιμίαν τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς εἰς κέρδος. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 16, οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ μᾶλλον δρέγονται τοῦ κέρδους ἢ τῆς τιμῆς. For the use of εἰς see Bon. Ind. 222 b 55 sqq. Κέρδος does not quite answer to ἀτιμίαν, but the same thing may be said of c. 11. 1315 a 17 sqq., where ἡ εἰς τὰ χρήματα δλιγορία is distinguished from ἡ εἰς ἀτιμίαν. I cannot follow Schmidt and Sus., who would read ἰσοτιμίαν for ἀτιμίαν.

10. πρὸς αὐτοὺς δὲ καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας κ.τ.λ. Καὶ is explanatory, as in 1. 9. 1257 b 10 and often elsewhere. Δημοτικῶς = ἴσως, as we see from the next sentence. In many Greek oligarchies a few members of the privileged class seem to have monopolized the whole authority. The chief offices might be held for long terms, so that vacancies would occur only at long intervals, or more than one might be held by a single individual (c. 10. 1310 b 22 sq.), or re-election might be made too easy, or only one member of each family might be allowed to hold office at the same time (c. 6. 1305 b 2 sqq.), or the most important offices might be confined to a few

(c. 6. 1306 a 12 sqq.). Aristotle's wish is, on the contrary, that all the members of the privileged class should as far as possible stand on an equal footing, and that all should have a turn of office. Compare Isocr. Nicocl. § 15, αἱ μὲν τοῖνυν ὀλιγαρχίαι καὶ δημοκρατίαι τὰς ἰσότηας τοῖς μετέχουσι τῶν πολιτειῶν ζητοῦσι, καὶ τοῦτο εὐδοκίμει παρ' αὐταῖς, ἢ μηδὲν ἕτερος ἑτέρου δύνηται πλεόν ἔχειν, and Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 39 sq. 'Within the Roman Senate itself precautions were taken to prevent any one man from aspiring to rise above the little circle of his peers; the offices of the State must be held at fixed intervals, and no man might hold the same office twice except after the lapse of ten years' (Strachan-Davidson, Cicero and the Fall of the Roman Republic, p. 28 sq.). In the oligarchy of Berne the offices were awarded in the eighteenth century by lot (Von Mülinen, Bern's Geschichte, p. 179). 'Within the circle of the ruling families of Berne an equalizing spirit prevailed. Pensions and promotions from foreign princes were forbidden, and in order that no family might have any advantage over its fellows, it was decided in 1783 that each family should have the right of prefixing "von" to its name' (ibid. p. 180). Macaulay remarks in the margin of his copy of the Politics (*Macmillan's Magazine*, July, 1875, p. 221), 'The Venetian aristocracy carried this rule as far as it could be carried.' The advice which Aristotle gives here, however, seems hardly consistent with the advice which he gives to the first form of oligarchy in 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 22 sqq., to make the property-qualification higher for the higher offices than for the lower.

11. δ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πλείους κ.τ.λ. Democrats claimed equality with the few for the many, though the many are not like the few: what they claimed without good ground for the many may justly be claimed for those who *are* alike.

13. διὸ κ.τ.λ. 'Εὰν πλείους ὦσιν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ is added because, if the number of those who enjoy political rights under the constitution is small, the difficulty referred to is not likely to arise, for there will be offices enough for all the Homoei, and all of them may be in office simultaneously. Indeed, there may conceivably be more offices than Homoei to fill them (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 1 sqq.). Aristotle would probably recommend the adoption in aristocracies and oligarchies not only of the democratic practice which he here recommends for their adoption, but also of others, such as the prohibition of a repeated tenure of most offices and of the cumulation of offices. It is evident, however, from c. 9. 1309 a 33 sqq.

that he would not recommend the use of the lot in appointments to important offices.

15. οἶον τὸ ἑξαμήνου τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι. So at Venice the six Counsellors of the Doge, 'who kept him in a state of absolute vassalage,' held office only for eight months, the six Savii Grandi and the five Savii agli Ordini only for six (Yriarte, *Patricien de Venise*, pp. 35, 36, 348, 349).

16. ἔστι, not εἰσί, cp. (with Richards) *Rhet.* 1. 1. 1354 a 13 sq.: *Thuc.* 3. 112. 1, ἐστὸν δὲ δύο λόφω ἡ Ἰδομένη ὑψηλῶ, and 5. 66. 4, σχεδὸν γὰρ τι πᾶν πλὴν ὀλίγου τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀρχόντες ἀρχόντων εἰσί: *Plato, Rep.* 422 E: *Aristoph. Theaemoph.* 21, *Nub.* 247 sq. The singular verb is due to the number of the predicate.

18. πρότερον, in c. 6. 1305 b 24 sqq.

ἐπειθ' ἦττον κ.τ.λ. The measures just recommended—the fixing of a short term for the tenure of offices and other similar measures—will not only serve to content the members of the class favoured by the constitution, but also to save oligarchies and aristocracies from becoming *δυναστεῖαι*. An oligarchy or aristocracy might easily become a *δυναστεία*, if the holders of the chief offices in them held office for long terms, for these men would be enabled to become very rich and to gather round them a large body of dependent friends, and so not only to secure the reversion of their offices for their sons, but also to make their will supreme over the law. A *δυναστεία* would then arise (6 (4). 5. 1292 b 5 sqq.: 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 30 sqq.). Cp. *Liv.* 4. 24. 4, maximam autem libertatis custodiam esse, si magna imperia diuturna non essent, et temporis modus imponeretur, quibus iuris imponi non posset (quoted by Meier, *Aristotelis Politicorum Analysis ac Expositio*, p. 479). For the meaning of *κακουργεῖν*, which includes embezzlement of public money, see *Aeschin. c. Timarch.* c. 109 sq.

20. ἐπεὶ διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. Διὰ τοῦτο, i. e. διὰ τὸ πολὺν χρόνον ἀρχεῖν τοὺς ἀρχοντας. It is evident from what follows that both in oligarchies and in democracies men sometimes won tyrannies simply through holding important offices tenable for long terms—especially, it would seem, the offices of *δημοουργός* and *θεωρός* (c. 10. 1310 b 21 sq.)—even though they were not demagogues or men of the chief oligarchical families. Compare the Argument to *Demosthenes'* speech against Androtion (p. 590), where the *Epistatês* of the Athenian Boulê of 500 is referred to, ἕκαστος δὲ ἀρχων ἐν μὲ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκαλείτο ἐπιστάτης. διὰ τί δὲ μίαν μόνην ἤρχεν; ἐπεὶ αὐτὸς

τὰς κλείς τῆς ἀεροπόλεως ἐπιστεύετο καὶ πάντα τὰ χρήματα τῆς πόλεως ὡς οὐκ ἐραστὴ τυραννίδος, διὰ τοῦτο μίαν ἡμέραν ἐποίησαν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι.

23. οἱ δηραγωγοί. Cp. Plato, Gorg. 466 B, ΠΛΑ. πῶς οὐ νομίζεσθαι; οὐ μέγιστον δύναται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν (οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες); . . . τί δέ; οὐχ, ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι, ἀποκτεννύασί τε ἐν ἃν βούλωνται καὶ ἀφαιροῦνται χρήματα καὶ ἐκβάλλουσιν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἐν ἃν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς;

24. σέζονται δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι κ.τ.λ. This refers back to and corrects c. 7. 1307 b 19 sqq., where we have been told that constitutions are overthrown when an opposite constitution is near at hand. This is not always so. Sometimes, on the contrary, the nearness of those who would be glad to overthrow the constitution is a cause of its preservation; it engenders fear in the minds of the rulers of the State and makes them vigilant. Hence the wise statesman will produce fears in the minds of those entrusted with the charge of the constitution, so as to prevent them from relaxing their vigilance. Cp. Xen. Oecon. 7. 25, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ φυλάττειν τὰ εἰσπρεχθέντα τῇ γυναικὶ προσέταξε, γινώσκων ὁ θεὸς ὅτι πρὸς τὸ φυλάττειν οὐ κακίον ἐστὶ φοβερὰν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πλείονος μέρους καὶ τοῦ φόβου ἐδάσατο τῇ γυναικὶ ἢ τῷ ἀνδρὶ, Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 5, τὸ μὲν γὰρ θάρρος ἀμελείαν τε καὶ ῥαθυμίαν καὶ ἀπειθειαν ἐμβάλλει, ὁ δὲ φόβος προσεκτικωτέρους τε καὶ εὐπειθεστέρους καὶ εὐτακτοτέρους ποιεῖ, and Demosth. Prooem. 43. p. 1450 sq. By what measures this state of fear is to be produced, Aristotle does not tell us. Partly perhaps by laws and penalties (compare the use of φοβεῖσθαι in reference to ζημίαι in 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 34), partly by magistracies enforcing vigilance on the magistrates, like the Council of the Areopagus or the Ephorate, partly by a policy resembling that recommended by the Chian statesman Onomademus, who advised his party, when they had won the victory, not to banish the whole of the opposite party for fear lest for want of foes they should proceed to fall out among themselves (Plut. De capienda ex inimicis utilitate, c. 10). In a similar spirit Scipio Nasica (Corculum) advised that Carthage should not be destroyed, wishing τοῦτον γοῦν τὸν φόβον ὥσπερ χαλῶν ἐπικεῖσθαι σφρονοσιήρα τῇ θρασυτήτι τῶν πολλῶν (Plut. Cato Censor, c. 27: cp. Plut. De capienda ex inimicis utilitate, c. 3 *sub fin.*; Sallust, De Bell. Jugurth. c. 41, nam ante Carthaginem deletam populus et senatus Romanus placide modesteque inter se rempublicam tractabant, neque gloriae neque dominationis certamen inter cives erat; metus hostilis in bonis artibus civitatem retinebat. Sed ubi illa formido mentibus decessit, scilicet ea quae secundae res amant,

lascivia atque superbia, incessere; Plin. Nat. Hist. 33. 150, *pariterque luxuria nata est et Carthago sublata, ita congruentibus fatis ut et liberet amplecti vitia et liceret*; and Vell. Pat. 2. 1. 1). Compare the unwillingness of Dionysius the Elder that the power of Carthage should be entirely destroyed lest Syracuse should have leisure to regain its liberty (Diod. 14. 75. 3). To what States does Aristotle refer when he says that constitutions are sometimes preserved by the nearness of those who desire to overthrow them? He may possibly, like Plato (Laws 698—9), connect the preservation of the moderate democracy at Athens till after the Persian War with the fear of Persian attack which prevailed there until the repulse of the invasion of Xerxes. Perhaps he also refers to Pharsalus, which was within easy reach of the tyrants of Pherae, and yet retained its oligarchical constitution (c. 6. 1306 a 10 sqq.). Megara, again, long retained the oligarchy which was set up there in B.C. 424 (Thuc. 4. 74), notwithstanding that, or perhaps because, it was close to Athens (cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 118). The same thing may be said of Corinth, which retained its oligarchy though it lay between the two powerful democracies of Athens and Argos. Compare the case of the Lacedaemonian State, which was surrounded by foes (2. 9. 1269 b 3 sqq.). It is probably to it that Plutarch refers when he says (De cap. ex inim. utilitate, c. 3), *καθάπερ αἱ πόλεις ἀστυγματοκοῖς καὶ στρατείαις ἐνδελεχέσι σωφρονιζόμεναι πόλεις εὐνομίαν καὶ πολιτείαν ὑγιαίνουσιν ἡγήθησαν*. It was in moments of elation and self-confidence that changes in the direction of extreme democracy were made in the Athenian constitution (see note on 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 22. § 3 in Sandys' edition). Machiavelli remarks in his Discourse on reforming the government of Florence (*in il.*), that the constitution introduced at Florence by Maso degli Albizzi 'would not have lasted so long as forty years, had it not been for the wars with the Visconti, Dukes of Milan, which happened in that period and kept the State united.' It may be noticed that the entire absence of any check of the nature here referred to by Aristotle (see Bryce, American Commonwealth, 3. 335) has not so far interfered with the preservation of the United States' constitution.

26. φοβούμενοι γὰρ κ.τ.λ., sc. οἱ πολῖται.

28. φόβους παρασκευάζειν. Cp. Philo, Mechan. Syntax. p. 90. 22 Schoene, *ὡς φόβον καὶ φόβον ταχίαν παρασκευάζει τοῖς τετρασηκομίνοις*, and p. 98. 39, *ὡς φόβον τε ὡς πλείστον παρασκευάζει*, and Plato, Phaedo, 84 A, *γαλῖπρον τούτων παρασκευάζουσα*. Cp. also (with Bon.

Ind. s. v. φόβος) Rhet. 3. 14. 1415 b 18, πάντες γὰρ ἢ διαβάλλουσιν ἢ φόβους ἀπολύονται ἐν τοῖς προοιμίαις.

29. φυλάττωσι, sc. οἱ πολῖται.

μὴ καταλύωσιν ὥσπερ νυκτερινὴν φυλακὴν τὴν τῆς πολιτείας τήρησιν. For καταλύειν νυκτερινὴν φυλακὴν, cp. Aristoph. Vesp. 2.

31. ἔτι τὰς τῶν γνωρίμων φιλονεικίας καὶ στάσεις κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 b 6 sq. Contrast the tendencies of tyranny (c. 11. 1313 b 16 sqq.). Among these φιλονεικίας would be those mentioned in c. 6. 1305 b 22 sq. Καὶ διὰ τῶν νόμων, 'by means of the laws also,' as well as by other means, such as the voluntary action of the magistrates or the intervention of private friends. So at Cumae we find a rising στάσις composed by the intervention of the elder citizens (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 4). Aristotle would have wished that 'the first seeds of the bitter and incurable quarrel' between Marius and Sulla, which arose out of Bocchus' surrender of Jugurtha to Sulla, and (in the words of Plutarch, Marius, c. 10) 'went near to overthrow Rome,' had been dealt with as he suggests. By what laws would he seek to prevent the rise of discords and rivalries among the notables? Partly perhaps by laws requiring differences to be at once referred to authorities entrusted with the task of reconciling them (cp. c. 4. 1303 b 27, διαλύειν τὰς τῶν ἡγεμόνων καὶ δυναμένων στάσεις), partly by other laws. The difference, for instance, between the two brothers at Hestiaea may have arisen in part from a failure of the law to provide means of compelling the richer brother to disclose the amount of the patrimony and of the treasure (c. 4. 1303 b 32 sqq.), and that in Phocis (1304 a 10 sqq.) from a failure of the law clearly to settle the question who had the best right to marry the orphan heiress. Again, men hopelessly at feud might be required by law to go into exile, a course vainly recommended by one of the elder citizens at Syracuse before the rise of the στάσις described in c. 4. 1303 b 20 sqq. (Plut. Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 32. 825 C).

32. καὶ τοὺς ἔξω τῆς φιλονεικίας ὄντας, sc. φυλάττειν.

33. πρὶν παρειληφέναι καὶ αὐτοὺς, 'before they too have caught' (or 'inherited') 'the rivalry': cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 8 sq. and 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 22 sq., and Plut. Ages. c. 4, διὸ καὶ πατρικὴν τινα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ παλαιοῦ διετελουν εὐθύς οἱ βασιλεῖς φιλονεικίαν καὶ διαφορὰν παραλαμβάνοντες.

ὥς τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ κ.τ.λ. This is added in support of what precedes. Discords and rivalries among the notables should be prevented from

arising, for if they arise in a section of the notables and spread beyond it, no one but a statesman will be able to detect the evil at its beginning, the only time when it can be easily healed. Pittacus had said (Diog. Laert. 1. 78: Stob. Floril. 108. 73: cp. Plato, Rep. 564 C, and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 14. l. 8 sqq.), συνετῶν ἀνδρῶν, πρὶν γενέσθαι τὰ δυσχερῆ, προνοῆσαι ὅπως μὴ γένηται, ἀνδρείων δὲ γενόμενα εὖ θέσθαι. Cp. Epicharm. Fragm. 131 Ahrens,

οὐ μετανοεῖν, ἀλλὰ προνοεῖν χρὴ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν σοφόν,
and Manil. Astron. 5. 354 (punctuation uncertain and text of fourth line),

Ille tenet medicas artes ad membra ferarum,
Et non auditos mutarum tollere morbos
(Hoc est artis opus, non expectare gementis),
†Et sibi non aegros iam dudum credere corpus†.

Solon had detected the design of Peisistratus to make himself tyrant long before it was executed (Diog. Laert. 1. 49), and Stesichorus the similar design of Phalaris (Rhet. 2. 20. 1393 b 10 sqq.) Prince Metternich said to Ticknor, 'C'est toujours avec le lendemain que mon esprit lutte' (Ticknor's Life and Letters, 2. 17).

35. πρὸς δὲ τὴν διὰ τὰ τιμήματα κ.τ.λ. See note on 1306 b 6. The valuations mentioned in the passage before us were probably made in most Greek States. In oligarchies based on a property-qualification and in polities they would be made in order to determine who possessed the property-qualification for office or citizenship and who did not; in constitutions not based on a property-qualification they would be made with a view to the imposition of *λειτουργία* and the *εἰσφορά*. The fact that they were made annually in small States shows that men's property or its value fluctuated a good deal in Greek States (cp. [Demosth.] Or. 42. in Phaenipp. c. 4, διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οἱ νόμοι καθ' ἕκαστον ἔτος ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀντιδόσεις, ὅτι τὸ δατυχεῖν συνεχῶς τῇ οὐσίᾳ οὐ πολλοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν διαμίνειν εἴθισται), and that the authorities took much pains to proportion their demands to these variations. In larger States the labour and cost of making the valuation were greater, and the valuations were consequently made at longer intervals. At Rome the period was five years (Mommson, Röm. Staatsrecht, 2. 316 sq.). In mediaeval Florence '*l'estimo* ou estimation des biens de toute sorte pour fixer des taxes proportionnelles' was made afresh every ten years (F. T. Perrens, La Civilisation Florentine, p. 99). The valuations were probably made in Greece by self-assessment corrected by *ἐπιγραφαίς*, as at Athens (Plato, Laws

754 D: cp. Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 365). Compare the practice at Rome (Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, 2. 363 sq.: Willems, *Droit Public Romain*, p. 273 sq.). In the advice which Aristotle gives in 38 sqq. he appears to 'assume the population of the State to be stationary. Otherwise it would be the average *τίμημα* that ought to be taken' (Richards). He appears also to take it for granted that the increase or decrease of the total valuation of the State indicates an increase or decrease of the wealth of the individual citizens generally, and not of a small minority of them.

37. *εὐπορίας δὲ νομίσματος γιγνομένης*. For an instance of this at Rome see Willems, *Droit Public Romain*, p. 94.

38. *τοῦ τιμήματος τοῦ κοινοῦ*, 'of the total valuation of the State': cp. Demosth. Or. 14. De Symmor. c. 19, *τὸ τίμημα τὸ τῆς χώρας*.

39. *πρὸς τὸ παρελθόν*, sc. *πλήθος*.

1308 b. 2. *τοῦ πρότερον*, sc. *πλήθος*.

ἐν ᾧ, sc. *χρόνῳ*, explains *πρότερον*: cp. *ἐν τοσούτῳ*, 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 30.

αἱ τιμήσεις τῆς πολιτείας, 'the ratings of the constitution for political purposes' (Liddell and Scott, who compare Diod. 18. 18. 4, *ἀπὸ τιμήσεως εἶναι τὸ πολίτευμα*).

3. *νόμον εἶναι*, sc. *συμφέρι*.

καὶ τὰ τιμήματα, 'the property-qualifications also,' as well as the total valuation of the State.

4. *ἐπιτείνειν ἢ ἀνέναι*, sc. *τοὺς ἀρχοντας*.

6. *ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις μὴ ποιοῦνται μὲν οὕτως κ.τ.λ.* Sus.^{2a} brackets the first *μὲν* and (following Niemeyer) transposes the second *μὲν* to after *οὕτως*, but I doubt whether the second *μὲν* is answered by *ἐκείνως δέ*, as is implied in this transposition. Both the first and the second *μὲν* appear to be cases of *μὲν solitarium*, which is not rare in the Politics (see note on 1262 a 6). For the repetition of *μὲν* cp. 3. 1. 1275 a 23 sqq.

9. *ἐκείνως δέ*, 'in the opposite case,' i. e. if the total valuation of the State has increased (so Vict. 'si facultates privatorum valde creverint,' and Schn.). I prefer this explanation to that of Lambinus, 'si altero modo non agant, hoc est, si auctis censibus aestimationes non intendant,' with which Dr. Weldon appears to agree, as he translates, 'if there is no increase of the requisite assessment from time to time.'

10. *κοινὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Here we pass from recommendations chiefly applicable to oligarchy and aristocracy to recommendations

applicable to all constitutions. Aristotle probably at first intended to follow up *μήτ' αὐξάνειν* by *μήτε ταπεινῶν* or some similar words, but the regular sequence of the passage is broken after *εὐτυχίαν*, 15, and thus *μήτε*, 11, remains without anything to answer to it. For *μήτε* followed by *ἀλλά*, and not by any answering *μήτε*, see above on 1339 a 17, and cp. also *Περὶ ἀναπνοῆς* 14. 477 b 9—12. As to [*καὶ ἐν μοναρχίᾳ*] see critical note on 1308 b 11. Demagogues tended to become overgreat in democracies (6 (4). 4. 1292 a 25 sqq.: 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 22 sq.: cp. Plato, Rep. 565 C, οὐκοῦν ἓνα τινα δεῖ δημοκρασίᾳ διαφερόντως προῖστασθαι ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῦτον τρέφειν τε καὶ αὔξειν μέγαν;), but oligarchies also sometimes made men overgreat (c. 10. 1310 b 22 sq.). At Rome the rule which fixed a minimum age for the tenure of the quaestorship praetorship and consulship was a check on this tendency (see Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 242). Aristotle has before him Solon, Fragm. 11, Theogn. 823,

μήτε τι νῦν αὖτε τύραννον ἐπ' ἐλπίδι, κέρδεσιν εἴκων,

μήτε κτεῖνε θεῶν ὄρκια συνθέμενος,

and Eurip. Fragm. 628 Nauck (626, ed. 2),

μηδ' ἄνδρα δήμῳ πιστὸν ἐκβάλλει ποτιέ,

μηδ' αὖτε καιροῦ μείζον', οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλές,

μή σοι τύραννος λαμπρὸς ἐξ ἀστοῦ φανῇ.

κόλουε δ' ἄνδρα παρὰ δίκην τιμώμενον.

The advice against taking away great honours at a blow was newer than the advice not to make a single individual overgreat. Aristotle no doubt remembers the sudden fall from power of Themistocles (Diod. 11. 27. 3), Alcibiades, and Lysander (Plut. Ages. cc. 8, 20), and the perilous state of affairs which resulted.

14. φέρειν οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς εὐτυχίαν. Cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 28 sqq. and Solon ap. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 12,

τίκτει γὰρ κέρος ὕβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἐπηγ[αί]

ἀνθρώποισιν ὅσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ.

15. εἰ δὲ μή, κ.τ.λ., 'but, if they do not act thus,' etc. Cp. c. 11. 1315 a 12 sqq.

16. καὶ μάλιστα μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 3. 1302 b 19 sqq. and 3. 13. 1284 b 17 sqq. As to the means of doing this see note on 1284 a 17. For δύναμις φίλων, χρημάτων, cp. Plato, Rep. 366 C, φ' τις δύναμις ὑπάρχει ψυχῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ σώματος ἢ γένους.

19. εἰ δὲ μή, ἀποδημητικὰς ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παραστάσεις αὐτῶν, 'but, failing that, to make removals imposed on such men removals beyond the limits of the State.' Cp. Plato, Laws 855 C, and see

Liddell and Scott. Men in the position described by Aristotle were probably often removed to a distance from the chief city without being banished from the State. Dionysius the Elder acted otherwise. Suspecting the fidelity of his brother Leptines, who was popular with the Syracusans, he sent him on a mission to Himera and on his arrival ordered him to stay there and not return to Syracuse (Aen. Poliorc. c. 10. 20 sqq.). 'The most exciting moment of the reign of King Luis of Portugal was when in 1870 he received the demand of the octogenarian Duke of Saldanha for the dismissal of his liberal adviser Loulé. The request was accompanied with the threat of armed revolt, and Dom Luis, judging the Duke to be strong, consented. Immediately afterwards he followed an excellent example set him by many other monarchs, and sent his inconvenient subject away on a mission of honour. Saldanha came as Minister to England, and died in London six years later' (*Times*, Oct. 21, 1889). The nomination of Marshal MacMahon as Governor-General of Algeria in 1864 by the Emperor Napoleon III is said to have been made from a similar motive.

20. ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Καὶ διὰ τοὺς ἰδίους βίους, 'on account of their private mode of life also,' as well as on account of public honours heaped on them or suddenly withdrawn. In oligarchies spendthrift ways of life were often unchecked (Plato, Rep. 555 C) and often ended in schemes of tyranny (c. 6. 1305 b 39 sqq.), and the same thing must have happened in democracies also. Even habits of luxury were thought to be perilous to constitutions (vol. i. p. 199, note 2). Nothing aroused more suspicion of the designs of Pausanias and Alcibiades than the *παρανομία* of their habits of life (Thuc. 1. 130, 132 and Diod. 11. 44. 5: Thuc. 6. 15. 4). The magistracy which Aristotle wishes to set up would be modelled more or less on the Lacedaemonian Ephorate (Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 4) and the Council of the Areopagus at Athens (Isocr. Areopag. § 46: Athen. Deipn. 168 a sq., a passage which shows that a similar jurisdiction existed at Abdera: Philochor. Fragm. 143: Plut. Solon, c. 22). It is possible that a magistracy charged with these functions existed in Aristotle's time in the oligarchy of Corinth: compare a fragment of the *Ἔμπορος* of Diphilus (ap. Athen. Deipn. 227 e sqq.: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 388), in which we read of the Corinthians,

ὅαν δ' ὑπὲρ τῆς οὐσίας δαπανῶν τύχη,
ἀπείκων αὐτῷ τοῦτο μὴ ποιῶν ἔτι,
ὅς ἂν δὲ μὴ πίθῃτ', ἐπέβαλον ζῆμίαν

ἐὰν δὲ μὴδ' ὅτιοῦν ἔχων (ἢ πολυτελῶς,
τῇ δημίῳ παρέδωκεν αὐτόν.

A law of Solon at Athens punished δ τὰ πατρῷα κατεθροκάως with ἀτιμία (Diog. Laert. 1. 55), and Theodorus Metochita (see Kluge, Aristoteles de Politia Carthaginiensium, p. 215) says of Carthage, ἀσωτεύων ἀπὴρ καὶ ἀκολάστως πατράσις κλήροις χρώμενος ὑπεύθυνος ἦν τῇ νόμῳ καὶ δίκῃς ἐπράττετο. Compare also the νόμος περὶ τῆς ἀργίας at Athens, which was ascribed to Draco or Solon or Peisistratus (see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 149. 1, who refers to Hdt. 2. 177. Diod. 1. 77. 5, Diog. Laert. 1. 55, and Demosth. Or. 57. in Eubul. c. 32 : cp. also Isocr. Areop. §§ 44—46). But Aristotle would not be satisfied with a law. What he asks for is a special magistracy to keep an eye on spendthrifts and to save them from themselves. One of the duties of the Council of Ten in the Venetian oligarchy was 'the conservation of public morals and the discipline of a riotous young nobility' (H. F. Brown, Venice, p. 180).

24. ἐκδόστη. Supply ἐν. For its absence cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 23, and see Bon. Ind. s. v. Praepositio.

καὶ τὸ εὐημεροῦν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Supply δεῖ. Giphanius (p. 620) gives two alternative renderings of this passage—'Adhibenda quoque est cautio ei civitatis parti quae praeter ceteras floreat iisdem de causis, vel cavendum quoque iisdem de causis, ne qua pars civitatis praeter ceteras floreat.' Τὸ εὐημεροῦν τῆς πόλεως ἀνὰ μέρος may, in fact, either mean τοὺς εὐημεροῦντας τῶν πολιτῶν ἀνὰ μέρος or may be a similar phrase to τὸ χαίρον ὑμῶν in Plut. De Fraterno Amore, c. 1 (see for other instances of this use of the neut. sing. of the present participle with the article Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, ed. 2, § 829 a). Welldon interprets the words in the former way, and Sus. in the latter. If parallel instances of this use of the participle can be adduced from Aristotle's writings, other than τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός in Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1132 b 21 sqq., I should prefer the latter interpretation, but in their absence the former. Διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας, i. e. because νεωτερισμός is apt to result (cp. 20, 30 sq.). Aristotle remembers the experience of the Lacedaemonian State (c. 7. 1306 b 36 sqq.). He has just been advising that a single individual should not be allowed to tower over the rest, and the transition is easy to the advice given in the passage before us. Giphanius (p. 621) has already referred to Cic. De Offic. 1. 25. 85, according to which it was a maxim of Plato's, ut (qui reipublicae praefuturi sunt) totum corpus reipublicae curent, ne, dum partem aliquam tuentur, reliquas

deserant. . . . Qui autem parti civium consulunt, partem neglegunt, rem perniciosissimam in civitatem inducunt, seditionem atque discordiam. . . . Hinc apud Athenienses magnae discordiae, in nostra republica non solum seditiones, sed etiam pestifera bella civilia.

25. *τούτου δ' ἄκος κ.τ.λ.*, 'and the remedy for this evil is' etc. (see note on 1267 a 3). If, however, we adopt the second of the two interpretations mentioned above on 24 of *τὸ εὐημεροῦν τῆς πόλεως ἀνὰ μέρος*, it is perhaps better to render *τούτου δ' ἄκος* with Bonitz (Ind. 26 b 50) 'and the means of averting this is' etc. Notwithstanding what Aristotle says here we learn from 1309 a 27 sqq. (cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq.) that the classes not favoured by the constitution should not be admitted, at any rate in a majority, to *ἀρχαὶ κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας*. For *τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις μορίοις* cp. c. 4. 1304 a 39 and 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 7-11. For *τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἀρχάς*, cp. Isocr. Panath. § 132, *ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καθιστάμεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις τοὺς ἱκανωτάτους τῶν πολιτῶν*, Plato, Polit. 304 A, *ξυνδιακυβερνᾷ τὰς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράξεις*, Demosth. Prooem. 55. p. 1461, *τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων ὄντας*, and Plut. Solon. et Public. Comp. c. 2. καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν χρημάτων κύριος γινόμενος.

28. καὶ τὸ πειρᾶσθαι κ.τ.λ. What does Aristotle mean by *συμμιγνύναι*? He probably refers to measures of various kinds for fusing rich and poor and not letting them form two States within the State (cp. c. 9. 1310 a 4 sq. and Plut. Pericl. c. 11, where we read of Thucydides son of Melesias, *οὗ γὰρ εἶασε τοὺς καλοὺς ἀγαθούς καλουμένους ἄνδρας ἐνδισπάρθαι καὶ συμμείχθαι πρὸς τὸν ἄμωμον*)—measures for their intermarriage (cp. Plato, Laws 773 C and Pol. 2. 7. 1266 b 2 sqq.), for making them mutually useful (8 (6). 5. 1320 a 35 sqq.), for bringing them together in the deliberative body (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.), and the like. Contrast the ways of tyranny (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 16 sqq.). 'Veneti solent locupletiores e plebe affinitatibus ac propinquitatibus sibi conciliare ac devincire, mutuasque a locupletioribus pecunias accipere, ut rempublicam amare ac tueri etiam inviti cogantur' (Bodin, De Republica, p. 706). 'Venetorum patriciis cum plebeiis iura connubiorum communia sunt, Rhagusiorum patriciis non item' (ibid. p. 222).

30. *ἢ τὸ μέσον αὔξειν*. Aristotle does not say how he would do this. Perhaps in part by such rules as to inheritances as those mentioned in 1309 a 23 sqq.

τοῦτο, 'this,' i.e. the increase of the midway class, not, I think, 'this class' (Welldon).

τὰς διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητά στάσεις. Cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 38 sqq.

31. μέγιστον δὲ κ.τ.λ. This recommendation is connected with what precedes. If, in oligarchies especially, it is made impossible for magistrates to derive illicit gain from holding office, one class will not be in the sunshine and the other in the shade, for both will have what they want (40 sqq.); the poor will become rich and the notables will hold office and not be ruled by their inferiors (1309 a 7 sqq.). The making of illicit gains by magistrates might be checked either by laws—e. g. laws against bribery and corruption and laws enforcing the rendering of accounts (2. 9. 1271 a 3 sqq.)—or by administrative arrangements not prescribed by law. At Athens various acts performed by the *polētai* and *apodectae* were required to be performed in the presence of the *Boulē*, whether by law or not we are not told (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 47. ll. 10, 14 : c. 48. l. 3), and the transfer of sacred property from one set of treasurers of Athena to another also took place in the presence of the *Boulē* (c. 47. l. 6). That all this did not suffice to prevent abuses we see from *Lys. Or.* 19. pro Aristoph. Bon. c. 57, *εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ προαναλίσκοιτες οὐ μόνον τοῦτον ἔνεκεν, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἄρχεω ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἀξιώθεντες διπλάσια κομίσωνται*, from *Xen. Anab.* 4. 6. 16, and from *Aeschin.* c. Timarch. c. 106 sq. (see also Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 222. 4). The institutions of the Lacedaemonian State (2. 9. 1271 a 3 sqq.), of Crete (2. 10. 1272 a 35 sqq.), and of Carthage (2. 11. 1273 b 1 sqq.) were still more defective in this respect, and no doubt the same thing might be said with truth of many oligarchies. Compare with Aristotle's counsel a saying ascribed to the Lacedaemonian king Alcamenes, son of Teleclus, who, when he was asked how a kingship could best be preserved, is said to have replied, *Εἰ περὶ πλείονος τὸ κέρδος μὴ ποιοῖτο* (*Plut. Apophth. Lac. Alcam.* 1). *Giph.* (p. 624) has already compared *Cic. De Offic.* 2. 21. 75 and 2. 22. 77, *nulla autem re conciliare facilius benevolentiam multitudinis possunt ii qui reipublicae praesunt quam abstinentia et continentia*. Aristotle goes further in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 31 sqq. and recommends that in oligarchies the holders of the chief magistracies should not only make no illicit gains but should expend money of their own for public objects. Meier in his *Aristot. Polit. Analysis ac Expositio* (published in 1668), p. 487, significantly remarks in a note on the passage before us, 'quid factum in civitatibus Germaniae, quae occasione causa ac modo in democraticas maximam partem

abierint formas, referre studio supersedemus.' For the construction *μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς κερδαίνειν* cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 24 sq. and a fragment of Philemon in Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Gr.* 4. 6,

οὐκ ἔστιν ἕτερον παρ' ἑτέρου λαβεῖν τύχην.

34. οὐ γὰρ οὕτως κ.τ.λ. This account of the feelings of the many agrees with the account of the *γεωργικὸς δῆμος* given in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 11–26 (cp. *Rhet. ad Alex.* c. 3. 1424 b 4, τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος οὐχ οὕτω τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀγανακτεῖ στερούμενον ὥς ἔχει βαρέως ὑβριζόμενον), but in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 29 sqq. the poor (*οἱ πένητες*), who must be identical with the many, are placed in a less favourable light, for they are said to plot against the rich and to covet their goods. Again in 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 18 sqq. we are told that the *demos* of Erythrae overthrew the oligarchy of the Basilidae, notwithstanding that they ruled well (which implies, we may suppose, that they governed purely), simply because they were so few in number.

36. πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις σχολάζειν, 'to have leisure to attend to their own business' (Welldon). Cp. 1309 a 5, *πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι*.

37. τότε δὲ κ.τ.λ. We expect γάρ rather than δέ, but see notes on 1268 b 30 and 1321 a 19.

38. μοναχῶς δὲ καὶ ἐνδέχεται κ.τ.λ. Καί qualifies the whole sentence. The meaning is, 'and not only is the constitution safer when office is not allowed to be a source of gain, but there is this further advantage, that then, and then only, aristocracy and democracy may exist together.' Democracy will exist, because the *demos* will have all that it cares about having if office does not bring gain, i. e. a right to hold office, and aristocracy will exist, because the notables will have what they want, i. e. office. Compare 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 32 sqq. According to a saying placed in the mouth of Periander in [Plut.] *Sept. Sap. Conv.* c. 11 *sub fin.* (cp. *Isocr. Panath.* §§ 131, 153) democracy is best when it is most like aristocracy. Many had claimed that the Athenian democracy was a mixture of aristocracy and democracy (*Thuc.* 2. 37. 2: [Plato,] *Menex.* 238 C sq.), or that it was so at any rate in early days (*Isocr. ibid.*); Aristotle may here intend to correct contentions of this kind.

40. ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν κ.τ.λ., 'for it would then be possible' etc. Cp. *Eth. Nic.* 9. 6. 1167 a 34 sqq.

1309 a. 2. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πᾶσιν ἀρχεῖν δημοκρατικόν. Cp. 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 31 sq.

τὸ δὲ τοὺς γνωρίμους εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀριστοκρατικόν. In strictness perhaps τοὺς κατ' ἀρετὴν διαφέροντας should take the place of τοὺς γνωρίμους, for not all γνώριμοι are διαφέροντες κατ' ἀρετὴν (6 (4). 3. 1289 b 40 sqq.), and it is to these that office falls in a true aristocracy (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sq.).

7. ὅστε συμβήσεται κ.τ.λ. It was by attention to their regular work, not by pay for attendance in the assembly and dicasteries, that the poor were enriched (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 20 sq.).

9. τοῖς δὲ γνωρίμοις μὴ ἀρχεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων. This was what the notables most disliked (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 35 sqq.).

10. τοῦ μὲν οὖν μὴ κλέπτεσθαι τὰ κοινὰ κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν is answered by δέ in τοῦ δὲ ἀκερδῶς ἀρχειν, 13. The magistrates might make illicit gains either by plundering public property or by plundering private individuals or receiving bribes from them. To guard against the former evil Aristotle recommends in effect that the whole body of citizens shall be enabled to keep an eye on the public property. It was already the custom at many places—at Athens (Αθ. Πολ. c. 47. l. 5 sq.), Ephesus (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 143. 1), and Delos (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 367 *init.*)—for the outgoing treasurers of sacred property to hand it over to their successors in presence of the Boulê, but Aristotle recommends a still stricter rule in reference to public property; he advises that public property shall be transferred in the presence not of the Boulê only, which might be corrupt or collusive, but of all the citizens (cp. Plut. Timol. c. 10 *init.*), and that not merely shall a list be kept of the articles, but that copies of this list shall be distributed (τιθείσθωσαν, literally 'deposited') by phratries companies and tribes, so that all the citizens may know what articles are comprised in the list. All that was usually done probably was to put up a list in some public spot (see the examples given by Dittenberger in Syll. Inscr. Gr. Nos. 366, 367). Παράδοις is the technical term for the handing over of property to successors (cp. [πα]ρίδοσαν in Dittenberger, No. 366 a. l. 9). What does Aristotle include under τὰ χρήματα? In 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 25 τὰ ἱερὰ χρήματα must include land. Yet how would it be possible to transfer land or houses or (e.g.) the contents of the dockyards in the presence of the whole citizen-body? With κατὰ φρατρίας καὶ λόχους καὶ φυλάς Bonitz (Ind. 368 b 23 sqq.) groups such phrases as κατὰ ζεύγη ('by pairs') in Hist. An. 9. 8. 613 b 24. Cp. also 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 1. Each of these subdivisions must evidently have had some central

place in which to keep its copy. Those of the tribe would be kept in the sacrarium of its eponymous hero, or exposed to view in the place where other public notices connected with the tribe were posted (as to Athens see Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ed. 2, 2. 423). As to public notices to members of the phratry see Busolt, 2. 428. 7. It is not clear why Aristotle does not require copies to be deposited with demes also. When oaths were taken by all the citizens, they were sometimes taken *κατὰ φυλὰς καὶ κατὰ δήμους* (*Andoc. De Myst. c. 97*). As to *λόχους* see note on 1264 a 7 and Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 68 (cp. p. 41), whence it appears that one at any rate of the Spartan *λόχοι* was a quarter of Sparta, so that the *λόχος* may well have usually been a local subdivision. It seems more natural to take *τιθέσθωσαν* (with Weldon) as passive than (with Sus.) as middle: for the use by Aristotle of a verb in the plural after a nominative in the neuter plural see Bon. Ind. 490 a 51 sqq. Magistrates in Greek States probably in many cases received an inadequate amount of pay, and this may have been one reason why they were often corrupt. If that was so, the remedy for the evil suggested by Aristotle may not have been the true one.

13. *τοῦ δὲ ἀκερδῶς ἄρχειν κ.τ.λ.* So at Athens νόμος ἦν τὴν βουλὴν τὴν δόξασαν τῷ δήμῳ καλῶς βεβουλευκέναι στεφανοῦσθαι (*Argument to Demosth. c. Androt. p. 590*: Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 267). See also Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 333*.

14. *δεῖ δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις κ.τ.λ.* The recommendations contained in 1309 a 14–32, like that contained in 1308 b 31–1309 a 14, are made with a view to heal or prevent the ‘prospering by sections’ of which we read in 1308 b 24 sqq. Compare with the passage before us c. 5. 1305 a 3 sqq., *Lys. Or. 21. c. 13 sq.*, and *Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 31 sqq.* Just as Aristotle holds that the best way of preserving a tyranny is to make it more like the normal constitution of which it is the deviation-form (c. 11. 1314 a 34 sq.), so he holds that democracies and oligarchies may be preserved by their studying the advantage of the less favoured class and thus making as near an approach as they can to constitutions existing for the common advantage.

16. *ἐν ἐνίαις τῶν πολιτειῶν.* E. g. in the constitution of Rhodes at one time (c. 5. 1304 b 27 sqq.), and perhaps also in that of Athens still (*Isocr. De Pace, § 128*).

17. καὶ βουλομένους. How willingly liturgies of this kind were sometimes undertaken, we see from Lys. Or. 21. cc. 1—5.

18. τὰς δαπανηρὰς μὲν μὴ χρησίμους δὲ λειτουργίας. Cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 4, τῶν ματαίων λειτουργιῶν. A trierarchy would no doubt be regarded by Aristotle as an useful liturgy. Χορηγίαι, on the contrary, whether in connexion with dramatic lyrical musical or dancing competitions, are classed by him with the λαμπαδαρχία (the function of providing the expenses of a torch-race), so far at any rate as their utility is concerned. The office of χορηγὸς τραγῳδοῖς cost in one instance, according to Lys. Or. 21. c. 1, 3000 drachmae, and that of χορηγὸς αὐληταῖς ἀνδράσι, according to Demosth. c. Mid. c. 156, was much more costly (see A. Müller, Die gr. Bühnenalterthümer, in C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. 2. 332. 4). In Crete the public liturgies were defrayed from public funds and did not fall on the rich (see note on 1272 a 17). Demetrius of Phalerum, a pupil of Aristotle, seems to have shared his low estimate of the value of the χορηγία, to judge by a fragment of his writings pointed out by F. Dümmler in Plut. De Gloria Atheniensium, c. 6, where he calls the tripod awarded to the winning chorêgus (if we adopt Reiske's emendations) ἐπίσπειαμα τῶν ἐκκεχυμένων βίων καὶ τῶν ἐκλειομένων κενοτάφιον οἶκον (see U. Köhler in *Rhein. Mus.* 53. 491 sqq.).

19. δεῖν ἄλλαι τοιαῦται, e.g. the ἰστίασις or feasting of the tribe.

20. ἐν δ' ὀλιγαρχίᾳ κ.τ.λ. That oligarchies did not commonly act as Aristotle here advises is clear from Isocr. De Pace, § 125. *Mutatis mutandis*, we can gather what measures he would recommend for giving help to the poor from the counsel which he gives to extreme democracies in 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 35 sqq., b 7 sqq. Aeneas (Poliorc. c. 14) suggests that during a siege the poor should be excused the payment of the interest or even the principal of debts, but Aristotle is silent as to that. It would have been well if the policy he recommends had been followed when the English Inclosure Acts of the early part of the present century were passed. 'They may have been good for the country as a whole, but there is no doubt that the interests of the poor were treated with a carelessness which has led to very evil results' (Mr. C. Elton, *Academy*, March 10, 1888). The class which then ruled in this country often acted more wisely. 'In the eighteenth century it was the poor who enjoyed exemption from taxation in England, in France it was the rich. In the one case the aristocracy had taken upon its own

shoulders the heaviest public charges in order to be allowed to govern; in the other case it retained to the end an immunity from taxation in order to console itself for the loss of government' (De Tocqueville, *L'Ancien Régime*, p. 146 sq., quoted by Lecky, *Democracy and Liberty*, ed. 1, i. 279).

21. τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀφ' ὧν λήμματα, 'the offices from which gains accrue.' Cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. i. 3, ὁπόσαι δ' εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ μισθοφορίας ἔνεκα καὶ ὠφελείας εἰς τὸν οἶκον, ταύτας ζητεῖ ὁ δῆμος ἀρχεῖν. What offices are referred to we are not told, except that those of the stratēgi and hipparchs are not among them. See as to the emoluments of offices at Athens, Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 222, note 4. Aristotle can hardly refer here (as in 2. 10. 1272 a 40 sqq.) to illicit gains, for in recognizing them he would abandon the ground taken up by him in 1308 b 31 sqq. If, as he holds (c. 10. 1311 a 9 sq.), the end for which oligarchies exist is wealth, he is asking much from them in asking them to abandon the offices of which he speaks to the poor. But some oligarchies have done what he recommends. 'Veneti cum plebe communicare solent minores aliquot magistratus et curationes—immo vero primicerium, cuius summa in republica dignitas est—ac fructuosissima scribarum munera plebeiis attribuire, ac patricos ab huiusmodi honorum petitione summovere' (Bodinus, *De Republica*, p. 706).

22. καὶν τις ὑβρίσῃ κ.τ.λ., 'and if any one among the rich outrages these, the penalties should be greater than if he outraged one of his own class.' So Vict. Sus. and others. The sentence ἡ δὲ σφῶν αὐτῶν, if complete, would apparently run ἡ δὲ τις ὑβρίσῃ τῶν εὐπόρων εἰς τινὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν, not that it is necessary to supply τινὰ, for the same meaning may be expressed by the partitive genitive σφῶν αὐτῶν (cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 30, τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων). Sepulveda, followed by Lamb. and Giph., takes σφῶν αὐτῶν to refer to the poor, translating 'et graviore poena sanciendum, si quis locupletum in pauperes, quam si quis ipsorum contumeliam inferat,' but not, I think, rightly. For the thought cp. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3. 1424 b 3 sqq. Aristotle's suggestion is perhaps modelled on a similar provision in the laws of Charondas for the protection of slaves (Heronidas, 2. 46 sqq.: cp. Plato, *Laws* 777 D). We read of the Venetian oligarchy in Bodinus, *De Republica*, p. 771, 'iniurias plebeiis ab optimatibus illatas acerrime ulciscuntur.'

23. καὶ τὰς κληρονομίας κ.τ.λ. Aristotle evidently thinks that if

in an oligarchy inheritances pass not by kinship but by gift or bequest (for *δοῖς* includes the two things: see Liddell and Scott), they will tend to go to those who are already rich. This had been the experience of the Lacedaemonian State, where land at any rate, if not property of all kinds, could be given or bequeathed by its owner to any one whom he chose to select, and indeed an orphan heiress might be given in marriage not only by her father, but also after his death by his representative, to any one, however rich, whom the father or his representative chose to name (2. 9. 1270 a 18—29). Whether in the Lacedaemonian State or elsewhere there existed a right of gift or bequest so absolutely free that a father could disinherit his own children without cause, may well be doubted, but the owner of property may often have been in a position to disappoint less near relatives. What Aristotle would wish to be done if a man had no kin, we do not learn. He would no doubt wish that the policy which he suggests should be followed in reference to the disposal of orphan heiresses in marriage. See on the whole subject note on 1270 a 21. The Thirty at Athens appear to have taken exactly the opposite course to that which Aristotle here recommends to oligarchies (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 35. l. 14, ὥ[ς] *περὶ τοῦ δοῦναι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ᾧ ἂν ἐθέλῃ κύριον ποιήσαντες καθάπερ κ.τ.λ.*). He would evidently be opposed to succession by primogeniture in oligarchy, and indeed to the succession of any single son exclusively of the rest. There was no right of primogeniture in the case of the Venetian nobility (De La Houssaye, *Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise*, 1. 32 sq.).

27. *συμφέροι δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, 'and it is expedient both in democracy and in oligarchy to allow to those whose share in the advantages of the constitution is less either an equality or precedence in all other things . . . except only the magistracies which are supreme over the constitution.' These 'other things' include the less important offices and other positions of dignity and emolument, though not of power, such as priesthoods, and marks of respect such as those referred to by Xenophon in *De Vect.* 3. 4, ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ καλὸν καὶ προσεθρίαε τιμᾶσθαι ἐμπόρους καὶ ναυκλήρους, καὶ ἐπὶ ξείνᾳ γ' ἴστω ὅτε καλεῖσθαι, οἳ ἂν δοκῶσιν ἀξιολύγοις καὶ πλοίοις καὶ ἐμπορεύμασιν ὠφελεῖν τὴν πόλιν. Cp. also *Xen. Cyrop.* 8. 4. 5 and *Athen. Deipn.* 235 a. Yriarte (*Patricien de Venise*, p. 94) says of Venice, 'Si la politique est réservée aux nobles, l'administration est ouverte aux citoyens; mais les hautes directions sont toujours données

aux patriciens.' Much the same thing may be said of Ragusa (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 2. 309).

80. πλὴν ὅσαι ἀρχαὶ κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας. The expression κύριοι τῆς πολιτείας is often used in the Politics of the rich or the few or the poor (3. 8. 1279 b 17 sq. : 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 33, etc.), but nowhere else of magistracies. In Antiphon, Tetral. 2. 1. 1 we read ὑπὸ τε τῶν ψηφισαμένων, οἱ κύριοι πάσης τῆς πολιτείας εἰσίν.

81. ταύτας δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3. 1424 a 40, τοῦτων δὲ (i.e. τῶν ἀρχῶν) εἶναι τὰς μὲν πλείστας κληρωτάς, τὰς δὲ μεγίστας κρυπτῇ ψήφῳ μεθ' ὁρκῶν καὶ πλείστης ἀκριβείας διαψηφιστάς.

τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας. Cp. Thuc. 8. 75. 2, τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἀλλαγίας. More usually we hear of οἱ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ (c. 6. 1306 b 4 : 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 32). So in 5 (8). 7. 1341 b 33 we have οἱ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ and in 1341 b 28 οἱ ἐκ φιλοσοφίας.

ἢ πλείουσιν, 'or in a majority.'

- C. 9. 88. Τρία δὲ τινα κ.τ.λ. Aristotle adds this advice because if the holders of the supreme magistracies in a State are not what they should be, the safety of the constitution will be imperilled: cp. c. 3. 1303 a 16 sqq. What offices are meant by αἱ κύριαι ἀρχαί? Not perhaps exclusively those which are κύριοι τῆς πολιτείας (30), but the chief offices generally, those for instance of a *stratēgus* or *tamias* (1309 b 4 sqq.). In c. 10. 1310 b 20 sqq. the offices of *demiurgus* and *theorus* are given as instances of κύριοι ἀρχαί. Here, as in 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 10 sqq. and 3. 13. 1284 a 5 sqq., Aristotle requires the ruler to possess not only virtue but also political skill (see note on 1284 a 6). Giphanius (p. 636) has pointed out the resemblance between the passage before us and a passage in a speech of Pericles in Thuc. 2. 60. 5, καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιοῦτ' ἀπὸ ὀργίζεσθε ὅς οὐδενὸς οἶομαι ἥσσαν εἶναι γινῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύειν ταῦτα, φιλόπολις τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσω. He also compares (p. 634) Rhet. 2. 1. 1378 a 6 sqq. Dionysius the Elder had advised the Syracusans (Diod. 13. 91. 5) αἰρεῖσθαι στρατηγοὺς μὴ τοὺς δυνατωτέρους ('the most powerful men,' opposed in what follows to τοὺς ταπεινότερους), ἀλλὰ τοὺς εὐνουστάτους καὶ δημοτικούς μᾶλλον. In elections to high offices at Athens popular opinion probably set most store by friendliness to the constitution (in combination, of course, with official skill) and regarded this as the best safeguard of the democracy (cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 7 and 2. 19, and Lys. Or. 13. c. Agorat. c. 10). Isocrates, however, had already said (Panath. § 139: cp. Plato, Rep. 558 B) that the rulers in a democracy should not only be

men devoted to the constitution but also men of worth and good character, and Aristotle follows in his track. Compare the view of Cicero in *pro Planc.* 25. 62. It is evident that Aristotle cannot have approved of the use of the lot even in a democracy in appointments to the *κύριαι ἀρχαί* of which he speaks here, unless indeed the subsequent *δοκιμασία* was made very strict and inquisitorial. See note on 1309 b 3.

35. *δύναμιν μεγίστην τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς*. This is explained by *ἐμπειρία* in 1309 b 5 and by *ἐπιστήμη* in 1309 b 8 (cp. *εἰδότες*, 1309 b 12). Compare such expressions as *τὴν τοῦ λόγου δύναμιν* (*Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm.* 52: *Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr.* 4. 250).

36. *τρίτον δ' ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην κ.τ.λ.* For *ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην* cp. 3. 9. 1280 b 12, *ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δίκαιους* (where see note), and *Lys. Or.* 12. c. *Eratosth.* c. 5, *ἐπ' ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην*. For *τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν* cp. 3. 4. 1276 b 30 and *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 25. l. 5. *δικαιοσύνη* is the *ἔξις ἀφ' ἧς πρακτικοὶ τῶν δικαίων εἰσὶν* (*Eth. Nic.* 5. 1. 1129 a 6 sqq.), so that if what is just varies in relation to each constitution, justice, the habit which enables men to do what is just, will do so too. The kind of justice which the citizen, for instance, of a democracy will possess will be different from true justice, for it will be unduly favourable to numbers and free birth as contrasted with wealth and virtue. Aristotle seems to imply here and in 3. 4. 1276 b 30 that not merely the justice of a good citizen, but also his virtue generally, will vary with each constitution, but he does not trace in detail how his courage, temperance, and moral prudence will do so. Probably in a *παρέμβασις* each of these virtues will be adjusted to an end which is other than the true one.

37. *μὴ ταῦτόν . . . κατὰ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας*, 'not the same in relation to all constitutions': cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 20, *καὶ κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας δὲ, πότιρον διαφέρει καθ' ἑκάστην καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν γένος*.

38. *ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ.* *Ἀπορίαι* are rare in this Book, but here we have one. Aristotle probably has before him some sharp sayings of Themistocles and Aristides which are recorded in *Plut. Aristid.* c. 24, *μήνα δ' οὗ ὥσπερ τοῦ Ἀριστείδου καὶ θαυμαστὸν ἔχοντος ἐπὶ τῇ διατάξει τῶν φέρον ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς λέγεται καταγλῶν, ὥς οἷα ἄνδρες δοτε τῶν ἴστων, ἀλλὰ θυλάκου χρυσοφύλακος ἀνομοίως ἀνυπόμεινος τὴν Ἀριστείδου παρησσίαν ἐκείνος γάρ, εἰκότως ποτὶ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους ἀρετῆς ἠγγίσθαι μεγίστην στρατηγῶ τὸ γνώσκων καὶ προαισθάνεσθαι τὰ βουλευόμενα τῶν πολεμίων, "Τοῦτο μὲν," εἰπὼν, "ἀσχεμαῖόν ἐστιν, ὁ Θεμιστοκλής, καλὸν δὲ καὶ στρατηγικὴν ἀληθῆς ἢ περὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἐκράτεια"*

(cp. Aristid. c. 4). Aristotle, unlike Aristides, regards generalship as the quality to be most insisted on in a general (cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 2. 1164 b 24 and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 23. l. 12 sqq.: Vict. compares the rejoinder of Cicero in Plut. Cic. c. 38 to Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, who wished to appoint a man who was no soldier to a military command and dwelt on his moral excellence, *τί οὐδ' οὐκ ἐπίτροπον αὐτὸν τοῖς τέκνοις φυλάσσει;*). So far he agrees with Themistocles, but he does not agree with him in setting little store by the virtue of a treasurer. A treasurer needs to have virtue much above that of most men.

1309 b. 8. *τοῖκε δὲ δεῖν βλέπειν* κ.τ.λ. Aristotle tells us to prefer the man who possesses the *rarest* of the three qualities demanded by the office. Should we not rather say the man who possesses the *most indispensable* of them? It was on this principle that St. Theresa's sage advice was based, to choose, if possible, a confessor both wise and pious, but, if that was not possible, to prefer the former quality. Aristotle appears to take it for granted that *ταμίαι* will be chosen by election, not by lot: this was the case with the *ταμίαι στρατιωτικῶν* at Athens ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 43), but not with the *ταμίαι τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς* ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 47). In the passage before us, as in 3. 11. 1282 a 31 and 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 9 sq., *ταμίαι* and *στρατηγοί* are taken as instances of high officials.

5. *στρατηγίας* = *στρατηγικῆς*, as in Eth. Eud. 1. 8. 1217 b 40 (Bon. Ind. s. v.): see also Liddell and Scott. *Μετέχουσι*, sc. *πάντες*.

6. *ἐν δὲ φυλακῇ* κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Hiero, 6. 11, *καὶ δεῖ μὲν δήπου τοὺς φύλακας μηδὲν οὕτω ποιεῖν δύνασθαι ὥς πιστοὺς εἶναι*. *Φυλακή* is here used not in a military sense, as in 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 10, but in a financial sense, of the custody of property and especially money, as in Eth. Nic. 4. 1. 1120 a 9. *Καὶ ταμεία* is added to make this clear.

7. *τάναντία* 'prope adverbii instar usurpatur' (Bon. Ind. 247 b 26): cp. Plato, Laws 636 E.

8. *ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη*, sc. *τοῦ φυλάττειν καὶ ταμειῦν*. The knowledge how to keep things is possessed even by women (3. 4. 1277 b 24 sq.). See note on 1277 b 24.

9. *κἄν*, 'if also': see note on 1298 b 23.

For *τῆς πολιτείας φιλία* cp. c. 3. 1303 a 17, *τοὺς μὴ τῆς πολιτείας φίλους*: Xen. Anab. 1. 3. 5, *τῇ Κύρου φιλίᾳ*, and 5. 6. 11.

10. *ποιήσει γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ δόξα*. Cp. Rhet. 3. 12. 1414 a 21, *τὸ γὰρ ἡδέϊαν εἶναι ποιήσει δῆλον ὅτι τὰ εἰρημένα*.

11. ἡ δὲ ἐνδέχεται κ.τ.λ. Aristotle implies that though a man who possesses full knowledge and is friendly to the constitution may be ἀπατής, a man who possesses virtue cannot be so. The same thing is implied in 1310 a 14—19 of men 'habituated and educated by the rule of the constitution,' no doubt because habituation and education result in virtue. That knowledge is no security against wrong action is well known to Euripides (Hippol. 358 sqq. Bothe, 380 sqq. Dindorf: Fragn. 838 Nauck (841, ed. 2) etc.): cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1095 a 8 sq. and 7. 2. 1145 b 12 sq. That friendliness to the constitution is no security against wrong action would be proved by daily experience, for many men who betrayed constitutions would be observed to do so not because of any unfriendliness to them, but because they were corrupted by bribes or the like.

14. ἀπλῶς δέ κ.τ.λ., 'and broadly whatever provisions in the laws we speak of as advantageous to constitutions.' See vol. i. p. 537, note 2. Cp. Diod. 5. 82. 4, αὐτὸς δ' ὁ Μακαρεὺς ἐν τῇ Λέσβῳ βασιλεύων νόμον ἔγραψε πολλὰ τῶν κοινῇ συμφερόντων περιέχοντα, and [Plut.] De Fato, c. 4, ἔπειτα μὴν καθόλου (ὁ πολιτικὸς νόμος) τὰ πόλει προσήκοντα εἰς δύναμιν περιλαμβάνει. I follow Sus. and others in my interpretation of this passage. Gilbert (Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. xxxvi, note 3) interprets it otherwise. He takes Aristotle to refer to a συναγωγή τῶν νόμων drawn up by himself and Theophrastus, 'a compilation of the laws obtaining in the various States and a description of the various authorities entrusted with their execution.' See also Zeller, Aristotle and the earlier Peripatetics, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 506 foot.

16. καὶ τὸ πολλὰκις εἰρημένον μέγιστον στοιχεῖον κ.τ.λ., 'and the often mentioned elementary principle of paramount importance.' For the order of the words see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm. (ed. 2 and ed. Gerth), §§ 405. 4 and 464. 7, and cp. Plato, Laws 708 D, τὸ παντοδαπὸν ἐς ταῦτ' ἐννεργητικὸς γένος. For στοιχεῖον see note on 1295 a 35. Πολλὰκις, in 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 14 sqq. and 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 4 sqq. It is again alluded to in 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 25 sqq. As has been pointed out in vol. i. p. 491, this principle was inherited by Aristotle from Theramenes. It was forgotten by those who made oligarchies too narrow (c. 6. 1305 b 2—22), or who took no pains to conciliate those outside the constitution (c. 8. 1309 a 20—32) or the moderately well-to-do (6 (4). 12. 1296 b 36 sq.), or who in planning aristocracies trusted to puerile devices

intended to conceal from the many their exclusion from power (6 (4). 12. 1297 a 7 sqq.). 'Like Dumouriez and at a later period Bonaparte, Danton was of opinion that in politics everything depends on being the strongest' (Von Sybel, French Revolution, Eng. Trans., vol. i. p. 474). It should be noticed that while Aristotle regards it as essential to every constitution that those who are on the side of the constitution should be stronger than those who are against it, he is still better pleased when the constitution is so framed that there is not even a minority which wishes for a different constitution from the existing one (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 36 sqq.).

18. *παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ.* For *παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα* cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 23, 32. *Παρὰ πάσας* is used in a slightly different sense in c. 11. 1315 a 15. This warning is suggested by Plato, *Laws* 701 E, *λαβόντες δὲ αὐτῶν ἑκάτερας μετρώτητά τινα, τῶν μὲν τοῦ δεσπόζειν, τῶν δὲ τοῦ ἐλευθερίας, κατείδομεν ὅτι τότε διαφερόντως ἐν αὐταῖς ἐγένετο εὐπραγία, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἄκρον ἀγαθόντων ἑκατέρων, τῶν μὲν δουλείας, τῶν δὲ τούραντίου, οὐ συνήρκεν οὔτε τοῖς οὔτε τοῖς*, and *Rep.* 562. Compare with the passage before us *Rhet.* 1. 4. 1360 a 21-30. Roscher (*Politik*, p. 319. 11) quotes from Mommsen the remark, 'die Demokratie hat sich immer dadurch vernichtet, dass sie die äussersten Konsequenzen ihres Principis durchführt.' Compare also the following passage from J. S. Mill, *System of Logic*, vol. ii. p. 521, ed. 3: 'Inasmuch, however, as no government produces all possible beneficial effects, but all are attended with more or fewer inconveniences, and since these cannot be combated by means drawn from the very causes which produce them, it would be often a much stronger recommendation of some practical arrangement, that it does not follow from what is called the general principle of the government than that it does. Under a government of legitimacy the presumption is far rather in favour of institutions of popular origin, and in a democracy in favour of arrangements tending to check the impetus of popular will. The line of argumentation so commonly mistaken in France for political philosophy tends to the practical conclusion that we should exert our utmost efforts to aggravate, instead of alleviating, whatever are the characteristic imperfections of the system of institutions which we prefer, or under which we happen to live.'

20. *πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 35 sqq. and 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 2 sqq., and *Rhet.* 1. 4. 1360 a 21-30. Aristotle's remark is based on Plato, *Rep.* 562 B. Among the *δοκούντα δημοτικά* and

δολιγαρχία referred to by him as fatal to democracy and oligarchy are probably the exaggerated devotion to wealth in oligarchies and to liberty in democracies on which Plato had commented: cp. 1310 a 25 sqq. as to democracy and 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 26 sqq. as to oligarchy.

21. οἱ δ' οἰόμενοι κ.τ.λ., 'but they' (i. e. the adherents of deviation-forms) 'thinking that this' (i. e. τὸ παρεκβεβηκός) 'is the only right thing.' For the attraction in ταύτην, cp. 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32, αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων. For μίαν ἀρετήν, cp. Menand. Ἡρίοχος, *Fragm.* (Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.* 4. 127),

μί' ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ τὸν ἄτοπον φεύγειν αἰεί.

For the thought, cp. Lucian, *De Saltat.* c. 82.

22. ἄκουσιν εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν. Cp. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 37 sq.

23. ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι κ.τ.λ. The verbs ἀποβαλεῖ (27), ποιήσει (28), ἔχει (29), and συμβαίνει (30) appear to be all of them dependent on ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλά, 25, i. e. though this is so, still etc.

26. πρῶτον μὲν κ.τ.λ., 'first he will let slip all the moderation of the feature, and at last will carry matters to such a point that it will not even seem to be a nose at all owing to the excess and defect in it of the two opposite elements (hookedness and snubness).' Cp. *De Gen. An.* 4. 3. 769 b 6, καὶ πάλιν τῆς πρὸς τοὺς προγόνους ὁμοιότητος, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος μὲν τούτων δ' οὐδενὶ προσόμοιος, ὅτι δὲ προῦν οὕτως τέλος οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ ζῷον τι μόνον φαίνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἃ δὴ καὶ λέγεται τέρατα. For the strangeness of the order in τέλος δ' οὕτως κ.τ.λ., see vol. ii. p. li, note 3. Ποίησει is displaced in order that special emphasis may be thrown on οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲ ῥῖνα.

30. τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας. Vict. suspects that ἄλλας is a mere repetition of ἄλλων in the preceding clause, though he does not venture to omit it. Schneider brackets and Coray omits it. Sus. thinks that Vict. may be right, but leaves ἄλλας in his text. Prof. Jowett, on the other hand, holds (*Politics of Aristotle*, 2. 213), that 'ἄλλας is used adverbially, as in Plato and Thucydides, in the sense of "likewise."' Perhaps this is so: compare the use of ἄλλος in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 30 (see note) and in *Περὶ μακροβιότητος* 6. 467 b 5, περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῶν.

31. καὶ γὰρ δολιγαρχία κ.τ.λ. In his reference here to democracy Aristotle may possibly have Pericles in view; at any rate Isocrates says of Pericles in *De Pace*, § 126, παραλαβὼν τὴν πόλιν χεῖρον μὲν φρονοῦσαν ἢ πρὶν κατασχεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν, ἔτι δ' ἀνεκτὸς πολιτευομένην.

Compare 2. 12. 1274 a 5 sqq. For *ἔστιν ὥστ' ἔχειν* cp. (with Bon. Ind. 220 b 8) Probl. 31. 17. 959 a 13, *ἔστιν ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐν δύο*.

34. οὐδὲ πολιτείας. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 30 sqq.

35. τὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν πολιτικόν. See note on 1274 b 36.

38. οὐδετέραν μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Γάρ, 'I say "destroys," for' etc. *Μέν* is answered by *ἀλλά* in the next line. For *εἶναι καὶ διαμίνειν* cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 22. It would seem that in Aristotle's view neither oligarchy nor democracy can be said to exist in a State all whose citizens have an even amount of property.

40. ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν, i. e. the constitution of a State in which an even amount of property is possessed by all. *Ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν* = *τὴν τούτων πολιτείαν*, as in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 6.

1310 a. 1. φθείροντες, sc. τοὺς εὐπόρους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος.

2. ἀμαρτάνουσι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle passes on to another mistake common to democracies and oligarchies like the last. Statesmen in each often make the State two and thus produce *στάσις* and constitutional change (cp. c. 3. 1303 b 7 sqq.). As to the structure of the sentence see Vahlen, Aristot. Aufsätze, 2. 24, who remarks that *ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου τοὺς ὀλιγαρχικοὺς* (6 sq.) should have been adapted in structure to 3 sq., whereas in fact the structure of this clause is affected by what immediately precedes. He compares c. 10. 1310 b 9-14 and 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 7-11.

3. ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις οἱ δημαγωγοί, οἷον τὸ πλῆθος κύριον τῶν νόμων. This is the mark of an ultimate democracy (c. 5. 1305 a 31 sq.). According to 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 10 sq., it is only in a democracy of this kind that demagogues exist; at any rate it is in such a democracy that they are most likely to court the many by fighting with the rich. There may be a reference here to Pericles' struggle with Thucydides son of Melesias (Plut. Pericl. c. 11), which is said by Plutarch to have broken the State into two sections, the few and the demos. It was characteristic of a demagogue to boast that he 'fought for the many' (Aristoph. Vesp. 665 sqq.).

5. δεῖ δὲ τοῦναντίον κ.τ.λ. Solon had done this, as Aristotle probably remembers: cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 5, καὶ γὰρ . . . πρὸς ἑκατέρους ὑπὲρ ἑκατέρων μάχεται καὶ διαμφισβητεῖ, and Aristid. 2. 361, quoted by Sandys in his note on this passage, καίτοι Σόλων τὰ μὲν εἰς Μεγαρίας ἔχοντα φῆσαι λέγεται, τοὺς δὲ νόμους οὐκ ἦδε περιῶν οὐδὲ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν εὐπόρων πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τοὺς πλουσίους οὐκ ἦδεν. Cp. [Demosth.] Phil. 4. c. 45.

6. ὑπὲρ εὐπόρων. For the omission of the article cp. 3. 13.

1283 b 6, ἡ μὲν τῇ διὰ πλουσίων ἡ δὲ τῇ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι, where see note. See also note on 1307 a 22.

7. καὶ τοὺς ὄρκους κ.τ.λ. Aristotle speaks of the oaths to which he refers being taken only 'in some oligarchies'; they would probably be especially taken in oligarchies set up after an actual battle with the demos (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 27 sqq.), or in oligarchies ruled by *ἐταιρίαι*, though of course not in those oligarchies of this type in which the demos elected the magistrates (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq.). They resembled in their terms the oaths taken by hostile States against each other. So the *ἀγγελᾶι* of Drerus in Crete swear by Hestia and other deities, μὴ μὰν ἐγὼ ποκα τοῖς Λυττίοις καλῶς φρονησεῖν μήτε τέχνη μήτε μαχαρῇ μήτε ἐν νυκτὶ μήτε πεδ' ἡμέραν καὶ σπενυσίω, ὅτι κα δύναμαι, κακὸν τῇ πᾶλει τῇ τῶν Λυττίων (Cauer, *Delectus Inscr. Gr. No. 121*, already referred to by Prof. Jowett). We read of oaths sworn by oligarchs against the Athenian demos in Andoc. De Myst. c. 98, but we are not told what their terms were. Compare also a Thasian decree in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 8. 402, ὄρκον δὲ ὁμόσαι πάντας Ἀθηναίους τοὺς] ὀλιγαρχίην καταστήσαντας, κ[αὶ ὁμόσαι τοῦ δ]ήμου ὃν ἂν ἡ βουλὴ συναγράψῃ. Mr. Freeman (Sicily, 2. 175, note 3) quotes a remark as to the 'scoffing anapaestic cadence' of the oligarchical oath cited by Aristotle here. Oaths to maintain democracy were sometimes taken by its partisans (Thuc. 8. 75. 2).

10. χρὴ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but the right thing is both to hold and to simulate the opposite opinion' (that it is against the interest of an oligarchy to wrong the demos), 'signifying in the oaths that "I will not wrong the demos."' So the tyrant is advised in c. 11. 1314 a 40 to simulate the ways of a king.

12. μέγιστον δὲ πάντων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here follows in the track of Plato, Rep. 552 E (cp. 554 B, *ἀπαιδευσίαν*) and Laws 793 and 870 A, and of Isocrates, Areop. § 40 sqq., a passage which Eaton has already compared. For the thought cp. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 14 sqq. and 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 3 sq.: also Plut. Lycurg. et Num. inter se comp. c. 4, μικρὸς γὰρ ἦν ὁ τῶν ὀρκῶν φόβος, εἰ μὴ διὰ τῆς παιδείας καὶ τῆς ἀγωγῆς οἷον ἀνέδευσε τοῖς ἥθεσι τῶν παίδων τοὺς νόμους καὶ συναφείωσε τῇ τροφῇ τὸν ζῆλον τῆς πολιτείας, ὥστε πεντακοσίων ἐτῶν πλείω χρόνον τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ μέγιστα διαμείναι τῆς νομοθεσίας, ὥσπερ βαφῆς ἀκράτου καὶ ἰσχυρῶς καθαφαμένης. Education and habituation must make the fulfilment of the behests of the law second nature to the citizens, or else the State will always be liable to accesses of *ἀκρασία* fatal to that obedience to the laws which is essential to the maintenance of

the constitution (cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 3 sq. and 2. 8. 1269 a 20 sqq.). Compare the saying of Vînet, 'qu'on est malheureux quand on n'a pas le tempérament de ses principes.' What sort of education would be favourable to the maintenance of an oligarchy? An education which excludes luxury (22 sqq.) and an excessive love of gain or honour or both (2. 7. 1266 b 35 sqq.) and which inculcates justice and considerate treatment of those outside the privileged class. An education favourable to the maintenance of a democracy, on the other hand, would be one which discountenanced the disregard of law and the ἀταξία καὶ ἀναρχία which often proved fatal to democracies (c. 3. 1302 b 27 sqq.) and inculcated justice to the rich and considerate treatment of them. Compare also Isocr. Areop. § 24, and see note on 1337 a 14. Aristotle does not repeat here what he has said in 1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq., that this training must be extended to women and girls. It is evident that when a constitution was suddenly introduced, it must have been very liable to overthrow till habits and ideas grew up to support it, and some time must have been needed to develop these. For μέγιστον δὲ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων cp. Isocr. Philip. § 136, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον τῶν εἰρημένων.

13. οὐ νῦν ὀλιγοῦσι πάντες. For νῦν πάντες cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 21.

15. συνδεδοξαμένων ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν πολιτευομένων, 'ratified by the consentient voice of the whole civic body' (Welldon). For τῶν πολιτευομένων, 'those who exercise the rights of citizenship,' see note on 1328 a 17. All the citizens of Athens took an oath to observe the laws of Solon (Ath. Pol. c. 7). It is evident from Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 42 sqq. that those laws were held to be laws in the fullest sense, οὗς τὸ πλῆθος συνελθὼν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἔγραψε. Συνδεδίξω is a rare word, especially as used here. It is possible, as Richards points out, though perhaps hardly likely, that συνδεδοξαμένων here means 'extolled,' not 'ratified.'

16. εἰθισμένοι καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, 'trained through habituation and education by the rule of the constitution': cp. Xen. Cyrop. 1. 2. 2, ἐπαιδεύθη γε μὴν ἐν Περσῶν νόμοις. In 14 we have τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας and in 19 sq. τὸ πεπαιδευθῆαι πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν (cp. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 14). For εἰθισμένοι καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι cp. 3. 18. 1288 b 1, καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔθνη.

18. εἴπερ γὰρ ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably regarded Athens as ἀκρατής: cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 11. 1152 a 19, καὶ τοῦτε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατής πόλις

ἡ ψηφίζεται μὲν πάντα τὰ δέοντα καὶ νόμους ἔχει σπουδαίους, χρήται δὲ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ Ἀναξαγρίδης ἔσκωψεν, "ἡ πόλις ἐβούλει", ἢ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει," and Diog. Laert. 5. 17, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἀποτεινόμενος τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔφασκεν (ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης) εὐρηκεῖν πυροὺς καὶ νόμους, ἀλλὰ πυροὺς μὲν χρῆσθαι, νόμοις δὲ μή. Cp. also Demosth. De Rhod. Libertate, c. 1, and Plato, Laws 689 B.

21. οἷς δυνήσονται κ.τ.λ. For the dative cp. Plato, Rep. 477 B, φήσομεν δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων, αἷς δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς δυνάμεθα ἃ δυνάμεθα, καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν ὃ τί περ ἂν δύνηται ;

22. νῦν δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις κ.τ.λ. Plato (Rep. 556 B) had already said of the rulers in an oligarchy, σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν, ἀρ' οὐ τρυφῶντας μὲν τοὺς νέους καὶ ἀπόνους καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, μαλακοὺς δὲ καρτερεῖν πρὸς ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας καὶ ἀργούς ; Cp. also Rep. 556 C sq., Eurip. Fragm. 55 Nauck (54, ed. 2), and Aristoph. Plut. 559 sqq. 'The Roman Noble was encouraged to spend his youth in luxury and extravagance' (Strachan-Davidson, Cicero and the Fall of the Roman Republic, p. 44).

25. ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῖς μάλιστα εἶναι δοκούσαις δημοκρατικαῖς κ.τ.λ. See as to this expression note on 1298 b 13. It is implied in the passage before us that 'living as one pleases' was realized only in the extreme form of Greek democracy. But in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 11 sqq. this is said to be a concomitant of democracy in general. If a νόμος περὶ τῆς ἀργίας existed in the Solonian democracy (see note on 1308 b 20), 'living as one pleases' cannot have been permitted in it.

27. αἷτιον δὲ τούτου ὅτι κακῶς ὀρίζονται τὸ ἐλεύθερον. 'Ορίζονται, 'men define.' The passage before us makes it probable that Aristotle would define freedom as obedience to rightly constituted law : cp. Metaph. A. 10. 1075 a 19, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις ἡεῖστα ἔξεστιν ὃ τι ἔπυχε ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἡ τὰ πλείεστα τέτακται, τοῖς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις μικρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ πολὺ ὃ τι ἔπυχεν. Compare also Cic. pro A. Cluentio, 53. 146 (quoted by Giph.), legibus denique idcirco omnes servimus, ut liberi esse possimus, and Plut. De recta ratione audiendi, c. 1 *sub fin.*, ἀντὶ μισθωτοῦ τινὸς ἡ ἀργυρωρήτου θεῖον ἡγεμόνα τοῦ βίου λαμβάνουσι τὸν λόγον ᾧ τοὺς ἱπομένους ἀξιὸν ἐστὶ μόνους ἐλευθέρους νομίζειν, μόνοι γάρ, ἃ δεῖ βούλεσθαι μαθόντες, ὥς βούλονται ζῶσι. For the view that freedom is doing as one likes cp. Plato, Laws 701 A sqq., Rep. 557 B, 560 E, 572 E : Isocr. Areop. § 20, Panath. § 131. When a slave was manumitted, he was declared to be ἐλεύθερος καὶ ἀνίπαπτος ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν πάντα

βίον, ποιῶν δ κα θέλη καὶ ἀποτρέχων οἷς κα θέλη (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 462: cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 13). There was a proverb, 'Ἐλευθέρα Κέρκυρα, χεῖρ' ὅπου θέλεις. 'The Stoics defined freedom, no doubt in agreement with the Cynics, ἐξουσίαν αὐτοπραγίας (Diog. Laert. 7. 121): cp. also Arrian, Diss. Epictet. 4. 1. 1, ἐλευθέρος ἐστὶν ὁ ζῶν ὡς βούλεται, Cic. Paradox. Stoic. 5. 1. 34, quid est enim libertas? potestas vivendi ut velis, and De Offic. 1. 20. 70, libertatis proprium est sic vivere ut velis' (Kaerst, Studien zur Entwicklung und theoret. Begründung der Monarchie im Altertum, p. 29, note).

28. δύο γὰρ ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here uses the word δοκεῖ, but in 8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40—b 17 he adopts this view as his own. The two characteristics of democracy here mentioned are not quite consistent with each other. If the will of the majority is supreme in democracy, the individual citizen cannot be free to live as he likes; he must live in subordination to the will of the majority. It should be added that Aristotle's teaching more often is that in democracy it is not the will of the majority that is supreme, but the will of the poor (3. 8. 1279 b 16 sqq.: 6 (4). 4. 1290 a 30 sqq.). Richards draws attention to the attraction in this passage, the dative τῷ taking the place of the nominative, and refers for parallel instances to Riddell's Digest of Platonic Idioms, § 192 (Apology of Plato, p. 192).

30. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δίκαιον κ.τ.λ. Δοκεῖ, i.e. seems to democrats. Cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 3—10 and 3. 9. 1280 a 11. This reasoning leads to the conclusion that justice requires that the will of the multitude should be supreme. In 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 20 *inil.* we read ἡττώμενος δὲ ταῖς ἐταιρείαις ὁ Κλεισθένης προσηγάγετο τὸν δῆμον, ἀποδιδούς τῷ πλήθει τὴν πολιτείαν.

31. ἐλευθερον δὲ καὶ ἴσον, and therefore suitable to democracy, for freedom and equality are thought to be accompaniments of democracy (6 (4). 4. 1291 b 34 sqq.).

32. ὥστε ἕη κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 30, Plato, Rep. 557 B, and Isocr. De Pace, § 102 sq.: also [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 1. 25.

33. εἰς δ χρῆζων, sc. τυγχάνει (Eurip. Fragm. 883 Nauck: 891, ed. 2). Cp. Cratin. Νόμοι, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 2. 87), where Solon is probably the speaker,

νῦν γὰρ δὴ σοι πάρα μὲν θεσμοὶ

τῶν ἡμετέρων, πάρα δ' ἄλλ' ὃ τι χρῆς.

34. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ φαῦλον. Cp. Plato, Laws 780 A.

οὐ γὰρ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably has before him Plato,

Laws 715 D. But a similar view is expressed in Andoc. c. Alcib. c. 19, νομίζω δὲ ταύτην εἶναι σωτηρίαν ἅπασιν, πείθεσθαι τοῖς ἀρχουσι καὶ τοῖς νόμοις: Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 6, ἐκεῖνό γε εὖ εἰδώς, ὅτι ὅταν διατηρηθῶσιν οἱ νόμοι τῇ πόλει, σώζεται καὶ ἡ δημοκρατία: Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 19, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως: and Demosth. c. Mid. c. 126 (cp. [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 1. 21).

39. καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας. As to the distinction here implied C. 10. between πολιτείας and μοναρχία see vol. i. p. 521 and vol. ii. p. xxvii. It should be noticed that Aristotle deals with the causes of the fall of monarchy and the means of preserving it at very considerable length, and is especially full on the subject of tyranny, notwithstanding that he has told us in 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 1 sqq. that there is not much to be said about it. He probably wished to do what could be done to amend the worst of Greek institutions, and he may also have desired to keep the Macedonian kingship in the right track (see below on 1313 a 34).

40. σχεδὸν δὲ παραπλήσια κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1311 a 22 sqq. and 1312 b 34 sqq.

2. ἡ μὲν γὰρ βασιλεία κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐστίν. Cp. 31 sq. 1310 b. and 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32 sq. Kingship is κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν because it is κατ' ἀξίαν (31 sqq.). Yet we are told in 1313 a 10 sqq. that in hereditary kingships the sceptre often falls to contemptible persons. For the use of κατὰ cp. 32, 3. 14. 1285 b 31, Eth. Nic. 7. 6. 1149 a 20, and Plato, Rep. 555 A. As kingship corresponds to aristocracy, the causes of its fall will resemble the causes of the fall of aristocracy. Aristocracy is especially destroyed by infractions of law and justice (c. 7. 1307 a 5 sqq., 40 sqq., c. 8. 1307 b 30 sqq.), and kingship will be so too (c. 10. 1313 a 1 sqq.).

3. ἡ δὲ τυραννὶς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ὑστάτης σύγκειται καὶ δημοκρατίας. Cp. 1312 b 34 sqq. and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 3 sq. The grounds on which tyranny is said to be composed of ultimate oligarchy and democracy are explained in 1311 a 8 sqq. Tyranny being thus composed, the causes which overthrow it are the same as those which overthrow the constitutions of which it is composed (1312 b 34 sqq.). For ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ὑστάτης cp. 1312 b 35, τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ἀκράτου καὶ τελευταίας. Τῆς ὑστάτης probably qualifies both ὀλιγαρχίας and δημοκρατίας: see note on 1296 a 3.

5. διὸ δὴ κ.τ.λ. For διὸ δὴ, 'just for this reason,' cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 and Poet. 24. 1460 a 22. Διὸ is followed by δὴ just as the relative pronoun is often followed by δὴ. For δυνὸν κακῶν cp. 3.

5. 1278 a 34, ἀμφοῖν ἀσπῶν. To be visited with two evils was proverbially bad: cp. Hdt. 3. 80, δύο δ' ἔχων ταῦτα ἔχει πᾶσαν κακότητα, Eurip. Ion, 531 Bothe (591 Dindorf),

ἵν' ἐσπεσούμαι δύο νόσῳ κεκτημένος,

Plato, Rep. 391 C, and Aristoph. Eccl. 1096,

ἐνὶ γὰρ ξυνέχεσθαι κρείττον ἢ δυοῖν κακοῖν.

Κακὸν ἐπὶ κακῷ was a proverb (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 148 and 2. 177, where we are referred to Hom. Il. 16. 111 and 19. 290). Compare also the prophecy (Thuc. 2. 54),

ἤξει Δωριακὸς πόλεμος, καὶ λοιμὸς δμ' αὐτῷ.

And that which is bad is harmful: cp. Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 22, οὔτε γὰρ θερμοῦ τὸ ψύχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ θερμαίνειν, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀγαθοῦ τὸ βλάπτειν.

7. τὰς παρ' ἀμφοτέρων τῶν πολιτειῶν. See note on 1276 a 14.

ὑπάρχει δ' ἡ γένεσις κ.τ.λ. To show how different kingship and tyranny are, Aristotle points out that they are different in their very origin (cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 23 sq.). Kingship comes into existence for the defence of the good against the many, and the king belongs to the *élite* of the good, whereas the tyrant is a bulwark of the many against the good. This is true of those tyrants who became tyrants after being demagogues, but does it hold of the earlier ones who became tyrants through being kings or through holding important magistracies? Aristotle does not make this clear, but he apparently regards these tyrants also as owing their position to the force (*κατεργάζεσθαι*, 1310 b 24) which their position as kings or high officials enabled them to exercise, and not to virtue and desert. Tyranny, in fact, in his view owes its origin to *δύναμις*, not to *ἀρετή*. For the view that the tyrant must be a bad man cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 35 sqq. and Strabo, p. 310, ἐκαλοῦντο δὲ τύραννοι, καίπερ οἱ πλείους ἐπιεικεῖς γεγονότες. That tyranny is hostile to the *ἐπιεικεῖς* we see from 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 19. The view that kingship is on the side of the *δριστοί* against the many is implied in Plut. Themist. c. 19. Aristotle here traces kingship in general to much the same origin to which he traces the heroic kingship of Greece in 3. 14. 1285 b 4 sqq. He seems to forget that he has traced kingship back to a family origin in the rule of the father in 1. 2. 1252 b 19 sqq. He is led to take a too favourable view of the origin of kingship partly by the ambiguity of the word *ἐπιεικεῖς*, partly by myths like those of Bellerophon (Hom. Il. 6. 189 sqq.) and others (see note

on 1285 b 7). According to Bacon (Essay on Nobility), 'there is rarely any rising but by a commixture of good and evil arts.'

9. πρὸς βοήθειαν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον τοῖς ἐπικεικείσι γέγονεν. All the MSS., including Γ, have τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου in place of τὴν ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον, but I have not found any parallel to the use of ἀπὸ in the sense of 'against' with βοήθεια, though in De Part. An. 4. 6. 682 b 33 we have πρὸς βοήθειαν τῶν βλαπτόντων ('for repelling those who injure them'), and other instances of a similar use of βοήθεια with the genitive are to be found in Bon. Ind. s. v. It seems, therefore, best to read ἐπὶ τὸν δῆμον with Rassow Sus. and Welldon.

11. καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς ἢ πράξεων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς, i.e. especially εὐεργεσιῶν, for ἀρετή is defined in Rhet. 1. 9. 1366 a 36 sqq. as δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων (cp. Pol. 3. 15. 1286 b 10 sq.). According to Paus. 8. 1. 4 Pelasgus was made king of the Arcadians for the first of these two reasons (μεγέθει μέντοι καὶ κατὰ ἀλκὴν καὶ κάλλος προείχεν ὁ Πελασγός, καὶ γνώμην ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἄλλους ἦν, καὶ τούτων ἵνα αἰρεθῇ μοι δοκεῖ βασιλεύειν ὑπ' αὐτῶν). Many were made kings in return for benefits conferred (34 sqq.). Τῆς is added before the second ἀρετῆς because ἀρετὴ has been mentioned just before (see note on 1286 b 17).

12. καθ' ὑπεροχὴν τοιοῦτου γένους, 'by reason of superiority in respect of a family stock of like character' (i.e. virtuous or given to action which flows from virtue): cp. 33, ἢ κατ' ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν ἢ κατὰ γένους. To be ἀγαθὸς ἐξ ἀγαθῶν was even better than to be ἀγαθός.

ὁ δὲ τύραννος κ.τ.λ. So in Theogn. 39 sq. the tyrant is referred to as εὐθυντήρ κακῆς ὕβριος ἡμετέρης, the writer being a γνώριμος. But Aristotle probably has before him Plato, Rep. 569 A, where the demos is represented as saying to the tyrant that it begat him and set him up, ἵνα ἀπὸ τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶν κάγαθῶν λεγομένων ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλευθερωθεῖν ἔκινου προστάντος.

ἐκ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τοῦ πλήθους. The addition of καὶ τοῦ πλήθους adds emphasis to τοῦ δήμου and places its meaning beyond a doubt. The expression ὁ δῆμος might be used, as it was by Hippodamus (2. 8. 1268 a 12 sq.), of the whole citizen-body. See note on 1303 a 38, τοὺς ξένους καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους, and cp. 3. 11. 1281 b 15, περὶ πάντα δῆμον καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος: Plato, Laws 689 B, ὅπερ δῆμος τε καὶ πλῆθος πόλεώς ἐστιν, and 684 C: and [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 2. 18, εὖ εἰδότες ὅτι οὐχὶ τοῦ δήμου ἐστὶν οὐδὲ τοῦ πλήθους ὁ κυμαυδούμενος ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πάλυ. If Aristotle's language implies that the τύραννος was not himself one of the γνώριμοι, this was not always the case, as the

instances of Peisistratus and Lygdamis (c. 6. 1305 a 39 sqq.) will suffice to show, to say nothing of the cases in which the *τύραννος* had been a king. That he was often of low origin, however, seems to be implied in Diod. 19. 1. 5.

14. *φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν συμβεβηκότων*, i. e. that the tyrant is *ἐκ τοῦ δήμου ἐπὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους*.

σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν τυράννων κ.τ.λ. In c. 5. 1305 a 8 sqq. this is said of *οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀρχαίων τυράννων*. Many men who won tyrannies in days nearer to those of Aristotle were not demagogues, but leaders of mercenary troops like Timophanes (c. 6. 1306 a 19 sqq. : see note on 1305 a 7). For *πιστευθέντες ἐκ τοῦ διαβάλλειν τοὺς γνωρίμους* cp. c. 5. 1305 a 21 sqq.

16 sqq. Compare with this classification of Greek tyrants according to the status which enabled them to win their tyrannies the similar classification of tyrants in mediaeval Italy given by J. A. Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy—Age of the Despots*, p. 100 sqq.

17. *ἡδὴ τῶν πόλεων ηὐξημένων*. It is doubtful whether *τῶν πόλεων* here means 'the States,' as in 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1, 2 and apparently in 3. 15. 1286 b 9 sq., 20 sq., and 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22 (see notes on these passages), or 'the cities,' as in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sqq. (see note), but perhaps the former interpretation is the true one, for Aristotle may well have before him Thuc. 1. 13, *δυνατωτέρας δὲ γιγνομένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὴν κτῆσιν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ποιουμένης, τὰ πολλὰ τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίσταντο, τῶν προσόδων μειζόνων γιγνομένων (πρότερον δὲ ἦσαν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέραςι πατρικαὶ βασιλείαι)*. Thucydides omits to explain why the increase in the wealth of Hellas led to the rise of tyrannies, but his meaning may be that as the revenues of individuals became larger, they became better able to establish tyrannies, or else that tyranny, being a costly form of government, could not exist without a large revenue to support it, and that this revenue could not be provided by States till their wealth had considerably increased. The connexion which Aristotle traces in the passage before us between the increased greatness of the States and the rise of demagogue-tyrants rests on a somewhat different basis, for his view seems to be that as the States grew greater, the *demos* and the demagogues came to be more powerful (cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 22 sqq.).

18. *αἱ δὲ πρὸ τούτων κ.τ.λ.* Kingships, which are here contrasted with elective magistracies (*αἰρετῶν*, 20, and *αἰρουμένων*, 23), belong to the era of small States (3. 15. 1286 b 7 sqq.). Kings who could

not rest content with the great office of king but sought to become tyrants were ill regarded (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 34 sq. : Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 10 sqq.). They often lost their kingships for their pains (1313 a 1 sqq.). Polybius (6. 7. 6 sqq.) depicts more in detail the steps by which kingship becomes tyranny.

21. τὸ γὰρ ἀρχαίων κ.τ.λ. As to the time indicated by τὸ ἀρχαίων see notes on 1285 a 30 and 1305 a 7. Οἱ δῆμοι = αἱ δημοκρατίαι, as in 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 13. Magistrates entitled *δημοουργοί* ('doers of public business') existed in many Greek States (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 327), and *θεωροί* (compare the title *ἑφοροί*) existed at Mantinea (Thuc. 5. 47. 9), Tegea (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 7), and Naupactus (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 183), but Aristotle's reference is to States which, in addition to possessing these high offices, were democratically governed at an early date, and we do not know of which of the States in which they are found this is true. As the tenure of them was an assistance to the would-be tyrant in the acquisition of his tyranny, it is likely that their functions were in part military. The epithet *πολυχροαίους* probably implies that they were tenable for more than a year.

22. αἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν ὀλιγαρχιῶν κ.τ.λ. Compare the practice at Carthage (2. 11. 1273 b 8 sqq.) and at Epidamnus and Opus (3. 16. 1287 a 6 sqq.). As the tyrants of Ionia and Phalaris of Agrigentum, who are referred to in 28 sq. as owing their tyrannies to the fact of their holding offices, probably won them under an oligarchical *régime*, they may well have held several great offices at the same time. Cp. c. 5. 1305 a 15 sqq. and c. 8. 1308 a 22 sqq. For *αἰρεῖσθαι ἐπὶ* cp. 20 and Plato, Meno 90 B.

23. πᾶσι γὰρ ὑπῆρχε κ.τ.λ., 'for in all these ways [those who aimed at tyranny] had it in their power to effect their purpose with ease' etc. Compare what Callicles says in Plato, Gorg. 492 B, *ἐπεὶ γε οἷς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπῆρξεν ἡ βασιλείων νείσειν εἶναι ἢ αὐτοὺς τῇ φύσει ἱκανοὺς ἐκπορίσασθαι ἀρχὴν τινα ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ δυναστείαν κ.τ.λ.*, and Diod. 20. 10. 2, *ὁ γὰρ Βομόλκας πάλαι μὲν ἦν ἐπιθυμητῆς τυραννίδος, οὐκ ἔχων δ' ἐξουσίαν οὐδὲ καιρὸν οἰκείον ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς τότε ἔλαβεν ἀφορμὰς ἀξιολόγους, τυχὼν τῆς στρατηγίας*, and see note on 1303 a 16. Βασιλικὴ ἀρχή is here contrasted with ἡ τιμή (cp. βασιλείας and τῶν τιμῶν just below), but in 36 kingship is referred to as τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης and in 1313 a 13 we have βασιλικὴν τιμήν. Thus Aristotle's use of the words τιμή and ἀρχή seems to vary a good deal. In 1312 b 22 we read of τὰς ἀρχάς of tyrants. Socrates had regarded both kingship

and tyranny as ἀρχαί (Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 12), and Aristotle may perhaps do so too.

27. ἑτέροι τύραννοι, e.g. Charilaus (c. 12. 1316 a 33 sq.), the kings of Cyrene after the first Battus (Diod. 8. 30. 1), and the kings of Achaia (Polyb. 2. 41. 5).

28. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰωνίαν κ.τ.λ. This was the case with Thrasybulus of Miletus, who was 'dux Milesiorum' when Miletus was besieged by Alyattes, before he became tyrant (Frontin. Strateg. 3. 15. 6). We hear of tyrants also at Ephesus (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 141) and at Samos (ibid. 2. 149), where Polycrates won the tyranny. Was it true also of them? As to Phalaris see Freeman, Sicily, 2. 65 sqq. According to Polyæn. Strateg. 5. 1 he was made by the Agrigentines ἐπιστάτης of the work of building a costly temple of Zeus Polieus in the acropolis of the city. But perhaps Aristotle is rather thinking of the story of his appointment as στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ of Himera narrated in Rhet. 2. 20. 1393 b 10 sqq. The same thing occurred in the municipalities of mediaeval Italy. So Ezzelino da Romano was named captain of the people by the cities of Verona, Vicenza, Padua, Feltre, and Belluno, and 'soon changed into a tyranny the authority which he derived from the people' (Sismondi, Italian Republics, pp. 69, 88). So again Marsilio Zorzi being elected count of Curzola in 1254 changed his elective magistracy into an hereditary principality (T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, 2. 239).

29 sqq. As to Panaetius see Freeman, Sicily, 2. 56 sqq. He seems, however, to have held the office of polemarch in addition to being a demagogue (Polyæn. Strateg. 5. 47), and the same thing is true of Cypselus (Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 58: Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 392). A demagogue was not usually able to make himself tyrant unless he held the office of polemarch or stratêgus, or was, at any rate, a man of military prowess (c. 5. 1305 a 7 sqq.). As to Peisistratus and Dionysius the Elder see c. 5. 1305 a 21 sqq. and 26 sqq.

32. εἴπομεν, in 1310 b 2 sq.

τέτακται κατὰ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν. See note on 1310 b 2.

33. κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 32, ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς (ἡ κοινωνία) ἀριστοκρατικὴ φαίνεται· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἄρχει καὶ περὶ ταῦτα αὐτοὶ τοῦ ἀνδρα, and Pol. 3. 5. 1278 a 18, οἷον εἰ τις ἐστὶν ἣν καλοῦσιν ἀριστοκρατικὴν καὶ ἐν ᾗ κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ τιμαὶ δίδονται καὶ κατ' ἀξίαν. Τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν δίκαιον ἰς τὸ ἀπλῶς δίκαιον (7 (5)).

1. 1301 b 35 sq.), and though *ἀξία* attaches in some degree to wealth, free birth, and the like (Eth. Nic. 5. 6. 1131 a 24—29), it is most truly found in virtue (Pol. 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 39 sqq.). See note on 1278 a 20. In strictness, however, kingship and aristocracy are not *κατ' ἀρετήν*, but *κατ' ἀρετήν κεχορηγημένην* (6 (4). 2. 1289 a 32 sq.).

ἢ *κατ' ἰδίαν ἀρετήν*, as in the case of Pelasgus (see note on 11).

ἢ *κατὰ γένους*, sc. *ἀρετήν*, as in the case of the Heracleidae (Isocr. Archid. § 20). For *ἀρετήν γένους* cp. 3. 13. 1283 a 37.

34. ἢ *κατ' εὐεργεσίας*. See notes on 1310 b 11 and 1285 b 6, 7, and Polyb. 5. 11. 6. Cp. also Diod. 11. 26. 6, where we read of Gelon, *τοσοῦτον ἀπέχευτο τοῦ τυχεῖν τιμωρίας ὥς τύρανος ὥστε μὲ φωνῇ πάντας ἀποκαλεῖν εὐεργέτην καὶ σωτήρα καὶ βασιλέα*. Benefits conferred create a presumption that the person who confers them is virtuous (see note on 1286 b 10, and cp. Xen: Hell. 7. 3. 12, *οὕτως, ὥς ἔοικεν, οἱ πλείστοι ὀρίζονται τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἑαυτῶν ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι*), so that to make a man king in return for benefits conferred is much the same thing as to make him king for virtue.

ἢ *κατὰ ταῦτά τε καὶ δύναμιν*. Vict. 'extremum ponit eorum quae aliquem perducunt ad hunc honorem, cum iam expositis rebus adiunctae sunt opes et facultas valde iuvandi; neque enim tantum honore afficiuntur qui iam bonum aliquod magnum salutemque dederunt, sed etiam qui potestatem habent id praestandi.' Cp. Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 28, *τιμῶνται δὲ δικαίως μὲν καὶ μάλιστα οἱ εὐεργετηθέντες, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τιμᾶται καὶ ὁ δυνάμενος εὐεργετεῖν*. So Thucydides says of Theseus, *γενόμενος μετὰ τοῦ ξυνοῦ καὶ δυνατός* (2. 15), and Solon *ἔλεγε βασιλεία τὸν ἰσχυρότατον τῇ δυνάμει* (Diog. Laert. 1. 58). Welldon appears to take *ταῦτα* to refer not to *ἀρετήν καὶ εὐεργεσίας*, but to *εὐεργεσίας* only, and perhaps he is right.

35. *τὰς πόλεις ἢ τὰ ἔθνη*. City-States like Athens and Lacedaemon, nations like the Persians, Macedonians, and Molossians.

36. *τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης*. See note on 23.

οἱ μὲν *κατὰ πόλεμον κωλύσαντες δουλεῖν, ὥσπερ Κόδρος*. *Κατὰ πόλεμον* goes with *δουλεῖν*, cp. 1. 6. 1255 a 23, *τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν*. According to the traditional account Codrus was already king of Athens when he delivered his country from a Dorian invasion by the sacrifice of his life, whereas Aristotle evidently takes him, if the text is correct, to have won a kingship by saving his country from enslavement. It is Melanthus, the father of Codrus, whom the prevailing tradition represents to have won the kingship

of Athens : cp. Strabo, p. 393, οὗτος δὲ (i. e. ὁ τῆς Μεσσηνίας βασιλεὺς Μέλανθος) καὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐβασίλευσεν ἐκόντων, νικήσας ἐκ μονομαχίας τὸν τῶν Βοιωτῶν βασιλεῖα Ξάνθον. Some have thought that Aristotle here follows a tradition according to which not Melanthus, but Codrus defeated Xanthus in single combat and won the kingship, and this is possible, for we find that Pausanias (in 9. 5. 16 : cp. 2. 18. 8) also follows a tradition of his own and ascribes the victory over Xanthus neither to Melanthus nor to Codrus, but to the father of Melanthus, Andropompus. But Toepffer (Att. Genealogie, p. 230), followed by Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 127. 5), objects that the war with Xanthus was a mere border-war and did not, like the invasion of the Dorians, threaten Attica with enslavement, so that, if Codrus saved his country from enslavement, he must have saved it not from Xanthus, but from the Dorians. The probability is that Aristotle follows some tradition or other of his own, as Plato does in Symp. 208 D (Busolt, *ibid.* p. 129. 1), but it is also possible that he here makes a mistake, just as he makes a mistake in attributing the overthrow of the Peisistratid tyranny to Harmodius and Aristogeiton (c. 10. 1312 b 30 sq.).

37. οἱ δ' ἐλευθερώσαντες, ὥσπερ Κύρος. Cp. Hdt. 3. 82, where Darius asks, κόθεν ἡμῖν ἡ ἐλευθερίη ἐγένετο καὶ τεῦ δόντος ; and adds, ἔχω τοῖσιν γνώμην ἡμέας ἐλευθερωθέντας διὰ ἑνα ἄνδρα τὸ τοιοῦτο περιστέλλειν, where Cyrus is referred to, and also [Plato,] Menex. 239 D, ὃν ὁ μὲν πρῶτος Κύρος ἐλευθερώσας Πέρσας κ.τ.λ.

38. ἡ κτίσαντες, like Dardanus, first founder and king of Dardania, the city which preceded Troy (Hom. Il. 20. 215 sqq.).

ἡ κτησάμενοι χώραν. Cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 7, πορίσαι χώραν. So we read of the Celts in Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 105 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 457), τιμῶσι δὲ μάλιστα τοὺς χώραν τῇ κοινῇ προσκτωμένους.

39. οἱ Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς. Cp. Isocr. Archid. § 20.

καὶ Μακεδόνων. Cp. Hdt. 8. 138 and Porphy. Tyr. Fragm. 1 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 690).

καὶ Μολοσσῶν. Neoptolemus son of Achilles became king of the Molossians after bringing followers and conquering the territory (Plut. Pyrrh. c. 1, referred to by Eaton).

40. βούλεται δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς εἶναι φύλαξ, ὅπως οἱ μὲν κεκτημένοι τὰς οὐσίας μηδὲν ἀδικον πάσχωσιν, ὁ δὲ δῆμος μὴ ὑβρίζηται μηδὲν. Aristotle has been dwelling on the difference in the origin of kingship and tyranny, and now he turns to the difference of their aim. He here repeats what Isocrates had said to Nicocles king of Salamis

in Cyprus (Ad Nicocl. § 16, *καλῶς δὲ δημαγωγήσεις ἐὰν μὴ θ' ὑβρίζῃς τὸν ὄχλον ἔῃς μὴ θ' ὑβριζόμενος περιωρῆς, ἀλλὰ σκοπῆς ὅπως οἱ βελτιστοὶ μὲν τὰς τιμὰς ἔξουσιν, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι μηδὲν ἀδικήσανται* ταῦτα γὰρ στοιχεῖα πρῶτα καὶ μέγιστα χρηστῆς πολιτείας ἐστίν). Cp. also Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 1 sq., Solon, Fragm. 5. 5 sq. and ap. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 12 *sub fin.*, and Plut. Aristid. c. 6, *ὅθεν ἀνὴρ πένης καὶ δημοτικὸς ἐκτίσαστο τὴν βασιλευσάτην καὶ θειωτάτην προσηγορίαν τὸν Δίκαιον*. Kingship has occasionally in modern times also been useful in the way pointed out by Aristotle. Thus Mr. S. R. Gardiner (The Thirty Years' War, p. 197 sq.), speaking of France in the time of Cardinal Richelieu, says, 'The establishment of a strong monarchical power was, as France was then constituted, the only chance for industry and commerce to lift up their heads, for the peaceable arts of life to develop themselves in security, for the intellect of man to have free course, and for the poor to be protected from oppression . . . The late growth of the royal power and the long continuance of aristocratic oppression threw the people helpless and speechless into the arms of the monarchy.' See also Sir J. R. Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, p. 169 sq.

3. πολλὰκις, in 3. 7. 1279 b 6 sq. and 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 17—22. 1311 a. εἰ μὴ τῆς ἰδίας ὠφελείας χάριν, cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 35 sqq.

5. διὰ καὶ τῶν πλεονεκτημάτων κ.τ.λ. So Isocrates (Epist. 7 *in il.*) praises Timotheus tyrant of Heracleia on the Euxine, *ὅτι προαρεῇ δόξαν καλὴν κτήσασθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλοῦτον μέγαν συναγαγεῖν*. Cp. Diod. 10. 32. 2, *ἡ δὲ τυραννικὴ πλεονεξία καὶ τὰ μικρὰ τῶν λημμάτων οὐ παρήσιν*, and Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 50 R, *καὶ μὲν δὴ οἶται (ὁ βασιλεὺς) δεῖν πλείον ἔχειν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ τῶν χρημάτων οὐδὲ τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐπιμελείας καὶ τῶν φροντίδων*.

7. καὶ φυλακῇ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 14. 1285 a 24—29. It is *καλόν* to be guarded by fellow-citizens.

8. ὅτι δ' ἡ τυραννὶς κ.τ.λ. This takes up 1310 b 3 sqq.

10. τὸ τὸ τέλος εἶναι πλοῦτον. This is the end of oligarchy (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 15), though in Pol. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 41 sqq. the quest of gain is connected rather with democracy, and it is also the end of tyranny, for if in Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 6 we read that the end of tyranny is self-defence (*φυλακῇ*), wealth was a condition both of the maintenance of a bodyguard and of the luxurious life which tyrants sought to live, and hence the first aim of a tyrant was to amass a treasure (Pol. 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 10). Thucydides (1. 17. *εἰς τὸ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον αὔξειν*) virtually says the same thing.

καὶ διαμένειν, 'to continue his also,' in addition to being originally acquired. Cp. 1. 6. 1255 a 14, καὶ βιάζεσθαι.

12. καὶ τὸ τῷ πλήθει μηδὲν πιστεύειν. Cp. c. 6. 1306 a 21, where we read of ἡ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ἀπιστία of oligarchies.

διὸ καὶ τὴν παραίρεσιν ποιοῦνται τῶν ὀπλων. We find oligarchies resorting to this measure in Mytilene (Thuc. 3. 27), and Athens (Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 20), and tyrants frequently (e.g. Peisistratus at Athens in 'Ae. Πολ. c. 15 and Aristodemus at Cumae in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 8). See Eaton's note. It is here implied that the πλῆθος possessed heavy arms (see note on 1294 a 41).

13. καὶ τὸ κακοῦν τὸν ὄχλον, 'and ill-treatment of the multitude.' Cp. Eurip. Fragm. 628 Nauck (626, ed. 2),

δῆμῳ δὲ μήτε πᾶν ἀναρτήσης κράτος

μήτ' αὖ κακώσης, πλούτον ἐντιμον τιθεῖς,

and Lys. Or. 13. c. Agorat. c. 91, τὸν δὲ δῆμον, ὃν αὐτὸς φησι πατέρα αὐτοῦ εἶναι, φαίνεται κακώσας, which is illustrated by ἔτυπτε καὶ οὐδὲν παρείχε τῶν ἐπιτηδείων and ἀφείλετο δ' ἦν ὑπάρχοντα ἐκείνῳ ἀγαθὰ. Herodotus (2. 124) says of Cheops the pyramid-builder, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον βασιλεύσαντά σφρων Χίοπα εἰς πᾶσαν κακότητι ἐλάσαι. That oligarchies often ill-used the demos we see from c. 9. 1310 a 8 sqq., and that tyrants often did so may be inferred from the conduct of Gelon to the demos of the Sicilian Megara and Euboea (Hdt. 7. 156): cp. c. 11. 1314 b 1 sqq. and Plato, Rep. 568 E sq.

καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἄστεως ἀπελαύνειν καὶ διοικίζειν. The Thirty at Athens drove the demos from the city to the Peiraeus and elsewhere (Xen. Hell. 2. 4. 1: Lys. Or. 12. c. Eratosth. c. 95: Diod. 14. 32. 4: Justin, 5. 9. 12), and it was in the interest of oligarchy that the διοικισμός of Mantinea by the Lacedaemonians took place. Cp. also Isocr. Panath. § 177 sqq., where the Lacedaemonians are charged with having made the demos perioeci, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διελόντας τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν ὡς οἷόν τ' ἦν εἰς ἐλαχίστους εἰς τόπους κατοικίσαι μικροὺς καὶ πολλοὺς, ὀνόμασι μὲν προσσγορευομένους ὡς πόλεις οἰκοῦντας, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν ἔχοντας ἐλάττω τῶν δῆμων τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν. Cp. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3. 1424 b 7, where oligarchies are advised μὴ συνάγειν ἐκ τῆς χώρας ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν τὸν ὄχλον· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων συνόδων συστρέφεται τὰ πλῆθη καὶ καταλύει τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας. Tyrants are here charged with driving the demos from the city, as oligarchies did, and we know that Gelon held a demos to be συνοίκημα ἀχαριτότατον (Hdt. 7. 156), and that many tyrants sought to induce their subjects to live in the country and to follow country-pursuits, e.g. Periander (Diog.

Laert. 1. 98), Peisistratus ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 16: cp. Aristoph. Lysistr. 1150—1156 and Pollux, 7. 68), and the tyrants of Sicyon (Pollux, 7. 68): see also [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 32. Here and in 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 29 all MSS. have *δοτειος*. In Poet. 3. 1448 a 38, on the other hand, we find *δοτειος*, and this form is exclusively used in the 'Αθ. Πολ. (see Sandys' Index). It is the only form which appears in Attic inscriptions (Meisterhans, Grammatik der att. Inschr., ed. 2, p. 108: see also Kühner, Ausführl. Gramm. der gr. Sprache, ed. Blass, 1. 441, Anm. 2).

15. *ἐκ δημοκρατίας δὲ κ.τ.λ.* So we read of the Athenian democracy in [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 14, *διὰ ταῦτα οὖν τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς ἀτιμοῦσι καὶ χρήματα ἀφαιροῦνται καὶ ἐξελαύνουσι καὶ ἀποκτείνουσι, τοὺς δὲ πονηροὺς αἰξουσιν* (cp. Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 42, whence we gather that the leading citizens were often banished when democracy was introduced). The same thing is said of Euphron tyrant of Sicyon in Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 8. Cp. also c. 11. 1314 a 19 sqq., Isocr. Epist. 7. 8, and Diod. 14. 45. 1. See, however, as to democracy note on 1304 b 21. For other measures adopted both by tyranny and by democracy see c. 11. 1313 b 32 sqq. and 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 27 sqq.

16. *διαφθεῖρην λάθρα*, as the Peisistratidae made away with Cimon, father of Miltiades (Hdt. 6. 103).

17. *ὡς ἀντιτέχνους*, 'as rivals in the craft [of ruling]': cp. Rhet. 2. 10. 1388 a 13, *ἐπὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς καὶ ἀντεραστὰς καὶ ὅλως τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐφιμένους φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἀνάγκη μάλιστα τούτοις φθονεῖν ὅθεν εἴρηται "καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ"* (sc. *κοτέει*, Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 25).

καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐμποδίου. Cp. c. 11. 1314 a 9 sq., 19 sqq.

18. *ἐκ γὰρ τούτων συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἐπιβουλὰς*, 'for it is from these that the conspiracies also [as well as the passive hindrances to the tyrant's rule] in fact proceed.' For the use of *ἐκ* cp. Xen. Hiero, 1. 38 (quoted on 1311 b 6). Cp. Polyb. 6. 7. 9 and Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio, Book 3. c. 6, 'We find in history that conspiracies are always formed and conducted either by great men or by such as are intimate with their Prince.' Were those who were led to plot by *ὑβρις*, however, always *γνώριμοι*? Aristogeiton is said by Thucydides (6. 54) to have been a *μίσος πολίτης*.

19. *τῶν μὲν ἀρχεῖν αὐτῶν βουλομένων.* *Αὐτῶν* has been interpreted in different ways. Sepulveda translates the clause, 'dum quidam eorum imperare volunt' (so Lamb.), and Vict. 'cum hi velint

imperium in ipsos habere,' but Giph. is probably right in translating it 'quorum hi quidem imperare ipsi velint' (so Stahr and Sus.).

20. *ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Περιάνδρου πρὸς Θρασύβουλον συμβούλευμά ἐστιν κ.τ.λ.* Here, as in 3. 13. 1284 a 26 sqq., the famous counsel is said to have been given by Periander to Thrasybulus, and not by Thrasybulus to Periander (see note on 1284 a 26).

22. *καθάπερ οὖν κ.τ.λ.* In c. 2. 1302 a 34 sqq. several *αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν κινήσεων* in constitutions are enumerated. They are the following—the sight of others justly or unjustly enjoying a superior share of gain and honour, *ὑβρις, φόβος, ὑπεροχή, καταφρόνησις, αἰξίσις ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἐριθεία, ὀλιγωρία, μικρότης, ἀνομοιότης*. That the first of these causes operates in the case of monarchies, or at any rate tyrannies, we see from 1312 a 22 sqq. Of *ὑβρις φόβος* and *καταφρόνησις* as causes of attacks on monarchs we hear much. As to *ὑπεροχή* see c. 11. 1315 a 8 sqq. Of the operation in reference to monarchies of the five last causes we hear little, if anything. As to the order followed in the enumeration see note on 1302 a 34.

26. *ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς μοναρχίαις*. Cp. 1312 b 18, *ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς τυραννίσιν*, and see note on 1305 b 41.

27. *τῆς δὲ ἀδικίας κ.τ.λ.* In c. 8. 1308 a 9 sq. (cp. c. 11. 1315 a 17 sqq.) we find a distinction drawn between *τὸ ἀδικεῖν εἰς ἀτιμίαν* and *τὸ ἀδικεῖν εἰς κέρδος*, which corresponds roughly to that which is drawn here.

ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἰδίων στέρησιν. As Giph. points out (p. 665), the conspiracy of the Pazzi against the Medici at Florence was in part brought about by Giovanni de' Pazzi's loss of a rich inheritance owing to a law enacted through the influence of the Medici (Machiavelli, Discorsi, Book 3. c. 6: Sismondi, Italian Republics, p. 267 sq.).

28. *ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τέλη ταῦτά κ.τ.λ.* Καὶ τὰ τέλη, i.e. *περὶ ὧν ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς μοναρχίαις* (cp. c. 2. 1302 a 31 sq.), as well as *αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν μεταβολῶν* (23 sq.). It appears from 1312 a 22 sqq. that some assailants of tyrants were led to make their attempts by the sight of the gains and honours enjoyed by tyrants, and from 1312 a 15 sq. that others were influenced partly by a desire for gain and partly by contempt, but it would seem from 1312 b 17 sqq. that most attacks on tyrannies were prompted by feelings of hatred and contempt, and it may be doubted whether such feelings usually

left much room in the minds of the assailants for a desire of wealth or honour.

29. καὶ περὶ τὰς τυραννίδας καὶ τὰς βασιλείας. For the non-repetition of the preposition see critical note on 1330 b 31, and notes on 1284 a 35 and 1302 a 33.

30. μέγεθος γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eurip. Fragm. 846 Nauck (850, ed. 2),

ἡ γὰρ τυραννὶς πάντοθεν τοξεύεται

δεινοῖς ἔρωσιν,

and Isocr. De Pace, § 111. For μέγεθος πλούτου καὶ τιμῆς cp. 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 34, καὶ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῆς οὐσίας.

31. τῶν δ' ἐπιθέσεων κ.τ.λ. Τῶν ἐπιθέσεων takes up ἐπιτίθενται ταῖς μοναρχίαις (26 sq.). Aristotle has just been speaking as if the aim of all those who attack tyrannies were to win for themselves the wealth and honour the tyrants enjoy, but now he points out that not all of them direct their attacks against the rule of the tyrant, and that most of those who do not do so seek vengeance, not greatness (35 sq.). In strictness he is only concerned with ἐπιθέσεις aiming at an overthrow of the tyranny, but he does not accept this limitation of his subject. 'Ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν probably means ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς διαφθοράν, cp. c. 11. 1315 a 24, τῶν ἐπιχειρούντων ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος διαφθοράν. 'Ἐπιθέσεις are described in 1311 a 32—1312 a 39 as occurring δι' ὕβριν (1311 a 32—b 36), διὰ φόβον (1311 b 36—40), διὰ καταφρόνησιν (1311 b 40—1312 a 14), διὰ πλείω τούτων (1312 a 15 sq.), διὰ φιλοτιμίαν (1312 a 21—39). Those which occur δι' ὕβριν may be caused either (1) by ὕβρις in the form of insult, verbal or other (1311 a 36—b 6), or (2) by ὕβρις εἰς τὸ σῶμα, and this may take the form either of ἐρωτική and other ὕβρις (1311 b 6—23) or of πληγαί (1311 b 23—34). For the various kinds of ὕβρις cp. c. 11. 1315 a 14 sqq. Many successful attempts had been made on the lives of kings and tyrants in the course of the fourth century B.C. Among these attempts the following may be mentioned. Archelaus, king of Macedon, was assassinated in B.C. 399; Evagoras, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus, in B.C. 374; Jason of Pherae in B.C. 370; Euphron, tyrant of Sicyon, in B.C. 367; Alexander of Pherae and Cotys, king of the Odrysae, in B.C. 359; Clearchus, tyrant of the Pontic Heracleia, in B.C. 352; and Philip of Macedon in B.C. 336. It will be noticed that most of these assassinations occurred in Northern Greece, Macedon, and Thrace. It is remarkable that both the elder and the younger Dionysius escaped assassination.

32. αἱ μὲν οὖν δι' ὕβριν ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα. Μὲν οὖν is not, I think,

answered by δέ, 33. Aristotle appears to have intended to pass on to another class of ἐπιθέσεις directed against the throne, not the person, of the monarch, the mention of which would have been introduced by δέ, but he loses sight of his intention in the course of the long enumeration of ἐπιθέσεις caused by ὕβρις and fails to complete his inquiry in the intended way. He does not say that attacks provoked by ὕβρις were the only ones directed against the person of the monarch (cp. c. 11. 1315 a 24 sqq.); those provoked by deprivation of property and those caused by fear and contempt will often have had a similar aim.

33. τῆς δ' ὕβρεως—36. ὑπεροχῆς, 'and though insolence assumes many forms, each of them gives rise to the anger [which animates those who make these attempts]' etc. A further characteristic of attacks on tyrants caused by ὕβρις is here pointed out. Not only do those who make them assail the tyrant's person, not his throne, but they attack in anger (cp. 1312 b 29 sqq.), and consequently in most cases seek vengeance, not superiority of position.

34. αὐτῶν, i. e. τῶν μερῶν, to be supplied from πολυμεροῦς: cp. 2. 12. 1274 b 24, where νόμος has to be supplied from νομοθέτης: De Gen. An. 4. 5. 773 b 11, καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ μὲν συνουσίᾳ πλείων τὸ ἀπὸν ἐστὶ σπέρμα, δὲ μερισθὲν ποιεῖ πολυτοκεῖν, ὡν (sc. τόκων) ὑστερεῖται θάτερον: and Hom. Il. 9. 383,

αἰθ' ἐκατόμυλοι εἰσι, διεκόσιοι δ' ἄν' ἐκάστας
ἀνέρες ἔξοιχνεῦσι σὺν ἵπποισιν καὶ ὄχεσφιν.

τῶν δ' ὀργιζομένων κ.τ.λ. Most angry men, not all, for sometimes assailants whose attacks were provoked by ὕβρις and who attacked in anger sought not only vengeance but also greatness. Crataeas did so (see note on 1311 b 8); see also note on 1316 a 29 as to the Gonzagas of Mantua.

35. τιμωρίας χάριν. Cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 11. 1126 a 21, πᾶσα δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῶν ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα, and Rhet. 1. 10. 1369 b 12 sqq. Phanias of Eresus, a disciple of Aristotle, wrote a work entitled Τυράννων ἀναίρεσις ἐκ τιμωρίας (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 2. 293).

36. ὑπεροχῆς, 'superiority of position,' as in c. 7. 1307 a 19 and c. 11. 1314 a 8.

οἶον—b 1, κύει. For the structure of this sentence (οἶον followed by δέ) see note on 1313 b 13.

οἶον ἢ μὲν τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν, sc. ἐπιθέσεις ἐγένετο (cp. 1311 b 7. γέγινηται) 'the attack on the Peisistratidae happened.' For the

objective genitive cp. 1311 b 30, τῆς Ἀρχελαίου ἐπιθέσει, and see Bon. Ind. 149 b 10 sqq., where Rhet. 2. 2. 1379 a 21, τὴν ἐκάστον (i. e. πρὸς ἑκάστον) ὀργήν, is given as an instance. For the fact cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 18, ἐρασθεῖς γὰρ (Θετταλὸς) τοῦ Ἀρμόδιου καὶ διαμαρτάνων τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν φιλίας, οὐ κατεῖχε τὴν ὀργήν, ἀλλ' ἐν τε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐννοημαίνετο πικ[ρ]ῶς, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον μέλλουσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀδελφὴν κατηφορεῖν Παναθηναίους ἐ[κώ]λυσεν λοιδορήσας τι τὸν Ἀρμόδιον ὡς μαλακὸν ὄντα, ὅθεν συνίβη παροξυνθὲν τὸν Ἀρμόδιον καὶ τὸν Ἀριστογείτουνα πράττειν τὴν πρᾶξιν μετεχόντων πολλῶν. Whether Aristotle in the passage before us ascribes the ὕβρις to Hipparchus (with Thuc. 6. 54) or to Thessalus (with the Ἀθ. Πολ.), it is impossible to say, nor is it clear whether (with the Ἀθ. Πολ.) he conceives that a separate insult was offered to Harmodius in addition to that offered to his sister. It would rather seem from 38, ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀρμόδιος διὰ τὴν ἀδελφὴν, that he does not. In 1312 b 30 sqq. (cp. Rhet. 2. 24. 1401 b 11 sq.) Aristotle evidently connects the overthrow of the Peisistratidae with the act of ὕβρις here referred to, unlike both Thucydides and the Ἀθ. Πολ., but like Plato (Symp. 182 C). A similar story is told of Antileon and Hipparchus at the Italian Heracleia (Phan. Eres. Fragm. 16 in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 2. 298: Plut. Amat. c. 16. 760 C). Many of the illustrations which Aristotle gives in this chapter of plots arising from ὕβρις are derived from the history of Macedon Thrace and Mytilene, regions with which he was personally acquainted.

37. ἐπηρέασαι δ' Ἀρμόδιον, 'and treated Harmodius with spiteful contumely.' Cp. Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 17, ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ἐπηρεασμὸς ἐμποδισμὸς ταῖς βουλήσεσιν οὐχ ὥς τι αὐτῷ ἀλλ' ὥς μὴ ἐκείνῳ, and see Wytttenbach on Plut. Praec. Sanit. Tuend. p. 135 D. Ἐπηρέαζω usually takes a dative after it, and M^s (possibly with Γ: see critical note) has ἀρμόδιῳ here, but in c. 4. 1304 a 17 we have the passive ἐπηρεασθεῖς, and in Plut. Lucull. c. 42, εἰς δὲ τὴν σύγκλητον (κατίβαινον) εἰ Πομπηίου τινὰ δέοι σπουδὴν ἢ φιλοτιμίαν ἐπηρέασαι, the construction with the accusative.

38. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀρμόδιος κ.τ.λ. Lamb. apparently supplies ἐπίθετο, for he translates 'in eos impetum fecerunt': Vict., on the other hand, translates 'commotus est,' and Sus. 'aufgebracht ward.' I incline to follow Lamb.

39. ἐπεβούλευσαν δὲ καὶ Περιάνδρῳ τῷ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ τυράννῳ κ.τ.λ. As to this Periander see note on 1304 a 31, and Plut. Amat. c. 23. 768 F. Compare the circumstances of the assassination of

Caligula by Cassius Chaerea (Merivale, Romans under the Empire, c. 48, vol. 6. 95, note 3).

- 1311 b. 1. ἡ δὲ Φιλίππου κ.τ.λ. Supply *ἐπίθεις ἐγένετο*. See Diod. 16. 93 sq., and Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 90. *τῶν περὶ Ἀτταλον*, i.e. Attalus himself (see note on 1305 b 25). Aristotle perhaps thought that the honours with which Philip sought to console Pausanias for the indignities inflicted on him (Diod. 16. 93. 9) were inadequate (cp. c. 11. 1315 a 23 sq.).

3. καὶ ἡ Ἀμύντου τοῦ μικροῦ ὑπὸ Δέρδα κ.τ.λ. It is not known what Amyntas and Derdas are referred to. 'Amyntas the little' was evidently a king or prince, but whether he was one of the kings of Macedon of that name is doubtful; he may, for instance, have been a king not of Macedon, but of Elimeia. It is hardly likely that Amyntas III of Macedon, the father of Philip, is referred to, for if he were, we should expect that he would be described not as *ὁ μικρός*, but as Philip's father, especially as Philip is named in the preceding sentence. Besides, it is probable that Derdas succeeded in his attempt on the life of Amyntas the little, as those in connexion with whom he is named did so, but we are nowhere told that Amyntas the father of Philip died a violent death (see Isocr. Archid. § 46: Diod. 15. 60. 3: Justin, 7. 4. 8). The addition of *ὁ μικρός* is not altogether respectful: see Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Gr.* 3. 497, and note on 1335 a 13, and cp. Plato, *Protag.* 323 D. Nor is it likely that Amyntas the little was the son of Archelaus king of Macedon who is mentioned in 14, and who became king of Macedon himself as Amyntas II for a short time in B.C. 392 (see as to him *Sus.*², Note 1678, Curtius, *Hist. of Greece, Eng. Trans.*, 5. 35, note, and Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr. Gr.* No. 60, note, and *Addenda*, p. 659: No. 77, ed. 2), for, if he was, he would probably be called *ὁ μικρός* again in 14, or some indication would be given in 14 that he had already been mentioned in 3. Whether the Derdas here mentioned is the Derdas who was king or prince of Elimeia in B.C. 382 and an ally of Amyntas III against Olynthus (*Xen. Hell.* 5. 2. 38 and 5. 3. 1 sq.) is quite uncertain.

4. καὶ ἡ τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρα τῷ Κυπρίῳ κ.τ.λ. Supply *ἐπίθεις ἐγένετο τιμωρίας χάριν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπεροχῆς*. Τῷ Κυπρίῳ is added to distinguish this Evagoras from other men of the same name, and perhaps especially from the famous Olympian winner Evagoras the Lacedaemonian (*Hdt.* 6. 103). A short abstract by Photius of the story of the murder of Evagoras as told by Theopompus

will be found in Theopomp. *Fragm.* 111 (Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* 1. 295): see also Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, Part 2. c. 76. According to this story Nicocreon, the master of the eunuch mentioned in the text, the eunuch being an Eleian named Thrasydaeus, had been detected in a conspiracy against Evagoras and had fled from Salamis. Thrasydaeus in revenge decoyed Evagoras and his son Pnytagoras into successive visits to a daughter whom Nicocreon had left behind, and seized the opportunity to slay both of them. Aristotle's brief reference to the event is not wholly inconsistent with the account of Theopompus, but he does not mention the fact that Pnytagoras shared his father's fate, and he gives a different account from Theopompus of the cause of the assassination, for according to him Thrasydaeus acted as he did not to avenge the failure of his master's illegal enterprise, but to avenge a wrong done to himself by the son of Evagoras, a wrong which under the singular circumstances of the case would be felt with especial bitterness. Machiavelli mentions a somewhat similar plot in his *Discourses*, Book 3. c. 6. 'Even in our own times Giulio Belanti conspired against Pandolfo lord of Siena, who, though he had given him his daughter to wife, afterwards took her away from him.' Looking to the tragical end of Evagoras and his son Pnytagoras after glorious careers, it is natural that Isocrates in the *Ad Nicoclem* (§ 29) should exhort Nicocles, the son and successor of Evagoras, to control his desires, and that Nicocles himself in the address to his subjects written for him by Isocrates (*Nicocl.* §§ 36—47) should lay special stress on his own practice of *σωφροσύνη*, dropping (§ 39) the significant remark that even the best men are sometimes mastered by desire, which appears to be an allusion to his father's fate. Nicocles does not seem to have long continued a model of *σωφροσύνη* (see note on 1314 b 28). Prof. W. Ridgeway (*Trans. Camb. Philol. Soc.* 2. 152) remarks that, in proof of the fact that married eunuchs were by no means uncommon, 'it is sufficient to quote the case of Potiphar (Genesis 37. 36), where the Septuagint version states, *οι δὲ Μαθηταὶ ἀπέδοντο τὸν Ἰωσήφ εἰς Αἴγυπτον τῷ Πετεφρῇ τῷ παύοντι φαραὼ ἀρχιμαγείρῳ*. Again, Montesquieu (*Esprit des Lois*, 15. 19) says, "Au Tonquin, dit Dampier, tous les Mandarins civils et militaires sont eunuques. Le même Dampier nous dit que dans ce pays les eunuques ne peuvent se passer de femmes et qu'ils se marient." Juvenal (1. 22) alludes to the same custom: Cum tener uxorem ducat spado.'

6. πολλὰ δ' ἐπιθέσεις κ.τ.λ. Here we pass to the second main division of acts of ὕβρις (see note on 1311 a 31), that of acts into which τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰσχυῆται enters, a term which Aristotle uses here in a sense inclusive of both the kinds of ὕβρις which he distinguishes in c. 11. 1315 a 15 sq., ἡ εἰς τὰ σώματα and ἡ εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, where ἡ εἰς τὰ σώματα ὕβρις is restricted to ὕβρις shown in punishment. For the fact mentioned in the text cp. Xen. Hiero, 1. 38, καὶ τοίνυν αἱ ἐπιβουλαὶ ἐξ οὐδένων πλέονες τοῖς τυράννοις εἰσὶν ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν μάλιστα φιλεῖν αὐτοὺς προσποιησαμένων.

8. ὅλον καὶ ἡ Κραταίου εἰς Ἀρχέλαον κ.τ.λ. The name is variously given—Aelian (Var. Hist. 8. 9) has Crateuas, Plutarch (Amat. c. 23) Crateas or Crateuas, Diodorus (14. 37. 5) Craterus (Sus.², Note 1675). The conspiracy of Crataeas, Hellanocrates of Larissa, and Decamnichus against Archelaus was memorable, because, though two at least of the conspirators were mere youths and one of the two not even a Macedonian, Crataeas actually succeeded in seating himself on the throne of Macedon for three or four days (Aelian, Var. Hist. 8. 9). Decamnichus, however, was the chief author and leader of the conspiracy (1311 b 30 sqq.). As Grote points out (Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 76, vol. 10. 63), his grudge against Archelaus must have been nursed for fully six years, for Euripides died in B.C. 406 and the assassination of Archelaus did not take place till B.C. 399. How powerful Archelaus was we see from the fact that Hellanocrates of Larissa looked to him to restore him to his country. A little later Macedon became 'partially dependent on' Jason of Pherae for a time (Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 78, vol. 10. 265).

10. ἡ δῖότι κ.τ.λ., 'or perhaps [he attacked Archelaus] because,' etc. Crataeas' aspiring character appears in the bargain he made with Archelaus for the hand of one of his daughters. He can hardly have been a welcome suitor, and it is not surprising that Archelaus, pressed in war by the Lyncestae and their chiefs Sirras and Arrabaeus, gave his elder daughter in marriage to the king of Elimeia, whose territory bordered that of the Lyncestae on the south and who would therefore be valuable as an ally against them, and his younger daughter to Amyntas (afterwards Amyntas II, see note on 3), his son by an earlier wife than Cleopatra, his object being to reduce to a minimum the quarrels which he foresaw between him and his son by Cleopatra, his destined successor on the throne.

11. τὴν μὲν προτέραν. Προτέραν probably means simply πρεσβυτέραν: cp. 1312 a 4, Διονυσίῳ τῷ ὑστέρῳ, where τῷ ὑστέρῳ perhaps

means the younger, not the second, for in Theopomp. ap. Athen. Deipn. 435 d we find Διονύσιον τὸν νεώτερον Σικελίας τύραννον distinguished from Διονύσιος ὁ πρότερος (435 f, 436 a).

12. κατεχόμενος ὑπὸ πολέμου. Cp. Isocr. Archid. § 44, τῷ πολέμῳ κατεχόμενος, and Demosth. Or. 50. in Polycl. c. 5, ὑπὸ Κυζικηνῶν κατέχονται τῷ πολέμῳ.

Σίρραν καὶ Ἀρράβαιον. We read of an Arribaeus king of the Lyncestae in Thuc. 4. 79 (B.C. 424): cp. Strabo, p. 326, αἱ δὲ Λυγκησταὶ ὑπ' Ἀρραβαίων ἐγένοντο τοῦ Βακχιαδῶν γένους ὅτε· τούτου δ' ἦν θυγατρὶς ἡ Φιλίππου μήτηρ τοῦ Ἀμύντου Εὐρυδίκη, Σίρρα δὲ θυγάτηρ. The Arrabaeus of the text may be the same man, or he may have died and been succeeded by a son named Sirras (his daughter being named Sirra), who may himself have had a son named Arrabaeus. The name Sirras may probably be connected with that of the city Siris or Serrae on a tributary of the lower Strymon (Hdt. 8. 115), for it is called Σίρρα by Steph. Byz. (Pape-Benseler, art. Σίρις).

13. τῷ βασιλεῖ τῷ τῆς Ἑλιμείας. Cp. Thuc. 2. 99, τῶν γὰρ Μακεδόνων εἰσὶ καὶ Λυγκησταὶ καὶ Ἑλιμειῶται καὶ ἄλλα ἔθνη ἐπάνωθεν, ἃ ἐξέμμεχα μὲν ἐστί· τούτοις καὶ ὑπήκοα, βασιλείας δ' ἔχει καθ' αὐτά.

15. ἀλλὰ τῆς γε ἀλλοτριότητος κ.τ.λ., 'but [if this was the cause of the actual attack,] his estrangement from Archelaus at any rate was brought about by,' etc. For ἀλλὰ . . . γε cp. 3. 17. 1287 b 41 sq. and 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 9. Aristotle's statement is confirmed by Plut. Amat. c. 23.

16. τὸ βαρέως φέρειν πρὸς τὴν ἀφροδισιαστικὴν χάριν. The use of βαρέως φέρειν with πρὸς appears to be rare: Liddell and Scott refer to Julian, Or. 1. Enc. Const. 17 C, χαλεπῶς φέροντες πρὸς τὸ δουλεύειν.

17. Ἑλληνοκράτης ὁ Λαρισαῖος. The termination of the name is Atticized, the Thessalian form being Ἑλλαοκράτης. See Cauer², Delectus Inscr. Gr. No. 409. 72, where an Hellanocrates of Crannon is recommended with many others for the citizenship of Larissa by Philip V of Macedon in B.C. 214. As Hellanocrates was a youth, he must probably have been exiled from Larissa in company with his father.

18. οὐ κατήγεν, 'persistently refrained from restoring him to his city': cp. οὐ κατᾶγεν in Timocreon, Fragm. 1 (ap. Plut. Themist. c. 21).

19. δι' ὕβριν καὶ οὐ δι' ἐρωτικὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. Cp. Eubul. Νάντιον, Fragm. (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 238),

καὶ μὴ λαθραῖαν κύπριν, αἰσχίστην νόσων
 πασῶν, διώκειν, ὕβρεος οὐ πόθου χάριν,
 and Fragm. Trag. Adesp. 337 Nauck (409, ed. 2),
 ὕβρις τῷδ', οὐχὶ Κύπρις, ἐξεργάζεται.

20. εἶναι, 'was.'

Πάρρων δὲ καὶ Ἡρακλείδης οἱ Αἴνιοι Κότυν διέφθειραν τῷ πατρὶ τιμωροῦντες. As to Πάρρων see critical note. See Grote, Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 80, vol. 10. 516 sqq., and Schäfer, Demosthenes, 1. 138. This happened in B.C. 359. What bodily outrage their father had suffered from Cotys, we do not learn here or elsewhere. Hardly blows or flogging, though Cotys was severe in punishing (Stob. Floril. 48. 45), for then the case would be grouped with those mentioned in 23 sqq. Οἱ Αἴνιοι is added to distinguish this Heracleides from Syracusans of the same name and from Heracleides Ponticus.

22. Ἀδάμας δ' ἀπέστη Κότυος κ.τ.λ. Adamas was apparently an eunuch in the service of Cotys.

23. πολλοὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. We come now to those who took vengeance for ὕβρις in the form of blows or flogging. 'And on account also of indignities inflicted on the body through blows many have been roused to anger and have either destroyed or attempted to destroy, as having been outraged, even holders of magistracies and persons connected with regal supremacies, [so that this is much more likely to befall tyrants].' For βασιλικὰς δυναστείας, cp. Plato, Critias, 114 D, ἐν δυναστείαις τισὶ βασιλείων. Βασιλικὰς is added because not all δυναστεῖαι are regal or even monarchical, cp. Plato, Laws 711 D, μεγάλας τισὶ δυναστείαις, ἢ κατὰ μοναρχίαν δυναστευούσαις ἢ κατὰ πλοῦτων ὑπεροχὰς διαφερούσαις ἢ γενῶν. In Diod. 15. 60. 3 the words τῶν ἐν δυναστείαις ὄντων τρεῖς are used of three persons, only two of whom were kings, the third being tagus of Thessaly.

26. οἷον ἐν Μιτυλήνῃ κ.τ.λ. As an instance of holders of offices to whom this happened the Penthilidae or Penthilidae are mentioned, and as an instance of royal personages Archelaus. The Penthilidae claimed descent from Penthilus, an illegitimate son of Orestes, who was believed to have headed the Aeolian emigration to Lesbos (Paus. 3. 2. 1 : Strabo, p. 582 : Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 273. 5). They appear to have been the ruling gens in the early oligarchy of Mytilene, as the Basilidae were at Erythrae and the Neleidae at Miletus (see note on 1305 b 18). As to the Penthilidae see Myrsil. Methymn. Fragm. 12 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 4. 459). Megacles

cannot have slain all the Pentilidae, for Pentilus, who fell later on (28 sqq.), must have been one of them. For misdeeds resembling those of the Pentilidae cp. Demosth. Or. 54. c. Conon. c. 37. The young nobles of Venice played the same pranks (Brown, Venice, p. 259).

29. Σμέρδης. See critical note. ΓΠ have σμέρδης. The forms Σμέρδης (Hdt. 3. 30 etc.: Anth. Pal. 7. 29), Σμερδής (Anth. Pal. 7. 31), and Σμερδῖος (king of Naxos in mythical times, Diod. 5. 51. 3) occur (see Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch der griech. Eigennamen, under these titles), but not Smerdes, which may however possibly be right. Pape-Benseler quotes Hesych. σμέρδος· ῥώμη, δύναμις, and εἰςμερδής· εὐρωστος. Compare the names, also Mytilenean, of Alcaeus and his two brothers, Antimenidas and Cicis, as to which see note on 1285 a 36.

30. διέφθειραν is probably the aorist: cp. 21 and 24, διέφθειραν.

καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελαίου δ' ἐπιθέσεως κ.τ.λ. For the objective gen. Ἀρχελαίου see note on 1311 a 36. As to proper names ending in -ιχος see Pape-Benseler, Wörterbuch der griech. Eigennamen, vol. i. p. xxii, and Kühner, Ausführl. Gramm. der griech. Sprache, ed. Blass, 2. 280.

33. ὁ δ' Εὐριπίδης κ.τ.λ. As Grote (Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 76, vol. 10. 65) and others remark, the story gives us an unfavourable impression of Euripides' character, but we do not know exactly what Decamnichus said. The defect in question was sometimes made the ground of scandalous imputations on character (Martial, 11. 30). Comments on it were not readily tolerated in antiquity (Plut. Sympos. 2. 1. 9, referred to by Giph., p. 672, εἰς δὲ δυσωδίαν μυκτηῖρος ἢ στόματος ἄχθονται σκωπτόμενοι).

34. καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle may probably refer among others to Jason of Pherae: see Valer. Max. 9. 10. Ext. 2, where the youths who murdered Jason are said to have done so to avenge a flogging inflicted on them by his command. Others, however, gave a different account of the circumstances of his death (Diod. 15. 60. 5).

36. ἔν γάρ τι κ.τ.λ., 'for this was one of the causes we mentioned, as in the case of constitutions, so also in the case of monarchies.' This refers to 1311 a 25. For ἦν see note on 1259 a 37. For ὥσπερ καὶ followed by καὶ cp. 2. 8. 1269 a 9 sq. and 2. 9. 1270 b 40 sq. (Sus.¹ Ind. Gramm.). For the omission of περί before τὰς μοναρχίας see notes on 1269 a 9 and 1311 a 29.

37. οἷον Ξέρξην Ἀρταπάνης κ.τ.λ. According to the story as told (with some variations) in Diod. 11. 69, Justin, 3. 1, and Ctesias, Persica ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 72 (Bekker, p. 39 b foot), Artapanes or Artapanus or Artabanus, the captain of the bodyguard of Xerxes, in the hope of winning the throne of Persia, first murdered Xerxes and then induced Artaxerxes, a younger son of Xerxes, to murder his elder brother Darius by falsely charging Darius with the murder of his father, following up these acts by an attempt to murder Artaxerxes which failed and led to his own execution. If we supply ἀνέλεν with the words οἷον Ξέρξην Ἀρταπάνης (and this is the word which it is natural to supply here, as in 1312 a 1 with Σαρδανάπαλλον), the difficulty arises that Aristotle evidently takes the murder of Darius to have preceded that of Xerxes, and not to have followed it, as in the received account. Schneider (whose view is adopted by Sus.², Note 1686) escapes this difficulty by taking Ξέρξην to mean Artaxerxes, not Xerxes, but then a new difficulty arises, for in the received account Artaxerxes is present at the murder of Darius, if indeed he does not himself murder him, and this does not agree with Aristotle's version of the story. Another difficulty is that if we adopt Schneider's interpretation of Ξέρξην, we must supply with οἷον Ξέρξην Ἀρταπάνης, not ἀνέλεν (for Artapanes failed to slay Artaxerxes), but ἐπεχείρησεν ἀνελεῖν or some such words, whereas in the closely similar passage, 1312 a 1, ἀνέλεν has to be supplied. It seems to me that Aristotle follows a different version of the story from that which Diodorus and the rest follow, one which made the murder of Darius precede that of Xerxes, Artapanes being led according to it to murder Xerxes not by a hope of winning his throne, but by a fear that Xerxes would put him to death for murdering Darius. The Emperor Commodus perished in a similar way. It was from fear of being put to death by him that Marcia Laetus and Eclectus conspired against his life and killed him (Herodian, 1. 16 sq.; Dio Cass. 72. 22). According to Aelian, Var. Hist. 13. 3, Xerxes 'was slain at night in his bed by his son.' Nöldeke (Aufsätze zur persischen Geschichte, p. 49) appears to reject Aristotle's version of the murders of Xerxes and Darius. He remarks that 'we can reconstruct from different Greek writers two accounts of the murder of Xerxes, those of Ctesias and Deinon, differing from each other in a number of particulars. A third is given by Aristotle in Pol. 1311 b. As to scenes of this kind enacted within the seraglio it is not easy for persons outside to

arrive at a trustworthy conclusion, but thus much is clear. Artabanus, captain of the bodyguard, murdered Xerxes, and Artaxerxes, the youngest of Xerxes' sons, in complicity with the murderer, put his elder brother Darius to death, who had a better claim to the throne than he had. It does not follow that he was a parricide.'

40. αἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but other attacks on monarchs are made on account of contempt.' Aristotle has told us (1311 a 32 sq.) that attacks provoked by ὕβρις are directed against the person of the monarch, but he does not say whether attacks arising from contempt and from φιλοψυμία are directed against his person or his throne. Dion at any rate attacked only the latter.

1. ὅσπερ Σαρδανάπαλλον κ.τ.λ. 'Ἀνέλεν must apparently be supplied. There were two accounts of this event (Athen. Deipn. 528 e sqq.). According to one of them, that of Duris, Arbaces, the τὴς referred to here, who was a Median and one of Sardanapalus' generals, put Sardanapalus to death on the spot, while according to the other, that of Ctesias, Arbaces made war upon him and drove him by defeat to put an end to his own life. Aristotle appears to follow the former account, whereas Diodorus (2. 23-27) and Justin (1. 3) follow the latter. Compare with the story of Sardanapalus that of Midas king of the Lydians in Athen. Deipn. 516 b. The dressing of wool (ξάπτειν) in order to prepare it for use in spinning was regarded as work for women, not men (Aristoph. Lysistr. 536 Didot: Fragm. Trag. Adesp. 7 Nauck—9, ed. 2).

2. οἱ μυθολογούντες. Aristotle refers to Herodotus as ὁ μυθολόγος in De Gen. An. 3. 5. 756 b 6, and Strabo (p. 507 sq.) speaks thus of Ctesias Herodotus and Hellanicus. It is to Ctesias, who probably added much to the legend of Sardanapalus, that Aristotle especially refers. As Sus.¹ (Note 1687 b) points out, Aristotle expresses distrust, at any rate of his marvellous stories about India, in Hist. An. 2. 1. 501 a 25, 3. 22. 523 a 26 sq., and 8. 28. 606 a 8. Add De Gen. An. 2. 2. 736 a 2 sqq.

3. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἄλλου γε κ.τ.λ. For ἀλλὰ . . . γε thus used cp. 1. 8. 1256 b 18 sq. and 2. 9. 1269 b 7 sq.

4. καὶ Διονυσίῳ τῷ ὑστέρῳ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1311 b 11 and cp. Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 12, τοῦ πρόσθεν Διονυσίου, Theopomp. ap. Athen. Deipn. 435 f and 436 a, Διονυσίου τοῦ προτέρου, and Plut. Dec. Orat. Vitae, 1, Antiphon, 833 B, τοῦ προτέρου Διονυσίου. It is implied in 21-39 that Dion attacked Dionysius II also from φιλοψυμία. Aristotle probably has the habitual drunkenness of Dionysius II before

him in c. 11. 1314 b 28 sqq. Cp. also Plut. Dion. et Brut. inter se comp. c. 4 and Justin, 21. 2. That Dion saw the weak points in the position of Dionysius II is clear from Plut. Dion, c. 23; the immediate occasion of his attempt was, however, the fact that Dionysius had given his wife to Timocrates in addition to confiscating his property (Plut. Dion, cc. 18, 21).

6. I propose the insertion after *μεθύοντα* of 17, *μάλιστα δέ—20, ἐπιθέσεις*, which seems to be out of place where it stands. I cannot regard it with Sus. as a double recension of 11, *ῥοπερ—14, ὧν*.

καὶ τῶν φίλων δέ κ.τ.λ., 'and indeed some friends attack monarchs on account of contempt,' not merely the high officers of whom Aristotle will have just been speaking if, as I suggest, we place 17, *μάλιστα δέ—20, ἐπιθέσεις*, after *μεθύοντα*, 6. *Διὰ γὰρ τὸ πιστεῦσθαι καταφρονοῦσιν ὡς λήσοντες* will then also correspond to *δὲ ἄς ἀμφοτέρως, ὡς ῥαδίως κρατήσονται, ποιοῦνται τὰς ἐπιθέσεις* in the preceding sentence. As to attempts of this kind, cp. Rhet. 1. 12. 1372 a 5-21.

8. *καὶ οἱ οἰόμενοι κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle here passes on to assailants who are led to attack monarchs by a confident belief that they will be able to win the throne for themselves, a belief which practically amounts to a contempt of the monarchs' power, though it is not quite the same thing. Here again compare the passage from the Rhetoric referred to in the last note.

12. *ὅσον Κύρος Ἀστυάγει κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle speaks of Cyrus as the general of Astyages, and says nothing of his being Astyages' grandson. Ctesias (ap. Phot. Biblioth. p. 36 a 9 sq. Bekker) had denied that there was any relationship between them, against Hdt. 1. 107 sqq. and other authorities, and it is possible that Aristotle here follows him as to this. Deinon ap. Athen. Deipn. 633 d sq. perhaps follows Ctesias.

13. *τῆς δυνάμεως* is rendered by Sepulveda 'exercitum' and *τὴν δύναμιν* 'milites,' and Sus.⁹ renders these words similarly 'Kriegsmacht,' but Vet. Int. renders them by 'potentia,' and I incline (with Welldon) to interpret them thus.

14. *καὶ Σεύθης ὁ Θρᾷξ Ἀμαδόκῃ στρατηγὸς ὦν*. Seuthes regained with the help of Xenophon and his troops about B.C. 400 a principality or *ἀρχή* (over the Melanditæ Thyni and Tranipsæ) which his father Maesades had held, but lost (Xen. Anab. 7. 2. 32 sqq.), and we find him described about B.C. 390 as *ὁ ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ ἄρχων* in Thrace and as being at variance with Amadocus, King of the Odrysæ, till he was reconciled to him by Thrasybulus about that year (Xen.

Hell. 4. 8. 26, where Keller reads 'Αμήδοκον in place of the vulg. Μήδοκον), when both Amadocus and Seuthes became allies of Athens. Aristotle probably refers in the text to events subsequent to this. It is not clear from his brief allusion whether Seuthes dispossessed Amadocus of his kingdom or only attempted to do so. His attack apparently was made between the year in which Thra-sybulus reconciled the two men and B.C. 386, for in the latter year an inscription discovered at Athens (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr., ed. 2, No. 76) mentions Hebrytelmis as king of the Odrysae. Dittenberger thinks that Hebrytelmis was probably the successor of Amadocus, and that Cotys, who was king of the Odrysae from B.C. 383 to 359, may have been the son of Seuthes. Diodorus (13. 105. 3 and 14. 94. 2) describes Seuthes as king, but neither Xenophon nor Aristotle does so (Dittenberger, *ibid.*). He is called 'the Thracian' in contradistinction to others of the name who were not Thracians, for though most of the bearers of the name known to us were Thracians, it is also traceable at Cyme in Aeolis, and the father of the philosopher Arcesilaus, who belonged to Pitane in Aeolis, was named Seuthes or Scythes (Diog. Laert. 4. 28: Pape-Benseler, art. Σεύθης).

16. ὥσπερ Ἀριοβαρζάνη Μιθριδάτης. The same event is probably referred to in Xen. Cyrop. 8. 8. 4, ὥσπερ Μιθριδάτης τὸν πατέρα Ἀριοβαρζάνην προδοῦς. Sus.³ (Note 1692) takes both passages to refer to the Ariobarzanes who was satrap of Pontus from B.C. 363 to 336, and who was succeeded by his son Mithridates II, but Nöldeke (Aufsätze zur persischen Geschichte, p. 72) thinks that the reference is to Ariobarzanes the successor of Pharnabazus in the Hellespontine satrapy, who revolted from Persia about B.C. 367, and was captured and put to death by the Persians, probably about two years later.

17. μάλιστα δὲ κ.τ.λ. If we transpose 17—20 to after μεθύνοντα, 6, it becomes easy to give διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν the meaning 'from contempt.' For the fact cp. c. 11. 1315 a 10 sqq. and Polyb. 6. 7. 9.

18. τιμὴν πολεμικὴν. Cp. Plato, Laws 943 A, τοὺς πολεμικοὺς ἀρχοντας. The term τιμὴ πολεμική includes many offices besides that of general (see 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 33 sqq.).

19. ἀνδρία γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχουσα θράσος ἐστίν. I incline to think that Giph. (p. 678), whom Sus. follows, is right in reading θάρσος in place of θράσος: cp. 1. 9. 1258 a 10 sq. There was a proverb λίων ξίφος ἔχων, ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει μὲν ἀνδρείων, ἐτέραν δὲ προσλαμβανόντων ἔξωθεν

βοήθειαν (Leutsch and Schneidewin, *Paroem. Gr.* 1. 429). See also note on 1255 a 13, and cp. *Rhet.* 2. 19. 1393 a 1, τό τε γὰρ ἐν δυνάμει καὶ βουλῇσι ὄν' ἔσται, καὶ τὰ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ ὀργῇ καὶ λογισμῷ μετὰ δυνάμειος ὄντα.

21. τῆς αἰτίας, sc. τῆς ἐπιθέσεως.

22. ἔνιοι, those, for instance, who seek to possess themselves of the wealth and honour which tyrants possess or who envy them for possessing these things (cp. 1311 a 28 sqq. and c. 2. 1302 a 31 sqq. and 38 sqq.).

26. οὗτοι δ' ὥσπερ κ.τ.λ., 'but these men, just as [they would wish to be allowed to take part,] if any other action out of the common were done on account of which men become noted and well known to their fellows, in the same spirit attack monarchs also.' Aristotle's language here is modelled on that of Plato in *Symp.* 208 C sq., which Isocrates imitates in *Evag.* § 3 (cp. *Philip.* §§ 133-136). Phoebeidas, who seized the Cadmeia of Thebes, was a man of this type (*Xen. Hell.* 5. 2. 28). 'Iason, Phraeorum tyrannus, a septem adolescentibus coniuratis δόξης ἔγκα interfectus est, teste Ephoro (*Diod.* 15. 60. 5), et C. Mucius Scaevola Romanus eodem animo Porsennam regem Etruscorum est aggressus (*Liv.* 2. 12). Eadem quoque causa Arato ad patriam Sicyonem tyranno liberandam fuit, et eadem Bruto coniurationis in Caesarem' (*Giph.* p. 679). Brutus' motive, however, was rather an hostility on principle to the absolute rule of a single man, a motive for assailing tyrannies which Aristotle omits to notice (*Plut. Brut.* c. 8, λέγεται δὲ Βρούτος μὲν τὴν ἀρχὴν βαρύνεσθαι, Κάσσιος δὲ τὸν ἀρχοντα μισεῖν).

30. For οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ . . . γε cp. 2. 12. 1274 b 25.

31. ὑποκείσθαι γὰρ δεῖ κ.τ.λ., 'for underlying their enterprise there should be an utter disregard of their own preservation in the event of their not being in a position to make it a success.' See critical note on 1312 a 32. For the absence of τις after μέλλῃ see *Bon. Ind.* 589 b 47 sqq.

33. οἷς ἀκολουθεῖν κ.τ.λ., 'for they must have present in their minds the view of Dion.' For οἷς cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 29.

36. οὕτως ἔχειν κ.τ.λ., 'huius animi se esse praedicans' (*Vict.*). Supply ὄν with ἱκανόν. For its omission compare the omission of ὅσους with πολέμους in c. 11. 1314 a 11 sq. (*Richards*). For the construction cp. Plato, *Rep.* 461 C, εἰάν τις βιάσθαι, οὕτω τιθεῖται, ὡς οὐκ οὕσης τροφῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ, and *Tim.* 29 B, ὥδε οὖν περί τε εἰκότος

καὶ περὶ τοῦ παραδείγματος αὐτῆς διοριστέον, ὥς ἄρα τοὺς λόγους, ὡς περ εἰσὶν ἐξηγηταί, τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ συγγενεῖς ὄντας. As to ὅπου see critical note, and Kühner, *Ausführl. gr. Gramm.*, ed. Gerth, § 447. Anm. 4.

39. φθείρεται δὲ τυραννὶς κ.τ.λ. Hitherto we have been concerned with attacks on the person or throne of monarchs, i.e. of both kings and tyrants, and these attacks do not necessarily imply the φθορά of the monarchy assailed, but now we pass to the ways in which the φθορά of monarchies comes about, and these ways are not the same for kingship and for tyranny. The former, for instance, is very little liable to overthrow from outside, whereas the opposite is the case with the latter.

40. ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη πολιτειῶν. Here Aristotle speaks as if tyranny was a πολιτεία, whereas he commonly in this Book marks off μοναρχίαι from πολιτείας. For the fact cp. c. 7. 1307 b 19 sqq.

ἐξωθεν, ἐὰν ἐναντία τις ἢ πολιτεία κρείττων. Cp. Demosth. Ol. 1. 5, καὶ ὅλος ἀπιστον, οἶμαι, ταῖς πολιτείαις ἢ τυραννίς, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὁμορον χώραν ἔχουσι.

8. ἀ δὲ βούλονται κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 2. 19. 1393 a 1 sqq. (quoted 1312 b. above on 1312 a 19).

4. καθ' Ἡσίοδον, 'as Hesiod says.' Hesiod had implied in Op. et Dies, 25 sq., that like is at variance with like: see Plato, *Lysis*, 215 C, and note on 1311 a 17, and contrast [Xen.] *Rep. Ath.* 3. 10, οἱ γὰρ ὅμοιοι τοῖς ὁμοίοις εὐνοί εἰσι. Supply κοτέει with ὥς κεραμένους κεραμεῖ. For καθ' Ἡσίοδον cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1100 a 11, κατὰ Σόλωνα, and Plato, *Phaedrus*, 227 B, κατὰ Πίνδαρον. Aristotle's explanation accounts for the hostility of the ultimate democracy to tyranny, but not for that of democracy in general, for he does not assimilate democracy in general to tyranny.

5. καὶ γὰρ ἡ δημοκρατία ἡ τελευταία τυραννὶς ἐστίν. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 17 sq., where see note.

6. βασιλεία δὲ καὶ ἀριστοκρατία κ.τ.λ. Kingship is the opposite of tyranny (1310 b 7—1311 a 8), and aristocracy is nearly akin to kingship (1310 b 2 sq., 32). When Aristotle speaks of kingship overthrowing tyrannies, it is possible that he refers not only to the action of the Lacedaemonian kings, but also to the orders sent to Greece by Alexander after the victory of Gaugamela that all tyrannies should be put down (Plut. *Alex. c.* 34, φιλοτιμούμενος δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἔγραψε τὰς τυραννίδας πάσας καταλυθῆναι καὶ πολιτεῖναι αὐτονόμους). This would be about B.C. 330.

7. διὸ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Thuc. 1. 18. 1, Plut. De Herod. Malign. c. 21, where instances are given, and Abbott, Hist. of Greece, 1. 436, note. When the Lacedaemonians gave countenance and support to Dionysius the Elder, they departed greatly from their earlier policy.

8. καὶ Συρακοῦσιοι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle refers to the period between the fall of the Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse in B.C. 466-5 and the substitution in B.C. 413 or 412 of a democracy for the aristocracy (or polity, c. 4. 1304 a 27 sqq.) which had existed since B.C. 466-5 (see note on 1304 a 27). Cp. Diod. 11. 72. 1, κατὰ δὲ τὴν Σικελίαν ἄρτι καταλειμμένης τῆς ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις τυραννίδος καὶ πασῶν τῶν κατὰ τὴν νῆσον πόλεων ἡλευθερωμένων. What Aristotle means by πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς will be seen from 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 32 sqq.

9. εἴνα δ' ἐξ αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ. For the phrase οἱ μετέχοντες (sc. τῆς τυραννίδος) cp. 1313 a 1, τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς βασιλείας, and see note on 1312 b 40. I do not notice that Aristotle anywhere suggests any remedy for the rise of discords within the ruling family of a kingship or tyranny.

10. ἡ τῶν περὶ Γέλωνα, sc. τυραννίς.

νῦν, in B.C. 356, a good many years before this was written, for, as Sus.² points out (Note 1699), Aristotle is speaking of the expulsion of Dionysius II from Syracuse by Dion, not of his final departure from Syracuse in B.C. 344. We see that Aristotle uses νῦν of events not so very recent (Sus.², *ibid.*).

11. ἡ μὲν Γέλωνος κ.τ.λ. The tyrannies founded by Gelon and Dionysius the Elder both of them came to an end owing to discords arising within the ruling family, but in different ways, the former through a maladroit attempt on the part of the ruling family to save it from destruction by overthrowing one of their own number, the latter through open war waged against it by a member of the ruling family, who called the demos to his assistance.

13. ὁρμῶντος. The transitive use of ὁρμᾶν is rare in Aristotle's writings: the Index Aristotelicus omits to mention the passage before us, and gives instances only of the passive, or what it takes to be the passive, in this sense.

ἵν' αὐτὸς ἄρχῃ, 'in order that he himself might rule.' This seems to imply that the son of Gelon (whose name we nowhere learn) was tyrant of Syracuse in however nominal a sense, perhaps from the time of his father's death, but certainly after the death of his uncle Hiero, whereas according to Diod. 11. 66. 4 Thrasybulus

succeeded his brother Hiero in the tyranny. In c. 12. 1315 b 38 also Thrasylbulus is treated as Hiero's successor, but the authenticity of c. 12. 1315 b 11—39 is very doubtful. See also Timaeus, *Fragm.* 84 (Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* 1. 212), and Freeman, *Sicily*, 2. 304. A similar aim to that here ascribed to Thrasylbulus was in later times falsely ascribed to Dion in reference to Dionysius the Younger ([Plato,] *Epist.* 7. 333 C).

τῶν δὲ οἰκείων συστησάντων κ.τ.λ., 'and the connexions (of Gelon's son) having banded together a body of confederates.' See Prof. Postgate, *Notes on the Politics of Aristotle*, p. 23, whom I follow in this note and the next, not having any better interpretation to suggest, but with some hesitation. Verbs are often used in the *Politics* without an expressed object (e.g. in c. 5. 1305 a 31 καθιστᾶσιν is thus used, in 2. 11. 1273 b 18 ἐκφεύγουσι, in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 29 μετέβαλεν, and in 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 14 διορβοῦν: see also note on 1313 a 1), but still the use of συστησάντων here without an object is remarkable. τῶν οἰκείων perhaps refers to Chromius and Aristonous, who had married sisters of Gelon and were left by him guardians of his son in the event of the death of his brother Polyzelus (*Tim. Fragm.* 84: Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ed. 2, 2. 798). Οἰκειότης is connected with κηδεῖα in 2. 3. 1262 a 11, and distinguished from blood-relationship there and from συγγένεια in *Rhet.* 2. 4. 1381 b 34.

14. οἱ δὲ συστάντες αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ., 'but their band of confederates,' etc. Perhaps, however, Sus.³ is right in suggesting that μετ' should be added before αὐτῶν (see critical note on 1312 b 15).

16. στρατεύσας, κηδεστής ὢν, καὶ προσλαβὼν τὸν δῆμον, 'having made an expedition, though a connexion by marriage, and having added the demos to his side.' Dion had married Arete, the half-sister of Dionysius II. It was because Dion accepted the help of the demos, and yet after winning the day did not introduce a complete democracy, that he ultimately came to a violent end.

17. For the pleonasm of ἐκείνον cp. Plato, *Phileb.* 30 D, ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ὀποφνημένοις ὡς αἰ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ ἀρχεὶ ξύμμαχος ἐπαίροις, and see Stallbaum *ad locum*.

δύο δὲ οὐδῶν αἰτιῶν κ.τ.λ. This results from 1311 a 31—1312 a 20. Aristotle here points out which causes of attack are most fatal to tyrannies, just as he has pointed out how democracies, oligarchies, and aristocracies are most apt to be overthrown in c. 5. 1304 b 20 sqq., c. 6. 1305 a 37 sqq., and c. 7. 1307 a 5 sqq.

19. θάτερον μὲν δεῖ τούτων ὑπάρχειν τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ μῖσος.

Aristotle here probably has before him Plato, Rep. 567 C, ἐν μακαρίῃ ἄρα, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀνάγκη δέδεται, ἢ προστάττει αὐτῷ ἢ μετὰ φαύλων τῶν πολλῶν οἰκεῖν, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μισούμενον, ἢ μὴ ζῆν : compare Laws 691 C sq. and Polyb. 5. 11. 6, τυράννου μὲν γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ κακῶς ποιοῦντα τῷ φόβῳ δεσπόζειν ἀκουσίων, μισούμενον καὶ μισοῦντα τοὺς ὑποταττομένους. Yet in c. 11. 1315 b 7 Aristotle seems to imply that the tyrant may escape being hated. For the use of δεῖ in a sense not far removed from that of ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν cp. c. 11. 1315 a 10, δεῖν, and Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 36, ἅτε δὲ ἐκ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων παρόντων τῶν Ἀρκάδων . . . πολλοὺς ἴδει τοὺς συλλαμβανομένους εἶναι.

20. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ καταφρονεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ., 'but it is in consequence of tyrants being despised [which they might have avoided] that many of the overthrows of tyrannies occur.'

21. For σημεῖον δέ followed by γάρ Bonitz (Ind. 146 b 16) compares 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 17 sq. and other passages.

τῶν μὲν γὰρ κτησαμένων κ.τ.λ. Cp. Polyb. 6. 1. 14 Hultsch, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἔργων οἱ μὲν κτησάμενοι πρὸς τὴν τήρησιν, οἱ δ' ἔτοιμα παραλαμβάνοντες πρὸς τὴν ἀπώλειαν εὐφυεῖς εἰσίν.

22. καὶ διεφύλαξαν τὰς ἀρχάς, 'kept their thrones also' (in addition to winning them). A τυραννίς is here implied to be an ἀρχή (see note on 1310 b 23).

οἱ δὲ παραλαμβάνοντες κ.τ.λ. There are many exceptions to this rule—Hiero, Periander, the successors of Clearchus at Heracleia on the Euxine, etc. Aristotle is probably thinking of cases in which the founder of a tyranny was succeeded by a son brought up in luxury, and especially of Dionysius II of Syracuse. It deserves notice that his remark does not hold good of the tyrants of mediaeval Italy, for they often founded dynasties which lasted long.

25. πολλοὺς καιροὺς παραδίδοσιν τοῖς ἐπιτιθεμένοις. Cp. Antiphanes, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 70 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 155),

ὦ γῆρας, ὡς ἅπασιν τοῖς ζητοῦσί σε

ψέγειν ἀφορμὰς παραδίδως τοῦ πράγματος.

μόριον δέ τι τοῦ μίσους καὶ τὴν ὀργὴν δεῖ τιθεῖναι. Cp. Poet. 5. 1449 a 33, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοῖον μόριον, where Bonitz (Ind. 473 b 60) explains μόριον as = εἶδος τι. In Rhet. 2. 4. 1382 a 1 sqq., where the difference between ἔχθρα (= μῖσος) and ὀργή is explained, ὀργή is said to be one of the things which produce ἔχθρα.

27. πολλὰκις δὲ καὶ πρακτικώτερον τοῦ μίσους. Πρακτικώτερον takes up πράξεων. Λογισμός often hampers action (Amphis, Φιλάδελφοι, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, 3. 316) : cp., with Richards, Thuc. 2. 40. 4).

28. συντονώτερον γὰρ ἐπιτίθενται, sc. οἱ ὀργιζόμενοι.

διὰ τὸ μὴ χρῆσθαι λογισμῷ τὸ πάθος. Cp. Thuc. 2. 11. 8: Demosth. c. Mid. c. 41: Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 64 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 252): Aristot. Fragm. 95—97. 1493 b 24—38.

30. τοῖς θυμοῖς. For the plural cp. (with Bon. Ind. 336 a 35 sqq.) Rhet. 2. 13. 1390 a 11 and De Part. An. 2. 4. 651 a 2.

ἢ τε τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν κατελύθη τυραννίς. See note on 1311 a 36.

32. ἀλλὰ μάλλον τὸ μῖσος. Sepulv. 'odium tamen magis est in causa,' and Vict. 'odium tamen magis efficit quod gerendum suscepit,' but Schlosser (Aristoteles Politik, 2. 243), who is followed by Schneider, Eaton, Sus., and others, is probably right in supplying *χρήται λογισμῷ*.

34. ὅσας αἰτίας, sc. τῆς φθορᾶς. The oppression of the rich, for instance, which is fatal to extreme democracy, and the oppression of the poor, which is fatal to extreme oligarchy, will also be fatal to tyranny. Aristotle speaks here as if he had described the causes of the overthrow of extreme democracy and extreme oligarchy separately from those of the overthrow of democracy and oligarchy in general, but this he has not done.

35. τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ἀκράτου καὶ τελευταίας. We often hear of ἡ τελευταία δημοκρατία, but not elsewhere of ἡ τελευταία ὀλιγαρχία, though in 1310 b 4 we have ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας τῆς ὑστάτης. 'Ἡ τελευταία δημοκρατία is not only *τελευταία* in the sense of 'extremeness' (cp. Soph. Electr. 271, τὴν τελευταίαν ὕβριν), but also *τελευταία* τοῖς χρόνοις (6 (4). 6. 1292 b 41 sq.); it is doubtful how far this is true of ἡ τελευταία ὀλιγαρχία (cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq.), though perhaps the decadarchies of Lysander were narrower, and therefore more 'ultimate,' than even the early oligarchies of knights.

37. καὶ γὰρ αὗται τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι διαιρεταὶ τυραννίδες. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 15 sqq. and 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 30 sqq.

40. ἕνα μὲν στασιασάντων τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς βασιλείας. Οἱ μετέχοντες τῆς βασιλείας are those who share in the advantages and power of the kingship. Vict. 'intelligit fratres ac liberos eorum qui regnant, hi namque participes amplae illius fortunae non sine causa vocari possunt, degustant enim ipsi quoque plurimum eorum bonorum.' The quarrels of Arcesilaus II of Cyrene with his brothers were one of the causes of the fall of the kingship (Hdt. 4. 160). The success of the royal house of Pergamum was largely due to its freedom from these dissensions (Polyb. 23. 11. 6 sqq.). The Duke of Wellington said that Philippe Égalité, Duke of

Orleans, 'was first driven into opposition by the misconduct of Marie Antoinette, who had taken a violent dislike to him, and encouraged the courtiers to insult him' (Lord Stanhope's Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, p. 64). 'Queen Isabella of Spain's caprices might have been condoned in 1868 as they had been condoned before . . . if there had been no family dissensions and parties. Admiral Topete rose to crown the Duc de Montpensier as much as to punish the lawlessness of the Duke's sister-in-law and her counsellors' (*Times*, Nov. 6, 1885). In ancient Greece these family discords would be all the more likely to arise, because the kings often had families by concubines as well as by their wives, and sometimes indeed appear to have had more wives than one.

1313 a. 1. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τυραννικώτερον πειρωμένων διοικεῖν. Supply τῶν βασιλείων with πειρωμένων, and probably τὴν ἀρχήν (rather than τὴν πόλιν) with διοικεῖν (cp. c. 11. 1313 a 35 sq. and 3. 15. 1286 b 30 sq.). Διοικεῖν is similarly used without an expressed object in c. 11. 1314 b 6, οὕτω γὰρ ἂν τις διοικῶν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1310 b 18 sqq.: Plato, *Laws* 690 D-691 A: Polyb. 6. 4. 8 and 6. 7. 6 sqq.: Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 74. This is the cause to which the fall of kingship is most usually attributed by ancient writers. It was thus that kingship fell in the Lacedaemonian State under Charilaus (c. 12. 1316 a 33 sq.), in Achaia (Polyb. 2. 41. 5), at Megara (Paus. 1. 43. 3), and in part at Cyrene under Arcesilaus II (Diod. 8. 30. 1). If the story of Tarquinius Superbus' reign at Rome is to be trusted, the same thing happened there.

3. οὐ γίνονται δ' ἔτι κ.τ.λ., 'but kingships do not come into existence any longer now, or if they do come into existence, it is monarchies or tyrannies rather than do so.' This remark appears at first sight to be hardly relevant, occurring as it does in the midst of an account of the causes of the fall of kingship, but the transition is easy from the fall of kingships through tyranny to the fact that they no longer arose for want of men deserving the willing obedience presupposed by the office. Καὶ in μοναρχία καὶ τυραννίδες probably means 'or' (see note on 1262 a 6), unless indeed we take it as explaining and limiting μοναρχία (see note on 1257 b 7). Μοναρχία is commonly used by Aristotle in a sense inclusive of kingship and tyranny, but here the word seems to be used in a sense approaching that of tyranny, as in c. 3. 1302 b 17. The kingship of the Archaeactidae of Panticapaeum arose

in the fifth century B.C., but they were βασιλείς only in their relation to their barbarian subjects; they ruled the Greek cities which were subject to them as ἄρχοντες for life (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 188 sq.).

4. ἄν περ γίνονται. 'Εἴνπερ non saepe invenitur' (i. e. in Aristotle's writings), 'cf. Rhet. 3. 16. 1417 b 13, Metaph. B. 6. 1003 a 16 (ἄνπερ), Metaph. Z. 12. 1038 a 13, Phys. 4. 8. 215 a 2 (ἄνπερ), and Phys. 4. 10. 218 a 4,' in addition to the passage before us (Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 65).

6. πολλοὺς δ' εἶναι τοὺς ὁμοίους κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 11 sqq. and Plato, Polit. 301 C.

7. τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς. Cp. Plut. Ages. c. 4, τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἐκείνων ἀρχῆς (i. e. τῶν ἐφόρων καὶ τῶν γερόντων). Compare also Ariphron, Fragm., τὰς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώποις βασιλεῖδος ἀρχᾶς. As to τῆς ἀρχῆς in reference to kingship, see notes on 1310 b 23 and 1301 b 18.

8. ὥστε διὰ μὲν τοῦτο ἐκόντες οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. Μέν should be subjoined to ἐκόντες rather than to διὰ τοῦτο, but 'μέν interdum non ei additur vocabulo, in quo vis oppositionis cernitur' (Bon. Ind. s.v.).

9. ἂν δὲ δι' ἀπάτης ἄρξῃ τις ἢ βίας κ.τ.λ., 'but if a man has won rule by deceit or force [so that those over whom he rules submit to him, though unwillingly],' etc. It is implied here that persons who are induced to submit by deceit submit unwillingly: contrast the use of ἐκόντες in c. 4. 1304 b 10—17. For ἄρξῃ cp. ἄρξαντες in 2. 9. 1271 b 4. Diogenes Laertius ascribes a definition of tyranny in similar terms to Plato (3. 83, τυραννὶς δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν ᾗ παρακρουσθέντες ἢ βιασθέντες ὑπὸ τινος ἄρχονται: cp. 3. 92). Compare also Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 10. For the order of the words, ἦδη δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι τυραννίς, cp. 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 3, δοκεῖ τοῦτ' εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατικόν. Π¹ Sus. place the words in a different order, ἦδη τοῦτο δοκεῖ τυραννίς εἶναι.

10. ἐν δὲ ταῖς κατὰ γένος βασιλείαις κ.τ.λ. Αἱ κατὰ γένος βασιλείαι are kingships in which succession to the throne is confined to members of a certain family (Diog. Laert. 3. 83); the phrase does not necessarily mean that the throne passes always from father to eldest son, or even from father to son. Aristotle's language implies that there were kingships not κατὰ γένος, and we know that the aesymneteship was not so (3. 14. 1285a 32 sq.), and that the absolute kingship might or might not be so (3. 17. 1288 a 15 sqq.). But it is not likely that Aristotle is thinking here of either the one or the other; he must be thinking of some forms of Greek or

barbarian kingship which were not *κατὰ γένος*, but freely elective without any limitation to a particular family. Of these forms we hear nothing in the classification of kingships contained in 3. 14, for the barbarian kingships described there are hereditary as well as elective, but possibly the barbarian kingships referred to in 6 (4). 10. 1295 a 11 sq. were of this type, or at any rate some of them, for they are not said to have been hereditary as well as elective.

12. καὶ τὸ δύναναι κ.τ.λ., 'and the fact of their possessing not the power of a tyrant, but only the dignity of a king, and yet being guilty of outrages.'

δύναναι μὴ κακτημένους τυραννικήν. Cp. 3. 14. 1285 a 18, ἔχουσι δ' αὖται τὴν δύναμιν πᾶσαι παραπλησίαν τυραννίσιν, and Plato, Gorg. 469 D, ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δυνάμεις τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγγόνεν.

15. ἀλλ' ὁ τύραννος, sc. τύραννός ἐστι. Cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 34 sq.

C. 11. 18. As to δῆλον see critical note.

19. ὥς δὲ καθ' ἑκαστον, sc. εἰπεῖν.

τῷ τὰς μὲν βασιλείας ἄγειν ἐπὶ τὸ μετρίωτερον. Μέν is taken up by αἱ δὲ τυραννίδες, 34. Aristotle's counsel to tyrannies is, however, substantially the same (see 1314 a 34 sqq.). For ἄγειν ἐπὶ τὸ μετρίωτερον cp. Plato, Tim. 48 A, Phaedr. 237 E. Plato had given the same advice as to kingship (Laws 690 D-E, 691 D sqq., esp. εἰς τὸ μέτρον μᾶλλον συνέστελλε). Aristotle probably has the Macedonian kingship in view, for the Molossian and Lacedaemonian kings did not need this advice, and there were not many other kingships for him to advise. As to the tendencies of the Macedonian kingship even previously to the Oriental triumphs of Alexander see vol. i. p. 278 sq.

21. πᾶσαν τὴν ἀρχήν, 'the office in its completeness': see notes on 1253 b 33 and 1271 b 34. Aristotle has before him in 19 sqq. Plato, Laws 691 D sqq.; perhaps he even remembers the phrase used by Plato in 691 D, πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν ἡφάνισεν αὐτῆς (i.e. τῆς ἀρχῆς).

αὐτοὶ τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The kings themselves become less despotic in authority and less disposed in character to exalt themselves above their subjects, and their subjects envy them less. Here Aristotle probably has in his memory Xen. Rep. Lac. c. 15. 8, αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ τιμαὶ οἴκοι ζῶντι βασιλεῖ δέδονται, οὐδέν τι πολὺ υπερφέρουσαι τῶν ιδιωτικῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἐβουλήθη οὔτε τοῖς βασιλεῦσι τυραννικὸν φρόνημα παραστήσαι οὔτε τοῖς πολίταις φθόνον ἐμποιῆσαι τῆς δυνάμεως.

23. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. Τοῦτο, the limitation of the royal

authority (cp. 20 sq.). Among the Chaonians and Thesprotians of Epirus, or at any rate among some of them, kingship had disappeared before the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2. 80). We infer that the power of the Chaonian and Thesprotian kings had been less limited. One indication of the limitation of kingship among the Molossians was that kings and people took an oath to each other from time to time, the kings engaging to rule in accordance with the laws and the people to preserve the kingship (Plut. Pyrrh. c. 5).

24. ἡ περὶ Μολοττοῦς βασιλεία is followed in 25 by ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων, just as in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 18 περὶ τούτους is followed in 25 by τούτων. See Bon. Ind. 579 b 43 sqq.

διέμεινεν does not imply that the Molossian kingship had ceased to exist, which was not the fact. For the aorist where we might expect the perfect see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 58, and Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. 2, § 386. 14 (ed. Gerth, § 386. 13).

25. καὶ ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle continues to follow in the track of Plato, Laws 691 D sqq. (cp. Epist. 8. 354 B, where however the institution of the ephorate is ascribed to Lycurgus), but, unlike Plato, he does not refer to the senate as a check on the kings. Perhaps he did not think it an effective check (cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 35—1271 a 18). Aristotle approves of the ephorate as a check on the kings, but not of the *ναυαρχία* (2. 9. 1271 a 37 sqq.). Plato (Laws 692 A) had ascribed the institution of the ephorate to a lawgiver later than Lycurgus, but Aristotle is the first to name Theopompus as its author. Herodotus (1. 65), Xenophon (Rep. Lac. c. 8. 3) and others (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 16, note 1) attribute its institution to Lycurgus. 'Plato (Laws 692 A) and Aristotle in the passage before us (cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 7 : Cic. De Rep. 2. 33. 58 and De Leg. 3. 7. 16 : Valerius Maximus, 4. 1. Ext. 8) represent the establishment of the ephorate as a weakening of the power of the kings, but this view is obviously an inference from the position of the ephors in the State in later times' (Gilbert, *ibid.*, p. 17, note 1). It does not appear in what other ways besides the establishment of the ephorate Theopompus moderated the power of the kings. With the double Lacedaemonian kingship compare the two kings of the Cadusii (Plut. Artox. c. 24, *ὅντων γὰρ δαεὶς ἐν τοῖς Καδουσίους βασιλείων, ἑκάτερου δὲ χωρὶς στρατοπεδεύοντος κ.τ.λ.*): it is not clear, however, whether the Cadusii had two royal

houses, like the Lacedaemonians, or only two kings. See as to Siam Frazer's Pausanias, 3. 312. Instances of more kings than one reigning at the same time are not rare: Waitz (*Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte*, 1. 283, note 4, and 1. 300 sq.) refers to cases of this among the Alamanni, Burgundians, Ostrogoths, Thuringians, and Franks. *Te* is here answered, as Richards points out, by *kai* introducing a clause little similar to the preceding one.

26. *μετριάσαντος*, sc. *τὴν βασιλείαν*. For the transitive use of this word cp. Plato, *Laws* 692 B, *ὅρκοις μετριάσαι ψυχὴν νίαν λαβοῦσαν ἀρχήν*.

29. *ἐλάττωρα* and 30. *μείζονα*. These forms of the acc. sing. are less frequently used by Attic writers than the shorter forms. Kühner, *Ausführl. gr. Gramm.* (ed. Blass), 1. 427, gives instances of their occurrence in Xen. *Cyrop.* 5. 4. 43 (*μείζονα*) and Hiero, 8. 5, where *καλλίονα* . . . *ἄνδρα* is followed in the next line by *καλλίω*. Cp. also Plato, *Tim.* 39 A and *Gorg.* 486 B.

30. *ὅπερ καὶ πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα κ.τ.λ.* The story is told also by Plutarch in *Lycurg.* c. 7 and *Ad Princ. Inerudit.* c. 1, and by Valerius Maximus, 4. 1. Ext. 8.

31. *εἰποῦσαν*, not *ἐρωτήσασαν*, because the remark was rather a comment than a question.

33. *οὐ δῆτα*, 'by no means': cp. *Rhet.* 3. 18. 1419 a 34 and Plato, *Gorg.* 449 E.

34. *αἱ δὲ τυραννίδες κ.τ.λ.* The two ways of preserving a tyranny differ in this:—in the first it is taken for granted that the subjects of a tyrant are necessarily hostile to him, and the aim is to make them *unable* to conspire against him by making them too poor and mean-spirited and too distrustful of each other, and also too busy and too well-watched, to do so, whereas in the second the aim is to make the subjects of the tyrant *indisposed* to conspire against him by inducing them to regard him as an *οἰκονόμος* and *ἐπίτροπος* of the State and not a *σφετεριστής* (1315 b 1 sq.). The first, again, is demoralizing both to the tyrant and to those over whom he rules, not so the second (1314 a 12–14, 1315 b 4–10). The first method is said by Aristotle to be that followed by most tyrants, not by all; he would not say that Peisistratus or Timotheus of the Pontic Heracleia ruled in this way. The account which he gives of the aims of most tyrants is sombre enough, here and there probably too sombre (as when he ascribes to the tyrants who were great

builders a deliberate purpose to make their subjects poor); he is partly led to make it sombre by the wish to place their actual mode of rule in the strongest possible contrast to that which he himself recommends. But we shall find when we examine the details of the picture that he borrows most of them from earlier authorities and that he is supported by their testimony. If the Greek race had been less opposed to despotic rule than it was, the methods of Greek tyrants would have been less black. Xenophon had already said that the tyrant cannot rejoice when his subjects are brave soldiers or when they become more prosperous and consequently less submissive to him (Hiero, 5. 3 sq.), and Plato had said of the rulers not only in tyranny but also in oligarchy and democracy, *φοβούμενος ἄρχων ἀρχόμενον οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε πλούσιον οὔτε ἰσχυρὸν οὔτ' ἀνδρείον οὔτε τὸ παράπαν πολεμικὸν ἐκὼν ἑάσει γίγνεσθαι ποτέ* (Laws 832 C: cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 4, 14 sq.). Aristotle was not the first to seek to lead the tyrant into a better path; Xenophon in the Hiero (cc. 9–11) and Isocrates in the Ad Nicoclem and the Helena (§ 32 sqq.) had already sought to do this; indeed it is possible that the counsel given by Aristotle that a tyrant should assimilate his rule as far as might be to that of a king had already been given by Dion under Plato's influence to the younger Dionysius (Plut. Dion, c. 10: [Plato,] Epist. 3. 315 D sq., 8. 354 A). It is to this method of preserving tyranny that the long examination of the causes of the fall of monarchy leads up, for if hatred anger and contempt are the most frequent causes of its fall, whatever tends to make tyranny less hateful irritating and contemptible must tend to preserve it. The traditional method of preserving tyranny, on the other hand, would in the long run add to its insecurity by intensifying the hatred anger and contempt with which it was regarded. It is possible that not a little in 1313 a 34–1314 a 12 was written in the hope that it might meet Alexander's eye and be useful in strengthening his sense of what is truly kingly in conduct at a time when some of the characteristics which Aristotle ascribes to the tyrant were disclosing themselves in him, but the counsels contained in this passage would also be useful to meaner men. Pupils of Greek philosophers sometimes became tyrants in after-life. Hermias of Atarneus and Clearchus, tyrant of the Pontic Heracleia, had been among Plato's hearers, and Duris of Samos the historian, who became tyrant of Samos, was a pupil of Theophrastus. Nothing is said in 1313 a 34–1314 a 12 of some

measures to which, according to c. 10. 1311 a 8-15, tyrants often had recourse, such as those of disarming the many (cp. c. 11. 1315 a 38) and driving them from the central city (see however note on 1313 b 4), nor of the emancipation of slaves, of which we hear in c. 11. 1315 a 37. If most Greek tyrants sought to preserve their tyrannies in the way described in 1313 a 34-1314 a 12, they chose rather a round-about way of doing so. According to c. 10. 1311 a 18 sqq., plotters against tyrannies belonged to the class of notables. If so, would not the banishment of the notables have made the tyrant secure? It is noticeable that we hear nothing of the employment by tyrants of a police, as distinguished from soldiers and a body-guard on the one hand and spies on the other.

36. *τούτων δὲ κ.τ.λ.* *Τούτων* = *τῶν παραδεδομένων τυραννικῶν* (cp. 1313 b 10, 1314 a 12 sq.). Tyranny is described in what follows by an enumeration of *τὰ τυραννικά*, just as democracy is described in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 17 sqq. by an enumeration of *τὰ δημοτικά*. *Τὸν Κορίνθιον* is added, as in Rhet. 1. 15. 1375 b 31, to distinguish this Periander from the tyrant of Ambracia (c. 10. 1311 a 39 sq.). It is not, however, added in 3. 13. 1284 a 26, 28, or in 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 20, or (for obvious reasons) in 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 25, 28. *Καταστήσαι*, 'instituted': cp. Plato, Rep. 410 B, *οἱ καθιστάντες μουσικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν παιδεύειν*. We know that Aristotle regarded Periander as the author of the advice to cut down those who overtop the rest (3. 13. 1284 a 26 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 20 sqq.). He also probably takes him to have sought to make his subjects busy and poor (1313 b 22: Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 59 in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 393), and to have been frequently at war (see note on 1313 b 28).

37. *πολλὰ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῆς Περσῶν ἀρχῆς ἔστι τοιαῦτα λαβεῖν*. So for instance the cutting down of those who overtop the rest (3. 13. 1284 a 41 sqq.), the encouragement of courtiership, and the employment of spies (see below on these points). The way in which the Persian kings ruled their subjects is well sketched in Plato, Laws 697 C sqq. For *ἔστι λαβεῖν* cp. 1314 a 32.

38. *ἔστι δὲ τὰ τε πάλαι λεχθέντα κ.τ.λ.*, 'and the things to which I refer are both the measures mentioned by me some time ago for the preservation,' etc. *Τὰ πάλαι λεχθέντα* refers according to Sus. to c. 10. 1311 a 15-22. For this use of these words cp. 1314 b 36, 2. 4. 1262 b 29, and 3. 11. 1282 a 15. *Τε*, which M^s P¹, but not Γ, omit, is apparently taken up by *καὶ μήτε συσσίτια ἔων κ.τ.λ.*, 41.

ὡς ὀδὸν τε, 'as much as is possible.' Cp. Plato, Rep. 387 C and Stallbaum's note, and also [Plut.] De Fato *in*it.

40. τὸ τοὺς ὑπερέχοντας κολοῦναι καὶ τοὺς φρονηματίας ἀναιρεῖν. Κολοῦναι does not necessarily imply ἀναιρεῖν, though the advice ascribed to Periander is thus interpreted in c. 10. 1311 a 20 sqq. To make away with men of high spirit would not be enough unless whatever tends to produce high spirit were also discountenanced (41 sqq.). For the non-repetition of τό before the infinitives in 1313 a 40—b 6 see note on 1263 a 15.

τοὺς φρονηματίας. See Liddell and Scott for other passages in which this rare word is used by Greek writers.

41. καὶ μήτε συσσίτια ἔαν μήτε ἑταιρίαν. The term συσσίτια here probably includes not only public meals but also private entertainments. Dionysius the Elder is said to have wished to stop his subjects' convivial dinner-parties (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Dionys. Sen. 7. 175 F). The tyrants were commonly experienced soldiers, and they seem to have borrowed this feature of their rule from the precautions which were adopted in besieged cities: cp. Aen. Poliorc. 10. 4, *τίς τε ἑορτὰς κατὰ πόλιν ἄγειν, συλλέγουσ τε ἰδίους μηδμοῦ μήτε ἡμέρας μήτε νυκτὸς γίγνισθαι, τοὺς δὲ ἀναγκαίους ἢ ἐν πρωτανείῃ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῃ φανερῷ τόπῳ· μηδὲ θέσθαι μάντιν ἰδίᾳ ἄνευ τῶν ἀρχόντων· μηδὲ δειπνεῖν κατὰ συσσιτίαν ἄλλ' ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν οἰκίαις ἐκάστους, ἔξω γάμου καὶ περιδείπνου, καὶ ταῦτα προαπαγγέλλοντας τοῖς ἀρχουσιν.* As to the hostility of tyrants to hetaeriae see Isocr. Nicocl. § 54, *ἑταιρείας μὴ ποιέσθε μηδὲ συνόδους ἄνευ τῆς ἐμῆς γνώμης· αἱ γὰρ τοιαῦται συστάσεις ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις πλεονεκτοῦσιν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς μοναρχίαις κινδυνεύουσιν*, where the speaker is a tyrant, and Dio Cass. 52. 36. 2. The hetaeriae referred to in the passage before us would be combinations of the wealthy and powerful, but even combinations of traders and artisans were discouraged under the Roman Empire and by Emperors as excellent as Trajan (Merivale, Romans under the Empire, cc. 63, 65, vol. 8. 61 sq., 146).

1. μήτε παιδείαν. As to the effect of education, and especially 1313 b. philosophical and gymnastic education, in inspiring high spirit see Plato, Phaedr. 269 E sqq. and Symp. 182 B sq., where it is implied that φιλοσοφία and φιλογυμναστία develop *φρονήματα μεγάλα* in the ruled, unwelcome to tyrants, and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 9: also Plut. Pericl. c. 4, *ὁ δὲ πλείστα Περικλεῖ συγγενόμενος καὶ μάλιστα περιθείς ὄγκον αὐτῷ καὶ φρόνημα δημαγωγίας ἐμβριθέστερον, ὅπως τε μετεωρίσας καὶ συνεξάρας τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῦ ἥθους, Ἀναξαγόρας ἦν ὁ Κλαζομίνος κ.τ.λ.* Musical education had a similar effect (Plut. Inst. Lac. § 14).

Dionysius the Elder had kept his son the younger Dionysius uneducated because of this (Plut. Dion, c. 9 sq.). Contrast Hipparchus as described in the Hipparchus, 228 C, *ταῦτα δ' ἐποίησεν βουλόμενος παιδεύειν τοὺς πολίτας* κ.τ.λ. It will be noticed that *παιδεία* is tacitly distinguished from *σχολαί*, which are mentioned separately in 3. Tyrants objected to *παιδεία* because it produced high spirit and mutual confidence, to *σχολαί* because they tended to make the citizens well acquainted with each other.

ἀλλὰ πάντα φυλάττειν κ.τ.λ. *Φυλάττειν*, 'to keep an eye upon,' as in c. 8. 1308 a 31 sqq. Among the things referred to would be close friendship between individuals (see Plato, Symp. 182 B-C and Athen. Deipn. 602 a—d).

3. *καὶ μήτε σχολᾶς* κ.τ.λ. The word *σχολή* appears to be here used of a gathering (cp. *ἄλλους συλλόγους σχολαστικούς*) for the intellectual employment of leisure, probably under a head, and especially a gathering for the study of philosophy or rhetoric (Plut. De Exil. c. 14: Dec. Orat. Vitae, 6, Aeschines, 840 E). The earliest use of the word in this sense appears to be that in Alexis, *Ὀλυμπ.* Fragn. (Meineke, Fragn. Com. Gr. 3. 455), *ταὺτ' οὐ σχολή Πλάτωνος*; The word *διατριβή* was used in the law of Sophocles the Sunian which in B.C. 316 enacted *μὴ ἐξεῖναι μηδενὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν διατριβὴν κατασκευάσασθαι* (Pollux, 9. 42). The *ἄλλοι σύλλογοι σχολαστικοί* would include gatherings in gymnasia and palaestrae (Plato, Laws 935 B), to both of which tyrants were occasionally hostile (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 9: Athen. Deipn. 602 d), and in *ieschae*, as to which see Liddell and Scott s.v. We read in Plut. Arat. c. 3 that Abantidas, tyrant of Sicyon in the days of Aratus, attended some gatherings in the agora for philosophical discussion, with the result that the opportunity was seized to assassinate him. *Σύλλογοι σχολαστικοί* stand in tacit contrast to *σύλλογοι πολιτικοί* (Rhet. ad Alex. 38. 1445 a 39 sq.: Plato, Gorg. 452 E), and probably also to other gatherings for business purposes. With gatherings of a purely business character tyrants would be the less disposed to interfere as they liked their subjects to be busy and unable to plot. Some tyrants appear to have sought to limit festivals (see next note). Charles II tried to close the coffee-houses in 1675 (Boase, Oxford, p. 163), but no doubt only with the object of checking inconvenient discussion, not with the object which Aristotle ascribes here to the tyrant. When tyrants did not forbid *σύλλογοι*, they often sent spies to them to report what was said (13 sqq.).

4. καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ. Under this head the measure of driving people from the central city to which tyrants occasionally resorted may possibly be included (c. 10. 1311 a 13 sq.). So in Cephallenia a tyrant, the son of Promnesus, *έορτὰς πλέον δυοῖν οὐκ ἐπέτρεπεν οὐδ' ἐν πόλει διατᾶσθαι πλέον ἡμέρας δέκα τοῦ μηνός* ([Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. § 32 : Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* 2. 222).

6. καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας κ.τ.λ., 'and the plan that those staying in the city shall be always visible and shall hang about the palace-gates.' Vict. takes τοὺς ἐπιδημοῦντας to mean 'peregrini externique homines qui urbem visunt': Lamb. translates 'cives qui non absunt peregre,' and so Coray. But perhaps the words refer to all staying in the city, whether citizens or strangers (Welldon, 'the residents in the city'). Greek tyrants seem to have expected all persons staying in the city to 'hang about their palace-gates,' mainly in order that they might be visible and their doings known, but the original author of the corresponding Persian custom, Cyrus, if Xen. *Cyrop.* 8. 1. 6-8, 16-20 may be trusted, enforced this only on subjects of his own of high rank, and his object was to have them at hand for any service which he might require of them. It is in a similar form that the custom survives to the present day in Chitral. 'Once during the year every leading man in the country is expected to come to Chitral to pay his respects to the Mehtar, and to remain in attendance on him for a couple of months or so. He has to attend the daily durbars and help the Mehtar with advice about the affairs of the State. . . . In this manner there is a constant ebb and flow from the provinces to the capital; the provincial people get to know what is going on at head-quarters, and the Mehtar becomes acquainted with those he rules' (Capt. Younghusband on Chitral, *Times*, March 26, 1895). There is much to be said for the custom in this form; it evidently does something in a rude way to make up for the absence of a representative Parliament. Xenophon, in fact (*Cyrop.* *ibid.*), approved the Persian custom, and not without reason, whatever we may think of his approval (see below on 11) of another Persian custom for which there is less to be said, that of encouraging the king's subjects to act as spies on each other. Philip of Macedon had drawn the sons of the Macedonian nobles to court and made pages of them (Abel, *Makedonien vor König Philipp*, p. 133), and there was some wisdom in that measure also. But customs of this kind may easily be carried too far. Louis XIV in France 'turned the governing aristocratic class into courtiers'

(Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, p. 262). The Duke of Wellington said of the grandees of Spain (Lord Stanhope, Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, p. 1), 'They are all at Madrid: none of them according to the ancient system could leave the Court without a special permission from the king,' and again (ibid. p. 56), 'They are so abased as to consider leaving the Court under any circumstances the greatest misfortune . . . It has been the constant policy of the government during many reigns to keep them in dependence,' and (p. 188: see also p. 79), 'Long habit has made them neither more nor less than domestics of the Palace; the Royal Household is everything to them.' Aristotle probably has before him Isocr. Paneg. § 151, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς διὰ τὰς μοναρχίας ταπεινὰς καὶ περιδεῖς ἔχοντες, ἐξεταζόμενοι πρὸς αὐτοῖς τοῖς βασιλεῖσι καὶ προκαλινδούμενοι καὶ πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες, θνητὸν μὲν ἄνθρωπον προσκυνοῦντες καὶ δαίμονα προσαγορεύοντες, τῶν δὲ θεῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀλιγωροῦντες. For διατρίβειν περὶ θύρας cp. Theopomp. ap. Athen. Deipn. 252 b, ἀκούων μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν Περσῶν τοὺς περὶ τὰς θύρας διατρίβοντας, οἰόμενος δὲ διὰ τῆς θεραπείας ταύτης χρηματισέσθαι μᾶλλον παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως: Diod. 14. 26. 7, Τισσαφέρης δὲ τοὺς μὲν στρατηγούς εἰς τὴν σκηνὴν ἐκάλεσεν, οἱ δὲ λοχαγοὶ πρὸς ταῖς θύραις διέτριβον: and Diod. 14. 25. 1. See also Dio Chrys. Or. 8. 284 R.

7. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἤκιστα λανθάνοιεν τί πράττουσι. Cp. Plato, Theaet. 174 B, τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸν τοιοῦτον ὁ μὲν πλησίον καὶ ὁ γείτων λείληθεν, οὐ μόνον ὃ τι πράττει, ἀλλ' ὀλίγου καὶ εἰ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν ἢ τι ἄλλο θρέμμα.

8. καὶ τᾶλλα κ.τ.λ., 'and the other Persian and barbarian customs of a similar kind.' Among these Aristotle perhaps refers to the προσκύνῃσις or adoration of the Persian king: cp. Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 36, τὰ βαρβαρικά, οἷον προσκυνήσεις καὶ ἐκστάσεις, and Isocr. Paneg. § 151 (quoted on 6), together with Plut. Alex. c. 54.

11. καὶ τὸ μὴ λανθάνειν πειρᾶσθαι κ.τ.λ. Just as the residents in the city are to be visible (6 sqq.), so the sayings and doings of the tyrant's subjects are to be made known to him. Isocrates advises Nicocles, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus, δεινὸς μὲν φαίνεται τῷ μηδὲν σε λανθάνειν τῶν γιγνομένων (Ad Nicocl. § 23). This custom came from Persia (Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 10-12, where Xenophon approves it). We read of Midas, king of the Phrygians, in Conon ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 186 (p. 130 b 40 Bekker), Μίδας δὲ πολλοὺς ἔχων ἀπαγγέλλοντας αὐτῷ τὰ ὅσα ἐλέγετό τε καὶ ἐπράττετο τοῖς ὑπηκόοις, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ ἀνεπιβουλεύτῳ τὴν βασιλείαν ἔχων καὶ εἰς γῆρας ἐλθὼν, μακρὰ ὄντα ἔχειν

ἐλέχθη, and of Caracalla in Xiphilinus' Epitome of Dio Cass. Hist. Rom. 77. 17, πάντα γὰρ δὴ οἱ πανταχόθεν καὶ τὰ βραχύτατα ἀνηγγέλλετο· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς ὠτακουστοῦντάς τε καὶ διοπτεύοντας αὐτὰ προσέταξεν ἵπῳ μηδενὸς πλὴν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κολάζεσθαι.

12. οἷον περὶ Συρακούσας κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plut. De Curios. c. 16, καίτοι τοὺς γε τυράννους, οἷς ἀνάγκη πάντα γινώσκειν, ἐπαχθεστάτους ποιεῖ τὸ τῶν λεγομένων ὄτων καὶ προσαγωγέων γένος· ὠτακουστάς μὲν οὖν πρῶτος ἔσχεν ὁ νέος Δαρεῖος ἀπιστῶν ἑαυτῷ καὶ πάντας ὑφορώμενος καὶ δεδοικώς, τοὺς δὲ προσαγωγίας οἱ Διονύσιοι τοῖς Συρακουσίοις κατέμψαν κ.τ.λ., and Plut. Dion, c. 28, both of which passages speak of these spies as men, not women. Hence Sepulveda (p. 181 sq.) would read οἱ προσαγωγίδαι καλούμενοι, and Sus. οἱ ποταγωγίδαι καλούμενοι, but Grote (Hist. of Greece, Part 2. c. 83, vol. 11. 69) has already pointed out that women may very possibly have been employed on this service as well as men. I may refer to Polyaen. Strateg. 5. 2. 13 : compare also the account given by Megasthenes (ap. Strab. p. 707) of the Indian caste of spies (ἑφοροί), who συνεργοὺς ἐποιοῦντο τὰς ἐταίρας.

13. καὶ τοὺς ὠτακουστάς κ.τ.λ. Π¹ Sus. add οὗς after ὠτακουστάς, but probably wrongly : compare for the structure of the sentence, in which οἷον is followed by καί, c. 6. 1306 a 1 sqq. (ὥσπερ followed by καί) and c. 10. 1312 a 1—6 (ὥσπερ and καί), and also 3. 13. 1284 a 38—b 3 (οἷον followed by δέ), 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 36—b 1 (οἷον and δέ), and 5 (8). 5. 1340 b 4 sq. (οἷον and δέ). Pindar gives many counsels to Hiero in his Second Pythian Ode (73 sqq. Bergk) against encouraging secret delation. The tyrants of Cyprus employed spies called Gergini (Clearch. Sol. Fragm. 25 : Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 2. 311).

14. συνουσία καὶ σύλλογος. The word συνουσία tends to be used rather of friendly gatherings for social intercourse than of gatherings of a more formal and public kind (cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 22 and Plato, Rep. 573 A), whereas the word σύλλογος, though it is used of convivial gatherings (e.g. in Plato, Laws 671 A) and generally of σύλλογοι σχολαστικοί (see note on 3), and of gatherings for worship and sacrifice (Plato, Laches 187 E and Laws 935 B), is used fully as much of public as of private gatherings (Phaedr. 261 A), and frequently of public meetings for debate and of deliberative and judicial assemblies. The presence of spies at convivial parties of friends, where 'in vino veritas' prevailed, would be especially intolerable.

16. καὶ τὸ διαβάλλειν ἀλλήλοις κ.τ.λ. For the construction διαβάλλειν τινὰ τινί see Plato, *Phaedo*, 67 E, εἰ γὰρ διαβέβληται μὲν πανταχῇ τῷ σώματι (with Stallbaum's note), and Plut. *De Adulatore et Amico*, c. 9, δ δὲ καὶ Διονυσίῳ Δίωνα καὶ Σάμον Φιλίππῳ καὶ Κλεομένη Πτολεμαίῳ διέβαλε καὶ ἀπόλεσεν.

18. τὸν δῆμον τοῖς γυνώμοις. We read of Panaetius at Leontini in Polyæn. *Strateg.* 5. 47, Παναίτιος Λεοντίνων Μεγαρεῦσι πολεμούτων περὶ γῆς ὄρων πολεμαρχῶν πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς πένητας καὶ πεζοὺς τοῖς εὐπόροις καὶ ἱππεύσι συνέκρουσεν κ.τ.λ. Cp. also Hdt. 1. 59, τούτων δὲ ὢν τῶν ἐθνέων τὸ μὲν Ἀττικὸν κατεχόμενόν τε καὶ διεσπασμένον ἐπυνθάνετο ὁ Κροῖσος ὑπὸ Πεισιστράτου τοῦ Ἰπποκράτεος, τούτων τὸν χρόνον τυραννεύοντος Ἀθηναίων.

τοὺς πλουσίους ἑαυτοῖς. It is not easy to set the ἐπεικεῖς at variance among themselves (1314 a 19 sqq.); hence Aristotle speaks only of the rich.

καὶ τὸ πένητας ποιεῖν κ.τ.λ. This is suggested by Plato, *Rep.* 567 A, οὐκοῦν (sc. πολέμους κινεῖ ὁ τύραννος) καὶ ἵνα χρήματα εἰσφέροντες πένητες γιγνώμενοι πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀναγκάζονται εἶναι καὶ ἡττον αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύωσι; Translate, 'and making the ruled poor is characteristic of the tyrant, in order that not only may no guard be kept on foot (by the citizens), but that they may also be too busy to conspire against their master, being absorbed in their daily needs.' In 18-29 the tyrant is described as keeping his subjects busy by making them too poor to live without working hard, and by engaging them in constant wars. As to μήτε . . . καὶ compare what is said of οὔτε . . . καὶ in the critical note on 1261 b 7. Οὔτε . . . καὶ occurs also in Plut. *Tib. Gracch.* c. 21 *ini.* It appears to be used in a somewhat similar way to οὔτε . . . τε, as to which see notes on 35 and 1272 b 19. Μῆτε φυλακὴ τρέφεται has been interpreted in more ways than one. See the notes of Sepulveda, Vict., and Giph. The interpretation given above seems to me the most natural one. That a citizen-force sometimes subsisted side by side with the tyrant's mercenaries we see from Diod. 11. 67. 5, where we read of Thrasybulus of Syracuse, καθόλου δέ, μισῶν καὶ μισούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδικουμένων, μισθοφόρων πλῆθος ἐξενολόγησεν, ἀντίταγμα κατασκευάζων ταῖς πολιτικαῖς δυνάμεσιν. There would of course be an end of this force when the citizens were deprived of their arms, but the tyrant might be glad to make them too poor to keep it up, and so to save himself the trouble of disarming them. Another interpretation of μήτε φυλακὴ τρέφεται is 'in order that no guard may have to be kept

on foot by the tyrant,' but, as Vict. points out, it would hardly be safe for him to dispense with a guard, however poor his subjects might be. Vict., followed by Giph. Bekk.² and others, would read *ἦ τε* for *μήτε*, but Thurot remarks (*Études sur Aristote*, p. 86), 'un tyran n' appauvrit pas ses sujets *pour* entretenir une garde, mais *en* entretenant une garde,' and indeed impoverishing the ruled seems a strange way of securing the maintenance of the tyrant's body-guard, for the poorer they became, the less able they would be to contribute the revenue needed for its support. A design to keep the citizens busily employed is ascribed to the tyrant Aristodemus of Cumae in Plut. De Mul. Virt. c. 26 (referred to by Dümmler, *Rhein. Mus.* 42. 186), *ἔτυχε δὲ κατ' ἐκεῖνο καιροῦ τάφρον ἄγων κύκλω περὶ τὴν χώραν ὁ Ἀριστόδημος, οὗτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἔργον οὔτε χρήσιμον, ἄλλως δὲ τριβεῖν καὶ ἀποκραῖεν πόνοις καὶ ἀσχολίαις τοὺς πολίτας βουλόμενος· ἦν γὰρ προστεταγμένοι ἐκάστῳ μέτρων τινῶν ἀριθμὸν ἐκφέρειν τῆς γῆς.* The device of preventing plots by keeping men busy was another of those which the experience of tyrants as military leaders would be likely to suggest to them: see note on 1313 a 41 and cp. Polyæn. Strateg. 3. 9. 35 and Justin, 20. 1. 1. 'While the embankment' protecting Mandalay from the floods of the Irrawaddy 'was being constructed, Mindone Min,' a recent king of Burmah, 'complacently remarked to an European gentleman resident in Mandalay, "When my troops come back to the palace after a hard day's work, they are too tired to think of conspiring against me"' (*Times*, Sept. 21. 1886). Slaves were also kept in order in this way (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 20 sq., where see note).

21. *παράδειγμα δὲ τούτου κ.τ.λ.* *Τούτου=τοῦ πένητος ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους κ.τ.λ.* The pyramid-building Kings of Egypt had been represented in a similar light by Herodotus (2. 124 sqq.), who dwells on the forced labour which they exacted from their subjects. Aristotle seems rather to have in view the fiscal exactions of the pyramid-builders as well as of the Cypselidae, Peisistratidae, and Polycrates.

22. *τὰ ἀνάθηματά τῶν Κυψελιδῶν.* As to the offerings of the Cypselidae at Delphi and Olympia see Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ed. 2, 1. 641, and Sus.², Note 1720. The chief of them was a colossal golden statue of Zeus in the Heraeum of Olympia, as to which see Plato, Phaedrus, 236 B, and Suidas, *Κυψελιδῶν ἀνάθημα*, where we find the following fragment of Theophrastus (Fragm. 128 Wimmer), which shows in all probability that Theophrastus was acquainted with the

passage before us, καὶ γὰρ Θεόφραστος ἐν τῇ περὶ καιρῶν β' λέγει οὕτως. ἕτεροι δ' εἰς ἀνθρωδέστερα καταδαπανῶντες, οἷον στρατείας ἐξάγοντες καὶ πολέμους ἐπαναιρούμενοι, καθάπερ καὶ Διονύσιος ὁ τύραννος· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ οὐ μόνον ᾤετο δεῖν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων καταναλίσκειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἐφόδιον τοῖς ἐπιβουλευουσιν· εἰκάσι δὲ καὶ αἱ πυραμίδες ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ ὁ τῶν Κυψελιδῶν κολοσσὸς καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ παραπλησίαν ἔχειν διάνοιαν. The passage from Didymus which precedes this fragment in Suidas' article may also be based on Theophrastus, Δίδυμος δὲ κατασκευάσαι τὸν κολοσσόν φησι Περίανδρον ὑπὲρ τοῦ τῆς τρυφῆς καὶ τοῦ θράσους ἐπισχεῖν τοὺς Κορινθίους.

23. καὶ τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου ἡ οἰκοδόμησις ὑπὸ τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν. In place of Ὀλυμπίου we should probably read (with Sus.) Ὀλυμπείου (see Liddell and Scott s. v.). The form τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου, however, is found in the MSS. even of Plato (Phaedr. 227 B). In those of Diodorus and Strabo it is of frequent occurrence (see Diod. 13. 6. 4, 82. 1 : 16. 83. 2 : 20. 29. 3 : 23. 18. 2 ; and Strabo, pp. 396 and 404). The building of the temple of the Olympian Zeus at Athens, which remained unfinished till the time of Hadrian, is here attributed to the Peisistratidae, but Peisistratus is commonly said to have begun it (Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 342), and perhaps he is included under the term Peisistratidae, just as Cypselus is included among the Cypselidae in c. 12. 1315 b 22 sqq. See as to the temple Frazer, Pausanias, 2. 178 sqq. One of the motives of Peisistratus in building it may have been a wish to outshine his old foe Megara, for there was an Olympieum at Megara (Paus. 1. 40. 4). For the absence of a second ἡ before ὑπὸ τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν see note on 1334 b 12.

24. καὶ τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργα Πολυκράτεια. Schneider appears from his note on this passage (Politica, 2. 350), if I understand it aright, to take τῶν as masc. and to supply τυράννων with it (cp. τῶν Πεισιστρατιδῶν and τῶν Κυψελιδῶν in the preceding lines), and if we interpret the passage thus, we might account for the absence of the article in ἔργα Πολυκράτεια as we account for its absence in 3. 14. 1285 b 12, τοῦ σκῆπτρου ἐπανάτασις (see note). But it is more likely that the interpreters generally are right in supplying ἔργων with τῶν and taking τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργων as a partitive genitive. The meaning of the words will then be 'and among the works at Samos those of Polycrates.' If, however, we take the passage thus, it seems necessary either to read (with Coray) τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργων τὰ Πολυκράτεια, or else (with Sauppe and Sus.) to change τῶν into τὰ and to

read τὰ περὶ Σάμον ἔργα Πολυκράτεια. Herodotus (3. 60) describes three great works at Samos, but does not say that any of them were built by Polycrates. One of Polycrates' works was probably the palace which Caligula at one time designed to restore (Suet. Calig. c. 21).

25. καὶ ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν κ.τ.λ. Dionysius the Elder's taxes appear to have been, at all events for a time, at the rate of twenty per cent. not on his subjects' income, but on their property. According to the comic poet Alexis (Πυλαΐαι, Fragm. ap. Athen. Deipn. 226 a Meineke) the fishmongers went even further,

λαμβάνοντες βασιλικούς

φόρους. B. φόρους μόνον; οὐχὶ δεκατεύουσι γὰρ

τὰς οὐσίας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθήμενοι,

ὅλας δ' ἀφαιροῦνται καθ' ἐκίστην ἡμέραν.

The period at which Dionysius' taxes were so heavy probably fell within the first ten years of his tyranny, several of which were years of war with Carthage, when the land and sea forces kept on foot by him were very large (Diod. 2. 5. 6), but it is clear from 1314 b 14 sqq. that in Aristotle's view Dionysius' revenue was not levied simply for the defence of the State. Compare the story told of Cypselus in Oecon. 2. 1346 a 32 sqq.

28. ἔστι δὲ καὶ πολεμοποιὸς ὁ τύραννος κ.τ.λ. This is suggested by Plato, Rep. 566 E, πρῶτον μὲν πολέμους τινὰς αἰὲ κινεῖ, ἢ ἐν χρεῖᾳ ἡγεμόνος ὁ δῆμος ἦ, and the passage from Rep. 567 A quoted above on 18. We read of Periander in Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 59 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 393), ἐστρατεύετο δὲ συνεχῶς καὶ ἦν πολεμικός. But both Plato and Aristotle probably have Dionysius the Elder especially in view (cp. Theophr. Fragm. 128, quoted on 22, and Diod. 14. 7. 1, 68. 1, 75. 3). The true king is not φιλοπολεμος (see Bücheler in *Rhein. Mus.* 42. 198). For ὅπως δὴ ('in order that forsooth') cp. ἵνα δὴ, Plato, Rep. 420 E, 610 C, Xen. Hell. 4. 1. 26. It should be noticed that tyrannies ran some special risks in time of war: thus the subjects of Dionysius the Elder rejoiced at his proposal of a war with Carthage, for they looked forward to regaining their arms and hoped that when they had done so, some opportunity would offer of regaining their freedom (Diod. 14. 45. 5).

29. καὶ ἡ μὲν βασιλεία κ.τ.λ. Here and in what follows down to 1314 a 12 the tyrant is shown commonly to distrust all who in his view are likely to plot against him, and especially those who are likely to plot successfully, to love flatterers and bad men, to

hate and to regard as subverters of his rule persons whose free bearing leaves him with a sense of diminished greatness, and to choose as his daily companions those on whose complaisance he thinks he can count. Thus he distrusts those whom a good ruler would trust, friends and good men, and his favour is for slaves rather than freemen, women rather than men, aliens rather than citizens. The saying that kingship is saved by friends is one of those which are placed in the mouth of the dying Cyrus by Xenophon (Cyrop. 8. 7. 13, which is imitated by Sallust in De Bell. Iugurth. 10. 4). The distrust of tyrants for their friends is dwelt on first by Aeschylus, Prom. Vinc. 224,

ἔνεστι γάρ πως τοῦτο τῇ τυραννίδι
νόσημα τοῖς φίλοις μὴ πεποιθέναι,

and after him by Euripides (Fragm. 608 Nauck: 605, ed. 2), Xenophon (Hiero, 3. 7 sqq. : cp. 1. 38), and Isocrates (Hel. § 33, De Pace, § 112). No one distrusted his friends more than Dionysius the Elder (Diod. 15. 7. 3). He distrusted even his own son Dionysius (see note on 1313 b 1). We read of him in Plut. Dion, c. 9, *ἔλεγε δὲ τοὺς φίλους φυλάττεσθαι νοῶν ἔχοντας εἰδὼς καὶ βουλευμένους μάλλον τυραννεῖν ἢ τυραννίσθαι*.

31. ὥς βουλευμένων μὲν πάντων, δυναμένων δὲ μάλιστα τούτων. 'Ultro intelligitur ἐπιτίθεσθαι (confer 2. 10. 1272 b 16), et futile est quorundam codicum additamentum αὐτὸν καθελεῖν' (Vahlen on Poet. 14. 1453 b 17). For the thought cp. c. 10. 1312 a 6 sqq. and Rhet. 2. 5. 1382 a 32, *τοιαῦτα δὲ (i. e. φοβερά) ἔχθρα τε καὶ ὀργὴ δυναμένων ποιεῖν τι*· δηλον γὰρ ὅτι βούλονται, ὥστε ἐγγὺς εἶσι τοῦ ποιεῖν.

32. καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 27 sqq., where much the same thing is said, except that we do not hear of *γυναικοκρατία* there, but only of *ἀναρχία γυναικῶν*, and that the further trait of *ἀναρχία παιδων* is added, the tyrant being also alleged to favour 'living as one likes.' *Περὶ τὰς οἰκίας* is added to distinguish this kind of *γυναικοκρατία* from *γυναικοκρατία* in the administration of the State, as to which see 2. 9. 1269 b 31 sq. As to *δούλων ἀνεσις* in an extreme democracy cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 10 sqq., Plato, Rep. 563 B, and Demosth. Phil. 3. 3. Aristotle's statement is borne out by the account given of the state of things at Rome under Domitian in Plin. Paneg. c. 42 (referred to by Roscher, Politik, p. 594), where Pliny addressing Trajan says, *reddita est amicis fides, liberis pietas, obsequium servis: verentur et parent et dominos habent. Non enim iam servi nostri principis amici, sed nos sumus,*

nec pater patriae alienis se mancipiis cariores quam civibus suis credit. Omnes accusatore domestico liberasti unoque salutis publicae signo illud, ut sic dixerim, servile bellum sustulisti. One of the cries vociferously shouted by the senate after the assassination of Commodus was 'servis serviimus' (Ael. Lamprid., Commodus Antoninus, c. 19. 5). The freedman Milichus informed Nero of Piso's conspiracy against him (Tac. Ann. 15. 55). For καὶ . . . δέ used as here cp. Categ. 13. 14 b 33.

34. ἐξαγγέλλωσι 'seems to be used here in the special sense which comes out most in the ἐξάγγελος of tragedy' (Richards). See Liddell and Scott s. vv. ἐξαγγέλλειν, ἐξάγγελος.

35. οὔτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ., 'for slaves and women not only do not plot against tyrants, but must also feel goodwill both to tyrannies and to democracies, if they prosper under them.' For οὔτε—τε see note on 1272 b 19. Aristotle must be thinking of women unconnected with tyrants, for the murder of Alexander of Pherae was planned by his wife (Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 35), and according to Xen. Hiero, 3. 8 the same thing had happened to many other tyrants. The stories of Eryxo and Xenocrite are to be read in Plut. De Mul. Virt. cc. 25–26.

38. καὶ γὰρ ὁ δῆμος κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 11, 15 sq.

39. διὸ καὶ ὁ κόλαξ κ.τ.λ., 'the flatterer also,' as well as slaves and women. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 20 sqq.

1. καὶ γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο πονηρόφιλον ἢ τυραννίς. This charge 1314 a. against tyranny is of early date: cp. Hdt. 3. 80. χαίρει δὲ (ὁ τύραννος) τοῖσι κακίστοις τῶν ἀστῶν, and Eurip. Ion, 566 Bothe (626 Dindorf),
τύραννος ὢν,

ὃ τὰς πονηροὺς ἡδονὴν φίλους ἔχειν.

As to Dionysius the Elder see Theopomp. Fragm. 146 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. i. 303). We read in Plin. Paneg. c. 45, where Trajan is addressed, et priores quidem principes, excepto patre tuo, praeterea uno aut altero, et nimis dixi, vitiis potius civium quam virtutibus laetabantur. Χρηστοφιλία is an element in εὐδαιμονία (Rhet. i. 5. 1360 b 18 sqq.). Cp. also Diod. 12. 12. 4, where we read of Charondas, ὁ νομοθέτης ἀπηγόρευσε τῇ τῶν πονηρῶν φιλίᾳ τε καὶ συνηθείᾳ χρῆσασθαι καὶ δίκας ἐποίησε κακομιλίας, and Eth. Nic. 9. 3. 1165 b 15, οὔτε δὲ φιλητέον (φιλητὸν τὸ Stahr, Bywater) πονηρὸν οὔτε δεῖ· φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαῦλῳ· εἴρηται δ' ὅτι τὸ ὁμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. Διὰ τοῦτο, i.e. because tyrants love flatterers.

2. *κολακευόμενοι γὰρ χαίρουσιν*. So Isocrates (Epist. 1. 4) says to Dionysius the Elder, *καίτοι τινὲς ἤδη με τῶν σοὶ πλησιασάντων ἐκφοβεῖν ἐπεχείρησαν λέγοντες ὡς σὺ τοὺς μὲν κολακεύοντας τιμᾷ, τῶν δὲ συμβουλευόντων καταφρονεῖς*.

3. *φιλοῦσιν οἱ ἐπικεικῆς ἢ οὐ κολακεύουσιν*. "H here = 'aut certe.' For the use of *ἢ* in this sense see Bon. Ind. 313 a 26 sqq. Friendship excludes flattery, for the flatterer is defined as *φαινόμενος φίλος* (Rhet. 1. 11. 1371 a 23 sq.). Aristotle perhaps corrects himself by adding *ἢ οὐ κολακεύουσιν* because Plato had said in Rep. 568 A, *οἱ δ' ἐπικεικῆς μισοῦσιν τε (τὸν τύραννον) καὶ φεύγουσι*.

4. *καὶ χρήσιμοι οἱ πονηροὶ εἰς τὰ πονηρά*. The tyrant likes bad men not only for the pleasure their flatteries give him, but also because they are useful to him. Leucon, king of Bosphorus, once said, *ἀπέκτεινα ἂν σὲ νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, εἰ μὴ πονηρῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡ τυραννὶς ἰδεῖτο* (Athen. Deipn. 257 d). Compare also the quotation in Plut. De Aud. Poet. c. 4 *sub fin.* and De Vitios. Pud. c. 13, *ποτὶ τὸν πονηρὸν οὐκ ἄχρηστον ἔπλον ἂ πονηρία*.

5. *ἤλψ γὰρ ὁ ἦλος, ὥσπερ ἡ παροιμία*. "Ἠλψ ὁ ἦλος, sc. ἐκκρούεται. Aristotle's use of the proverb is not the usual one. It was commonly used of the driving out of a thing by a thing of the same kind (cp. *κακὸν κακῷ ἰᾶσθαι*), not of the execution of evil deeds by appropriate agents. See Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 253, 363 and 2. 116.

καὶ τὸ μηδενὶ χαίρειν σεμνῷ μηδ' ἐλευθέρῳ τυραννικόν. *Μηδενί* is of course masc. Aristotle remembers the lines in the 'Dionysius' of the comic poet Eubulus,

ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῖς σεμνοῖς μὲν αὐθαδέστερος κ.τ.λ.

(Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 3. 217). He possibly has in view the experience of Plato at the courts of Dionysius I and II (Diod. 15. 7. 1: Plut. Dion, c. 20), or that of the tragic poet Antiphon at the court of the former ([Plut.] Dec. Orat. Vitae, 1, Antiphon, 833 B: Phot. Biblioth. p. 486 a 35 sqq. Bekker), or that of Diodotus at the court of some tyrant in Asia, narrated by Isocrates in Epist. 4. § 7.

8. *ἀφαιρείται τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ δεσποτικόν τῆς τυραννίδος*. The flatterer, on the contrary, *διαφυλάττει τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῷ κολακευομένῳ* (Plut. De Adulatore et Amico, c. 10).

10. *καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Xen. Hiero, 6. 5, *ἔτι δὲ ξείνοις μὲν μᾶλλον ἢ πολίταις πιστεύειν, βαρβάρους δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ Ἕλλησιν*, where the tyrant is referred to. *Συνημερυνταί* are friends and favourites of the tyrant, *σύσσιτοι* are not necessarily so. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 7. 1158 a

8, φίλοι δ' οὐ πάντ' εἰσι διὰ τὸ μὴ συνημερεύειν μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις, ἀ δὴ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ φιλικά. See also Liddell and Scott s. v. συμβιωτής.

11. ὥς τοὺς μὲν πολεμίους τοὺς δ' οὐκ ἀντιποιομένους, 'in the view that citizens are hostile, whereas aliens do not act in opposition to him.' Cp. Xen. Hiero, 6. 14 and Isocr. De Pace, § 112. The absolute use of ἀντιποιεῖσθαι is rare. For the omission of ὄντας compare the omission of οὖσι in 19 and of ὄν in c. 10. 1312 a 37 after ἰκανόν.

12. ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κ.τ.λ. For the asyndeton see note on 1286 a 30.

13. οὐδὲν δ' ἄλλειπει μοχθηρίας, 'but they' (i. e. ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα) 'leave out nothing of badness' (so Vict. Lamb. Stahr and others: Welldon, however, following Sus., 'nor is there any villany from which he'—i. e. the tyrant—'shrinks'). Cp. Plato, Rep. 571 D, ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἔλλειπει: Tim. 20 C, ἐλλείψομεν προθυμίας οὐδὲν (with Stallbaum's note): Demosth. De Fals. Leg. c. 178, πολλὰ καὶ διὰ ἐργασμίνον . . . οὐδὲν ἔλλειποτά μοχθηρίας. In Plato, Symp. 210 A we have προθυμίας οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω (see Stallbaum's note). The line of conduct which Aristotle recommends to the tyrant has on the contrary nothing demoralizing in it (1315 b 8 sqq.).

16. μικρὰ φρονεῖν. In 29 and 1313 b 8 sq. we have μικρόν, not μικρά. Cp. μεγάλα δὴ φρονεῖ in Aristoph. Acharn. 988, and ὑπέρογκα φρονοῦντες in Phot. Biblioth. 120 a 29 sq. Bekker.

17. δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ διαπιστεῖν ἀλλήλοις. Cp. 1313 a 40 sqq., b 16 sqq.

18. πρὶν ἢ πιστεῦσώσι τινες ἑαυτοῖς. See note on 1336 b 21 and cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 20 sqq., and see Bon. Ind. s. v. πρὶν and Eucken, De Partic. Usu, p. 6.

21. διὰ τὸ πιστοὺς καὶ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἶναι. Cp. 3. 13. 1283 a 32 sq., Theogn. 69—72, and [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 5.

22. καταγορεύειν followed by a gen. is rare. See Liddell and Scott.

23. τρίτον δ' ἀδυναμία τῶν πραγμάτων, sc. σκοπός ἐστιν. Bonitz (Ind. 10 b 5) explains τῶν πραγμάτων as=τοῦ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικά. 'Ἀδυναμία τῶν πραγμάτων' appears to mean 'powerlessness for political action,' not, I think, 'a general incapacity for affairs' (Welldon). A lack of material strength seems to be especially referred to. Cp. for the expression Top. 6. 6. 145 b 1, ἵπνος ἐστὶν ἀδυναμία αἰσθήσεως, and De Gen. An. 4. 6. 774 b 35, διὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ ἰκτρίφειν.

24. ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς
ἐπιχειροῖ τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις

ὥστε οὐδὲ τυραννί
Chrysostom seems
δυνατὸν πᾶσις τε ἐξ
πανταχοῦ προστάττει

25. εἰς οὓς μὲν
polation by Schn

Poet. 4. 424),
'hierin ich mich

erkennen oder
entstandene W

especially as a
lation in 3. 7

here = σκοποῖ
τὰ βουλήμ

ἀξιώματα (sc
30. δι' οὗ

δι' ὧν τρόπ.
Inc. Fab.

In c. 6.

τοὺς φα

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represent himself as thus acting in a letter to Solon to him in Diog. Laert. i. 53, ἀπάγει δὲ ἕκαστος Ἀθηναίων τοῦ δουρὸς δεκάτην, οὐκ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ ὑπόθεν ἔσται ἀναλοῦν εἰς τε θυσίας καὶ εἰς τι ἄλλο τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἦν ὁ πόλεμος ἡμᾶς καταλάβῃ. ὡς τε κ.τ.λ., 'and broadly,' i. e. not merely in respect of sacrifices and liturgies, but in his whole dealings with the revenue. 15 b 2, μὴ σφετεριστὴν ἀλλ' ἐπίτροπον. So we read in Diod. 15. 1 of the kings of Cyrene after Battus I, τοὺς δὲ ὑστερον αἰὲς ἀποδιδόντες τὴν δυναστείαν ἐξιδιοποιήσασθαι μὲν τὰς δημοσίας προσόδους, ἀλλὰ οὐ τὰ δημόσια τῆς βασιλείας κτήματα. διὸ τὰς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποδιδόντας ὡς περὶ τυραννικὰς ἀκολασίας μισεῖν δεῖ, τὰς δὲ δημοσίας καὶ φιλανθρωπικὰς τῶν εἰσφορῶν ἀπαιτήσεις ὡς περὶ κηδεμονίαν τιμᾶν. A tyrant as ruler of public funds demands no more than the requirements of the State oblige him to demand and makes his demands in a considerate way. 3. καὶ φαίνεσθαι μὴ χαλεπὸν ἀλλὰ σεμνόν. Tyrants were often called χαλεπός: Arcesilaus II of Cyrene was called ὁ χαλεπός (Plut. De tyr. c. 1. Virt. c. 25 *infra*). As to Dionysius the Elder we read in Plut. De tyr. c. 1, non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 6, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ μείζον, ἔλαττον γὰρ τὸ κακὸν ἦν Ἀθηναίοις ἢ Λαχάρους, καὶ Συρακουσίοις ἢ Διονυσίου χαλεπότῃς, ἥπερ αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις ταραττόντες γὰρ ἐταράττοντο, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθαι κακῶς προσεδόκων ἐκ τοῦ προαδικεῖν καὶ λυμαινέσθαι τοὺς προεγγυμένους. It is implied in Isocr. Epist. 7. 2 that Clearchus, the tyrant of the Pontic Heracleia, was δύσκολος καὶ χαλεπός. As to Alexander of Pherae see Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 35: ἐπειράτο τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐκ τυράννου πρῶτον ἀρχόντα τοῖς Θεσσαλοῖς καὶ νόμιμον. Compare also [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebus publ. c. 32, ἐν Κεφαλληνίᾳ Προμηθεὺς τοῦ υἱὸς ἐκράτησε καὶ χαλεπός ἦν, and what Thucydides says of the tyrant of the Lacedaemonian Pausanias, when he was suspected of aiming at tyranny (Thuc. i. 130. 2). Σεμνότης, on the other hand, is characteristic of a king (Plut. Demetr. c. 2, βασιλικὴ σεμνότης: De aud. poet. c. 8. 26 E, σεμνότερος καὶ βασιλικώτερος). Isocrates had already given similar advice to Nicocles, tyrant of Salamis (Ad Nicocl. § 34).

19. ἔτι δὲ τοιούτων κ.τ.λ. Some tyrants sought to inspire fear in those who came in contact with them, for instance Clearchus of

24. ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις. Cp. Xen. Mem. 2. 3. 5, τί ἂν τις ἐπιχειροῖ τοῖς ἀδυνάτοις ;

ὥστε οὐδὲ τυραννίδα καταλύειν μὴ δυνάμεως ὑπαρχούσης. Dio Chrysostom seems to have this before him in Or. 1. 64 R, οὐ γὰρ δυνατὸν πόλεις τε εἰσφέρειν καὶ τυράννους ἀνθρώπους καταλύειν καὶ πᾶσι πανταχοῦ προστάττειν χωρὶς δυνάμεως.

25. εἰς οὓς μὲν οὖν ὄρους—29. φρονῶσιν is bracketed as an interpolation by Schn. Cor. and Bekk.², but Vahlen (Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 4. 424), whom Sus. follows, remarks as to this passage, 'hierin ich mich nicht entschliessen kann eine Interpolation zu erkennen oder eine aus der Nachlässigkeit des Lehrvortrags entstandene Wiederholung.' The question is not free from doubt, especially as a somewhat similar difficulty arises as to the recapitulation in 3. 5. 1278 a 40 sqq. (see note on 1278 a 34). Ὅρους here = σκοπούς, as in 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 33 (cp. 1342 b 17 sq.).

τὰ βουλήματα τῶν τυράννων. Cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 39, νυνὶ δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα (sc. τῶν δημοκρατιῶν) καὶ τὰ ἥθη καὶ ὧν ἐφίενται λέγωμεν.

30. δι' οὗ (not καθ' οὗ, as in 1313 a 35), cp. 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 15, δι' ὧν τρόπων πλεονεκτήσουσιν, Demosth. in Lept. c. 100, and Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 11 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 234),

πλὴν ἔν τι τῶν πάντων ἀδύνατον ἦν ἄρα

εὐρεῖν δι' οὗ τρόπου τις οὐ λυπήσεται.

In c. 6. 1305 a 37 sq. we have, still more remarkably, διὰ δύο τρόπους τοὺς φανερωτάτους.

31. ὁ δ' ἕτερος κ.τ.λ. For the phrase see note on 1297 b 18.

34. οὕτω τῆς τυραννίδος σωτηρία ποιεῖν αὐτὴν βασιλικωτέραν. Ποιεῖν, not τὸ ποιεῖν: see notes on 1330 b 10, 1331 b 28, and 1289 a 3. Plato may perhaps have given this advice to Dionysius II through Dion (see note on 1313 a 34).

36. τὴν δύναμιν, 'his power': cp. c. 10. 1313 a 12, δύναμιν τυραννικήν.

38. ὥσπερ ὑπόθεσιν, 'as a fundamental postulate' (cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 16 and 8 (6). 2. 1317 a 40).

39. τὰ δὲ δοκεῖν, sc. ποιεῖν. For instance, the tyrant is to seem to care for the public weal.

40. πρῶτον μὲν τοῦ δοκεῖν φροντίζειν τῶν κοινῶν κ.τ.λ. The tyrant will thus seem to resemble a king (c. 10. 1311 a 2 sqq.: 3. 7. 1279 a 33 sqq.).

1314 b. 1. μήτε δαπανῶντα (εἰς) δωρεὰς τοιαύτας κ.τ.λ. Μήτε—τε, 'not only not—but also' (see notes on 1313 b 35 and 1272 b 19). For the

addition of *eis* see critical note. For *τοιούτους ἐφ' αἷς* see note on 1266 b 36. For *τὰ πλήθη χαλεπαίνουν*, where a neut. pl. substantive is followed by a plural verb, see Bon. Ind. 490 a 44 sqq.

2. *ὅταν ἀπ' αὐτῶν μὲν κ.τ.λ.* *Γλίσχρους* goes with *λαμβάνουσιν* (Bon. Ind. s. v. *γλίσχρους*). Cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 91, *τοῖς δὲ τυράννοις ἔθος καθέστηκε τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων πόνοις καὶ κακοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡθονὰς παρασκευάζειν*, and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 16. l. 18 sqq. There may be a reminiscence here of some lines of Archilochus (Fragm. 142 Bergk², ap. Ael. Var. Hist. 4. 14), *πολλάκις τὰ κατ' ὀβολὸν μετὰ πολλῶν πόνων συναχθέντα χρήματα, κατὰ τὸν Ἀρχιλοχον, εἰς πόρνης γυναικὸς ἔντερον καταρρέουσιν*. The conjunction in the passage before us of the three unpopular classes, *ἐταῖροι ξένοι* and *τεχνίται*, is significant. Hiero I of Syracuse was famed for his bounty (Ael. Var. Hist. 9. 1), and especially for his bounty to aliens (Pindar, Pyth. 3. 71 Bergk, *ξείνους δὲ θανμαστὸς πατήρ*). Among the aliens favoured by tyrants would often be found poets and philosophers (Plato, Rep. 568 C: Athen. Deipn. 656 d). The *τεχνίται* would be of very various types; there would be not only practitioners of the fine arts but also cooks, physicians (Polycrates outbade Athens for the services of Democedes, Hdt. 3. 131), actors, dancers, makers of the remarkable dresses which tyrants loved to wear (Polyb. 6. 7. 7), and the whole tribe of craftsmen required for the outfit of a luxurious court. In addition to these there would be the *τεχνίται* employed in the equipment of the tyrant's army and fleet; thus we hear of Dionysius the Elder offering *δωρεὰς μεγάλαις τοῖς κατασκευάσασιν ὄπλα* (Diod. 14. 41. 4). Dionysius was no doubt munificent also to those who made the dies for his splendid coins, 'the finest of all the Syracusan coins both in gold and in silver' (Head, Hist. Num. p. 154). *Τεχνίται* are distinguished from aliens in the passage before us, but that many of them would be aliens we see from 3. 5. 1278 a 6 sqq. The rule of tyrants probably did much to add to the numbers of the metoeci in Greek States. The more luxurious they were, the more they would need the services of *τεχνίται*, and therefore of metoeci and other aliens.

3. *ὅπερ ἦδη πεποιήκασί τινες τῶν τυράννων*. Gelon (Diod. 11. 26. 5: Polyæn. Strateg. 1. 27. 1), and Micythus of Rhegium (Diod. 11. 66). We read of Caligula in Sueton. Calig. c. 16, *rationes imperii ab Augusto proponi solitas sed a Tiberio intermissas publicavit*. Compare what Pliny tells us of Trajan in Paneg. c. 20, where he adds, *adsuescat imperator cum imperio calculum ponere: sic exeat*,

sic redeat, tamquam rationem redditurus; edicat quid absumpserit. Ita fiet ut non absumat quod pudeat dicere. As to the use of the perfect with *ἦδη* see note on 1303 a 27.

6. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν τις διοικῶν κ.τ.λ. For the use of *διοικῶν* here without an expressed object see note on 1313 a 1.

7. οἰκονόμος ἀλλ' οὐ τύραννος, 'a steward of the State and not a tyrant': cp. 38, ὡς ἐπίτροπον ὄντα καὶ μὴ τύραννον, and 1315 b 1, οἰκονόμον καὶ βασιλικόν. A steward had to render an account, whereas a tyrant claimed to be ἀνυπεύθυνος (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 20). Οἰκονομικὴ ἀρχή is for the advantage of the ruled (3. 6. 1278 b 37 sqq.).

οὐ δεῖ δὲ φοβεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ. Giph. (p. 717) points out the similarity of the advice given by Maecenas to Augustus in Dio Cass. 52. 34. 10.

9. ἀλλὰ τοῖς γ' ἐκτοπίζουσι τυράννοις ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας κ.τ.λ. For ἀλλὰ . . γ' see note on 1311 b 15. Ἐκτοπίζειν is not often used in this sense. Καὶ συμφέρει, 'is expedient also' as well as right. Τοῦτο, i.e. the course just recommended, that of rendering an account of receipts and expenditure. It is implied that the adoption of this course would preclude the accumulation of a treasure. The first thing a tyrant usually did was to amass a great treasure by confiscation and heavy taxation (Lucian, Cataplus, c. 8: Diod. 14. 95. 5: Isocr. Epist. 7. 1). Aristotle's view was perhaps inherited by him from Dionysius the Elder (see the fragment of Theophrastus quoted above on 1313 b 22).

11. ἐπιτιθεῖντο. See critical note.

12. εἰσι δὲ φοβερώτεροι κ.τ.λ. Φοβερώτεροι τῶν πολιτῶν, 'more to be dreaded than the citizens.' For the fear which tyrants felt of those who guarded them and their treasure cp. Xen. Hiero, 1. 12 and 6. 4, 11: Isocr. De Pace, § 112, Hel. § 34: Polyæn. Strateg. 5. 2. 4: Plut. De Mul. Virt. c. 15 *init.* Cp. also Hdt. 3. 61 *init.* Dionysius the Elder often left his brother Leptines in charge of Syracuse, and Dionysius the Younger trusted Philistus in the same way (Dio Chrys. Or. 73: 2. 389 R).

14. ἔπειτα τὰς εἰσφορὰς κ.τ.λ., 'next the tyrant should evidently collect,' etc. For φαίνεσθαι with the participle see Bon. Ind. 808 b 40 sqq. φαίνεσθαι recurs in 18, 23, 33, 39, 1315 a 21, b 1 (in this last passage with the infin.). The tyrant must not only do the things recommended but be seen to do them (cp. 22 sq.). In collecting revenue only to the extent made necessary by the needs of the State he imitates the king (1315 b 1 sqq.). Peisistratus is

made to represent himself as thus acting in a letter to Solon ascribed to him in Diog. Laert. i. 53, ἀπάγει δὲ ἕκαστος Ἀθηναίων τοῦ αὐτοῦ κλήρου δεκάτην, οὐκ ἐμοί, ἀλλὰ ὀπόθεν ἔσται ἀναλοῦν εἰς τε θυσίας δημοτελεῖς καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἦν ὁ πόλεμος ἡμᾶς καταλάβῃ.

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18. καὶ φαίνεσθαι μὴ χαλεπὸν ἀλλὰ σεμνόν. Tyrants were often χαλεποί: Arcesilaus II of Cyrene was called ὁ χαλεπός (Plut. De Mul. Virt. c. 25 *init.*). As to Dionysius the Elder we read in Plut. Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, c. 6, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ μείζον, οὐκ ἔλαττόν γε τὸ κακὸν ἦν Ἀθηναίους ἢ Λαχάρους, καὶ Συρακουσίοις ἢ Διονυσίου χαλεπότῃς, ἥπερ αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις ταραττοντες γὰρ ἐταράττοντο, καὶ πείσεσθαι κακῶς προσεδόκων ἐκ τοῦ προαδικεῖν καὶ λυμᾶνεσθαι τοὺς προετυγχάνοντας. It is implied in Isocr. Epist. 7. 2 that Clearchus, the founder of the tyranny at the Pontic Heracleia, was δύσκολος καὶ χαλεπός. As to Alexander of Pherae see Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 35: Pelopidas, we read in Plut. Pelop. c. 26, ἐπειρᾶτο τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ποιεῖν ἐκ τυράννου πρᾶον ἄρχοντα τοῖς Θεσσαλοῖς καὶ νόμμον. Compare also [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. c. 32, ἐν Κεφαλληνίᾳ Προμηήσου υἱὸς ἐκράτησε καὶ χαλεπὸς ἦν, and what Thucydides says of the χαλεπότῃς of the Lacedaemonian Pausanias, when he was suspected of aiming at tyranny (Thuc. i. 130. 2). Σεμνότης, on the other hand, is characteristic of a king (Plut. Demetr. c. 2, βασιλικὴ σεμνότης: De aud. poet. c. 8. 26 E, σεμνότερος καὶ βασιλικώτερος). Isocrates had already given similar advice to Nicocles, tyrant of Salamis (Ad Nicocl. § 34).

19. ἔτι δὲ τοιοῦτον κ.τ.λ. Some tyrants sought to inspire fear in those who came in contact with them, for instance Clearchus of

Heracleia on the Euxine, of whom we read in Memnon (ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 224. p. 222 b 19 Bekk.), *ἐξαλλάττειν δὲ καὶ τοὺς χιτῶνας ἐπὶ τὸ φοβερόν τε καὶ ἀβρότερον*. Thucydides (6. 55. 3) speaks of τὸ *ξύνηθες τοῖς πολίταις φοβερόν* of Hippias. Kings, on the other hand, are *αἰδοῖοι* (Plato, Rep. 390 E : cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 51 R, *τοὺς δὲ προσιώντας* (sc. τῷ βασιλεῖ) καὶ ὀρώντας οὐκ ἔκπληξις οὐδὲ φόβος, ἀλλ' αἰδῶς ὑπείκει, πολὺν κρεῖττον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον φόβον). Pindar had praised Xenocrates, brother of Theron tyrant of Agrigentum, because he was *αἰδοῖος ἀστοῖς ὁμιλεῖν* (Isthm. 2. 37) : compare a saying of Pittacus (ap. Stob. Floril. 48. 47), *ἕκτος δ' ὁ Πιττακὸς (ἔφη εὐδαιμονίαν ἄρχοντος νομίζειν), εἰ τοὺς ὑπηκόους ὁ ἄρχων παρασκευάσειε φοβεῖσθαι μὴ αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ*, and one of Cheilon (ibid.), *ῥυπατός δ' ὁ Χεῖλων εἶπε, κάλλιστον εἶναι βασιλέα τὸν μὴ μόνου τοῦ φοβερόν εἶναι φροντίζοντα*. Cp. also Plut. Apophth. Lac. Polydor. 4. 231 F. Isocrates had said much the same thing as is here said by Aristotle (De Antid. § 122 : Ad Nicocl. § 23 : Evag. § 45), and a dictum of Epicurus ran (Usener, Epicurea, Fragm. 537), *οὐκ ἔστιν ἀφοβὸν εἶναι φοβερόν φανόμενον*. For the contrast of αἰδῶς and φόβος cp. Probl. 11. 53. 905 a 5 sqq., Plato, Euthyphro 12 B-C and Laws 886 A (with Stallbaum's note) : see also Pol. 4 (7). 12. 1331 a 41, where genuine αἰδῶς is connected with ὁ τῶν ἐλευθέρων φόβος.

21. *ὄντα εὐκαταφρόνητον*, 'if he is contemptible.'

καὶ μὴ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιῆται. Isocrates had said to Nicocles, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus (Ad Nicocl. § 11), *ὡς ἐνθυμούμενον χρή προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ὅπως ὅσοντες ταῖς τιμαῖς τῶν ἄλλων προέχεις, τοσοῦτον καὶ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς αὐτῶν διοίσεις*.

22. *ἀλλὰ τῆς πολεμικῆς* (sc. ἀρετῆς). As to πολεμικῆς see critical note. For the connexion of military and tyrannical tendencies see Plato, Soph. 222 C and Laws 831 E sq. Isocrates had already advised Nicocles, *πολεμικὸς μὲν ἵσθι ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς* (Ad Nicocl. § 24), and we read of the good tyrant Timotheus of Heracleia on the Euxine, *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς τῶν πράξεων ἀνδρείως ἐφέρετο* (Memnon ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 224. p. 223 b 19 Bekk.).

23. *ἔτι δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, 'and further not only should he himself manifestly avoid outraging any of the ruled, whether boy or girl, but also the men connected with him.' For *μὴ φαίνεσθαι ὑβρίζοντα* see note on 1261 a 9 sqq., *οὐ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον*. Dionysius the Elder sharply reproved his son Dionysius for seducing the wife of a free-man (Plut. Reg. et Imp. Apophth. Dionys. Sen. 3. 175 D sq.). We

read of Cato the Censor in Plut. Marc. Cato, c. 10, οὐ μόνον δ' αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν ἐφύλαττε καθαρὸς παντὸς λήματος: cp. (with Giph.) Cic. Epist. ad Quint. Fratrem, 1. 1. 3. 10. Cp. also Tac. Agric. c. 19, a se suisque orsus primum domum suam coercuit, quod plerisque haud minus arduum est quam provinciam regere.

26. ὥς καὶ διὰ γυναικῶν ὕβρεις κ.τ.λ. Giph. refers to Dio Cass. 60. 8. 4, ταῦτα μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦ τε τοῦ Κλαυδίου ἔργα ἦν καὶ ὑφ' ἀπάντων ἐπηνέιτο· ἐπράχθη δὲ καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα τότε, οὐχ ὁμοίотροπα, ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐξελευθέρων αὐτοῦ καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς γυναικὸς Οὐαλερίας Μεσσαλίνης. Contrast the account given in Plin. Paneg. c. 83 sq. of the bearing of Trajan's wife and sister.

28. περὶ τε τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς κ.τ.λ. Pittacus had advised Periander of Corinth μὴ μεθύσκεσθαι μηδὲ κωμάζειν, ἵν', ἔφη, μὴ γνωσθῇς οἷος ὢν τυγχάνεις, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷος προσποιῇ (Athen. Deipn. 427 e). Aristotle probably remembers the habits and fate of the younger Dionysius, of whom it was recorded in the Συρακοσίων Πολιτεία ascribed to his pen, that he was sometimes drunk for ninety days together (Athen. Deipn. 435 e: Plut. Dion, c. 7). According to [Plato,] Epist. 3. 315 B he addressed the Delphic Apollo thus,
χαῖρε καὶ ἡδόμενον βίον διδάσκει τυράννου.

Nicocles, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus, is also probably referred to, for we read of his competition in luxury with Strato, king of Tyre, in Theopomp. Fragm. 126 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 299), where Theopompus says of both in words which recall the passage before us, ἐσπούδαζον δὲ δοκεῖν εὐδαίμονες εἶναι καὶ μακαριστοί. The phrase εὐδαίμων καὶ μακάριος indicates the height of felicity: it is used of the gods (4 (7). 1. 1323 b 24: Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 b 9) and of tyrants (Plato, Rep. 344 B sq.). Cp. also Plato, Rep. 354 A, Laws 718 B etc. Warnings against drinking continued for many days together would not be thrown away on Alexander (Aelian, Var. Hist. 3. 23). 'Diocletian flattered himself that an ostentation of splendour and luxury would subdue the imagination of the multitude' (Gibbon, Decline and Fall, c. 13: vol. ii. p. 166, ed. 1812). For τοῦναντίον ποιεῖν ἢ νῦν ('as it is') τιπὲς τῶν τυράννων ποιοῦσιν cp. (with Vahlen, Beiträge zu Aristot. Poet. 4. 422 sq.) Anal. Post. 1. 17. 80 b 35, ληπτέαι γὰρ ἐναντίως ἢ ὥς ἔχουσιν αἱ προτάσεις: cp. also Pol. 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 29 sqq.

32. θαυμάσωσιν. So Π, except a correction in P^s which is of no authority: θαυμάζωσιν Bekk.^s Sus. 'MS. evidence apart, θαυμάζωσιν seems much more natural than θαυμάσωσιν, for Aristotle would

naturally speak of a lasting state of admiration, but the aorist may be used here of the entrance upon a state, like *ἐθάρσησα*, i. e. "that they may conceive, be struck with, admiration" (Richards).

33. *μετριάζειν τοῖς τοιούτοις*. Peisistratus *μετρίως ἐχρῆτο ταῖς ἡδοναῖς* (Theopomp. *Fragm.* 147: Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* 1. 303), and we read of Jason, tyrant of Pherae, in Xen. *Hell.* 6. 1. 16, *καὶ μὴν ἐγκρατέστατός γ' ἐστὶν ὃν ἐγὼ οἶδα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡδονῶν ὥστε οὐδὲ διὰ ταῦτα ἀσχολίαν ἔχει τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἀεὶ τὸ δεόμενον*.

36. *τοῦναντίον τε ποιητέον κ.τ.λ.* takes up *τοῦναντίον ποιεῖν*, 28.

τῶν πάλαι λαχθέντων refers to 1313 b 18-25. See note on 1313 a 39. A tyrant builds and adorns a city in order to make his subjects poor, an *ἐπίτροπος* with a view to their well-being.

38. *ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς κ.τ.λ.* In honouring the gods and men of merit the tyrant imitates the king: cp. Dio Chrys. *Or.* 1. 49 R, where Dio Chrysostom says of the king, perhaps with the passage before us in his memory, *ἔστι δὴ πρῶτον μὲν θεῶν ἐπιμελὴς καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον προτιμῶν . . . μετὰ δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελείται, τιμῶν μὲν καὶ ἀγαθῶν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς, κηδόμενος δὲ πάντων*. Some tyrants had been wanting in reverence for the gods, for instance the tyrants of Cyrene after Battus I (Diod. 8. 30. 1), and Dionysius the Elder (Diod. 14. 67. 4 and 69. 2: [Aristot.] *Oecon.* 2. 1353 b 20 sqq., 1349 b 33 sqq.: yet Dionysius built some temples, Diod. 15. 13. 5, and sent offerings to Delphi and Olympia, Diod. 16. 57). Cypselus (Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ed. 2, 1. 641) and Peisistratus (*ibid.* 2. 343 sqq.) followed a very different policy. Alexander of Pherae paid special reverence to the Dionysus of Pagasae (Head, *Hist. Num.* p. 261). Maecenas in Dio Cass. 52. 36. 1 gives Augustus the same advice as Aristotle gives the tyrant here. According to Machiavelli (Prince, c. 18) 'a prince should take the greatest care to look and to speak as if he were the incarnation of pity, good faith, humanity, integrity, and religion.'

39. *ἡττόν τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Xen. *Cyrop.* 8. 1. 25, *πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις ἐλογίζετο ὡς εἰ πάντες οἱ κοινῶς θεοσεβεῖς εἴεν, ἦττον ἂν αὐτοὺς ἐβόλευεν περὶ τὴν ἀλλήλους ἀνυσίαν τι ποιεῖν καὶ περὶ ἑαυτόν*, and Trag. *Gr. Fragm.* Adesp. 494 Nauck, ed. 2,

οὐδεὶς παρανομῶν πρὸς θεοὺς ἐχέγγυος.

- 1315 a. 1. *τὸν ἀρχοντα*. We expect *τοὺς ἀρχοντας*, but variations in number of this kind are not rare in Aristotle's writings: see Vahlen on *Poet.* 4. 1448 b 7.

2. καὶ ἐπιβουλευουσιν ἥττον κ.τ.λ. Cp. Hom. II. 17. 98 sq., Aesch. Sept. c. Theb. 596, *δεινὸς δὲ θεοὺς σέβει*, and Pindar, Fragm. 209,

ἴσων μὲν θεὸν ἄνδρα τε φίλον (θεῷ)

ὑποτρέσσαι.

Cp. also Plut. Timol. c. 16 *sub fin.*, Diod. 14. 69. 2, and Lucian, Dial. Mort. 14. 1, where Alexander says to his father in defence of his claim to be the son of Ammon, *οὐδεὶς ἔτι ἀνθίστατο οἰόμενοι θεῷ μάχεσθαι, ὥστε ῥᾶον ἐκράτουν αὐτῶν*. Dionysius the Elder was probably plotted against all the more because of his acts of sacrilege and impiety.

4. τοὺς τε ἀγαθοὺς περὶ τι γιγνομένους κ.τ.λ., i. e. skilled in the arts of peace or war, in oratory or in philosophy (cp. Xen. Cyneg. 1. 14, *ἐγένοντο καὶ τέχνας καὶ λόγους καὶ πολέμους ἀγαθοί*). The honours referred to would consist in social precedence, a place at the tyrant's table, rich dresses, etc. (Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 2 sqq. : 8. 3. 3 : 8. 6. 11). We read of the Persian king in Xen. Oecon. 4. 15, *φασὶ δὲ τινες, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης . . . καὶ ὅταν δῶρα διδῷ βασιλεὺς, πρῶτον μὲν εἰσκαλεῖν τοὺς παλέμφ ἀγαθοὺς γηγόνους . . . δεύτερον δὲ τοὺς κατασκευάζοντας τὰς χώρας ἄριστα καὶ ἐνεργοὺς ποιοῦντας κ.τ.λ.* Cp. also Hdt. 3. 154 and 7. 135, and Xen. Cyrop. 8. 4. 5. It was thought kingly to honour men of merit (Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 49 R, quoted above on 1314 b 38): tyrants were often jealous of such men and ungrateful to them; thus we read in Plut. De tranq. an. c. 12, *Διονύσιος ὁ πρεσβύτερος οὐκ ἡγάπα μέγιστος ὢν τῶν τότε τυράννων, ἀλλ' ὅτι Φιλοξένου τοῦ ποιητοῦ μὴ βέλτιον ἦδε, μηδὲ περιῆν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι Πλάτωνος, ὀργισθεὶς καὶ παροξυνθεὶς, τὸν μὲν εἰς τὰς λατομίας ἀνέβαλε (ἐνέβαλε ?), τὸν δ' ἀπέδοτο πέμψας εἰς Λέγναν*. Memnon (ap. Phot. Biblioth. Cod. 224. p. 222 b 21 sq. Bekk.) calls Clearchus, tyrant of Heracleia on the Euxine, *πρὸς τοὺς εὐεργέτας ἀχάριστον* (cp. Aesch. Prom. Vinc. 221 sqq.), and Pindar (Pyth. 3. 71 Bergk) is careful to speak of Hiero as *οὐ φθονίων ἀγαθοῖς* (cp. Isocr. Evag. § 43, *τοὺς χρηστοὺς τιμῶν*, and Plato, Laws 694 B). Peisistratus paid great honour to Solon (Plut. Solon, c. 31). Philip of Macedon, on the other hand, is described by Demosthenes (Ol. 2. 18) as jealous of his most efficient officers. Maecenas in Dio Cass. 52. 34. 9 gives Augustus similar advice to that given to tyrants here, and we read of Augustus in Suet. Aug. c. 38, *nec parcius in bellica virtute honoranda super triginta ducibus iustos triumphos et aliquanto pluribus triumphalia ornamenta decernenda curavit*. Pliny (Paneg. c. 44) perhaps has the passage before us in his memory when he says of Trajan, *eadem quippe sub*

principe virtutibus praemia quae in libertate, nec bene factis tantum ex conscientia merces.

6. καὶ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας τιμὰς κ.τ.λ., 'honours of the kind just mentioned,' i.e. honours paid to men of merit. This advice, as Giph. points out, is borrowed from Xen. Hiero, 9. 3, ἐγὼ οὖν φημι ἀνδρὶ ἄρχοντι τὸ μὲν τὸν ἀνάγκης δεόμενον ἄλλοις προστακτίον εἶναι κολάζειν, τὸ δὲ τὰ ἄλλα ἀποδιδόναι δι' αὐτοῦ ποιητέον. Maecenas in Dio Cass. 52. 31. 4 gives similar advice to Augustus, and Machiavelli (Prince, c. 19) recommends princes to leave odious functions ('cose di carico') to others and to reserve acts of grace ('quelle di grazie') for themselves.

7. δι' ἐτέρων, ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων, 'by the agency of others, magistrates and lawcourts.' For the epexegetis of ἐτέρων by ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 35, μάλιστα μὲν πάντας, ἐκκλησίαν δικαστήρια ἀρχάς, and Athen. Deipn. 21 f, ἀπὸ ποδῶν δὲ πλείους (κινήσεις φέρειν), ἐμβατηρίου καὶ χορευτικὰς. Sus. following Oncken brackets ἀρχόντων καὶ δικαστηρίων; but Welldon rightly abstains from following him in this. Cp. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 8 sqq., where the distribution of ungracious functions between magistrates and dicasteries is recommended.

8. κοινῇ δὲ φυλακῇ πάσης μοναρχίας κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 10. 1312 a 8 sqq. and c. 8. 1308 b 10 sqq. Aristotle probably thinks that Astyages and Amadocus would have been wiser if they had not heaped greatness on one person. Philip of Macedon made both Parmenio and Antipater great, and Alexander exalted no one of his generals above the rest.

10. εἰδὼν δ' ἄρα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 10. 1312 a 17 sqq. It may be safe to make a Burghley great but not an Essex.

For μή τοι . . . γε see critical note on 1308 b 15.

12. καὶ τῆς δυνάμεώς κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 8. 1308 b 15 sq. Aristotle is perhaps thinking of the sudden removal of Dion from power by Dionysius II. Contrast the way in which the emperor Alexander Severus dealt with Epagathus, the principal leader in the mutiny of the praetorian guards which ended in the murder of Ulpian. Epagathus 'was removed from Rome by the honourable employment of prefect of Egypt; from that high rank he was gently degraded to the government of Crete; and when at length his popularity among the guards was effaced by time and absence, Alexander ventured to inflict the tardy but deserved punishment of his crimes' (Gibbon, Decline and Fall, c. 6). The story of

Carmagnola illustrates Aristotle's counsel. Carmagnola had been made great by Filippo Maria Visconti, duke of Milan, but his greatness at length aroused the duke's jealousy. The duke removed him from the government of Genoa with the result that Carmagnola entered the service of Venice (H. F. Brown, *Venice*, p. 284). Wallenstein, suddenly dismissed by the emperor Ferdinand II, intrigued with Gustavus Adolphus (Gardiner, *Thirty Years' War*, p. 141). Napoleon's dismissal of Talleyrand from the office of High Chamberlain and the insults by which it was accompanied had ultimately important consequences, though they were long delayed (Chancellor Pasquier's *Memoirs*, Eng. Trans., vol. i. pp. 380—383).

13. The fem. form ἀθρόος is rare.

14. πάσης ὕβρεως. Under the head of ὕβρις fall, in addition to the two kinds here specified, verbal and other insults and arrogant outrages of all sorts.

15. παρὰ πάσας, 'above all others.' Eucken (*Praepositionen*, p. 61) compares Hist. An. 8. 19. 602 a 12, συμφέρει δὲ τοῖς κορακίνοις ὡς εἰπεῖν παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἰχθύς τὰ αὐχμώδη μᾶλλον τῶν ἑτῶν. Cp. also Plato, Rep. 424 B, παρὰ πάντα αὐτὸ φυλάττωσι.

τῆς τε εἰς τὰ σώματα [κολάσεως]. See critical note. For the phrase ὕβρις εἰς τὰ σώματα cp. Demosth. c. Mid. c. 179, πολλὰ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ μὴ τὸ σῶμα ἕκαστον ὑβρίζεσθαι πεποιήκασιν οἱ νόμοι.

17. For the distinction between δλιγωρία εἰς τὰ χρήματα and δλιγωρία εἰς ἀτιμίαν cp. c. 8. 1308 a 9 sq. The latter phrase evidently includes both the infliction of bodily punishment in a spirit of outrage and ἡ πρὸς τὴν ἡλικίαν δμυλία. The word δλιγωρία here takes the place of ὕβρις, but it is properly a wider term (Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 13 sqq.). For δλιγωρία εἰς τὰ χρήματα cp. Demosth. Or. 38. in Nausim. c. 21, τῶν εἰς χρήματα γιγνομένων ἀδικημάτων. For οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων see note on 1281 b 10.

20. ἢ τὰς μὲν κολάσεις κ.τ.λ., 'or manifestly to inflict the punishments which he inflicts in a paternal spirit.' The tyrant Alexander of Pherae is described in Plut. Pelop. c. 29 as inflicting punishment in sport (see J. A. Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy—Age of the Despots*, p. 138, for an account of the similar atrocities practised by Giovanni Maria Visconti). Aristotle has especially in view the treatment of Smerdis by Penthilus and of Decamnichus by Archelaus (c. 10. 1311 b 28 sqq.). Isocrates had already given tyrants similar advice (Ad Nicocl. § 23, cp. Evag. § 43, νομίμως δὲ τοὺς ἐξαμαρτόντας

κολάζων). It will be observed that Aristotle's counsel refers only to the punishment of φιλότιμοι, though he might well have extended it to punishment in general.

23. ὅλως δέ, 'and broadly,' i.e. in whatever way the apparent slight may have been inflicted, whether in connexion with punishment or ὁμιλία or other matters. Philip of Macedon did endeavour to conciliate Pausanias in the way which Aristotle recommends, but without success (Diod. 16. 93. 9). See note on 1311 b 1.

24. τῶν ἐπιχειρούντων ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος διαφθοράν. For the use of ἐπὶ with the acc. in Aristotle's writings to express the end or aim, cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 30 sq., and see Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 58, where De Part. An. 3. 1. 661 a 36, τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἢ τῶν ἰδόντων φύσις κοινὴ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς ἐργασίαν ὑπάρχει, is quoted among other passages. See also Bon. Ind. 268 b 59 sqq.

28. ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ ὧν κηδόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν. Decamnichus, Crataeas, Pausanias belong to the former category, Aristogeiton and the two regicides of Aenus to the latter. For the phrase cp. Rhet. 2. 4. 1381 a 12 and 2. 6. 1383 b 19.

30. Ἡράκλειτος. Heraclit. Fragm. 105 (Bywater). There is a tacit allusion to the saying in Plato, Laws 863 B, ὁ θυμὸς, δύσερι καὶ δύσμαχον κτῆμα ἐμπεφυκός, and Rep. 375 B (quoted in note on 1328 a 6). Cp. also Seneca, Epist. 4, quisquis vitam suam contempsit tuae dominus est. For ψυχῆς ἀνείσθαι cp. Xen. Cyrop. 3. 1. 36, κὰν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡραϊάμην ὥστε μήποτε λατρεύσαι ταύτην, and Eurip. Med. 915 Bothe, 967 Dindorf,

τῶν δ' ἐμῶν παίδων φυγὰς
ψυχῆς ἂν ἀλλαξαίμεθ', οὐ χρυσοῦ μόνον.

33. μάλιστα μὲν ἀμφοτέρους κ.τ.λ. This is the case in a true kingship (c. 10. 1310 b 40 sqq.). So we read of Darius in Plato, Laws 695 D, φιλίαν πορίζων καὶ κοινωνίαν πᾶσι Πέρσαις, χρήμασι καὶ δωρεαῖς τὸν Περσῶν δῆμον προσαγόμενος. Peisistratus succeeded to a large extent in winning the good will of both classes ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 16. l. 36 sqq.). When in c. 10. 1311 a 15 sqq. tyranny is described as making war on the γνῶριμοι, Aristotle is no doubt referring to the policy usually adopted by tyrants, though it was not the only policy open to them.

34. καὶ τοὺς ἑτέρους ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων ἀδικεῖσθαι μηδέν. Supply διὰ τὴν ἀρχήν ('as a consequence of his rule'), which is common to both clauses, though it is placed in the first. The same thing is

often noticeable in Thucydides: see Classen's Thucydides, ed. 2, Einleitung, p. lxxv.

35. *ὁπότεροι δ' ἂν ᾤσι κρείττους* κ.τ.λ. This is in accordance with the principle laid down in c. 9. 1309 b 16 sqq. Euripides had placed in the mouth of one of his characters (Fragm. 171),

δεῖ τοῖσι πολλοῖς τὸν τύραννον ἀνδάνειν.

Dionysius the Elder sought to win the many (Diod. 14. 70. 3), and Machiavelli (Discorsi, 1. 40) advises tyrants always to make the people their friends. Gelon, on the other hand, seems to have favoured the rich (Hdt. 7. 156).

τούτους ἰδίους μάλιστα ποιεῖσθαι τῆς ἀρχῆς. Cp. Diod. 18. 8. 2, *ἀμα δὲ βουλόμενος ἔχειν ἐν ἐκάστη πόλει πολλοὺς ἰδίους ταῖς εὐνοίαις πρὸς τοὺς νεωτερισμοὺς καὶ τὰς ἀποστάσεις τῶν Ἑλλήνων.*

36. *ἂν ὑπάρξῃ τοῦτο τοῖς πράγμασιν*, 'if their good will and support are given to his interests.' For *τοῖς πράγμασιν*, cp. 1. 11. 1259 a 30 sq. and Demosth. c. Aristocr. cc. 127—8, *τὰ Φιλίππου πράγματα, τὰ Κερσοβλήπτου πράγματα.*

37. *οὔτε δούλων ἐλευθέρωσιν . . . οὔτε δούλων παραίρεσιν.* Tyrants often set slaves free in order to add them to their body-guard (Plato, Rep. 567 E). We hear of this being done by Aristodemus of Cumae (Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 8): compare what we read of Dionysius the Elder in Diod. 14. 58. 1 and of Clearchus of Heracleia on the Euxine in Justin, 16. 5. 2. Cp. also Aristot. Fragm. 356. 1538 a 24 sqq. Xenophon (Hiero, 6. 5) had put in the mouth of Hiero a complaint that the tyrant's position left him no choice but to set slaves free. Aristotle here tacitly replies to this remark and contends that the tyrant is not obliged either to do this or to disarm the citizens. Success in conciliating both rich and poor, however, does not seem to have enabled Peisistratus to dispense with the latter measure ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 15. l. 13 sq. : c. 16. l. 36 sqq.), though we do not hear of his freeing slaves. Aristotle may possibly have before him the example set by Cleommiis tyrant of Methymna (Isocr. Epist. 7. 8 sq.). In [Demosth.] De Foed. cum Alex. c. 15, *δούλων ἀπειλευθέρωσεις ἐπὶ νεωτερισμῶ* are grouped with *γῆς ἀναδασμοί* and *χρεῶν ἀποκοπαί* and other similar measures.

38. *ἱκανὸν γὰρ* κ.τ.λ. For *ἱκανός* followed by *ᾤσι* cp. Plato, Laws 875 A, and see Stallbaum on Polit. 295 A. The subject of *κρείττους εἶναι* appears to be 'those attacked.' *τῇ δυνάμει*, 'his power.'

1315 b. 1. οἰκονόμον καὶ βασιλικόν. See note on 1314 b 7.

2. μὴ σφετεριστὴν ἀλλ' ἐπίτροπον. See note on 1314 b 16. The ἐπίτροπος administers for the benefit not of himself but of another (Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1198 b 12 sqq.). Compare Spartian. Hadrianus, c. 8, et in contione et in senatu saepe dixit (Hadrianus) ita se rem publicam gesturum ut sciret populi rem esse, non propriam.

καὶ τὰς μετριότητος τοῦ βίου διώκειν, μὴ τὰς ὑπερβολάς, i. e. moderation in pleasures (1314 b 28 sqq.) and in expenditure on them and on gifts (1314 b 1 sqq.) and buildings (1314 b 36 sqq.). Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 14, ἐπεὶ τὸ μέσον μὲν τῶν ὑπερβολῶν ἐπαυοῦμεν καὶ χρῆναι διώκειν φαμέν. We read of the well-known physician Mnesitheus (see note on 1335 a 41) in a fragment of the *Σύντροφοι* of Alexis (Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Gr.* 3. 481),

Μνησίθεος γάρ φησι δεῖν

φεύγειν ἀπάντων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς αἰεί,

so that the principle had found its way into medicine.

3. ἔτι δὲ τοὺς μὲν γνωρίμους καθομιλεῖν, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς δημαγωγεῖν. The difference between καθομιλεῖν and δημαγωγεῖν is illustrated by Ἀθ. Πωλ. c. 16, where we read of Peisistratus, ἐβούλοντο γὰρ καὶ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν [δημο]τικῶν οἱ πολλοί· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις τοὺς δὲ ταῖς εἰς τὰ ἴδια βοηθείαις προ[σ]ήγετο (cp. Plato, *Laws* 695 D, χρήμασι καὶ δωρεαῖς τὸν Περσῶν δῆμον προσαγόμενος). Aristotle does not advise the tyrant καθομιλεῖν τοὺς πολλοὺς, 'to win the many by daily companionship'; he must win them by benefactions (c. 12. 1315 b 17 sq.). Dionysius the Elder φιλανθρώποις λόγοις χρησάμενος καθωμιλεῖ τὰ πλήθη, καὶ τινὰς μὲν δωρεαῖς ἐτίμα, τινὰς δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ συσσίτια παρελάμβανε (Diod. 14. 70. 3), but companionship of this kind is not what Aristotle recommends to the tyrant.

5. τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι καλλίω κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 25 sqq. This was the aim of Hipparchus according to [Plato,] Hipparch. 228 C, ταῦτα δ' ἐποίει βουλόμενος παιδεύειν τοὺς πολίτας, ἵνα ὡς βελτίστων αὐτῶν ἄρχοι, οὐκ οἰόμενος δεῖν οὐδενὶ σοφίας φθονεῖν, ἀτε ὧν καλὸς τε κάγαθός.

7. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν κ.τ.λ. The correspondence should be noted between 5-7, τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι καλλίω, and μηδὲ μισούμενον καὶ φοβούμενον διατελεῖν on the one hand, and 7-10, τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι πολυχρονιωτέραν and ἔτι δ' αὐτὸν κ.τ.λ. on the other. For the awkward repetition of τὴν ἀρχὴν see critical note on 1319 a 33. There is more excuse for it than for the iteration in [Xen.] *Rep. Ath.* 3. 10,

ἐν οὐδεμῇ γὰρ πόλει τὸ βέλτιστον εὖνουν ἐστὶ τῷ δήμῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ κάκιστον ἐν ἐκάστῃ ἐστὶ πόλει εὖνουν τῷ δήμῳ.

8. ἔτι δ' αὐτὸν διακείσθαι κ.τ.λ. Plato had said of the tyrant in Rep. 580 A, ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον γίγνισθαι αὐτῷ ἢ πρότερον διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν φθονερῶ, ἀπίστω, ἀδίκῳ, ἀφίλῳ, ἀνοσίῳ, καὶ πάσης κακίης πανδοκεῖ τε καὶ τροφεῖ. Isocrates, on the other hand, had claimed in Hel. § 34 that Theseus ἐπέδειξεν ὅτι ῥαδίον ἐστὶν ἅμα τυραννεῖν καὶ μηδὲν χείρον διακείσθαι τῶν ἐξ ἴσου πολιτευομένων. Aristotle agrees rather with Isocrates than with Plato.

9. The phrase (διακείσθαι) ἡμίχρηστον ὄντα is a remarkable one, and I have not noticed any parallel to it.

11. [Καίτοι—39. παντελῶς]. I follow Sus. in bracketing this C. 12. passage. See Sus.², Note 1745. As Spengel (Aristot. Studien, 3. 63) has already pointed out, the reference to oligarchy seems quite out of place in a part of the Book which is concerned with monarchies only. Nothing further, indeed, is said on the subject of oligarchy. Again, it is implied in 11, πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, that tyranny is a constitution, whereas (with the one exception of c. 10. 1312 a 39 sq.) monarchies are distinguished from constitutions throughout the Book. Sus.² remarks in Note 1756 on the omission of any reference to the tyranny of Dionysius I and his successors at Syracuse, which lasted (with a break under Dion and Callippus) fifty-seven or fifty-eight years, but neither is there any reference to the tyranny of Heracleia on the Euxine, which was founded by Clearchus in B.C. 364 and lasted till B.C. 285 (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 190), so that at the time at which the Politics was written it had already lasted more than thirty years. Nor is anything said about the tyranny of Pherae, which seems to have been founded by Lycophron towards the end of the fifth century B.C. (Diod. 14. 82. 5) and which lasted till B.C. 352 (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 11, 13). It is hardly likely that Aristotle would have omitted to take these tyrannies into account, though we can understand the omission of semi-Oriental tyrannies like those of Cyprus and of tyrannies like those of Cyrene and Panticapaeum, which might be regarded as kingships. As to the short duration of tyrannies cp. Isocr. Epist. 4. § 6 and Ael. Var. Hist. 6. 13. Some Greek oligarchies lasted a long time; that of Corinth, for instance, lasted (with a break of five years in B.C. 392–387) from B.C. 583 till long after the Politics was written (Gilbert, 2. 90).

12. πλείστον γὰρ ἐγένετο χρόνον κ.τ.λ. Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2,

1. 661. 4) takes the tyranny of the Orthagoridae to have lasted from about B.C. 665 to an uncertain date in the sixth century, probably several years later than B.C. 576 or 572 (p. 666 sq.). Cp. Strabo, p. 382, *ἐτυραννήθη δὲ (ἡ Σικυῶν) πλείστον χρόνον, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τοὺς τυράννους ἐπιμικεῖς ἄνδρας ἔσχεν*. As Eaton remarks, the Delphic oracle had predicted for this tyranny a duration of a hundred years (Diod. 8. 24). For *πλείστον ἐγένετο χρόνος*, cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 44 *ἰνίλ., καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε πλείω χρόνον οὔτε δις τὸν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι* (sc. ἐπιστάτην).

18. *ἡ τῶν Ὀρθαγόρου παίδων καὶ αὐτοῦ Ὀρθαγόρου*. These words imply, as Busolt points out (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 661. 4), that the tyrants of Sicyon after Orthagoras were his sons, whereas, according to Hdt. 6. 126, Andreas, who is thought to be identical with Orthagoras, was the great-grandfather of Cleisthenes, the tyrant of Sicyon. See note on 1316 a 29. Busolt prefers the account of Herodotus, as he does not think it likely that a tyranny of two generations only can have lasted a hundred years.

14. *τούτου δ' αἴτιον κ.τ.λ.* Those who assailed tyrannies were commonly influenced by feelings of hatred or contempt (c. 10. 1312 b 17 sqq.), and the Orthagoridae could be neither hated nor despised. They courted their subjects, and one of them at any rate, Cleisthenes, was formidable in war; and the fact that they exercised their power for the most part in subordination to the laws would tend to assimilate it to that of a king (6 (4). 10. 1295 a 9 sqq.) and to make it more durable.

17. *ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις ἐδημαγωγούν*, 'they courted their subjects by their acts of attention.' Cp. Isocr. Hel. § 37, *τῇ μὲν ἐξουσίᾳ τυραννῶν, ταῖς δ' εὐεργεσίαις δημαγωγῶν*, and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 16, l. 37, *τοῖς δὲ ταῖς εἰς τὰ ἴδια βοηθείαις προ[σ]ήγγετο*.

18. *λέγεται γοῦν Κλεισθένης . . . ὥς ἐσταφάνωσεν*. For the construction cp. Xen. De Vect. 1. 1, *ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν Ἀθῆναισι προσσηκότεων ἐλέγοντό τινας ὥς γινώσκουσι μὲν τὸ δίκαιον κ.τ.λ.*

τὸν ἀποκρίναντα τῆς νίκης αὐτόν. The construction in Lycurg. c. Leocr. c. 149, *τὸν Λεωκράτους ἀποψηφιζόμενον θάνατον*, or in Pol. 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 26, *καλῶς ἀπεδοκίμασαν αὐτοῦ οἱ πρότερον τὴν χρῆσιν ἐκ τῶν νόων καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων*, is not quite similar, and I have not happened to meet with an exact parallel to this use of ἀποκρίνειν.

19. *ἔνιοι δ' εἰκόνα κ.τ.λ.* If Cleisthenes placed in the agora, or allowed to be placed there, a statue of the judge who refused him the victory, this would be to do him a still greater honour than

crowning him : cp. Deinarch. c. Demosth. c. 101, *περιείδες αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ χαλκοῦν σταθέιντα καὶ τῆς ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως κεκοινωνηκῶτα τοῖς Ἀρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἀπογόνους*, and Rhet. 1. 9. 1368 a 16 sqq. For *τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ καθήμενον* cp. Paus. 2. 20. 1, *ἀγαλμα καθήμενον Διὸς Μειλιχίου*, and 9. 2. 7.

21. *φασὶ δὲ καὶ Πεισιστράτον κ.τ.λ.* Ὑπομείναι is probably 'to be taken closely with the participle: see Liddell and Scott' (Richards). For the fact cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 16 and Plut. Solon, c. 31, where we learn that the charge was one of homicide and that the accuser was afraid to appear. Compare as to Augustus Suet. Aug. c. 56, and as to Trajan Plin. Paneg. c. 36.

22. *δευτέρα δὲ περὶ Κόρινθον ἢ τῶν Κυψελιδῶν.* The term Cypselidae, as here used, seems to include Cypselus. Busolt (Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 638. 1, 639. 1) places the tyranny of Cypselus in B.C. 657–627, that of Periander in B.C. 627–586, and that of Psammetichus in B.C. 586–3.

26. *τέτταρα.* See critical note.

Ψαμμίτιχος. In Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 60 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 394) the name of the son of Gorgus who succeeded Periander at Corinth is given as Cypselus, not Psammetichus.

27. *καὶ ταύτης*, 'of [the durability of] this tyranny also.'

ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κύψελος κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 10. 1310 b 29 sqq. Cypselus is described as king, and Periander as tyrant, of Corinth in Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 59 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 393), and we read in Fragm. 58, *Κύψελος δὲ Κορίνθου πρῶτος ἤρχεν οὔτε δορυφόρους ἔχων οὔτ' ἀποθύμιος ὢν Κορινθίαις*. Cp. [Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 5: Diog. Laert. 1. 98. Herodotus' account (5. 92. 5) is different and less favourable to Cypselus. For *κατὰ τὴν ἀρχήν* ('omni suo principatu,' Vict.) cp. c. 7. 1307 a 4, *ὁ στρατηγήσας κατὰ τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον*.

28. *Περίανδρος δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 59, *ἐστρατεύετο δὲ συνεχῶς (Περίανδρος) καὶ ἦν πολεμικός*.

31. *ὥστ' ἐν ἔτεσι κ.τ.λ.* According to Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 17 *ἰνί.* and c. 19 *sub fin.* Peisistratus ruled not seventeen but nineteen years, and his sons not eighteen but about seventeen, so that the total would be not thirty-five years but thirty-six, which agrees with Hdt. 5. 65. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 17 is in accord with the passage before us in reckoning thirty-three years from the time when Peisistratus first became tyrant to his death, but Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 19 reckons forty-nine years from the first acquisition of the tyranny to the fall of the dynasty, whereas

the passage before us reckons fifty-one (33 + 18). As Kirchner (*Rhein. Mus.* 53. 383 sqq.) points out, the two passages in the 'Αθ. Πολ. are not in agreement with each other as to the number of years which elapsed between the time when Peisistratus first became tyrant and his death, for according to 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 19 thirty-two years (forty-nine, *minus* seventeen) elapsed, and according to 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 17 thirty-three. Kirchner thinks that the inconsistency arises from a difference in the mode in which the years are counted in the two passages. In 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 17 (as also in the passage before us) the year which forms the 'terminus ad quem' is reckoned in, while in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 19 it is not.

34. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν κ.τ.λ. Supply *πλείστον ἐγένετο χρόνον* (cp. 1315 b 12). 'This again is not correct, for Anaxilaus of Rhégium (e.g.) himself reigned eighteen years from B.C. 494 to 476 (Diod. 11. 48. 2), and his sons were not expelled till after the fall of Thrasybulus (Diod. 11. 76. 5).' I translate from Sus.², Note 1760. The fall of Thrasybulus happened in B.C. 466.

For ἡ περὶ 'Ιέρωνα καὶ Γέλωνα (sc. *τυραννίς*) cp. Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 2, τὴν περὶ Φίλιππον *τυραννίδα*. Hence there is no need to insert τῶν (with Bojesen and Sus.) before περὶ 'Ιέρωνα.

35. ἐτὶ δ' οὐδ' αὖτῃ κ.τ.λ. See as to this passage Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 2. 779. 3. Diod. 11. 38. 7 makes Gelon reign seven years, but Hiero eleven and eight months, and Thrasybulus his successor is said in Diod. 11. 66. 4 to have reigned one year. Busolt adopts Diodorus' account of the duration of Hiero's reign in preference to that of the passage before us, thinking that it rests on the testimony of Timaeus, who is said to have had the merit of chronological exactness. As Sus.² (Note 1700) points out, in the passage before us Thrasybulus is regarded as the successor of Hiero, whereas in c. 10. 1312 b 10 sqq. it is apparently implied that the son of Gelon was on the throne after Hiero's death.

37. δέκα δ' 'Ιέρων, sc. *ἐτυράνευσε*.

40. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Here after a nominative prefixed to the sentence a change of construction occurs in *σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πάντων*: see note on 1306 b 9. The sentence would have been more regularly constructed if its closing words had been *ἴστω τεθεωρημένα τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον*, as in 2. 12. 1274 b 27 sq., and not *σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πάντων*.

1316 a. 1. ἐν δὲ τῇ πολιτείᾳ—b 27. δ Σωκράτης. See vol. i. p. 519, note 1, as to this passage. The article is prefixed to Σωκράτους

because the Socrates of the dialogue is referred to (see critical note on 1261 b 19). In 2. 1. 1261 a 6 we have *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος*, but in 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 32 sq. and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 10 sq. *ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ* as here. Compare as to the fault here found with the Platonic Socrates Magn. Mor. 1. 1. 1182 a 11, *πρῶτος μὲν οὖν ἐνεχείρησε Πυθαγόρας περὶ ἀρετῆς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δέ· τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνάγων οὐκ οἰκείαν τῶν ἀρετῶν τὴν θεωρίαν ἐποιεῖτο· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκεις ἴσος*. Aristotle goes even further here. He holds that the overthrow of the best constitution should be traced to causes not only special to constitutions in general as distinguished from other things, but special to it. In a similar spirit he undertakes in c. 5. 1304 b 19 sqq. to trace the causes of overthrow special to each existing constitution.

3. *τῆς τε γὰρ ἀρίστης πολιτείας καὶ πρώτης οὕσης κ.τ.λ.* Cp. 28, *τὴν πρώτην καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην*: 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 19, *παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν*: 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 24, *τὴν ἀληθινὴν καὶ πρώτην*. *Πρώτης* here probably means something more than merely 'first on the list'; it means rather *τῆς κυριωτάτης*, for the word is often used by Aristotle in this sense (Bon. Ind. 653 a 26 sqq.). It is implied that to omit to assign a mode of change special to itself to an entity so supreme as the best constitution, the constitution *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, is a very serious omission.

4. *φησὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, 'for he says that the cause [of its change] is that nothing [that comes into existence] abides, but that everything changes in a period of some kind, and that the source [of change] is contained in those things whose ratio 4 : 3 taken in its lowest terms, wedded to the number 5, furnishes two harmonies, meaning [that this happens] when the number of this diagram becomes cubed, his view being that nature occasionally brings into existence individuals bad and beyond the influence of the education, speaking perhaps truly so far as this particular remark is concerned' etc. See on the subject of the Nuptial Number of Plato Sus.², Note 1763; Zeller, *Plato*, Eng. Trans., p. 423, note 110; Mr. J. Adam, *The Nuptial Number of Plato, its Solution and Significance*, and Mr. D. B. Monro's remarks in *Class. Rev.* 6. 152 sqq., 242 sqq., together with those of Mr. Adam, *ibid.* 6. 240 sqq. The words *ὡν ἐπίτρισος πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεῖς δύο ἁρμονίας παρέχεται* are quoted *verbatim* from the famous passage of Plato, *Rep.* 546 C, where they are followed by the words *τρίσις αὐξηθεῖς*: Aristotle omits these two words, substituting for them (by way of explanation,

according to Zeller, *loc. cit.*, and Mr. Monro, *Class. Rev.* 6. 154 b) the words λέγων ὅταν ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τοῦτου γίνηται στερεός. 'In Plato's language τρίτη αὔξη denotes the "third dimension" or so-called "solid" numbers, and in particular the cube' (Mr. Monro, *ibid.* 6. 154 a), so that τρις αὐξηθεῖς would seem to mean 'when cubed.' The antecedent of ὧν in the passage before us is τοῦτων and in the passage of the Republic probably αὐξήσεις, though Zeller prefers to take πάντα as the antecedent. 'The ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν can only be the numbers 3 and 4 themselves, for πυθμένες means (Theon, *Math.* 125 sq. Bull.) for any arithmetical relation αἱ ἐν ἐλαχίστοις καὶ πρώτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους λόγοις ὄντες (ἀριθμοὶ) . . . ἐπιτρίτων δὲ ὁ τῶν δ' πρὸς γ' (Zeller, *loc. cit.*). 'No one doubts that the explanation' of ὧν ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν—τρις αὐξηθεῖς 'turns upon the figure known as the Pythagorean triangle, that is to say, the right-angled triangle whose sides are represented by the numbers, 3, 4, 5' (Mr. Monro, *Class. Rev.* 6. 153 b). 'Πεμπάδε συζυγείς seems a natural phrase to express the circumstance that the two sides which exhibit the ratio 4 : 3 are "yoked together" in the Pythagorean triangle with the number 5, which is the hypotenuse' (Mr. Monro, *Class. Rev.* 6. 154 a). As to ὁ τοῦ διαγράμματος ἀριθμὸς τοῦτου see Mr. Adam, *Nuptial Number of Plato*, pp. 15, 23 sq. Zeller (*loc. cit.*) explains δύο ἁρμονίας as 'two series of numbers progressing in a definite arithmetical ratio.' As to the question what the 'two harmonies' are and how they are generated from the wedding of the ἐπίτριτος πυθμὴν with the number 5, reference must be made to the authorities cited above. Not a little light has been thrown on this question by the labours of a succession of learned men, but there is much that remains obscure, and as Plato himself places his dark and oracular deliverance on this subject in the mouth of the Muses and hints that they utter it in a playful mood, it is doubtful whether he meant the enigma to have a solution. Some, however, among whom are Zeller and Susemihl, believe that it was comprehended by Aristotle and others, which implies that it is not incomprehensible. It is not perhaps certain that Aristotle understood it. It is true that he does not complain of the obscurity of the passage, as we should expect him to do, but his words of approval, as Mr. Monro points out (*Class. Rev.* 6. 243 b), relate only to the remark of Plato that nature sometimes brings into being individuals incapable of being made what they ought to be even by the best

education. Some light may possibly be thrown on the reason why Plato introduced this mathematical puzzle into the Republic by a story told of him in Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 7, where he is made to account for an oracle commanding that the altar at Delos should be doubled, a command which the Delians for want of geometrical knowledge were unable to obey, by saying *προσπαίξουν τὸν θεὸν Ἕλλησιν, ὀλιγωροῦσι παιδείας, οἷον ἐφυβρίζοντα τὴν ἀμαθίαν ἡμῶν καὶ κελεύοντα γεωμετρίας ἀπτεσθαι μὴ παρέργως*. Cp. Plato, Laws 819 D sq.

8. *ὥς τῆς φύσεώς κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Rhet. 2. 15. 1390 b 25 sqq., with which Dr. Sandys (*Class. Rev.* 5. 308) compares Pindar, Nem. 6. 9 sqq. Bergk and 11. 40 sqq. Compare also a saying of Plato's quoted by Plutarch in De Cohib. Ira, c. 16, *καὶ γὰρ Ἑλικῶνα τὸν μαθηματικὸν οὕτως ἐπαινεῖν φησὶν (ὁ Πλάτων), ὥς φύσει εὐμετάβολον ζῆον, καὶ τοὺς τεθραμμένους ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῶς δεδιέναι, μὴ ἄνθρωποι καὶ σπέρματα ἀνθρώπων ὄντες ἐκφύγῃσι πού τῆς φύσεως τὴν ἀσθίνειαν*.

14. *καὶ διὰ γε τοῦ χρόνου κ.τ.λ.*, 'yes, and is it through the influence of time, to which he ascribes the change of everything, that things also which have not come into being contemporaneously change contemporaneously? For instance, if a thing came into being the day before the revolution of things, does it then change contemporaneously [with things which came into being long before]?' For *καὶ . . . γε*, 'yes, and,' cp. 2. 2. 1261 b 12 and 2. 5. 1263 b 37: Xen. Hiero, 2. 1: Plato, Gorg. 450 D, Epist. 7. 325 C. Mr. Adam (*Class. Rev.* 5. 446) identifies the *τροπή* here mentioned with the *μεγίστη καὶ τελειωτάτη τροπή* of Plato, Polit. 270 B.

18. *ἐκ ταύτης εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν μεταβάλλει*, sc. *ἡ πολιτεία*: cp. c. 1. 1301 a 22, *ἐκ ποίων εἰς ποίας μάλιστα μεθίστανται* (sc. *αἱ πολιτεῖαι*), and c. 7. 1307 a 28, *εἰς ἑλαττον (τίμημα) μετέβη* (sc. *ἡ πολιτεία*). 'Ἡ πολιτεία or αἱ πολιτεῖαι or τὴν πολιτείαν should similarly be supplied in 21, 23, 35, 40, b 11, and 20.

πλεονάκεις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 7. 1307 a 20—27 and Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 21 sq. What constitutions are 'contrary' to each other may be gathered to some extent from the former passage and from c. 10. 1312 b 4 sqq. It should be noticed that though we often hear of the normal constitutions changing into the deviation-forms (i. e. of kingship changing into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, and polity into democracy), we seldom hear of the deviation-forms changing into the normal constitutions, and never of tyranny changing into kingship, though in 33 we hear of tyrannies changing

into aristocracies. Deviation-forms, however, seem freely to have changed into each other. Perhaps what Aristotle says here of constitutional change is less true of modern Europe than it was of ancient Greece, where constitutional change was usually sweeping and sudden.

21. ἐκ γὰρ τῆς Λακωνικῆς κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 550 C sqq., 555 B sqq., 562 A sqq.

22. εἰς τυραννίδα δὲ ἐκ δημοκρατίας. For the reversal in the order of the words in ἐκ δὲ ταύτης εἰς δημοκρατίαν, εἰς τυραννίδα δὲ ἐκ δημοκρατίας see note on 1277 a 31, and cp. 1316 b 11, 12, where εἰς δῆμον ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας is followed by ἐκ δῆμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν.

24. ἐκ δῆμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. Cp. c. 5. 1304 b 20—1305 a 7.

καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς μοναρχίαν. Aristotle thought that democracies were less apt to change into tyranny than they once were (c. 5. 1305 a 7 sqq.), though he held that they were still liable to do so (c. 8. 1308 a 20 sqq.), and that this was especially true of the extreme democracy (6 (4). 11. 1296 a 3 sq.).

27. ἀόριστον γάρ κ.τ.λ., 'for this is not determinable, since [the only account which it was open to him to give of it is an unsatisfactory one, for] according to him the change from tyranny ought to be into the first and the best constitution, [which is absurd].' The words ἀόριστον γάρ have been interpreted in two ways: see Giph. p. 752, who apparently prefers the second of the two interpretations given by him—'propterea quod res sit infinita . . . id est, quod non ita una mutatio ut priorum quatuor, sed multiplex et infinita sit tyrannidis, quae alias aliter et in aliam rempublicam mutatur . . . Haud scio tamen an non aliter accipi possit illud ἀόριστον γάρ, non pro infinito sed pro inexplicabili.' Sus., followed by Welldon, who translates, 'no precise determination of the question is possible,' appears to adopt Giphanius' second interpretation, and is probably right in this.

28. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐγίγνετο συνεχὲς καὶ κύκλος. Just before Plato reveals his Nuptial Number in Rep. 546 B sqq., he has spoken of κύκλοι in 546 A, οὐ μόνον φυτοῖς ἐγγείους, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπιγείοις ζῴοις φορὰ καὶ ἀφορία ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γίγνεται, ὅταν περιτροπαὶ ἐκάστοις κύκλων περιφορὰς ξυνάπτωσι. Thus he might be expected to make his series of constitutional changes move in a circle and repeat itself. There was a proverb κύκλος τὰ ἀνθρώπινα (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 2. 492): see Bon. Ind. 570 b 1, where reference is made to Phys. 4. 14. 223 b 24 sqq. and Probl. 17. 3. 916 a 24 sqq.

Polybius *does* thus arrange changes of constitution (6. 9. 10, αὕτη πολιτειῶν ἀνακύκλωσις, αὕτη φύσεως οἰκονομία, καθ' ἣν μεταβάλλει καὶ μεθίσταται καὶ πάλιν εἰς αὐτὰ καταστῆ τὰ κατὰ τὰς πολιτείας). The view that Nature moves in a circle and returns into herself was held by Heraclitus: see Plut. De EI Delphico, c. 8. 388 C—E, and Bywater on Heraclit. Fragm. 22.

29. ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα τυραννίς κ.τ.λ. Cleisthenes of Sicyon seems from Nic. Damasc. Fragm. 61 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 3. 394) to have won the tyranny from his brothers Myron and Isodemus, grandsons apparently of the Myron whom Herodotus (6. 126) and Pausanias (2. 8. 1) name as the grandfather of Cleisthenes (see Busolt, Gr. Gesch., ed. 2, 1. 661. 4). According to this account Isodemus was induced by Cleisthenes to slay the tyrant Myron, who had seduced his wife, and to share the tyranny with Cleisthenes. To purge his homicide, however, he went into exile for a year, and Cleisthenes forbade his return. The succession of one tyranny to another may be traced also in the history of mediaeval Italy. Thus, when the Gonzagas acquired the tyranny of Mantua, which they retained till the eighteenth century, they dispossessed an earlier tyrant. Passerino de' Bonacossi, tyrant of Mantua, had offered an affront to the wife of one of them, and they assassinated him on Aug. 14, 1328, and took his place (Sismondi, Italian Republics, p. 141).

31. ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Χαλκίδι ἡ Ἀντιλέοντος. See note on 1304 a 29.

32. καὶ εἰς δημοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν Γέλωνος ἐν Συρακούσαις. Elsewhere in the Politics we gather that 'the tyranny of Gelon's house' (τῶν Γέλωνος: see, with Richards, Krüger, Gr. Gr. § 47. 5. 2) was succeeded by a polity or aristocracy (see note on 1304 a 27).

33. καὶ εἰς ἀριστοκρατίαν, ὥσπερ ἡ Χαριλάου ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι καὶ . . . ἐν Καρχηδόνι. There were two traditions as to the rule of the Lacedaemonian king Charilaus, one that it was too mild (Plut. Lycurg. c. 5), the other that it was tyrannical ([Heraclid. Pont.] De Rebuspubl. 2. 3 in Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 2. 210: [Plato,] Epist. 8. 354 B). Aristotle here follows the latter tradition, and may possibly refer to Charilaus among others in c. 10. 1310 b 18 sqq. and 1313 a 1 sqq. Contrast the statement in Xen. Ages. 1. 4, οἱ τε βασιλεῖς (i. e. the Lacedaemonian kings) οὐδεπώποτε μειζόνων ὠρέχθησαν ἢ ἐφ' οἷσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὴν βασιλείαν παρέλαβον. When Aristotle implies here that a tyranny once existed at Carthage, it is difficult to reconcile his statement with 2. 11. 1272 b 32 sq. But

more than one statement in this part of c. 12 is inconsistent with statements contained in other parts of the Politics (see vol. i. p. 519, note 1, and above on 1316 a 32). As to the existence of a small lacuna before *ἐν Καρχηδόνι* see critical note on 1316 a 34.

34. *καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα μεταβάλλει ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας*, sc. *ἡ πολιτεία* (see above on 1316 a 18). This remark is made in further correction of Plato, who had represented tyranny as preceded by democracy.

35. *ὅσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ σχεδὸν αἱ πλείσται τῶν ἀρχαίων*, sc. *ὀλιγαρχιῶν*. Gelon's tyranny at Syracuse was preceded by a democracy (c. 3. 1302 b 31 sq.), but this was an exception.

36. *ἐν Λεοντίνοις κ.τ.λ.* For Panaetius cp. c. 10. 1310 b 29 sqq., and see Freeman, Sicily, 2. 56 sqq., for Cleander Freeman, 2. 104, and for Anaxilaus of Rhegium (which is mentioned here as if it were in Sicily) Freeman, 2. 107.

39. *ἄτοπον δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Plato, Rep. 550 D sqq., 551 A. Aristotle appears to agree with Plato in 3. 15. 1286 b 14 sqq.

1316 b. 1. *ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* Cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 27 sqq.

3. *ἐν πολλαῖς τε ὀλιγαρχίαις κ.τ.λ.*, 'and [so far from its being an accompaniment of oligarchy that the holders of office engage in money-making occupations,] in many oligarchies they are not allowed to do so and there are laws to prevent it, and in Carthage, though it is a democratically governed State [and not an oligarchy], the holders of office *do* engage in occupations of this kind and yet no change of constitution has so far taken place.' The statement that Carthage was a democratically governed State is of course inconsistent with 2. 11 and with 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sqq., where it is said to be aristocratically governed. This, however, affords no ground for rejecting the reading *δημοκρατουμένη*, for several remarks made in this chapter are inconsistent with statements contained in other parts of the Politics (see note on 1316 a 33). Still the sense of the passage would be improved if we read *τιμοκρατουμένη* in place of *δημοκρατουμένη*. I cannot give any reference for the word *τιμοκρατουμένη* except to Mich. Ephes. in Eth. Nic. κ, p. 611. 10 Heylbut (quoted in Sus.^{2a} p. xli), but in Plato's view (Rep. 545 B, 550 D) it is the *τιμοκρατία* that changes into oligarchy when the rulers come to be lovers of gain, not the *ἀριστοκρατία*, and Schneider's emendation *ἀριστοκρατουμένη*, which is adopted by Sus. and also by Meltzer (Gesch. der Karthager, 2. 459), seems to be open to objection on this ground, as well as on that of the difficulty of accounting for the

change of ἀριστοκρατουμένη into δημοκρατουμένη. I must admit, however, that I cannot prove that Aristotle regarded Carthage as a τυμοκρατία of the kind described in the Republic, though he may well have done so. As to the existence in oligarchies of laws forbidding holders of offices to trade, see note on 1278 a 25. Laws forbidding the ruling nobility to trade existed in the oligarchy of Venice (Houssaye, Hist. du Gouvernement de Venise, 1. 25).

6. ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις κ.τ.λ. This refers to Plato, Rep. 551 D. Aristotle thinks (2. 5. 1264 a 24 sqq.) that Plato's own ideal State described in the Republic is open to this criticism, and indeed many democracies (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 4 sq.).

8. τί γὰρ αὕτη κ.τ.λ., 'for what happens to this more than to the Laconian,' etc.?

10. οὐδενὸς δὲ πενεστέρου γενομένου κ.τ.λ. This refers to Plato, Rep. 552 A sqq., 555 B sqq. Aristotle passes on here to another assertion of Plato's, the assertion that oligarchies change into democracies through the impoverishment of the citizens. This assertion also he probably regards as ἀτοπος. Sus. transposes οὐδενός, 10—νοῦν, 14, to after πολιτείαν, 21, where however the passage interrupts Aristotle's enumeration of the 'many causes' which bring about the fall of oligarchies. Καὶ ἐκ δήμου εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν κ.τ.λ. is added in further correction of Plato, who had made democracy change into tyranny.

14. πολλῶν τε οὐσῶν αἰτιῶν δι' ὧν γίνονται αἱ μεταβολαί. This refers to Plato, Rep. 555 D. Aristotle has just said that Plato attributes the change of oligarchy into democracy to a cause to which it is not always attributable, and now he adds that Plato passes over many causes of that change in silence. Thus over and above an error of commission he is guilty of a huge error of omission. For δι' ὧν (αἰτιῶν) cp. 1. 9. 1258 a 9, δι' ἄλλης αἰτίας τοῦτο (πορίζεω) πειρῶνται, and Plato, Tim. 57 C, ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἄκρατα καὶ πρῶτα σώματα, διὰ τοιούτων αἰτιῶν γέγονε. Αἱ μεταβολαί appears to mean 'the changes of oligarchy into democracy.'

15. οὐ λέγει ἀλλὰ μίαν. For ἀλλά thus used see Bon. Ind. 33 b 14 sqq., where Eth. Nic. 10. 5. 1176 a 21, ἡδία δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτοις καὶ οὕτω διακειμένοις, is quoted among other passages.

18. ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν κ.τ.λ. As to the consequences of the impoverishment of leading men see c. 6. 1305 b 39 sqq., 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 13. l. 12 sqq., and Plut. Aristid. c. 13. Aristotle does not always treat the impoverishment of others than leading men so lightly as

he does here : cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 10 sqq. and 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 36 sqq. etc.

22. *κἄν ἀδικῶνται ἢ ὑβρίζωνται*. Here *ἀδικία* is distinguished from *ὑβρις* (cp. Plato, Soph. 229 A, Laws 691 C and 906 A), though in c. 10. 1311 a 27 (cp. Rhet. 2. 16. 1391 a 18 sq.) it is implied that *ὑβρις* is a kind of *ἀδικία* (compare the Definitions ascribed to Plato, 415 E). See also note on 1302 b 6.

23. *κἄν μὴ καταδαπανήσωσι τὴν οὐσίαν διὰ τὸ ἐξεῖναι ὃ τι ἂν βούλωνται ποιεῖν*. This refers to Plato, Rep. 555 C, *ἄγε, οἶμαι, ἄρχοντες ἐν αὐτῇ οἱ ἄρχοντες διὰ τὸ πολλὰ κεκτῆσθαι, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν εἰργεῖν νόμφ τῶν νῶν ὅσοι ἂν ἀκόλαστοι γίγνωνται, μὴ ἐξεῖναι αὐτοῖς ἀναλίσκειν τε καὶ ἀπολλύναι τὰ αὐτῶν, ἵνα ὠνούμενοι τὰ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ εἰσδανέζοντες ἔτι πλουσιώτεροι καὶ ἐντιμότεροι γίγνωνται*, and 556 A, *καὶ οὔτε γ' ἐκείνη, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τοιοῦτον κακὸν ἐκκαόμενον ἐθέλουσιν ἀποσβεννύναι, εἰργοντες τὰ αὐτοῦ ὅπη τις βούλεται τρέπειν, οὔτε κ.τ.λ.* It is to the absence in oligarchies of any check on the tendency of improvident rich men to squander their patrimony that Plato traces their fall. I do not agree, therefore, with Schn. Cor. and Sus. that a lacuna exists before *διὰ τὸ ἐξεῖναι*.

24. *οὐ αἰτίαν τὴν ἄγαν ἐλευθερίαν εἶναι φησιν*. *Οὐ* probably does not refer to the whole of the preceding sentence, *κἄν μὴ καταδαπανήσωσι—ποιεῖν*, for Plato nowhere says that the squandering of fortunes by spendthrifts is caused by excessive freedom; this squandering, in fact, goes on in oligarchies, and excessive freedom is a concomitant not of oligarchy, but of democracy. *Οὐ* refers rather to *τὸ ἐξεῖναι ὃ τι ἂν βούλωνται ποιεῖν*, which Plato *does* connect with excessive freedom in Rep. 557 B, *οἰκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν δὴ ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἡ πόλις μεστὴ καὶ παρρησίας γίγνεται, καὶ ἐξουσία ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν ὃ τί τις βούλεται*; where he is speaking of the democratic State. Aristotle's charge against Plato seems to be that, as he traces squandering to liberty to do what one pleases and traces this again to excessive freedom, he in effect traces squandering to excessive freedom. He sneers at him, I think, for doing so, his own view probably being (cp. 2. 5. 1263 b 22 sqq.) that squandering is not caused by excessive freedom but by *μοχθηρία*.

25. *πλειόνων δ' οὐσῶν κ.τ.λ.* Cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 8 sqq. Aristotle speaks here as if he had himself done in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book what he finds fault with Plato for not doing and had taken account in it of the many sub-forms of oligarchy and democracy which he distinguishes in the Sixth and Eighth (old Fourth and

Sixth) Books, but this is not so; as has been pointed out in vol. ii. p. xxvii, he has noticed in the Seventh only two forms of oligarchy and democracy, *ἐνομοι δημοκρατίαι καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι* and *κύριοι* (7 (5). 6. 1306 b 20 sq.: compare the mention of the ultimate oligarchy and the extreme democracy in c. 10. 1312 b 34 sqq.).

27. Conring Schneider and Susemihl agree in believing that something is wanting after *Σωκράτης*. Conring says (p. 729 of his edition), 'cum haec disputatio non finiatur sueto Aristoteli more, facile patet quaedam deesse.' Schneider not only misses the 'formula solennis et clausa' with which Aristotle is wont to wind up his discussion of a subject, but holds that he cannot have brought to a close here the illustrations and arguments with which he combats the views expressed in Plato's Republic on the subject of constitutional change. Susemihl (Sus.³, Note 1786) thinks that Aristotle is not likely to have left unassailed the account given by Plato in the Republic of the change of democracy into tyranny. He also thinks (see Sus.^{3a}, Appendix, p. 368) that, looking to what is said in 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 11 sqq., an inquiry respecting laws is wanting. Be that as it may, the abrupt way in which the chapter ends certainly seems to indicate that it is not complete.

BOOK VIII (VI).

31. Πόσαι μὲν οὖν διαφοραὶ—34. πολιτείαν. These topics are C. 1. dealt with in 6 (4). 14—16. For τοῦ βουλευτικοῦ καὶ κυρίου τῆς πολιτείας cp. 6 (4). 14. 1299 a 1 sq., and for τὸ βουλευτικόν in the sense of τὸ βουλευόμενον, 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 31, 38, where however it is used in a slightly different way. With περὶ δικαστηρίων supply πόσαι καὶ τίνες διαφοραί. For ποία (sc. διαφορά) πρὸς ποίαν συντίταται πολιτείαν, cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 11, διήρηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τούτων τὸν τρόπον, and Theopomp. Fragm. 110 (Müller, Fragm. Hist. Gr. 1. 295), συντίταται καὶ συνακολουθεῖ τοῖς μὲν πλούτοις καὶ ταῖς δυναστείαις ἄνοια καὶ μετὰ ταύτης ἀκολασία: also Plato, Rep. 550 C, τὸ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου, λέγωμεν

ἄλλον ἄλλῃ πρὸς πόλει τεταγμένον
(cp. Sept. c. Theb. 451 and 570).

34. ἔτι δὲ περὶ φθορᾶς τε κ.τ.λ. In the Seventh (old Fifth) Book.

35. ἐκ ποίων τε γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνος αἰτίας. See note on 1301

a 22, and cp. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 23—26, 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 20 sq., 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 17 sq., 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 34 sqq., and 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 16 sq.

γίνεται is in the sing., though φθορά καὶ σωτηρία must be supplied: cp. Xen. Anab. 2. 4. 16, ἔπεμψέ με Ἀριαῖος καὶ Ἀρτάωτος, and Plato, Lysis, 207 D, ἡ που, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Λύσι, σφόδρα φιλεῖ σε ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ. In these passages, however, 'the verb precedes the still indeterminate noun,' and this is the more usual case (Prof. J. B. Mayor in *Class. Rev.* 10. 111), whereas in the passage before us γίνεται follows περὶ φθορᾶς τε καὶ σωτηρίας: see also 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 33 sqq.

36. ἐπεὶ δὲ τετύχηκεν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here tells us that he will point out what is the appropriate and the advantageous way of constructing the various sub-kinds of each constitution, and will also investigate any points which remain to be investigated with respect to each. Under the latter head of inquiry may possibly fall such questions as that which is dealt with in c. 4. 1318 b 6—1319 a 6, the question which is the best form of democracy and why it is the best. Here and also in 1317 a 15 Aristotle leads us to expect that he will deal with the sub-kinds of all constitutions, but we shall find that in fact he confines his attention to the sub-kinds of democracy and oligarchy, in conformity with his announcement in 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 20 sqq.

38. καὶ τὸν οἰκείον καὶ τὸν συμφέροντα τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι πρὸς ἐκάστην, 'and to determine the mode of organization which is appropriate and advantageous to each.' For ἀποδοῦναι in this sense cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 1. 1110 b 7, ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἰρετέον, οὐ ῥᾶδιον ἀποδοῦναι, and see Bon. Ind. 80 a 51 sqq. Πρὸς ἐκάστην should apparently be taken with τὸν οἰκείον καὶ τὸν συμφέροντα τρόπον, not with ἀποδοῦναι: see note on 1317 a 36. For the meaning of οἰκείος cp. 1317 a 29 sqq., and for the distinction between οἰκείος and συμφέρων c. 4. 1318 b 27, διὸ δὴ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστὶ τῇ πρότερον ῥηθείᾳ δημοκρατία καὶ ὑπάρχειν εἶωθεν. There may be ways of organizing each sub-kind of democracy and oligarchy which are appropriate but not advantageous. An 'advantageous' mode is one which makes the constitution durable (c. 5. 1319 b 33—1320 a 4: Rhet. 1. 8. 1365 b 26).

39. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς συναγωγὰς κ.τ.λ., 'and further we must investigate the combinations also of all the modes of organizing the above-mentioned departments,' i.e. the deliberative, magisterial, and

judicial (so Heinsius, p. 695, Schneider, and Welldon). Aristotle's instances of these combinations are taken from cases in which a normal constitution is combined with its deviation-form—aristocracy with oligarchy, polity with democracy. We see from this that the classification of constitutions as normal or deviation-forms which we find in 3. 6. 1279 a 17 sqq. is not exhaustive, for there are in fact constitutions which are partly normal, partly deviation-forms. Aristotle does not in all probability mean to imply that the institutions of other constitutions also might not be combined—for instance, those of aristocracy and polity and those of oligarchy and democracy. It is interesting to know that these hybrid constitutions existed in Greece, but our acquaintance with its constitutional history is too imperfect to enable us to point to clear examples of them. Epidamnus at one time had a democratic Boulê, but was in other respects oligarchically governed (7 (5). 1. 1301 b 21 sqq.). The Council of the Areopagus was to a certain extent an aristocratic element in the oligarchy which existed at Athens in early times ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 2. l. 2 sqq.: c. 3. l. 34 sqq.), but it is questionable whether Aristotle has it in his mind here. It should be noticed that as the deliberative is *κύριον τῆς πολιτείας* (6 (4). 14. 1299 a 1 sq.), the way in which it was organized must have gone far to determine the character of the constitution. The deliberative had the right of legislating, and therefore it might modify the constitution at any moment.

1. ταῦτα, 'these modes,' referring to *τρόπων*.

1317 a.

2. For *ἐπαλλάττειν* see note on 1255 a 13.

4. οἷον ἂν τὸ μὲν βουλευόμενον καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρείας ὀλιγαρχικῶς ἢ συντεταγμένον. For the way in which the deliberative is organized in oligarchies see 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 34 sqq. The oligarchical mode of election to office is τὸ τιναὶ ἐκ τινῶν (6 (4). 15. 1300 b 1 sq.).

6. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια ἀριστοκρατικῶς. Cp. 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 13 sqq. and 2. 11. 1273 a 19 sq. As to the oligarchical mode of organizing dicasteries see 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 12 sq. For τὰ περὶ τὰ δικαστήρια cp. c. 8. 1322 b 34, but we expect *τά* (which Spengel and Bekk.³ read) instead of *τά*.

8. ἀριστοκρατικῶς δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρείας, i.e. when office is awarded for virtue (6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sq.: 2. 11. 1273 a 17 sq.: 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 2 sq.: 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 2 sq.).

13. εἴρηται πρότερον, in 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 13—1297 a 6.

15. καὶ τὰς ἄλλας. See note on 1316 b 36.

17. φανερόν, sc. ἔσται, which is omitted as in 2. 5. 1263 b 34, where however ἔσται is easily supplied from the preceding line, which is not the case here. See note on 1306 a 24 for instances of similar omissions. It may be added that ἦν is omitted in 1. 9. 1257 a 23 and ἦσαν in 1. 9. 1257 a 32.

18. ἦν καλοῦσί τινες ὀλιγαρχίαν. Cp. Plato, Rep. 544 C, καὶ δευτέρα καὶ δευτέρως ἐπαινουμένη, καλουμένη δ' ὀλιγαρχία. 'Ολιγαρχία is not quite the appropriate name, for the few rule in aristocracy also (7 (5). 7. 1306 b 25); oligarchy is the form in which the rich rule, and that fact should find expression in its name. See, however, note on 1331 b 9.

19. ταύτην τὴν μέθοδον, i.e. the inquiry how to construct each kind of democracy.

πάντα τὰ δημοτικά. Cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 4. 1166 a 1, τὰ φίλικὰ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι ὀρίζονται, and Pol. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 27, τὰ τυραννικά.

24. πρότερον, 'in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 15-28: 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 25 sqq.: 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 26-31' (Sus.³).

γίνεται. See note on 1304 b 5.

25. πλῆθος is here used in the same sense as ὄχλος (cp. c. 4. 1319 a 19 sq. and 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20 sq., and see note on 1281 b 15). For the use of the two words in the 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία, see Kaibel, Stil und Text der Πολ. 'Αθ., p. 52 sq.

26. ὡν τοῦ πρώτου κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 26-31. A democracy in which the peasants and handicraftsmen are supreme seems to be regarded by Aristotle as better than one in which the peasants, handicraftsmen, and day-labourers are supreme.

27. τοῖς ἀμφοτέροις, 'the two previously mentioned': cp. Plato, Laws 875 A, τῷ κοινῷ τε καὶ ἰδίῳ τοῖν ἀμφοῖν.

οὐ μόνον διαφέρει κ.τ.λ., 'not only does the democracy differ in respect of its becoming better and worse, but also in respect of its becoming not the same.' We should probably supply ἡ δημοκρατία with διαφέρει.

32. τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἐλάττω. Thus in the first form of democracy (c. 4. 1318 b 27 sqq.) many δημοτικά are wanting: all judge and elect magistrates, but the most important magistracies are not accessible to all, and it is only the less important ones that are filled by lot. Pay is also probably absent, and the assembly is not supreme over everything.

33. χρήσιμον δ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν γνωρίζειν κ.τ.λ. Αὐτῶν, i.e. τῶν ταῖς δημοκρατίας ἀκολουθούντων. The fact that a knowledge of the institutions which go with each kind of democracy is useful in correcting existing examples of each form, as well as in instituting new ones, is an additional reason for studying them, though the question which Aristotle now has before him is how the various kinds of each constitution should be *instituted* (1317 a 13 sqq.). For the thought cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 3 sqq., and for the language 1. 11. 1259 a 33 sq. For πρὸς τὸ κατασκευάζειν καὶ πρὸς τὰς διορθώσεις, cp. Polyb. 3. 118. 12, καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολιτευμάτων διορθώσεις καὶ κατασκευάς.

35. ζητοῦσι μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ., '[for errors are committed for want of this knowledge,] for' etc. Some δημοτικά are fatal to democracies, and some ὀλιγαρχικά to oligarchies (7 (5). 9. 1309 b 20 sq.), others are not.

36. ἅπαντα τὰ οἰκεῖα must be taken with πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν: cp. Polyb. 5. 105. 1, οἰκεῖους χρησάμενος λόγους πρὸς τὴν ὁρμὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἥδη προκατασκευασμένην ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ Δημητρίου παραινέσεων.

37. καθάπερ κ.τ.λ., in 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 18 sqq.

39. νυνὶ δὲ τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ τὰ ἥθη καὶ ὧν ἐφίενται λέγωμεν, 'but now let us speak of the demands of democratic constitutions and their ethical character and the things they aim at.' Aristotle tacitly distinguishes these matters from the institutions through which democracies seek to attain their aims (τὰ δημοτικά). Νυνὶ must occur but rarely in Aristotle's writings, for it is omitted in the Index Aristotelicus. Τὰ ἀξιώματα = 'quae requiruntur in democratia, cf. ἀξιοῦν, postulare, et ὑπόθεσις τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας, 40' (Bon. Ind. 70 a 46: see also Coray's note). So in Plato, Laws 690 A, ἀξιώματα τοῦ τε ἀρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι is rendered by Stallbaum 'Ansprüche.' With τὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ τὰ ἥθη should probably be supplied τῶν δημοκρατιῶν, not τῶν πολιτειῶν, and αἱ δημοκρατίαι with ἐφίενται. For τὰ ἥθη τῶν δημοκρατιῶν cp. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 14 sqq. and Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 12, and for ὧν ἐφίενται 1366 a 2 sqq.

40. Ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 1. 8. 1366 a 4. Stahr C. 2. and Welldon apparently take ὑπόθεσις to be the subject of the sentence, but perhaps it is better (with Sus.) to make it the predicate. In either case it takes up τὰ ἀξιώματα, 39, and means 'the fundamental postulate' (cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 38 sq.).

41. τοῦτο γὰρ λέγειν εἰώθασιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 562 B sq. and see note on 1291 b 34. The words τοῦτο γὰρ λέγειν εἰώθασιν,

ὡς ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ μετέχοντας (sc. τοὺς πολίτας) ἐλευθερίας have been interpreted in two different ways. Sus. translates them thus, 'ist es doch Dies, was man immer im Munde zu führen pflegt, als ob man in dieser Verfassung allein der Freiheit genösse'; he seems, therefore, to take τοῦτο to refer to the preceding sentence, ὑπόθεσις μὲν οὖν τῆς δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας ἐλευθερία, but Sepulveda, who translates, 'sic enim dici consuevit, in sola populari republica homines libertate frui,' appears to refer τοῦτο to ὡς ἐν μόνῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ μετέχοντας ἐλευθερίας, i. e. not to what precedes, but to what follows, and so do Giph. and Stahr, the latter translating, 'und es ist eine ganz gewöhnliche Behauptung, dass nur die Bürger einer solchen Verfassung die Freiheit wirklich genössen.' Perhaps the latter interpretation is to be preferred (for the use of ὡς with the participle cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 19 sqq. and 2. 12. 1274 a 25 sqq.). Τοῦτου γὰρ στοχάζεσθαι φασι πᾶσαν δημοκρατίαν seems to be added not in proof of the assertion which precedes it, that freedom is enjoyed only in a democracy, for obviously it does not prove the truth of this assertion, but in justification of the mention of freedom—'[freedom, I say,] for' etc. Aristotle probably has Plato, Rep. 562 B sq. before him, where the two things had already been brought into connexion with each other, democracy being described as insatiable in its quest of freedom, and democrats being represented as holding that no one who is by nature a freeman will deign to live under any other constitution.

1317 b. 1. τοῦτου = τῆς ἐλευθερίας. See note on 1330 b 8.

2. ἐλευθερίας δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eurip. Suppl. 390 Bothe, 404 Dindorf,

οὐ γὰρ ἄρχεται
ἐνὸς πρὸς ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' ἐλευθέρα πᾶσι.
δῆμος δ' ἀνάσσει διαδοχαῖσιν ἐν μίρῃ
ἐνιαυσίαισιν.

Aristotle is here reproducing the conception of freedom entertained by οἱ δημοτικοί (cp. 11), not giving his own, as to which see vol. i. p. 246 and notes on 1259 a 39 and 1310 a 27. It should be noticed that in 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 28 sqq. ἐλευθερία is distinguished from τὸ τὸ πλεῖον εἶναι κύριον. The δημοτικοί read much into the conception of freedom which does not strictly belong to it. According to them freedom implied two things—1. an equal share for each citizen (7)—whether in everything, property included, or not, we do not learn—and consequently an interchange of ruling

and being ruled, and also the supremacy of the will of the majority, or in other words of the poor, for the poor are in a majority; and 2. living as one likes. Both these sides are recognized in the conception of freedom by Pericles in his Funeral Oration (Thuc. 2. 37. 3: see the remarks of L. Schmidt, *Ethik der alten Griechen*, 2. 233 sq.). These notions of freedom differ in one respect from those current among ourselves. We do not hold that freedom implies an interchange of ruling and being ruled, or in other words that no one is free who has not from time to time a turn of office. This was a view likely to prevail in communities like the Greek City-States, in which a person excluded from office felt himself to be on a level with a resident-alien (3. 5. 1278 a 37 sq.). We still, however, often identify freedom with 'government by majority' (Seeley, *Introduction to Political Science*, p. 158), and with 'permission to do what you like' (ibid. p. 119). Among us, again, as among the Greeks, freedom is often construed as bound up with equality, so that it eventually involves the supremacy of the majority, or in other words the poor, over the rich, a state of things in which equality disappears. It will be observed that here as elsewhere Aristotle regards the demands characteristic of democracies as originating not in conscious self-seeking, but in a mistaken, perhaps a biased (3. 9. 1280 a 14 sqq.), theory of what is just and of what freedom implies. The teaching of the passage before us does not quite agree with that of 3. 8, where it is implied that democracy is a constitution in which the poor are supreme, whether they are in a majority or not, nor with that of 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 28-39 and *Eth. Nic.* 5. 6. 1131 a 25 sqq., where τὸ δημοτικὸν δίκαιον is treated as a form of τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν δίκαιον. See note on 1288 a 22. It will be noticed that Aristotle says nothing about *παρρησία*, or the free expression of opinion, in connexion with freedom, and nothing about publicity of government. Nor does he mention the tendency of Greek democracy to extend citizenship to persons of semi-alien or semi-servile or illegitimate birth, of which we read in 3. 5. 1278 a 26 sqq. His account of freedom, indeed, can hardly be made to include this tendency.

3. τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, sc. τοὺς πολίτας (cp. 7).

4. τοῦτου δ' ὅπως κ.τ.λ. This conclusion appears not to be accepted in c. 3. 1318 a 11-b 1, where it is argued that if all are to have an arithmetically equal share, the rich and the poor must not be thrown together into one undivided aggregate and supremacy

given to a majority of that aggregate, but that supremacy should be given to a majority of the rich and a majority of the poor, or if the two majorities do not agree, to that combination of rich and poor which possesses the larger amount of property.

5. καὶ ὃ τι ἂν δόξῃ τοῖς πλείοσι, τοῦτ' εἶναι [καὶ] τέλος καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον, 'and that what is decided by the majority, this is the crown of the matter, and this is that which is just.' Τέλος here is 'operis perfectio et absolutio' (Bon. Ind. 753 a 47, b 6 : Sus.³ Ind. s.v.). For the repetition of τοῦτο cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 11, τούτῳ καλὸν ἀκολουθεῖν καὶ τούτῳ πείθεσθαι δίκαιον : 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 11 sq. : Xen. Mem. 2. 2. 13, τούτῳ δίκην τε ἐπιτίθῃσι καὶ ἀποδοκιμάζουσα οὐκ ἐᾷ ἄρχειν τοῦτον : Plato, Gorg. 510 C, οὗτος μέγα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται, τοῦτον οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδικήσει : [Demosth.] Or. Fun. c. 36 : Polyb. 6. 8. 2, οἱ πολλοὶ τούτοις ἐχρῶντο προστάταις καὶ τούτοις ἐπείτρεπον περὶ σφῶν. See also note on 1284 b 28.

10. For the attraction of δν into the gender of ὅρον cp. ἦν in 1. 9. 1256 b 40.

11. ἐν δὲ τὸ ζῆν ὥς βούλεται τις. See note on 1310 a 27, and compare the appeal of Nicias to the Athenians in Thuc. 7. 69, πατριδος τε τῆς ἐλευθερωτάτης ὑπομνήσκων καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνεπιτάκτου πᾶσι ἐς τὴν διαίταν ἐξουσίας : cp. also 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 28 sq., where it is implied that democracy is an ἀναιμένη καὶ μαλακὴ πολιτεία. Aristotle does not say, as he says of the other sign of freedom, that all the δημοτικοί regarded this as a mark of democracy, and it appears from 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25 sqq. that 'living as one pleases' was a concomitant only of extreme democracies, notwithstanding that it is treated here as a characteristic of democracy in general. It would seem, indeed, from 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 22 sqq. (cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 34 sqq.) that in oligarchies also the oligarchs were allowed to do what they pleased. That a 'desire of the individual to be let alone, to do as he pleases, indulge his impulses, follow out his projects,' 'has been extremely strong' in the United States is remarked by Mr. Bryce (American Commonwealth, 3. 268). On the other hand, Mr. Lecky remarks (Democracy and Liberty, ed. 1, 1. 213) that 'in our own day no fact is more incontestable and conspicuous than the love of democracy for authoritative regulation,' extending in his view apparently to habits of life (ibid. 1. 462).

13. εἴπερ τοῦ δουλεύοντος, sc. ἐστί. See note on 1310 a 27.

14. ἐντεῦθεν δ' ἐλήλυθε κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Rep. 562, 563 D, and Laws 698 A, 701 B.

16. καὶ συμβάλλεται ταύτῃ κ.τ.λ., 'and in this way [this second criterion of freedom] contributes to the freedom based on equality.' See Bon. Ind. 714 b 57 sqq. Bonitz, however (715 a 2 sq.), places a note of interrogation after his quotation of the passage before us, possibly regarding it as corrupt.

17 sqq. The logical connexion of 1317 b 17—1318 a 3 with what has preceded in 1317 a 40—b 17 is as follows:—democracy means a turn of office for all and a share for all in deliberative and judicial work, and also the supremacy of the many; hence whatever facilitates the access of all to office and to deliberative and judicial work is democratic, and also the aggrandizement of the assembly and the enfeeblement of the magistrates. Now the access of all to office is facilitated by the use of the lot in appointments to most offices, by the absence or smallness of property-qualifications for office, by the prohibition of a repeated tenure of most offices, and by a short tenure of most offices; hence all these things are democratic. So, too, is the provision of pay for office-holders and for members of the assembly and dicasteries, for this measure facilitates the access of all to office and to deliberative and judicial work. The enfeebling of offices of life-long tenure, if any such offices are permitted to exist, is also democratic, and the substitution of the lot for election in appointments to them. This follows from the rule that the tenure of office should be short, and that appointments to offices should be made by lot. The sentence 1317 b 38—41 stands in no logical connexion with 1317 a 40—b 17, and Sus. is probably right in bracketing it.

17. τούτων δ' ὑποκειμένων κ.τ.λ., 'and these things being the starting-point and the principle [of democracy] being such, the following institutions are democratic.' For ὁ τοιοῦτος in the sense of 'the following' and referring not, as it commonly does, to something already mentioned but to something about to be mentioned, cp. 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 6 sqq. and see note on that passage. For ταύτων ὑποκειμένων compare (with Bon. Ind. 797 b 46 sqq.) Phys. 4. 4. 211 a 6 sq., De Gen. An. 4. 1. 766 a 16 sqq., and Rhet. 2. 4. 1381 a 3 sqq., and for τοιούτης οὐσης τῆς ἀρχῆς Pol. 7 (5). 1. 1302 a 5 sqq. By 'the principle of democracy' Aristotle means freedom in the two senses mentioned by him. He arranges his list of democratic institutions under the three heads of ἀρχαί, τὸ δικαστικόν, and τὸ βουλευόμενον. It is evident from this list that the aim of Greek democracy was twofold—1. to give all the citizens a turn of office,

at any rate so far as regards offices not needing special experience, and also a share either in all kinds of judicial work or in the more important kinds of it, and to enable the poor by pay to act as officials and dicasts: 2. by making the assembly supreme over all matters, or all important matters, and providing pay for its members to secure the supremacy of the poor over the rich. In modern democracies a popular assembly and popular dicasteries no longer find a place, nor does the lot, but the two aims indicated by Aristotle are still traceable in democratic institutions. 'Rotation in office' is demanded by democratic feeling in the United States (Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, 2. 482), and the supremacy of the will of the poorer class is an universal accompaniment of democracy. It will be noticed that the uniformity of nurture education and dress which is dwelt upon as democratic in 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 19 sqq. is not referred to here, nor are the matters which are so described in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 27 sqq. and in *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 9. No mention is made of the preference of democracy for boards of magistrates in comparison with single magistrates (7 (5). 1. 1301 b 25 sq.) and for a multiplicity of small magistracies (Plato, *Polit.* 303 A), or of its disapproval of the holding of two paid offices together (Demosth. c. *Timocr.* cc. 123, 150), or of the ostracism, or of the democratic tendency to publicity in government and in judicial proceedings, or of secret voting. Nor, as has been noticed already (see note on 2), is anything said of the tendency of Greek democracy to admit to citizenship persons of semi-alien or semi-servile or illegitimate birth, of which we read in 3. 5. 1278 a 26 sqq. In *Hdt.* 3. 80 the Persian Otanes says of democracy, *πάλη μὲν ἀρχὰς ἄρχει, ὑπεύθυνον δὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχει, βουλευόμενα δὲ πάντα ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἀναφέρει.* The second of these characteristics of democracy is not included by Aristotle in his enumeration of τὰ δημοτικά.

18. τὸ αἰρεῖσθαι τὰς ἀρχὰς πάντας ἐκ πάντων. Not many offices will be elective (cp. 20 sq.), but to those that are all the citizens will elect out of all. In the case both of electors and of elected restrictions will be eschewed, whether connected with wealth or birth or age. An 'ordo certus magistratuum' will not be in harmony with the spirit of a democracy, because it places restrictions of age on the choice of the electors. A democracy, however, will be apt to place restrictions on the repeated tenure of the same office, unless it is connected with war. It deserves notice that Greek democracies do not appear to have attempted to make the rich and noble ineligible

for office, whereas at Florence the nobles were made incapable of holding most offices (Duffy, *Tuscan Republics*, p. 163).

19. τὸ ἀρχειν πάντας μὲν ἐκάστου ἑκάστον δ' ἐν μέρει πάντων. The democratic principle is that all the citizens rule over each individual, and yet that their rule over him is balanced by the fact that he has his turn of ruling over all. If the individual citizen submits to be ruled by all, he does so not as one excluded from rule, but as one who has his turn of ruling. This does not seem to be true of the first form of democracy, for in it only γνώριμοι will hold the greatest offices (c. 4. 1318 b 27 sqq.). It is also obvious that the rule exercised by all over each individual citizen is of a more absolute nature than the rule exercised over all by the individual citizen as a temporary holder of office. We see, however, that the Greek conception of democracy involved not only the rule of all the citizens over the individual citizen, but also a rotation of office among the individual citizens. The individual citizen in a Greek democracy expected, in fact, not only to rule as a part of the collective citizen-body, but also individually as an official. Cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 30 sqq.

20. τὸ κληρωτὸς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἢ πάσας ἢ ὅσαι μὴ ἐμπειρίας δέονται καὶ τέχνης. It is not the mere use of the lot in appointments to magistracies that is characteristic of democracy, but its use in appointments to all magistracies or all but a few. In *Rhet.* 1. 8. 1365 b 31 sq. democracy is similarly defined as a constitution ἐν ᾗ κλήρη διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχὰς: cp. *Plato, Rep.* 557 A. Aristotle omits to add ἐκ πάντων with κληρωτὸς, but this is what he means, for the lot would not be democratic if it was not ἐκ πάντων. A limited lot finds a place in oligarchy (6 (4). 15. 1300 b 2). Isocrates (*Areop.* § 23) had already urged that the lot is not really as democratic as a well-regulated system of election, inasmuch as it allows persons not friendly to democracy to find their way into office. At Athens, however, all persons appointed to office had to undergo a strict δοκιμασία, which would exclude persons of this kind (*Lys. Or.* 13. c. *Agorat.* c. 10). For the exception from the rule prescribing the lot of offices demanding experience and skill cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 27 sq. Among these offices would be those of the strategēi (c. 8. 1322 a 32 sqq.: 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 4 sqq.), of some great financial officers, of envoys, though envoys were not in strictness ἀρχοντες (see note on 1299 a 19), and perhaps in some States of auditors and bouleutae, for these offices are said in c. 8. 1322 a 32-b 17

to require much experience. The following offices are mentioned in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 43 *inil.* as elective at Athens in the time of Aristotle—those of the ταμίης στρατιωτικῶν, of οἱ ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικόν, and of δ τῶν κρητῶν ἐπιμελητής, as well as all those connected with war. It is difficult to think that there ever was a democracy in which all offices without exception were filled by lot—one, for instance, in which the generals were appointed by lot.

22. τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τιμήματος κ.τ.λ. See note on 1294 b 7.

23. τὸ μὴ δις τὸν αὐτὸν ἄρχειν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 10, and 3. 1. 1275 a 24 sq.: also 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 62, ἄρχειν δὲ τὰς μὲν κατὰ πόλεμον ἀρχὰς ἑ[ξ]εσ[τ]ι πλεονάκις, τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐδεμίαν, πλὴν βουλευῆσαι δις (see Sandys' note on this passage). It is easy to see how much this exception must have added to the influence of the magistracies connected with war, and especially to the influence of the stratēgi, for they must have stood to the other magistrates, or most of them, in the relation in which skilled persons stand to novices. Pericles was elected stratēgus at Athens fifteen years in succession (Plut. Pericl. c. 16) and Phocion forty-five times (Plut. Phoc. c. 8). 'The re-election of stratēgi of proved efficiency was the rule at Athens' (Beloch, *Attische Politik seit Perikles*, p. 267). There seems to have been some laxity at Athens in the application of the rule against a repeated tenure of the same office, for Lysias (Or. 30. c. Nicom. c. 29) and Demosthenes (Prooem. 55. p. 1461) complain that it was applied to unimportant offices and neglected in the case of important ones. Restrictions on the repeated tenure of offices were not peculiar to democratic States; aristocracies like the Lacedaemonian went even further than democracies usually did, and imposed restrictions on the repeated tenure of some offices connected with war; thus the Lacedaemonian office of ναύαρχος could not be held twice (Xen. Hell. 2. 1. 7: see however Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, 9. 359 and note 3). In the aristocratical Republic of Ragusa the Rector held his office but for one month and was re-eligible only after an interval of two years (T. G. Jackson, *Dalmatia*, 2. 311). At San Marino, the constitution of which is a sort of ἀριστοκρατία, the two Captain Regents hold office for six months and are not re-eligible for twelve years (E. Armstrong in *Macmillan's Magazine*, No. 375, Jan. 1891, p. 200). Some democracies are less rigid in this matter than others. Mr. Bryce remarks (*American Commonwealth*, 2. 405, note), that 'the tendency in Switzerland to re-elect the same men to the legislature and to

public office has doubtless worked as much for good in politics there as the opposite tendency works for evil in the United States.'

ἡ ὀλιγάκις ἡ ὀλίγως. See Vahlen on Poet. 14. 1454 a 1, and note on 1296 a 38.

24. τὸ ὀλιγοχρονίους κ.τ.λ. The aim in this matter, as in prohibitions of a repeated tenure, was that as many might share in office as possible: cp. 2. 11. 1273 b 12 sqq. In the early days of Greek democracy this principle was neglected (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 21 sq.).

25. τὸ δικάζειν πάντας καὶ ἐκ πάντων κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 38 sqq., 1301 a 11 sq.

26. τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων. Cp. 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 3. l. 35, τὰ πλείστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, and c. 8. l. 21, τὰ ἄλλα τὰ πλείστα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πολιτ[ικ]ῶν, and Plut. Lycurg. et Num. Comp. c. 4, τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ μέγιστα τῆς νομοθεσίας.

28. πολιτείας. Cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 20, ὅσα εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν φέρει.

τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων. Some causes of this kind at any rate involved large interests (6 (4). 16. 1300 b 22 sq.).

τὸ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κυρίαν εἶναι πάντων κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 28 sqq. and see note on 33. Compare also Cic. pro Flacc. c. 7, Graecorum autem totae respublicae sedentis contionis temeritate administrantur, and Plato, Polit. 303 A, τὴν δ' αὖ τοῦ πλήθους (ἀρχὴν) κατὰ πάντα ἀσθενῆ καὶ μηδὲν μῆτε ἀγαθὸν μῆτε κακὸν μέγα δυναμένην ὡς πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας διὰ τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν ταύτῃ διανεμεῖσθαι κατὰ σμικρὰ εἰς πολλούς. But I do not remember that Plato, or indeed any one else before Aristotle, calls attention to the characteristic of democracy pointed out in the passage before us. 'All the main features of American government may be deduced from two principles. One is the sovereignty of the people. . . . The second principle, itself a consequence of this first one, is the distrust of the various organs and agents of government' (Bryce, American Commonwealth, 1. 407). It is an accepted principle in the United States that 'legislatures, officials, and all other agents of the sovereign people ought to be strictly limited by law, by each other, and by the shortness of the terms of office' (ibid. 3. 267). For κυρίαν τῶν μεγίστων cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 7 sq. and Xen. Cyrop. 8. 5. 22.

30. τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν δημοτικώτατον βουλή κ.τ.λ. One reason for this may be gathered from 3. 11. 1282 a 29 sqq., where it appears that the property-qualification for membership of the Boulê was

commonly small, while the property-qualifications for the offices of *στρατηγός* and *ταμίας* were larger.

83. *εἰς αὐτὸν γὰρ ἀνάγει κ.τ.λ.* Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 4, *ἀπαντα αὐτοὶ κρίνουσιν*, and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 41, *ἀπάντων γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν πεποιήκεν ὁ δῆμος κύριον, καὶ πάντα διοικεῖται ψηφίσμασιν καὶ δικαστηρίοις, ἐν οἷς ὁ δῆμος ἐστὶν ὁ κρατῶν*· καὶ γὰρ α[ι τ]ῆς βουλῆς κρίσεις εἰς τὸν δῆμον ἐληλύθασιν. Deliberative and administrative decisions are referred to, as well as judicial ones: see vol. i. p. 230, note 1, and cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 26 sq., 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 13 sqq., and 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 6 sqq.

84. *καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τῇ μεθόδῳ τῇ πρὸ ταύτης.* This refers to 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 38–1300 a 4. For this reference cp. c. 4. 1318 b 7, *ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων λόγοις*, and see vol. ii. p. xxvii. It is possible that *ἡ μέθοδος ἡ πρὸ ταύτης* includes both the Sixth (old Fourth) and the Seventh (old Fifth) Book. The Eighth (old Sixth) Book is supplementary to them.

85. *ἔπειτα τὸ μισθοφορεῖν κ.τ.λ.* It appears that the burden imposed on the revenue by the payment of the assembly dicasteries and magistracies was often diminished by restricting payment in the case of the assembly to those of its meetings which were termed *κύριαι*, meetings which took place at Athens only once in each prytany ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 43: Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 285 sq.), or indeed by going farther and paying not all the magistracies, but only 'those whose members required to have a common table,' for this appears to be the meaning of *τῶν ἀρχῶν ὡς ἀνάγκη συσσιτεῖν μετ' ἀλλήλων*, not 'the magistracies which required to take their meals with each other.' At Athens after the disaster at Syracuse it was ordained *τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀμίσθους ἀρχεῖν ἀπάσας ἕως ἂν ὁ πόλεμος ᾗ, πλὴν τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων καὶ τῶν πρυτάνων οἱ ἂν ὦσιν* ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 29. l. 30). We know that at Athens the prytaneis of the Boulê and their secretaries took their meals together ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 43. l. 10 sq.: Demosth. *De Fals. Leg.* cc. 190, 249), and that the archons did the same ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 62: c. 3. l. 30 sq.), and also the stratêgi (Demosth. *De Fals. Leg.* c. 190: Gilbert, *Beitr. zur innern Gesch. Athens*, p. 30). This custom no doubt did much to alleviate the defects of an administrative system in which boards of magistrates were largely employed. We hear the same thing of the ephors at Sparta (Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 52 sq.), and of magistrates elsewhere (Plut. *Cimon*, c. 1: Aen. Poliorc. 11. 3). Aristotle himself evidently intends the most important boards of

magistrates in his 'best State' to have each its common table (4 (7). 12. 1331 a 25), among them apparently those of the *stratēgi* and *ταμίαι* (7 (5). 9. 1309 a 33 sqq.), and he probably means his *agronomi* to have a common table too (4 (7). 12. 1331 b 14 sqq.). The question, indeed, arises, what boards of magistrates in Greek States had not a common table, and the answer is not easy. Those boards would be least likely to have one whose business was not of a nature to call for promptitude in joint action. A similar custom prevailed in the cities of mediaeval Italy. The priors at Florence not only took their meals together, but 'slept together' (Perrens, *La Civilisation Florentine*, p. 49). As to the *κύριαι ἐκκλησίαι* it should be noticed that at Athens attendance at them was paid at a higher rate than attendance at other meetings of the assembly (*Αθ. Πολ.* c. 62).

38. [ἐν ἐπειδὴ . . . 41, βαναυσία]. I follow Sus. in bracketing this sentence, mainly for the reason given in the note on 1317 b 17 sqq. (which see). It may possibly have been written by Aristotle himself in the margin of his MS., but, if it was, he can hardly have intended it to be inserted in the text where it stands. Oligarchy is defined by the attributes to which it allots office (cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9 sqq.), and these are here said to be birth wealth and culture; therefore democracy allots office to the opposite attributes. More usually oligarchy is said to allot office to wealth (3. 8. 1280 a 1 sq.), and culture is treated rather as a note of aristocracy than of oligarchy (6 (4). 15. 1299 b 24 sq.), but its connexion with oligarchy is explained by 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 37 sq. Notwithstanding what is said here as to the liking of democracy for *βαναυσία*, Aristotle tells us in 3. 4. 1277 b 1 sqq. that in some States handicraftsmen (i.e. *βδραννοί*) did not share in office till the extreme form of democracy came into existence. As to the preference of democracy for the lowborn and poor cp. [Xen.] *Rep. Ath.* 1. 7, 2. 19, and 3. 10, Aristoph. *Eq.* 180 sq., 185 sqq., 217 sq., and Isocr. *De Pace*, § 53. No doubt in a certain sense, as L. Schmidt points out (*Ethik der alt. Griechen*, 1. 161), 'indifference to the advantages of birth was alien to the spirit of Athenian democracy,' but it is one thing to respect high birth and another to accord it political power. 'A gentleman having been recommended to Mr. Buchanan as eminently qualified to fill the post of Minister to Spain, because to all other qualities requisite for the position he added that of understanding and speaking Spanish, the President's sole reply was

"Oh, that is too damned aristocratic," and another candidate for the office was named' (Frances Anne Kemble, *Further Records*, 1848-1883). As to this story I may say with Aristotle (7 (5). 10. 1312 a 3), *εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἄλλου γε ἂν γένοιτο τοῦτο ἀληθές*.

41. *ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν κ.τ.λ.* Yet cp. 3. 16. 1287 a 4 sqq. It has not, I think, been noticed that Aristotle here refers to the fate of the kingship in many Greek States; this was originally an office held for life, but its powers were curtailed (3. 14. 1285 b 13 sqq.), and it often came, as at Athens, to be filled by lot. For the change by which the archonships at Athens, and among them the office of archon basileus, ceased to be elective and came to be filled by lot, see 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 22, l. 20 sqq.

- 1318 a. 3. *τὰ μὲν οὖν . . . b 5, φροντίζουσιν* is bracketed by Sus. The passage, or at any rate all of it but its first clause, *τὰ μὲν οὖν κοινὰ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῦτ' ἐστί*, looks like a subsequent addition, but it may well have been added by Aristotle; the reminiscence of Plato, *Laws* 663 E in 1318 b 1 sqq. (see note) points to this, as well as the general character of the passage.

5. *ἡ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκοῦσα δημοκρατία καὶ δῆμος*. Cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30-38. In 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25 sq., however, Aristotle refers to extreme democracies as *αἱ δημοκρατίαι αἱ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκοῦσαι δημοκρατικάι*: cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq. As to *δῆμος*, a *demos* comprising both rich and poor would have the best claim to the name.

6. *ἴσον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* Probably *δοκεῖ* should be supplied from *δοκοῦσα* in the preceding sentence, for it is clear from 9, *οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὑπάρχειν νομίζοιεν κ.τ.λ.*, that Aristotle is expressing the opinions of others.

- C. 3. 11. *τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο*, 'in the next place:' cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 6, *τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα*.

12. *τὰ τιμήματα διελεῖν χιλίους τὰ τῶν πεντακοσίων*, 'place the assessed properties in two groups, so that those of a thousand will be equal in value to those of five hundred.' Cp. c. 6. 1320 b 22 sq., where the phrase recurs, with this difference, however, that *τὰ τιμήματα* is there used in the sense not of 'assessed properties,' but of 'property-qualifications.'

13. *ἢ οὐχ οὕτω δεῖ τιθέναι τὴν κατὰ τοῦτο ἰσότητα*, 'or ought we to institute equality in respect of property-qualification not in this way, but otherwise?' For *τιθέναι* ('statuere') cp. Plato, *Laws* 801 A, *ἢ μηδὲν ἐπακρωτῶ, τιθῶ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτω*; Κλ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τίθει· νεκρὸν γὰρ πάσαισι ταῖς ψήφοις οὗτος ὁ νόμος.

15. *ἔπειτα . . . λαβόντα . . . τούτους κυρίους εἶναι κ.τ.λ.* Cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 21 sqq. For the construction, or want of construction, cp. Meteor. 1. 3. 341 a 23, τὸ δὲ μάλιστα γίγνεσθαι ἅμα τῷ ἡλίῳ αὐτῷ τὴν θερμότητα ἐδλογον, λαμβάνοντας τὸ ὅμοιον ἐκ τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν γεγνημένων, and Pol. 2. 9. 1269 a 40 sqq., τὰς γειτνιώσας πόλεις . . . μηδεμίαν εἶναι σύμμαχον τοῖς ἀφισταμένοις, and see the examples from Plato of 'inversion of government' collected by Riddell in his edition of Plato's Apology, p. 223, § 271.

16. *τούτους*, 'these' and not the 1000 and 500 themselves. The advantage of this arrangement would be that supremacy in the State would rest with one body of men and not two.

18. *ἡ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος*, sc. *τῶν ἀνθρώπων*.

φασὶ γὰρ οἱ δημοτικοὶ τοῦτο δίκαιον κ.τ.λ. For the omission of *εἶναι* cp. 2. 3. 1261 b 22, *ἕκαστος γὰρ υἱὸν ἑαυτοῦ φήσκει τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ γυναῖκα δὴ τὴν αὐτήν*, and 3. 10. 1281 a 34 sq., and Menand. Monost. 737 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 361),

φασὶν κακίους οἱ ποτηροὶ τοὺς κακοὺς.

For the fact cp. c. 2. 1317 b 5 sqq.

20. *οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 22 sqq.: 3. 13. 1283 a 31 sq.: 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 31 sqq.: 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 39 sqq. *κατὰ πλῆθος οὐσίας*, and not *κατὰ πλῆθος ἀριθμοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων* (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 10, *κατ' ἀριθμοῦ γὰρ πλῆθος τῶν ἐνοικούντων κρίνουσι τὴν μεγάλην*).

21. *κρίνεσθαι δεῖν*, 'iudicium esse faciendum' (Sepulv.).

22. *ὃ τι ἂν οἱ ὀλίγοι*. It is not clear what Greek word or words exactly should be supplied (possibly *βούλωνται*), and a similar doubt recurs in 33, but the sense is clear, 'whatever the few decide.'

23. *καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν κ.τ.λ.* Cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 16 sqq.

26. *τῶν πλουσίων καὶ ἑλαττόνων*. See note on 1290 a 35.

καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, in 3. 10. 1281 a 14–17.

30. *μὴ μέντοι πάντως*, 'but not in all ways': cp. 2. 5. 1263 b 31, *δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πως μίαν καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάντως*.

32. *ἢ τοῖς πλείοσι*, sc. *ἀμφοτέρων*, 'or to the majority of each,' i. e., for example, if six rich out of ten and twelve poor out of twenty agreed.

ἐὰν δὲ τῶναντία δόξῃ, i. e. if the majority of the rich decide in one way and the majority of the poor in the opposite way.

33. *ὃ τι ἂν οἱ πλείους καὶ ὧν τὸ τίμημα πλεῖον*, 'whatever is decided by the majority, that is by those whose property-qualification is greater.' I take *καὶ* here to be explanatory, as often else-

where (see for instance note on 1257 b 7). Welldon translates the passage in much the same way. Spengel would bracket *καὶ* or read *ὡν καὶ* in place of *καὶ ὡν*, which is the reading of ΓΠ, and Susemihl, who follows him in the latter change, translates, 'das, für welches sich diejenige von beiden Mehrheiten ausgesprochen hat, welche zugleich (mit der übereinstimmenden Minderheit zusammen) die höhere Schätzung aufweisen kann,' but Susemihl's equivalent for *οἱ πλείους* is hardly that which would most naturally suggest itself to a translator, and it does not seem to me that any change is necessary. Aristotle's language implies that each man's *τίμημα* was recorded and could be readily ascertained, but would this be the case with the poor? We gather from 3. 12. 1283 a 17 sq. and 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 19 sqq. that *οἱ ἄποροι οὐκ ἔχουσι τίμημα*. His solution differs from that which the advocates of oligarchy would put forward because it takes account of the property of the poor and adds it together, whereas oligarchs would claim that the will of those who own property in large amounts should prevail, even if the total amount of their property is less than the total amount of the property of the poor. But if, as Aristotle often tells us, democracy implies the supremacy of the will of the numerical majority, is the arrangement which he recommends here suitable to a democracy?

34. *ἔδοξε δὲ κ.τ.λ.*, sc. *τάναντία*, 'and a conflicting decision was arrived at by six of the rich and fifteen of the poorer.' For *τοῖς ἔξ* see note on 1259 a 27, and Kühner, *Ausführl. gr. Gramm.*, ed. 2, § 465. 13 (ed. Gerth, § 465. 13. ζ).

38. *τοῦτο*, i.e. *τὸ τοῦτοις δόξαν*. Cp. *ταῦτα* in 1. 2. 1252 a 33. *Ἔστω* is apparently to be supplied (cp. 32). See notes on 1306 a 24 and 1317 a 17.

ἴδαν δὲ ἴσοι συμπίσωσι, i.e. *τύχασιν ὄντες* (Bon. Ind. s.v. *συμπίπτειν*).

40. For *δίχα γένηται* see critical note.

1318 b. 1. *ἀποκληρωτέον*, 'sorte discernendum est' (Bon. Ind. s. v.).

ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον ποιητέον. Aristotle would perhaps suggest that if the votes should be equal, those voting No should win (cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 34 sqq.). For other modes of meeting the difficulty referred to in the case of a dicastery cp. Julian, Or. 3. 114 D, 'Ἀθήνησι μὲν οὖν φασίν, ὅτε τοῖς πατρίοις ἔθεσιν ἐχρῶντο καὶ ἔζων τοῖς οἰκείοις πειθόμενοι νόμοις μεγάλην καὶ πολυάνθρωπον οἰκοῦντες πόλιν, εἴ ποτε τῶν δικαζόντων αἱ ψῆφοι κατ' ἴσον γένοιντο τοῖς φεύγουσι πρὸς τοὺς διώκοντας, τὴν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ἐπιτεμεμένην τῇ τὴν δίκην ὀφλήσειν μέλλουσι

ἀπολύειν ἀμφω τῆς αἰτίας, τὸν μὲν ἐπάγοντα τὴν κατηγορίαν τοῦ δοκεῖν εἶναι συκοφάντην, τὸν δέ, ὡς εἰκός, τοῦ δοκεῖν ἔνοχον εἶναι τῷ ποτηρέματι: see also the agreement regulating the relations of Oeantheia and Chaleion (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 31: Meister, Rechtsvertrag zwischen Chaleion und Oianthea, p. 35 sqq.).

ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου κ.τ.λ. Here there is an allusion to a common saying which has come down to us among the Γνώμαι μονόστιχοι ascribed to Menander, though the saying, if not the verse, is probably older than Menander (Monost. 178: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 345),

εὐρεῖν τὸ δίκαιον πανταχῶς οὐ ῥάδιον.

Aristotle also remembers Plato, Laws 663 E, καλὸν μὲν ἡ ἀλήθεια, ὧς ἔστι, καὶ μόνιμον· ἔοικε μὴν οὐ ῥάδιον εἶναι πείθειν: cp. Eryxias, 405 B, καταμαθὼν δ' αὐτὸν ἐγὼ ὅτι ἴσον εἶη πείσαι, ὅπερ ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον λίθον ἐψῆσαι κ.τ.λ. For τοὺς δυναμένους πλεονεκτεῖν cp. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 10.

4. δεῖ γὰρ ζητοῦσι κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rhet. 1. 3. 1358 b 36, ὡς δ' οὐκ ἄδικον τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας καταδουλοῦσθαι καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικούντας, (οἱ συμβουλεύοντες) πολλάκις οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.

6. Δημοκρατιῶν δ' οὐσῶν τεττάρων κ.τ.λ. Five in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b C. 4. 30 sqq., four in 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 22 sqq. In βελτίστη μὲν κ.τ.λ. and in c. 6. 1320 b 21 sqq. a question is answered which has been raised in c. 1. 1317 a 13 sq.

7. καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἐλέχθη λόγοις. The reference is to 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 30 sqq. and 6 (4). 11. 1296 b 3 sqq. For ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων λόγοις cp. c. 2. 1317 b 34 sq.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν αὕτη, 'and this kind of democracy is also the most ancient of all; but I call it first [not for this reason, but] in the sense in which one might range different kinds of demos in groups [as first or second].' The demos which is supreme in the first kind of democracy is first because it is best (cp. 6 (4). 11. 1296 b 3 sqq.). That the most moderate form of democracy was also the most ancient is confirmed by the fact that the earliest democracies resembled polities (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 24 sq.).

9. βελτιστος γὰρ δῆμος ὁ γεωργικός ἐστιν. The agricultural demos is best, 1. because it is *unable* owing to the small amount of property it possesses to attend the assembly frequently, and further because owing to its need of the necessities of life it devotes itself closely to its work and does not covet the goods of others, and indeed *prefers* a life of business to a life of office-holding

and politics (compare for the antithesis c. 4. 1319 a 30-32), unless office offers a prospect of large gains, so that, if it asks for any share of political power, it asks only for the right of electing the magistrates and reviewing their conduct in office: 2. because its life is not devoid of virtue, like the lives of handicraftsmen, shopkeepers, and day-labourers (this is implied in 1319 a 24 sqq.). The γεωργοί were often hoplites (6 (4). 4. 1291 a 30 sq.), and they would make good soldiers, like the herdsman and shepherds whose military efficiency Aristotle praises in 1319 a 22 sqq. The members of both these classes probably had less alien or servile blood in their veins than the members of the classes to which Aristotle prefers them, but of this he says nothing. It seems clear from his language in 1319 a 6 sqq., which implies that when the demos sold or lost its land it ceased to be an agricultural demos, that his agricultural demos is a demos of peasant-proprietors (see Liddell and Scott s.v. γεωργός), but he does not, like modern believers in the 'magic of property,' trace its good qualities to this fact. Most of the Greek States which were still vigorous in the third century B. C. were States with a demos of small cultivating landowners or else a pastoral demos (e.g. the Achaeans, Arcadians, Macedonians, and Aetolians), and ancient States in general often began to decline when these classes disappeared and were replaced by slaves or serfs, but Aristotle does not seem to have observed this, or he would not have advised that the tillers of the soil in his 'best State' should be slaves or serfs, as he does in 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq. We see that he is not so much enamoured of an agricultural demos as to introduce it into his 'best State,' though he holds that it forms the fittest basis for a democracy. 'We scarcely ever find [in Greek writers] any recognition of the fact that a strong and healthy race of peasants together with an industrious middle class is the best means of maintaining the life of a State' (Blümner, *Home Life of the Ancient Greeks*, Eng. Trans., p. 493). 'Jefferson regarded agriculture as so much the best occupation for citizens that he was alarmed by the rumour that the cod-fish of the north-eastern coasts were coming down to the shores of Virginia and Carolina, lest the people of those States should "be tempted to catch them, and commerce, of which we have already too much, should receive an accession"' (Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, 2. 359 note). Aristotle nowhere includes in his enumeration of the different kinds of δῆμος

such a *δημος* as existed in the Lacedaemonian State, one composed not of small cultivating landowners resident in the country, but of small non-cultivating landowners resident in Sparta. Would he prefer a *demos* of the cultivating type to a *demos* of this sort?

10. ὥστε καὶ ποιεῖν ἐνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν κ.τ.λ., 'and so it is also possible to institute a democracy [as well as other forms of constitution, such as oligarchy], where the mass of the citizens lives by agriculture or pastoral farming,' for—Aristotle in effect continues—a *demos* of this kind will claim only a small measure of political power. He probably intends here to correct a common impression that under these circumstances an oligarchy was the only constitution in place: cp. Plut. Themist. c. 19, οἱ τριάκοντα . . . οἰόμενοι τὴν μὲν κατὰ θάλατταν ἀρχὴν γένεσιν εἶναι δημοκρατίας, ὀλιγαρχίᾳ δ' ἦτον δυσχεραίνειν τοὺς γεωργοῦντας, and Eurip. Suppl. 406 Bothe (420 Dindorf),

γαπόνος δ' ἀνὴρ πένης,
εἰ καὶ γένοιτο μὴ ἀμαθής, ἔργων ὑπο
οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο πρὸς τὰ κοινὰ ἀποβλέπειν.

An oligarchy existed at Epidaurus (Plut. Quaest. Gr. c. 1), and no doubt in many other places, when the *demos* consisted for the most part of cultivators of the soil. However, democracies of the agricultural type may be traced at Athens in the days of Solon and Peisistratus (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 18 sqq.: Isocr. Areop. § 52), and in far later times at Elis (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 102), at Mantinea (1318 b 23 sqq.), at Aphytis (1319 a 14 sqq.), in the cities of Achaia (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 105), and probably elsewhere in the Peloponnesus.

11. διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1319 a 30 sqq., 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 25 sq., and 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 25 sqq. If they had had a large amount of property or none at all, they would have had more leisure (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 6 sqq., 18 sq.). Compare the picture of the Roman *demos* in early times which we find in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 7. 58. The ruling class in the first form of oligarchy has 'not a very large amount of property' (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 12 sq.), but that is a different thing.

13. διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὰναγκαῖα κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 25 sqq., where we read of τὸ γεωργικόν, that ἔχουσιν ἐργαζόμενοι ζῆν, οὐ δύνανται δὲ σχολάζειν. The cultivators had a small amount of property, but had not the necessities of life. There is no inconsistency in this, for in 2. 7. 1267 a 9 sqq. οὐσία βραχεία καὶ ἐργασία

are said to be the means of obtaining necessities. Men who were busily engaged in attending to their own property were thought to be least likely to covet the goods of others (Plut. Aristid. et Cat. Comp. c. 3, *ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀμελοῦντας οἰκίας καὶ ποριζομένους ἐξ ἀδικίας*, and Philopoemen, c. 4, *πάνυ προσήκειν οἰόμενος οἰκεία κεκτήσθαι τὸν ἀλλοτρίων ἀφεξόμενον* : Isocr. Areop. § 24).

14. ἀλλ' ἦδιον κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 4 sqq. and Aristoph. *Γεωργοί*, *Fragm. 1* (Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Gr.* 2. 985),

A. *ἐθέλω γεωργεῖν. εἴτα τίς με κωλύει;*

B. *ἡμεῖς. Α. ἐπεὶ δίδωμι χιλίας δραχμάς, εἴαν με τῶν ἀρχῶν ἀφῆτε.*

As to *πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ ἀρχειν* see note on 1293 a 4, and cp. [Demosth.] c. Aristog. 2. 3.

16. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 9 sq., and Heraclit. *Fragm. 111*, *αἰρεῦνται γὰρ ἐν ἀντία πάντων οἱ ἄριστοι, κλέος ἀέανον θνητῶν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ κεκόρηται ὅκωσπερ κτήνηα*. Plato had said the same thing in *Laws* 870 A, *τοῦτο δ' ἔστι μάλιστα ἐνταῦθα, οὐ πλείστός τε καὶ ἰσχυρότατος ἥμερος ὃν τυγχάνει τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἢ τῶν χρημάτων τῆς ἀπλήστου καὶ ἀπείρου κτήσεως ἔρωτας μυρίους ἐντίκτουσα δύναμις διὰ φύσιν τε καὶ ἀπαίδευσιν τὴν κακὴν* : cp. 918 D. Compare also Demosthenes' account of the feelings of οἱ πολλοὶ Μακεδόνων in *Olynth.* 2. 16.

17. σημείον δέ· καὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See note on 1312 b 21. Machiavelli gives much the same account of the tendencies of the 'ignobili' in *Discorsi*, 1. 5.

19. εἴαν τις αὐτοὺς ἐργάζεσθαι μὴ κωλύῃ. How did oligarchies hinder the many in their business? Possibly in part by discouraging the residence of the urban poor, or some of them; in the central city (cp. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 13 sqq.).

20. ταχέως γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Menand. *Inc. Fab. Fragm. 95* (Meineke, *Fr. Com. Gr.* 4. 259).

21. ἔτι δὲ τὸ κυρίους εἶναι τοῦ ἐλέσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν κ.τ.λ. It is not often that we find the aor. infin. used in conjunction with the pres. infin. as here. In 29 we have *αἰρεῖσθαι μὲν τὰς ἀρχάς καὶ εὐθύνειν καὶ δικάζειν πάντας* (cp. 2. 12. 1274 a 16, *τὸ τὰς ἀρχάς αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν*). But in *Eth. Nic.* 1. 1. 1094 b 8 sq. we have *μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελειώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίμεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν*, where *λαβεῖν* seems used of an instantaneous and *σώζειν* of a continued act : cp. *Pol.* 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 29 sq. (*γένοιτο* followed by *σώζοιτο*) and 1289 a 3, *ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔργον τὸ ἐπαυροῦσθαι πολιτείαν ἢ κατασκευάζειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς*, and *Demosth. De Cor.* c. 254 (*προελίσθαι* followed by *πράττειν*). Cp.

also 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 30. l. 17, τοὺς δ' ἑκατὸν ἀνδρας διανεῖμαι σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τέτταρα μέρη ὡς ἰσαίετα καὶ διακληρώσει, καὶ εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν βουλευέω. Perhaps the tenses in the passage before us should be explained in a similar way. As to the fact the following may be quoted. 'A very little voting would be enough for the [Bulgarian] peasant, who grudges a walk to the polling-place as so much time taken from the more serious business of field-labour. In some districts it is difficult to find candidates for the Sobranje, and the village patriarch who lets himself be elected makes a virtue of his self-denial' (*Times*, Oct. 29. 1886).

22. εἴ τι φιλοτιμίας ἔχουσιν. Cp. 2. 10. 1272 b 9, ἔχει τι πολιτείας ἡ τάξις. Φιλοτιμίας takes up τῆς τιμῆς, 17.

23. ἐπεὶ παρ' ἐνίοις δήμοις κ.τ.λ. It is not clear why the whole citizen-body of Mantinea met for purposes of deliberation, while the election of the magistrates was made over to sections of it selected in succession for the purpose. And does *αἰρετοί* imply that these sections were elected, or that they were selected by some system of rotation similar to that described in 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 15 sqq.? If they were elected, by whom were they elected? By the whole citizen-body? Perhaps it was thought that, while deliberation was best left to gatherings of the whole citizen-body, in elections to offices a small body of electors would make a better choice than a large one. The fact that this arrangement existed in some democracies is a remarkable one, because there were oligarchies in which the magistrates were elected by the entire demos (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 30 sqq.). Gilbert (*Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 126. 2) takes Aristotle to refer in the passage before us to the democracy which existed at Mantinea in B.C. 421.

27. ὥσπερ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ ποτ' ἦν is added in explanation of καὶ τοῦτο.

ὁδὸς δὴ κ.τ.λ. For ὁδὸς δὴ see note on 1310 b 5. It would seem from the passage before us that Aristotle regarded the Solonian democracy as a democracy of the first kind, for many of the institutions here referred to existed in it: for instance, all the citizens possessed the right of electing the magistrates and reviewing their conduct in office (3. 11. 1281 b 32 sqq.) and of acting as dicasts (2. 12. 1274 a 3), while the magistracies were filled by election (2. 12. 1273 b 40 sqq.), and a higher property-qualification may probably have been required for the most important of them (see note on 1274 a 18). A similar distinction between the property-qualifica-

tion required for some offices and for others was made in the first form of oligarchy (c. 6. 1320 b 22 sqq.).

32. ἀλλὰ τοὺς δυναμένους, sc. ἄρχειν : cp. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 36 sq. This restriction would probably exclude poor men : cp. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 6 sq. and 2. 11. 1273 a 24 sq.

33. αἱ τε γὰρ ἀρχαὶ κ.τ.λ. For τε γάρ here see note on 1333 a 2, and for τῶν βελτίστων note on 1292 a 9. Οἱ βέλτιστοι is an ambiguous term, meaning either 'the best men' or 'men of high social position.' In order that the conclusion, ἀνάγκη πολιτευομένους οὕτω πολιτεῖσθαι καλῶς, may be justified, οἱ βέλτιστοι should here bear the former meaning. Eucken (De Partic. Usu, p. 20) points out the resemblance of the passage before us to Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 12-19.

35. τοῖς ἐπικείσι καὶ γνωρίμοις. The omission of the article before γνωρίμοις shows that the ἐπικεῖς are regarded as not far removed from the γνώριμοι. Cp. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 31, τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ γνωρίμων (sc. πλῆθος), and Ἄθ. Πολ. c. 28. l. 6, τῶν εὐγενῶν καὶ γνωρίμων, and contrast 1319 b 13, τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν μέσων.

36. ἄρξονται γὰρ οὐχ ὅπ' ἄλλων χειρόνων. The form ἀρχθήσεται occurs in 1. 13. 1259 b 40. Nothing was more bitter to Greeks than to be ruled by men inferior to themselves : cp. 1319 b 15 sqq., Soph. Philoct. 456 sqq., Plato, Protag. 338 B, Rep. 347 C, and Laws 770 E, Demosth. De Rhod. Lib. c. 15, and Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 3. 10, τίς γὰρ ἑκουσίως ἄρχεται τῶν κρείττονων ὑπὸ τοῦ χειρόνος ;

38. τὸ γὰρ ἐπανακρέμασθαι κ.τ.λ. Ἐπανακρέμασθαι is a very rare word. For the thought cp. Hdt. 7. 104, εὐεῖθεροι γὰρ ὄντες οὐ πάντα εὐεῖθεροὶ εἰσι, ἔπειτα γὰρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος.

40. For φυλάττειν in the sense of 'watch and check,' cp. 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 19, and Plato, Laws 867 A, ὁ μὲν τὸν θυμὸν φυλάττων, and for τὸ ἐν ἐκάστῃ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φαῦλον cp. 3. 16. 1287 a 30 sqq. and Plato, Timaeus, 71 D, τὸ φαῦλον ἡμῶν.

1319 a. 2. ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὠφελιμώτατον ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here has in his memory Isocr. Ad Nicocl. § 16, καλῶς δὲ δημαγωγῆσεις, εἰάν μήθ' ὑβρίσειν τὸν ὄχλον ἢς μήθ' ὑβριζόμενον περιωρῆς, ἀλλὰ σκοπῆς ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι μὲν τὰς τιμὰς ἔξουσιν, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι μηδὲν ἀδικήσονται· ταῦτα γὰρ στοιχεῖα πρῶτα καὶ μέγιστα χρηστῆς πολιτείας ἐστίν. For ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις cp. 2. 5. 1263 b 18, τῶν νῦν ὑπαρχόντων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν.

6. πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν γεωργὸν τὸν δῆμον κ.τ.λ. Τε in τῶν τε νόμων τινές has nothing to answer to it. Aristotle's attention

appears to be distracted by the task of adducing examples, or he would have gone on to mention administrative measures (cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 32) likely to produce a similar effect. Some of the laws referred to by Aristotle may have been due to tyrants who wished to keep the citizens away from the city and to make peasants of them (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 13 sqq.). According to Plutarch, however (Themist. c. 19), the ancient *kings* of Athens sought to induce their subjects to occupy themselves with the cultivation of the olive, and not with sea-faring pursuits. It is evident from what Aristotle says that there were two ways at least in which an 'agricultural demos' might cease to exist in a Greek State. It might cease to exist because its members lost their land altogether, or it might cease to exist because they lost the fixed *quantum* of land the possession of which secured them political rights. There were, therefore, two ways of making the demos agricultural; one of them was to prevent the loss of its land, and the other was to avoid fixing too high the amount of land on the possession of which its political rights depended. When the demos lost its land, it appears most commonly to have done so either by mortgaging it and failing to pay the interest due or by selling it, the result being in either case that a few large landowners took the place of a number of small ones. The laws mentioned by Aristotle were intended to prevent this happening. They would be especially in place in colonies and in those States of Greece Proper in which a conquest had at one time taken place, for when the colonists or conquerors lost their lots, they ceased to be in a position to serve as hoplites, and, if many did so, the dominant race might find it difficult to hold its own. It will be noticed that Aristotle takes it for granted throughout that small owners will reside on the land they own and cultivate it. This is not always the case; it often is not the case in Flanders at the present day, as readers of Laveleye's *Économie Rurale de la Belgique* will remember, but perhaps small owners of land in Greece had more difficulty in finding tenants and could hardly trust a slave, except under their own eye. The laws to which Aristotle refers would not avail to make the whole of the demos agricultural, for, notwithstanding their existence, a large element of handicraftsmen day-labourers and *ἀγροπαῖοι* might find a place within the demos, unless indeed these classes were excluded from citizenship. One incidental result of making the whole demos of a State agricultural should be noticed. This is that a body of

metoeci (or other aliens) and slaves would develop within it who would practise the handicrafts and trades in the absence of which the State could not prosper. It was the ease with which metoeci and slaves could be drawn from surrounding regions that made it possible for the Greeks to leave the practice of handicrafts and trade to a large extent to aliens and slaves (3. 5. 1278 a 6 sqq.), and to reserve themselves for agriculture, war, and politics.

8. *πάντες*. *Πᾶς* is often placed either at the beginning (as in 7 (5). 6. 1305 a 39: cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 10) or at the end of a sentence (as in the passage before us and 1319 b 27 sq.: cp. 'Αδ. Πολ. c. 12. 1. 1 sq.). For *τινίς* . . . *πάντες* cp. 7 (5). 12. 1315 b 38 sq.

ἡ τὸ θλῶς μὴ ἐξεῖναι κ.τ.λ. Cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 17 sq. The law broken by the *γνώριμοι* at Thurii may have been a law of this kind (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 29 sqq.). Evasion of a law to this effect would probably also be easy. Harrington, however, in his *Oceana* (pp. 87, 100, ed. 1656) provides that no one shall own land of a greater annual value than £2000. For the use of *τό* with the infin. to express the effect of a law cp. 2. 8. 1268 b 4 sqq.

9. ἡ ἀπὸ τινος τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ καὶ τὴν πόλιν. No land was so likely to be bought up by rich men as land lying within an easy distance of the central city. The owner of land thus situated would have a better market for his produce, would find it easier to obtain whatever he needed to purchase (see Hom. Il. 23. 834 sq.), and would be better able to combine a life of political activity with attention to his estate. That land lying near the city was usually the most valuable we see from Xen. De Vect. 4. 50. Thus in the newly-founded colony of Thurii the Sybarite portion of the colonists appropriated to themselves all the land lying near the city (Diod. 12. 11. 1). The rising of the Attic Diacrii under Peisistratus against the Pedieis was a rising of the owners of land at a distance from the city against the owners of land near it. Καὶ τὴν πόλιν is perhaps added after τὸ ἄστυ because τὸ ἄστυ was sometimes used to designate a part only of the central city, at Athens the acropolis (see Schm. 2. 373).

10. ἢν δὲ τό γε ἀρχαῖον κ.τ.λ. Μηδὲ πωλεῖν, 'not even to sell,' to say nothing of buying or owning. Leucas was probably one of the States referred to (2. 7. 1266 b 21 sqq.). We hear of a similar law in the Lacedaemonian State (see note on 1270 a 19). Laws of this kind will hardly have existed in the States with which Hesiod was familiar, for he speaks in Op. et Dies, 341, as if the

buying and selling of lots was a common occurrence (see Prof. Ridgeway in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 6. 338 sq.). Yet it is likely that the sale of the lot was forbidden at Corinth and Thebes when Pheidon and Philolaus legislated there, for otherwise the legislation by which the former sought to maintain the number of the lots intact (2. 6. 1265 b 12 sqq.), and the latter to prevent a diminution of their number through the extinction of families (2. 12. 1274 b 2 sqq.), would have been of little avail. According to Plato, Rep. 552 A sq., 555 C, laws forbidding men to sell their property were not favoured in oligarchies and did not exist in them. As to the provisions respecting the lot in the Laws of Plato see vol. i. p. 441. According to Professor Mahaffy (*Times*, Sept. 10, 1892), the Macedonian and Greek *κληροῦχοι* in the Fayoum whose position is made known to us in the Petrie Papyri were not allowed to alienate their farms. Measures of this kind are still resorted to in India. 'Acting on the advice of Mr. Lawrence, the Kashmir Government has decided that the title given by the new settlement of Kashmir to the cultivators, heretofore serfs, may not be alienated by sale or mortgage. This means, of course, that the Kashmir cultivator will have to pay a higher interest for borrowed money than he would have to pay if he could pledge a first-class security such as his homestead. Mr. Lawrence was perfectly aware of the fact, but he considered that high interest was a less evil than the expropriation of the cultivators from their land, if they were allowed to alienate it' (*Times*, Oct. 14, 1895).

12. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν λέγουσιν 'Οξύλου νόμον εἶναι κ.τ.λ. The mention of Oxylus indicates that this law existed at Elis. This State seems to have studied with especial care the convenience and well-being of the small landowners scattered over its territory (Polyb. 4. 73. 8). Solon, on the other hand, does not appear to have placed any check on the mortgaging of land, though he did much to diminish the occasion for mortgaging it by checking expenditure (Plut. Solon, c. 21). Laws not unlike that ascribed to Oxylus have found advocates in some States in recent years. The National or Slovene party in Carniola, finding that the peasants were being pauperized by excessive partition, the population increasing rapidly, in 1883 favoured the proposal that 'the minimum amount of land required for the support of a family should be made indivisible and should not be capable of being mortgaged beyond a fixed proportion—say a third—of its value'

(*Times*, Dec. 26, 1883). So in the United States individual States have legislated to exempt 'homesteads, or a certain amount of personal property, from the claims of creditors' (Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, 3. 275, 276 note). But here a wider object is sought than the preservation of a class of small cultivating landowners.

14. νῦν δὲ δεῖ διορθοῦν καὶ τῷ Ἀφυταίων νόμῳ κ.τ.λ., 'but, as things are, [the evil having already made its way into the State,] it is well to amend matters by the law of the Aphytaeans also [as well as by those previously mentioned].' The laws previously mentioned, as Vict. points out, tend to prevent the evil finding its way into the State; this one tends to mitigate its effects after it has found its way in. The law of Aphytis to which Aristotle refers appears to have been a law fixing the property-qualification which any one enjoying political rights under the constitution was required to possess at a certain portion of a lot of land. Thus at Aphytis those who owned no land at all were excluded from political rights and apparently from citizenship (cp. 16, πάντες γεωργοῦσιν). Compare the law proposed by Phormisius at Athens after the restoration of the democracy (Lysias, Or. 34: Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, Part 2. c. 66, vol. 8. 403 sqq.). Phormisius, however, seems to have been prepared to admit to citizenship any one who owned land, however small might be the quantity held by him. Aphytis, like the other cities in Pallene (Kuhn, *Entstehung der Staedte der Alten*, p. 296), had evidently escaped when Philip of Macedon destroyed Olynthus and many other Thraceward cities (Demosth. Phil. 3. 26). Pallene had a fertile soil and was especially well-suited for the cultivation of the vine (Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ed. 2, 1. 453); this was one reason why the demos of Aphytis was agricultural. It should be noticed that in sketching the measures by which an agricultural demos might be created Aristotle does not suggest anything resembling what Tiberius Gracchus proposed at Rome two centuries later (Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, Eng. Trans., 3. 90, 95), the establishment by the State of a new class of small landowners. Greek States had not in all probability a sufficient amount of *ager publicus* at their disposal to effect this.

17. τιμῶνται γὰρ οὐχ ὅλας τὰς κτήσεις κ.τ.λ., 'for they value the lots of land not in their entirety, but dividing them up in parts so small that even the poor can exceed in the valuations of their property [the value of one of these parts].' Many have taken the suppressed object of *ὑπερβάλλειν* to be τοὺς πλουσίους, but not,

I think, rightly: Welldon's version is right, 'can more than attain the necessary standard of assessment.' See as to this law at Aphytis vol. i. p. 375, and cp. Oecon. 2. 1347 a 18 sqq. In States in which the sale of the original lots was forbidden the property-qualification required for citizenship would be the ownership of a lot, but at Aphytis the lots had come to be broken up. Aristotle does not say that the law was enacted at Aphytis with the object of creating an agricultural democracy; its object more probably was to prevent the owner of a portion of a lot escaping such imposts as the *eisphora*.

19. *μετὰ δὲ τὸ γεωργικὸν πλῆθος κ.τ.λ.* For the use of *πλῆθος* here as an equivalent to *δῆμος* see note on 1317 a 25, and cp. c. 7. 1321 a 5 sq. Whether the *νομαῖς*—a term including herdsmen of all kinds and shepherds—were generally small owners of land like the *γεωργοί*, or owners of the herds and flocks tended by them, is not clear, but they resembled the *γεωργοί* at any rate in this, that they were too busy to attend the assembly often or to take an active part in politics. In summer, indeed, they would be far from the city on mountain-pastures with their cattle and sheep. Many citizens of Achaean and Arcadian cities (E. Curtius, Peloponnesos, 1. 169) and also of Elis (E. Meyer, Gesch. d. Alterthums, 2. 286) would be herdsmen and shepherds.

21. *πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει τῇ γεωργίᾳ παραπλησίως.* For the adverb cp. Hist. An. 2. 12. 503 b 29, *ὁμοίως δ' ἔνια μόρια καὶ οἱ ὄρνιθες τοῖς εἰρημένοισι ἔχουσι ζῴους*.

22. *καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις κ.τ.λ.* Contrast Xen. Oecon. 5. 8, *καὶ δραμεῖν δὲ καὶ βαλεῖν καὶ πηδῆσαι τίς ἱκανωτέρος τέχῃ γεωργίας παρέχεται*; For *τὰ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς πράξεις* cp. 3. 14. 1285 a 5, *τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον*, and Polyb. 6. 12. 4, *τῶν πρὸς τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις ἀνηκόντων*. Richards adds Xen. Cyneg. 1. 18, *τὰ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἀγαθοί*, and 12. 1, *τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον μάλιστα παιδεύει*. *Γεγυμνασμένοι τὰς ἔξεις*, sc. *τοῦ σώματος*, 'trained and hardened in habit of body' (to bear fatigue and heat and cold): cp. Xen. Oecon. 7. 2, *ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔνδον γε διατρίβεις οὐδὲ τοιαύτη σου ἡ ἔξις τοῦ σώματος καταφαίνεται*, and 21. 7. *Χρήσιμοι τὰ σώματα*, 'serviceable in body': cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 5. 9, *οὐκ ἂν οὖν ῥαδίως γέ τις εὖροι Σπαρτιατῶν οὔτε ὑγεινωτέρους οὔτε τοῖς σώμασι χρησιμωτέρους*: *ὁμοίως γὰρ ἀπὸ τε τῶν σκελῶν καὶ ἀπὸ χειρῶν καὶ ἀπὸ τραχήλου γυμνάζονται*, and [Aristot.] Oecon. 1. 2. 1343 b 3 sqq. A person might be hardened in constitution without having muscular strength and handiness, or swiftness of

foot. Aristotle has before him in this passage Plato's description of the Persians in *Laws* 695 A, ἡγόμει τὴν πατρίαν οὐ παιδευομένους τέχνην, οὐσαν Περσικὴν, ποιμένας ὄντων Περσῶν, τραχείας χώρας ἐκγότων, σκληρὰν καὶ ἱκανὴν ποιμένας ἀπεργάζεσθαι μάλα ἰσχυροὺς καὶ δυναμίονες θυραυλεῖν καὶ ἀγρυπνεῖν καί, εἰ στρατεύεσθαι θέοι, στρατεύεσθαι. In ancient Greece, as in the East, it was necessary for shepherds to 'abide with their flocks by night' in order to protect them from wild beasts. 'The nomad shepherds' of modern Greece 'live out among their flocks on the barren mountains, where the sheep in the summer find precarious subsistence. In wet or dry, by day or by night, these men have no shelter but their coarse frieze cloaks, a blanket stretched on a couple of sticks, or in the winter a rude hut of brushwood and reeds' (Review of Mr. Rennell Rodd's 'Customs and Lore of Modern Greece,' *Times*, July 7, 1892). So we read of Daphnis in Timaeus, *Fragm.* 4 (Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* 1. 193), βουκολῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν Λέανθον χειματὸς τε καὶ θέρους ἡγραίλει. The military achievements of the herdsmen and shepherds of Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden illustrate the truth of Aristotle's remark.

24. τὸ δ' ἄλλα πλήθη κ.τ.λ., i.e. βάανσοι τεχνίται, ἀγοραῖοι, and θῆτες, as appears from 27 sq. (cp. c. 7. 1321 a 5, ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα μὲν ἐστὶ μέρη μάλιστα τοῦ πλήθους, γεωργικὸν βανυστικὸν ἀγοραῖον θητικόν). In c. 1. 1317 a 24 sqq. only τὸ γεωργικόν, τὸ βάανσον, and τὸ θητικόν are mentioned. We hear nothing in this Book of the more varied εἶδη τοῦ δήμου enumerated in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 17 sqq., except so far as οἱ νόθοι καὶ οἱ ἐξ ὀποτερουοῦν πολίται are regarded as parts of the *demos* in 1319 b 9 sq., but Aristotle would probably say of all of them except the γεωργοί what he says here of the βάανσοι, ἀγοραῖοι, and θῆτες (compare what he says of the trireme-oarsmen in 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 7 sqq.). In Aristoph. *Eccl.* 432 τὸ σκυτοτομικὸν πλῆθος is contrasted with οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν. For ἐξ ἃν αἱ λοιπαὶ δημοκρατίαι συνιστῶσι, cp. *Lycurg.* c. *Leocr.* c. 79, τρία γάρ ἐστιν ἐξ ἃν ἡ πολιτεία συνίστηκεν, ὁ ἀρχων, ὁ δικαστής, ὁ ἰδιώτης. As to οἱ ἀγοραῖοι see note on 1291 a 4.

25. ὁ γὰρ βίος φαῦλος κ.τ.λ. Cp. 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 40 sq., 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 8 sqq., 3. 4. 1277 a 35 sqq., 3. 5. 1278 a 20 sq. Cp. also *Xen. Oecon.* 6. 7 and *Plut. Pericl.* c. 1.

26. τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων. There is a slight shade of contempt in the use of ἀνθρώπων here, as in Plato, *Gorg.* 518 C, διακρίνους μοι λέγει καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, and

Phrynichus, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 601), *ἄνθρωπος ὃν ὑδατοπότης*.

ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ τὸ ἄστυ κυλίσσθαι κ.τ.λ. The *βάνανοι* τεχνῆται and the *ἀγοραῖοι* came to the marketplace to sell what they had to sell, and the *θήτες* to be hired (Matth. 20. 3). The Sausage-seller in the Knights of Aristophanes (636) prays to the ἀγορά, *ἐν ᾗ πᾶς ὃν ἐπαιδευθῆν ἐγά.* The *δῆμος* of Byzantium spent its time *περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ τὸν λιμένα* (Theopomp. Fr. 65: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 287). Diodorus, contrasting Egyptian ways with Greek to the advantage of the former, says of Greek handicraftsmen, *πλείστοι δ' ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατουμέναις πόλεσιν εἰς τὰς ἐκκλησίας συστρέφοντες τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν λυμαίνονται, τὸ δὲ λυσitelὲς περποιούνται παρὰ τῶν μισθοδοτούντων* (1. 74. 7). The assembly in many cities probably met in the marketplace (Polyb. 28. 7. 3: 29. 24. 5 Hultsch). At Delphi meetings of the assembly were called *ἀγοραί* (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 313: Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 37). For some purposes the assembly at Athens met in the agora (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 288). We ask, were not the *γεωργοί* also, like farmers among ourselves, frequently to be seen in the marketplace? Did they not take their own produce to the marketplace and sell it there? Probably they often did (cp. Plut. Arat. c. 8, *ἡ δὲ ὥρα κατήπειγεν ἥδη φθεγγομένων ἀλεκτρυόνων καὶ ὅσων ὅπως τῶν ἐξ ἀγροῦ τι φέρειν εὐθότως πρὸς ἀγορὰν ἐπερχομένων*), but Büchschütz (Besitz und Erwerb, p. 456 sq.) thinks that it was more usual for them to sell their produce to retail-dealers, who sold it again at a profit. As to the form *κυλίσσθαι*, which seems to be that commonly used by Aristotle, see Kühner, Ausführl. gr. Gramm., ed. Blass, 2. 453.

31. οὐτ' ἀπαντῶσιν οὐθ' ὁμοίως δέονται τῆς συνόδου ταύτης, 'neither attend this gathering nor have a similar need of it.' For the suppression of *εἰς τὴν σύνοδον ταύτην* after ἀπαντῶσιν see note on 1339 a 19. For ἀπαντῶν cp. (with Bon. Ind. s. v.) 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 24 sq. The term *σύνοδος* is applied to gatherings of different kinds, in 2. 9. 1271 a 28 to the Lacedaemonian *syssitia*, in Pollux, 8. 131 to the *dicasteries*, and in Plut. Quaest. Rom. c. 42 (cp. 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 10) to markets; it is often applied by Polybius to meetings of an assembly (e. g. in 4. 14. 1 to those of the Achaean assembly).

32. ὅπου δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει κ.τ.λ., 'and where it also happens [in

addition to the demos being agricultural or pastoral] that' etc. 'Ὅπου δέ takes up 1318 b 10 sq. and 1319 a 19 sqq. This must commonly have been the case in Achaia, where the cities were mostly on or near the seacoast, while much of their pasture-land, and in some cases of their tillage-land and vineyards, lay far from the coast on the mountain-slopes of the interior (Curtius, Peloponnesos, I. 408-9, 484). In many colonies, again, the city was on an islet or headland, and most of the territory a good way off, if not on the other side of an arm of the sea. As to the repetition of τὴν χώραν see critical note on 1319 a 33.

36. ποιῆσθαι τὰς ἀποικίας, 'to make its settlements' (Welldon), or perhaps 'its out-settlements.' Cp. Hist. An. 8. 13. 599 a 4, τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἐκτοπισμοὺς τοῦτον ποιοῦνται τὸν τρόπον.

ὥστε δεῖ κ.τ.λ., 'and so, [as democracies are better when the assembly meets rarely,] it is well, even if there is a city-populace in the State, [so that sufficient numbers to form an assembly can easily be got together,] not to hold meetings of the assembly in democracies without the presence of the body of citizens scattered over the territory, [for this will make its meetings rarer].' At Athens the citizens resident in the country were summoned to important special meetings of the assembly (Pollux, 8. 116), but probably the assembly often met there without any citizens from the country being present. For τὸ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλῆθος cp. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 30.

40. ἐπομένως. Bonitz (Ind. s.v. ἔπεισθαι) compares Metaph. Δ. 23. 1023 a 23, καὶ τὸ ἔν τινι δὲ εἶναι ὁμοιοτρόπως λέγεται καὶ ἐπομένως τῷ ἔχειν.

1319 b. 1. τὸ χεῖρον δεῖ πλῆθος χωρίζειν. Cp. c. 6. 1320 b 28 sq. The γεωργοί are best, then the νομαίς, then the βάνανσοι τεχνῖται (see note on 1317 a 26), then the ἀγοραῖοι and θῆτες, then οἱ νόθοι καὶ οἱ ἐξ ὀποτερουοῦν πόλιτου (1319 b 9 sq.). Compare the order in which the different kinds of demos are enumerated in 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 18 sqq. At the bottom of the list would stand οἱ ἐκ δούλου ἢ δούλης (3. 5. 1278 a 33).

τὴν δὲ τελευταίαν κ.τ.λ. To what kind of States the ultimate democracy is alone appropriate, will be clear from 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq. As this constitution could not exist in its fullness unless pay was provided for the members of the assembly and dicasteries and for the magistrates, its maintenance imposed a heavy burden on the rich in States which did not possess special sources of revenue

such as an emporium or dependent allies. Aristotle adds that an ultimate democracy would not be durable in the absence of laws and customs favourable to its continuance—preventing, for instance, the spoliation of the rich by lawsuits or eisphorae or heavy liturgies or confiscation (c. 5). See note on 40.

4. *ἀ δὲ φθείρειν συμβαίνει κ.τ.λ.* *Συμβαίνει* with the infin. is sometimes used by Plato not impersonally, but personally (Kühner, *Ausführl. gr. Gramm.*, ed. 2, § 477 c), and, as Richards points out, it may be so used here and in 17 sq.

5. *εἴρηται πρότερον*, in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book.

6. *πρὸς δὲ τὸ καθιστάναι κ.τ.λ.*, 'and with a view to institute' this democracy the leaders of the popular party are accustomed to make the demos also [as well as the democracy] strong by adding as many as possible to the citizen-body' etc. We are told in 3. 15. 1286 b 18 sqq. that democracies tend to arise when the *πληθος* becomes numerous and strong. For *οἱ προσητάωτες*, which is explained by *οἱ δημαγωγοί* in 11, cp. Plato, *Rep.* 565 A. Aristotle is concerned with *τὸ καθιστάναι* (or *τὸ κατασκευάζειν*, 12) down to the end of c. 4, but in c. 5 he passes to measures intended to *preserve* this kind of democracy. Contrast with his counsels the view expressed in *Lys. Or.* 20. pro Polystr. c. 13, *πῶς δ' ἂν γένοιτο δημοτικώτερος ἢ ὅστις ὑμῶν ψηφισαμένων πεντακισχιλίοις παραδοῦναι τὰ πράγματα καταλογεῖς ὡν ἑννακισχιλίους κατέλεξεν . . . ; καίτοι οὐχ οἱ ἂν πλείστους πολίτας ποιῶσι, οὗτοι καταλύουσι τὸν δῆμον, ἀλλ' οἱ ἂν ἐκ πλείωνων ἐλάττους.*

9. *τοὺς νόθους καὶ τοὺς ἐξ ὀποτερουῶν πολίτου.* See note on 1278 a 26. This may have been done by the founders of the democracy at Cyrene (see 17 sqq.). Cleisthenes, though he was not the founder of an ultimate democracy, went still further, and brought absolute aliens into the tribes (3. 2. 1275 b 35 sqq.).

10. *ἔπαν γὰρ οἰκείον τοῦτο τῷ τοιοῦτῃ δήμῳ μᾶλλον*, 'for all this element is congenial to the kind of democracy of which we have been speaking rather than to any other' (cp. 20, *χρήσιμα πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν τὴν τοιαύτην*). For *μᾶλλον* see note on 1270 b 33.

12. *δεῖ μέντοι προσλαμβάνειν κ.τ.λ.*, 'it is well, however, to add members to the citizen-body only until the mass of the citizens exceeds in number the notables and the moderately well-to-do.' Cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 23 sqq. and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 16 sqq. The advice which Aristotle gives here is hardly in harmony with what he says in the latter of these two passages, for there he tells us that when the poor without the addition of the moderately well-to-

do to their side are more numerous than the rich, democracies do not last long. For *μέχρι ἂν ὑπερτείνῃ* cp. De Gen. An. 1. 21. 729 b 31, *μέχρι ἂν συστήσῃ*, sc. τὸ κύημα (Bon. Ind. s. v. *μέχρι*).

14. *ὑπερβάλλοντες γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* Supply *οἱ πολλοί*, contained in τὸ πλῆθος (cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 17 sq.). For the thought, cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 31, *ὁ δὲ λίαν ὑπερβάλλον ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξεως*.

17. *ὑπερ*, 'which,' i.e. the discontent of the notables with the democracy.

περὶ Κυρήνην. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 231. 1) takes the reference to be to the *στάσις* which Diodorus (14. 34) describes under the date of B. C. 401. Five hundred of the rich were put to death and many of the rest fled from the city, till after a battle in which the losses on both sides were large an arrangement was come to, and the rich were allowed to return. Compare the experience of Syracuse (Diod. 11. 86. 3).

19. *ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κατασκευάσματα κ.τ.λ.* For τὰ τοιαῦτα οἷς κ.τ.λ. see note on 1337 b 6. The measures referred to are measures for re-grouping the citizens in tribes phratries and worships, with a view to mingling them together and putting an end to pre-existing groupings not favourable to democracy. It is unfortunate that Aristotle does not tell us whether all the measures he mentions were adopted both by Cleisthenes and by the founders of the democracy at Cyrene, or, if not, which of them were adopted by Cleisthenes and which by the Cyreneans. Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 230) thinks it likely that new and more numerous tribes and phratries were instituted at Cyrene when democracy was introduced there on the death of Arcesilaus IV somewhat after B. C. 462. We know that Cleisthenes introduced new and more numerous tribes at Athens (Hdt. 5. 69) and took pains to mingle the old and new citizens together ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 21) and to break up the pre-existing political intimacies, but the statement ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 21. l. 23), *τὰ δὲ γένη καὶ τὰς φρατρίας καὶ τὰς ἱερωνύμους εἶασεν ἔχειν ἐκάστους κατὰ τὰ πατρία*, seems to me to imply that he did not introduce new and more numerous phratries, and is perhaps hardly consistent with his having made the change referred to in the worships of the State. Dr. Sandys ('Αθ. Πολ. p. 83), it is true, seeks to reconcile the statement in the 'Αθ. Πολ. with that before us by taking the former to refer only 'to those who were already citizens connected with existing γένη and φρατρίαι.' 'Cleisthenes,' he adds, 'allowed all these to continue as of old in their respective γένη and φρατρίαι with their

religious institutions intact,' but 'provided new *φρατρίαι*' for his *ποπολίται*. The object of Cleisthenes, however, was to mingle the *ποπολίται* with the old citizens ('*Αθ. Πολ.* c. 21), and would he have been content to place the former in phratries of their own distinct from the others? Perhaps, if we seek to reconcile the two statements, the safest way of doing so is to suppose that Aristotle refers only to Cyrene in his mention of phratries in 1319 b 24. But even if the '*Αθ. Πολ.*' is from Aristotle's pen, which is doubtful, there is no reason why all its statements should agree with those of the *Politics*, for statements which are not in complete harmony with each other are to be found in the *Politics* itself. It is easy to understand why new tribes and phratries should be introduced on the foundation of a democracy, but why should they be more numerous than the pre-existing ones? Probably because small tribes and phratries do not break up the citizen-body so much as large and powerful ones. An university composed of four large colleges would be less of an unity than one composed of a dozen small ones. Plutarch tells us in *Num. c. 17* that Numa softened the contrast between the Roman and Sabine elements in the citizen-body by breaking it up into smaller groups based on trade, *διακοσθεὶς ὅτι καὶ τῶν σωματίων τὰ φύσει δύσμικτα καὶ σκληρὰ καταθραύοντες καὶ διαιροῦντες ἀναμεγνύουσιν, ὑπὸ μικρότητος ἀλλήλοις συμβαίνοντα μᾶλλον*. The substitution of Departments for Provinces in France at the Revolution may be compared. The increase in the number of the *ἐκατοστήες* at the Pontic Heracleia mentioned by Aeneas in *Poliorc. 11. 10* seems to have had a different object, and to have been intended to baffle the treasonable schemes of the rich, not to make the democracy more extreme. So again, when Marshal Boucicault, the French Governor of Genoa from 1401 to 1409, 'broke up the old unions under constables and divided the citizens into fresh combinations for military purposes' (Duffy, *Tuscan Republics*, p. 233), and further steps of the same nature were taken in 1528 (*ibid.* p. 401 sq.), the object was to restore peace to the faction-ridden city, not to strengthen a democracy. The same thing may be said of Spenser's suggestion in his 'View of the State of Ireland' (H. Morley, *Ireland under Elizabeth and James I*, p. 193 sqq.), that a division into tithings and hundreds should take the place of the division into septis. Still schemes of this kind help us to understand the measures referred to in the text.

21. βουλόμενος ἀξῆσαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν. Herodotus, on the

contrary, speaks of Cleisthenes as *ὁ τὰς φυλὰς καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίην Ἀθηναίοισι καταστήσας* (6. 131). Aristotle here represents the object of Cleisthenes in his re-grouping of the citizens of Athens to have been the intensification of the democracy by the destruction of pre-existing unions which were the strongholds of an anti-democratic spirit, but in *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 21 the aim ascribed to him in his re-grouping is rather that of facilitating and paving the way for the introduction of new citizens. The two aims, however, do not lie far apart. Cleisthenes may, indeed, have had other aims also. The tribe was closely connected with the military organization of the State, and he may well have desired that the former military grouping of the citizens should be altered, for it evidently favoured the influence of the nobles. We may also conjecture looking to the way in which he constituted his new tribes, making each of them to consist of three trittyes, one in the seacoast region, another in the interior, and a third in the city and its neighbourhood (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 21), that one of his aims was to put an end to feuds between different districts of Attica and to make the tribes willing and fit to work together in the *Boulê* and elsewhere by making them as uniform and as free from local feeling as possible.

24. καὶ τὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἱερῶν συνακτέον εἰς ὀλίγα καὶ κοινά. Private worships were those in which it was not open to all the citizens to take part. So the Gephyraei at Athens had a private worship of their own (*Hdt.* 5. 61). As to the private worship of the phratry of the Clytidae at Chios see Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr. Gr.* No. 360 (commented on by Prof. Percy Gardner in his *Manual of Greek Antiquities*, ed. 1, p. 197 sq.), where it appears that the images of the gods of the phratry were at one time kept in the private houses of certain influential members, not in a temple common to all, and that the sacrifices on festal days were long offered in these private houses, a circumstance which must have secured to their owners an ascendancy in the phratry. It is to private worships of gentes and phratries and sacrificial unions that Aristotle refers here. He intends, it would seem, to ascribe to Cleisthenes a measure of the kind which he describes, for Cleisthenes certainly sought to mingle the citizens together (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 21), but what the private worships were which he converted into a few public ones, it is not easy to say. Gilbert (*Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 150) seems to take the reference to be to the worship of *Zeûs φράτριως*, *Ἀθηνα φρατρία*, and *Ἀπόλλων πατρώος*, but the point is doubtful.

Plato in the *Laws* (909 D sq. : see vol. i. p. 179) is little tolerant of exclusive private worships. The object ascribed to Cleisthenes by Aristotle (the intensification of the democracy) was probably not the only object he had in view in making private worships public. He sought also to put an end to the ignorance of each other and distrust of each other which the tyranny had probably produced in the minds of the citizens (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 4 sqq.). Common sacrifices drew men together and made them friendly to each other (Plato, *Laws* 738 D sq.). Herodotus (1. 59) speaks of τὸ Ἀττικὸν ἔθνος ὡς κατεχόμενον τε καὶ διεσπασμένον ὑπὸ Πεισιστράτου, and Cleisthenes did his best to heal its divisions. Compare with his measures the introduction of the worship of the Emperor in the Roman Empire, as a worship in which all could join, whatever their national or local worship, and consequently a means of union.

25. καὶ πάντα σοφιστέον κ.τ.λ. For ἀναμυχθῶσι cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 21. ll. 4, 11. In αἱ συνήθειαι αἱ πρότερον the reference appears to be to intimacies based on the tribe, the phratry, and the private sacrificial union, perhaps also the *ναυκραρία* (cp. Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 21. l. 19 sqq.). The new tribes of Cleisthenes were so constructed (see above on 21) as to mingle together residents in widely severed regions of Attica. Citizens living in districts at a distance from each other and formerly hostile were drawn together by being made members of the same tribe. Another means by which Cleisthenes sought to effect the same object was the classification of the citizens by demes, for this enabled him to make all citizens resident in the deme members of the State, whether they were the sons of Athenian fathers and mothers or not (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 21), and to break down family exclusiveness. Plutarch (Pericl. c. 3) justly says of Cleisthenes, νόμους ἔθετο καὶ πολιτείαν ἀριστα κεκραμένην πρὸς ὁμόνοιαν καὶ σωτηρίαν κατέστησεν. Ὅπως ἂν is rarely used in the genuine writings of Aristotle (see Weber, *Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles*, pp. 22 sq., 40 sq., and Eucken, *De Partic. Usu*, p. 55). It occurs with the optative in c. 5. 1320 a 35.

27. ἴτι δὲ καὶ τὰ τυραννικὰ κατασκευάσματα κ.τ.λ. See notes on 1313 b 32 and 35, and as to κατασκευάσμα note on 1271 a 33. Compare Demosth. Phil. 3. 3, who says, addressing the Athenians, ὑμῖς τὴν παρρησίαν ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων οὕτω κοινὴν ὀλέσθε δεῖν εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὥστε καὶ τοῖς ξένοις καὶ τοῖς δούλοις αὐτῆς μεταδεῶκατε, καὶ πολλοὺς ἂν τις οἰκέτας ἴδοι παρ' ὑμῖν μετὰ πλείονος ἐξουσίας ὅ τι βούλονται λέγοντας ἢ πολίτας ἐν ἐνίαις τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων. We read in

Polyb. 15. 30. 9 of a riot at Alexandria, *ἐγένετο βοή καὶ κραυγὴ σύμ-
μικτος, ὥς ἂν γυναικῶν ἡμοῦ καὶ παιδῶν ἀνδράσιν ἀναμιγμένον* οὐ γὰρ
ἐλάττω ποιεῖ τὰ παιδάκια τῶν ἀνδρῶν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ταραχῆς ἢ τε τῇ
Καρχηδονίων πόλει καὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν.

29. αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη *μέχρι* τοῦ συμφέρουσά, 'and this would be [not
only congenial to the extreme democracy, but also] up to a certain
point advantageous to it.' For the distinction between what is
δημοσικόν and what is advantageous to democracy cp. 1318 b 27 sqq.
For *μέχρι* τοῦ cp. 3. 12. 1282 b 18 sq. and 4 (7). 6. 1327 a 41, *μέχρι*
τινὸς πλήθους. For the reason why indulgence to slaves is up to a
certain point advantageous to an extreme democracy see 7 (5).
11. 1313 b 37 sqq.

30. πολλὰ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ βοηθεῖν, 'for many
will be the quarters from which support will come to a constitution
of the kind we have described' (i. e. to one which permits living as
one likes). Τοῖς πολλοῖς takes up πολὺ.

- C. 5. 33. Ἔστι δ' ἔργον κ.τ.λ. Cp. Plato, Laws 960 B, τῶν πάντων δ'
ἐκάστοτε τέλος οὐ τὸ δρᾶσαι τι σχεδὸν οὐδὲ τὸ κτήσασθαι κατοικίαν τ' ἐστίν,
ἀλλὰ τῇ γεννηθέντι σωτηρίαν ἐξευρόντα τελείως αἰεὶ τὸτ' ἦδη νομίζειν πᾶν
ὅσον ἔδειπραχθῆναι πεπράχθαι, πρότερον δ' ἀτελεῖς εἶναι τὸ ἅλον. As to
the repetition of ἔργον see critical note on 1319 b 35.

34. For the order of the words in τὰς τοιαύτης πολιτείας cp. 6
(4). 4. 1290 b 30, *στόματός τινα πλείω γένῃ*, and Plato, Critias 112 E,
τινὰ τοιοῦτον . . . τρόπον.

36. μέναι, 'to hold one's ground' (i. e. τὴν πολιτείαν σώζεσθαι :
cp. 35): compare 1319 b 3, *διαμένειν*, and 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 3, *εἶναι*
μένουσιν οὐ μόνον ἀριστοκρατίαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι. For οὐ χαλεπὸν
with the aor. infin. μέναι cp. Thuc. 6. 34. 4, *χαλεπὸν δὲ διὰ πλοῦ*
μήκος ἐν τάξει μέναι. Yet in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 28 we have *χαλεπὸν*
μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν συμμαχηκυῖαν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον. So in 2. 7.
1266 a 40 sq. we have οὐ χαλεπὸν φέτο ποιεῖν and in 4 (7). 12.
1331 b 20 οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν ἐστὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα νοῆσαι, ἀλλὰ ποιῆσαι
μᾶλλον.

37. οὐδὲ δεῖ κ.τ.λ. This passage, which cannot easily be detached
from the context in which it stands (vol. ii. p. xxvii), and therefore
can hardly have been added by a later hand than that of Aristotle,
clearly indicates that the Seventh (old Fifth) Book should precede
the Eighth (old Sixth) Book. Indeed, even if this passage were
away, we might assume that the inquiry what institutions are most
conducive to the preservation of an ultimate democracy would

follow, not precede, the treatment in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book of the whole subject of the preservation of constitutions. The experience of Rhodes (7 (5). 5. 1304 b 27 sqq.) and other States is as much present to Aristotle's mind as that of Athens, but still we may gather from the counsels he gives what practical suggestions he would make for the improvement of the Athenian democracy. His recommendations appear very gentle when we compare them with the sweeping and severe change which Antipater made in the constitution in the year of Aristotle's death (Diod. 18. 18). We might have expected some reference to be made here to the fact that ultimate democracies have already been counselled in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq. as to the way in which the deliberative should be organized in them. In that passage, however, Aristotle's aim is to enable the deliberative to do its work better, whereas here the object is to point out how an ultimate democracy should be organized and managed so as to be durable.

38. κατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν. Cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 45, τῇ μὲν δὴ ὅλῃ Περσῶν ἀρχῇ οὕτω τὴν ἀσφάλειαν κατασκευάζειν.

40. τιθεμένους δὲ τοιοῦτους νόμους καὶ τοὺς ἀγράφους καὶ τοὺς γεγραμμένους κ.τ.λ. It is here implied that the lawgiver is the source not only of written, but also of unwritten law (see vol. i. p. 75, note 1, and cp. Plato, Polit. 295 A, τὸν νόμον θήσει, καὶ ἐν γράμμασιν ἀποδιδούς, καὶ ἐν ἀγράμματοις, πατρίους δέ, ἔθεσι νομοθετῶν, and Thuc. 2. 97. 4, where an unwritten law is probably referred to). He may, for instance, create among the γνῶριμοι a custom of starting the poor in trades or making their own property common in use (1320 b 7 sqq.). A custom like this would not be embodied in writing. Cp. Hesych. Miles. Fragm. 4. c. 32 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 4. 152), καὶ στρατηγὸς τοῦ παντὸς ἀναδειχθεὶς δήμου πᾶσαν ὁμοῦ τὴν πῶλιν εἰς τὸ μείζον καὶ ὠφέλιμον μετερρύθμισε, νόμους τε περὶ τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν συμβολαίων τιθίμενος καὶ ἔθη καθιστὰς πολιτικά τε καὶ ἡμέρα, δι' ἧν ἀστέιους τε καὶ φιλανθρώπους τοὺς πολίτας ἀπέδειξε. As to the relation of unwritten to written law see Plato, Laws 793 A sqq. and note on 1287 b 5. The laws and customs which Aristotle would recommend in an ultimate democracy would be laws and customs preventing oppression of the rich and tending permanently to increase the material prosperity of the poor (1320 a 4—b 16), discouraging living as one pleases (7 (5). 9. 1310 a 25 sqq.), associating rich and poor in the deliberative (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 13 sqq.) and the magistracies (8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq.), and the like.

1320 a. 2. καὶ μὴ νομίζειν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 20 sqq. and 1310 a 19 sqq.

4. οἱ δὲ νῦν δημαγωγοὶ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 29, δ νῦν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ποιοῦσιν, and (with Sus.², Note 1458) c. 7. 1321 a 40 sqq., and also 2. 12. 1274 a 10, τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν. Διὰ τῶν δικαστηρίων is added because confiscation was sometimes decreed by the assembly (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 6). See Bernays, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, I. 173, and as to other accounts in the *Politics* of the ways in which the rich suffered oppression in democracies note on 1304 b 21. The reference is to Eubulus among others (see Schäfer, *Demosthenes*, 2. 435 on *Demosth. De Chers.* c. 69, *ὅστις μὲν γὰρ . . . παρίδων ἃ συνοῖσαι τῇ πόλει κρίνει δημεύει δίδωσι κατηγορεῖ*, and c. 71, *δυνάμενος ἂν ἴσως, ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροι, κατηγορεῖν καὶ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ δημεύειν καὶ τῶν ἄλλ' ἃ ποιοῦσιν οὗτοι ποιεῖν*). Compare Plato, *Gorg.* 466 A-C, and *Lys. Or.* 30. c. Nicom. c. 22, where the *Boulê* is said, when it is driven by impecuniosity to resort to confiscation, to do so under pressure from demagogues. The penalty of confiscation was inflicted at Athens either separately or, as more often happened, as an accompaniment of sentences of death, life-long exile, the severer form of ἀτιμία, or enslavement, and therefore might be incurred for non-political offences (Meier und Schömann, *Der attische Process*, ed. Lipsius, p. 959: C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Ant.*, ed. Thalheim, 2. 125 sq.: Thonissen, *Droit Pénal de la République Athénienne*, p. 121 sq.), but the charges on which rich men whose wealth was coveted would be most likely to incur it would be those of treason, sacrilege, a design to upset the democracy, and wrong to the Athenian people. Plato in the *Laws*, wishing to preserve the lots of land intact, forbids confiscation except in one extreme case (855 A, 856 C sq.: vol. i. p. 441), and Aristotle might well have gone a little further than he does and recommended the abolition of this penalty, which 'has disappeared in our own days from most of the criminal codes of Europe' (Thonissen, p. 128). Still the change which he suggests would have been very beneficial. At Athens, when the penalty of confiscation was inflicted, only a tenth went to Athena (*Xen. Hell.* I. 7. 10). It must be remembered, however, that sacred funds could be borrowed under certain restrictions by the State (Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 336), so that the State profited by any addition to them, and thus the dicasts would have a motive for inflicting the penalty, even though the confiscated property became

part of a sacred fund. The rule at Athens by which the expense of keeping the lawcourts on foot was defrayed from the fees of the suitors and the fines imposed on the condemned (Gilbert, *ibid.* p. 339) was a singularly unfortunate one, inasmuch as it gave the dicasts a direct interest in imposing high fines, their own pay being thus secured. Part of these fines seems, however, to have gone to provide pay for the assembly (see note on 17).

6. *πρὸς ταῦτα.* Cp. c. 7. 1321 a 16, *πρὸς τοῦτο.*

τοὺς κηδομένους τῆς πολιτείας. Cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 28, *τοὺς τῆς πολιτείας φροντίζοντας.*

7. *μηδὲν εἶναι δημόσιον τῶν καταδικαζομένων*, 'that nothing belonging to those who are (from time to time) condemned should be public property.' *Τῶν καταδικαζομένων* must be masc., like *τῶν κρινομένων* in 11 and *τῶν καταδικασθέντων* in c. 8. 1321 b 42, but *μηδὲν τῶν καταδικαζομένων* is, as Richards points out, curious Greek.

δημόσιον . . . ἱερόν. The marked distinction between public and sacred property should be noticed: cp. 2. 8. 1267 b 34. In modern times the question has been raised whether Church property is the property of the State or not.

10. *ζημιώσονται.* The future middle of *ζημῶ* is often used in a passive sense, but the future passive also often occurs (see Veitch, *Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective*, s. v.).

11. *τὰς γινομένας δημοσίας δίκας.* Public actions at Athens were those in which an offence against the State, not merely against an individual, was charged, and this offence might be of two kinds, either directly against an individual and indirectly against the State or directly against the State and indirectly against an individual. Public actions, in fact, might be concerned either with political or with non-political offences. See Meier und Schömann, *Der attische Process*, ed. Lipsius, p. 195 sqq., and Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 404 sq. They might be brought by *ὁ βουλόμενος Ἀθηναίων οἷς ἕξεται* (C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Ant.*, ed. Thumser, 1. 549), and not merely by persons specially interested. As Aristotle speaks of their being brought against *γυῖραιμοι*, he probably refers mainly to public actions relating to political offences.

12. *μεγάλους ἐπιτιμίοις τοὺς εἰκὴ γραφομένους κωλύοντας.* At Athens in most public actions, if the prosecutor did not obtain a fifth of the votes given by the dicasts, he became liable to a penalty of 1,000 drachmae and lost the right of bringing similar actions in

future (Meier und Schömann, *Der att. Process*, ed. Lipsius, p. 951 sq.: Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 413 sq.; C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Ant.*, ed. Thumser, 1. 585 sq.). According to Pollux, 8. 41 failure in a charge of ἀσίβεια was punished with death, but see as to this Meier und Schömann, p. 375, note.

15. καὶ τῇ πολιτείᾳ, 'to the constitution also,' as well as to οἱ κύριοι under it.

16. μή τοί γε. See critical note on 1308 b 15.

ὡς πολέμιους νομίζειν τοὺς κυρίους. Cp. 1. 9. 1257 a 1, ἦν ὡς μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ λεχθείᾳ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γειννάσιον.

17. ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ τελευταῖαι δημοκρατίαι κ.τ.λ. The ultimate democracy involved considerable expense to the State, because under it all the citizens expected to share in political functions (c. 4. 1319 b 2), and yet they were both many in number and to a large extent poor men who could not easily attend the assembly without pay; hence when special revenues (as to the meaning of the word πρόσσοδοι, which is here tacitly distinguished from εἰσφορά, see note on 1292 b 30) were not forthcoming, the heavy burden of paying the fees of the many members of the assembly fell on the rich, and the necessary funds were often exacted from them by means of eisphorae, confiscation, and the imposition of penalties by the dicasteries (cp. Lys. Or. 30. c. Nicom. c. 22: Or. 27. c. Epicr. c. 1), for part of these penalties would seem from what is said here to have gone to provide pay for members of the assembly. On the other hand, when special revenues were forthcoming (and this was the case of Athens, for even when she had few or no dependent allies, she had a great emporium at the Peiraeus and silver-mines at Laurium), the demagogues often squandered their proceeds in distributions of doles of money to the poorer citizens, which were spent as soon as received and left the recipients as much in need of pecuniary help as ever. In both cases Aristotle recommends that the meetings of the assembly should be few (22 sq. and 1320 b 2 sqq.), and he probably desires in both cases that the dicasteries should meet only for a few days, though he dwells on this explicitly only in the case in which special revenues are not forthcoming (23 sq.). It seems likely from his language here that the provision of pay for the assembly was one of the heaviest of the burdens entailed by the ultimate democracy, and this is not surprising, for we learn from 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 62. l. 6 sqq. that each

member of the Athenian assembly in Aristotle's day received nine obols for attendance at a *κυρία ἐκκλησία* and a drachma for attendance at others. At Athens there were forty ordinary meetings of the assembly in the year, four in each prytany, one of the four being a *κυρία ἐκκλησία* (Αθ. Πολ. c. 43. ll. 13 sq., 17), so that the expense would obviously be considerable.

18. τοῦτο, 'this circumstance,' i.e. the circumstance that the citizens are numerous and cannot easily attend the assembly without pay.

19. *πολέμιον*, 'pernicious': cp. Plato, Laws 856 B, τοῦτων δὲ διαροῖσθαι δεῖ πάντων πολεμιώτατον ὅλη τῇ πόλει.

20. γίνεσθαι, sc. τὸν μισθόν, which must be obtained from ἀμίσθους, 18. See notes on 1311 a 34 and 1321 a 21.

21. *δικαστηρίων φαύλων*. Cp. Plato, Laws 876 A, *δικαστήρια φαῦλα καὶ ἄφωνα*.

ἀ πολλὰς ἤδη δημοκρατίας ἀνέτρεψεν. 'A, 'things which,' probably refers not to *δικαστηρίων φαύλων* only, but also to *εἰσφορὰς καὶ δημεύσεως*. For the tense of ἀνέτρεψεν see note on 1303 a 27. Aristotle perhaps has in view the cases of Cos, Rhodes, Megara, the Pontic Heracleia, and Cyme (7 (5). 5. 1304 b 25 sqq.: 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 23 sq.). For the fact cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 36 sqq.

22. *ὅπου μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* Μὲν οὖν introduces the apodosis, as in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 18 sqq. (Bon. Ind. 540 b 38 sq.). Aristotle speaks here as if the number of the meetings of the assembly and the dicasteries depended on the will of the authorities of the State. But they would hardly be able to limit the number of the meetings without withdrawing matters from the assembly and dicasteries with which they would otherwise have dealt, and empowering the magistrates to deal with these matters. Would this be possible in an ultimate democracy? And would it be possible in such a democracy to make the assembly and dicasteries meet less often and so to reduce the amount of pay received by their members?

23. *δικαστήρια πολλῶν μὲν ὀλίγαις δ' ἡμέραις*, 'dicasteries with many members, but sitting on only a few days,' costly in the one way but not in the other. Aristotle abstains from making the number of the members few, because that would be unsuitable to an ultimate democracy, and besides would have no chance of acceptance. As to *ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις*, contrast the practice at Athens, where the dicasteries sat on all days except festivals and unlucky days and days on which the assembly met (Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 403 sq.).

26. οἱ δ' ἄποροι, 'but the poor [alone receive it].' Here, as often elsewhere, 'only' is suppressed. See note on 1282 a 36.

φέρει δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κρίνεσθαι τὰς δίκας πολὺ βέλτιον. Judicial work, no less than deliberative (6 (4). 14. 1298 b 20 sq.), is thought by Aristotle to be performed better when rich and poor act together than when the poor act by themselves.

29. οὗτου δ' εἰσὶ πρόσοδοι κ.τ.λ. It is not quite clear whether νῦν means 'as it is' and stands in contrast to what ought to be, or 'now' in contrast to 'formerly.' Susemihl and Welldon give it the latter sense. If they are right, there may be an intention tacitly to contrast the conduct of later demagogues with that of Themistocles, who persuaded the citizens of Athens to use the surplus revenues from Laurium for the building of a fleet (Hdt. 7. 144: Plut. Themist. c. 4: 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 22). Later demagogues distributed surplus funds as Theoric money to enable the poorer citizens to take part in festivals, and especially the Dionysia and Panathenaea. Aristotle refers perhaps to Pericles (Plut. Pericl. c. 9) and his successors (Plut. Aristid. c. 24, Περικλέους δ' ἀποθανόντος . . . οἱ δημαγωγοὶ . . . τὸν δῆμον εἰς διανομὰς καὶ θεωρικά καὶ κατασκευὰς ἀγαλμάτων καὶ ἱερῶν προσαγόντες): more certainly to Eubulus (Theopomp. Fr. 96 in Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 293: Schäfer, Demosthenes, 1. 184: Beloch, Att. Politik, p. 178. 2), Diophantus (Beloch, ibid. p. 180. 4), and Demades (Schäfer, Demosthenes, 3. 1. 194). Compare Aristoph. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 42 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 1186),

κινῶντες γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν κοτυλίζετε τοῖσι πένησιν, Demosth. Ol. 3. 33 (also Prooem. 53 *sub fin.* p. 1459 sq.), and [Demosth.] c. Neaer. c. 4. Cp. also Aristot. Fragm. 87. 1491 a 39 sqq. We expect Aristotle to recommend that the proceeds of the special revenues shall be spent not in distributions of money, but in providing pay for attendance at the assembly and dicasteries, and this is what he would probably wish to be done, as soon as the demos has been sufficiently enriched; for the present, however, he recommends in preference that the proceeds of these revenues shall be spent in promoting the permanent enrichment of the poorer citizens, and that, while they are needed for this purpose, the rich shall be enabled to supply pay for the assembly and dicasteries by being relieved of the burden of useless liturgies.

30. λαμβάνουσι δὲ ἅμα, sc. οἱ ἄποροι. The poor receive the money distributed and after a little need a fresh supply, just as the leaky pitchers of the Danaides receive water and in a moment need more.

Cp. Leutsch and Schneidewin, *Paroem. Gr.* 2. 154, *Δαναῖδων πίθος ἐπὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ἐκλειπόντων καὶ μὴ πληρουμένων*, and 2. 161, *εἰς τὸν τετραμένον πίθον ἐπὶ τῶν μάτην ἀναλίσκόντων*. See Frazer's *Pausanias*, 5. 388 sqq.

34. *τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μοχθηρὰν εἶναι τὴν δημοκρατίαν*. A similar view underlies the Areopagitic Oration of Isocrates (see e.g. §§ 44 sq., 54 sq.). He seems to ascribe the poverty prevailing at Athens in his day mainly to the laziness of the Athenian poor and to the absence of any authority like the Council of the Areopagus to compel them to work and to encourage the rich to assist them to do so (§§ 32 sq., 55). He does not ask how far it was due to the competition of metoeci and slaves, and to the provision of pay for attendance in the assembly and dicasteries, which must have tended to withdraw the poorer citizens from the paths of industry and trade. Poverty, he says (§ 44), led to ill-doing, and we gather that, in his view, it lay at the root of the unsatisfactory condition of matters political at Athens. Aristotle appears to agree (cp. 2. 6. 1265 b 10 sqq.), though the remedy suggested by him in the passage before us is not the re-establishment of the Council of the Areopagus. He would perhaps add that when the many are very poor, they need to be maintained by the State (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 19); thus they need pay and frequent meetings of the assembly and dicasteries, and in the end become supreme in place of the law (6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1-10).

35. *τεχναστῶν οὖν ὅπως ἂν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος*. Eucken (*De Partic. Usu*, p. 52 sq.) remarks that this passage and *Eth. Nic.* 10. 7. 1177 b 10 sqq. offer exceptions to the general rule which prevails in Aristotle's writings: 'nullo enim loco optativo post particulas finales utitur, sed promiscue et post tempus praesens et post praeteritum coniunctivum adhibet.' See Weber, *Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles*, p. 40 sq., who says of the passage before us, 'in the form of the sentence there is an unmistakable approximation to an indirect question, but on the other hand it is equally impossible to contest with success its indubitably final signification.' As to *ὅπως ἂν* see note on 1319 b 25.

ἐπεὶ δὲ συμφέρει τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐπόροις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle's advice is—use all the surplus revenue in giving the poorer citizens either simultaneously or by successive sections a start in farming or trade, relieve the rich of all useless liturgies, and make them contribute pay for such meetings of the assembly and dicasteries as are absolutely necessary. The result of this will be that the pauper

demos living by attendance at frequent meetings of the assembly and dicasteries will be replaced by a better-to-do demos occupied in farming and trade, and therefore content with a few meetings of the assembly and dicasteries. It is when the assembly meets frequently that it claims all authority for itself and exalts itself above the magistracies and above the law (6 (4). 15. 1300 a 3 sq.). Aristotle, indeed, wishes the rich to do more, not merely to contribute pay for the assembly and dicasteries, but to do the same with their private income as the State does with its surplus revenue—to use it in giving the poor a start in business. He gets this idea from Isocrates, as we shall see presently. It will be noticed that Aristotle's plan for the enrichment of the demos presupposes the existence of special State-revenues and a surplus from them. It would not be applicable to States not possessing surplus revenues. It is not clear whether he intends the advice which he gives the rich in 1320 b 7 sqq. to apply to States which do not possess surplus revenues, as well as to those which do.

37. συναθροίζοντας and ἀθρόα are emphatic. The surplus revenues are not to be served out in dribblets as fast as they come in, but a fund is to be formed and advances made from it, by way of gift, it would seem, not by way of loan.

38. μάλιστα μὲν κ.τ.λ. To give the poor the means of purchasing a piece of land would be to make peasant-proprietors of them, and peasant-proprietors had this merit among others, that they were content with rare meetings of the assembly and dicasteries. If there were not funds enough for that, it might be possible to help the poor to rent a piece of land or to supply them with tools or seed or oxen for ploughing. We might have expected Aristotle to suggest that the State should let some of its public land to poor men, but this he does not do. Probably Greek States had not commonly much at their disposal for this purpose. He seems to have no fear of the success of his paupers in farming; the veterans of Sulla's Asiatic army, whom he provided with land, do not, however, appear to have prospered as farmers (Strachan-Davidson, Cicero and the Fall of the Roman Republic, p. 116). He no doubt remembers the advice of Phocylides (Fragm. 7),

χρηζῶν πλούτου μελέτην ἔχει πίνος ἀγροῦ·

ἀγρὸν γάρ τε λέγουσιν Ἀμαλθείης κέρας εἶναι.

For the brevity of *δσον εἰς γηδίου κτήσῃ* cp. 1. 13. 1260 a 16 sq. and 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 38.

39. εἰ δὲ μή, πρὸς ἀφορμὴν ἐμπορίας καὶ γεωργίας. Καί, 'ορ,' as in 2. 3. 1262 a 8 and elsewhere. This advice is based on Isocrates' account of the ways of the rich at Athens in the days of Solon and Cleisthenes (Areop. § 32, οἱ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες . . . ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς ἐνδείαις (τῶν πολιτῶν), τοῖς μὲν γεωργίας ἐπὶ μετρίαις μισθώσεσι παραδίδόντες, τοὺς δὲ κατ' ἐμπορίαν ἐκπέμποντες, τοῖς δ' εἰς τὰς ἄλλας ἐργασίας ἀφορμὴν παρέχοντες). Compare Areop. §§ 35, 55, and Isocr. Epist. 7. 3, and the account given of Peisistratus in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 16 and Ael. Var. Hist. 9. 25, where we read how Peisistratus used to send for those who idled away their time in marketplaces, and ask them why they did so, καὶ ἐπέλεγεν, Εἰ μὲν σοι τίθηκε ζεύγος, παρ' ἐμοῦ λαβὼν ἄπιθι καὶ ἐργάζου· εἰ δὲ ἀπορεῖς σπερμάτων, παρ' ἐμοῦ σοι γενέσθω· δεδιὼς μὴ ἡ σχολὴ τούτων ἐπιβουλὴν τέκῃ. 'Ἐμπορία is used here in a broader sense than in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 5, where it is distinguished from καπηλεία. Was the advice given here known to Tiberius Gracchus when he introduced his law respecting Attalus' bequest to the Roman people (Plut. Tib. Gracch. c. 14, εὐθὺς ὁ Τιβέριος δημαγωγῶν εἰσήνεγκε νόμον, ὅπως τὰ βασιλικά χρήματα κομισθέντα τοῖς τὴν χώραν διαλαγχάνουσι τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπάρχονσι πρὸς κατασκευὴν καὶ γεωργίας ἀφορμὴν)?

2. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ κ.τ.λ., 'and in the meantime,' i. e. while the surplus revenue of the State, which might otherwise be employed in supplying pay for the assembly and dicasteries, has to be employed in lifting the poor out of pauperism. τὰς ἀναγκαίας συνόδους probably includes meetings both of the assembly and of the dicasteries.

4. τῶν ματαίων λειτουργιών. See note on 1309 a 18. Aristotle evidently thinks that the rich would not be able to pay these liturgies in addition to providing pay for the assembly and dicasteries. They were, however, probably often expected to do so.

τοιούτων δὲ τίνα τρόπον κ.τ.λ., i. e. by enriching the demos (2. 11. 1273 b 18 sqq.). Φίλον, i. e. to the constitution and the ruling class (cp. 1320 a 14 sqq.). The fact that the demos at Carthage was thus disposed was probably one reason why no one succeeded in establishing a tyranny there (2. 11. 1272 b 30—33 : cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 21 sqq.). Compare with the passage before us the humorous suggestion of the Athenian Epicrates, ψήφισμα γράφειν φάσκοντος ἀπὸ τῶν ἐννέα ἀρχόντων χειροτονεῖσθαι κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἐννέα πρέσβεις πρὸς βασιλείᾳ τῶν δημοτικῶν καὶ πεινήτων, ὅπως λαμβάνοντες εὐπορώσιν (Plut. Pelop. c. 30). The senate at Rome had many opportunities of enriching members of the demos and used them (Polyb. 6. 17. 1—5).

6. πινας . . . τοῦ δήμου. Cp. [Xen.] Rep. Ath. i. 16, τοὺς τοῦ δήμου, and 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 25. l. 16, τοὺς ἀφαιρεθέντας (or αἰρεθέντας) τῆς βουλῆς. 'Homer (Il. 2. 198) has δήμου ἄνδρα' (Richards).

7. χαριέντων δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τοὺν ἐχόντων γνωρίμων κ.τ.λ. Aristotle's meaning is, 'but if the notables are men of sense and good feeling, they will do more than simply relieve the poor in the aggregate by supplying pay for the assembly and dicasteries, they will in addition each take charge of a section of the poor and start it in some business.' This will be a sensible course for them to take, for the better able the poor are to support themselves, the less demand there will be for the pay of the State and the lighter will be the burden on the rich. Aristotle's counsel is no doubt suggested by the traditions as to the ways of the rich at Athens which have been noticed above on 1320 a 39. Probably in his own day this form of charitable activity had died out there. We read of the rich at Rhodes in Strabo, p. 653, σιταρχεῖται δὲ ὁ δήμος καὶ οἱ εὐποροὶ τοὺς ἐνδεεῖς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔθει τῶν πατρίφ. At Rome the patricians were helpful in many ways to their clients. See as to the nobles of mediaeval Venice H. F. Brown, Venice, p. 258, and as to those of Switzerland, Roscher, Politik, p. 157. For διαλαμβάνοντες cp. Polyb. ii. 26. 5, τοῖς μὲν χιλιάρχοις τοῖς πρεσβεύσασι συνέταξε δι' ἀπορρήτων ὁ Πόπλιος ἀπαντᾶν τοῖς ἀποσταταῖς, καὶ διελομένους ἕκαστον πέντε τῶν ἀρχηγῶν τῆς στάσεως εὐθέως κατὰ τὴν ἀπάντησιν φιλανθρωπεῖν καὶ καλεῖν ὡς αὐτούς. If each rich man took charge of a section of the poor, not only would there be no 'overlapping of charity,' but a cordial relation would spring up between the rich man and those whom he befriended. 'The individualizing of the work [of relief], which assigns to each almoner as limited an area as possible,' is a feature of the Elberfeld system of poor-law administration (G. Drage, Report on Germany to the Royal Commission on Labour, p. 87).

8. καλῶς δ' ἔχει μιμεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ Ταραντίνων. It was probably from their Lacedaemonian ancestors (cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 35 sqq.) that the Tarentines inherited the practice of making possessions common in use. They also made part of their magistracies specially accessible to the poor by arranging that they should be filled by lot. It is not said that Tarentum enriched its poor by these two measures, as Carthage did, but at any rate it won their good-will. Carthage had no κληρωταὶ ἀρχαί to give (2. ii. 1273 a 17). The rich at Tarentum were all the better able to be generous to the

demos because the Tarentine demos does not seem, like the Athenian, to have been greedy for State-pay (Theopomp. Fragm. 95: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 293).

10. κοινὰ . . . ἐπὶ τὴν χρῆσιν, 'common for purposes of use.' Ἐπὶ is used here 'vi finali' (Bon. Ind. 269 a 5). See note on 1315 a 24. We have κοινὸς τῇ χρήσει in 2. 5. 1263 a 38 sq. and 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 1 sq.

11. ἔτι δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς πάσας κ.τ.λ., 'and further they made the magistracies as a whole of two kinds, some of them elective and others filled by lot.' Τὰς ἀρχὰς πάσας stands in contrast to τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς, 15. Ἐποίησαν does not imply that this arrangement did not exist at Tarentum in Aristotle's day. A similar plan is recommended in Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3. 1424 a 12 sqq. At Athens there were both αἵρεταί and κληρωταί ἀρχαί, but those only were αἵρεταί for which the lot would have been unsuitable (c. 2. 1317 b 20 sq.: [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 3). Savonarola introduced a system like the Tarentine at Florence, probably being influenced by the teaching of the Politics. 'He suggested that while all the most important offices should be filled by election, lots might be drawn for the minor ones, by which system every citizen could hope to take some part in the government' (Duffy, Tuscan Republics, p. 354). For the interchange of ὅπως and ὥσα see note on 1333 b 40.

14. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς μερίζοντας τοὺς μὲν κληρωτοὺς τοὺς δ' αἵρετούς. Sepulveda and Vict. connect καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς with μερίζοντας, the latter translating 'licet autem hoc facere, et eiusdem magistratus partientes'; Lamb. with τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, translating 'licet autem hoc facere etiam in eodem magistratu.' The sentence is mostly translated more or less as Lamb. translates it, but, if we take it thus, the use of the genitive seems strange, though it is true that Aristotle sometimes uses the genitive in the sense of 'in respect of': cp. De Part. An. 4. 11. 691 a 18, ἰσχυρότεραι γὰρ γίνονται τῶν ὀστέων ('in respect of the bones') ὥς οὖσαι τοιαῦται τὴν φύσιν. I incline myself to suggest a third interpretation. Is not τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς in the gen. after τοὺς μὲν and τοὺς δέ? Cp. 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 8, ὁλον εἰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δικαστηρίου εἴεν οἱ μὲν ἐκ πάντων οἱ δ' ἐκ τινῶν. If this is so, we should translate, 'but it is possible to do this also by parting off some members of the same magistracy from others [and making] the former appointed by lot and the latter appointed by election.' The plan suggested by

Aristotle would hardly be applicable to military offices. It would not be advisable to appoint any generals by lot.

C. 6. 18. πῶς δεῖ, sc. κατασκευάζειν τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας.

19. ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This passage has been interpreted in different ways. Vict. and Sus. take συνάγειν ἐκάστην ὀλιγαρχίαν together and translate these words 'put together each form of oligarchy.' Lamb., on the other hand, followed by Giph., takes ἐκάστην ὀλιγαρχίαν not with συνάγειν, but with ἀναλογιζόμενον, translating 'oportet enim ex contrariis colligere, unaquaque oligarchia ad contrariam democratiam spectata et relata.' Welldon takes ἐκάστην ὀλιγαρχίαν with συνάγειν, but translates 'infer the characteristics of the several forms of oligarchy.' Jowett translates, 'we have only to reason from opposites and compare each form of oligarchy with the corresponding form of democracy'; he seems, therefore, to agree with Welldon as to the meaning of συνάγειν, but to take ἐκάστην ὀλιγαρχίαν, like Lamb. and Giph., not with συνάγειν, but with ἀναλογιζόμενον. The true interpretation of the passage is doubtful. The rendering of Vict. and Sus. attaches an unusual meaning to συνάγειν, but cp. Plato, Polit. 310 E, λέων καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον εὐήριον ὕψασμα ξυνάγοντα ἐξ αὐτῶν. I incline on the whole to adopt it (cp. c. 1. 1317 a 18 sqq.) and to translate, 'for it is from the opposite institutions [to those which go with each form of democracy] that we must put together each form of oligarchy, calculating the structure of each in relation to that of the opposite democracy, the most tempered of the oligarchies and first in order [in relation to the first kind of democracy].' Aristotle would have added 'in relation to the first kind of democracy,' if he had not been prevented doing so by the length to which his comparison of this oligarchy to the polity extends. The adoption of two property-qualifications, one for the major offices and the other for the minor, evidences a readiness to pay regard to the claims of both the rich and the poor, which relates this oligarchy to the polity, and indeed also to the first form of democracy (c. 4. 1318 b 30 sq.). Is this double property-qualification, however, quite consistent with that equality within the privileged class which is recommended in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 10 sqq.? One difference between the first form of oligarchy and the polity is that while in the polity those who possess political rights are, or ought to be, more numerous than those who do not (6 (4). 13. 1297 b 2-6), the reverse is the case in the first form of oligarchy (6 (4). 5. 1292 a 39 sqq.).

22. ἥ, 'for which.'

τὰ τιμήματα διαιρεῖν. See note on 1318 a 12.

25. τῷ τε κτωμένῳ τὸ τίμημα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 7. 1321 a 26 sqq. and 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 29 sq. Supply δεῖ with ἐξείναι from what precedes. Sus.² (Note 1444) explains that the lower of the two property-qualifications is referred to here.

26. τοσοῦτον εἰσαγομένους κ.τ.λ. This reminds us of Theramenes' speech in Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 42, οὐδέ γε τὸ φρουροὺς μισθοῦσθαι συνήρεσκέ μοι, ἐξὼν αὐτῶν τῶν πολιτῶν τοσοῦτους προσλαμβάνειν, ὥς ῥαδίως ἐμέλλομεν οἱ ἄρχοντες τῶν ἀρχομένων κρατήσιν. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 16 sqq. For the way in which the acc. plur. participle is introduced without any strict grammatical connexion with the rest of the sentence, cp. c. 7. 1321 a 30 and Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 60, τῷ δὲ κοινῶι καὶ τούτων ἐν[αι] ἐξαγωγήν, εἰπόντας Ἀμύνται πρὶν ἐξάγειν, τελέοντας τὰ τέλεα τὰ γεγραμμένα, and see Stallbaum on Plato, Laws 759 B.

28. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ μὲν εὖ σώματα διακείμενα πρὸς ὑγίειαν κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle probably has before him what Plato says of the oligarchical State in Rep. 556 E. For the order of the words cp. Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 38, τὰ ἐν τοῖς παραδείσοις θηρία τρεφόμενα. Εὖ is placed first for the sake of emphasis, like νοσερώς in 36. Cp. Demosth. De Cor. c. 144, καὶ γὰρ εὖ πρᾶγμα συνεθεὶν ὄψεσθε.

34. καὶ πλοῖα τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν καλῶς ἔχοντα . . . τοῖς πλωτῆρσιν, 'and vessels well constituted for navigation and' (or 'both in other respects and') 'in respect of their crews.' See critical note on 1320 b 35.

37. τὰ τῶν πλοίων ἐκκελυμένα, 'ships whose joints are unstrung.' Cp. Pollux, 1. 114, διαλυθείσης τῆς νεώς. In τὰ τῶν πλοίων ἐκκελυμένα we have 'an unusual order of words for a partitive genitive, but cp. Thuc. 1. 25. 4, τοῖς Ἑλλήνων πλουσιωτάτοις, and 6. 62. 5: Plato, Soph. 247 C, Laws 906 C sq., 952 E' (Richards).

1. τὰς μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίας κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 4. 1319 b 6 sqq., 7 (5). 1321 a. 7. 1307 a 16, διόπερ ἀσφαλίστεραι αἱ τοιαῦται (i.e. αἱ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος ἀποκλίνουσαι πολιτεῖαι) τῶν ἐτέρων εἰσὶν κρείττον' τε γὰρ τὸ πλεῖον κ.τ.λ., and 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 36, καὶ δι' αὐτῆς (σώζεσθαι) μὴ τῷ πλείους εἶναι τοὺς βουλομένους (εἴη γὰρ ἂν καὶ ποτηρὰ πολιτεία τοῦθ' ὑπάρχον). Ἡ πολυανθρωπία, 'the largeness of the citizen-body': see note on 1327 a 11.

2. τοῦτο γὰρ ἀντίκειται πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, 'for this is the antithesis to justice according to desert [which is the

safeguard of the constitutions opposed to democracy].’ Cp. 7 (5). 1. 1302 a 2 sqq., and for *κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν* (not *κατ’ ἀξίαν*, as usually), 7 (5). 2. 1302 b 14.

3. For *ὅπῃ τῆς εὐταξίας δεῖ τυγχάνειν τῆς σωτηρίας* cp. Xen. Mem. 4. 8. 10, *οἶδα δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπιμελείας τεύξομαι ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων*, and Cyrop. 1. 6. 10, *ὑπ’ ἄλλων αἰδοῦς τεύξει*: also Plato, Soph. 225 C. Good order is the opposite of *πολυανθρωπία*, for it is inapplicable to a great multitude (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 31 sq.). In Thessaly oligarchy often found a home, yet we read of it in Plato, Crito, 53 D, *ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία* (cp. Athen. Deipn. 527 a).

- C. 7. 5. *Ἐπεὶ δὲ τέτταρα μὲν ἐστί μέρη μάλιστα τοῦ πλήθους κ.τ.λ.* See note on 6 (4). 3. 1289 b 32, where three kinds of *demos* only are enumerated. *Τέτταρα μάλιστα*, ‘about four’: cp. Hist. An. 9. 14. 616 a 33, *τίκτει δὲ περὶ πέντε μάλιστα φά (ἢ ἄλκων)*. The fact that there are four parts of the *πλήθος* seems to be mentioned not because it has any bearing on what follows, but to prepare the way for a mention of the similar quadruple division of *τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πόλεμον*. Founders of oligarchies must not introduce narrow oligarchies anywhere and everywhere, but only where the character of the State-territory makes cavalry the most important force. This remark was needed, for Lysander had set up narrow oligarchies in a number of States, and in particular at Athens. It slightly qualifies the advice given in 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 31 sqq. (see note on that passage). Aristotle further counsels founders of oligarchies, if they have to do with a State in which light-armed troops are numerous, to take measures to secure a supply of such troops on the side of the oligarchs. Some oligarchies had been driven by a pressing need of troops to give the many a share in the constitution (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 25 sqq.), and Aristotle perhaps remembers the fatal results of this step when he recommends in 26 sqq. that this should not be done in a wholesale fashion, but in one of three ways which he enumerates. As a further means of contenting the *demos*, he recommends that the tenure of high office in oligarchies should be connected with the discharge of costly liturgies.

8. *ὅπου μὲν συμβέβηκε κ.τ.λ.* For *ὅπου μὲν—ἐνταῦθα μὲν* cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 17 sqq. This was the case at Chalcis and Eretria and at Magnesia on the Maeander and many other cities of Asia Minor (6 (4). 3. 1289 b 39 sq.). In the broad open plains of Asia Minor cavalry was the most important force, as both Agesilaus (Xen.

Hell. 3. 4. 15: Plut. Ages. c. 9) and Alexander (Plut. Alex. c. 16) found. The same was the case in Thessaly (see the account in Diod. 15. 71. 4 sq. of the successful resistance offered by Alexander of Pherae and his cavalry to the invading Boeotian army), and Aristotle perhaps remembers that Philip of Macedon introduced narrow oligarchies (decadarchies) there (Demosth. Phil. 2. 22: Schäfer, Demosthenes, 2. 324). Crete, on the other hand, was not suited for cavalry (Plato, Laws 625 D), nor Attica (Hdt. 9. 13: cp. 5. 63).

11. αἱ δ' ἱπποτροφίαι κ.τ.λ. See note on 1289 b 35. For *μακρὰς οὐσίας* cp. 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 16.

12. ὅπου δ' ὀπλιτικὴν, sc. *συμβέβηκε τὴν χώραν εἶναι*. Boeotia was of this character (Plut. Aristid. c. 10, *καλὸν δὲ τὸ Βοιωτίου πεδίου ἀγαθοῖς ἱππεῦσι καὶ ὀπλίταις ἐναγωνίσασθαι*). That plains were suited to hoplites is clear from Polyb. 4. 14. 6. See note on 1289 b 31.

τὴν ἔχουμένην ὀλιγαρχίαν, cp. 6 (4). 6. 1292 b 35.

13. ἡ δὲ ψιλὴ δύναμις καὶ ναυτικὴ δημοτικὴ πάμπαν. Hence it is not surprising to find the oligarchies of Chalcis and Eretria, when at war with each other about the Lelantine plain, agreeing *μὴ χρῆσθαι τηλεβόλοις* (Strabo, p. 448). When Aristotle speaks of light-armed and naval forces as supplied by the demos, it must be borne in mind that mercenaries were often employed in both these kinds of force. Light-armed troops were obtainable from Crete, Acarnania, and elsewhere (see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Droysen, 2. 2. 25). The fleet of Dionysius the Elder was partly manned by citizens, partly by aliens (Diod. 14. 43. 4), partly by emancipated slaves (Diod. 14. 58. 1). See also notes on 1327 b 11 and 1291 b 20.

14. νῦν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'as things are, indeed, where there are large numbers of light-armed and trireme-oarsmen, when the citizens have fallen asunder into two hostile bodies, the oligarchs often get the worst of it.' There were probably many light-armed at Argos when the many defeated the few (Thuc. 5. 82. 2: cp. Paus. 2. 20. 2), and many light-armed and trireme-oarsmen at Corcyra when the same thing happened there (Thuc. 3. 74). Ὅταν διαστώσι, cp. 19, *ἐν ταῖς διαστάσεσιν*. Bonitz (Ind. 196 a 23 sqq.) groups the passage before us with Eth. Eud. 7. 5. 1239 b 15, οὐ φίλοι ἑαυτοῖς, ἀλλὰ δίστανται, and Pol. 1. 6. 1255 a 19 sq. Cp. also Thuc. 1. 18. 6, *εἰ τινὲς που διασταῖεν*.

16. δεῖ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. For *πρὸς τοῦτο* cp. c. 5. 1320 a 6.

The combined use of hoplites and light-armed is traceable at a very early date: see Tyrtaeus, 11. 35 sqq. Aristides (Plut. Aristid. c. 14) sent Olympiodorus against the Persian cavalry under Masistius, *ἔχοντα τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτῷ τεταγμένους λογάδας τριακοσίους καὶ τοξότας ἀναμεμγμένους σὺν αὐτοῖς*. As to the combination of light-armed and cavalry, an early instance of this occurs in the defeat of the Athenians at Spartolus by the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans in B.C. 429 (Thuc. 2. 79). We first hear of *ἄμипποι* in connexion with Boeotian troops (Thuc. 5. 57. 2, *Βοιωτοὶ μὲν πεντακισχίλιοι ὀπλῖται καὶ τοσοῦτοι ψιλοὶ καὶ ἱππῆς πεντακόσιοι καὶ ἄμипποι ἴσοι*). Epaminondas made a great point of the use of them (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 23 sq.: cp. Diod. 15. 71. 6, 85. 4). We find Agesilaus using peltastae intermingled with cavalry against the cavalry of Tissaphernes (Plut. Ages. c. 10, *τοῖς ἱππεύσιν ἀναμίξας τὸ πελταστικόν*). Whether Gylippus used his javelin-throwers as *ἄμипποι* at Syracuse in the fight described in Thuc. 7. 6. 2, is not clear, but at any rate he grouped them with his cavalry, and the same thing may be said of Xanthippus and the Carthaginians in Polyb. 1. 33. 7. Xenophon strongly recommends the use of *ἄμипποι* (Hipparch. 5. 13, *ἱππαρχιδὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ διδάσκειν τὴν πόλιν ὡς ἀσθενές τὸ πεζῶν ἔρμηον ἱππικὸν πρὸς τὸ ἀμίππους πεζοὺς ἔχον*). See Sandys on 'Aθ. Πολ. c. 49, *ἀμίππους*. Light-armed troops, however, were used with cavalry both as *ἄμипποι* and otherwise; sometimes they were ranged behind cavalry and made to start out suddenly (Xen. Hipparch. 5. 13, 8. 19: C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Droysen, 2. 2. 51 sq.).

19. *ταύτη δ' ἐπικρατοῦσιν κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle may perhaps remember Xen. Cyrop. 2. 1. 8, *ἀνάγκη γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κυαζάρης· οὐκοῦν ἐν ταύτῃ μὲν (i. e. τῇ ἀκροβολίζεσθαι) τῶν πλειόνων ἢ νίκῃ· πολὺ γὰρ ἂν θάπτον οἱ ὀλίγοι ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν τιτρωσόμενοι ἀναλωθεύσαν ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ὀλίγων*. For *οἱ δῆμοι* cp. 3. 11. 1282 a 28. As to *δε* see note on 1308 b 37.

20. *ψιλοὶ γὰρ ὄντες κ.τ.λ.*, 'for though they are light-armed' etc. That light-armed troops were a match for cavalry, we see from Diod. 15. 85. 4; that they were a match for hoplites, from Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 16 and 7. 1. 19. It was with archers and slingers that the Romans forced the heavy-armed phalanx of Antiochus to give way in the battle of Magnesia (Mommsen, Hist. of Rome, Eng. Trans., vol. ii. p. 271).

21. *τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων καθιστάται κ.τ.λ.* 'Εκ τούτων, i. e. ἐκ τῶν δημοτικῶν, which must be obtained from *οἱ δῆμοι*, 19. See note

on 1320 a 20. Aristotle tacitly discountenances the alternative of employing mercenary light-armed troops, no doubt on account of the risks attaching to the practice (7 (5). 6. 1306 a 21 sqq.). The Roman nobles employed Cretan archers against C. Gracchus (Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, Eng. Trans., vol. iii. p. 127 sq.).

22. δεῖ δὲ διηρημένης τῆς ἡλικίας κ.τ.λ. Does Aristotle mean by *διηρημένης* that the oligarchy is to mark off the older from the young, or that nature has done so? Vict. interprets the word in the former way—'requiri igitur in dominatione paucorum oportere inquit, ut aetas eorum qui participes sunt eius dividatur, distinguanturque senes ab adolescentibus': Sepulveda in the latter—'sed cum duplex sit aetas, sintque alteri seniores, alteri adolescentes,' and Lamb. in much the same way, 'oportet autem, cum aetas non sit simplex sed in aliquot partes divisa, alique sint aetate grandiores, alii iuvenes.' The latter interpretation seems to me to be preferable. Cp. Pindar, *Pyth.* 4. 157 Bergk, ἀλλ' ἤδη με γηραῖον μέρος ἀλικίας ἀμφιπολεῖ. See also 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 5 sq. Οἱ πρεσβύτεροι are here contrasted with οἱ νέοι, and the term probably refers to a much less advanced age than in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 15 and 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 29 (see notes on 1329 a 13 and 1335 b 29). For τοὺς αὐτῶν υἱαῖς see note on 1262 a 9. Διδάσκεισθαι is probably in the middle voice ('have their sons taught'). In τὰς κοῦφας καὶ τὰς ψιλὰς ἐργασίας light-armed exercises (cp. Xen. *Mem.* 3. 5. 27, ὠπλισμένους κορυμβοτέρους ὅπλοις) are distinguished from exercises without ὅπλα of any kind. Plato had already advised that boys and girls should be taught military exercises (*Laws* 813 D sq.), but he had not favoured exercises without ὅπλα (*Laws* 833 A, 834 C). Compare with Aristotle's advice Socrates' suggestion to Pericles in Xen. *Mem.* 3. 5. 27. In the cities of Boeotia the young men of twenty were enrolled first among the peltasts and did not become hoplites till some years later, when their physical strength had increased (Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 58 sq.). The κοῦφαι καὶ ψιλὰι ἐργασίαι referred to no doubt include exercises in the work of javelin-throwers, peltasts (i.e. javelin-throwers with a sword and light shield: see C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Ant.*, ed. Droysen, 2. 2. 25), archers (though archers are distinguished from ψιλοὶ in c. 8. 1322 b 1), and slingers. The Cyrus of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* has a great contempt for slinging, which he regards as fit only for slaves (*Cyrop.* 7. 4. 15). Compare Eustath. on *Hom. Il.* 13. 600, θανάπροντος δὲ ὅπλον αὕτη (i.e. ἡ σφενδόνη), οὐ μὴν ἥρωος, οὐδὲ γὰρ

ἐχρῆν (quoted by Sturz, *Lex. Xen.* s. v. σφενδαῶν). The suggestion that the sons of the oligarchs should be taught to serve as light-armed soldiers, a kind of service usually abandoned to men of the demos or to mercenaries, was a bold one and would offend many prejudices.

25. ἐκκεκριμένους δὲ ἐκ παίδων ἀθλητὰς εἶναι αὐτοὺς τῶν ἔργων, 'and when they have been taken out of the ranks of the boys, they should themselves be skilled practitioners of the duties of soldiers of this sort.' It would seem, however, from *Xen. Mem.* 3. 5. 27 that men would only be fit for service as light-armed soldiers μέχρι τῆς ελαφρᾶς ἡλικίας. For ἐκκεκριμένους ἐκ παίδων, compare διέκρινον τῶν νεωτέρων παίδων in Phot. συνέφηβος (quoted in note on 1337 a 1). and see Bon. *Ind.* s. v. ἐκκρίνειν. For ἀθλητὰς τῶν ἔργων, cp. *Polyb.* 1. 6. 6, ἀθληταὶ γεγονότες ἀθητικοὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἔργων, 2. 20. 9, and 15. 9. 4, and *Diod.* 12. 75. 7.

26. τὴν δὲ μετὰδοσιν γίνεσθαι τῷ πλήθει τοῦ πολιτεύματος κ.τ.λ. By a share in the πολιτεύμα is meant a share in the magistracies, and especially the supreme magistracy (3. 6. 1278 b 8 sqq.). Thus what is here termed a μετὰδοσις τοῦ πολιτεύματος in reference to Thebes is referred to as the bestowal of a share of office in 3. 5. 1278 a 25 sq. This counsel is probably given because in some oligarchies the many had been brought within the constitution in a more wholesale way (see note on 5). For the phrase μετὰδοσις τοῦ πολιτεύματος cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 15, τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ πολιτεύματος.

27. καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, in c. 6. 1320 b 25 sqq.

28. ἦ, καθάπερ Θηβαίοις κ.τ.λ. For the dative Θηβαίοις see critical note on 1292 a 22, and cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 1, καθ' ὃν νῦν τρόπον ἔχει πᾶσι. For the fact cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 25 sq. It was not enough in the Theban oligarchy of which Aristotle speaks that a man should have acquired a certain property-qualification; he was also required to have abstained for ten years from βάνανσα ἔργα, or, which comes to much the same thing, from the sale of the products of a handicraft in the market (1278 a 25 sq.). As βάνανσα ἔργα are unfavourable to virtue (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 26 sqq.: 4 (7). 9. 1328 b 37 sqq.), this rule showed some regard to virtue, and to some extent fell in with Aristotle's own recommendation that those who belonged to the better kind of demos should be admitted to the privileged class in preference to others (c. 6. 1320 b 28 sq.). It will be noticed that the practice of agriculture did not exclude men from the πολιτεύμα at Thebes, but only the practice of a handicraft.

29. ἢ, καθάπερ ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ κ.τ.λ. The exact nature of the process to which Aristotle refers is obscure. Vict. understands it thus—'Massilienses narrat solitos diligenter existimare de vita ac moribus eorum qui participes reipublicae forent, et eorum etiam qui expertes, atque ita delectum habere ut deteriores inde eiicerent et meliores extra ipsam positos in eum ordinem reciperent.' Giph. (p. 845) takes much the same view of the passage. Following Vict., I think that what Aristotle means is this—the Massaliots framed a list of those who deserved to be members of the *πολίτευμα*, taking into account not only those who were already members but also those who were not, so that the admission of members of the *demos* to the *πολίτευμα* was an incident of the framing of this list. This method gave more weight to virtue than that followed in the Theban oligarchy, for while at Thebes no security was taken that those admitted to the *πολίτευμα* were virtuous and all that was done was to exclude from it those whose occupation was unfavourable to virtue, at Massalia those only were admitted to the *πολίτευμα* who deserved to be so on the ground of virtue. It is not certain that the method here described was practised at Massalia in Aristotle's own day, for the law to which he refers at Thebes had apparently been repealed (3. 5. 1278 a 25 sq.). *Κρίσιν ποιῆσαι* occurs in Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 333 *inií*. For the acc. *κρίσιν ποιουμένους* see note on 1320 b 26. For *τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι* cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 24, 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 34, and 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 6 sq. In the Venetian oligarchy membership of the Patriciate with a seat in the Great Council was given in 1381 to thirty commoners as a reward of merit (Brown, Venice, p. 237), but in later times this privilege commonly passed by sale (Houssaye, Hist. du Gouvernement de Venise, i. 97, 98).

31. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς κυριωτάταις κ.τ.λ. 'The most supreme magistracies also' as well as the rich, who were always subject to these burdens. For *ὡς δὲ τοὺς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ κατέχειν* cp. 7 (5). 8. 1309 a 31 sq. For *προσκέισθαι* see Bon. Ind. 646 b 44 sqq., where the word as used here is explained by 'iniungi' and *προσθεῖσθαι*. It was the custom at Rome for the aediles to contribute largely from their private fortunes to the celebration of games (Willems, Droit Public Romain, p. 289). In the cities of Italy under the Roman Empire office was confined to those who possessed a fixed amount of property, and office-holders were required by usage, and in part also by law, to spend money on

public buildings and games and in other ways (Friedländer, *Petronii Cena Trimalchionis*, pp. 29, 31, 37). At Venice the Doges sometimes 'ruined themselves in the service of the State' (Yriarte, *Patricien de Venise*, p. 350). In the oligarchy of Berne in the middle ages the members of the Small Council 'mainly belonged to the most respected families and often had to make important sacrifices for the commonwealth' (Geiser, *Gesch. der bern. Verfassung von 1191-1471*, p. 39). In England during the last century and the earlier part of this the upper class paid dearly for their position in election expenses. The objection to Aristotle's recommendation of course is that it practically confines office to the very rich. Office-holders might also be tempted to recoup their expenditure by illicit practices (cp. 2. 11. 1273 b 1 sqq.).

33. *ἐν' ἐκὼν ὁ δῆμος κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Plut. *De se ipso citra invidiam laudando*, c. 14, *ὡς γὰρ οἰκίαν καὶ χωρίον, οὕτω καὶ δόξαν οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀρετὴν τοῖς προῖκα καὶ βραδίως ἔχειν δοκοῦσιν, οὐ τοῖς πριαμένοις πόνων πολλῶν καὶ κινδύνων, φθονοῦσιν.*

34. *μισθὸν πολύν.* Πολύν is made emphatic by being placed after *μισθόν* (see note on 1275 a 32).

35. *ἀρμόττει δὲ κ.τ.λ.* The expenditure which Aristotle recommends is of a kind to come home to the palates and the senses of the many. It also belongs to the class of *τίμα δαπανήματα* (Eth. Nic. 4. 5. 1122 b 19 sqq.). Though the outlay on sacrifices and banquets might soon be forgotten, the outlay on buildings would not. In Plut. *Aristid.* c. 24 we read of *κπτασκευὰς ἀγαλμάτων καὶ ἱερῶν*. *Κατασκευάζειν* includes the equipping of a temple with *ἀναθήματα* (Hdt. 2. 44), or the rebuilding of walls and other public edifices.

39. *συμβήσεται δὲ κ.τ.λ.* Cp. Isaeus, *Or.* 5. c. 41, *καὶ τούτων μαρτύρια ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἀναθήματα ἐκείνοι ἐκ τῶν περιόντων, μνημεῖα τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς, ἀνέθεσαν.*

καὶ τοῖς γνωρίμοις, 'to the notables also,' i.e. the notables will profit as well as the State.

40. *οἱ περὶ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας.* Cp. Demosth. c. *Timocr.* c. 76, *τῶν ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις*, and see Hicks, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, No. 126, l. 2.

41. *τὰ λήμματα γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* Athenagoras makes the same complaint at Syracuse (Thuc. 6. 39. 2) and Thrasybulus at Athens (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 4. 40).

42. *διόπερ εὖ ἔχει κ.τ.λ.* Because they are ruled by men who

are as eager for gain as the many who rule in democracies (c. 4. 1318 b 16 sq.).

1. πῶς μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. In c. 1. 1317 a 14 sqq. an inquiry has been 1321 b. promised as to the best way of constructing not only democracies and oligarchies, but also other constitutions, but this latter part of the promise is here left unfulfilled.

4. Ἀκόλουθον δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις κ.τ.λ. The question how to C. 8. institute a democracy or an oligarchy leads on to a consideration of the questions arising as to magistracies, for magistracies must exist in every State. Besides, as we are told in 1323 a 3 sqq., some magistracies are suitable to democracies and others to oligarchies. For ἀκόλουθον cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 4. 1122 a 18 sq. The chapter before us takes up the investigation contained in 6 (4). 15 (see vol. i. p. 516 sqq.): cp. also 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 1, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅς δεῖ καὶ τίνων εἶναι κυρίας, καὶ ποῖαν τινὰ δεῖ γίγνεσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν αὐτῶν). Aristotle's enumeration of magistracies and their functions begins with the most necessary ones (1322 a 29 sq.) and gradually rises to ἡ μάλιστα κυρία πάντων ἀρχή (1322 b 12 sq.), then to magistracies, or rather charges (ἐπιμέλεια, 1322 b 18 sq.), connected with the worship of the gods, and lastly to magistracies peculiar to leisured and prosperous States which study good order. He groups the magistracies otherwise in 1322 b 29 sqq. (see note). He bases his classification of magistracies on the practice of Greek States; he follows this in separating military from civil functions, for this was the general rule at any rate in democratic States; he follows it also in instituting magistracies for the audit of the accounts of outgoing office-holders, and in reserving the initiative for the Boulê and its equivalents (1322 b 12 sqq.). In these three points Roman practice differed from Greek, at any rate originally (see Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Aristoteles und Athen, 1. 238). We note that the functions of archons escape enumeration except so far as they were sacrificial (1322 b 26 sqq.). Not a few magistracies are omitted from the list which we expect to find included in it. It includes no magistracy explicitly commissioned to make the valuations of property referred to in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 35 sqq., or to guard the public health, notwithstanding what is said in 4 (7). 11. 1330 a 38 sqq., or to check spendthrift habits, though the need of such a magistracy is pointed out in 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 20 sqq. To which, again, of the magistracies on the list will the operations

for the relief of the poor described in 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 35 sqq. be entrusted? Which will manage the coinage or the farming of the taxes? We hear of no magistrates whose duty it is to keep a list of the citizens, or to take charge of and exhibit copies of laws, decrees, lists of public property, and the like. Some magistracies which played a great part in oligarchies and aristocracies escape without mention, such as the *gerusiae* and judicial magistrates of the Lacedaemonian and Carthaginian States, and the Lacedaemonian ephorate. It should also be noticed that Aristotle makes all his magistracies boards, whereas at Athens in his day some important magistracies were held by single individuals ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 43. l. 2 sq.).

τὸ διηρηθῆναι καλῶς τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. *Διαιρεῖν* seems here to be used in the sense of *διορίζειν*, as in 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 12 and elsewhere: compare the use of *διαίρεσις* in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 3, *ἐχομένη δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς διαίρεσις*.

5. καθάπερ εἰρηται καὶ πρότερον comes in here rather awkwardly, for it has not been said before that this inquiry is *ἀκόλουθον τοῖς εἰρημένοις*, but the reference is no doubt to 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 1 sqq. and 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 3 sqq.

6. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀρχῶν κ.τ.λ. Compare 3. 12. 1283 a 20 sqq. Magistracies are divided into *ἀναγκαῖαι* and *κυριώτεραι* in c. 6. 1320 b 24 sq. For magistracies *πρὸς εὐταξίαν καὶ κόσμον* cp. 1322 b 37 sqq. For the conjunction of *εὐταξία* and *κόσμος* Bonitz (Ind. s. v. *κόσμος*) compares that of *τάξις* and *κόσμος* in *De Caelo*, 3. 2. 301 a 10 and *Metaph. A.* 3. 984 b 16 sq.

10. ὥσπερ τυγχάνει πρότερον εἰρημένον, in 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 34 sqq.

11. συνάγειν, cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 13, *ποίας ἀρμόττει συνάγειν ἀρχὰς εἰς μίαν ἀρχήν*.

12. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., 'first then there is the charge of things necessary which is concerned with the marketplace,' etc. For *ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀναγκαίων* cp. 30, *αὗται μὲν οὖν ἐπιμέλειαί εἰσι τούτων τρεῖς*. Aristotle begins with magistracies which make *κοινωνία*, and especially *κοινωνία τῶν ἀναγκαίων*, possible (14 sqq., 1322 a 5 sqq.). He follows the general custom of ancient Greece in marking off the *agoranomi* from the *astynomi*, though it probably sometimes happened that these two magistracies were united. Thus it appears from Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr. Gr.* No. 337, that after the Lamian War the functions of the *astynomi* at the Peiraeus were transferred for

a while to the agoranomi. In small cities the agoranomi cannot have had a great deal to do, but at Athens and the Peiraeus their hands must have been full. Commodities of all kinds were sold in the agora—slaves, cattle and sheep, provisions, raw and manufactured products—and it was necessary that an authority should exist to marshal the different classes of sellers and their booths in the agora (Plato, *Laws* 849 E), to control the motley mob of buyers and sellers, and to see that the weights and measures used were honest and the goods sold unadulterated and sound, and generally that buyers and sellers were true to their contracts and conducted themselves in a peaceable and orderly way, and that no refuse or the like was left to accumulate. These duties were discharged in Greek States by the agoranomi (Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 331), who had authority to hear and dispose of cases judicially (1322 a 12 sqq.) and to inflict fines and other punishments. Sometimes, as at Astypalaea (Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr. Gr. No.* 338), one of their functions was that of seeing that the corn and other commodities sold in the agora were sold at a cheap rate. At Athens the offices of ἀγορανόμος and ἀστυνόμος seem to have been of little account (Demosth. c. Timocr. c. 112 : Ol. 3. c. 29). Some of the functions usually discharged by the agoranomi were there entrusted to other magistracies—e. g. to metronomi ('*Αθ. Πολ.* c. 51. l. 5 sqq.) and sitophylakes (Lys. Or. 22. c. 16)—and in '*Αθ. Πολ.* c. 51 the only function ascribed to them is that of seeing that articles sold were pure and sound. At Rome the aediles answer in many respects to the Greek agoranomi and astynomi.

13. ἐφ' ἧ. Is ἐπιμέλεια (Sepulv. *Vict. Lamb.*) or ἀγοράν (Welldon) the antecedent to ἧ? For ἐπί cp. 1322 a 37 sq.

14. τὰ συμβόλαια. The contracts made in the agora are no doubt referred to (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 11, τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν συμβολαίων). Not all contracts were made in the agora.

τὴν εὐκοσμίαν. Cp. Theophr. *Fragm.* 98, Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς περὶ νόμων φησὶ δυοῖν τούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι δεῖν τοὺς ἀγορανόμους, τῆς τε ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ εὐκοσμίας καὶ τοῦ ἀψευδεῖν μὴ μόνον τοὺς πιπράσκοντας ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ὠνομένους.

σχεδὸν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ. This takes up and justifies the mention of τὰ συμβόλαια. Πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσι, 'for all States.' Supply τοὺς πολίτας or τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας or something similar with ὠνεῖσθαι and πωλεῖν. Aristotle has before him Plato, *Rep.* 371 B, ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει πῶς ἀλλήλοις μεταδώσουσιν ὧν ἂν ἕκαστοι ἐργάζωνται; ὧν δὲ ἕνεκα

καὶ κοινωρίαν ποιησάμενοι πύλιν ᾠκίσσαμεν. Δῆλον δὴ, ἡ δ' ὅς, ὅτι πωλοῦντες καὶ ὠνούμενοι. Here, as in 1. 9. 1257 a 14 sqq., Aristotle implies that buying and selling are necessary only so far as the object is the supply of the needs of buyer and seller, and not profit. For ἀναγκαία χρεια cp. 1. 3. 1253 b 15 sq.

16. ὑπογυϊότατον πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν, 'the readiest means' of securing self-completeness (Liddell and Scott).

17. δι' ἣν δοκοῦσιν εἰς μίαν πολιτείαν συνελθεῖν. Δοκοῦσιν, 'are thought,' for this is not entirely the case (3. 6. 1278 b 20 sqq. : 3. 9. 1280 a 35 sq.). *Eis μίαν πολιτείαν συνελθεῖν*, cp. Plato, Laws 680 E, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτά γε εἰς τὸ κοινόν, μείζους ποιοῦντες πόλεις, πλείους συνέρχονται, and for μίαν πολιτείαν, 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 32 sq.

18. ἑτέρα δὲ ἐπιμέλεια κ.τ.λ. Ταύτης ἐχομένη καὶ σύνεγγυς, because the agoranomi cared for εὐκοσμία in the ἀγορά and the astynomi in the ἀστυ (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 16 sq.), and the ἀγορά and the ἀστυ are closely connected with each other (cp. c. 4. 1319 a 29, τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ τὸ ἀστυ, and Plato, Laws 881 C). The functions of the astynomi are defined in a very similar way by Plato in Laws 758 E sq., 763 C sqq., and 779 B sqq. Other duties are assigned to astynomi in Laws 849 E and 913 D of which Aristotle says nothing. In States where the astynomi were charged with the preservation and repair of the city-walls, the care of the city-fountains, and the guard of the harbour, functions nearly connected with the defence of the city, these officers were of high importance. Their importance was less in the more populous States, where these duties were withdrawn from them and made over to special magistrates. This step had been taken at Athens, and probably their functions had come to be much contracted in consequence; at any rate 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 50 dwells mainly on their control of small matters like the fees of αἰλητρίδες and the doings of κοπρολόγοι. See Sandys' notes. We read in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 46 of the Boulê at Athens, ἐξετάζει δὲ καὶ τὰ οἰκοδομήματα τὰ δημόσια πάντα, so that at Athens the task of seeing that the public buildings were in a good state of repair seems to have been entrusted to the Boulê. We are not told whose province it was to keep them in repair to the satisfaction of the Boulê. The 'supervision' by the astynomi 'of public and private property in the city with a view to good order' related probably exclusively to the matériel; they prevented encroachments on the street, the opening of window-shutters outwards, the discharge of water-pipes at a high level into the street, and the like. Whether they had control of sacred

property also within the city in relation to these matters does not appear (cp. 1322 b 18 sqq.) According to Blümner, *Home Life of the Ancient Greeks*, Eng. Trans., p. 180, the streets of Greek cities were unpaved, at any rate till the days of Roman predominance, so that their maintenance and repair (nothing is said of cleansing) would not cast a heavy burden on the *astynomi*. But the expression *τῶν πιπτόντων οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ ὁδῶν σωτηρία καὶ διόρθωσις* rather suggests that they were paved. Like the *agoranomi*, the *astynomi* could hear and dispose of cases judicially (1322 a 12 sqq.) and could inflict fines and other punishments.

21. *σωτηρία καὶ διόρθωσις*. Cp. 1322 b 20 sqq. For the absence of the article see note on 1285 b 12.

καὶ τῶν ὁρίων κ.τ.λ. Should *σωτηρία καὶ διόρθωσις* be supplied, or *ἐπιμέλεια*? Probably the latter. If the boundaries of contiguous properties were not distinctly marked, disputes might arise, and still more if they were moved by either party.

22. *ἔχουσιν*, sc. *τὰ ὅρια*, for in Aristotle's writings a substantive in the neut. plur. is often followed by a verb in the plural (Bon. Ind. 490 a 44 sqq.).

For *ὅσα ἄλλα τῆς ἐπιμελείας* cp. Plato, *Soph.* 232 C, *τί δ' ὅσα φανερά γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα*;

23. *καλοῦσι δ' ἀστυνομίαν οἱ πλείστοι τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχήν*. At Heracleia in Lucania these magistrates were called *πολιανόμοι* (Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 332). At Thebes magistrates with similar functions were called *τελέαρχοι* (Plut. *Reip. Gerend. Praec.* c. 15 *init.*: Valer. Max. 3. 7. Ext. 5).

24. *ἔχει δέ κ.τ.λ.*, 'but [though one name is given to it,] it includes more parts than one.'

26. *οἷον τειχοποιούς καὶ κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητὰς καὶ λιμένων φύλακας*. We hear of *τειχοποιοί* at Athens (Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 14) and at Cyzicus (Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 333), of a *κρηνῶν ἐπιμελητής* a. Athens (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 43, where see Sandys' note), and of *λιμενοφύλακες* at Carystus (Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr. Gr. No.* 343). We read in *Aen. Poliorc.* c. 29. 12 of *τοὺς λιμενοφύλακας τε καὶ ἀποστολείας*. That the charge of the city-fountains at Athens was an important one we see from the fact that the office was elective (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 43). The water-supply of the city was of high importance, especially in the event of fires (Tac. *Ann.* 15. 43) or of a siege. Frontinus (*De Aquae Ductibus Urbis Romae*, 1. 1) says of the '*aquarum officium*' at Rome that it was '*tum ad usum tum ad salubritatem atque etiam*

ad securitatem urbis pertinens,' and that it had always been administered by the leading citizens of the Roman State.

27. ἄλλη δ' ἀναγκαία κ.τ.λ. As to the ἀγρονόμοι or ὑλωροί cp. 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 15, where it appears that these officers were charged with the guard of the country districts, and see note on 1331 b 13. Περὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ ἄστεος is added to show that everything outside the city, whether deserving the name of χώρα or not, fell under their jurisdiction. The agronomi would keep forts and other public buildings, and also roads, in repair throughout the territory of the State, and would have judicial authority so far as might be necessary for the discharge of their official duties. The title ὑλωροί would probably be especially in use where there were valuable forests of ship-timber belonging to the State. The Chalcidic peninsula was rich in ship-timber (Hicks, Greek Historical Inscriptions, p. 130 sq.), and ὑλωροί may have existed there, and possibly at Stageira, Aristotle's own city. The Lacedaemonian πεδιανόμοι perhaps answer to the agronomi (see as to them Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 26). Aristotle says nothing about demarchs, which is remarkable, as the existence of these magistrates in the Athenian State must have been well known to him.

28. περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν is followed by περὶ with the acc. See notes on 1300 a 8 and 1322 b 30.

31. ἄλλη δ' ἀρχή κ.τ.λ. Already in 19 τὰ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ δημόσια have been mentioned, and the transition is natural to a magistracy which receives the public revenues and takes charge of them till they are distributed to each department of administration. This magistracy appears to be referred to in 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 9 sq. as ἡ κυρία τῶν προσόδων. In Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 9 we read of προσόδων ἀποδεκτῆρες καὶ δαπανημάτων δοτῆρες. Under the term αἱ πρόσοδοι τῶν κοινῶν Aristotle probably means to include revenues from all public sources—taxes, fees, fines, and the like, as well as public property strictly so called—for in the recapitulation in 1322 b 32 τὰς προσόδους represents τὰς προσόδους τῶν κοινῶν here. The collection of taxes is not provided for, because, the taxes being farmed, that duty fell on the farmers of them. Aristotle implies that the apodectae not only received the revenue, but also had the custody of it, but at Athens the apodectae appear not to have had a special exchequer of their own, their duty being to divide the sums they received among the magistracies on the same day on which they

received them ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 48. l. 7 sq.: Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 237 sq.). Παρ' ὧν φυλαττόντων does not necessarily imply that the distribution of the revenues was made by the officials referred to. Παρά is not quite the same thing as ὑπό. For ὧν referring to ἀρχή cp. οὗς in 1. 2. 1252 b 14.

34. ἑτέρα δ' ἀρχή κ.τ.λ. For πρὸς ἣν ἀναγράφεσθαι δεῖ cp. Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 344. 25, ἀπογράφονται π[ρὸς] τοὺς ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ πολέμου, and Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 15, λόγον καὶ εὐθύνas ἐγγράφειν πρὸς τὸν γραμματεῖα καὶ τοὺς λογιστάς. For the absence of τὰς before ἐκ in τὰς κρίσεις ἐκ τῶν δικαστηρίων see note on 1334 b 12. These κρίσεις stand in contrast to the κρίσεις of the assembly (c. 2. 1317 b 33 sq.) and to the κρίσεις of arbitrators (2. 8. 1268 b 6 sqq.). Aristotle here passes on to other incidents of social life which call for the creation of magistracies to deal with them. Private contracts will be made and lawsuits will arise out of them (2. 5. 1263 b 20 sq.); hence there must be a magistracy to keep a register of contracts and of the decisions of dicasteries, and to preside over the first steps in lawsuits. It will be noticed that Aristotle regards as essential the keeping by a magistracy of a register of private contracts. No such registers are kept in modern States, but the way in which Aristotle refers to them would seem to imply that they were not uncommon in ancient Greece. It is not likely that all private contracts were registered. But a register of gifts in dower was kept in Myconos (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 433: Dareste Haussoullier and Reinach, Inscriptions Juridiques Grecques, série 1, p. 48 sqq.), and a register of sales of land and houses and of gifts in dower in Tenos (Inscr. Jurid. Gr., série 1, p. 64 sqq.). A register of debts was kept in Chios ([Aristot.] Oecon. 2. 1347 b 35 sqq.). At Iasus 'emtionēs venditionēs tum demum ratae fuisse videntur, cum a mnemonibus in tabulas relatae erant' (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 77, p. 137 note), and a similar rule seems to have existed at Pergamum (Cic. pro Flacc. c. 30. 74). As to the utility of registers of these various kinds see Inscr. Jurid. Gr., série 1, pp. 61, 118 sqq. In many Greek States there was no register of contracts, but the law required that an intended sale should be announced many days in advance by proclamation through a herald, or, as at Athens, in writing before a magistrate, in order that persons aware of any impediment to the sale might have an opportunity of objecting, a similar purpose to that served among ourselves by the publication of banns before a marriage. Buyers were thus protected against

bad faith on the part of vendors. Theophrastus, however, greatly prefers a register of contracts and of property to these expedients. He says (Fragm. 97), οὐ χρὴ δ' ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι αἱ προγραφαὶ καὶ αἱ προκηρύξεις καὶ ὅλως ὅσα πρὸς τὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις ἐστὶ πάντα τὰ πλείστα δι' ἑλλειψιν ἑτέρου νόμου τίθεται· παρ' οἷς γὰρ ἀναγραφὴ τῶν κτημάτων ἐστὶ καὶ τῶν συμβολαίων, ἐξ ἐκείνων ἐπὶ μαθεῖν εἰ ἐλεύθερα καὶ ἀνέπαφα καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πωλεῖ δικαίως· εὐθὺς γὰρ καὶ μετεγγράφει ἡ ἀρχὴ τὸν ἰωνημένον. In States where registers of contracts existed their use must have been compulsory on the parties, and they must have been open to public inspection. They would serve not only to record the exact nature of a contract and to prevent either of the parties receding from his bargain, but also to facilitate the detection and punishment of fraud. It would be convenient that the magistracy which kept the register of contracts should also be that which had to do with the first steps in lawsuits, for the entry of the contract would commonly form the basis of the lawsuit, and also that its head-quarters should be situated near the agora (4 (7). 12. 1331 b 6 sqq.). A register of the decisions of dicasteries was not kept in all Greek States. Gortyna at any rate appears to have had no such register at the time when the well-known Code was drawn up. 'Le jugement, comme tout le reste de la procédure, est purement oral. Aussi l'existence de la chose jugée, en cas de contestation ultérieure, ne peut-elle être établie que par le serment du juge et du mnémon' (Dareste, Inscr. Jurid. Gr., série 1, p. 435: cp. Col. 9. 31 sqq.). The magistracy here described by Aristotle appears to have been closely connected with the dicasteries (cp. 1322 b 34), and that is probably the reason why it did not apparently register anything but private contracts and the decisions of dicasteries. It does not seem, for instance, to have registered decrees of the assembly or the valuations of property of which we read in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 35 sqq. As to *ιερομνήμονες μνήμονες* and *ἐπιστάται* see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 334, and as to the functions of the *μνίμων* at Gortyna, Bücheler und Zitelmann, Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 54. In Diog. Laert. 6. 45 we read of *οἱ ἱερομνήμονες τῶν ταμίων*, we are not told of what city; these officials probably kept a list of the valuables in charge of the *tamiae*. *Συμβολοφύλακες* are mentioned in the Revenue Laws of Ptolemy Philadelphus, col. 10. 2, etc. At Athens, as we have seen, no register of contracts was kept; contracts were often deposited with money-changers or priests (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thalheim, 2. p. 108 sq.), a very different thing. Indictments were entered at the

Metroum before the Archon (Athen. Deipn. 407 c, ἦκεν ('Αλκιβιάδης) εἰς τὸ μητρώον, ὅπου τῶν δικῶν ἦσαν αἱ γραφαί, καὶ βρέξας τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκ τοῦ στόματος διήλειψε τὴν δίκην τοῦ Ἠγήμονος: Diog. Laert. 2. 40: Deinarch. c. Demosth. c. 86: Boeckh, Publ. Econ. of Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 405 note). Were the decisions of the dicasteries also registered at the Metroum? The 'Grefte' in the Channel Islands is thus described by Lord de Saumarez (*Times*, Oct. 11, 1894). 'There is a land-registry office—locally called the Grefte—in which are entered all purchases, sales, and mortgages. The entries are open to public inspection on payment of a small fee. Thus all trouble and expense as regards title-deeds are obviated. A glance at the register shows the whole history of a property—the prices paid on successive transfers, the mortgages, if any, upon it, and its exact legal *status*. Arrangements concerning a property which are not thus registered at the Grefte have no legal value.' The 'Grefte,' however, it will be seen, has only to do with dealings with land, not with τὰ ἴδια συμβόλαια generally.

36. τὰς γραφὰς τῶν δικῶν. Cp. 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 7 sq. The expression includes indictments in private actions as well as public (Meier und Schömann, *Der att. Process*, ed. Lipsius, p. 233, note).

37. τὰς εἰσαγωγάς, sc. τῶν δικῶν (Bon. Ind. 224 a 26).

καὶ ταύτην, 'this magistracy also,' as well as that of the astynomi (24 sqq.). Little, if anything, would be gained, one would think, by breaking up this magistracy. It would be convenient that the registers of contracts and of the decisions of dicasteries should be kept in the office of one and the same magistracy, and that this magistracy should also have to do with the first steps in lawsuits.

38. ἔστι δὲ μία κυρία τούτων πάντων, 'but there is one magistracy supreme over all these things, and its holders are called' etc. Cp. 1322 a 38 sq. As to τούτων πάντων see critical note on 1282 a 40.

40. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην κ.τ.λ. There is a singular resemblance in point of language between the passage before us and *Metaph. B. 4. 999 a 24*, ἔστι δ' ἐχομένη τε τούτων ἀπορία καὶ πασῶν χαλεπωτάτη καὶ ἀναγκαιοτάτη θεωρῆσαι, περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος ἐφέστηκε νῦν. The word *χαλεπωτάτη* is translated in the passage before us by Lamb. 'difficillimus' and by Jowett and Weldon 'most difficult,' but by Sepul., Vict., and Heinsius 'molestissimus' (so Stahr, 'überaus beschwerlich'), and by Ramus 'molestissimus et difficillimus.' In Susemihl's rendering, 'welche es am Schwersten von allen hat,'

I am not sure whether 'schwer' means 'onerous' or 'difficult,' and the same doubt arises in a less degree as to Schlosser's, 'einer der schwersten Dienste.' I incline myself to translate the word 'most difficult' or 'most trying' (cp. 1322 a 2). In the very similar passage quoted above from the *Metaphysics* χαλεπωτάτη evidently means 'most difficult.' We now come to a magistracy standing next to that which has just been described (for it has to do with the execution of sentences of dicasteries, as that has to do with the sentences themselves, and the sentences come first and their execution next), but which is the most necessary and the most trying of all. This magistracy executed, as the last-named registered, the sentences of dicasteries. It had also to put the law in execution against persons publicly placarded as debtors to the State, and to assume the custody of prisoners. Aristotle does not mention the title of this magistracy, as he mentions those of others—perhaps because he is in effect proposing its abolition—but at Athens the functions assigned to it were discharged partly by the *practores* and *polêtai*, partly by the eleven. Compare the functions of the 'tres viri capitales' at Rome (Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, 2. 558 sqq.). *τῶν καταδικασθέντων* is masc., like *τῶν καταδικαζομένων* in c. 5. 1320 a 8. *τῶν προτιθεμένων κατὰ τὰς ἐγγραφάς*, 'those whose names are posted up in connexion with the entries [in the lists of the *practores*].' It was the duty of the *practores* at Athens 'to enforce payment of the fines imposed by magistrates or dicasteries and to hand them over to the proper authorities, for which reason the names of those who were condemned in these penalties were reported to them and entered in their lists pending payment' (Schömann, *Gr. Alt.* 1. 432 : see also Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 240). These names were exposed on boards in the Acropolis ([Demosth.] c. Aristog. 1. 4). It would seem that the Gortyna Code left it to the winning side to levy the fines imposed by the judge : 'c'est à la partie gagnante à pratiquer sur les biens du débiteur, quand et comme elle voudra, des saisies jusqu'à concurrence des dommages-intérêts qui lui sont alloués' (Dareste, *Inscr. Jurid. Gr.*, série 1, p. 448). At Athens the execution of the sentences of dicasteries in private suits was left, except in certain cases, to the plaintiff himself : see Meier und Schömann, *Der att. Process*, ed. Lipsius, p. 962 sqq., and Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 414.

1322 a. 4. οὐθ' ὑπομείναντες ἐθέλουσι πράττειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. The

holders of this office probably often infringed the law by undue lenity: cp. Plato, Rep. 558 A. Socrates might have escaped from prison if he had been willing to allow his friends to bribe the gaolers (Plato, Crito, 44 sqq.).

5. ἀναγκαία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle perhaps remembers Plato, Crito, 50 B, ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οὐδὲν τε ἔτι ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατετράφθαι, ἐν ᾗ ἂν αἱ γινόμεναι δίκαι μὴδὲν ἰσχύωσω, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ ἰδιωτῶν ἄκυροί τε γίνωνται καὶ διαφθείρωνται ;

8. διὰ βέλτιον κ.τ.λ., 'hence it is better that this magistracy' (i. e. that which exacts the penalty) 'should not be one, but should consist of some persons from one dicastery and others from another, and that as to the posting-up of the names of persons registered as public debtors, an effort should be made to distribute the task in the same way, and further that [the whole burden should not be allowed to fall on the dicasteries, but that] the magistrates also should exact some penalties, and especially the incoming magistrates those due to the outgoing ones, and in the case of those due to magistrates actually in office, that, when one magistracy has tried the case and condemned, a different magistracy should exact the penalty.' With τὰς τῶν ἔνων, τὰς τῶν ἐνεστῶτων, τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀγοραζόμενων, and τὰς παρὰ τούτων we should probably supply πράξεις. With a view especially to the efficient exaction of penalties Aristotle seeks to distribute the odium connected with their exaction as much as possible. If the task is assigned to dicasteries, it should not be assigned to the members of one dicastery, but to some from one and some from another, and a part of the burden should be borne by magistracies, but in their case care should be taken that the magistracy which tries and condemns should not be that which exacts the penalty. At Athens the whole of the burden fell on two magistracies, the practores and the polêtae (as to whom see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., pp. 239-240, and Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 335), and the result probably was that the sentences of dicasteries were not fully carried into effect, and that there was laxity in connexion with the posting-up of the names of public debtors. In some States the authority which tried and condemned also exacted the penalty, and this arrangement is disapproved by Aristotle. Plato had, it would seem, adopted it in Laws 958 B. The Council of the Areopagus (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 8. l. 19 sqq.), and the Boulê of 500 (Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 45) at Athens had power at one time both to try cases and to exact the

penalty; the ephors had the same power in the Lacedaemonian State (Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 4). The podestà at Florence in the thirteenth century executed his own judicial decisions (Perrens, *La Civilisation Florentine*, p. 26), but then he did not belong to Florence and left it as soon as he laid down his office. We are ourselves familiar with the distinction between the judge and jury, the sheriff, and the authorities of prisons. In the phratry of the Labyadae at Delphi the penalty for infractions of its statutes was assessed by one authority and levied by another (Baunack, *Die delphischen Inschriften*, No. 2561. D 18, in Collitz, *Sammlung der gr. Dialekt-Inschriften*, αἱ δὲ τι τούτων παρβάλλοιτο τῶν γεγραμμένων, θεούτων τοῖ τε δαμοργοὶ καὶ τοὶ ἄλλοι πάντες λαβυάδαι, πρᾶσσόντων δὲ τοὶ πεντεκαίδεκα). At Corinth in the days of the oligarchy of the Bacchiadae, if we may trust Nic. Damasc. *Fragm.* 58 (Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* 3. 392), fines imposed by dicasteries were levied by the polemarch.

12. τὰς τῶν ἐνιστώτων. Bonitz (*Ind. s. v. ἐνιστάμαι*) places a query after ἐνιστώτων here, but compare the use of the word in an inscription of Iasus (*Revue des Études Grecques*, 6. 155), τὸ δὲ ψήφισμα ἀπαγράφει[ι] τοὺς νεωποίας τοὺς ἐνιστώτας ἐν τῇ[ι πα]ραστάδι, and in an inscription of Chios (Hicks, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, No. 126), τοὺς ἐξεταστὰς το[ύ]ς ἐνιστηκότ[α]ς.

15. ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν κ.τ.λ., 'for the less odium there is in the business for those who exact the penalty.'

16. τὸ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μέν here, as often elsewhere, = 'while.' Lamb. adds ποιῇ after πᾶσι, and Sus. ποιῇ αὐτούς before πολεμίους. I am not *certain* that any word or words have fallen out of the text, for Aristotle may intend us to carry on ἔχει, which is of course unsuitable (see notes on 1257 a 21, 1287 b 26, and 1297 a 40: see also note on 1294 b 27), or at any rate to obtain the notion of ποιῇ from it, but perhaps it is more likely that ποιῇ or some similar word has dropped out. In Hippocr. *De Morb. Vulgar.* 6. vol. iii. p. 629 Kühn, ἀγαθοῖσι δὲ λητροῖσιν αἱ ὁμοίτητες πλάνος καὶ ἀπορίας, the omission of παρέχουσι is explained by the fact that the sixth Book of the *De Morbis Vulgaribus* consists of rough notes written in a very concise and elliptical style.

17. τοὺς καταδικάσαντας καὶ πραττομένους. Observe the difference of tense. The condemnation precedes, the exaction of the penalty follows.

19. πολλαχοῦ δὲ κ.τ.λ. We hear of a φυλάκτης at Cyme (Plut. *Quaest. Gr. c.* 2). For διαρεῖν followed by πρὸς cp. Plato, *Polit.* 265 A.

20. οἷον Ἀθήνησιν (ἡ) τῶν ἑνδεκα καλουμένων, sc. διήρηται πρὸς τὴν πραττομένην. Susemihl brackets these words and may well be right in doing so (see critical note). They are very possibly a gloss which has crept from the margin into the text, and in addition to that a further difficulty arises in connexion with them (see Sus.², Note 1469). The eleven at Athens were not only charged with the custody of prisoners, but also with the execution of capital sentences, and indeed appear to have been sometimes employed to get in State-debts (Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 257). Thus they combined to a certain extent the functions of ἡ φυλάττουσα ἀρχή with those of ἡ πραττομένη, and can hardly be with strict accuracy adduced as an instance of the severance of the two sets of functions. No doubt in most cases at Athens the money-fines were levied by the practores, and it is possible (see C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Ant.*, ed. Thumser, i. 569. 4) that all that is intended in the passage before us is to point out that the practores were a distinct magistracy from the eleven. Still the instance adduced of a severance between the authority charged with the custody of prisoners and the authority charged with the exaction of penalties is not quite satisfactory.

21. καὶ ταύτην χωρίζειν, 'to part off this magistracy also,' as well as ἡ πραττομένη.

τὸ σόφισμα is translated by Welldon, perhaps rightly, 'the same artifice as before.'

22. συμβαίνει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Men of worth appear to have shunned the office which was charged with the custody of prisoners even more than that which had to do with the levying of penalties. That men of worth were inclined to avoid office of all kinds at Athens we see from Demosth. Prooem. 55. p. 1460 sq.: cp. Plato, *Rep.* 549 C and Ἀθ. Πολ. c. 27. l. 23 sq. To give bad men the charge of the gaols was not safe, both for other reasons and because aspirants to tyranny (e.g. Aristodemus at Cumae, Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 7. 7) had occasionally set prisoners free and enlisted them in their cause. Vict. compares Cic. in Q. Caecil. *Divin.* c. 16. 51, custodem, inquit, Tullio me apponite. Quid? mihi quam multis custodibus opus erit, si te semel ad meas capsas admisero?

23. πρὸς αὐτοῖς, 'to attend to prisoners.'

27. ἀλλὰ τῶν τε νέων κ.τ.λ., 'but successive sections of the young, where an organization of youthful police or guards exists,

and of the magistrates should take charge of the matter.' It is implied that *φρουροί* were young as well as *ἔφηβοι*, and this was probably usually the case in ancient Greece: cp. Chionides, *Ἡρώες*, Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 5), where a father says to his son,

πολλοὺς ἐγγὺς καὶ κατὰ σὲ νεανίας

φρουροῦντας ἀτεχνῶς κὰν σάμακι κοιμωμένους.

The Lacedaemonian *κρυπτεία* was composed of young men (Aristot. Fragm. 495. 1558 b 19 sqq.). Cp. also Xen. *Cyrop.* 1. 2. 12.

29. ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς ἀρχὰς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle sometimes places a thing first, as here, because it is most necessary (e. g. in 4 (7). 11. 1330 a 38), sometimes, as in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 8 sqq., because it is best. See note on 1330 a 38.

31. ἐν σχήματι δὲ μάλιστα τεταγμένως, 'but ordered in a more imposing guise.' For *σχήματι* cp. Plato, *Laws* 685 C, *ἦν γὰρ ἔτι τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐκείνης σχῆμα τὸ σωζόμενον οὐ σμικρόν*, and Demosth. c. Aristocr. c. 210, *εἰ ἄρα αἰσθουτο ὅτι νῦν ἡ πόλις εἰς ὑπηρετοῦ σχῆμα καὶ τάξιν προελήλυθε*. Compare also Plut. *An seni sit gerenda respublica*, c. 20, *οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχαῖς τὸν τηλικούτον ὥρα φέρεσθαι, πλήν ὅσαι γε μέγεθος τι κέκτηνται καὶ ἀξίωμα*. As to the greatness of the position held by the *stratēgi* at Athens see Alexis, *Ἀπεγλαυκωμένος*, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 391), and Gilbert, *Beiträge zur innern Geschichte Athens*, p. 2 sq., where Lys. Or. 26. c. Evand. c. 20 is referred to among other passages.

32. καὶ γὰρ ἐμπειρίας καὶ πίστεως δεόνται πολλῆς, 'for they require [for their due administration] much experience and trustworthiness.' Vict. 'egere autem affirmat hos (magistratus) usu et fide multa, nec posse recte sustineri haec munera, nisi ab hominibus peritis et probis.' I follow Vict. and the earlier interpreters, and also Welldon, in translating *πίστεως* 'trustworthiness,' but Stahr and Sus. translate it 'Vertrauen' ('trust,' 'confidence'), and Bonitz also apparently (see Ind. s. v.).

33. τοιαῦται δ' εἶεν ἂν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 b 10 sqq., where the high dignity of *ἡ κυρία τῆς φυλακῆς ἀρχή* (i. e. *στρατηγία*) is dwelt upon. The *stratēgi* are charged with the *φυλακὴ τῆς πόλεως* in Plato, *Laws* 760 A also. In Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr. Gr.* No. 240. 29, the magistrates at Miletus entitled *οἱ ἡρημένοι ἐπὶ τῇ φυλακῇ* are probably *stratēgi*. That the charge of the gates—a very important and anxious charge (Aen. Poliorc. cc. 18–20)—fell to the *stratēgus* or *polemarch* we see from Polyb. 4. 18, where

we read of Cynaetha in Arcadia, *πολέμαρχοι τῶν κατεληλυθότων τινέσιν ἐγγόνοισαν ταύτην δὲ συμβαίνει τὴν ἀρχὴν κλείειν τὰς πύλας καὶ τὸν μεταξὺ χρόνον κυριεύειν τῶν κλειδῶν, ποιέισθαι δὲ καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν τὴν διαίταν ἐπὶ τῶν πυλῶνων*, and from Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 25, 29. The *φυλακὴ τῆς χώρας* was an important part of the duties of the *stratēgi* at Athens (see Sandys on 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 61), but of this Aristotle says nothing. He distinguishes the 'watch and ward of the city' from 'matters connected with war', because the city needs to be guarded against domestic as well as external foes.

34. *δεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ.* 'Ομοίως goes with *καὶ ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ*. This remark is added to correct a mistaken view which might be entertained by some that offices of this kind need not exist except in time of war (Vict.). In time of war the *stratēgi* and *polemarchs* would have other duties to discharge in addition.

36. For *ἐξετάσεως καὶ συντάξεως τῶν πολιτῶν*, 'inspection of the citizens and drawing them up in order of battle', cp. Xen. Cyrop. 2. 4. 1, *ἐξέτασιν δὲ ποτε πάντων τοῦ Κύρου ποιουμένου ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ σύνταξιν κ.τ.λ.*

37. *ἔνθα μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ.* Aristotle does not describe in detail the way in which the various functions of the *stratēgi* and *polemarchs* were distributed, when distributed they were, but the charge of the walls and gates of the city may well have been occasionally severed from the duties of inspecting and marshalling the army and of commanding it on expeditions beyond the frontier.

39. *καλοῦσι δὲ στρατηγούς καὶ πολεμάρχους τοὺς τοιούτους*. 'Of these two titles *πολέμαρχος* was the older, it would seem, and the less frequent, *στρατηγός* the commoner' (Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 329). The two offices existed together in Athens Eretria and Paros (Gilbert, 2. 329. 2), and also probably at Leucas (Oberhammer, Akarnanien, p. 272 sqq.). For other duties discharged by *stratēgi* and *polemarchs* besides those mentioned in the passage before us by Aristotle, see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 330. 1. As to the functions of the *stratēgi* at Athens, see Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens, Eng. Trans., p. 233 sqq.

1. *ἔτι δὲ κἀν ὄσιν κ.τ.λ.* It would seem from Aristotle's language 1322 b. here that cavalry, light-armed troops, and archers were not kept on foot in every Greek State. Light-armed troops (javelin-throwers, slingers, and the like) are here distinguished from archers, as in Plato, Laws 756 A.

2. *ἐπὶ τούτων ἐκάστων*, 'in charge of each of these': compare
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such phrases as *ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁπλῶν στρατηγός*, and see Kühner, *Ausführl. gr. Gramm.*, ed. 2, § 438. I. 3. h (ed. Gerth, § 438. I. 3. f). For *τούτων ἐκάστων* cp. Plato, *Laws* 682 D, τὰ τῶν πολιορκούντων ἐκάστων, and 943 B, ἐκάστων τούτων. Coray remarks, 'εἰς τὸ ἐκάστω ἔτραψεν ὁ Συνείδερος τὴν λέξιν (μηδὲν δέον, οἶμαι)'. No mention is here made of persons employed in supervising engineering work or in the command of a siege-train. There would not be many such persons in Greek citizen-armies.

8. *ναυαρχίαι*. Athenian admirals were called *στρατηγοί*, not *ναύαρχοι*, but the Lacedaemonian *ναυαρχία* is well known (2. 9. 1271 a 37 sqq.), and *παύαρχοι* existed in Achaia (Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 178*), at Rhodes (Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 179), Abydos (Gilbert, 2. 159), and elsewhere.

ταξιαρχίαι. This term appears to be used here of commands over light-armed troops or archers: cp. Xen. *Anab.* 4. 1. 28, and see C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Ant.*, ed. Droysen, 2. 2. 81. 2. The taxiarchs of this kind of force appear to have had *λοχαγοί* under them (1322 b 4).

5. τὸ δὲ πᾶν κ.τ.λ., i.e. τὸ δὲ πᾶν τούτων εἶδος ἐστὶν ἐν τι εἶδος, εἶδος ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν. For the exegetic genitive *ἐπιμελείας* see note on 1289 b 35 and Riddell, *Apology of Plato*, p. 124 (*Digest of Platonic Idioms*, § 24).

7. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔναι τῶν ἀρχῶν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 248*. 170, πλείστα χειρίσας τῶν κοινῶν, and Aeschin. c. Ctes. c. 27, τὰ δημόσια χρήματα διεχειρίζε. Apodectae, tamiae, polêtae, practores, and stratêgi would be among the magistracies referred to. Aristotle evidently holds that an audit was especially necessary in the case of magistracies which had the control of large amounts of public money or public property, and at Rome the only magistrates subject to an audit were those who had to do with the disbursement of public money from the treasury of the State (Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, 1. 88 sq.), but at Athens all magistracies were subject to audit, and not only magistracies, but also posts like those of priests and ambassadors (C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Ant.*, ed. Thumser, 1. p. 651). Aristotle often speaks of the right of audit as resting with the deliberative authority (3. 11. 1281 b 32 sqq.: 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 6), and not with any magistracy, but here he takes it for granted that a magistracy will be necessary to exercise it. In τὴν ληψομένην λογισμὸν καὶ προσευθυνοῦσαν the distinction between *λόγος* and *εὐθυνα* appears, as to which see

Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Aristoteles und Athen*, 2. 231 sqq., and Stallbaum on Plato, *Laws* 945 B. 'The *εὐθυνα* has primarily nothing to do with the money, but concerns itself rather with the exercise of the powers of the magistracy', remarks Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (*ibid.* 2. 234), who quotes *Lys. Or.* 24. 26, *ὅτε χρήματα διαχειρίσας τῆς πόλεως δίδωμι λόγον αὐτῶν, ὅτε ἀρχὴν ἄρξας οὐδεμίαν εὐθύνας ὑπέχω νῦν αὐτῆς*. Notwithstanding αὐτὴν μηδὲν διαχειρίζουσιν ἕτερον, it does not seem that in Greek States the magistracy which exacted an account was always, or perhaps commonly, confined to this function; it was often charged not only with the direction of the finances, but also with particular financial operations (*Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 336).

10. καλοῦσι δὲ τοὺτους κ.τ.λ. For the distribution of these titles in Greece see *Gilbert, ibid.* At Athens both *logistae* and *euthyni* existed, but it appears from *Ἀθ. Πολ.* cc. 48 and 54 that the main part of the work of reviewing the conduct of magistrates at the expiration of their term of office must have fallen on the *logistae*, for the powers of the *euthyni* were called into action only when some citizen was dissatisfied with the result of the trial of an outgoing magistrate before a *dicastery* presided over by the *logistae*; thus they were merely supplementary officials designed to correct any errors in the process before the *logistae*. See *Gilbert, Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 226 sqq. *Synegori* also existed at Athens, as to whom see *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 54, and *Gilbert, ibid.*

12. παρὰ πάσας δὲ ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς κ.τ.λ., 'and besides all these magistracies there is that which is in the highest degree supreme over all State-affairs; [I speak of it thus,] for the same magistracy often has in its hands the final completion and the introduction of a measure, [and so is itself supreme,] or at any rate presides over the many where the *demos* is supreme, for there must be an authority to convene the supreme element in the constitution'. When a magistracy has in its hands both the inception and the completion of measures, its powers are great: cp. *Plut. De Pyth. Orac.* c. 16 *μεθ' ἧν, Σκυθινῷ λέγοντι περὶ τῆς λύρας, ἦν ἀρμόζεται Ζητὸς εὐειδὴς Ἀπόλλων, πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος συλλαβών*, and *Polyb.* 6. 1. 9 sq. *Hultsch*. It was the prerogative of kings τὸ τέλος ἐπιτείνειν (*Plato, Laws* 761 E, *πλὴν τῶν τὸ τέλος ἐπιτείνων, οἷον βασιλέων*: *Eustath. on Hom. Il.* 1. 25, *ἦν γὰρ τοῦ δήμου παντὸς εἰπεῖν, βασιλείας δὲ τὴν ὑστάτην κατ' Εὐρυπιδὴν ἀφεῖναι ὅπα καὶ κυρῶσαι τὸ δοκοῦν*):

cp. *Περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως* 3. 469 a 4, ἡ δὲ καρδία κυριωτάτη καὶ τὸ τέλος ἐπιτίθσιν. Compare the powers of the consuls at Rome (Polyb. 6. 12. 4, καὶ μὴν ὅσα δεῖ διὰ τοῦ δήμου συντελεῖσθαι τῶν πρὸς τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις ἀνηκόντων, τοῖτοις καθήκει φροντίζειν καὶ συνάγειν τὰς ἐκκλησίας, τοῖτοις εἰσφέρειν τὰ δόγματα, τοῖτοις βραβεύειν τὰ δοκοῦντα τοῖς πλείοσιν). For προκάθεται τοῦ πλήθους cp. Plato, *Laws* 758 D, διὰ ξυλλόγων τε αἰεὶ δεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ προκαθήμενον τῆς πόλεως κύριον καὶ διαλύσεων τῶν τε κατὰ νόμους τῶν τε ἐξαίφνης προσπιπτουσῶν τῇ πόλει. At Athens the Boulê possessed large powers in matters of finance and administration, but of this Aristotle says nothing here.

16. ὅπου δὲ πλῆθος ἐστί, 'where the many rule': cp. τοῦ πλήθους, 14. Sus.³ (Ind. s.v.) explains πλῆθος as = δημοκρατία here and in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 16, but in the absence of parallel passages this seems doubtful.

17. αἱ μὲν οὖν πολιτικαὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν κ.τ.λ. For the distinction here drawn between πολιτικαὶ ἀρχαί and priesthoods cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 18 sq. and 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 4 sq. Aristotle seems here, however, to imply that priesthoods are ἀρχαί, though not πολιτικαὶ ἀρχαί. We note that he distinguishes the offices of archon, king, and prytanis, as well as priesthoods, from πολιτικαὶ ἀρχαί.

18. ἄλλο δ' εἶδος ἐπιμελείας κ.τ.λ. It would seem that in small States, and probably also in the smaller temples of large States, the priests not only discharged their special function of offering sacrifices and superintending the temple-worship, but also kept the sacred buildings and other sacred objects in repair and managed the sacred property. Plato in the *Laws* (759 E) creates special ταμίαι τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων καὶ τεμενῶν καὶ καρπῶν καὶ μισθώσεων, and arranges that they shall be elected in a particularly careful way, while he treats the appointment of priests differently, allowing a considerable place to the lot. In the case of a priest he makes ceremonial purity the main requirement, whereas in that of a treasurer of sacred property much would be desirable over and above this (cp. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 6 sqq.). It sometimes happened, indeed, in ancient Greece that the priest was a youth or a very old man, and where this was so, there would be an additional reason for making careful provision for the wise administration of the temple-property. Aristotle says nothing about ἐξηγηταί, though Plato in *Laws* 759 C sqq. provides for the appointment of sacred officials thus entitled, nor about μάντις, though Thyrraeum and Ambracia kept a μάντις (Oberhammer, *Akarnanien*, p. 230).

19. τῶν περὶ τὰ ἱερά. Vict. 'rerum quae pertinent ad aedes sacras': Sepulv. 'earum rerum quae ad sacra pertinent': Lamb. 'quae ad res sacras pertinent': Welldon, 'the ordinances of religion'. Sus. translates simply 'die Heiligthümer'. I incline to follow Vict.

21. τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τέτακται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, 'of all other things which are set apart for the service of the gods', is dependent on ἐπιμεληταί, like τῶν περὶ τὰ ἱερά. Sacred property, both animate (slaves, herds, and flocks) and inanimate, not falling under the head of τὰ περὶ τὰ ἱερά, and sacred revenues are probably especially referred to. For ὅσα τέτακται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, cp. 2. 10. 1272 a 17 sqq. and 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 34, ὅσαι (ἀρχαί) τάττονται πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς χρείας.

24. ἱεροποιούς.' At the temple of Apollo in Delos (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 367. 1 sqq.: Gardner and Jevons, Manual of Greek Antiquities, ed. 1, p. 189 sqq.), and also in Myconus (Dittenberger, No. 373. 17 sqq.), the ἱεροποιοί had the control of the sacred property. The same was the case with the ἱεροποιοί of the temple at Eleusis (Dittenberger, No. 13. 9 sqq.). It is to ἱεροποιοί attached to temples, not to State-officers like those whose functions are described in 'Αθ. Πολ. c. 54, that Aristotle here refers. See Dittenberger, No. 334, note 13, as to the different kinds of ἱεροποιοί at Athens.

25. ναοφύλακας. We read of ναοφύλακες in Eurip. Iph. Taur. 1175 Bothe (1284 Dindorf), and ἱεροφύλακες existed in Rhodes and Segesta (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 2. § 11. 7).

ταμίας τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων. These existed at Athens ('Αθ. Πολ. c. 30: see Sandys' note) and at the temple of Apollo Didymaeus at Branchidae (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 170. 1). We find ταμίαι τῶν ἱερῶν at Chersonesus Taurica (Dittenberger, No. 252. 53), and ἱεροταμίαι at Stiris (Dittenberger, No. 294. 20 sqq.) and Ialysus (No. 357).

26. ἐχομένη δὲ ταύτης κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 14. 1285 b 10, τῶν θυσίων, ὅσαι μὴ ἱερατικαί. Aristotle's language appears to imply that some public sacrifices were celebrated by priests, while others were 'celebrated from the common hearth' by archons, kings, and prytaneis. According to Plato, Polit. 290 E the sacrifices offered by ὁ λαὸν βασιλεύς at Athens were τὰ σεμνότεστα καὶ μάλιστα πάτρια τῶν ἀρχαίων θυσίων. The 'common hearth' of a State was in the prytaneum (Dittenberger, Syll. Inscr. Gr. No. 347. 6, ἐν τῷ πρυτανείῳ ἐπὶ τῆς

κοινῆς ἐστίας τοῦ δήμου : Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2. 65). For the connexion of kings and prytaneis with the 'common hearth' cp. Aesch. Suppl. 370 sqq. and Cauer, *Delectus Inscr. Gr.* No. 431. 45-49, and as to ἀρχοντες Plut. Sympos. 6. 8. 1, *θυσία τις ἐστὶ πατριος, ἣν ὁ μὲν ἀρχων ἐπὶ τῆς κοινῆς ἐστίας δρᾷ, τῶν δ' ἄλλων ἕκαστος ἐπ' οἴκου*, and Dittenberger, No. 240. 26 and No. 389. 31 sqq. In Plut. De Gen. Socr. c. 30 the ἀρχων is a sacred functionary. See also Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 323-6.

27. After ἀλλά supply ὅσαι. Cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 a 36 sq. and Isocr. Nicocl. § 43, *καλλιστον οὖν ὑπέλαβον, εἴ τις δύνατο ταύταις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς προέχειν τῶν ἄλλων, ὅν οὐδὲν μέρος τοῖς ποτηροῖς μέτεστιν, ἀλλὰ γησιώταται καὶ βεβαϊόταται καὶ μεγίστων ἐπαίων ἀξίαι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι*.

29. αἱ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. In the enumeration of magistracies contained in 1321 b 12-1322 b 29 Aristotle begins with the minor ones and ends with the most important, but in this recapitulation he arranges magistracies in a different way. He groups them thus—those connected with the gods, war, and finance; those whose functions are local; and those which are connected with the dicasteries and the deliberative. Matters connected with the gods are grouped with matters connected with war, just as they are in 3. 14. 1285 a 5 sqq. and 1285 b 9 sq.

30. περὶ τούτων is followed in 31 sqq. by περὶ with the acc.: see notes on 1300 a 8 and 1321 b 28.

31. τὰ δαιμόνια is probably a somewhat more comprehensive term than τὰ θεῖα: cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 5. 1122 b 19, *οἷον τὰ περὶ θεοὺς ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσα περὶ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόσιον*.

37. For the suppression of περὶ before τῶν κοινῶν cp. 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 22, and see note on 1292 a 32 and Meisterhans, *Gramm. d. att. Inschr.*, ed. 2, p. 168. In 6 (4). 14. 1297 b 41 we have τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν κοινῶν.

Ἰθαίαι δὲ κ.τ.λ. As to the magistracies here mentioned see Gilbert, *Gr. Staatsalt.* 2. 337 sq. As to the νομοφύλακες cp. Xen. Oecon. 9. 14, *ἐδίδασκον δὲ αὐτὴν ὅτι καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν οὐκ ἀρκεῖν δοκεῖ τοῖς πολίταις, ἣν νόμους καλοὺς γράψωνται, ἀλλὰ καὶ νομοφύλακας προσαιρούνται, οἵτινες ἐπισκοποῦντες τὸν μὲν ποιῶντα τὰ νόμιμα ἐπαινοῦσιν, ἣν δὲ τις παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ποιῇ, ζημιοῦσι*. The way in which the νομοφύλακες are here mentioned suggests that their function was to compel adult male citizens to observe εὐκοσμία, as the γυναικονόμοι and παιδονόμοι compelled women and boys to do so. Cp. 1323 a

6 sqq. We find *γυναικονόμοι* not only in wealthy communities like those of Samos and Syracuse, but also, which we hardly expect after what Aristotle says here, at Gambreium, not probably a very wealthy one (Gilbert, *ibid.*: Dittenberger, *Syll. Inscr. Gr.* No. 470). The same thing may be said of *παιδονόμοι* and *γυμνασιάρχοι*, but these magistracies may well have become more common after Aristotle's time. As to the *γυμνασιαρχία* see C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Ant.*, ed. Blümner, 4. 337 sq. The Athenian citizen who defrayed the expenses of a torch-race is often said *γυμνασιαρχεῖν* (*Lys. Or.* 21. c. 3: Gilbert, *Const. Antiq. of Sparta and Athens*, Eng. Trans., p. 360 sq.), but in the passage before us the reference is not to a *χορηγός*, but to a magistrate, the magistrate who kept order in the gymnasia: cp. [Plato,] *Axiochus*, 367 A, *γυμνασιαρχία καὶ βάβδοι*, and *Eryxias*, 399 A, and *Plut. Amat.* c. 10, *ἀρχουσι γὰρ (οἱ γυμνασιάρχοι) ἰσχυρῶς τῶν ἐφήβων καὶ προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν σφόδρα τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτῶν πραττομένοις*. We see from *Valer. Max.* 9. 10. Ext. 2 that the office existed at Pherae in the time of Jason.

1. *πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις κ.τ.λ.* It would seem that a special magistracy 1823 a. for the management of the matters here referred to would commonly be found only in prosperous and leisured States which cared for *εὐκοσμία*. For *ἀγῶνας Διονυσιακούς* cp. *Rhet.* 3. 15. 1416 a 32. At Athens the *athlothetae* managed the musical and gymnastic competitions, and also the horse-races, at the Panathenaea (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 60), while the eponymous archon managed the competitions of the greater Dionysia (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 56. l. 27 sq.) and the archon *basileus* those of the Lenaea (*Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 57. l. 4 sqq.).

3. *θεωρίας*. See note on 1342 a 21, *ἀγῶνας καὶ θεωρίας*. There were *θεωρίαι* which were not *ἀγῶνες*, for instance non-competitive dramatic or musical performances.

τούτων δ' ἔνιαί κ.τ.λ. Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 30—1300 a 8, where much the same thing has already been said, though no notice is here taken of the fact. We can understand why *gynaeconomi* should object to the employment of women as *ἀκόλουθοι* (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 4 sqq.), but the passage before us implies that *paedonomi* also would object to the employment of children for the same purpose. Was it one of the functions of the *paedonomi* to keep boys and girls out of the public streets?

5. *τοῖς γὰρ ἀπύροις κ.τ.λ.* We are often told that a Greek democracy was virtually an aristocracy, inasmuch as most, if not all, of the citizens would be the owners of one or more slaves, but

the passage before us shows the baselessness of this view, for it implies that *ἄποροι* will have no slaves, and there can be little doubt that in almost all democracies a majority of the citizens were *ἄποροι*. The same thing is implied of *οἱ πένητες* in 1. 2. 1252 b 12. The fact is no more than one would expect. The maintenance of a slave, to say nothing of the purchase of one, would be too heavy a burden for a poor man's purse. I find a statement quoted from Mr. Booth's *Life and Labour of the People in London*, that out of the 4,200,000 inhabitants of London no fewer than 3,700,000 have no servants at all (*Times*, June 6, 1895). As to the use of slaves as *ἀκόλουθοι* ('pedisequi') see Büchsen-schütz, *Besitz und Erwerb*, p. 187 sqq. When a Greek citizen went to the market, he needed some one to carry home the provisions or other articles he purchased (Theophr. *Charact.* c. 22). Hence an *ἀκόλουθος* was the most necessary kind of slave (Aristoph. *Eccl.* 593,

μηδ' ἀνδράποδοις τὸν μὲν χρῆσθαι πολλοῖς, τὸν δ' οὐδ' ἀκολουθῶν : Lys. Or. 32. c. 16 : Büchsen-schütz, *ibid.*). That poor relatives were sometimes employed as *ἀκόλουθοι* we see from Isaeus, Or. 5. c. 11, and Dio Chrys. Or. 15. p. 451 R, οὕτω μὲν, ἔφη, καὶ τοὺς υἱοὺς ἀποφαίνεις δούλους τῶν πατέρων, καὶ γὰρ ἀκολουθοῦσι πολλοῖς τῶν πενήτων καὶ εἰς γυμνάσιον βαδίζουσι καὶ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον, passages quoted by C. F. Hermann, *Gr. Ant.*, ed. Blümner, 4. p. 86, note 1. See Liddell and Scott s. v. *αὐτολήκυθος*.

β. τριῶν δ' οὐσῶν ἀρχῶν κ.τ.λ. Καθ' ἃς probably means 'in accordance with whose directions': cp. *Ἀθ. Πολ.* c. 44, ποιῶσι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαιρεσίας στρατηγῶν καὶ ἑπάρχων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἀρχῶν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, καθ' ὃ τι ἂν τῷ δήμῳ δοκῇ· ποιῶσι δ' οἱ μετὰ τὴν ἔκτην πρυτανεύοντες ἐφ' ᾧ ἂν εὐσημία γένηται. δεῖ δὲ προβούλευμα γενέσθαι καὶ περὶ τούτων. If a *προβούλευμα* of the *Boulê* was a necessary preliminary to these elections at Athens, similar elections may well have been to a still greater extent under the control of the pre-considering authority elsewhere. As to *nomophylakes* see notes on 1298 b 27 and 1322 b 37. For the reversal in the order of the words in 8 sq. see note on 1277 a 31.

θ. μὲν οὖν implies that this Book is not complete (vol. ii. p. xxvi). For *ὡς ἐν τύπῳ* cp. (with Bon. Ind. s.v. *τύπος*) *Eth. Nic.* 5. 1. 1129 a 11 and *Hist. An.* 1. 6. 491 a 7 sqq. For *περὶ πασῶν* see note on 1301 a 19.

APPENDIX A.

(See explanatory note on 1307 b 26.)

THE counsels given in the eighth and ninth chapters of the Seventh (old Fifth) Book are as a rule deduced from the investigations in the preceding part of the Book as to the causes of the overthrow of constitutions. This will be evident from the following table:—

- 1307 b 30-40. Based on the experience of Thurii (1307 b 6-19) and Ambracia (1303 a 23-25).
- 1307 b 40-1308 a 3. This does not seem to be based on anything said previously in the Seventh (old Fifth) Book. Aristotle probably has in his mind what has been said in 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 7-13. 1297 b 1, where the subject is fully dealt with, though advice respecting it is given in that passage not only to aristocracies, but also to democracies.
- 1308 a 3-24. Based on 1302 b 6-14, 1305 b 2-22, 36-39, 1306 a 12-19, 31-b 5, 1306 b 31-36.
- 1308 a 24-30. Possibly based on the warning against neglectfulness in 1303 a 16-25.
- 1308 a 31-35. Based on 1303 b 19-1304 a 17 and on 1305 b 22-39.
- 1308 a 35-b 10. Based on 1306 b 6-16.
- 1308 b 10-19. Based on 1302 b 15-21 and 1307 a 2-5.
- 1308 b 20-24. Based on 1305 b 39-1306 a 9.
- 1308 b 24-31. Based on 1302 b 33-1303 a 13, 1304 a 17-38, 1306 b 36-1307 a 2.
- 1308 b 31-1309 a 14. Based on 1302 b 5-10.
- 1309 a 14-20. Based on 1304 b 20-1305 a 7.
- 1309 a 20-32. Based on 1305 a 38-b 1.
- 1309 a 33-b 14. Based on the experience of Oreus (1303 a 16-20) and also on 1302 b 5-10.
- 1309 b 14-18. Based on the warning against incurring contempt given in 1302 b 25-33 and on the fact of the

frequent overthrow of narrow oligarchies (1305 b 2-22, 36-39, 1306 a 12-19) and the frequent peril of narrow aristocracies (1306 b 22-1307 a 5).

1309 b 18-1310 a 2. Based perhaps on 1305 a 28-34 and on the reference to the errors of Charicles and Phrynichus in 1305 b 24-27, but probably suggested by Plato, Laws 701 E.

1310 a 2-12. Based on 1304 b 20-1305 a 7 and on 1305 a 38 sqq.

1310 a 12-36. Based perhaps on 1302 b 25-33 and on the experience of Thurii (1307 a 32 sq.), but probably rather suggested by Plato, Rep. 552 E (cp. 554 B, ἀπαιδευσίαν) and Laws 793.

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS TO VOL. IV.

P. 101, line 1, *add* καὶ before κατ'.

P. 109, line 19, *add* Sus. *after* Bekk.

P. 110, five lines from foot of page, *after* Π³ *add* except Ald.

P. 120, twenty lines from foot of page, *after* Γ *add* Sus.

P. 138, line 6, *after* 684 B sq. *add* and Rep. 426 B sq.

P. 140, line 3, *for* "Ην *read* "Ην.

P. 140, ten lines from foot of page, *after* ἐπηρώρωσε *add* 4. ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μεταμνησθάναι τοῦ μνησθάναι ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Cp. Dio Chrys. Or. 11. 307 R, χαλεποῦ δέ, ὡς ἔφη, ὅντος τοῦ διδάσκειν, τῷ παντὶ χαλεπώτερον τὸ μεταδιδάσκειν.

P. 164, fifteen lines from foot of page, *dele* As to εἰ δὴ see note on 1331 a 10, and.

P. 189, note on 1293 a 3, and p. 222, note on 1296 b 18. Τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχὴν in 1296 b 18 sq. probably means 'superiority in number', not, as I have taken it in my note to mean, 'the numerical superiority of the many'. The meaning of διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλήθους in 1293 a 4 is, however, more doubtful. It may mean either (1) 'by reason of the excess (or magnitude) of the numbers', presumably of the citizens (cp. Sepulv. 'propter maximam multitudinem', and Lamb. 'propter ingentem multitudinem'); it is thus that I understand Bonitz (Ind. 793 a 35) to take it; or (2) 'in consequence of the predominant influence of the masses' (Sus., Welldon); or (3) 'on account of the numerical superiority of the many' (Vict.). The first rendering has the merit of giving τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλήθους much the same sense in 1293 a 4 and 1296 b 18 sq., but it is not clear how an excess in the number of the citizens leads to τὸ πάντας μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας. If we have to choose between the two other renderings, I incline to prefer the third, which is that adopted in my note on 1293 a 3, for it seems likely from 3. 15. 1286 b 18 sqq. and 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 24 sqq. that the numerical superiority of the many is referred to, not their superiority in influence.

P. 190, line 1, note of interrogation *in place of* comma *after* διέλθωμεν.

P. 199, line 5, *after* laws *add* He will not allow that εὐνομία exists where the laws are good, but are not obeyed.

P. 200, seven lines from foot of page, *dele* of.

P. 215, line 10, and p. 270, line 17, *after* 1253 b 3 *add* and iii. Additions and Corrections, p. 595 (on iii. 131).

P. 223, line 3, *after* 1286 a 36) *add* As to τὴν τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχὴν see above on p. 189.

P. 223, line 10, *for* τοῦτο τὸ μέρος *read* τοὺς ἀγενεῖς ἢ τοὺς ἀπόρους.

P. 223, line 11, *after* 25. *add* Τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλήθος probably means here, as in 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 9 and 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 29, 'the body' (or 'class') 'of the poor', not 'the number of the poor' ('die Zahl der Armen'), as Sus. takes it to do: cp. 1296 b 31, τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ γυναικῶν (πλήθος), and 34, τοῦ δλιγαρχικοῦ πλήθους.

P. 227, lines 9-15. This reference to the late South African Republic should be in the past tense.

P. 245, five lines from foot of page, *after* spirit *add* *Alperot re δσι*, sc. *οι κύριοι τοῦ βουλευέσθαι* (cp. 1298 b 3).

P. 256, line 11, *after* lot *add* For the inference compare explanatory note on 1254 a 28.

P. 256, line 15, *for* χορηγοὶ *read* χορηγοί.

P. 285, line 11, *after* κ.τ.λ. *add* This is added to show how it is that men of high birth are led to claim more than an equal share. They base their claim not on their own virtue or wealth, like those previously mentioned, but on the virtue and wealth of their ancestors.

P. 302, line 2, *after* 470 R *add* Prof. Bywater suggests that in the above quotation from De Gen. An. 4. 3. 768 b 27 sqq. the bracketed words τοῦ ζῆναι are 'a dittographia of τοῦ προσώπου', the *προς* being represented by 'the well-known compendium which is so easily mistaken for ζ or ξ, as Bast tells us (Comm. Pal. p. 727)'.

P. 310, twenty lines from foot of page, *after* εἶναι *add* and Eth. Nic. 7. 1. 1145 a 25 sq., Demosth. Prooem. 42. p. 1450, and Polyb. 6. 47. 8.

P. 312, nine lines from foot of page, *for* claim *read* claimed.

P. 323, five lines from foot of page, *after* uncertain *add* See as to recent excavations on this site *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 21 (1901). 347.

P. 344, nineteen lines from foot of page, *after* 32. *add* For ὡς κύριον εἶναι see explanatory note on 1. 8. 1256 b 11.

P. 459, sixteen lines from foot of page, *after* 18 *add* and Hdt. 3. 134.

P. 540, line 3, *for* 7 (5). 2 *read* 7 (5). 3.

P. 546, line 9, *for* last *read* eighteenth *and for* this *read* the nineteenth.

INDEXES :—P. 578 a, l. 13, *for* 129 *read* 219; last line but four, *add* the comic poet *before* iii: P. 583 b, l. 27, *for* 342 *read* 442: P. 587 a, l. 22, *for* ii *read* iii: P. 590 b, l. 12, *for* 423 *read* father of Miltiades, iv. 423: P. 591 b, l. 40, *add* iii. *before* 268: P. 598 a, l. 39, *add* iv. *before* 498: P. 599 b, l. 18, *dele* 364; l. 38, *for* 501 sq. *read* 502 sq.: P. 601 b, l. 39, *for* 468 *read* 268: P. 602 b, l. 43, *add* another *before* iii: P. 605 b, l. 28, *for* 328 *read* 338: P. 607 b, l. 3, *for* 171 *read* 172: P. 610 a, l. 38, *for* iii *read* ii: P. 610 b, l. 14, *for* 200 *read* 201; l. 20, *for* 490 *read* 491; last line but three, *transfer* 551 to Heracleia in Italy: P. 611 b, l. 23 sq., *for* 260, 286 *read* 261, 287: P. 614 a, l. 3, *for* 508 *read* 502: P. 616 b, l. 36, *for* 177 *read* 178: P. 617 b, l. 28, *dele* i. 312 sq.: P. 622 a, last line but seven, *add* iv. *before* 562: P. 622 b, l. 13, *for* iii *read* ii: P. 627 a, l. 11, *for* 53 note *read* p. liii note, 66; l. 25, *for* 370 *read* 371: P. 630 a, l. 37, *for* 138 *read* 108: P. 631 b, l. 27, *for* i *read* ii: P. 636 a, l. 7, *add* of Leontini *before* iv; l. 9, *add* iv. *before* 532: P. 655 a, l. 19, *for* xxxiii *read* xxiii: P. 656 b, last line but five, *dele* 370: P. 676 b, l. 15, *for* ii *read* iii: P. 678 b, l. 31, *for* ii *read* iii: P. 679 b, l. 29, *for* 455 *read* 456: P. 682 b, last line but eight, *for* 201 *read* 202: P. 686 a, l. 24, *add* iv. *before* 568: P. 687 b, l. 5, *for* 359 *read* 399: P. 692 a, last line but seven, *dele* 356: P. 693 a, last line but seven, *for* 118 *read* 119: P. 693 b, l. 5, *add* iii. *before* 312; l. 19, *dele* 345: P. 694 b, l. 42, *for* 200 *read* 201.

The following errata should be added to the list of errata in the Indexes contained in vol. iv, p. 572 :—

- P. 585 a, last line but seven, *for* iii. 357 note, 524 *read* i. 357 note; iii. 524.
P. 585 b, last line but thirteen, *for* 535 *read* Attalus iii of Pergamon, iv.
535.
P. 596 b, l. 17, *transfer* iii. 301 *to* Cyrus, the younger.
P. 623 a, l. 5, *add* iv. *before* 477.
P. 635 b, l. 17, *add* iii. *before* 385.
P. 638 a, last line but twelve, *for* 388 *read* 389.
P. 641 b, l. 36, *for* 339 *read* 340.
P. 648 b, l. 35, *for* 260 *read* 261.
P. 657 a, ll. 28, 34, *for* 200 *read* 201.
P. 657 b, l. 33, *for* 159 *read* 140.
P. 696 a, l. 29, *for* 201 *read* 202.
P. 697 a, l. 24, *for* ii *read* iv.
P. 699 a, last line but thirteen, *for* 361 *read* 561.
P. 700 a, last line but nine, *for* 208 *read* 308.
P. 700 b, last line but thirteen, *or* αὐτὸν *read* αὐτὸν.

Newman, vol. iv.

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SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS.

Vat. Pal. = the Palimpsest Fragments of the Third and Sixth (Fourth) Books in the Vatican Library (see vol. i. p. vii sq., and vol. ii. p. xlii sq.).

M^a = B 105, ordinis superioris, of the Ambrosian Library at Milan.

P¹ = 2023 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.

corr.¹ P¹ = corrections in P¹ in ink of the same colour as the MS.

p¹ = corrections in P¹ in a paler ink.

Γ = the Greek text rendered by the Vetus Interpres, William of Moerbeke.

P² = the I^b of Bekker, MS. Coislin 161 in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.

corr.¹ P² = corrections in P² in ink of the same colour as the MS.

corr.² P² = corrections in P² in darker ink than the MS.

corr.³ P² = corrections in P² in paler ink than the MS.

P³ = 2026 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.

corr.¹ P³ = corrections in P³ in ink of the same colour as the MS.

P⁴ = 2025 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.

P⁵ = 1858 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.

P⁶ = 1857 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.

Q = Marcianus Venetus 200.

M^b = Marcianus Venetus 213.

Q^b = Laurentianus 81, 5.

R^b = Laurentianus 81, 6.

S^b = Laurentianus 81, 21.

T^b = Urbinas 46.

U^b = Marcianus Venetus Append. 4, 3.

V^b = Vaticano-Palatinus 160.

L^a = Lipsiensis bibliothecae Paulinae 1335.

C⁴ = Florentinus Castiglioneensis iv (Acquisti nuovi) in the Laurentian Library at Florence.

O¹ = 112, Corpus Christi College, Oxford (see vol. ii. pp. xli, 58 sqq.).

corr.¹ O¹ (see vol. ii. p. 59).

Harl. = Brit. Mus. MS. Harl. 6874 (see vol. iii. Appendix A).

C^c = a MS. known to Camerarius, but now lost.

Ald. = the Aldine edition (see vol. ii. p. xlv).

Vet. Int. = the Latin Translation of the Politics by the Vetus Interpres, William of Moerbeke.

Ar. = Leonardus Aretinus' Latin Translation of the Politics.

- II = the consent of the Aldine edition and all extant complete MSS., so far as they were examined for Susemihl's editions (see vol. ii. p. xlix).
 II¹ = the consent of ΓM¹P¹.
 II² = the consent of the Aldine edition and the MSS. of the second family (P^{1,2,3,4,5} Q M^b Q^b R^b S^b T^b U^b V^b L^a C^a), so far as they were examined for Susemihl's editions.
 II³ = the consent of the Aldine edition and the MSS. of the less good variety of the second family (P^{4,5} Q M^b Q^b R^b S^b T^b U^b V^b L^a), subject to the same limitation.
 a = 19, *sciences et arts, latin*, of the Bibliothèque de l' Arsenal at Paris, a MS. of William of Moerbeke's Latin Translation of the Politics collated for Sus. (vol. ii. p. xli sq.; see also Sus.¹, p. xxxiv sq.).
 b c g h k l m = other MSS. of William of Moerbeke's Latin Translation consulted by Sus. (see as to them Sus.¹, p. xxxv sq.).
 o = 112, Balliol College, Oxford, a MS. of the same Latin Translation (see vol. ii. p. 61 sq.).
 y = Bodl. Canon. Class. Lat. 174 (see vol. ii. p. 62).
 z = 891, Philipps Library, Cheltenham (see vol. ii. pp. xli sq., 60 sq.).
 n (see Sus.¹, p. xxxviii).
 s (see Sus.¹, p. xli).
 Alb. = the commentary of Albertus Magnus (see Sus.¹, p. xli).
 Bas.³ = the third Basle edition of Aristotle published in 1550 (vol. ii. p. xlv).
 Bekk.¹ = the Berlin Academy edition of Aristotle in quarto form edited by Bekker and published in 1831.
 Bekk.² = the edition of the Politics in octavo edited by Bekker, the second edition of which appeared in 1855.
 Sus.¹ = the edition of the Politics published by Susemihl in 1872.
 Sus.² = the edition of the Politics in two volumes published by Susemihl in 1879.
 Sus.³ = the edition of the Politics belonging to the Bibliotheca Teubneriana published by Susemihl in 1882.
 Sus.^{3a} = the revision of the last-named edition published by Susemihl in 1894.
 Sus.⁴ = the edition of the Politics in English by Susemihl and R. D. Hicks, of which the first volume was published in 1894.
 pr. prefixed to the name of a MS. refers to its original state, and distinguishes an original reading from a correction.
 corr. prefixed to the name of a MS. denotes a correction.
 rec. prefixed to the name of a MS. denotes a recent hand.
 marg. = in the margin.
 marg. rec. = a recent hand in the margin.

Half brackets ([]) have been used by me in printing the Greek text in passages needing, in my opinion, to be placed elsewhere (see vol. iv. pp. 38, 59).



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